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Improve Nutrient Management

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Sector
Food, Agriculture, Land & Ocean
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Cut Emissions
Cluster
Shift Agriculture Practices
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Farm equipment applying fertilizer selectively
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Summary

We define the Improve Nutrient Management solution as reducing excessive nitrogen use on croplands. Nitrogen is critical for crop production and is added to croplands as synthetic or organic fertilizers and through microbial activity. However, farmers often add more nitrogen to croplands than crops can use. Some of that excess nitrogen is emitted to the atmosphere as nitrous oxide, a potent GHG. 

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Nature protection
Description for Social and Search
We define the Improve Nutrient Management solution as reducing excessive nitrogen use on croplands.
Overview

Agriculture is the dominant source of human-caused emissions of nitrous oxide (Tian et al., 2020). Nitrogen is critical for plant growth and is added to croplands in synthetic forms, such as urea, ammonium nitrate, or anhydrous ammonia; in organic forms, such as manure or compost; and by growing legume crops, which host microbes that capture nitrogen from the air and add it to the soil (Adalibieke et al., 2023; Ludemann et al., 2024). If more nitrogen is added than crops can use, the excess can be converted to other forms, including nitrous oxide, through microbial processes called denitrification and nitrification (Figure 1; Reay et al., 2012).

Figure 1. The agricultural nitrogen cycle represents the key pathways by which nitrogen is added to croplands and lost to the environment, including as nitrous oxide. The “4R” nutrient management principles – right source, right rate, right time, right place – increase the proportion of nitrogen taken up by the plant, therefore reducing nitrogen losses to the environment.

Diagram of agricultural nitrogen cycle.

Illustrations: BioRender CC-BY 4.0

Farmers can reduce nitrous oxide emissions from croplands by using the right amount and the right type of fertilizer at the right time and in the right place (Fixen, 2020; Gao & Cabrera Serrenho, 2023). Together, these four “rights” increase nitrogen use efficiency – the proportion of applied nitrogen that the crop uses (Congreves et al., 2021). Improved nutrient management is often a win-win for the farmer and the environment, reducing fertilizer costs while also lowering nitrous oxide emissions (Gu et al., 2023).

Improving nutrient management involves reducing the amount of nitrogen applied to match the crop’s requirements in areas where nitrogen is currently overapplied. A farmer can implement the other three principles – type, time, and place – in a number of ways. For example, fertilizing just before planting instead of after the previous season’s harvest better matches the timing of nitrogen addition to that of plant uptake, reducing nitrous oxide emissions before the crop is planted. Certain types of fertilizers are better suited for maximizing plant uptake, such as extended-release fertilizers, which allow the crop to steadily absorb nutrients over time. Techniques such as banding, in which farmers apply fertilizers in concentrated bands close to the plant roots instead of spreading them evenly across the soil surface, also reduce nitrous oxide emissions. Each of these practices can increase nitrogen use efficiency and decrease the amount of excess nitrogen lost as nitrous oxide (Gao & Cabrera Serrenho, 2023; Gu et al., 2023; Wang et al., 2024; You et al., 2023).

For this solution, we estimated a target rate of nitrogen application for major crops as the 20th percentile of the current rate of nitrogen application (in t N/t crop) in areas where yields are near a realistic ceiling. Excess nitrogen was defined as the amount of nitrogen applied beyond the target rate (see Adoption and Appendix for more details). Our emissions estimates include nitrous oxide from croplands, fertilizer runoff, and fertilizer volatilization. They do not include emissions from fertilizer manufacturing, which are addressed in the Deploy Low-Emission Industrial Feedstocks and Increase Industrial Efficiency solutions. We excluded nutrient management on pastures from this solution due to data limitations, and address nutrient management in paddy rice systems in the Improve Rice Management solution instead. 

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Credits

Lead Fellow

  • Avery Driscoll

Contributors

  • Ruthie Burrows, Ph.D.

  • James Gerber, Ph.D.

  • Yusuf Jameel, Ph.D.

  • Daniel Jasper

  • Alex Sweeney

  • Eric Toensmeier

Internal Reviewers

  • Aiyana Bodi

  • Hannah Henkin

  • Ted Otte

Effectiveness

We relied on the 2019 IPCC emissions factors to calculate the emissions impacts of improved nutrient management. These are disaggregated by climate zone (“wet” vs. “dry”) and by fertilizer type (“organic” vs. “synthetic”). Nitrogen use reductions in wet climates, which include ~65% of the cropland area represented in this analysis (see Appendix for details), have the largest impact. In these areas, a 1 t reduction in nitrogen use reduces emissions by 8.7 t CO₂‑eq on average for synthetic fertilizers and by 5.0 t CO₂‑eq for organic fertilizers. Emissions savings are lower in dry climates, where a 1 t reduction in nitrogen use reduces emissions by 2.4 t CO₂‑eq for synthetic fertilizers and by 2.6 t CO₂‑eq for organic fertilizers. While these values reflect the median emissions reduction for each climate zone and fertilizer type, they are associated with large uncertainties because emissions are highly variable depending on climate, soil, and management conditions. 

Based on our analysis of the adoption ceiling for each climate zone and fertilizer type (see Appendix), we estimated that a 1 t reduction in nitrogen use reduces emissions by 6.0 t CO₂‑eq at the global median (Table 1). This suggests that ~1.4% of the applied nitrogen is emitted as nitrous oxide at the global average, which is consistent with existing estimates (IPCC, 2019). 

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Table 1. Effectiveness at reducing emissions.

Unit: t CO₂‑eq /tN, 100-yr basis

25th percentile 4.2
median (50th percentile) 6.0
75th percentile 7.7
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Cost

Improving nutrient management typically reduces fertilizer costs while maintaining or increasing yields, resulting in a net financial benefit to the producer. Gu et al. (2023) found that a 21% reduction in global nitrogen use would be economically beneficial, notably after accounting for increased fertilizer use in places that do not currently have adequate access. Using data from their study, we evaluated the average cost of reduced nitrogen application considering the following nutrient management practices: increased use of high-efficiency fertilizers, organic fertilizers, and/or legumes; optimizing fertilizer rates; altering the timing and/or placement of fertilizer applications; and use of buffer zones. Implementation costs depend on the strategy used to improve nutrient management. For example, optimizing fertilizer rates requires soil testing and the ability to apply different fertilizer rates to different parts of a field. Improving timing can involve applying fertilizers at two different times during the season, increasing labor and equipment operation costs. Furthermore, planting legumes incurs seed purchase and planting costs. 

Gu et al. (2023) estimated that annual reductions of 42 Mt of nitrogen were achievable globally using these practices, providing total fertilizer savings of US$37.2 billion and requiring implementation costs of US$15.9 billion, adjusted for inflation to 2023. A 1 t reduction in excess nitrogen application, therefore, was estimated to provide an average of US$507.80 of net cost savings, corresponding to a savings of US$85.21 per t CO₂‑eq of emissions reductions (Table 2).

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Table 2. Cost per unit of climate impact, 100-yr basis.

Unit: 2023 US$/t CO₂‑eq

mean -85.21
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Methods and Supporting Data

Abatzoglou, J. T., Dobrowski, S. Z., Parks, S. A., & Hegewisch, K. C. (2018). TerraClimate, a high-resolution global dataset of monthly climate and climatic water balance from 1958–2015. Scientific Data, 5(1), 170191. https://doi.org/10.1038/sdata.2017.191

Adalibieke, W., Cui, X., Cai, H., You, L., & Zhou, F. (2023). Global crop-specific nitrogen fertilization dataset in 1961–2020. Scientific Data, 10(1), 617. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41597-023-02526-z

Gerber, J. S., Ray, D. K., Makowski, D., Butler, E. E., Mueller, N. D., West, P. C., Johnson, J. A., Polasky, S., Samberg, L. H., & Siebert, S. (2024). Global spatially explicit yield gap time trends reveal regions at risk of future crop yield stagnation. Nature Food, 5(2), 125–135. https://doi.org/10.1038/s43016-023-00913-8 

IPCC, 2019: Summary for Policymakers. In: Climate Change and Land: an IPCC special report on climate change, desertification, land degradation, sustainable land management, food security, and greenhouse gas fluxes in terrestrial ecosystems [P.R. Shukla, J. Skea, E. Calvo Buendia, V. Masson-Delmotte, H.-O. Pörtner, D. C. Roberts, P. Zhai, R. Slade, S. Connors, R. van Diemen, M. Ferrat, E. Haughey, S. Luz, S. Neogi, M. Pathak, J. Petzold, J. Portugal Pereira, P. Vyas, E. Huntley, K. Kissick, M. Belkacemi, J. Malley, (eds.)].

Mehta, P., Siebert, S., Kummu, M., Deng, Q., Ali, T., Marston, L., Xie, W., & Davis, K. F. (2024). Half of twenty-first century global irrigation expansion has been in water-stressed regions. Nature Water, 2(3), 254–261. https://doi.org/10.1038/s44221-024-00206-9

Learning Curve

The improved nutrient management strategies considered for this solution are already well-established and widely deployed (Fixen, 2020). Large nitrogen excesses are relatively easy to mitigate through simple management changes with low implementation costs. As nitrogen use efficiency increases, further reductions may require increasingly complex mitigation practices and increasing marginal costs. Therefore, a learning curve was not quantified for this solution.

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Speed of Action

Speed of action refers to how quickly a climate solution physically affects the atmosphere after it is deployed. This is different from speed of deployment, which is the pace at which solutions are adopted.

At Project Drawdown, we define the speed of action for each climate solution as emergency brake, gradual, or delayed.

Improve Nutrient Management is a GRADUAL climate solution. It has a steady, linear impact on the atmosphere. The cumulative effect over time builds as a straight line.

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Caveats

Emissions reductions from improved nutrient management are permanent, though they may not be additional in all cases.

Permanence

As this solution reduces emissions rather than enhancing sequestration, permanence is not applicable.

Additionality

Additionality requires that the emissions benefits of the practice are attributable to climate-related incentives and would not have occurred in the absence of incentives (Michaelowa et al., 2019). If they are not contingent on external incentives, fertilizer use reductions implemented solely to maximize profits do not meet the threshold for additionality. However, fertilizer reductions may be additional if incentives are required to provide access to the technical knowledge and soil testing required to identify optimal rates. Other forms of nutrient management (e.g., applying nitrification inhibitors, using extended-release or organic fertilizers, or splitting applications between two time points) may involve additional costs, substantial practice change, and technical expertise. Thus, these practices are likely to be additional.

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Current Adoption

Given that improved nutrient management takes a variety of forms and data on the adoption of individual practices are very limited, we leveraged several global datasets related to nitrogen use and yields to directly assess improvements in nitrogen use efficiency (see Appendix for details).

First, we calculated nitrogen use per t of crop produced using global maps of nitrogen fertilizer use (Adalibieke et al., 2023) and global maps of crop yields (Gerber et al., 2024) for 17 major crops (see Appendix). Next, we determined a target nitrogen use rate (t N/t crop) for each crop, corresponding to the 20th percentile of nitrogen use rates observed in croplands with yield gaps at or below the 20th percentile, meaning that actual yields were close to an attainable yield ceiling (Gerber et al., 2024). Areas with large yield gaps were excluded from the calculation of target nutrient use efficiency because insufficient nitrogen supply may be compromising yields (Mueller et al., 2012). Yield data were not available for a small number of crops; for these, we assumed reductions in nitrogen use to be proportional to those of other crops.

We considered croplands that had achieved the target rate and had yield gaps lower than the global median to have adopted the solution. We calculated the amount of excess nitrogen use avoided from these croplands as the difference in total nitrogen use under current fertilization rates relative to median fertilizer application rates. As of 2020, croplands that had achieved the adoption threshold for improved nutrient management avoided 10.45 Mt of nitrogen annually relative to the median nitrogen use rate (Table 3), equivalent to 11% of the adoption ceiling.

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Table 3. Current (2020) adoption level.

Unit: tN/yr

estimate 10,450,000
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Adoption Trend

Global average nitrogen use efficiency increased from 47.7% to 54.6% between 2000 and 2020, a rate of approximately 0.43%/yr (Ludemann et al., 2024). This increase accelerated somewhat in the latter decade, from an average rate of 0.38%/yr to 0.53%/yr. Underlying this increase were increases in both the amount of nitrogen used and the amount of excess nitrogen. Total nitrogen additions increased by approximately 2.64 Mt/yr, with the amount of nitrogen used increasing more rapidly (1.99 Mt/yr) than the amount of excess nitrogen (0.65 Mt/yr) between 2000 and 2020 (Ludemann et al., 2024). Although nitrogen use increased between 2000 and 2020 as yields increased, the increase in nitrogen use efficiency suggests uptake of this solution.

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Adoption Ceiling

We estimated the adoption ceiling of improved nutrient management to be 95.13 Mt avoided excess nitrogen use/year, not including current adoption (Table 4). This value reflects our estimate of the maximum potential reduction in nitrogen application while avoiding large yield losses and consists of the potential to avoid 62.25 Mt of synthetic nitrogen use and 32.88 Mt of manure and other organic nitrogen use, in addition to current adoption. In total, this is equivalent to an additional 68% reduction in global nitrogen use. The adoption ceiling was calculated as the difference between total nitrogen use at the current rate and total nitrogen use at the target rate (as described in Current Adoption), assuming no change in crop yields. For nitrogen applied to crops for which yield data were not available, the potential reduction in nitrogen use was assumed to be proportional to that of crops for which full data were available.

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Table 4. Adoption ceiling.

Unit: tN/yr

estimate 105,580,000
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Achievable Adoption

We estimated that fertilizer use reductions of 69.85–91.06 Mt of nitrogen are achievable, reflecting current adoption plus nitrogen savings due to the achievement of nitrogen application rates equal to the median and 30th percentile of nitrogen application rates occurring in locations where yield gaps are small (Table 5).

This range is more ambitious than a comparable recent estimate by Gu et al. (2023), who found that reductions of approximately 42 Mt of nitrogen are avoidable via cost-effective implementation of similar practices. Differences in target nitrogen use efficiencies underlie differences between our estimates and those of Gu et al., whose findings correspond to an increase in global average cropland nitrogen use efficiency from 42% to 52%. Our estimates reflect higher target nitrogen use efficiencies. Nitrogen use efficiencies greater than 52% have been widely achieved through basic practice modification without compromising yields or requiring prohibitively expensive additional inputs. For instance, You et al. (2023) estimated that the global average nitrogen use efficiency could be increased to 78%. Similarly, cropland nitrogen use efficiency in the United States in 2020 was estimated to be 71%, and substantial opportunities for improved nitrogen use efficiency are still available within the United States (Ludemann et al., 2024), though Lu et al. (2019) and Swaney et al. (2018) report slightly lower estimates. These findings support our slightly more ambitious range of achievable nitrogen use reductions for this solution.

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Table 5. Range of achievable adoption levels.

Unit: tN/yr

Current Adoption 10,450,000
Achievable – Low 69,850,000
Achievable – High 91,060,000
Adoption Ceiling 105,580,000
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We estimated that improved nutrient management has the potential to reduce emissions by 0.63 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr, with achievable emissions reductions of 0.42–0.54 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr (Table 6). This is equivalent to an additional 56–76% reduction in total nitrous oxide emissions from fertilizer use, based on the croplands represented in our analysis.

We estimated avoidable emissions by multiplying our estimates of adoption ceiling and achievable adoption by the relevant IPCC 2019 emissions factors, disaggregated by climate zone and fertilizer type. Under the adoption ceiling scenario, approximately 70% of emissions reductions occurred in wet climates, where emissions per t of applied fertilizer are higher. Reductions in synthetic fertilizer use, which are larger than reductions in organic fertilizer use, contributed about 76% of the potential avoidable emissions. We estimated that the current implementation of improved nutrient management was associated with 0.06 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr of avoided emissions. 

Our estimates are slightly more optimistic but well within the range of the IPCC 2021 estimates, which found that improved nutrient management could reduce nitrous oxide emissions by 0.06–0.7 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr.

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Table 6. Climate impact at different levels of adoption.

Unit: Gt CO₂-eq/yr, 100-yr basis

Current Adoption 0.06
Achievable – Low 0.42
Achievable – High 0.54
Adoption Ceiling 0.63
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Additional Benefits

Droughts

Balanced nutrient concentration contributes to long-term soil fertility and improved soil health by enhancing organic matter content, microbial diversity, and nutrient cycling (Antil & Raj, 2020; Selim, 2020). Healthy soil experiences reduced erosion and has higher water content, which increases its resilience to droughts and extreme heat (Rockström et al., 2017).

Income and Work

Better nutrient management reduces farmers' input costs and increases profitability (Rurinda et al., 2020; Wang et al., 2020). It is especially beneficial to smallholder farmers in sub-Saharan Africa, where site-specific nutrient management programs have demonstrated a significant increase in yield (Chivenge et al., 2021). A review of 61 studies across 11 countries showed that site-specific nutrient management resulted in an average increase in yield by 12% and increased farmer’s’ income by 15% while improving nitrogen use efficiency (Chivenge et al., 2021). 

Food Security

While excessive nutrients cause environmental problems in some parts of the world, insufficient nutrients are a significant problem in others, resulting in lower agricultural yields (Foley et al., 2011). Targeted, site-specific, efficient use of fertilizers can improve crop productivity (Mueller et al., 2012; Vanlauwe et al., 2015), improving food security globally. 

Health

Domingo et al. (2021) estimated about 16,000 premature deaths annually in the United States are due to air pollution from the food sector and found that more than 3,500 premature deaths per year could be avoided through reduced use of ammonia fertilizer, a secondary particulate matter precursor. Better agriculture practices overall can reduce particulate matter-related premature deaths from the agriculture sector by 50% (Domingo et al., 2021). Nitrogen oxides from fertilized croplands are another source of agriculture-based air pollution, and improved management can lead to decreased respiratory and cardiovascular disease (Almarez et al., 2018; Sobota et al., 2015). 

Nitrate contamination of drinking water due to excessive runoff from agriculture fields has been linked to several health issues, including blood disorders and cancer (Patel et al., 2022; Ward et al., 2018). Reducing nutrient runoff through better management is critical to minimize these risks (Ward et al., 2018). 

Nature Protection

Nutrient runoff from agricultural systems is a major driver of water pollution globally, leading to eutrophication and hypoxic zones in aquatic ecosystems (Bijay-Singh & Craswell, 2021). Nitrogen pollution also harms terrestrial biodiversity through soil acidification and increases productivity of fast-growing species, including invasives, which can outcompete native species (Porter et al., 2013). Improved nutrient management is necessary to reduce nitrogen and phosphorus loads to water bodies (Withers et al., 2014; van Grinsven et al., 2019) and terrestrial ecosystems (Porter et al., 2013). These practices have been effective in reducing harmful algal blooms and preserving biodiversity in sensitive water systems (Scavia et al., 2014). 

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Risks

Although substantial reductions in nitrogen use can be achieved in many places with no or minimal impacts on yields, reducing nitrogen application by too much can lead to yield declines, which in turn can boost demand for cropland, causing GHG-producing land use change. Reductions in only excess nitrogen application will prevent substantial yield losses.

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Some nutrient management practices are associated with additional emissions. For example, nitrification inhibitors reduce direct nitrous oxide emissions (Qiao et al., 2014) but can increase ammonia volatilization and subsequent indirect nitrous oxide emissions (Lam et al., 2016). Additionally, in wet climates, nitrous oxide emissions may be reduced through the use of manure instead of synthetic fertilizers (Hergoualc’h et al., 2019), though impacts vary across sites and studies (Zhang et al., 2020). Increased demand for manure could increase livestock production, which has high associated GHG emissions. Emissions also arise from transporting manure to the site of use (Qin et al., 2021).

Although nitrous oxide has a strong direct climate-warming effect, fertilizer use can cool the climate through emissions of other reactive nitrogen-containing compounds (Gong et al., 2024). First, aerosols from fertilizers scatter heat from the sun and cool the climate (Shindell et al., 2009; Gong et al., 2024). Moreover, other reactive nitrogen compounds from fertilizers shorten the lifespan of methane in the atmosphere, reducing its warming effects (Pinder et al., 2012). Finally, nitrogen fertilizers that leave farm fields through volatilization or runoff are ultimately deposited elsewhere, enhancing photosynthesis and storing more carbon in plants and soils (Zaehle et al., 2011; Gong et al., 2024). Improved nutrient management would reduce these cooling effects.

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Interactions with Other Solutions

Reinforcing

Improved nutrient management will reduce emissions from the production phase of biomass crops, increasing their benefit.

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Competing

Improved nutrient management will reduce the GHG production associated with each calorie and, therefore, the impacts of the Improve Diets and Reduce Food Loss and Waste solutions will be reduced

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Each of these solutions could decrease emissions associated with fertilizer production, but improved nutrient management will reduce total demand for fertilizers.

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Dashboard

Solution Basics

t avoided excess nitrogen application

t CO₂-eq (100-yr)/unit
04.26
units/yr
Current 1.045×10⁷6.985×10⁷9.106×10⁷
Achievable (Low to High)

Climate Impact

Gt CO₂-eq (100-yr)/yr
Current 0.06 0.420.54
US$ per t CO₂-eq
-85
Gradual

N₂O

t CO2-eq/ha
01

The Problem — Emissions of Nitrous Oxide Coming from Over-fertilized Soils

The world’s agricultural lands can emit high levels of nitrous oxide (N2O), the third most powerful greenhouse gas. These emissions stem from overusing nitrogen-based fertilizers, especially in regions in China, India, Western Europe, and central North America (in red). While crops absorb some of the nitrogen fertilizer we apply, much of what remains is lost to the atmosphere as nitrous oxide pollution or to local waterways as nitrate pollution. Using fertilizers more wisely can dramatically reduce greenhouse gas emissions and water pollution while maintaining high levels of crop production.

Analysis: Project Drawdown; Driscoll et al, In prep.

t CO2-eq/ha
01

The Problem — Emissions of Nitrous Oxide Coming from Over-fertilized Soils

The world’s agricultural lands can emit high levels of nitrous oxide (N2O), the third most powerful greenhouse gas. These emissions stem from overusing nitrogen-based fertilizers, especially in regions in China, India, Western Europe, and central North America (in red). While crops absorb some of the nitrogen fertilizer we apply, much of what remains is lost to the atmosphere as nitrous oxide pollution or to local waterways as nitrate pollution. Using fertilizers more wisely can dramatically reduce greenhouse gas emissions and water pollution while maintaining high levels of crop production.

Analysis: Project Drawdown; Driscoll et al, In prep.

Maps Introduction

Improved nutrient management will have the greatest emissions reduction if it is targeted at areas with the largest excesses of nitrogen fertilizer use. In 2020, China, India, and the United States alone accounted for 52% of global excess nitrogen application (Ludemann et al., 2024). Improved nutrient management could be particularly beneficial in China and India, where nutrient use efficiency is currently lower than average (Ludemann et al., 2024). You et al. (2023) also found potential for large increases in nitrogen use efficiency in parts of China, India, Australia, Northern Europe, the United States Midwest, Mexico, and Brazil under standard best management practices. Gu et al. (2024) found that nitrogen input reductions are economically feasible in most of Southern Asia, Northern and Western Europe, parts of the Middle East, North America, and Oceania.

In addition to regional patterns in the adoption ceiling, greater nitrous oxide emissions reductions are possible in wet climates or on irrigated croplands compared to dry climates. Nitrous oxide emissions tend to peak when nitrogen availability is high and soil moisture is in the ~70–90% range (Betterbach-Bahl et al., 2013; Elberling et al., 2023; Hao et al., 2025; Lawrence et al., 2021), though untangling the drivers of nitrous oxide emissions is complex (Lawrence et al., 2021). Water management to avoid prolonged periods of soil moisture in this range is an important complement to nutrient management in wet climates and on irrigated croplands (Deng et al., 2018).

Importantly, improved nutrient management, as defined here, is not appropriate for implementation in areas with nitrogen deficits or negligible nitrogen surpluses, including much of Africa. In these areas, crop yields are constrained by nitrogen availability, and an increase in nutrient inputs may be needed to achieve target yields. Additionally, nutrient management in paddy (flooded) rice systems is not included in this solution but rather in the Improve Rice Production solution.

Action Word
Improve
Solution Title
Nutrient Management
Classification
Highly Recommended
Lawmakers and Policymakers
  • Focus policies and regulations on the four nutrient management principles – right rate, type, time, and place.
  • Create dynamic nutrient management policies that account for varying practices, environments, drainage, historical land use, and other factors that may require adjusting nutrient regulations.
  • Offer financial assistance responsive to local soil and weather conditions, such as grants and subsidies, insurance programs, and tax breaks, to encourage farmers to comply with regulations.
  • Mandate insurance schemes that allow farmers to reduce fertilizer use.
  • Mandate nutrient budgets or ceilings that are responsive to local yield, weather, and soil conditions.
  • Require farmers to formulate nutrient management and fertilizer plans.
  • Mandate efficiency rates for manure-spreading equipment.
  • Ensure access to and require soil tests to inform fertilizer application.
  • Invest in research on alternative organic nutrient sources.
  • Create and expand education programs and extension services that highlight the problems that arise from the overuse of fertilizers, benefits of soil management such as cost-savings, and penalties for non-compliance
  • Create ongoing support groups among farmers.

Further information:

Practitioners
  • Use the four nutrient management principles – right rate, type, time, and place – to guide fertilizer application.
  • Utilize or advocate for financial assistance and tax breaks for farmers to improve nutrient management techniques.
  • Create and adhere to nutrient and fertilizer management plans.
  • Conduct soil tests to inform fertilizer application.
  • Use winter cover crops, crop rotations, residue retention, and split applications for fertilizer.
  • Improve the efficiency of, and regularly calibrate, manure-spreading equipment.
  • Leverage agroecological practices such as nutrient recycling and biological nitrogen fixation.
  • Join, create, or participate in partnerships or certification programs dedicated to improving nutrient management.
  • Take advantage of education programs, support groups, and extension services focused on improved nutrient management.

Further information:

Business Leaders
  • Provide incentives for farmers in primary sourcing regions to adopt best management practices for reducing nitrogen application.
  • Invest in companies that use improved nutrient management techniques or produce equipment or research for fertilizer application and testing.
  • Advocate to policymakers for improved nutrient management techniques, incentives, and regulations.
  • Join, create, or participate in partnerships or certification programs dedicated to improving nutrient management practices.
  • Promote products produced with improved nutrient management techniques and educate consumers about the importance of the practice.
  • Create or support education programs and extension services that highlight the problems that arise from the overuse of fertilizers, benefits of soil management such as cost-savings, and penalties for non-compliance.
  • Create ongoing support groups among farmers.

Further information:

Nonprofit Leaders
  • Start model farms to demonstrate improved nutrient management techniques, conduct experiments, and educate local farmers.
  • Conduct and share research on improved nutrient management techniques, alternative organic fertilizers, or local policy options.
  • Advocate to policymakers for improved nutrient management techniques, incentives, and regulations.
  • Engage with businesses to encourage corporate responsibility and/or monitor water quality and soil health.
  • Join, create, or participate in partnerships or certification programs dedicated to improving nutrient management practices.
  • Create or support education programs and extension services that highlight the problems that arise from the overuse of fertilizers, benefits of soil management such as cost-savings, and penalties for non-compliance.
  • Create ongoing support groups among farmers.

Further information:

Investors
  • Invest in companies developing technologies that support improved nutrient management such as precision fertilizer applicators, alternative fertilizers, soil management equipment, and software.
  • Invest in ETFs and ESG funds that hold companies committed to improved nutrient management techniques in their portfolios.
  • Encourage companies in your investment portfolio to adopt improved nutrient management.
  • Provide access to capital at reduced rates for farmers adhering to improved nutrient management.

Further information:

Philanthropists and International Aid Agencies
  • Provide financing for farmers to improve nutrient management.
  • Start model farms to demonstrate nutrient management techniques, conduct experiments, and educate local farmers.
  • Conduct and share research on improved nutrient management, alternative organic fertilizers, or local policy options.
  • Advocate to policymakers for improved nutrient management techniques, incentives, and regulations.
  • Engage with businesses to encourage corporate responsibility and/or monitor water quality and soil health.
  • Join, create, or participate in partnerships or certification programs dedicated to improving nutrient management practices.
  • Create or support education programs and extension services that highlight the problems that arise from the overuse of fertilizers, benefits of soil management such as cost-savings, and penalties for non-compliance.
  • Create ongoing support groups among farmers.

Further information:

Thought Leaders
  • Start model farms to demonstrate techniques, conduct experiments, and educate local farmers.
  • Conduct and share research on improved nutrient management, alternative organic fertilizers, or local policy options.
  • Advocate to policymakers for improved nutrient management techniques, incentives, and regulations.
  • Engage with businesses to encourage corporate responsibility and/or monitor water quality and soil health.
  • Join, create, or participate in partnerships dedicated to improving nutrient management practices.
  • Create or support education programs and extension services that highlight the problems that arise from the overuse of fertilizers, benefits of soil management such as cost-savings, and penalties for non-compliance.
  • Create ongoing support groups among farmers.

Further information:

Technologists and Researchers
  • Improve technology and cost-effectiveness of precision fertilizer application, slow-release fertilizer, alternative organic fertilizers, nutrient recycling, and monitoring equipment.
  • Create tracking and monitoring software to support farmers' decision-making.
  • Research and develop the application of AI and robotics for precise fertilizer application.
  • Improve data and analytics to monitor soil and water quality, assist farmers, support policymaking, and assess the impacts of policies.
  • Develop education and training applications to promote improved nutrient management and provide real-time feedback.

Further information:

Communities, Households, and Individuals
  • Create or join community-supported agriculture programs that source from farmers who used improved nutrient management practices.
  • Conduct soil tests on your lawn and garden and reduce fertilizer use if you are over-fertilizing.
  • Volunteer for soil and water quality monitoring and restoration projects.
  • Start model farms to demonstrate techniques, conduct experiments, and educate local farmers.
  • Advocate to policymakers for improved nutrient management techniques, incentives, and regulations.
  • Engage with businesses to encourage corporate responsibility and/or monitor water quality and soil health.
  • Join, create, or participate in partnerships dedicated to improving nutrient management.
  • Create or support education programs and extension services that highlight the problems that arise from the overuse of fertilizers, benefits of soil management such as cost-savings, and penalties for non-compliance.
  • Create ongoing support groups among farmers.

Further information:

Sources
Evidence Base

There is high scientific consensus that reducing nitrogen surpluses through improved nutrient management reduces nitrous oxide emissions from croplands. 

Nutrient additions to croplands produce an estimated 0.9 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr (range 0.7–1.1 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr ) of direct nitrous oxide emissions from fields, plus approximately 0.3 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr of emissions from fertilizers that runoff into waterways or erode (Tian et al., 2020). Nitrous oxide emissions from croplands are directly linked to the amount of nitrogen applied. Furthermore, the amount of nitrous oxide emitted per unit of applied nitrogen is well quantified for a range of different nitrogen sources and field conditions (Reay et al., 2012; Shcherbak et al., 2014; Gerber et al., 2016; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], 2019; Hergoualc’h et al., 2021). Tools to improve nutrient management have been extensively studied, and practices that improve nitrogen use efficiency through right rate, time, place, and type principles have been implemented in some places for several decades (Fixen, 2020; Ludemann et al., 2024).

Recently, Gao & Cabrera Serrenho (2023) estimated that fertilizer-related emissions could be reduced up to 80% by 2050 relative to current levels using a combination of nutrient management and new fertilizer production methods. You et al. (2023) found that adopting improved nutrient management practices would increase nitrogen use efficiency from a global average of 48% to 78%, substantially reducing excess nitrogen. Wang et al. (2024) estimated that the use of enhanced-efficiency fertilizers could reduce nitrogen losses to the environment 70–75% for maize and wheat systems. Chivenge et al. (2021) found comparable results in smallholder systems in Africa and Asia.

The results presented in this document were produced through analysis of global datasets. We recognize that geographic biases can influence the development of global datasets and hope this work inspires research and data sharing on this topic in underrepresented regions.

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Appendix

In this analysis, we calculated the potential for reducing crop nitrogen inputs and associated nitrous oxide emissions by integrating spatially explicit, crop-specific data on nitrogen inputs, crop yields, attainable yields, irrigated extent, and climate. Broadly, we calculated a “target” yield-scaled nitrogen input rate based on pixels with low yield gaps and calculated the difference between nitrous oxide emissions under the current rate and under the hypothetical target emissions rate, using nitrous oxide emissions factors disaggregated by fertilizer type and climate. 

Emissions factors

We used Tier 1 emissions factors from the IPCC 2019 Refinement to the 2006 Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories, including direct emissions factors as well as indirect emissions from volatilization and leaching pathways. Direct emissions factors represent the proportion of applied nitrogen emitted as nitrous oxide, while we calculated volatilization and leaching emissions factors by multiplying the proportion of applied nitrogen lost through these pathways by the proportion of volatilized or leached nitrogen ultimately emitted as nitrous oxide. Including both direct and indirect emissions, organic and synthetic fertilizers emit 4.97 kg CO₂‑eq/kg nitrogen and 8.66 kg CO₂‑eq/kg nitrogen, respectively, in wet climates, and 2.59 kg CO₂‑eq/kg nitrogen and 2.38 kg CO₂‑eq/kg nitrogen in dry climates. We included uncertainty bounds (2.5th and 97.5th percentiles) for all emissions factors. 

We classified each pixel as “wet” or “dry” using an aridity index (AI) threshold of 0.65, calculated as the ratio of annual precipitation to potential evapotranspiration (PET) from TerraClimate data (1991–2020), based on a threshold of 0.65. For pixels in dry climates that contained irrigation, we took the weighted average of wet and dry emissions factors based on the fraction of cropland that was irrigated (Mehta et al., 2024). We excluded irrigated rice from this analysis due to large differences in nitrous oxide dynamics in flooded rice systems.

Current, target, and avoidable nitrogen inputs and emissions

Using highly disaggregated data on nitrogen inputsfrom Adalibieke et al. (2024) for 21 crop groups (Table S1), we calculated total crop-specific inputs of synthetic and organic nitrogen. We then averaged over 2016–2020 to reduce the influence of interannual variability in factors like fertilizer prices. These values are subsequently referred to as “current” nitrogen inputs. We calculated nitrous oxide emissions under current nitrogen inputs as the sum of the products of nitrogen inputs and the climatically relevant emissions factors for each fertilizer type.

Next, we calculated target nitrogen application rates in terms of kg nitrogen per ton of crop yield using data on actual and attainable yields for 17 crops from Gerber et al., 2024 (Table S1). For each crop, we first identified pixels in which the ratio of actual to attainable yields was above the 80th percentile globally. The target nitrogen application rate was then calculated as the 20th percentile of nitrogen application rates across low-yield-gap pixels. Finally, we calculated total target nitrogen inputs as the product of actual yields and target nitrogen input rates. We calculated hypothetical nitrous oxide emissions from target nitrogen inputs as the product of nitrogen inputs and the climatically relevant emissions factor for each fertilizer type.

The difference between current and target nitrogen inputs represents the amount by which nitrogen inputs could hypothetically be reduced without compromising crop productivity (i.e., “avoidable” nitrogen inputs). We calculated avoidable nitrous oxide emissions as the difference between nitrous oxide emissions with current nitrogen inputs and those with target nitrogen inputs. For crops for which no yield or attainable yield data were available, we applied the average percent reduction in nitrogen inputs under the target scenario from available crops to the nitrogen input data for missing crops to calculate the avoidable nitrogen inputs and emissions. 

This simple and empirically driven method aimed to identify realistically low but nutritionally adequate nitrogen application rates by including only pixels with low yield gaps, which are unlikely to be substantially nutrient-constrained. We did not control for other factors affecting nitrogen availability, such as historical nutrient application rates or depletion, rotation with nitrogen fixing crops, or tillage and residue retention practices.

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Table S1. Crops represented by the source data on nitrogen inputs (Adalibieke et al., 2024) and estimated and attainable yields (Gerber et al., 2024). Crop groups included consistently in both datasets are marked as “both,” and crop groups represented in the nitrogen input data but not in the yield datasets are marked as “nitrogen only.”

Crop Dataset(s)
BarleyBoth
CassavaBoth
CottonBoth
MaizeBoth
MilletBoth
Oil PalmBoth
PotatoBoth
RiceBoth
RyeBoth
RapeseedBoth
SorghumBoth
SoybeanBoth
SugarbeetBoth
SugarcaneBoth
SunflowerBoth
Sweet PotatoBoth
WheatBoth
GroundnutNitrogen only
FruitsNitrogen only
VegetablesNitrogen only
OtherNitrogen only
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Updated Date

Protect Peatlands

Submitted by Drawdown Admin on
Sector
Food, Agriculture, Land & Ocean
Mode
Cut Emissions
Cluster
Protect & Manage Ecosystems
Image
placeholder
Coming Soon
On
Summary

The Protect Peatlands solution is defined as legally protecting peatland ecosystems through establishment of protected areas (PAs), which preserves stored carbon and ensures continued carbon sequestration by reducing degradation of the natural hydrology, soils, and/or vegetation. This solution focuses on non-coastal peatlands that have not yet been drained or otherwise severely degraded. Reducing emissions from degraded peatlands is addressed in the Restore Peatlands solution, and mangroves located on peat soils are addressed in the Protect Coastal Wetlands solution.

Extreme weather events
Income & work,Health
Nature protection,Water resources
Description for Social and Search
The Protect Peatlands solution is coming soon.
Overview

Peatlands are diverse ecosystems characterized by waterlogged, carbon-rich peat soils consisting of partially decomposed dead plant material (Figure 1). They are degraded or destroyed through clearing of vegetation and drainage for agriculture, forestry, peat extraction, or other development. An estimated 600 Gt carbon (~2,200 Gt CO₂‑eq ) is stored in peatlands, twice as much as the carbon stock in all forest biomass (Yu et al., 2010; Pan et al., 2024). Because decomposition occurs very slowly under waterlogged conditions, large amounts of plant material have accumulated in a partially decomposed state over millennia. These carbon-rich ecosystems occupy only 3–4% of land area (Xu et al., 2018b; United Nations Environment Programme [UNEP], 2022). Their protection is both feasible due to their small area and highly impactful due to their carbon density.

When peatlands are drained or disturbed, the rate of carbon loss increases sharply as the accumulated organic matter begins decomposing (Figure 2). Removal of overlying vegetation produces additional GHG emissions while also slowing or stopping carbon uptake. Whereas emissions from vegetation removal occur rapidly following disturbance, peat decomposition and associated emissions can continue for centuries depending on environmental conditions and peat thickness. Peat decomposition after disturbance occurs faster in warmer climates because cold temperatures slow microbial activity. In this analysis, we evaluated tropical, subtropical, temperate, and boreal regions separately.

Figure 2. Greenhouse gas emissions and sequestration in intact peatlands (left) and a drained peatland (right). Intact peatlands are a net greenhouse gas sink, sequestering carbon in peat through photosynthesis but also emitting methane due to waterlogged soils. Drained peatlands are a greenhouse gas source, producing emissions from peat decomposition and drainage canals.

Diagram comparing healthy and degraded peatland

Source: Link to source: https://www.iucn-uk-peatlandprogramme.org/news/new-briefing-addresses-peatlands-and-methane-debate 

In addition to peat decomposition, biomass removal, and lost carbon sequestration, peatland disturbance impacts methane and nitrous oxide emissions and carbon loss through waterways (Figure 2; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], 2014; UNEP, 2022). Intact peatlands are a methane source because of methane-producing microbes, which thrive under waterlogged conditions. However, carbon uptake typically outweighs methane emissions. Leifield et al. (2019) found that intact peatlands are a net carbon sink of 0.77 ± 0.15 t CO₂‑eq /ha/yr in temperate and boreal regions and 1.65 ± 0.51 t CO₂‑eq /ha/yr in tropical regions after accounting for methane emissions. Peatland drainage reduces methane emissions from the peatland itself, but the drainage ditches can become potent methane sources (Evans et al., 2015; Peacock et al., 2021). Dissolved and particulate organic carbon also run off through drainage ditches, increasing CO₂ emissions in waterways from microbial activity and abiotic processes. Finally, rates of nitrous oxide emissions increase following drainage as the nitrogen stored in the peat becomes available to microbes. 

Patterns of ongoing peatland drainage are poorly understood at the global scale, but rates of ecosystem disturbance are generally lower in PAs and on Indigenous peoples’ lands than outside of them (Li et al., 2024b; Wolf et al., 2021; Sze et al., 2021). The International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) defines six levels of PAs that vary in their allowed uses, ranging from strict wilderness preserves to sustainable use areas that allow for some extraction of natural resources. All PA levels were included in this analysis (UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Center [UNEP-WCMC] and IUCN, 2024). Due to compounding uncertainties in the distributions of peatlands and Indigenous peoples’ lands, which have not yet been comprehensively mapped, and unknown rates of peatland degradation within Indigenous people’s lands, peatlands within Indigenous peoples’ lands were excluded from the tables but are discussed in the text (Garnett et al., 2018; UNEP-WCMC and IUCN, 2024). 

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Credits

Lead Fellow

Avery Driscoll

Contributors

Ruthie Burrows, Ph.D.

James Gerber, Ph.D.

Daniel Jasper

Alex Sweeney

Internal Reviewers

Aiyana Bodi

Hannah Henkin

Megan Matthews, Ph.D.

Ted Otte

Christina Swanson, Ph.D.

Paul West, Ph.D.

Effectiveness

We estimated that protecting a ha of peatland avoids 0.92–13.47 t CO₂‑eq /ha/yr, with substantially higher emissions reductions in subtropical and tropical regions and lower emissions reductions in boreal regions (100-yr GWP; Table 1; Appendix). 

We estimated effectiveness as the avoided emissions attributable to the reduction in peatland loss conferred by protection (Equation 1). First, we calculated the biome-specific difference between the annual rate of peatland loss outside PAs (Peatland lossbaseline) versus inside PAs (Peatland lossprotected) (Appendix; Conchedda & Tubellio, 2020; Davidson et al., 2014; Miettinen et al., 2011; Miettinen et al., 2016; Uda et al., 2017, Wolf et al., 2021). We then multiplied the avoided peatland loss by the total emissions from one ha of drained peatland over 30 years. This is the sum of the total biomass carbon stock (Carbonbiomass), which degrades relatively quickly; 30 years of annual emissions from peat itself (Carbonflux); and 30 years of lost carbon sequestration potential, reflecting the carbon that would have been taken up by one ha of intact peatland in the absence of degradation (Carbonuptake) (IPCC 2014; UNEP, 2022). The carbon flux includes CO₂‑eq emissions from: 1) peat oxidation, 2) dissolved organic carbon loss through drainage, 3) the net change in on-field methane between undrained and drained states, 4) methane emissions from drainage ditches, and 5) on-field nitrous oxide emissions.

Equation 1. 

Effectiveness= (Peatland lossbaseline- Peatland lossprotected)* (Carbonbiomass + 30*Carbonflux + 30*Carbonuptake) 

Without rewetting, peat loss typically persists beyond 30 years and can continue for centuries (Leifield & Menichetti, 2018). Thus, this is a conservative estimate of peatland protection effectiveness that captures near-term impacts, aligns with the 30-yr cost amortization time frame, and is roughly consistent with commonly used 2050 targets. Using a longer time frame produces larger estimates of emissions from degraded peatlands and therefore higher effectiveness of peatland protection.

The effectiveness of peatland protection as defined here reflects only a small percentage of the carbon stored in peatlands because we account for the likelihood that the peatland would be destroyed without protection. Peatland protection is particularly impactful for peatlands at high risk of drainage.

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Table 1. Effectiveness of peatland protection at avoiding emissions and sequestering carbon. Regional differences in values are driven by variation in emissions factors and baseline rates of peatland drainage.

Unit: t CO₂‑eq , 100-yr basis/ha of peatland protected/yr

Boreal 0.92
Temperate 4.42
Subtropical 13.47
Tropical 13.23
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Cost

We estimated that the net cost of peatland protection is approximately US$1.5/ha/yr, or $0.25/t CO₂‑eq avoided (Table 2). Data related to the costs of peatland protection are very limited. These estimates reflect global averages rather than regionally specific values, and rarely include data specific to peatlands. The costs of peatland protection include up-front costs of land acquisition and ongoing costs of management and enforcement. The market price of land reflects the opportunity cost of not using the land for other purposes, such as agriculture, forestry, peat extraction, or urban development. Protecting peatlands can also generate revenue through increased tourism. Costs and revenues are highly variable across regions, depending on the costs of land and enforcement and potential for tourism. 

Dienerstein et al. (2024) estimated the initial cost of establishing a protected area for 60 high-biodiversity ecoregions. Amongst the 33 regions that were likely to contain peatlands, the median acquisition cost was US$957/ha, which we amortized over 30 years. Costs of protected area maintenance were estimated at US$9–17/ha/yr (Bruner et al., 2004; Waldron et al., 2020), though these estimates were not specific to peatlands. Additionally, these estimates reflect the costs of effective enforcement and management, but many existing protected areas lack adequate funds for effective enforcement (Adams et al., 2019; Barnes et al., 2018; Burner et al., 2004). Waldron et al. (2020) estimated that, across all ecosystems, tourism revenues directly attributable to protected area establishment were US$43 ha/yr, not including downstream revenues from industries that benefit from increased tourism. Inclusion of a tourism multiplier would substantially increase the estimated economic benefits of peatland protection.

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Table 2. Cost per unit climate impact for peatland protection.

Unit: 2023 US$/t CO₂‑eq , 100-yr basis

median 0.25
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Learning Curve

A learning curve is defined here as falling costs with increased adoption. The costs of peatland protection do not fall with increasing adoption, so there is no learning curve for this solution.

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Speed of Action

Speed of action refers to how quickly a climate solution physically affects the atmosphere after it is deployed. This is different from speed of deployment, which is the pace at which solutions are adopted.

At Project Drawdown, we define the speed of action for each climate solution as gradual, emergency brake, or delayed.

Protect Peatlands is an EMERGENCY BRAKE climate solution. It has the potential to deliver a more rapid impact than nominal and delayed solutions. Because emergency brake solutions can deliver their climate benefits quickly, they can help accelerate our efforts to address dangerous levels of climate change. For this reason, they are a high priority.

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Caveats

Permanence, or the durability of stored carbon, is a caveat for emissions avoidance through peatland protection that is not addressed in this analysis. Protected peatlands could be drained if legal protections are reversed or inadequately enforced, resulting in the loss of stored carbon. Additionally, fires on peatlands have become more frequent due to climate change (Turetsky et al., 2015; Loisel et al., 2021), and can produce very large emissions pulses (Konecny et al., 2016; Nelson et al., 2021). In boreal regions, permafrost thaw can trigger large, sustained carbon losses from previously frozen peat (Hugelius et al., 2020; Jones et al., 2017). In tropical regions, climate change-induced changes in precipitation can lower water tables in intact peatlands, increasing risks of peat loss and reducing sequestration potential (Deshmukh et al., 2021). 

Additionality, or the degree to which emissions reductions are above and beyond a baseline, is another important caveat for emissions avoidance through ecosystem protection (Atkinson & Alibašić, 2023; Fuller et al., 2020; Williams et al., 2023). In this analysis, additionality was addressed by using baseline rates of peatland degradation in calculating effectiveness. Evaluating additionality is challenging and remains an active area of research.

Finally, there are substantial uncertainties in the available data on peatland areas and distributions, peatland loss rates, the drivers of peatland loss, the extent and boundaries of PAs, and the efficacy of PAs at reducing peatland disturbance. Emissions dynamics on both intact and cleared peatlands are also uncertain, particularly under different land management practices and in the context of climate change.

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Current Adoption

Because peatlands are characterized by their soils rather than by overlying vegetation, they are difficult to map at the global scale (Minasny et al., 2024). Mapping peatlands remains an active area of research, and the adoption values presented here are uncertain. We estimated that 22.6 Mha of peatlands are located within strictly protected PAs (IUCN classes I or II), and 82.2 Mha are within other or unknown PA classes (Table 3; UNEP, 2022; UNEP-WCMC & IUCN, 2024), representing 22% of total global peatland area (482 Mha). Because of data limitations, we did not include Indigenous peoples’ lands in subsequent analyses despite their conservation benefits. There are an additional 186 Mha of peatlands within Indigenous peoples’ lands that are not also classified PAs, with a large majority (155 Mha) located in boreal regions (Table 3; Garnett et al., 2018; UNEP, 2022).

Given the uncertainty in the global extent of peatlands, estimates of peatland protection vary. The Global Peatlands Assessment estimated that 19% (90.7 Mha) of peatlands are protected (UNEP, 2022), with large regional variations ranging from 35% of peatlands protected in Africa to only 10% in Asia. Using a peatland map from Melton et al. (2012), Austin et al. (2025) estimated that 17% of global peatlands are within PAs, and an additional 27% are located in Indigenous peoples’ lands (excluding Indigenous peoples’ lands in Canada covering large peatland areas).

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Table 3. Current peatland area under protection by biome (circa 2023). Estimates are provided for two different forms of protection: “strict” protection, including IUCN classes I and II, and “nonstrict” protection, including all other IUCN classes. Regional values may not sum to global totals due to rounding.

Unit: Mha protected

Boreal 12.4
Temperate 3.0
Subtropical 1.1
Tropical 6.1
Global total 22.6

Unit: Mha protected

Boreal 41.7
Temperate 10.1
Subtropical 1.6
Tropical 28.9
Global total 82.3
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Adoption Trend

We calculated the annual rate of new peatland protection based on the year of PA establishment for areas established in 2000–2020. The median annual increase in peatland protection was 0.86 Mha (mean 2.0 Mha; Table 4). This represents a roughly 0.8%/yr increase in peatlands within PAs, or protection of an additional 0.2%/yr of total global peatlands. This suggests that peatland protection is likely occurring at a somewhat slower rate than peatland degradation – which is estimated to be around 0.5% annually at the global scale – though this estimate is highly uncertain and spatially variable (Davidson et al., 2014).

There were large year-to-year differences in how much new peatland area was protected over this period, ranging from only 0.2 Mha in 2016 to 7.9 Mha in 2007. The rate at which peatland protection is increasing has been decreasing, with a median increase of 1.7 Mha/yr between 2000 and 2010 declining to 0.7 Mha/yr during 2010–2020. Recent median adoption of peatland protection by area is highest in boreal (0.5 Mha/yr) and tropical regions (0.2 Mha/yr), followed by temperate regions (0.1 Mha/yr) and subtropical regions (0.01 Mha/yr) (2010–2020). Scaled by total peatland area, however, recent rates of peatland protection are lowest in the subtropics (0.04%/yr), followed by the boreal (0.14%/yr) the tropics (0.16%/yr), and temperate regions (0.19%/yr).

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Table 4. Adoption trend for peatland protection in PAs of any IUCN class (2000–2020). The 25th and 75th percentiles reflect only interannual variance.

Unit: Mha of peatland protected/yr

25th percentile 0.24
mean 0.87
median (50th percentile) 0.50
75th percentile 0.89

Unit: Mha of peatland protected/yr

25th percentile 0.07
mean 0.23
median (50th percentile) 0.10
75th percentile 0.28

Unit: Mha of peatland protected/yr

25th percentile 0.00
mean 0.04
median (50th percentile) 0.01
75th percentile 0.04

Unit: Mha of peatland protected/yr

25th percentile 0.48
mean 0.84
median (50th percentile) 0.25
75th percentile 0.83
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Adoption Ceiling

We considered the adoption ceiling to include all undrained, non-coastal peatlands and estimated this to be 425 Mha, based on the Global Peatlands Database and Global Peatlands Map (UNEP, 2022; Table 5; Appendix). We estimated that 284 Mha of undrained peatlands remain in boreal regions, 26 Mha in temperate regions, 12 Mha in the subtropics, and 103 Mha in the tropics. The adoption ceiling represents the technical upper limit to adoption of this solution.

There is substantial uncertainty in the global extent of peatlands, which is not quantified in these adoption ceiling values. Estimates of global peatland extent from recent literature include 404 Mha (Melton et al., 2022), 423 Mha (Xu et al., 2018b), 437 Mha (Müller & Joos, 2021), 463 Mha (Leifield & Menichetti, 2018), and 488 Mha (UNEP, 2022). Several studies suggest that the global peatland area may still be underestimated (Minasny et al., 2024; UNEP, 2022). 

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Table 5. Adoption ceiling: upper limit for adoption of legal protection of peatlands by biome. Values may not sum to global totals due to rounding.

Unit: Mha protected

Boreal 284
Temperate 26
Subtropical 12
Tropical 103
Global total 425
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Achievable Adoption

UNEP (2022) places a high priority on protecting a large majority of remaining peatlands for both climate and conservation objectives. We defined the achievable range for peatland protection as 70% (low achievable) to 90% (high achievable) of remaining undrained peatlands. Only ~19% of peatlands are currently under formal protection within PAs (UNEP, 2022; UNEP-WCMC and IUCN, 2024). However, approximately 60% of undrained peatlands are under some form of protection if peatlands within Indigenous peoples’ lands are considered (Garnett et al., 2018; UNEP, 2022; UNEP-WCMC and IUCN, 2024). While ambitious, this provides support for our selected achievable range of 70–90% (Table 6). 

Ensuring effective and durable protection of these peatlands from drainage and degradation, including secure land tenure for Indigenous peoples who steward peatlands and other critical ecosystems, is a critical first step. Research suggests that local community leadership, equitable stakeholder engagement, and cross-scalar governance are needed to achieve conservation goals while also balancing social and economic outcomes through sustainable use (Atkinson & Alibašić, 2023; Cadillo & Bennett, 2024; Girkin et al., 2023; Harrison et al., 2019; Suwarno et al., 2015). Sustainable uses of peatlands include some forms of paludiculture, which can involve peatland plant cultivation, fishing, or gathering without disturbance of the hydrology or peat layer (Tan et al., 2021).

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Table 6. Range of achievable adoption of peatland protection by biome.

Unit: Mha protected

Current Adoption 54
Achievable – Low 199
Achievable – High 255
Adoption Ceiling 284

Unit: Mha protected

Current Adoption 13
Achievable – Low 18
Achievable – High 24
Adoption Ceiling 26

Unit: Mha protected

Current Adoption 3
Achievable – Low 9
Achievable – High 11
Adoption Ceiling 12

Unit: Mha protected

Current Adoption 35
Achievable – Low 72
Achievable – High 92
Adoption Ceiling 103

Unit: Mha protected

Current Adoption 105
Achievable – Low 297
Achievable – High 382
Adoption Ceiling 425
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CO₂‑eq/yr (Table 7). Achievable levels of peatland protection have the potential to reduce emissions 1.3–1.7 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr, with a technical upper bound of 1.9 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr. The estimate of climate impacts under current adoption does not include the large areas of peatlands protected by Indigenous peoples but not legally recognized as PAs. Inclusion of these areas would increase the current estimated impact of peatland protection to 0.9 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr.

Other published estimates of additional emissions reductions through peatland protection are somewhat lower, with confidence intervals of 0–1.2 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr (Griscom et al., 2017; Humpenöder et al., 2020; Loisel et al., 2021; Strack et al., 2022). These studies vary in their underlying methodology and data, including the extent of peatland, the baseline rate of peatland loss, the potential for protected area expansion, which GHGs are considered, the time frame over which emissions are calculated, and whether they account for vegetation carbon loss or just emissions from the peat itself. 

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Table 7. Climate impact at different levels of adoption.

Unit: Gt CO₂‑eq , 100-yr basis/yr

Current Adoption 0.05
Achievable – Low 0.18
Achievable – High 0.24
Adoption Ceiling 0.26

Unit: Gt CO₂‑eq , 100-yr basis/yr

Current Adoption 0.06
Achievable – Low 0.08
Achievable – High 0.11
Adoption Ceiling 0.12

Unit: Gt CO₂‑eq , 100-yr basis/yr

Current Adoption 0.04
Achievable – Low 0.12
Achievable – High 0.15
Adoption Ceiling 0.17

Unit: Gt CO₂‑eq , 100-yr basis/yr

Current Adoption 0.46
Achievable – Low 0.95
Achievable – High 1.22
Adoption Ceiling 1.36

Unit: Gt CO₂‑eq , 100-yr basis/yr

Current Adoption 0.61
Achievable – Low 1.33
Achievable – High 1.71
Adoption Ceiling 1.90
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Additional Benefits

Climate Adaptation

Peatland protection can help communities adapt to extreme weather. Because peatlands regulate water flows, they can reduce the risk of droughts and floods (IUCN, 2021; Ritson et al., 2016). Evidence suggests that peatlands can provide a cooling effect to the immediate environment, lowering daytime temperatures and reducing temperature extremes between day and night (Dietrich & Behrendt, 2022; Helbig et al., 2020; Worrall et al., 2022).

Health

When peatlands are drained they are susceptible to fire. Peatland fires can significantly contribute to air pollution because of the way these fires smolder (Uda et al., 2019). Smoke and pollutants, particularly PM2.5, from peatland fires can harm respiratory health and lead to premature mortality (Marlier et al., 2019). A study of peatland fires in Indonesia estimated they contribute to the premature mortality of about 33,100 adults and about 2,900 infants annually (Hein et al., 2022). Researchers have linked exposure to PM2.5 from peatland fires to increased hospitalizations, asthma, and lost workdays (Hein et al., 2022). Peatland protection mitigates exposure to air pollution and can save money from reduced health-care expenditures (Kiely et al., 2021).

Income and Work

Peatlands support the livelihoods of nearby communities, especially those in low- and middle-income countries. In the peatlands of the Amazon and Congo basins, fishing livelihoods depend on aquatic wildlife (Thornton et al., 2020). Peatlands in the Peruvian Amazon provide important goods for trade, such as palm fruit and timber, and are used for hunting by nearby populations (Schulz et al., 2019). Peatlands can also support the livelihoods of women and contribute to gender equality. For example, raw materials – purun – from Indonesian peatlands are used by women to create and sell mats used in significant events such as births, weddings, and burials (Goib et al., 2018).

Nature Protection

Peatlands are home to a wide range of species, supporting biodiversity of flora and an abundance of wildlife (UNEP, 2022; Minayeva et al., 2017; Posa et al., 2011). Because of their unique ecosystem, peatlands provide a habitat for many rare and threatened species (Posa et al., 2011). A study of Indonesian peat swamps found that the IUCN Red List classified approximately 45% of mammals and 33% of birds living in these ecosystems as threatened, vulnerable, or endangered (Posa et al., 2011). Peatlands also support a variety of insect species (Spitzer & Danks, 2006). Because of their sensitivity to environmental changes, some peatland insects can act as indicators of peatland health and play a role in conservation efforts (Spitzer & Danks, 2006).

Water Resources

Peatlands can filter water pollutants and improve water quality and are important sources of potable water for some populations (Minayeva et al., 2017). Xu et al. (2018a) estimated that peatlands store about 10% of freshwater globally, not including glacial water. Peatlands are a significant drinking water source for people in the United Kingdom and Ireland, where they provide potable water for about 71.4 million people (Xu et al., 2018a).

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Risks

Leakage occurs when peatland drainage and clearing moves outside of protected area boundaries and is a risk of relying on peatland protection as an emissions reduction strategy (Harrison & Paoli, 2012; Strack et al., 2022). If the relocated clearing also occurs on peat soils, emissions from peatland drainage and degradation are relocated but not actually reduced. If disturbance is relocated to mineral soils, however, the disturbance-related emissions will typically be lower. Combining peatland protection with policies to reduce incentives for peatland clearing can help avoid leakage.

Peatland protection must be driven by or conducted in close collaboration with local communities, which often depend on peatlands for their livelihoods and economic advancement (Jalilov et al., 2025; Li et al., 2024a; Suwarno et al., 2016). Failure to include local communities in conservation efforts violates community sovereignty and can exacerbate existing socioeconomic inequities (Felipe Cadillo & Bennet, 2024; Thorburn & Kull, 2015). Effective peatland protection requires development of alternative income opportunities for communities currently dependent on peatland drainage, such as tourism; sustainable peatland use practices like paludiculture; or compensation for ecosystem service provisioning, including carbon storage (Evers et al., 2017; Girkin et al., 2023; Suwarno et al., 2016; Syahza et al., 2020; Tan et al., 2021; Uda et al., 2017).

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Interactions with Other Solutions

Reinforcing

Protected areas often include multiple ecosystems. Peatland protection will likely lead to protection of other ecosystems within the same areas, and the health of nearby ecosystems is improved by the services provided by intact peatlands. 

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Restored peatlands need protection to reduce the risk of future disturbance, and the health of protected peatlands can be improved through restoration of adjacent degraded peatlands.

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Reducing food loss and waste and improving diets reduce demand for agricultural land. These solutions reduce pressure to convert peatlands to agriculture use, easing expansion of protected areas.

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Competing

None

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Dashboard

Solution Basics

1 ha

t CO₂-eq (100-yr)/unit/yr
0.92
units
Current 5.4×10⁷1.99×10⁸2.55×10⁸
Achievable (Low to High)

Climate Impact

Gt CO₂-eq (100-yr)/yr
Current 0.05 0.180.24
US$ per t CO₂-eq
0
Emergency Brake

CO₂ , CH₄, N₂O

Solution Basics

1 ha

t CO₂-eq (100-yr)/unit/yr
4.42
units
Current 1.3×10⁷1.8×10⁷2.4×10⁷
Achievable (Low to High)

Climate Impact

Gt CO₂-eq (100-yr)/yr
Current 0.06 0.080.11
US$ per t CO₂-eq
0
Emergency Brake

CO₂ , CH₄, N₂O

Solution Basics

1 ha

t CO₂-eq (100-yr)/unit/yr
13.47
units
Current 3×10⁶9×10⁶1.1×10⁷
Achievable (Low to High)

Climate Impact

Gt CO₂-eq (100-yr)/yr
Current 0.04 0.120.15
US$ per t CO₂-eq
0
Emergency Brake

CO₂ , CH₄, N₂O

Solution Basics

1 ha

t CO₂-eq (100-yr)/unit/yr
13.23
units
Current 3.5×10⁷7.2×10⁷9.2×10⁷
Achievable (Low to High)

Climate Impact

Gt CO₂-eq (100-yr)/yr
Current 0.46 0.951.22
US$ per t CO₂-eq
0
Emergency Brake

CO₂ , CH₄, N₂O

Trade-offs

None

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Action Word
Protect
Solution Title
Peatlands
Classification
Highly Recommended
Lawmakers and Policymakers
  • Set clear designations of remaining peatlands and implement robust monitoring and enforcement methods.
  • Place bans or regulations on draining intact peatlands, compensate farmers for income losses, and offer extension services that promote protection and paludiculture (growing food on peatlands).
  • Grant Indigenous communities full property rights and autonomy and support them in monitoring, managing, and enforcing protected areas.
  • Incorporate peatland protection into national climate plans and international commitments.
  • Coordinate peatland protection efforts horizontally (e.g., across agencies) and vertically (e.g., across subnational, national, and international efforts), ensuring an inclusive process for local and Indigenous communities.
  • Use financial incentives such as subsidies, tax breaks, and payments for ecosystem services (PES) to protect peatlands from development.
  • Synthesize water management regulations to ensure local authorities, renters, and landowners coordinate sufficient water levels in peatlands.
  • Remove harmful agricultural, logging, and mining subsidies.
  • Map and utilize real-time data to monitor the status and condition of peatland areas.
  • Invest public funds in peatland conservation, restoration, sustainable management practices, specialized research facilities, and other R&D efforts.
  • Invest in fire warning, prevention, and response efforts and establish local volunteer fire prevention groups.
  • Work with farmers, civil society, and businesses to develop high-integrity carbon markets for peatlands.

Further information:

Practitioners
  • Refrain from draining or developing intact peatlands.
  • Invest in peatland conservation, restoration, sustainable management practices, specialized research facilities, and other R&D efforts.
  • Participate in stakeholder engagements and assist policymakers in designating peatlands, creating regulations, and implementing robust monitoring and enforcement methods.
  • Grant Indigenous communities full property rights and autonomy and support them in monitoring, managing, and enforcing protected areas.
  • Ensure protected peatlands don’t displace, violate rights, or reduce access to vital resources for local and Indigenous communities.
  • Assist in managing and monitoring protected peatlands, utilizing real-time monitoring and satellite data.
  • Create sustainable use regulations for protected peatland areas that provide resources to the local community.
  • Conduct proactive land-use planning to avoid infrastructure or development projects that may interfere with protected peatlands or incentivize drainage.
  • Create legal grievance processes, dispute resolution mechanisms, and restitution procedures for violations or disagreements over protected peatlands.
  • Help shift public narratives to mobilize public action and build political will for protecting peatlands by creating educational campaigns and strengthening networks of stakeholders and rightsholders.
  • Take advantage of existing financial incentives such as subsidies, tax breaks, and payments for ecosystem services (PES) to protect peatlands from development.
  • Offer or create market mechanisms such as biodiversity offsets, payments for ecosystem services, voluntary high-integrity carbon markets, and debt-for-nature swaps to fund peatland protection.
  • Synthesize water management regulations to ensure local authorities, renters, and landowners coordinate sufficient water levels in peatlands.
  • Establish coordinating bodies for farmers, landowners, policymakers, and other stakeholders to manage protected areas holistically.
  • Invest in fire warning, prevention, and response efforts and establish local volunteer fire prevention groups.

Further information:

Business Leaders
  • Create peat-free supply chains, utilizing data, information, and the latest technology to inform product sourcing.
  • Integrate peat-free business and investment policies and practices in net zero strategies.
  • Only purchase carbon credits from high-integrity, verifiable carbon markets and do not use them as replacements for decarbonizing operations.
  • Develop financial instruments to invest in peatlands focusing on supporting Indigenous communities.
  • Conduct proactive land-use planning to avoid infrastructure or development projects that may interfere with protected peatlands or incentivize drainage.
  • Amplify the voices of local communities and civil society to promote robust media coverage.
  • Invest in and support Indigenous and local communities' capacity for legal protection and public relations.
  • Leverage political influence to advocate for stronger peatland protection policies at national and international levels. 

Further information:

Nonprofit Leaders
  • Ensure operations utilize peat-free products and supply chains.
  • Advocate for protecting peatlands and for public investments.
  • Assist in managing and monitoring protected peatlands, utilizing real-time monitoring and satellite data.
  • Provide financial support for protecting peatlands management, monitoring, and enforcement.
  • Assist in conducting proactive land-use planning to avoid infrastructure or development projects that may interfere with protected peatlands or incentivize drainage.
  • Advocate for creating legal grievance processes, dispute resolution mechanisms, and restitution procedures for violations or disagreements over protected peatlands.
  • Support high-integrity carbon markets, institutions, rules, and norms to cultivate the demand for high-quality carbon credits.
  • Share data, information, and investment frameworks that successfully avoid deforestation to support protected peatlands, businesses, and investors.
  • Help shift public narratives to mobilize public action and build political will for protecting peatlands by creating educational campaigns and strengthening networks of stakeholders and rightsholders.
  • Amplify the voices of local communities and civil society to promote robust media coverage.
  • Invest in and support Indigenous and local communities' capacity for legal protection and public relations.

Further information:

Investors
  • Create peat-free investment portfolios, utilizing data, information, and the latest technology to inform investments.
  • Invest in peatland protection, monitoring, management, and enforcement mechanisms.
  • Utilize financial mechanisms such biodiversity offsets, payments for ecosystem services, voluntary high-integrity carbon markets, and debt-for-nature swaps to fund peatland protection.
  • Invest in and support Indigenous and local communities' capacity for legal protection and public relations.
  • Share data, information, and investment frameworks that successfully avoid investments that drive peatland destruction to support peatlands, other investors, and NGOs.
  • Help shift public narratives to mobilize public action and build political will for protecting peatlands by creating educational campaigns and strengthening networks of stakeholders and rightsholders.

Further information:

Philanthropists and International Aid Agencies
  • Ensure operations utilize peat-free products and supply chains.
  • Advocate for protecting peatlands and for public investments.
  • Provide technical assistance to low- and middle-income countries and communities to protect peatlands.
  • Provide financial assistance to low- and middle-income countries and communities for peatland protection.
  • Assist in managing and monitoring protected peatlands, utilizing real-time monitoring and satellite data.
  • Assist in conducting proactive land-use planning to avoid infrastructure or development projects that may interfere with protected peatlands or incentivize drainage.
  • Support and finance high-integrity carbon markets, institutions, rules, and norms to cultivate the demand for high-quality carbon credits.
  • Advocate for creating legal grievance processes, dispute resolution mechanisms, and restitution procedures for violations or disagreements over protected peatlands.
  • Support peatlands, other investors, and NGOs by sharing data, information, and investment frameworks that successfully avoid financing peatland destruction.
  • Help shift public narratives to mobilize public action and build political will for protecting peatlands by creating educational campaigns and strengthening networks of stakeholders and rightsholders.
  • Amplify the voices of local communities and civil society to promote robust media coverage.
  • Invest in and support Indigenous and local communities' capacity for legal protection and public relations.
  • Financially support Indigenous land tenure.

Further information:

Thought Leaders
  • Advocate for protecting peatlands and for public investments.
  • Assist in managing and monitoring protected peatlands, utilizing real-time monitoring and satellite data.
  • Assist in conducting proactive land-use planning to avoid infrastructure or development projects that may interfere with protected peatlands or incentivize drainage.
  • Provide technical assistance to low- and middle-income countries and communities to protect peatlands.
  • Advocate for creating legal grievance processes, dispute resolution mechanisms, and restitution procedures for violations or disagreements over protected peatlands.
  • Support high-integrity carbon markets, institutions, rules, and norms to cultivate the demand for high-quality carbon credits.
  • Share data, information, and investment frameworks that successfully avoid deforestation to support protected peatlands, businesses, and investors.
  • Help shift public narratives to mobilize public action and build political will for protecting peatlands by creating educational campaigns and strengthening networks of stakeholders and rightsholders.
  • Amplify the voices of local communities and civil society to promote robust media coverage.
  • Support Indigenous and local communities' capacity for legal protection and public relations.

Further information:

Technologists and Researchers
  • Improve mapping of peatland area, carbon content, emissions data, and monitoring methods, utilizing field measurements, models, satellite imagery, and GIS tools.
  • Develop land-use planning tools that help avoid infrastructure or development projects that may interfere with protecting peatlands or incentivize drainage.
  • Create tools for local communities to monitor peatlands, such as mobile apps, e-learning platforms, and mapping tools.
  • Develop verifiable carbon credits using technology such as blockchain to improve the integrity of carbon markets.
  • Develop supply chain tracking software for investors and businesses seeking to create peat-free portfolios and products.

Further information:

Communities, Households, and Individuals
  • Ensure purchases and investments utilize peat-free products and supply chains.
  • Advocate for protecting peatlands and for public investments.
  • Invest in fire warning, prevention, and response efforts and establish local volunteer fire prevention groups.
  • Establish coordinating bodies for farmers, landowners, policymakers, and other stakeholders to manage protected areas holistically.
  • Assist in managing and monitoring protected peatlands, utilizing real-time monitoring and satellite data.
  • Assist in conducting proactive land-use planning to avoid infrastructure or development projects that may interfere with protected peatlands or incentivize drainage.
  • Advocate for creating legal grievance processes, dispute resolution mechanisms, and restitution procedures for violations or disagreements over protected peatlands.
  • Help shift public narratives to mobilize public action and build political will for protecting peatlands by creating educational campaigns and strengthening networks of stakeholders and rightsholders.
  • Support Indigenous and local communities' capacity for legal protections and public relations.

Further information:

Sources
Evidence Base

Avoided emissions from protecting peatlands: High

There is high scientific consensus that protecting peatland carbon stocks is a critical component of mitigating climate change (Girkin & Davidson, 2024; Harris et al., 2022; Leifield et al., 2019; Noon et al., 2022; Strack et al., 2022). Globally, an estimated 11–12% of peatlands have been drained for uses such as agriculture, forestry, and harvesting of peat for horticulture and fuel, with much more extensive degradation in temperate and tropical regions (~45%) than in boreal regions (~4%) (Fluet-Chouinard et al., 2023; Leifield & Menichetti, 2018; UNEP, 2022). Rates of peatland degradation are highly uncertain, and the effectiveness of PAs at reducing drainage remains unquantified. In lieu of peatland-specific data on the effectiveness of PAs at reducing drainage, we used estimates from Wolf et al. (2021), who found that PAs reduce forest loss by approximately 40.5% at the global average. 

Carbon stored in peatlands has been characterized as “irrecoverable carbon” because it takes centuries to millennia to accumulate and could not be rapidly recovered if lost (Goldstein et al., 2020; Noon et al., 2021). Degraded peatlands currently emit an estimated 1.3–1.9 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr  (excluding fires), equal to ~2–4% of total global emissions (Leifield and Menichetti., 2018; UNEP, 2022). Leifield et al. (2019) projected that without protection or restoration measures, emissions from drained peatlands could produce enough emissions to consume 10–41% of the remaining emissions budget for keeping warming below 1.5–2.0 °C. Peatland drainage had produced a cumulative 80 Gt CO₂‑eq by 2015, equal to nearly two years worth of total global emissions. In a modeling study, Humpenöder et al. (2020) projected that an additional 10.3 Mha of peatlands would be degraded by 2100 in the absence of new protection efforts, increasing annual emissions from degraded peatlands by ~25% (an additional 0.42 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr  in their study). 

The results presented in this document synthesize findings from 11 global datasets, supplemented by four regional studies on peatland loss rates in Southeast Asia. We recognize that geographic bias in the information underlying global data products creates bias, and hope this work inspires research and data sharing on this topic in underrepresented regions.

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Appendix

This analysis quantifies the emissions associated with peatland degradation and their potential reduction via establishment of Protected Areas (PAs). We leveraged multiple data products, including national-scale peatland area estimates, a peatland distribution map, shapefiles of PAs and Indigenous people’s lands, available data on rates of peatland degradation by driver, country-scale data on reductions in ecosystem degradation inside of PAs, maps of biomass carbon stocks, and biome-level emissions factors from disturbed peat soils. This appendix describes the source data products and how they were integrated. 

Peatland extent

The global extent and distribution of peatlands is highly uncertain, and all existing peatland maps have limitations. Importantly, there is no globally accepted definition of a peatland, and different countries and data products use variable thresholds for peat depth and carbon content to define peatlands. The Global Peatland Assessment was a recent comprehensive effort to compile and harmonize existing global peatland area estimates (UNEP, 2022). We rely heavily on two products resulting from this effort: a national-scale dataset of peatland area titled the Global Peatland Database (GPD) and a map of likely peatland areas titled the Global Peatlands Map (GPM; 1 km resolution). 

Scaling procedures

The GPM represents a known overestimate of the global peatland area, so we scaled area estimates derived from spatially explicit analyses dependent on the GPM to match total areas from the GPD. To develop a map of country-level scaling factors, we first calculated the peatland area within each country from the GPM. We calculated the country-level scaling factors as the country-level GPD values divided by the associated GPM values and converted them to a global raster. Some countries had peatland areas represented in either the GPD or GPM, but not both. Four countries had peatland areas in the GPM that were not present in the GPD, which contained 0.51 Mha of peatlands per the GPM. These areas were left unscaled. There were 38 countries with peatland areas in the GPD that did not have areas in the GPM, containing a total 0.70 Mha of peatlands. These areas, which represented 0.14% of the total peatland area in the GPD, were excluded from the scaled maps. We then multiplied the pixel-level GPM values by the scalar raster. Because of the missing countries, this scaling step very slightly overestimated (by 0.4%) total peatlands relative to the GPD. To account for this, we multiplied this intermediate map by a final global scalar (calculated as the global GPM total divided by the GPD total). This process produced a map with the same peatland distribution as the GPM but a total area that summed to that reported in the GPD.

Exclusion of coastal peatlands

Many coastal wetlands have peat soils, though the extent of this overlap has not been well quantified. Coastal wetlands are handled in the Protect Coastal Wetlands solution, so we excluded them from this solution to avoid double-counting. Because of the large uncertainties in both the peatland maps and available maps of coastal wetlands, we were not confident that the overlap between the two sets of maps provided a reliable estimate of the proportion of coastal wetlands located on peat soils. Therefore, we took the conservative approach of excluding all peatland pixels that were touching or overlapping with the coastline. This reduced the total peatland area considered in this solution by 5.33 Mha (1.1%). We additionally excluded degraded peatlands from the adoption ceiling and achievable range using country-level data from the GPD. Degraded peatlands will continue to be emissions sources until they are restored, so protection alone will not confer an emissions benefit.

Total peatland area

We conducted the analyses by latitude bands (tropical: –23.4° to 23.4°; subtropical: –35° to –23.4° and 23.4° to 35°; temperate: –35° to –50° and 35° to 50°; boreal: <–50° and >50°) in order to retain some spatial variability in emissions factors and degradation rates and drivers. We calculated the total peatland area within each latitude band based on both the scaled and unscaled peatland maps with coastal pixels excluded. We used these values as the adoption ceiling and for subsequent calculations of protected areas. 

Protected peatland areas

We identified protected peatland areas using the World Database on Protected Areas (WDPA, 2024), which contains boundaries for each PA and additional information, including their establishment year and IUCN management category (Ia to VI, not applicable, not reported, and not assigned). For each PA polygon, we extracted the peatland area from the unscaled version of the GPM with coastal pixels removed. 

Each PA was classified into climate zones (described above) based on the midpoint between its minimum and maximum latitude. Then, protected peatland areas were summed to the IUCN class-climate zone level, and the proportion of peatlands protected within each was calculated by dividing the protected area by the unscaled total area in each climate zone. The proportion of area protected was then multiplied by the scaled total area for each zone to calculate adoption in hectares within each IUCN class and climate zone. To evaluate trends in adoption over time, we aggregated protected areas by establishment year as reported in the WDPA. We used the same procedure to calculate the proportion of area protected using the unscaled maps, and then scale for the total area by biome. 

We used the maps of Indigenous people’s lands from Garnett et al. 2018 to identify Indigenous people’s lands that were not inside of established PAs. The total peatland area within Indigenous people’s lands process as above.

Peatland degradation and emissions

Broadly, we estimated annual, per-ha emissions savings from peatland protection as the difference between net carbon exchange in a protected peatland versus an unprotected peatland, accounting for all emissions pathways, the drivers of disturbance, the baseline rates of peatland disturbance, and the effectiveness of PAs at reducing ecosystem degradation. In brief, our calculation of the effectiveness of peatland protection followed Equation S1, in which the annual peatland loss avoided due to protection (%/yr) is multiplied by the 30-yr cumulative sum of emissions per ha of degraded peatland (CO₂‑eq /ha over a 30-yr period). These two terms are described in depth in the subsequent sections.

Equation S1. Effectiveness= Peatland lossavoided t=130(Emissions)  

Peatland degradation rates 

We calculated the avoided rate of peatland loss (%/yr) as the difference between the baseline rate of peatland loss without protection and the estimated rate of peatland loss within PAs (Equation S2), since PAs do not confer complete protection from ecosystem degradation. 

Equation S2. Peatland lossavoided =Peatland lossbaseline ✕ Reduction in loss  

We compiled baseline estimates of the current rates of peatland degradation from all causes (%/yr) from the existing literature (Table S1). Unfortunately, data on the rate of peatland loss within PAs are not available. However, satellite data have enabled in-depth, global-scale studies of the effectiveness of PAs at reducing tree cover loss. While not all peatlands are forested and degradation dynamics on peatlands can differ from those on forests writ large, these estimates are a reasonable approximation of the effectiveness of PAs at reducing peatland loss. We used the country-level estimates of the proportionate reduction in loss inside versus outside of PAs from Wolf et al. (2021), which we aggregated to latitude bands based on the median latitude of each country (Table S1).

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Table S1. Biome-level annual baseline rate of peatland loss, the effectiveness of protection at reducing loss, and the annual avoided rate of peatland loss under protection.

Climate Zone Mean Annual Peatland Loss (%/yr) Proportionate Reduction in Loss Under Protection Avoided Loss Under Protection (%/yr)
Boreal 0.3% 0.44 0.13%
Subtropic 1.2% 0.60 0.73%
Temperate 0.6% 0.56 0.33%
Tropic 1.5% 0.41 0.63%
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3.3 Emissions factors for peatland degradation

Equation S3 provides an overview of the calculation of emissions from degraded peatlands. In brief, we calculated cumulative emissions as the biomass carbon stock plus the 30-yr total of CO₂‑equivalent fluxes from peat oxidation (Pox), dissolved organic carbon losses (DOC), methane from drainage ditches (Mditch), on-field methane (Mfield), on-field nitrous oxide (N) and the lost net sequestration from an intact peatland, accounting for carbon sequestration in peat and methane emissions from intact peatlands (Seqloss).

Equation S3. t=130(Emissions)=Biomass+t=130(Pox+DOC+Mditch+Mfield+N+Seqloss)  

The IPCC Tier 1 emissions factors for peatland degradation are disaggregated by climate zone (tropical, temperate, and boreal), soil fertility status (nutrient-poor versus nutrient rich), and the driver of degradation (many subclasses of forestry, cropland, grassland, and peat extraction) (IPCC 2014; Tables 2.1–2.5). Table III.5 of Annex III of the Global Peatlands Assessment provides a summarized set of emissions factors based directly on the IPCC values but aggregated to the four coarser classes of degradation drivers listed above (UNEP, 2022), which we use for our analysis. They include the following pathways: CO₂ from peat oxidation, off-site emissions from lateral transport of dissolved organic carbon (DOC), methane emissions from the field and drainage ditches, and nitrous oxide emissions from the field. Particulate organic carbon (POC) losses may be substantial, but were not included in the IPCC methodology due to uncertainties about the fate of transported POC. These emissions factors are reported as annual rates per disturbed hectare, and emissions from these pathways continue over long periods of time.

Three additional pathways that are not included in the IPCC protocol are relevant to the emissions accounting for this analysis: the loss of carbon sequestration potential from leaving the peatland intact, the methane emissions that occur from intact peatlands, and the emissions from removal of the vegetation overlying peat soils. Leifield et al. (2019) reported the annual net carbon uptake per hectare of intact peatlands, including sequestration of carbon in peat minus naturally occurring methane emissions due to the anoxic conditions. If the peatland is not disturbed, these methane emissions and carbon sequestration will persist indefinitely on an annual basis. 

We accounted for emissions from removal of biomass using a separate protocol than emissions occurring from the peat soil due to differences in the temporal dynamics of loss. While all other emissions from peat occur on an annual basis and continue for many decades or longer, emissions from biomass occur relatively quickly. Biomass clearing produces a rapid pulse of emissions from labile carbon pools followed by a declining, but persistent, rate of emissions as more recalcitrant carbon pools decay over subsequent years. The entire biomass carbon stock is likely to be lost within 30 years. Average biomass carbon stocks over the extent of the peatland distribution in the GPM were calculated by latitude band based on the above and below ground biomass carbon stock data from Spawn et al. (2020). We presumed 100% of the biomass carbon stock is lost from peatland degradation, though in many cases some amount of biomass remains following degradation, depending on the terminal land use.

3.3 Peatland degradation drivers 

Emissions from peatland loss depend on the driver of degradation (e.g., forestry, cropland, peat extraction; IPCC 2014). The GPD contains national-scale estimates of historical peatland loss by driver, which we used to calculate weights for each driver, reflecting the proportion of peatland loss attributable to each driver by latitude band. We took the weighted average of the driver-specific peatland emissions factors, calculated as the sum of the products of the weights and the driver-specific emissions factors.

Source Data

Garnett, S. T., Burgess, N. D., Fa, J. E., Fernández-Llamazares, Á., Molnár, Z., Robinson, C. J., Watson, J. E. M., Zander, K. K., Austin, B., Brondizio, E. S., Collier, N. F., Duncan, T., Ellis, E., Geyle, H., Jackson, M. V., Jonas, H., Malmer, P., McGowan, B., Sivongxay, A., & Leiper, I. (2018). A spatial overview of the global importance of Indigenous lands for conservation. Nature Sustainability, 1(7), 369–374. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-018-0100-6

IPCC 2014, 2013 Supplement to the 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories: Wetlands, Hiraishi, T., Krug, T., Tanabe, K., Srivastava, N., Baasansuren, J., Fukuda, M. and Troxler, T.G. (eds). Published: IPCC, Switzerland.

Leifeld, J., Wüst-Galley, C., & Page, S. (2019). Intact and managed peatland soils as a source and sink of GHGs from 1850 to 2100. Nature Climate Change, 9(12), 945–947. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-019-0615-5

Spawn, S. A., Sullivan, C. C., Lark, T. J., & Gibbs, H. K. (2020). Harmonized global maps of above and belowground biomass carbon density in the year 2010. Scientific Data, 7(1), 112. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41597-020-0444-4

UNEP (2022). Global Peatlands Assessment – The State of the World’s Peatlands: Evidence for action toward the conservation, restoration, and sustainable management of peatlands. Main Report. Global Peatlands Initiative. United Nations Environment Programme, Nairobi.

UNEP-WCMC and IUCN (2024), Protected Planet: The World Database on Protected Areas (WDPA) and World Database on Other Effective Area-based Conservation Measures (WD-OECM) [Online], Accessed November 2024, Cambridge, UK: UNEP-WCMC and IUCN. Available at: www.protectedplanet.net.

Wolf, C., Levi, T., Ripple, W. J., Zárrate-Charry, D. A., & Betts, M. G. (2021). A forest loss report card for the world’s protected areas. Nature Ecology & Evolution, 5(4), 520–529. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41559-021-01389-0

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Protect Forests

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Sector
Food, Agriculture, Land & Ocean
Mode
Cut Emissions
Cluster
Protect & Manage Ecosystems
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Summary

We define the Protect Forests solution as the long-term protection of tree-dominated ecosystems through establishment of protected areas (PAs), managed with the primary goal of conserving nature, and land tenure for Indigenous peoples. These protections reduce forest degradation, avoiding GHG emissions and ensuring continued carbon sequestration by healthy forests. This solution addresses protection of forests on mineral soils. The Protect Peatlands and Protect Coastal Wetlands solutions address protection of forested peatlands and mangrove forests, respectively, and the Restore Forests solution addresses restoring degraded forests.

Extreme weather events
Food security,Health,Equality
Nature protection,Water quality
Description for Social and Search
We define the Protect Forests solution as the long-term protection of tree-dominated ecosystems through establishment of protected areas (PAs), managed with the primary goal of conserving nature, and land tenure for Indigenous peoples. These protections reduce forest degradation, avoiding GHG emissions and ensuring continued carbon sequestration by healthy forests.
Overview

Forests store carbon in biomass and soils and serve as carbon sinks, taking up an estimated 12.8 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr  (including mangroves and forested peatlands; Pan et al., 2024). Carbon stored in forests is released into the atmosphere through deforestation and degradation, which refer to forest clearing or reductions in ecosystem integrity from human influence (DellaSala et al., 2025). Humans cleared an average of 0.4% (16.3 Mha) of global forest area annually from 2001–2019 (excluding wildfire but including mangroves and forested peatlands; Hansen et al., 2013). This produced a gross flux of 7.4 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr (Harris et al., 2021), equivalent to ~14% of total global GHG emissions over that period (Dhakal et al., 2022). Different forest types store varying amounts of carbon and experience different rates of clearing; in this analysis, we individually evaluate forest protection in boreal, temperate, subtropical, and tropical regions. We included woodlands in our definition of forests because they are not differentiated in the satellite-based data used in this analysis.

We consider forests to be protected if they 1) are formally designated as PAs (UNEP-WCMC and IUCN, 2024), or 2) are mapped as Indigenous peoples’ lands in the global study by Garnett et al. (2018). The International Union for Conservation of Nature defines PAs as areas managed primarily for the long-term conservation of nature and ecosystem services. They are disaggregated into six levels of protection, ranging from strict wilderness preserves to sustainable-use areas that allow for some natural resource extraction, including logging. We included all levels of protection in this analysis, primarily because not all PAs have been classified into these categories. We rely on existing maps of Indigenous peoples’ lands but emphasize that much of their extent has not been fully mapped nor recognized for its conservation benefits (Garnett et al., 2018). Innovative and equity-driven strategies for forest protection that recognize the land rights, sovereignty, and stewardship of Indigenous peoples and local communities are critical for achieving just and effective forest protection globally (Dawson et al., 2024; Fa et al., 2020; FAO, 2024; Garnett et al., 2018; Tran et al., 2020; Zafra-Calvo et al., 2017).

Indigenous peoples’ lands and PAs reduce, but do not eliminate, forest clearing relative to unprotected areas (Baragwanath et al., 2020; Blackman & Viet 2018; Li et al., 2024; McNicol et al., 2023; Sze et al. 2022; Wolf et al., 2023; Wade et al., 2020). We rely on estimates of how effective PA are currently for this analysis but highlight that improving management to further reduce land use change within PAs is a critical component of forest protection (Jones et al., 2018; Meng et al., 2023; Vijay et al., 2018; Visconti et al., 2019; Watson et al., 2014).

Market-based strategies and other policies can complement legal protections by increasing the value of intact forests and reducing incentives for clearing (e.g., Garett et al., 2019; Golub et al., 2021; Heilmayr et al., 2020; Lambin et al., 2018; Levy et al., 2023; Macdonald et al., 2024; Marin et al., 2022; Villoria et al., 2022; West et al., 2023). The estimates in this report are based on legal protection alone because the effectiveness of market-based strategies is difficult to quantify, but strategies such as sustainable commodities programs, reducing or redirecting agricultural subsidies, and strategic infrastructure planning will be further discussed in a future update. 

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Credits

Lead Fellow

  • Avery Driscoll

Contributors

  • Ruthie Burrows, Ph.D.

  • James Gerber, Ph.D.

  • Yusuf Jameel, Ph.D. 

  • Daniel Jasper

  • Alex Sweeney

Internal Reviewers

  • Hannah Henkin

  • Megan Matthews, Ph.D.

  • Ted Otte

  • Christina Swanson, Ph.D.

  • Paul C. West, Ph.D.

Effectiveness

We estimated that one ha of forest protection provides total carbon benefits of 0.299–2.204 t CO₂‑eq/yr depending on the biome (Table 1a–d; Appendix). This effectiveness estimate includes avoided emissions and preserved sequestration capacity attributable to the reduction in forest loss conferred by protection (Equation 1). First, we calculated the difference between the rate of human-caused forest loss outside of PAs (Forest lossbaseline) and the rate inside of PAs (Forest lossprotected). We then multiplied the annual rate of avoided forest loss by the sum of the carbon stored in one hectare of forest (Carbonstock) and the amount of carbon that one hectare of intact forest takes up over a 30-yr timeframe (Carbonsequestration).

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Equation 1.

$$\mathit{Effectiveness} = (\mathit{Forest\ loss}_{\mathit{baseline}} - \mathit{Forest\ loss}_{\mathit{protected}}) \times (\mathit{Carbon_{\mathit{stock}}} + \mathit{Carbon_{\mathit{sequestration}}})$$

Each of these factors varies across biomes. Based on our definition, for instance, the effectiveness of forest protection in boreal forests is lower than that in tropical and subtropical forests primarily because the former face lower rates of human-caused forest loss (though greater wildfire impacts). Importantly, the effectiveness of forest protection as defined here reflects only a small percentage of the carbon stored (394 t CO₂‑eq ) and absorbed (4.25 t CO₂‑eq/yr ) per hectare of forest (Harris et al., 2021). This is because humans clear ~0.4% of forest area annually, and forest protection is estimated to reduce human-caused forest loss by an average of 40.5% (Curtis et al., 2018; Wolf et al., 2023). 

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Table 1. Effectiveness at reducing emissions and sequestering carbon, with carbon sequestration calculated over a 30-yr timeframe. Differences in values between biomes are driven by variation in forest carbon stocks and sequestration rates, baseline rates of forest loss, and effectiveness of PAs at reducing forest loss. See the Appendix for source data and calculation details. Emissions and sequestration values may not sum to total effectiveness due to rounding.

Unit: t CO₂‑eq/ha/yr, 100-yr basis

Avoided emissions 0.207
Sequestration 0.091
Total effectiveness 0.299

Unit: t CO₂‑eq/ha/yr, 100-yr basis

Avoided emissions 0.832
Sequestration 0.572
Total effectiveness 1.403

Unit: t CO₂‑eq/ha/yr, 100-yr basis

Avoided emissions 1.860
Sequestration 0.344
Total effectiveness 2.204

Unit: t CO₂‑eq/ha/yr, 100-yr basis

Avoided emissions 1.190
Sequestration 0.300
Total effectiveness 1.489
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Cost

We estimated that forest protection costs approximately US$2/t CO₂‑eq (Table 2). Data related to the costs of forest protection are limited, and these estimates are uncertain. The costs of forest protection include up-front costs of land acquisition and ongoing costs of management and enforcement. The market price of land reflects the opportunity cost of not using the land for other purposes (e.g., agriculture or logging). Protecting forests also generates revenue, notably through increased tourism. Costs and revenues vary across regions, depending on the costs of land and enforcement and potential for tourism. 

The cost of land acquisition for ecosystem protection was estimated by Dienerstein et al. (2024), who found a median cost of US$988/ha (range: US$59–6,616/ha), which we amortized over 30 years. Costs of PA maintenance were estimated at US$9–17/ha/yr (Bruner et al., 2004; Waldron et al., 2020). These estimates reflect the costs of effective enforcement and management, but many existing PAs do not have adequate funds for effective enforcement (Adams et al., 2019; Barnes et al., 2018; Burner et al., 2004). Tourism revenues directly attributable to forest protection were estimated to be US$43/ha/yr (Waldron et al., 2020), not including downstream revenues from industries that benefit from increased tourism. Inclusion of a tourism multiplier would substantially increase the estimated economic benefits of forest protection.

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Table 2. Cost per unit of climate impact.

Unit: 2023 US$/t CO₂‑eq, 100-yr basis

median 2
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Learning Curve

A learning curve is defined here as falling costs with increased adoption. The costs of forest protection do not fall with increasing adoption, so there is no learning curve for this solution.

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Speed of Action

Speed of action refers to how quickly a climate solution physically affects the atmosphere after it is deployed. This is different from speed of deployment, which is the pace at which solutions are adopted.

At Project Drawdown, we define the speed of action for each climate solution as emergency brake, gradual, or delayed.

Protect Forests is an EMERGENCY BRAKE climate solution. It has the potential to deliver a more rapid impact than gradual and delayed solutions. Because emergency brake solutions can deliver their climate benefits quickly, they can help accelerate our efforts to address dangerous levels of climate change. For this reason, they are a high priority.

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Caveats

Additionality, or the degree to which emissions reductions are above and beyond a baseline, is a key caveat for emissions avoided through forest protection (e.g., Fuller et al., 2020; Ruseva et al., 2017). Emissions avoided via forest protection are only considered additional if that forest would have been cleared or degraded without protection (Delacote et al., 2022; Delacote et al., 2024; Gallemore et al., 2020). In this analysis, additionality is addressed by using baseline rates of forest loss outside of PAs in the effectiveness calculation. Additionality is particularly important when forest protection is used to generate carbon offsets. However, the likelihood of forest removal in the absence of protection is often difficult to determine at the local level.

Permanence, or the durability of stored carbon over long timescales, is another important consideration not directly addressed in this solution. Carbon stored in forests can be compromised by natural factors, like drought, heat, flooding, wildfire, pests, and diseases, which are further exacerbated by climate change (Anderegg et al., 2020; Dye et al., 2024). Forest losses via wildfire in particular can create very large pulses of emissions (e.g., Kolden et al. 2024; Phillips et al. 2022) that negate accumulated carbon benefits of forest protection. Reversal of legal protections, illegal forest clearing, biodiversity loss, edge effects from roads, and disturbance from permitted uses can also cause forest losses directly or reduce ecosystem integrity, further increasing vulnerability to other stressors (McCallister et al., 2022).

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Current Adoption

We estimated that approximately 1,673 Mha of forests are currently recognized as PAs or Indigenous peoples’ lands (Table 3e; Garnett et al., 2018; UNEP-WCMC and IUCN, 2024). Using two different maps of global forests that differ in their methodologies and definitions (ESA CCI, 2019; Hansen et al., 2013), we found an upper-end estimate of 1,943 Mha protected and a lower-end estimate of 1,404 Mha protected. These two maps classify forests using different thresholds for canopy cover and vegetation height, different satellite data, and different classification algorithms (see the Appendix for details). 

Based on our calculations, tropical forests make up the majority of forested PAs, with approximately 936 Mha under protection (Table 3d), followed by boreal forests (467 Mha, Table 3a), temperate forests (159 Mha, Table 3b), and subtropical forests (112 Mha, Table 3c). We estimate that 49% of all forests have some legal protection, though only 7% of forests are under strict protection (IUCN class I or II), with the remaining area protected under other IUCN levels, as OECMs, or as Indigenous peoples’ lands.

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Table 3. Current (circa 2023) forest and woodland area under legal protection by biome (Mha). The low and high values are calculated using two different maps of global forest cover that differ in methodology for defining a forest (ESA CCI, 2019; Hansen et al., 2013). Biome-level values may not sum to global totals due to rounding.

Unit: Mha

low 313
mean 467
high 621

Unit: Mha

low 135
mean 159
high 183

Unit: Mha

low 85
mean 112
high 138

Unit: Mha

low 872
mean 936
high 1,000

Unit: Mha

low 1,404
mean 1,673
high 1,943
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Adoption Trend

We calculated the rate of PA expansion based on the year the PA was established. We do not have data on the expansion rate of Indigenous peoples’ lands, so the calculated adoption trend reflects only PAs. An average of 19 Mha of additional forests were protected each year between 2000 and 2020 (Table 4a–e; Figure 1), representing a roughly 2% increase in PAs per year (excluding Indigenous peoples’ lands that are not located in PAs). There were large year-to-year differences in how much new forest area was protected over this period, ranging from only 6.4 Mha in 2020 to over 38 Mha in both 2000 and 2006. Generally, the rate at which forest protection is increasing has been decreasing, with an average increase of 27 Mha/yr between 2000–2010 declining to 11 Mha/yr between 2010–2020. Recent rates of forest protection (2010–2020) are highest in the tropics (5.6 Mha/yr), followed by temperate regions (2.4 Mha/yr) and the boreal (2.0 Mha/yr), and lowest in the subtropics (0.7 Mha/yr).

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Figure 1. Trend in forest protection by climate zone. These values reflect only the area located within PAs; Indigenous peoples’ lands, which were not included in the calculation of the adoption trend, are excluded.

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Table 4. 2000–2020 adoption trend.

Unit: Mha protected/yr

25th percentile 1.3
mean 2.8
median (50th percentile) 2.0
75th percentile 3.4

Unit: Mha protected/yr

25th percentile 1.9
mean 2.8
median (50th percentile) 2.5
75th percentile 3.1

Unit: Mha protected/yr

25th percentile 0.5
mean 1.0
median (50th percentile) 0.7
75th percentile 1.1

Unit: Mha protected/yr

25th percentile 5.4
mean 12.5
median (50th percentile) 7.7
75th percentile 17.8

Unit: Mha protected/yr

25th percentile 9.1
mean 19.0
median (50th percentile) 12.9
75th percentile 25.4
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Adoption Ceiling

We estimated an adoption ceiling of 3,370 Mha of forests globally (Table 5e), defined as all existing forest areas, excluding peatlands and mangroves. Of the calculated adoption ceiling, 469 Mha of boreal forests (Table 5a), 282 Mha of temperate forests (Table 5b), 211 Mha of subtropical forests (Table 5c), and 734 Mha of tropical forests (Table 5d) are currently unprotected. The high and low values represent estimates of currently forested areas from two different maps of forest cover that use different methodologies and definitions (ESA CCI, 2019; Hansen et al., 2013). While it is not socially, politically, or economically realistic that all existing forests could be protected, these values represent the technical upper limit to adoption of this solution. Additionally, some PAs allow for ongoing sustainable use of resources, enabling some demand for wood products to be met via sustainable use of trees in PAs.

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Table 5. Adoption ceiling.

Unit: Mha protected

low 686
mean 936
high 1,186

Unit: Mha protected

low 385
mean 441
high 498

Unit: Mha protected

low 260
mean 323
high 385

Unit: Mha protected

low 1,557
mean 1,669
high 1,782

Unit: Mha protected

low 2,889
mean 3,370
high 3,851
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Achievable Adoption

We defined the lower end of the achievable range for forest protection as all high integrity forests in addition to forests in existing PAs and Indigenous peoples’ lands, totaling 2,297 Mha (Table 6a–e). We estimated that there are 624 Mha of unprotected high integrity forests, based on maps of forest integrity developed by Grantham et al. (2020). High integrity forests have experienced little disturbance from human pressures (i.e., logging, agriculture, and buildings), are located further away from areas of human disturbance, and are well-connected to other forests. High integrity forests are a top priority for protection as they have particularly high value with respect to biodiversity and ecosystem service provisioning. These forests are also not currently being used to meet human demand for land or forest-derived products, and thus their protection may be more feasible. 

To estimate the upper end of the achievable range, we excluded the global areas of planted trees and tree crops from the adoption ceiling (Richter et al., 2024), comprising approximately 335 Mha globally (Table 6a–e). Planted trees include tree stands established for crops such as oil palm, products such as timber and fiber production, and those established as windbreaks or for ecosystem services such as erosion control. These stands are often actively managed and are unlikely to be protected.

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Table 6. Range of achievable adoption levels. 

Unit: Mha protected

Current Adoption 467
Achievable – Low 847
Achievable – High 861
Adoption ceiling 936

Unit: Mha protected

Current Adoption 159
Achievable – Low 204
Achievable – High 378
Adoption ceiling 441

Unit: Mha protected

Current Adoption 112
Achievable – Low 126
Achievable – High 219
Adoption ceiling 323

Unit: Mha protected

Current Adoption 936
Achievable – Low 1,120
Achievable – High 1,577
Adoption ceiling 1,669

Unit: Mha protected

Current Adoption 1,673
Achievable – Low 2,297
Achievable – High 3,035
Adoption ceiling 3,370
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We estimated that forest protection currently avoids approximately 2.00 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr, with potential impacts of 2.49 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr at the low-achievable scenario, 3.62 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr  at the high-achievable scenario, and 4.10 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr at the adoption ceiling (Table 7a–e). Although not directly comparable due to the inclusion of different land covers, these values are aligned with Griscom et al. (2017) estimates that forest protection could avoid 3.6 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr and the IPCC estimate that protection of all ecosystems could avoid 6.2 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr (Nabuurs et al., 2022).

Note that the four adoption scenarios vary only with respect to the area under protection. Increases in either the rate of forest loss that would have occurred if the area had not been protected or in the effectiveness of PAs at avoiding forest loss would substantially increase the climate impacts of forest protection. For instance, a hypothetical 50% increase in the rate of forest loss outside of PAs would increase the carbon impacts of the current adoption, low achievable, high achievable, and adoption ceiling scenarios to 3.0, 3.7, 5.4, and 6.1 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr, respectively. Similarly, if legal forest protection reduced forest loss twice as much as it currently does, the climate impacts of the four scenarios would increase to 3.9, 4.8, 7.0, and 7.8 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr, respectively.

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Table 7. Climate impact at different levels of adoption.

Unit: Gt CO₂‑eq/yr, 100-yr basis

Boreal 0.14
Achievable – Low 0.25
Achievable – High 0.26
Adoption ceiling 0.28

Unit: Gt CO₂‑eq/yr, 100-yr basis

Current Adoption 0.22
Achievable – Low 0.29
Achievable – High 0.53
Adoption ceiling 0.62

Unit: Gt CO₂‑eq/yr, 100-yr basis

Current Adoption 0.25
Achievable – Low 0.28
Achievable – High 0.48
Adoption ceiling 0.71

Unit: Gt CO₂‑eq/yr, 100-yr basis

Current Adoption 1.39
Achievable – Low 1.67
Achievable – High 2.35
Adoption ceiling 2.49

Unit: Gt CO₂‑eq/yr, 100-yr basis

Current Adoption 2.00
Achievable – Low 2.49
Achievable – High 3.62
Adoption ceiling 4.10
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Additional Benefits

Extreme Weather Events

Protected forests are more biodiverse and therefore more resilient and adaptable, providing higher-quality ecosystem services to surrounding communities (Gray et al., 2016). Protected forests can also buffer surrounding areas from the effects of extreme weather events. By increasing plant species richness, forest preservation can contribute to drought and fire tolerance (Buotte et al., 2020). Forests help regulate local climate by reducing temperature extremes (Lawrence et al., 2022). Studies have shown that the extent of forest coverage helps to alleviate vulnerability associated with heat effects (Walton et al., 2016). Tropical deforestation threatens human well-being by removing critical local cooling effects provided by tropical forests, exacerbating extreme heat conditions in already vulnerable regions (Seymour et al., 2022).

Food Security

Protecting forests in predominantly natural areas can improve food security by supporting crop pollination of nearby agriculture. Sarira et al. (2022) found that protecting 58% of threatened forests in Southeast Asia could support the dietary needs of about 305,000–342,000 people annually. Forests also provide a key source of income and livelihoods for subsistence households and individuals (de Souza et al., 2016; Herrera et al., 2017; Naidoo et al., 2019). By maintaining this source of income through forest protection, households can earn sufficient income that contributes to food security. 

Health

Protected forests can benefit the health and well-being of surrounding communities through impacts on the environment and local economies. Herrera et al. (2017) found that in rural areas of low- and middle-income countries, household members living downstream of higher tree cover had a lower probability of diarrheal disease. Proximity to PAs can benefit local tourism, which may provide more economic resources to surrounding households. Naidoo et al. (2019) found that households near PAs in low- and middle-income countries were more likely to have higher levels of wealth and were less likely to have children who were stunted. Reducing deforestation can improve health by lowering vector-borne diseases, mitigating extreme weather impacts, and improving air quality (Reddington et al., 2015). 

Equality

Indigenous peoples have a long history of caring for and shaping landscapes that are rich with biodiversity (Fletcher et al., 2021). Indigenous communities provide vital ecological functions for preserving biodiversity, like seed dispersal and predation (Bliege Bird & Nimmo, 2018). Indigenous peoples also have spiritual and cultural ties to their lands (Garnett et al., 2018). Establishing protected areas must prioritize the return of landscapes to Indigenous peoples so traditional owners can feel the benefits of biodiversity. However, the burden of conservation should not be placed on Indigenous communities without legal recognition or support (Fa et al., 2020). In fact, land grabs and encroachments on Indigenous lands have led to greater deforestation pressure (Sze et al., 2022). Efforts to protect these lands must include legal recognition of Indigenous ownership to support a just and sustainable conservation process (Fletcher et al., 2021).

Nature Protection

Forests are home to a wide range of species and habitats and are essential for safeguarding biodiversity. Forests have high above- and below-ground carbon density, high tree species richness, and often provide habitat to threatened and endangered species (Buotte et al., 2020). PAs can aid in avoiding extinctions by protecting rare and threatened species (Dinerstein et al. 2024). In Southeast Asia, protecting 58% of threatened forests could safeguard about half of the key biodiversity areas in the region (Sarira et al., 2022). 

Water Quality

Forests act as a natural water filter and can maintain and improve water quality (Melo et al., 2021). Forests can also retain nutrients from polluting the larger watershed (Sweeney et al., 2004). For example, forests can uptake excess nutrients like nitrogen, reducing their flow into surrounding water (Sarira et al., 2022). These excessive nutrients can cause eutrophication and algal blooms that negatively impact water quality and aquatic life. 

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Risks

Ecosystem protection initiatives that are not led by or undertaken in close collaboration with local communities can compromise community sovereignty and create injustice and inequity (Baragwanath et al., 2020; Blackman & Viet 2018; Dawson et al., 2024; Fa et al., 2020; FAO, 2024; Garnett et al. 2018; Sze et al. 2022; Tauli-Corpuz et al., 2020). Forest protection has the potential to be a win-win for climate and communities, but only if PAs are established with respect to livelihoods and other socio-ecological impacts, ensuring equity in procedures, recognition, and the distribution of benefits (Zafra-Calvo et al., 2017).

Leakage is a key risk of relying on forest protection as a climate solution. Leakage occurs when deforestation-related activities move outside of PA boundaries, resulting in the relocation of, rather than a reduction in, emissions from forest loss. If forest protection efforts are not coupled with policies to reduce incentives for forest clearing, leakage will likely offset some of the emissions avoided through forest protection. Additional research is needed to comprehensively quantify the magnitude of leakage effects, though two regional-scale studies found only small negative effects (Fuller et al., 2020; Herrera et al., 2019).

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Interactions with Other Solutions

Reinforcing

Other intact and degraded ecosystems often occur within areas of forest protection. Therefore, forest protection can facilitate natural restoration of these other degraded ecosystems, and increase the health of adjacent ecosystems.

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Reducing the demand for agricultural land will reduce barriers to forest protection.

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Competing

Forest protection will decrease the availability and increase the prices of wood feedstocks for other applications.

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Dashboard

Solution Basics

ha protected

t CO₂-eq (100-yr)/unit/yr
0.299
units
Current 4.67×10⁸8.47×10⁸8.61×10⁸
Achievable (Low to High)

Climate Impact

Gt CO₂-eq (100-yr)/yr
Current 0.14 0.250.26
US$ per t CO₂-eq
2
Emergency Brake

CO₂

Solution Basics

ha protected

t CO₂-eq (100-yr)/unit/yr
1.403
units
Current 1.59×10⁸2.04×10⁸3.78×10⁸
Achievable (Low to High)

Climate Impact

Gt CO₂-eq (100-yr)/yr
Current 0.22 0.290.53
US$ per t CO₂-eq
2
Emergency Brake

CO₂

Solution Basics

ha protected

t CO₂-eq (100-yr)/unit/yr
2.204
units
Current 1.12×10⁸1.26×10⁸2.19×10⁸
Achievable (Low to High)

Climate Impact

Gt CO₂-eq (100-yr)/yr
Current 0.25 0.280.48
US$ per t CO₂-eq
2
Emergency Brake

CO₂

Solution Basics

ha protected

t CO₂-eq (100-yr)/unit/yr
1.489
units
Current 9.36×10⁸1.12×10⁹1.577×10⁹
Achievable (Low to High)

Climate Impact

Gt CO₂-eq (100-yr)/yr
Current 1.39 1.672.35
US$ per t CO₂-eq
2
Emergency Brake

CO₂

% tree cover
0100

Tree cover, 2000 (excluding mangroves and peatlands)

We exclude mangroves and peatlands because they are addressed in other solutions.

Global Forest Watch (2023). Global peatlands [Data set]. Retrieved December 6, 2024 from Link to source: https://data.globalforestwatch.org/datasets/gfw::global-peatlands/about

Hansen, M.C., Potapov, P.V., Moore, R., Hancher, M., Turubanova, S.A., Tyukavina, A., Thau, D., Stehman, S.V., Goetz, S.J., Loveland, T.R., Kommareddy, A., Egorov, A., Chini, L., Justice, C.O., and Townshend, J.R.G. (2013). High-resolution global maps of 21st-century forest cover change [Data set]. Science 342 (15 November): 850-53. Link to source: https://glad.earthengine.app/view/global-forest-change

UNEP-WCMC (2025). Ocean+ habitats (version 1.3) [Data set]. Retrieved November 2024 from habitats.oceanplus.org

% tree cover
0100

Tree cover, 2000 (excluding mangroves and peatlands)

We exclude mangroves and peatlands because they are addressed in other solutions.

Global Forest Watch (2023). Global peatlands [Data set]. Retrieved December 6, 2024 from Link to source: https://data.globalforestwatch.org/datasets/gfw::global-peatlands/about

Hansen, M.C., Potapov, P.V., Moore, R., Hancher, M., Turubanova, S.A., Tyukavina, A., Thau, D., Stehman, S.V., Goetz, S.J., Loveland, T.R., Kommareddy, A., Egorov, A., Chini, L., Justice, C.O., and Townshend, J.R.G. (2013). High-resolution global maps of 21st-century forest cover change [Data set]. Science 342 (15 November): 850-53. Link to source: https://glad.earthengine.app/view/global-forest-change

UNEP-WCMC (2025). Ocean+ habitats (version 1.3) [Data set]. Retrieved November 2024 from habitats.oceanplus.org

Maps Introduction

The adoption, potential adoption, and effectiveness of forest protection are highly geographically variable. While forest protection can help avoid emissions anywhere that forests occur, areas with high rates of forest loss from human drivers and particularly carbon-rich forests have the greatest potential for avoiding emissions via forest protection. The tropics and subtropics are high-priority areas for forest protection as they contain 55% of currently unprotected forest area, forest loss due to agricultural expansion is particularly concentrated in these regions (Curtis et al., 2018; West et al., 2014; Gibbs et al., 2010), and tend to have larger biomass carbon stocks than boreal forests (Harris et al., 2021). 

Developed countries also have significant potential to protect remaining old and long unlogged forests and foster recovery in secondary natural forests. The top 10 forested countries include Canada, the USA, Russia and even Australia, with the latter moving towards ending commodity production in its natural forests and increasing formal protection. Restoration of degraded forests is addressed in the Forest Restoration solution, but including regenerating forests in well designed protected areas is well within the capacity of every developed country.

Buffering and reconnecting existing high integrity forests is a low risk climate solution that increases current and future forest ecosystem resilience and adaptive capacity (Brennan et al., 2022; Brink et al., 2017; Grantham et al., 2020; Rogers et al., 2022). Forests with high ecological integrity provide outsized benefits for carbon storage and biodiversity and have greater resilience, making them top priorities for protection (Grantham et al., 2020; Rogers et al., 2022). Within a given forest, large-diameter trees similarly provide outsized carbon storage and biodiversity benefits, comprising only 1% of trees globally but storing 50% of the above ground forest carbon (Lutz et al., 2018). Additionally, forests that improve protected area connectivity (Brennan et al., 2022; Brink et al., 2017), areas at high risk of loss (particularly to expansion of commodity agriculture; Curtis et al., 2018; Hansen et al., 2013), and areas with particularly large or specialized benefits for biodiversity, ecosystem services, and human well-being (Dinerstein et al., 2024; Sarira et al., 2022; Soto-Navarro et al., 2020) may be key targets for forest protection.

Action Word
Protect
Solution Title
Forests
Classification
Highly Recommended
Lawmakers and Policymakers
  • Set achievable targets and pledges for PA designation and set clear effectiveness goals for PAs, emphasizing the effectiveness of current PAs before seeking to expand designations.
  • Use a variety of indicators to measure effectiveness, such as estimated avoided deforestation.
  • Ensure public procurement utilizes deforestation-free products and supply chains.
  • Grant Indigenous communities full property rights and autonomy and support them in monitoring, managing, and enforcing PAs.
  • Ensure PAs do not displace, violate rights, or reduce access to vital resources for local and Indigenous communities.
  • Invest in PA infrastructure, monitoring, management, and enforcement mechanisms.
  • Utilize real-time monitoring and satellite data such as the “Real-Time System for Detection of Deforestation” (DETER).
  • Join, support, or create certification schemes like the Forest Stewardship Council for sustainable logging practices.
  • Conduct proactive land-use planning to avoid roads and other development projects that may interfere with PAs or incentivize deforestation.
  • Create processes for legal grievances, dispute resolution, and restitution.
  • Remove harmful agricultural and logging subsidies.
  • Prioritize reducing food loss and waste.
  • Create education programs that educate the public on PA regulations, the benefits of the regulations, and how to use forest resources sustainably.

Further information:

Practitioners
  • Set achievable targets and pledges for PA designation and set clear effectiveness goals for PAs, emphasizing the effectiveness of current PAs before seeking to expand designations
  • Use a variety of indicators to measure effectiveness, such as estimated avoided deforestation.
  • Ensure PAs do not displace, violate rights, or reduce access to vital resources for local and Indigenous communities.
  • Utilize real-time monitoring and satellite data such as the “Real-Time System for Detection of Deforestation” (DETER).
  • Create sustainable use regulations for PA areas that provide resources to the local community.
  • Conduct proactive land-use planning to avoid infrastructure or development projects that may interfere with PAs or incentivize deforestation.
  • Grant Indigenous communities full property rights and autonomy and support them in monitoring, managing, and enforcing PAs.
  • Join, support, or create certification schemes like the Forest Stewardship Council for sustainable logging practices.
  • Create processes for legal grievances, dispute resolution, and restitution.
  • Create education programs that educate the public on PA regulations, the benefits of the regulations, and how to use forest resources sustainably.

Further information:

Business Leaders
  • Create deforestation-free supply chains, utilizing data, information, and the latest technology to inform product sourcing.
  • Integrate deforestation-free business and investment policies and practices in Net-Zero strategies.
  • Only purchase carbon credits from high-integrity, verifiable carbon markets and do not use them as replacements for reducing emissions.
  • Help shift the public narrative around carbon markets as integrity increases to boost education, dialogue, and awareness.
  • Develop financial instruments to invest in PA jurisdictions, focusing on supporting Indigenous communities.
  • Join or create public-private partnerships, alliances, or coalitions of stakeholders and rightsholders to support PAs and advance deforestation-free markets.
  • Join, support, or create certification schemes like the Forest Stewardship Council for sustainable logging practices.
  • Conduct proactive land-use planning to avoid infrastructure or development projects that may interfere with PAs or incentivize deforestation.
  • Amplify the voices of local communities and civil society to promote robust media coverage.
  • Invest in and support Indigenous and local communities' capacity for public relations and communications.
  • Support education programs that educate the public on PA regulations, the benefits of the regulations, and how to use forest resources sustainably.
  • Leverage political influence to advocate for stronger PA policies at national and international levels, especially policies that reduce deforestation pressure. 

Further information:

Nonprofit Leaders
  • Ensure operations utilize deforestation-free products and supply chains.
  • Advocate for PAs and for public investments and evaluation indicators to strengthen the effectiveness of PAs.
  • Assist in managing and monitoring PAs, utilizing real-time monitoring and satellite data such as the “Real-Time System for Detection of Deforestation” (DETER).
  • Provide financial support for PAs management, monitoring, and enforcement.
  • Assist in conducting proactive land-use planning to avoid infrastructure or development projects that may interfere with PAs or incentivize deforestation.
  • Advocate for creating legal grievance processes, dispute resolution mechanisms, and restitution procedures for violations or disagreements over PAs.
  • Support high-integrity carbon markets, institutions, rules, and norms to cultivate the demand for high-quality carbon credits.
  • Help shift the public narrative around carbon markets as integrity increases to boost education, dialogue, and awareness.
  • Support PAs, businesses, and investors by sharing data, information, and investment frameworks that successfully avoid deforestation.
  • Help shift public narratives to mobilize public action and build political will for PAs by creating educational campaigns and strengthening networks of stakeholders and rightsholders.
  • Join, support, or create certification schemes like the Forest Stewardship Council for sustainable logging practices.
  • Amplify the voices of local communities and civil society to promote robust media coverage.
  • Invest in and support Indigenous and local communities' capacity for legal protection and public relations.
  • Advocate for non-timber forest products to support local and Indigenous communities.
  • Advocate to remove harmful agricultural subsidies and prioritize reducing food loss and waste.

Further information:

Investors
  • Create deforestation-free investment portfolios, utilizing data, information, and the latest technology to inform investments.
  • Invest in PA infrastructure, monitoring, management, and enforcement mechanisms.
  • Invest in green bonds or high-integrity carbon credits for forest conservation efforts.
  • Develop financial instruments to invest in PA jurisdictions, focusing on supporting Indigenous communities.
  • Support PAs, other investors, and NGOs by sharing data, information, and investment frameworks that successfully avoid investments that drive deforestation.
  • Join, support, or create science-based certification schemes like the Forest Stewardship Council for sustainable logging practices.
  • Help shift public narratives to mobilize public action and build political will for PAs by creating educational campaigns and strengthening networks of stakeholders and rightsholders.
  • Require portfolio companies to eliminate deforestation from their supply chains and ask that they demonstrate strong PA practices.
  • Consider opportunities to invest in forest monitoring technologies or bioeconomy products derived from standing forests (e.g., nuts, berries, or other derivatives)

Further information:

Philanthropists and International Aid Agencies
  • Ensure operations utilize deforestation-free products and supply chains.
  • Provide financial support for PAs management, monitoring, and enforcement.
  • Assist in monitoring PAs, utilizing real-time monitoring and satellite data such as the “Real-Time System for Detection of Deforestation” (DETER).
  • Assist in conducting proactive land-use planning to avoid infrastructure or development projects that may interfere with PAs or incentivize deforestation.
  • Support and finance high-integrity carbon markets, institutions, rules, and norms to cultivate the demand for high-quality carbon credits.
  • Help shift the public narrative around carbon markets as integrity increases to boost education, dialogue, and awareness.
  • Support PAs, businesses, and investors by sharing data, information, and investment frameworks that successfully avoid deforestation.
  • Help shift public narratives to mobilize public action and build political will for PAs by creating educational campaigns and strengthening networks of stakeholders and rightsholders.
  • Amplify the voices of local communities and civil society to promote robust media coverage.
  • Invest in and support Indigenous and local communities' capacity for public relations and communications.
  • Financially support Indigenous land tenure.
  • Join, support, or create certification schemes like the Forest Stewardship Council for sustainable logging practices.
  • Advocate for PAs and for public investments and evaluation indicators to strengthen the effectiveness of PAs.
  • Advocate for legal grievances, dispute resolution, and restitution processes.

Further information:

Thought Leaders
  • Advocate for PAs and for public investments and evaluation indicators to strengthen the effectiveness of PAs.
  • Assist in monitoring PAs, utilizing real-time monitoring and satellite data such as the “Real-Time System for Detection of Deforestation” (DETER).
  • Assist in conducting proactive land-use planning to avoid infrastructure or development projects that may interfere with PAs or incentivize deforestation.
  • Advocate for legal grievances, dispute resolution, and restitution processes.
  • Support high-integrity carbon markets, institutions, rules, and norms to cultivate the demand for high-quality carbon credits.
  • Help shift the public narrative around carbon markets as integrity increases to boost education, dialogue, and awareness.
  • Support PAs, businesses, and investors by sharing data, information, and investment frameworks that successfully avoid deforestation.
  • Help shift public narratives to mobilize public action and build political will for PAs by creating educational campaigns and strengthening networks of stakeholders and rightsholders.
  • Amplify the voices of local communities and civil society to promote robust media coverage.
  • Support Indigenous and local communities' capacity for public relations and communications.

Further information:

Technologists and Researchers
  • Improving PA monitoring methods and data collection, utilizing satellite imagery and GIS tools.
  • Develop land-use planning tools that help avoid infrastructure or development projects that may interfere with PAs or incentivize deforestation.
  • Create tools for local communities to monitor PAs, such as mobile apps, e-learning platforms, and mapping tools.
  • Conduct evaluations of the species richness of potential PAs and recommend areas of high biodiversity to be designated as PAs.
  • Develop verifiable carbon credits using technology such as blockchain to improve the integrity of carbon markets.
  • Develop supply chain tracking software for investors and businesses seeking to create deforestation-free portfolios and products.

Further information:

Communities, Households, and Individuals
  • Ensure purchases and investments utilize deforestation-free products and supply chains.
  • Advocate for PAs and for public investments and evaluation indicators to strengthen the effectiveness of PAs.
  • Assist in monitoring PAs, utilizing real-time monitoring and satellite data such as the “Real-Time System for Detection of Deforestation” (DETER).
  • Assist in conducting proactive land-use planning to avoid infrastructure or development projects that may interfere with PAs or incentivize deforestation.
  • Advocate for legal grievances, dispute resolution, and restitution processes.
  • Support Indigenous and local communities' capacity for public relations and communications.
  • Assist with evaluations of the species richness of potential PAs and advocate for PAs in areas of high biodiversity that are threatened.
  • Help shift public narratives to mobilize public action and build political will for PAs by creating educational campaigns and strengthening networks of stakeholders and rightsholders.
  • Undertake forest protection and expansion initiatives locally by working to preserve existing forests and restore degraded forest areas.
  • Engage in citizen science initiatives by partnering with researchers or conservation groups to monitor PAs and document threats. 

Further information:

Sources
Evidence Base

There is high scientific consensus that forest protection is a key strategy for reducing forest loss and addressing climate change. Rates of forest loss are lower inside of PAs and Indigenous peoples’ lands than outside of them. Globally, Wolf et al. (2021) found that rates of forest loss inside PAs are 40.5% lower on average than in unprotected areas, and Li et al. (2024) estimated that overall forest loss is 14% lower in PAs relative to unprotected areas. Regional studies find similar average effects of PAs on deforestation rates. For instance, McNichol et al. (2023) reported 39% lower deforestation rates in African woodlands in PAs relative to unprotected areas, and Graham et al. (2021) reported 69% lower deforestation rates in PAs relative to unprotected areas in Southeast Asia. In the tropics, Sze et al. (2022) found that rates of forest loss were similar between Indigenous lands and PAs, with forest loss rates reduced 17–29% relative to unprotected areas. Baragwanath & Bayi (2020) reported a 75% decline in deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon when Indigenous peoples are granted full property rights.

Reductions in forest loss lead to proportionate reductions in CO₂ emissions. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimated that ecosystem protection, including forests, peatlands, grasslands, and coastal wetlands, has a technical mitigation potential of 6.2 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr, 4.0 Gt of which are available at a carbon price less than US$100 tCO₂‑eq/yr  (Nabuurs et al., 2022). Similarly, Griscom et al. (2017) found that avoiding human-caused forest loss is among the most effective natural climate solutions, with a potential impact of 3.6 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr (including forests on peatlands), nearly 2 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr of which is achievable at a cost below US$10/t CO₂‑eq/yr.

The results presented in this document were produced through analysis of 12 global datasets. We recognize that geographic biases can influence the development of global datasets and hope this work inspires research and data sharing on this topic in underrepresented regions.

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Appendix

In this analysis, we integrated global land cover data, maps of forest loss rates, shapefiles of PAs and Indigenous people’s lands, country-scale data on reductions in forest loss inside of PAs, and biome-scale data on forest carbon stocks and sequestration rates to calculate currently protected forest area, total global forest area, and avoided emissions from forest protection. Forested peatlands and mangroves are excluded from this analysis and addressed in the Protect Peatlands and Protect Coastal Wetlands solutions, respectively.

Land cover data

We used two land cover data products to estimate forest extent inside and outside of PAs and Indigenous people’s lands, including: 1) the Global Forest Watch (GFW) tree cover dataset (Hansen et al., 2013), resampled to 30 second resolution, and 2) the 2022 European Space Agency Climate Change Initiative (ESA CCI) land cover dataset at native resolution (300 m). For the ESA CCI dataset, all non-flooded tree cover classes (50, 60, 70, 80, 90) and the “mosaic tree and shrub (>50%)/herbaceous cover (<50%)” class (100) and associated subclasses were included as forests. Both products are associated with uncertainty, which we did not address directly in our calculations. We include estimates from both products in order to provide readers with a sense of the variability in values that can stem from different land cover classification methods, which are discussed in more detail below.

These two datasets have methodological differences that result in substantially different classifications of forest extent, including their thresholds for defining forests, their underlying satellite data, and the algorithms used to classify forests based on the satellite information. For example, the ESA CCI product classifies 300-meter pixels with >15% tree cover as forests (based on our included classes), attempts to differentiate tree crops, relies on a 2003–2012 baseline land cover map coupled with a change-detection algorithm, and primarily uses imagery from MERIS, PROBA-V, and Sentinel missions (ESA CCI 2019). In contrast, the Global Forest Watch product generally requires >30% tree cover at 30-meter resolution, does not exclude tree crops, relies on a regression tree model for development of a baseline tree cover map circa 2010, and primarily uses Landsat ETM+ satellite imagery (Hansen et al., 2013). We recommend that interested readers refer to the respective user guides for each data product for a comprehensive discussion of the complex methods used for their development.

We used the Forest Landscape Integrity Index map developed by Grantham et al. (2020), which classifies forests with integrity indices ≥9.6 as high integrity. These forests are characterized by minimal human disturbance and high connectivity. Mangroves and peatlands were excluded from this analysis. We used a map of mangroves from Giri et al. (2011) and a map of peatlands compiled by Global Forest Watch to define mangrove and peatland extent (accessed at https://data.globalforestwatch.org/datasets/gfw::global-peatlands/about). The peatlands map is a composite of maps from five publications: Crezee et al. (2022), Gumbricht et al. (2017), Hastie et al. (2022), Miettinen et al. (2016), and Xu et al. (2018). For each compiled dataset, the data were resampled to 30-second resolution by calculating the area of each grid cell occupied by mangroves or peatlands. For each grid cell containing forests, the “eligible” forest area was calculated by subtracting the mangrove and peatland area from the total forest area for each forest cover dataset (GFW, ESA CCI, and high-integrity forests).

Protected forest areas

We identified protected forest areas using the World Database on Protected Areas (WDPA, 2024), which contains boundaries for each PA and additional information, including their establishment year and IUCN management category (Ia to VI, not applicable, not reported, and not assigned). For each PA polygon, we extracted the forest area from the GFW, ESA CCI, and high-integrity dataset (after removing the peatland and mangrove areas).

Each protected area was classified into a climate zone based on the midpoint between its minimum and maximum latitude. Zones included tropical (23.4°N–23.4°S), subtropical (23.4°–35° latitude), temperate (35°–50° latitude), and boreal (>50° latitude) in order to retain some spatial variability in emissions factors. We aggregated protected forest cover areas (from each of the two forest cover datasets and the high-integrity forest data) by IUCN class and climate zone. To evaluate trends in adoption over time, we also aggregated protected areas by establishment year. We used the same method to calculate the forest area that could be protected, extracting the total area of each land cover type by climate zone (inside and outside of existing PAs). 

We used maps from Garnett et al. (2018) to identify Indigenous people’s lands that were not inside established PAs. We calculated the total forest area within Indigenous people’s lands (excluding PAs, mangroves, and peatlands) using the same three forest area data sources. 

Forest loss and emissions factors

Forest loss rates were calculated for unprotected areas using the GFW forest loss dataset for 2001–2022, resampled to 1 km resolution. Forest losses were reclassified according to their dominant drivers based on the maps originally developed by Curtis et al. (2018), with updates accessible through GFW. Dominant drivers of forest loss include commodity agriculture, shifting agriculture, urbanization, forestry, and wildfire. We classified all drivers except wildfire as human-caused forest loss for this analysis. We calculated the area of forest loss attributable to each driver within each climate zone, which represented the “baseline” rate of forest loss outside of PAs. 

To calculate the difference in forest loss rates attributable to protection, we used country-level data from Wolf et al. (2021) on the ratio of forest loss in unprotected areas versus PAs, controlling for a suite of socio-environmental characteristics. We classified countries into climate zones based on their median latitude and averaged the ratios within climate zones. We defined the avoided forest loss attributable to protection as the product of the baseline forest loss rate and the ratio of forest loss outside versus inside of PAs.

We calculated the carbon benefits of avoided forest loss by multiplying avoided forest loss by average forest carbon stocks and sequestration rates. Harris et al. (2021) reported carbon stocks and sequestration rates by climate zone (boreal, temperate, subtropical, and tropical), and forest type. Carbon stocks and sequestration rates for primary and old secondary (>20 years old) forests were averaged for this analysis. We calculated carbon sequestration over a 20-yr period to provide values commensurate with the one-time loss of biomass carbon stocks.

Source data

Crezee, B. et al. Mapping peat thickness and carbon stocks of the central Congo Basin using field data. Nature Geoscience 15: 639-644 (2022). https://www.nature.com/articles/s41561-022-00966-7. Data downloaded from https://congopeat.net/maps/, using classes 4 and 5 only (peat classes). 

Curtis, P. G., Slay, C. M., Harris, N. L., Tyukavina, A., & Hansen, M. C. (2018). Classifying drivers of global forest loss. Science, 361(6407), 1108–1111. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aau3445

ESA CCI (2019). Copernicus Climate Change Service, Climate Data Store: Land cover classification gridded maps from 1992 to present derived from satellite observation. Copernicus Climate Change Service (C3S) Climate Data Store (CDS). Accessed November 2024. doi: 10.24381/cds.006f2c9a

Garnett, S. T., Burgess, N. D., Fa, J. E., Fernández-Llamazares, Á., Molnár, Z., Robinson, C. J., Watson, J. E. M., Zander, K. K., Austin, B., Brondizio, E. S., Collier, N. F., Duncan, T., Ellis, E., Geyle, H., Jackson, M. V., Jonas, H., Malmer, P., McGowan, B., Sivongxay, A., & Leiper, I. (2018). A spatial overview of the global importance of Indigenous lands for conservation. Nature Sustainability, 1(7), 369–374. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-018-0100-6

Giri C, Ochieng E, Tieszen LL, Zhu Z, Singh A, Loveland T, Masek J, Duke N (2011). Status and distribution of mangrove forests of the world using earth observation satellite data (version 1.3, updated by UNEP-WCMC). Global Ecology and Biogeography 20: 154-159. doi: 10.1111/j.1466-8238.2010.00584.x . Data URL: http://data.unep-wcmc.org/datasets/4

Gumbricht, T. et al. An expert system model for mapping tropical wetlands and peatlands reveals South America as the largest contributor. Global Change Biology 23, 3581–3599 (2017). https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/gcb.13689 

Hansen, M. C., Potapov, P. V., Moore, R., Hancher, M., Turubanova, S. A., Tyukavina, A., Thau, D., Stehman, S. V., Goetz, S. J., Loveland, T. R., Kommareddy, A., Egorov, A., Chini, L., Justice, C. O., & Townshend, J. R. G. (2013). High-Resolution Global Maps of 21st-Century Forest Cover Change. Science, 342(6160), 850–853. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1244693. Data available on-line from: http://earthenginepartners.appspot.com/science-2013-global-forest. Accessed through Global Forest Watch on 01/12/2024. www.globalforestwatch.org

Harris, N. L., Gibbs, D. A., Baccini, A., Birdsey, R. A., de Bruin, S., Farina, M., Fatoyinbo, L., Hansen, M. C., Herold, M., Houghton, R. A., Potapov, P. V., Suarez, D. R., Roman-Cuesta, R. M., Saatchi, S. S., Slay, C. M., Turubanova, S. A., & Tyukavina, A. (2021). Global maps of twenty-first century forest carbon fluxes. Nature Climate Change, 11(3), 234–240. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-020-00976-6

Hastie, A. et al. Risks to carbon storage from land-use change revealed by peat thickness maps of Peru. Nature Geoscience 15: 369-374 (2022). https://www.nature.com/articles/s41561-022-00923-4

Miettinen, J., Shi, C. & Liew, S. C. Land cover distribution in the peatlands of Peninsular Malaysia, Sumatra and Borneo in 2015 with changes since 1990. Global Ecological Conservation. 6, 67– 78 (2016). https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2351989415300470

UNEP-WCMC and IUCN (2024), Protected Planet: The World Database on Protected Areas (WDPA) and World Database on Other Effective Area-based Conservation Measures (WD-OECM) [Online], Accessed November 2024, Cambridge, UK: UNEP-WCMC and IUCN. Available at: www.protectedplanet.net.

Wolf, C., Levi, T., Ripple, W. J., Zárrate-Charry, D. A., & Betts, M. G. (2021). A forest loss report card for the world’s protected areas. Nature Ecology & Evolution, 5(4), 520–529. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41559-021-01389-0

Xu et al. PEATMAP: Refining estimates of global peatland distribution based on a meta-analysis. CATENA 160: 134-140 (2018). https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0341816217303004 

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Manage Oil & Gas Methane

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Summary

Oil and gas methane management is the process of reducing methane emissions from oil and gas (O&G) supply chains. These supply chains release methane when pipes and other system parts leak or methane is intentionally vented for operation and safety reasons. We define the Manage Oil & Gas Methane solution as adopting approaches to reduce methane emissions, including fixing leaks in components, upgrading control equipment, changing procedures, and destroying methane by burning methane as a fuel or in flares.

Food security,Health
Air quality
Description for Social and Search
We define the Manage Oil & Gas Methane solution as adopting approaches to reduce methane emissions, including fixing leaks in components, upgrading control equipment, changing procedures, and destroying methane by burning methane as a fuel or in flares.
Overview

Methane can be unintentionally released due to imperfections and faults along the supply chain or intentionally released as part of operations and maintenance. Atmospheric methane has a GWP of 81 over a 20-yr time basis and a GWP of 28 over a 100-yr time basis (IPCC, 2023). This means methane is 81 times more effective at trapping heat than CO₂.  Because methane is a short-lived climate pollutant that has a much stronger warming effect than CO₂ over a given time period, abating methane will have a relatively large near-term impact on slowing global climate change (IEA, 2023b).

The first step to reduce methane releases from O&G production is to identify where releases occur along the supply chain. Many occur during O&G extraction as methane is either intentionally vented or unintentionally emitted. The International Energy Agency (IEA, 2024) estimated more than 60% of global energy-related methane emissions originated from the O&G sector in 2023, with the remaining emissions mostly coming from coal use and some bioenergy (Figure 1). The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) has formed a transparency and accountability initiative whose members are responsible for 42% of global O&G production. It reported that activities involved in exploration and processing of O&G accounted for 83% of total reported O&G emissions from 2020 to 2023, with production processes being responsible for 90% of those emissions (UNEP 2024). Alvarez et al. (2018) found that in the United States, more than 58% of O&G methane emissions came from production and about 20% came from extraction in 2015. 

Figure 1. Methane emissions (kt) from energy sources (IEA, 2025).

Source: International Energy Agency. (2025). Methane tracker: Data tools. https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/data-tools/methane-tracker 

O&G producers can reduce their methane emissions by preventing its release or by converting it to CO₂ through combustion. Strategies for reducing O&G methane emissions can be put into two broad categories (Climate & Clean Air Coalition [CCAC], 2021):

Device conversion, replacement, and installation is the practice of fixing leaks in pipes, valves, compressors, pumps, and other equipment. This can include converting natural gas–powered devices to electric, driving compressors/pneumatics with air instead of natural gas, or replacing emitting components with non-emitting ones (Pembina Institute, 2024).

Changes to operations and maintenance practices seek to reduce the intentional venting of methane. They include eliminating the need for blow-down (releasing gases during the maintenance or operation of pipe infrastructure), reducing venting, and capturing methane before it is released into the atmosphere, then using it as fuel for product refining or burning it to convert it into CO₂.

Leak detection and repair (LDAR) is the practice of regularly monitoring for methane leaks and modifying or replacing leaking equipment. 

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Ocko, I. B., Sun, T., Shindell, D., Oppenheimer, M. Hristov, A. N., Pacala, S. W., Mauzerall, D. L., Xu, Y. & Hamburg, S. P. (2021). Acting rapidly to deploy readily available methane mitigation measures by sector can immediately slow global warming. Environmental Research, 16(5). Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/abf9c8 

Odjugo, P. A. O. & Osemwenkhae, E. J. (2009). Natural gas flaring affects microclimate and reduces maize (Zea mays) yield.. International Journal of Agriculture and Biology, 11(4), 408-412. Link to source: https://www.cabidigitallibrary.org/doi/full/10.5555/20093194660

Oil and Gas Climate Initiative. (2023). Building towards net zero. Link to source: https://www.ogci.com/progress-report/building-towards-net-zero 

Olczak, M., Piebalgs, A., & Balcombe, P. (2023). A global review of methane policies reveals that only 13% of emissions are covered with unclear effectiveness. One Earth, 6(5), 519–535. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.oneear.2023.04.009

Pembina Institute. (2024). Comments on environment and climate change Canada’s (ECCC) regulations amending the regulations respecting reduction in the release of methane and certain volatile organic compounds (upstream oil and gas sector). Link to source: https://www.pembina.org/reports/2024-02-joint-methane-submission-eccc.pdf 

Project Drawdown. (2021). Climate solutions at work. Link to source: https://drawdown.org/publications/climate-solutions-at-work 

Project Drawdown. (2022). Legal job function action guide. Link to source: https://drawdown.org/programs/drawdown-labs/job-function-action-guides/legal 

Project Drawdown. (2023). Government relations and public policy job function action guide. Link to source: https://drawdown.org/programs/drawdown-labs/job-function-action-guides/government-relations-and-public-policy 

Project Drawdown. (2024, May 29). Unsung (climate) hero: The business case for curbing methane | presented by Stephan Nicoleau [video]. YouTube. Link to source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y5y0i-RMfJ0 

Ramya, A., Dhevagi, P., Poornima, R., Avudainayagam, S., Watanabe, M., & Agathokleous, E. (2023). Effect of ozone stress on crop productivity: A threat to food security. Environmental Research, 236(2), 116816. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envres.2023.116816 

Ravikumar, A. P., & Brandt, A. R. (2017). Designing better methane mitigation policies: The challenge of distributed small sources in the natural gas sector. Environmental Research Letters, 12(4), 044023. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/aa6791

Rissman, J. (2021). Benefits of the build back better act’s methane fee. Energy Innovation. Link to source: https://energyinnovation.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Benefits-of-the-Build-Back-Better-Act-Methane-Fee.pdf 

Sampedro, J., Waldhoff, S., Sarofim, M., & Van Dingenen, R. (2023). Marginal damage of methane emissions: Ozone impacts on agriculture. Environmental and Resource Economics, 84(4), 1095-1126. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-022-00750-6 

Schiffner, D., Kecinski, M., & Mohapatra, S. (2021). An updated look at petroleum well leaks, ineffective policies and the social cost of methane in Canada’s largest oil-producing province. Climatic Change, 164(3-4). Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-021-03044-w

Schmeisser, L., Tecza, A., Huffman, M., Bylsma, S., Delang, M., Stanger, J., Conway, TJ, and Gordon, D. (2024). Fossil Fuel Operations Sector: Oil and Gas Production and Transport Emissions [Data set]. RMI, Climate TRACE Emissions Inventory. Retrieved April 18, 2025 from Link to source: https://climatetrace.org 

Shindell, D., Sadavarte, P., Aben, I., Bredariol, T. O., Dreyfus, G., Höglund-Isaksson, L., Poulter, B., Saunois, M., Schmidt, G. A., Szopa, S., Rentz, K., Parsons, L., Qu, Z., Faluvegi, G., & Maasakkers, J. D. (2024). The methane imperative. Frontiers. Link to source: https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/science/articles/10.3389/fsci.2024.1349770/full

Smith, C., Nicholls, Z. R. J., Armour, K., Collins, W., Forster, P., Meinshausen, M., Palmer, M. D., & Watanabe, M. (2021). The earth’s energy budget, climate feedbacks, and climate sensitivity supplementary material (climate change 2021: The physical science basis. Contribution of working group I to the sixth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change). Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Link to source: https://www.ipcc.ch/ 

Tai, A. P., Sadiq, M., Pang, J. Y., Yung, D. H., & Feng, Z. (2021). Impacts of surface ozone pollution on global crop yields: Comparing different ozone exposure metrics and incorporating co-effects of CO2. Frontiers in Sustainable Food Systems, 5, 534616. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.3389/fsufs.2021.534616 

Tradewater. (2023). Methane. Retrieved August 16, 2024, from Link to source: https://www.ogci.com/progress-report/building-towards-net-zero 

Tran, H., Polka, E., Buonocore, J. J., Roy, A., Trask, B., Hull, H., & Arunachalam, S. (2024). Air quality and health impacts of onshore oil and gas flaring and venting activities estimated using refined satellite‐based emissions. GeoHealth, 8(3), e2023GH000938. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1029/2023GH000938 

UN Environment Program. (2021). Global methane assessment: Benefits and costs of mitigating methane emissions. Link to source: https://www.unep.org/resources/report/global-methane-assessment-benefits-and-costs-mitigating-methane-emissions 

UN Environment Program. (2024). An eye on methane: Invisible but not unseen. Link to source: https://www.unep.org/interactives/eye-on-methane-2024/ 

U.S. Department of Commerce, Commercial Law Development Programme. (2023). Methane abatement for oil and gas - handbook for policymakers. Link to source: https://cldp.doc.gov/sites/default/files/2023-09/CLDP%20Methane%20Abatement%20Handbook.pdf

U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2024). What countries are the top producers and consumers of oil? Link to source: https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=709&t=6 

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. (2019). Global non-CO2 greenhouse gas emission projections & mitigation 2015 - 2050. Link to source: https://www.epa.gov/ozone-layer-protection/transitioning-low-gwp-alternatives-residential-and-commercial-air

Van Dingenen, R., Crippa, M., Maenhout, G., Guizzardi, D., & Dentener, F. (2018). Global trends of methane emissions and their impacts on ozone concentrations. Joint Research Commission (European Commission). Link to source: https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/c40e6fc4-dbf9-11e8-afb3-01aa75ed71a1/language-en

Wang, J., Fallurin, J., Peltier, M., Conway, TJ, and Gordon, D. (2024). Fossil Fuel Operations Sector: Refining Emissions [Data set]. RMI, Climate TRACE Emissions Inventory. Retrieved April 18, 2025 from Link to source: https://climatetrace.org 

World Bank Group. (2023). What you need to know about abatement costs and decarbonization. Link to source: https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2023/04/20/what-you-need-to-know-about-abatement-costs-and-decarbonisation 

World Bank Group. (2024). Global flaring and methane reduction partnership (GFMR). Retrieved August 16, 2024, from Link to source: https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/gasflaringreduction 

Credits

Lead Fellow

  • Jason Lam

Contributors

  • Ruthie Burrows, Ph.D.

  • James Gerber, Ph.D.

  • Yusuf Jameel, Ph.D.

  • Daniel Jasper

  • Alex Sweeney

Internal Reviewers

  • Aiyana Bodi

  • Hannah Henkin

  • Ted Otte

  • Amanda D. Smith, Ph.D.

  • Paul C. West, Ph.D.

  • James Gerber, Ph.D.

Effectiveness

Each Mt of methane that is not emitted avoids 81.2 million t CO₂‑eq on a 20-yr basis and 27.9 million t CO₂‑eq on a 100-yr basis (Smith et al., 2021). The GWP of methane is shown in Table 1. If the methane is burned (converted into CO₂ ), the contribution to climate change will still be less than that of methane released directly into the atmosphere. Methane abatement can have a more immediate impact on future global temperature rise because it has a larger and faster warming effect than CO₂. Mitigating methane emissions in the near term can give us more time for reducing GHG emissions in hard-to-abate sectors.

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Table 1. Effectiveness at reducing emissions.

Unit: t CO₂‑eq /Mt of methane abated

100-yr GWP 27,900,000
20-yr GWP 81,200,000
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Cost

The cost of methane abatement will vary depending on the type of O&G production, the methane content of the O&G resource, and the strategies used to address it. We averaged the costs for various abatement strategies; methane content is sufficiently high to utilize methane abatement strategies, and energy infrastructure is available to utilize abated methane. The initial cost to abate 1 Mt of methane is US$594 million, the revenue is about US$193 million, and the overall net savings over a 30-yr amortization period is US$173 million. This means that reducing O&G methane emissions offers a net economic gain for O&G producers. We were not able to find operating cost information for the solution, meaning the net economic gain may be lower in practice. 

We considered the baseline scenario where O&G producers do not have systems or practices in place to monitor or stop methane from escaping to the atmosphere and found very limited cost data. We assumed baseline costs to be 0 for initial costs, operational costs, and revenue because current practices and infrastructure are releasing methane to the atmosphere as a part of their existing cost of doing business. 

Many of the initial cost data for methane abatement come from studies estimating how much capital would be required to reach methane emission targets for the O&G industry. These costs are for the global scale of O&G methane abatement and not from the point of view of an individual O&G producer. These studies do not go into detail about the cost of specific abatement strategies or their potential revenues. The context and assumptions are difficult to identify, since the abatement strategies must be tailored to each site. Ocko et al (2021) noted that most (around 80%) of economically feasible methane abatement actions are from the O&G sector. 

Table 2 shows the costs per t CO₂‑eq. The value of the methane sold, instead of released, will often bring in revenue that covers the costs of abatement. Refer to the Appendix for information on the proportion of strategies that O&G producers could implement at low to no cost.

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Table 2. Net cost per unit of climate impact.

Unit: 2023 US$/t CO₂‑eq

median (100-yr basis) -6.20
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Learning Curve

Many of the technology solutions for reducing methane emissions are mature, and we were unable to find literature suggesting the costs to implement these solutions will fall in the future. There may be efficiencies to be gained in LDAR, but little research offers insights into the costs of LDAR programs (Delphi Group, 2017, ICF, 2016). 

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Speed of Action

Speed of action refers to how quickly a climate solution physically affects the atmosphere after it is deployed. This is different from speed of deployment, which is the pace at which solutions are adopted.

At Project Drawdown, we define the speed of action for each climate solution as emergency brake, gradual, or delayed.

Manage OIl & Gas Methane is an EMERGENCY BRAKE climate solution. It has the potential to deliver a more rapid impact than gradual and delayed solutions. Because emergency brake solutions can deliver their climate benefits quickly, they can help accelerate our efforts to address dangerous levels of climate change. For this reason, they are a high priority.

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Caveats

Burning methane produces CO₂. Though the GWP is far less than that of releasing methane into the atmosphere, the practice still creates a negative climate impact. Depending on the type of O&G production, methane abatement is already practiced with natural gas production and is likely to bring added profit. However, oil producers who are not already producing methane for profit may not be able to abate methane at a profit. 

Avoiding fossil fuel extraction, transport, and use is the only way to permanently reduce emissions from O&G production. For many low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), O&G is the main source of energy, and it is challenging for them to completely eliminate O&G from their energy mix while they are simultaneously working to improve living standards. High-income countries can help LMICs develop clean energy infrastructure by providing financial and technological support. This will prevent new investments in O&G infrastructure (Laan, et al., 2024), which would result in ongoing emissions for decades. It would also allow LMICs a realistic pathway to transition away from their existing O&G usage. O&G demand must fall by 80% between 2022 and 2050 to stay in alignment with the net-zero emissions scenarios modeled by IEA (2023c). O&G methane abatement will decrease over time as the O&G industry produces less methane to be abated.

Our assessment does not include the impact of the CO₂ created from the destruction of methane.

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Current Adoption

We found little literature quantifying the current adoption of methane management; much of the methane abatement research revolves around the amount of methane that needs to be abated to reach certain climate targets. Based on data from Global Methane Initiative (GMI, 2024), 0 Mt of methane was abated in 2023 and is shown in Table 3.


GMI (2024) provided a conservative estimate of cumulative methane emissions abated each year, with a total of 153.6 Mt CO₂‑eq (5.51 Mt methane) abated as of 2023. The methane is given as a cumulative value to show the incremental increase in total methane abated and to avoid double counting methane abated. GMI members only cover 70% of human-caused methane emissions, and the organization does not capture methane mitigation that occurs outside of GMI members. This suggests that even in years where methane was abated, it would likely still be an underestimate of what may have actually occurred globally. The untapped potential for methane abatement suggests that O&G companies are investing in increasing natural gas production, which may be due to relatively smaller profits from abatement and nonbinding regulations (Shindell et al., 2024). 

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Table 3. Current (2023) adoption level.

Unit: Mt of methane abated/yr

median (50th percentile) 0
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Adoption Trend

Although there is little research specifically quantifying the adoption of methane abatement strategies over time, we estimate the average adoption trend in recent years to be about 0.35 Mt/yr of methane abated. To create this estimate, we relied on GMI analysis (GMI, 2024). GMI showed methane abatement gradually increasing from 2011 to 2023, then tapering off around 2020 and beginning to decrease among its member organizations. Table 4 shows the adoption trend for O&G methane abatement.

The IEA (2025) compiled country-level reporting for GHG emissions with data up to 2024. However, we were not able to use the data for the adoption trend because the changes in methane emissions could have been due to reasons other than methane abatement. In reality, methane emissions may be affected by multiple factors such as natural disasters, political conditions, changes in O&G demand, and changes in O&G industry practices.

Oil and Gas Climate Initiative (2023) data on methane abatement to date for 12 major O&G companies indicate that methane emissions decreased 50% from 2017 to 2022; however, we cannot assume the rest of the O&G industry has made the same level of progress. 

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Table 4. Adoption trend, 2011–2022.

Unit: Mt methane abated/yr

median (50th percentile) 0.35
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Adoption Ceiling

We found an adoption ceiling of 80.7 Mt/yr of methane based on the IEA’s (2025) estimate for total methane emissions from the O&G sector. We assumed that current O&G methane emissions would remain the same into the future with no changes in O&G production or demand. Table 5 shows the adoption ceiling for O&G methane abatement.

Even in the IEA’s (2023c) highest methane abatement energy scenario, only 93% of the methane emissions are reduced by 2050. This would still leave methane emissions being released into the atmosphere by the O&G sector. Reduced O&G production will reduce the amount of methane emissions produced by the O&G sector and consequently reduce the amount of methane that needs to be controlled with methane abatement. 

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Table 5. Adoption ceiling.

Unit: Mt methane abated/yr

median (50th percentile) 80.7
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Achievable Adoption

Based on the limited data available for current adoption and adoption trend, we expect 3.26–8.84 Mt/yr of methane abated. The Achievable – Low value aligns with the IEA (2023c) baseline energy scenario (STEPS), in which partial methane abatement is used but not all technically possible methane is abated. The Achievable – High value aligns with the IEA (2023c) baseline scenario (STEPS), in which full methane abatement is employed (all technically possible methane is abated). We determined this range by taking the total methane abated in these scenarios and dividing by the difference between the target year and 2024 to determine an average amount of methane abated each year to reach the scenario target. Under both scenarios, reduced demand for O&G would reduce methane emissions produced and lower the adoption ceiling possible for methane abatement. Even in scenarios where there is reduced O&G demand, methane abatement would still be required to control fugitive methane emissions from O&G infrastructure and limit global climate change. 

The amount of methane that can be abated varies greatly depending on how much methane the O&G industry produces. If O&G production remains steady, cumulative methane abatement could be 21–81 Mt, according to the IEA energy scenarios. If O&G demand drops 80% (IEA’s Net Zero Emissions scenario), total methane emissions would decline to 18 Mt, and the use of methane abatement would reduce methane emissions further by 17 Mt, leaving only 1 Mt of methane emitted in 2050. 

There has been growing interest from governments and academia to more accurately identify methane emissions using technologies such as satellite sensing (MethaneSat, 2024); UNEP (2024) has set up a monitoring and operator’s alliance group that will share best practices among O&G producers. This alliance group has identified more than 1,200 methane releases, but only 15 responses from government or companies provided detail about the source of the emissions or whether any mitigation action was considered or taken. This shows there are still many opportunities to abate methane emissions. 

More than 150 countries (representing 50% of the world’s human-caused methane emissions) have joined the Global Methane Pledge to reduce methane emissions 30% from 2020 to 2030 (UNEP, 2021). The IEA (2023b) found that many governments already have announced or put into place measures to cut methane emissions, so we expect global methane abatement to grow. 

Conrad et al. (2023) found that the emission inventories reported by the Alberta, Canada, government underestimate the methane emissions from the O&G sector, with a large portion coming from venting. These sources of methane are relatively easier to address and can allow the O&G sector to quickly reduce methane emissions. Table 6 shows the statistical low and high achievable ranges for O&G methane abatement based on different sources for future uptake of O&G methane abatement.

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Table 6. Achievable adoption.

Unit: Mt methane abated/yr

Current Adoption 0
Achievable – Low 3.26
Achievable – High 8.84
Adoption Ceiling 80.66
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We estimate that the O&G industry is currently abating approximately 0 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr on a 100-yr basis and 0 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr on a 20-yr basis using methane abatement strategies. 

As the O&G industry grows or shrinks its emissions, the amount of methane available to abate will change accordingly. If O&G demand and production stay constant to 2050, we estimate 0.09–0.25 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr of methane could be abated. 

However, if O&G demand drops, the methane abatement potential would drop because the O&G sector is producing less methane. This is projected in the different energy scenarios modeled by the IEA (2023). The range between the current O&G methane abatement and the adoption ceiling is shown in Table 7.

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Table 7. Climate impact at different levels of adoption.

Unit: Gt CO₂‑eq/yr, 100-yr basis

Current Adoption 0
Achievable – Low 0.09
Achievable – High 0.25
Adoption Ceiling 2.25
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Additional Benefits

Air Quality and Health

Methane reacts with other pollutants to create ground-level ozone (Mar et al., 2022), and incomplete combustion of methane (Figure 2) releases other pollutants such as CO₂, carbon monoxide, black carbon, and volatile organic compounds (Fawole et al., 2016; Johnson and Coderre, 2012; Motte et al., 2021). These pollutants cause respiratory, reproductive, and neurological diseases; cancer; and premature death (Michanowicz et al., 2021; Motte et al., 2021; Tran et al., 2024), so reducing methane release can improve human health. Reducing or stopping flaring at a small number of the largest active sites can significantly reduce air pollution (Anejionu et al., 2015; Johnson and Coderre, 2012). Van Dingenen et al. (2018) estimate that ambitious methane reduction could prevent 70,000 to 130,000 ozone-related deaths worldwide each year.

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Figure 2. Air pollutants emitted along the O&G life cycle (Moore et al., 2014). BTEX = benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene, xylene.

Diagram listing air pollutants emitted along the oil and gas life cycle

Source: Moore, C. W., Zielinska, B., Pétron, G., & Jackson, R. B. (2014). Air impacts of increased natural gas acquisition, processing, and use: A critical review. Environmental Science & Technology, 48(15), 8349–8359. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1021/es4053472

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Food security

Methane reacts with chemicals like VOCs to form tropospheric, or ground-level ozone (Fiore et al., 2002). Ground-level ozone has been linked to reduced crop growth and yields (Mills et al., 2018; Samperdo et al., 2023; Tai et al., 2021). Mitigating methane emissions from O&G could improve food security by reducing ground-level ozone and its harmful impacts on agricultural productivity (Tai et al., 2014; Ramya et al., 2023).

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Risks

If natural gas prices drop there would be less economic reason for industries to voluntarily abate methane (IEA, 2021). Without policy support enforcing the use of methane abatement technologies, methane could continue to be released into the atmosphere. The use of methane abatement will be needed regardless of whether O&G demand remains the same or decreases over time because it has an immediate effect on reducing global temperature rise in the near term.

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Interactions with Other Solutions

Reinforcing

Managing O&G methane can reinforce other solutions that reduce the amount of methane released to the atmosphere. The use of solutions such as applying changes to operations and maintenance; converting, replacing, and installing devices; and LDAR in the O&G industry can help demonstrate the effectiveness and economic case for methane abatement elsewhere and build momentum for adoption of methane abatement in other sectors. 

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Competing

Managing O&G methane has the potential to compete with solutions that provide clean electricity and solutions that focus on fuel switching in transportation because this solution increases O&G supply and can reduce the cost of O&G products. As a result, it could prolong the use of fossil fuels and slow down the transition to clean electricity.

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Dashboard

Solution Basics

Mt methane abated

t CO₂-eq (100-yr)/unit
2.79×10⁷
units/yr
Current 03.268.84
Achievable (Low to High)

Climate Impact

Gt CO₂-eq (100-yr)/yr
Current 0 0.090.25
US$ per t CO₂-eq
-6
Emergency Brake

CH₄, N₂O, BC

Trade-offs

Methane abatement could increase the use of O&G resources without a broader strategy to reduce reliance on O&G as an energy resource. The use of methane abatement strategies to extend the use of existing O&G infrastructure, or building new O&G infrastructure, will not result in a net decrease in emissions. Beck et al. (2020) found that more than 57% of the GHG emissions from the O&G supply chain are from methane emissions, while the rest is due to CO₂ emissions (15% from the extraction process and 28% from O&G energy use). Even with methane mitigation, continued use of O&G will generate CO₂ emissions and will contribute to global temperature rise. 

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Mt CO2–eq/yr
< 50
50–100
100–200
200–300
> 300
Refining
Production
Transport

Annual emissions from oil and gas sources, 2024

Globally, oil and gas sources, including production, refining, and transport, were responsible for 81 Mt out of the 354 Mt of anthropogenic methane emissions in 2024. This is equivalent to 2,250 Mt CO2-eq based on a 100-year GWP time scale. Methane emissions occur throughout the supply chain due to equipment imperfections, leaks, and intentional venting.

International Energy Agency. (2025). Global Methane tracker 2025: Data tools. Link to source: https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/data-tools/methane-tracker

Schmeisser, L., Tecza, A., Huffman, M., Bylsma, S., Delang, M., Stanger, J., Conway, TJ, and Gordon, D. (2024). Fossil fuel operations sector: Oil and gas production and transport emissions [Data set]. RMI, Climate TRACE Emissions Inventory. Retrieved April 18, 2025 from Link to source: https://climatetrace.org

Wang, J., Fallurin, J., Peltier, M., Conway, TJ, and Gordon, D. (2024). Fossil fuel operations sector: Refining emissions [Data set]. RMI, Climate TRACE Emissions Inventory. Retrieved April 18, 2025 from Link to source: https://climatetrace.org

Mt CO2–eq/yr
< 50
50–100
100–200
200–300
> 300
Refining
Production
Transport

Annual emissions from oil and gas sources, 2024

Globally, oil and gas sources, including production, refining, and transport, were responsible for 81 Mt out of the 354 Mt of anthropogenic methane emissions in 2024. This is equivalent to 2,250 Mt CO2-eq based on a 100-year GWP time scale. Methane emissions occur throughout the supply chain due to equipment imperfections, leaks, and intentional venting.

International Energy Agency. (2025). Global Methane tracker 2025: Data tools. Link to source: https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/data-tools/methane-tracker

Schmeisser, L., Tecza, A., Huffman, M., Bylsma, S., Delang, M., Stanger, J., Conway, TJ, and Gordon, D. (2024). Fossil fuel operations sector: Oil and gas production and transport emissions [Data set]. RMI, Climate TRACE Emissions Inventory. Retrieved April 18, 2025 from Link to source: https://climatetrace.org

Wang, J., Fallurin, J., Peltier, M., Conway, TJ, and Gordon, D. (2024). Fossil fuel operations sector: Refining emissions [Data set]. RMI, Climate TRACE Emissions Inventory. Retrieved April 18, 2025 from Link to source: https://climatetrace.org

Maps Introduction

Methane abatement is recommended for all oil and gas (O&G) production. The levels of achievable abatement can vary geographically, depending on the extraction technology used (i.e., conventional drilling versus hydraulic fracturing). The Middle East, Europe, Asia, and North America are among the largest O&G producers and have the highest related methane emissions, according to the IEA (2025). Research from Shindell et al. (2024) found that North America, Russia, and several countries in the Middle East and Africa have the most methane abatement potential in O&G. O&G methane abatement could be accelerated if technologies and strategies used in high-income countries are shared with other O&G producing countries.

Action Word
Manage
Solution Title
Oil & Gas Methane
Classification
Highly Recommended
Lawmakers and Policymakers
  • Hold well owners accountable for harm caused to the public and environment.
  • Introduce performance goals for emissions reductions.
  • Use economic measures such as taxes or financial incentives.
  • Regulate key aspects of abatement, such as the use of LDAR, and enforce existing regulations.
  • Utilize data-driven public information programs such as collecting and publishing monitoring and reporting data (“naming and shaming”).
  • Distribute information to operators, such as technology options that fit relevant regulations. 

Further information:

Practitioners
  • Shift business models toward 100% renewable energy.
  • Detect and repair methane leaks.
  • Implement device conversion, replacement, and installation and LDAR.
  • Change operations and maintenance practices to reduce or recover vented methane.
  • Implement zero-tolerance policies for methane leaks.
  • Increase transparency on emissions and practices.
  • Join cross-company and industry coalitions that facilitate implementation.

Further information:

Business Leaders
  • Eliminate major methane O&G emitters in your value chains or pressure them to improve performance.
  • Create a plan to transition to renewable energy.
  • Center methane in net-zero strategies, such as establishing internal methane pricing mechanisms and requiring suppliers to meet standards for monitoring and reducing methane emissions in your operations.
  • Identify technology partners that are monitoring and reducing methane emissions and make market commitments.
  • If your company is participating in the voluntary carbon market, look into funding projects that plug methane leaks.
  • Proactively collaborate with government and regulatory actors to support methane abatement policies.
  • Join or support transparency initiatives led by trusted third parties, such as the Oil and Gas Methane Partnership 2.0.

Further information:

Nonprofit Leaders
  • Help with monitoring and reporting by, for example, utilizing satellite data.
  • Help design policies and regulations that support methane abatement.
  • Educate the public on the urgent need to abate methane.
  • Join or support efforts such as the Global Methane Alliance.
  • Encourage policymakers to create ambitious targets and regulations.
  • Pressure O&G companies to improve their practices.
  • Take or support legal action when companies do not follow relevant regulations.
  • Work with journalists and the media to support public education on the importance of methane abatement.

Further information:

Investors
  • Pressure and influence portfolio companies to incorporate methane abatement into their operations, noting that this saves money and adds value for investors.
  • Provide capital for nascent methane abatement strategies and leak detection and monitoring instruments.
  • Invest in green bonds and other financial instruments that support methane abatement projects.
  • Seek impact investment opportunities such as sustainability-linked loans in entities that set methane abatement targets.
  • Invest in projects that plug methane leaks. 

Further information:

Philanthropists and International Aid Agencies
  • Provide capital for methane monitoring, de-risking, and abatement in the early stages of implementation.
  • Support global, national, and local policies that reduce methane emissions.
  • Support accelerators or multilateral initiatives like the Global Methane Hub.
  • If working in a fossil fuel–producing nation, support sustainable developments in other sectors of the economy.
  • Explore opportunities to fund the plugging of abandoned oil or gas wells that leak methane.
  • Advance awareness of the public health and climate threats from the O&G industry.
  • Join, create, or participate in partnerships or certification programs dedicated to managing oil and gas methane.

Further information:

Thought Leaders
  • Provide technical assistance (e.g., monitoring and reporting) to businesses, government agencies, and other entities working to reduce methane emissions.
  • Help design policies and regulations that support methane abatement.
  • Analyze historical emissions patterns to identify and publicize successful programs.
  • Educate the public on the urgent need to abate methane.
  • Advocate to policymakers for more ambitious targets and regulations.
  • Pressure O&G companies to improve their practices.
  • Join, create, or participate in partnerships or certification programs dedicated to managing oil and gas methane.

Further information:

Technologists and Researchers
  • Develop new LDAR technologies that reduce cost and required capacity.
  • Develop new technologies for measuring and verifying emissions.
  • Conduct longitudinal studies to measure emissions against objectives or means of enforcement. 

Further information:

Communities, Households, and Individuals
  • If you are impacted by harmful O&G methane management practices, document your experiences.
  • Reduce household consumption of fossil fuels by adopting clean energy sources, increasing energy efficiency, and replacing fossil fuel-powered equipment with electricity-powered equipment.
  • Share documentation of harmful practices and/or other key messages with policymakers, the press, and the public.
  • Encourage policymakers to improve regulations.
  • Support public education efforts on the urgency and need to address the issue.

Further information:

Sources
Evidence Base

Consensus of effectiveness of abating methane emissions in the O&G sector: High

There is a high level of consensus about the effectiveness of methane abatement strategies. These strategies can be deployed cost effectively in many cases and have an immediate impact on reducing global temperature rise. 

Authoritative sources such as the IEA (2023d), UNEP (2021), and Global Methane Hub (2024) agree that reducing methane emissions can noticeably reduce the rate of global temperature rise. DeFabrizio et al. (2021) identified that methane abatement strategies such as LDAR, switching from natural gas fuel to electric power, using air for pneumatic devices, and using vapor recovery units could reduce O&G methane emissions by 40% by 2030 based on global 2017 O&G emissions. With methane being the second largest contributor to climate change after CO₂, reductions in methane emissions can quickly reduce global temperature rise.

Others (Marks Levi, 2022; DeFabrizio et al., 2021; Malley et al., 2023) have identified that many methane abatement strategies can use existing technologies, often at low cost. Dunsky (2023) found that implementing 24 of the least expensive abatement measures in the exploration and production phases of Canada’s O&G industry could help Canada achieve its 2030 methane target. The IEA (2023a) noted that the O&G industry was responsible for 80 Mt of methane in 2022 and had the largest potential for abatement in the near term. The O&G industry has the potential to abate 60 Mt of methane by 2030 using abatement strategies; 40% of that could be abated at no net cost based on average natural gas prices from 2017 to 2021 (IEA, 2023a).

The results presented in this document summarize findings from more than 15 reviews and meta-analyses and more than 10 original studies reflecting current evidence from two countries, primarily from the United States and Canada, and from global sources. We recognize this limited geographic scope creates bias, and hope this work inspires research and data-sharing on this topic in underrepresented regions.

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Appendix

Data describing methane abatement potential in the O&G industry are often shown in marginal abatement cost curves (MACCs), which incorporate the initial cost, operating cost, revenue, and any extra costs per unit of emissions reduced as one value.

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Figure A1. Marginal abatement cost curves (MACC) for methane abatement in the O&G industry (IEA, 2024).

Cost curve chart.

Source: International Energy Agency (Global Methane Tracker 2024).

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MACCs indicate a range of potential climate actions and show at a glance the magnitude of financial return or financial cost across that range. In Figure A1, for the blocks below the horizontal axis, the value received from the sale of the captured methane is greater than the cost of the solution employed. The width of a block shows the annual amount of emissions a technology can abate, with wider blocks abating more emissions than narrower blocks.

MACCs are useful for identifying which climate action could have the most impact at reducing emissions or which options have a net economic gain. However, they do not illustrate the intricacies that may be in play among different climate actions and can lead users to ignore hard-to-abate emissions. The World Bank (2023) identified that MACCs are useful to find which option will reduce emissions by a set percentage but less useful for reducing absolute emissions to near zero. 

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Updated Date

Manage Coal Mine Methane

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Summary

Managing coal mine methane (CMM) is the process of reducing methane emissions released from coal deposits and surrounding rock layers due to mining activities. CMM is naturally found in coal seams and released into the atmosphere when the coal seams are disturbed. Coal mines can continue to emit methane even after being closed or abandoned, which is known as abandoned mine methane (AMM). CMM and AMM can be captured and then utilized as a fuel source or destroyed before they reach the atmosphere [U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 2024a].

Food security,Health
Air quality
Description for Social and Search
Managing coal mine methane (CMM) is the process of reducing methane emissions released from coal deposits and surrounding rock layers due to mining activities.
Overview

CMM is released from coal mines before, during, and after active coal mining and from coal being transported (EPA, 2024a). Atmospheric methane has a GWP of 81 on a 20-yr basis and a GWP of 28 on a 100-yr basis (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], 2023). This means methane is 81 times more effective at trapping heat than CO₂. Because methane is a short-lived climate pollutant that has a much stronger warming effect than CO₂ over a given time period, abating methane from coal mines will have a powerful near-term impact on slowing global climate change. If capturing methane is not possible, destroying the methane by burning it is preferable to releasing it.

CMM comes from five major sources throughout the coal mine’s life cycle (Figure 1): 

  1. Degasification systems – pipes installed in the ground to move methane into the atmosphere before starting mining
  2. Ventilation air – air escaping from underground mines when fresh air is used to push out underground methane during mining
  3. Surface mines – exposed coal seams that emit methane directly into the atmosphere during mining
  4. Fugitive emissions – already mined coal that emits methane while being transported or stored
  5. Abandoned or closed mines – coal seams and rock strata that are exposed to air, allowing AMM to escape through existing vents or cracks after mine closure. 

Figure 1. Percent breakdown of CMM sources in the United States, 2021.

Source: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2024d). Sources of coal mine methane. Retrieved November 5, 2024. https://www.epa.gov/cmop/sources-coal-mine-methane

CMM management relies on several practices and technologies to reduce the amount of methane released into the atmosphere. The CMM that is captured can be used as a fuel at high concentrations and destroyed through flaring or oxidation at low concentrations. The methane captured from degasification systems typically has a high concentration while fugitive and ventilation methane sources are low concentration. CMM management also includes leak detection and repair using satellites, drones, or other technologies to prevent methane from escaping into the atmosphere.

Underground coal mines have more methane abatement strategies available due to higher average methane concentrations and relative ease of capture. Surface coal mines are exposed directly to the atmosphere and can cover large areas, making them more difficult to abate methane, though there are technologies that can reduce CMM emissions. See the Appendix for more details on the abatement technologies specific to underground and surface coal mines.

Assan, S., & Whittle, E. (2023). In the dark: Underreporting of coal mine methane is a major climate risk. Ember. Link to source: https://ember-energy.org/latest-insights/in-the-dark-underreporting-of-coal-mine-methane-is-a-major-climate-risk/#supporting-material 

Assan, S. (2024). Understanding the EU’s methane regulation for coal. Ember. Link to source: https://ember-energy.org/latest-insights/eumethane-reg-explained/ 

CNX. (2024, March 20). Jumpstarting coal mine methane capture projects for beneficial end use [PowerPoint slides].Global Methane Initiative. Link to source: https://www.globalmethane.org/resources/details.aspx?resourceid=5386 

DeFabrizio, S., Glazener, W., Hart, C., Henderson, K., Kar, J., Katz, J., Pratt, M. P., Rogers, M., Ulanov, A., & Tryggestad, C. (2021). Curbing methane emissions: How five industries can counter a major climate threat. McKinsey Sustainability. Link to source: https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/business%20functions/sustainability/our%20insights/curbing%20methane%20emissions%20how%20five%20industries%20can%20counter%20a%20major%20climate%20threat/curbing-methane-emissions-how-five-industries-can-counter-a-major-climate-threat-v4.pdf 

Domingo, N. G. G., Fiore, A. M., Lamarque, J.-F., Kinney, P. L., Jiang, L., Gasparrini, A., Breitner, S., Lavigne, E., Madureira, J., Masselot, P., das Neves Pereira da Silva, S., Sheng Ng, C. F., Kyselý, J., Guo, Y., Tong, S., Kan, H., Urban, A., Orru, H., Maasikmets, M., … Chen, K. (2024). Ozone-related acute excess mortality projected to increase in the absence of climate and air quality controls consistent with the Paris Agreement. One Earth (Cambridge, Mass.), 7(2), 325–335. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.oneear.2024.01.001

Fiore, A. M., Jacob, D. J., & Field, B. D. (2002). Linking ozone pollution and climate change: The case for controlling methane. Geophysical Research Letters, 29(19), 182-197. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1029/2002GL015601 

Gajdzik, B., Tobór-Osadnik, K., Wolniak, R., & Grebski, W. W. (2024). European climate policy in the context of the problem of methane emissions from coal mines in Poland. Energies, 17(10), 2396. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.3390/en17102396 

Global Energy Monitor (n.d.). Global coal mine tracker. Retrieved February 27, 2025 from Link to source: https://globalenergymonitor.org/projects/global-coal-mine-tracker/ 

Global Methane Initiative. (2015). Coal mine methane country profiles. Link to source: https://www.globalmethane.org/documents/toolsres_coal_overview_fullreport.pdf 

Global Methane Initiative (2018). Expert dialogue on ventilation air methane (VAM). Link to source: https://www.globalmethane.org/documents/res_coal_VAM_Dialogue_Report_20181025.pdf 

Global Methane Initiative (2024a). 2023 Accomplishments in methane mitigation, recovery, and use through U.S.-supported international efforts. Link to source: https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2024-12/epa430r24009-fy23-accomplishments-report.pdf 

Global Methane Initiative (2024b). International coal mine methane project list. Link to source: https://globalmethane.org/resources/details.aspx?resourceid=1981 

Hong, C., Mueller, N. D., Burney, J. A., Zhang, Y., AghaKouchak, A., Moore, F. C., Qin, Y., Tong, D., & Davis, S. J. (2020). Impacts of ozone and climate change on yields of perennial crops in California. Nature Food, 1(3), 166–172. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1038/s43016-020-0043-8 

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). (2023). In: Climate change 2023: Synthesis report. Contribution of working groups I, II and III to the sixth assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change [core writing team, H. Lee and J. Romero (eds.)]. IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland, pp. 1–34, doi: 10.59327/IPCC/AR6-9789291691647.001 Link to source: https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/syr/ 

International Energy Agency. (2021). Global methane tracker 2021: Methane abatement and regulation. Link to source: https://www.iea.org/reports/methane-tracker-2021/methane-abatement-and-regulation 

International Energy Agency. (2023a). Net zero roadmap: A global pathway to keep the 1.5℃ goal in reach - 2023 update. Link to source: https://www.iea.org/reports/net-zero-roadmap-a-global-pathway-to-keep-the-15-0c-goal-in-reach 

International Energy Agency. (2023b). Strategies to reduce emissions from coal supply. Global Methane Tracker 2023. Link to source: https://www.iea.org/reports/global-methane-tracker-2023/strategies-to-reduce-emissions-from-coal-supply 

International Energy Agency. (2023c). The imperative of cutting methane from fossil fuels. Link to source: https://www.iea.org/reports/the-imperative-of-cutting-methane-from-fossil-fuels 

International Energy Agency. (2023d). Global methane tracker 2023: Overview. Link to source: https://www.iea.org/reports/global-methane-tracker-2023/overview 

International Energy Agency. (2024a). Global methane tracker documentation 2024 version. Link to source: https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/d42fc095-f706-422a-9008-6b9e4e1ee616/GlobalMethaneTracker_Documentation.pdf 

International Energy Agency. (2024b). Methane tracker: Data tools. Link to source: https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/data-tools/methane-tracker 

International Energy Agency. (2024c). World energy outlook 2024. Link to source: https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-outlook-2024 

International Energy Agency. (2025). Global methane tracker documentation 2025 version. Link to source: https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/2c0cf2d5-3910-46bc-a271-1367edfed212/GlobalMethaneTracker2025.pdf 

Kholod, N., Evans, M., Pilcher, R. C., Roshchanka, V., Ruiz, F., Coté, M., & Collings, R. (2020). Global methane emissions from coal mining to continue growing even with declining coal production. Journal of Cleaner Production, 256. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2020.120489 

Lewis, C., Tate, R.D., and Mei, D.L. (2024). Fuel operations sector: Coal mining emissions methodology [Data set]. WattTime and Global Energy Monitor, Climate TRACE Emissions Inventory. Retrieved April 18, 2025, from Link to source: https://climatetrace.org 

Malley, C. S., Borgford-Parnell, N. Haeussling, S., Howard, L. C., Lefèvre E. N., & Kuylenstierna J. C. I. (2023). A roadmap to achieve the global methane pledge. Environmental Research: Climate, 2(1). Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1088/2752-5295/acb4b4 

Mar, K. A., Unger, C., Walderdorff, L., & Butler, T. (2022). Beyond CO2 equivalence: The impacts of methane on climate, ecosystems, and health. Environmental Science & Policy, 134, 127–136. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2022.03.027 

MethaneSAT. (2024). Solving a crucial climate challenge. Retrieved September 2, 2024 Link to source: https://www.methanesat.org/satellite/ 

Mills, G., Sharps, K., Simpson, D., Pleijel, H., Frei, M., Burkey, K., Emberson, L., Cuddling, J., Broberg, M., Feng, Z., Kobayashi, K. & Agrawal, M. (2018). Closing the global ozone yield gap: Quantification and cobenefits for multistress tolerance. Global Change Biology, 24(10), 4869–4893. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1111/gcb.14381 

Ocko, I. B., Sun, T., Shindell, D., Oppenheimer, M. Hristov, A. N., Pacala, S. W., Mauzerall, D. L., Xu, Y. & Hamburg, S. P. (2021). Acting rapidly to deploy readily available methane mitigation measures by sector can immediately slow global warming. Environmental Research, 16(5). Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/abf9c8 

Ramya, A., Dhevagi, P., Poornima, R., Avudainayagam, S., Watanabe, M., & Agathokleous, E. (2023). Effect of ozone stress on crop productivity: A threat to food security. Environmental Research, 236(2), 116816. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envres.2023.116816 

Roshchanka, V., Evans, M., Ruiz, F., & Kholod, N. (2017). A strategic approach to selecting policy mechanisms for addressing coal mine methane emissions: A case study on Kazakhstan. Environmental Science & Policy, 78, 185–192. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2017.08.005 

Roshchanka, V., & Talkington, C. (2022). Effective monitoring, reporting and verification of methane emissions in the coal industry and the linkage to methane mitigation. Link to source: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4298409

Rystad Energy. (2023, October 18). Methane tracking technologies study [PowerPoint slides]. Environmental Defense Fund. Link to source: https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/documents/Methane%20Tracking%20Technologies%20Study%20Oct%2018%202023.pdf 

Sampedro, J., Waldhoff, S., Sarofim, M., & Van Dingenen, R. (2023). Marginal damage of methane emissions: Ozone impacts on agriculture. Environmental and Resource Economics, 84(4), 1095–1126. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-022-00750-6 

Setiawan, D. & Wright, C. (2024). The risks of ignoring methane emissions in coal mining. Ember. Link to source: https://ember-energy.org/latest-insights/the-risks-of-ignoring-methane-emissions-in-coal-mining/#supporting-material 

Shindell, D., Sadavarte, P., Aben, I., Bredariol, T. O., Dreyfus, G., Höglund-Isaksson, L., Poulter, B., Saunois, M., Schmidt, G. A., Szopa, S., Rentz, K., Parsons, L., Qu, Z., Faluvegi, G., & Maasakkers, J. D. (2024). The methane imperative. Frontiers. Link to source: https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/science/articles/10.3389/fsci.2024.1349770/full

Silvia, F., Talia, V., & Di Matteo, M. (2021). Coal mining and policy responses: Are externalities appropriately addressed? A meta-analysis. Environmental Science & Policy, 126, 39–47. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2021.09.013

Smith, C., Nicholls, Z. R. J., Armour, K., Collins, W., Forster, P., Meinshausen, M., Palmer, M. D., & Watanabe, M. (2021). The earth’s energy budget, climate feedbacks, and climate sensitivity supplementary material (climate change 2021: The physical science basis. Contribution of working group I to the sixth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change). Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Link to source: https://www.ipcc.ch/ 

Tai, A. P., Sadiq, M., Pang, J. Y., Yung, D. H., & Feng, Z. (2021). Impacts of surface ozone pollution on global crop yields: comparing different ozone exposure metrics and incorporating co-effects of CO2. Frontiers in Sustainable Food Systems, 5, 534616. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.3389/fsufs.2021.534616 

Tao, S., Chen, S., & Pan, Z. (2019). Current status, challenges, and policy suggestions for coalbed methane industry development in China: A review. Energy Science & Engineering, 7(4), 1059–1074. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1002/ese3.358

Tate, R. D., (2022). Bigger than oil or gas? Sizing up coal mine methane. Global Energy Monitor. Link to source: https://globalenergymonitor.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/GEM_CCM2022_final.pdf 

United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). (2019). Best practice guidance for effective methane recovery and use from abandoned coal mines. Link to source: https://unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/energy/images/CMM/CMM_CE/Best_Practice_Guidance_for_Effective_Methane_Recovery_and_Use_from_Abandoned_Coal_Mines_FINAL__with_covers_.pdf 

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U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2024a). About coal mine methane. Retrieved November 5, 2024. Link to source: https://www.epa.gov/cmop/about-coal-mine-methane 

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Zhu, R., Khanna, N., Gordon, J., Dai, F., & Lin, J. (2023). Abandoned coal mine methane reduction. Berkeley Lab. Link to source: https://ccci.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/Abandonded%20Coal%20Mines_Final%20%28EN%29.pdf 

Credits

Lead Fellow

  • Jason Lam

Contributors

  • James Gerber, Ph.D.

  • Yusuf Jameel, Ph.D. 

  • Ruthie Burrows, Ph.D.

  • Daniel Jasper

  • Alex Sweeney

Internal Reviewers

  • Sarah Gleeson, Ph.D.

  • Aiyana Bodi

  • Hannah Henkin

  • Ted Otte

  • Amanda D. Smith, Ph.D.

  • Paul C. West, Ph.D.

Effectiveness

Each Mt of methane that is not emitted avoids 81.2 Mt CO₂‑eq on a 20-yr basis and 27.9 Mt CO₂‑eq on a 100-yr basis (Smith et al., 2021). The GWP of methane is shown in Table 1. If the methane is converted into CO₂ through burning the contribution to global climate change will still be less than if the methane were released into the atmosphere. Methane abatement can have a more immediate impact on future global temperature rise because it has a larger and faster warming effect than CO₂. Mitigating methane emissions in the near term can give us more time for reducing GHG emissions in hard-to-abate sectors.

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Table 1. Effectiveness at reducing emissions.

Unit: t CO₂‑eq/Mt methane abated

100-yr GWP 27,900,000
20-yr GWP 81,200,000
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Cost

The cost of methane abatement will vary depending on the type of coal mine, the methane content of the coal seam, the strategies used, and the availability of financial support for methane abatement. For our analysis, we average the costs for various feasible abatement strategies under two general assumptions: sufficiently high methane content for any of the major abatement strategies to be applied (IEA, 2024a) and the ability to use the abated methane on-site or sell it to natural gas companies. The initial cost to abate 1 Mt of methane is US$1.5 billion, the operating cost is about US$130 million, revenue is about US$260 million and the overall net savings over a 30-yr amortization period is US$90 million. We were only able to find revenue information from the IEA (2023b, 2024a), meaning the net cost could be different than shown here due to the site specific nature of methane abatement strategies. 

We considered the baseline scenario to be coal mining practices without methane abatement; all cost estimates here are relative to that scenario.

Cost data were limited for this solution. The available costs for a specific abatement strategy were normalized according to the cost of abating one Mt of methane, and it was assumed that a single strategy abated all of the methane for the coal mine. This results in an overestimate of the effectiveness of any individual strategy. In reality, multiple strategies are likely to be used. The costs shown in Table 2 are for the global scale of coal methane abatement and not from the point of view of an individual coal producer. Many studies that look at global coal methane abatement put multiple abatement strategies together and do not go into detail about the individual technology costs. The IEA (2024a) included costs for individual CMM abatement strategies; however, the costs were only applicable for coal mines that produce enough methane for it to be economically feasible to deploy the specific abatement strategy. Flaring is an effective strategy for destroying captured methane, but will not create revenue in the absence of a carbon market. For more details on important aspects for coal methane abatement strategies, refer to the Appendix.

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Table 2. Cost per unit climate impact.

Unit: 2023 US$/t CO₂‑eq, 100-yr basis

median -3.17
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Learning Curve

Many of the solutions for reducing methane emissions from coal mining are mature. Research from Rystad (2023) found that technologies for abating CMM emissions, such as drainage gas utilization, sealing and rerouting, and flaring, were considered mature in Australian coal mines. Regenerative thermal oxidation technology is in commercial use for destroying volatile organic compounds and can be used for destroying ventilation air methane (VAM), but the manufacturers have little interest in improving the technology for use in coal mines without confirmed markets (GMI, 2018; Rystad, 2023). We do not foresee the costs of implementing these solutions falling in the future. CMM regulations may encourage manufacturers to improve oxidation technology, but the technology is already used commercially, so there may not be large efficiency gains.

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Speed of Action

Speed of action refers to how quickly a climate solution physically affects the atmosphere after it is deployed. This is different from speed of deployment, which is the pace at which solutions are adopted.

At Project Drawdown, we define the speed of action for each climate solution as emergency brake, gradual, or delayed.

Manage Coal Mine Methane is an EMERGENCY BRAKE climate solution. It has the potential to deliver a more rapid impact than gradual and delayed solutions. Because emergency brake solutions can deliver their climate benefits quickly, they can help accelerate our efforts to address dangerous levels of climate change. For this reason, they are a high priority.

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Caveats

CMM abatement consists of capturing methane that would otherwise be released into the atmosphere. If the methane is burned, CO₂ will be emitted as a byproduct; however, this provides a net climate benefit compared to the methane that would be emitted. CMM emissions management can be avoided by not extracting, transporting, or using coal in the first place. 

As coal demand drops, the number of closed or abandoned coal mines will increase. These mines will continue to release AMM into the atmosphere for many decades. Sealing underground mines can stop methane from being released, but seals have been known to fail and require ongoing monitoring to verify methane is not escaping (Kholod et al., 2020). Gas collection systems can be used to capture AMM, but the CO₂ produced will need to be captured for complete emission reductions. Flooding underground coal mines is very effective at stopping methane from being released; however, there are concerns about water contamination (McKinsey, 2021).

Our assessment does not include the impact of the CO₂ created from the destruction of methane.

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Current Adoption

We estimated that the coal sector abated 0.59 Mt of methane in 2023 and released 40 Mt in 2024 (IEA, 2025). Reports from EPA (2022), and GMI (2023) estimated the amount of CMM abated to date, and the statistical ranges from the sources are shown in Table 3. However, most of the data focused on coal mines in the United States. The EPA (2024b) stated that 0.3 Mt of methane was captured in 2021 due to the Coalbed Methane Outreach Program. CMM is controlled at coal mines for health and safety reasons, but only in 2024 was regulation introduced for reducing methane emissions from the energy sector in the European Union (Assan, 2024).


GMI (2024a) reports that 0.79 Mt of methane was abated from coal mines in 2023 among its member countries. The organization includes 48 GMI member countries but covers only 70% of human-caused methane emissions and does not track methane mitigation that has occurred outside of the group. GMI (2024b) currently lists more than 471 CMM abatement projects in 20 countries worldwide. According to Global Energy Monitor (n.d.), over 6,000 coal mines were active in more than 70 countries as of April 2024. With these data sources, we consider our analysis of the current adoption of CMM abatement as conservative. 

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Table 3. Current (2023) adoption level.

Unit: Mt/yr of methane abated

25th percentile 0.49
mean 0.59
median (50th percentile) 0.59
75th percentile 0.69
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Adoption Trend

Although there are little data specifically quantifying the adoption trend of methane abatement strategies, we estimate the median adoption trend to be about 0.60 Mt/yr of methane abated.  Table 4 shows the adoption trend for CMM abatement.

GMI (2024) reported methane abatement staying relatively stable from 2016 to 2023 at about 0.8 Mt/yr, with a small increase to 1.0 Mt of methane in 2019–2022 before decreasing back to 0.8 Mt in 2023, causing the adoption trend to be higher than the current adoption value we state above. The EPA (2024a) Coalbed Methane Outreach Program showed fairly stable emission reductions of around 0.33 Mt/yr between 2016 and 2022. The annual methane emission abatement from this program gradually increased 2003–2011, followed by a continued trend of methane abatement at a slower rate 2011–2022. The IEA (2024b) found that almost 2.0 Mt of methane was emitted in 2023 by the United States coal industry, and 60% of those emissions could be abated.

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Table 4. (2016–2023) adoption trend.

Unit: Mt/yr methane abated

25th percentile 0.46
mean 0.60
median (50th percentile) 0.60
75th percentile 0.73
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Adoption Ceiling

We found an adoption ceiling of about 40.3 Mt/yr of methane based on the IEA’s (2025) estimate for total methane emissions from the coal mine sector. We assumed that current CMM emissions would remain the same into the future with no changes in coal production or demand. Table 5 shows the adoption ceiling for coal mine methane abatement.

Even in the IEA’s (2023c) highest methane abatement energy scenario, only 93% of the methane emissions are reduced by 2050. This would still leave the coal sector releasing methane into the atmosphere. Reduced coal production will reduce the amount of methane emissions produced by the coal sector and consequently reduce the amount of methane that needs to be controlled with methane abatement. However, methane abatement will still be important for abating the remaining CMM emissions and the growing proportion of AMM emissions (IEA, 2023c, Kholod et al., 2020). 

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Table 5. Adoption ceiling.

Unit: Mt/yr of methane abated

median (50th percentile) 40.30
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Achievable Adoption

The amount of methane that could be abated from CMM varies greatly depending on global coal demand. We estimate an achievable adoption range of 2.83–4.40 Mt/yr of methane abated.The Achievable – Low value aligns with the IEA (2023c) Announced Pledges scenario, in which all announced climate policies are met and full methane abatement is employed, but net-zero emissions are not achieved. This range of high and low values was determined by taking the total methane abated in these scenarios and dividing by the difference between the target year and 2024 to determine an average amount of methane abated each year to reach the scenario target. 

The Achievable – High value aligns with Ocko et al.(2021), where all economically and technically feasible methane abatement is employed by 2030. DeFabrizio et al. (2021) estimated that the degasification of underground mines and flaring would be the source of most methane abatement from coal mining, with degasification of surface mines abating a smaller proportion of methane over time. However, research from Kholod et al. (2020) suggested there will be an increase in AMM emissions as coal mines are closed. Methane emissions from AMM are not extensively monitored right now, and there is limited research on the topic. Methane abatement strategies will be needed to abate growing AMM emissions (Zhu et al, 2023). 

In addition, some research suggested CMM is being underestimated, with global emissions being as high as 67 Mt/yr (Assan & Whittle, 2023). If coal demand drops by 90%, as outlined in IEA’s Net Zero Emissions scenario, total coal methane emissions would decline to 3 Mt/yr, and the use of methane abatement would reduce emissions by 2 Mt/yr, leaving only 1 Mt/yr of CMM emitted in 2050. 

With growing interest and investment from governments and academia in identifying methane leaks using technologies such as satellite sensing (MethaneSAT, 2024), the opportunities for methane abatement will increase. Over 150 countries have joined the Global Methane Pledge (representing 50% of the world’s human-caused methane) to reduce methane emissions by 30% of 2020 emissions by 2030 (UNEP, 2021). The IEA (2023a) found that even in a baseline scenario, many governments have announced or put in place measures to cut methane emissions; we would expect a growing trend in global methane abatement to occur. The IEA (2024c) states that in all scenarios global coal demand will decrease. Table 6 shows the statistical low and high achievable ranges for CMM abatement based on different sources for future uptake of CMM abatement.

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Table 6. Range of achievable adoption levels.

Unit: Mt/yr methane abated

Current Adoption 0.59
Achievable – Low 2.83
Achievable – High 4.40
Adoption Ceiling 40.30
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We estimate that the coal industry is currently abating approximately 0.02 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr on a 100-yr basis and 0.03 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr on a 20-yr basis using methane abatement strategies. This is about 1% of total methane emissions emitted in 2024 (IEA, 2025). 

As the coal industry opens or closes coal mines due to changing coal demand, the opportunities for CMM abatement projects will change along with it. If coal demand gradually drops by 2050, more than 0.12 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr of methane could be abated. However, if coal demand drops more quickly from the implementation of energy and climate policies, the methane abatement potential would drop because the coal sector is producing less methane. This is projected in the different energy scenarios modeled by the IEA (2023c). The range between the current CMM abatement and the adoption ceiling is shown in Table 7.

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Table 7. Climate impact at different levels of adoption.

Unit: Gt CO₂‑eq/yr, 100-yr basis

Current Adoption 0.02
Achievable – Low 0.08
Achievable – High 0.12
Adoption Ceiling 1.12
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Additional Benefits

Food Security 

Methane reacts with chemicals like VOCs to form tropospheric, or ground-level ozone (Fiore et al., 2002). Ground-level ozone has been linked to reduced crop growth and yields (Mills et al., 2018; Samperdo et al., 2023; Tai et al., 2021). Mitigating methane emissions from coal mines could improve food security by reducing ground-level ozone and its harmful impacts on agricultural productivity (Tai et al., 2014; Ramya et al., 2023).

Health and Air Quality

Around 10% of anthropogenic methane comes from coal mines (IEA, 2024a). Methane released from coal mines contributes to ground-level ozone pollution, which can harm lung function, exacerbating conditions like asthma, bronchitis, and emphysema, and can contribute to premature mortality (Mar et al., 2022). Domingo et al. (2024) estimated that ground-level ozone accounted for about 6,600 excess deaths per year in about 400 cities globally. 

Methane released from coal mines also endangers workers’ safety in the mines, increasing the possibility of explosions, which are a significant source of fatalities and injuries (CDC, 2024). In the United States, from 2006 to 2011, mine explosions were responsible for about 25% of fatalities in the mining industry (CDC, 2024). While advances in methane mitigation technologies can prevent explosions and fatalities, mines across LMICs usually do not have methane mitigation protocols in place. Installing methane abatement strategies can potentially protect workers from such explosions (Tate, 2022).

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Risks

CMM abatement strategies could be implemented on a voluntary basis due to favorable natural gas prices, but if natural gas prices drop there is less economic incentive to abate methane (IEA, 2021). Without policy support enforcing methane abatement, emissions could continue, especially from VAM and AMM, which are more difficult to capture and use. Ensuring long-term monitoring and abatement of CMM can be challenging if coal mines are abandoned due to owners going bankrupt, leaving environmental damages unpaid for and remediation up to nearby communities or taxpayers (Ward et al., 2023). 

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Interactions with Other Solutions

Reinforcing

Managing coal methane can have a positive impact on other solutions that reduce methane release to the atmosphere. The use of technologies such as degasification systems, methane destruction, and Leak Detection and Repair (LDAR) in the coal mine sector can demonstrate the effectiveness and economic case for employing methane abatement. This would build momentum for the widespread adoption of methane abatement because successes in the coal sector can be leveraged and applied to other sectors. In addition, LDAR is a key part in identifying where we can abate methane emissions and lessons learned from the coal sector can be applied to other sites, as well as identifying methane leaks in general. 

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Competing

CMM management interacts negatively with solutions that provide clean electricity as this solution captures methane that can be used as an energy source, prolonging the use of natural gas infrastructure and reducing the cost of methane as a fuel source. 

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Dashboard

Solution Basics

Mt methane abated

t CO₂-eq (100-yr)/unit
2.79×10⁷
units/yr
Current 0.592.834.4
Achievable (Low to High)

Climate Impact

Gt CO₂-eq (100-yr)/yr
Current 0.02 0.080.12
US$ per t CO₂-eq
-3
Emergency Brake

CH₄ , N₂O, BC

Trade-offs

Methane abatement strategies are a powerful tool to reduce methane emissions; however, providing a secondary source of revenue for coal mining could increase the profitability and longevity of some coal mines. A broad strategy to reduce reliance on coal as an energy resource is needed to reduce the amount of CMM generated. Even with methane abatement strategies in place, methane used as a fuel or destroyed through flaring will still emit GHGs and contribute to global climate change.

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Mt CO2–eq/yr
< 1
1–3
3–5
5–7
7–9
> 9

Annual emissions from coal mine sources, 2024

Globally, coal mines are responsible for 40 of the 354 Mt of anthropogenic methane emissions in 2024. This is equivalent to 1,116 Mt CO2-eq based on a 100-year GWP time scale. Methane emissions occur throughout the life of a coal mine and can continue after mines are closed or abandoned.

Lewis, C., Tate, R.D., and Mei, D.L. (2024). Fuel operations sector: Coal mining emissions methodology [Data set]. WattTime and Global Energy Monitor, Climate TRACE Emissions Inventory. Retrieved April 18, 2025, from Link to source: https://climatetrace.org

International Energy Agency. (2025). Global methane tracker documentation 2025 version. Link to source: https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/2c0cf2d5-3910-46bc-a271-1367edfed212/GlobalMethaneTracker2025.pdf

Mt CO2–eq/yr
< 1
1–3
3–5
5–7
7–9
> 9

Annual emissions from coal mine sources, 2024

Globally, coal mines are responsible for 40 of the 354 Mt of anthropogenic methane emissions in 2024. This is equivalent to 1,116 Mt CO2-eq based on a 100-year GWP time scale. Methane emissions occur throughout the life of a coal mine and can continue after mines are closed or abandoned.

Lewis, C., Tate, R.D., and Mei, D.L. (2024). Fuel operations sector: Coal mining emissions methodology [Data set]. WattTime and Global Energy Monitor, Climate TRACE Emissions Inventory. Retrieved April 18, 2025, from Link to source: https://climatetrace.org

International Energy Agency. (2025). Global methane tracker documentation 2025 version. Link to source: https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/2c0cf2d5-3910-46bc-a271-1367edfed212/GlobalMethaneTracker2025.pdf

Maps Introduction

Coal mine methane abatement is applicable in any area with coal mines. While China and the United States are the largest coal producers, Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and India also generated more than 10 Mt CO₂‑eq (100-yr) from coal mines in 2015 (GMI, 2015).

Levels of methane emissions from coal mines can vary geographically. The greatest abatement potential is in China, Kazakhstan, Australia, and several countries in Eastern Europe and Africa (Shindell et al., 2024). However, methane abatement is recommended for all coal mining activities, and high-income countries are in a position to share supportive technologies and practices for coal mine methane abatement with other coal-producing countries to reduce methane emissions from active and abandoned or closed mines.

Action Word
Manage
Solution Title
Coal Mine Methane
Classification
Highly Recommended
Lawmakers and Policymakers
  • Create policies based on global best practices, such as the IEA’s roadmap to implementing CMM regulations.
  • Require all coal mines to measure and report on methane emissions.
  • Invest in monitoring, reporting, and verification technologies, such as satellites, and support low-income countries in monitoring emissions.
  • Provide financial incentives, such as reduced taxes, subsidies, grants, low-interest loans, and feed-in tariffs, for adopting drainage and capture technologies suitable for the region.
  • Require closed and abandoned mines to be sealed and monitored.
  • Compile or update global inventories of the status of abandoned and closed mines.
  • When possible, do not approve the construction of new coal mines.
  • Require low-emitting technologies for equipment, coal processing, storage, and transportation.
  • Develop infrastructure to use captured CMM, including gas processing, grid connections, and industry capacity.
  • Establish clear resource rights to methane emitted from active and abandoned mines.
  • Include CMM recovery in Nationally Determined Contributions and other international reporting instruments.
  • Provide educational resources to industry leaders, including potential reduction options, workshops, actionable reports, direct engagements, and demonstrations.
  • Join, support, or create public initiatives such as the Global Methane Initiative, Global Methane Pledge, or Global Methane Hub.

Further information:

Practitioners
  • Utilize or destroy CMM to the maximum extent.
  • Work with policymakers to create policies based on global best practices, such as the IEA’s roadmap to implementing CMM regulations.
  • Measure and report on methane emissions.
  • Invest in monitoring, reporting, and verification technologies, such as satellites, and support low-income countries to monitor emissions.
  • Take advantage of any financial incentives, such as reduced taxes, subsidies, grants, low-interest loans, and feed-in tariffs, to adopt drainage and capture technologies suitable for the region.
  • Ensure abandoned and closed mines are sealed and monitored.
  • Compile or update global inventories of the status of abandoned and closed mines.
  • When possible, do not approve the construction of new coal mines.
  • Develop infrastructure to use captured CMM, including gas processing, grid connections, and industry capacity.
  • Assist policymakers in establishing clear resource rights to methane emitted from active and abandoned mines.
  • Use existing drainage systems for gas capture, utilization, and sale.
  • Improve technologies, such as thermal oxidizers, for the purposes of VAM destruction.
  • Partner with carbon markets that are linked to CMM abatement.
  • Improve CMM emissions modeling and monitoring, including satellites and on-the-ground methods.
  • Invest in R&D to improve extraction, capture, storage, transportation, and utilization technologies.
  • Join, support, or create public initiatives such as the Global Methane Initiative, Global Methane Pledge, or Global Methane Hub.
  • Utilize educational resources to industry leaders, including potential reduction options, workshops, actionable reports, direct engagements, and demonstrations.

Further information:

Business Leaders
  • Ensure that operations or investments that include coal mines utilize or destroy methane emissions.
  • Do not invest, plan to use, or create agreements with new coal mines.
  • Invest in high-integrity carbon markets that are linked to CMM abatement.
  • Invest in R&D to improve the efficiency of extraction, capture, storage, transportation, and utilization technologies.
  • Develop infrastructure to use captured CMM, including gas processing, grid connections, and industry capacity.
  • Utilize existing data sets such as the UN’s International Methane Emissions Observatory to inform current and future decisions.
  • Join, support, or create public initiatives such as the Global Methane Initiative, Global Methane Pledge, or Global Methane Hub.

Further information:

Nonprofit Leaders
  • Advocate for regulating CMM emissions and local policies based on global best practices, such as the IEA’s roadmap to implementing CMM regulations.
  • Assist coal mines in measuring and reporting or conducting independent studies on CMM emissions.
  • Advocate for financial incentives, such as reduced taxes, subsidies, grants, low-interest loans, and feed-in tariffs, for the adoption of drainage and capture technologies suitable for the region.
  • Advocate to stop the construction of new coal mines.
  • Compile or update global inventories of the status of abandoned and closed mines.
  • Help create high-integrity carbon markets that are linked to CMM abatement.
  • Provide educational resources to industry leaders, including potential reduction options, workshops, actionable reports, direct engagements, and demonstrations.
  • Join, support, or create public initiatives such as the Global Methane Initiative, Global Methane Pledge, or Global Methane Hub.

Further information:

Investors
  • Invest in monitoring, reporting, and verification technologies, such as satellites, and support low-income countries to monitor emissions.
  • Provide financial support through low-interest loans or green bonds to adopt drainage and capture technologies suitable for the region.
  • Do not invest in constructing new coal mines and require any existing investments to provide transparent emissions data and time-based reduction strategies.
  • Invest in R&D to improve the efficiency of extraction, capture, storage, transportation, and utilization technologies.
  • Develop infrastructure to use captured CMM, including gas processing, grid connections, and industry capacity.
  • Invest in high-integrity carbon markets that are linked to CMM abatement.
  • Join, support, or create public initiatives such as the Global Methane Initiative, Global Methane Pledge, or Global Methane Hub.

Further information:

Philanthropists and International Aid Agencies
  • Invest in monitoring, reporting, and verification technologies, such as satellites, and support low-income countries to monitor emissions.
  • Provide financial support to adopt drainage and capture technologies suitable for the region.
  • Invest in R&D to improve the efficiency of extraction, capture, storage, transportation, and utilization technologies.
  • Assist in establishing clear resource rights to methane emitted from active and abandoned mines.
  • Help create high-integrity carbon markets that are linked to CMM abatement.
  • Join, support, or create public initiatives such as the Global Methane Initiative, Global Methane Pledge, or Global Methane Hub.
  • Provide educational resources to industry leaders, including potential reduction options, workshops, actionable reports, direct engagements, and demonstrations.
  • Advocate for regulating CMM emissions and local policies based on global best practices, such as the IEA’s roadmap to implementing CMM regulations.
  • Compile or update global inventories of the status of abandoned and closed mines.

Further information:

Thought Leaders
  • Advocate for regulating CMM emissions and local policies based on global best practices, such as the IEA’s roadmap to implementing CMM regulations.
  • Assist coal mines in measuring and reporting or conducting independent studies on CMM emissions.
  • Advocate for financial incentives, such as reduced taxes, subsidies, grants, low-interest loans, and feed-in tariffs, for adopting drainage and capture technologies suitable for the region.
  • Assist in establishing clear resource rights to methane emitted from active and abandoned mines.
  • Advocate to stop the construction of new coal mines.
  • Compile or update global inventories of the status of abandoned and closed mines.
  • Help create high-integrity carbon markets that are linked to CMM abatement.
  • Provide educational resources to industry leaders, including potential reduction options, workshops, actionable reports, direct engagements, and demonstrations.
  • Join, support, or create public initiatives such as the Global Methane Initiative, Global Methane Pledge, or Global Methane Hub.

Further information:

Technologists and Researchers
  • Improve CMM emissions modeling and monitoring, including satellites and on-the-ground methods.
  • Compile or update global inventories of the status of abandoned and closed mines.
  • Develop infrastructure to use captured CMM, including gas processing, grid connections, and industry capacity.
  • Discover ways to utilize existing drainage systems for gas capture, utilization, and sale.
  • Improve technologies, such as thermal oxidizers, for the purposes of VAM destruction.
  • Develop new ways to improve extraction, capture, storage, transportation, and utilization technologies.
  • Develop verifiable carbon credits using technology such as blockchain to improve the integrity of carbon markets.
  • Improve the efficiency of mining equipment to reduce maintenance requirements and costs.

Further information:

Communities, Households, and Individuals
  • Advocate for regulating CMM emissions and local policies based on global best practices, such as the IEA’s roadmap to implementing CMM regulations.
  • Advocate for financial incentives, such as reduced taxes, subsidies, grants, low-interest loans, and feed-in tariffs, for the adoption of drainage and capture technologies suitable for the region.
  • Advocate to stop the construction of new coal mines.
  • Assist coal mines in measuring and reporting or conducting independent studies on CMM emissions.
  • Provide educational resources to industry leaders, including potential reduction options, workshops, actionable reports, direct engagements, and demonstrations.
  • Join, support, or create public initiatives such as the Global Methane Initiative, Global Methane Pledge, or Global Methane Hub.

Further information:

Sources
Evidence Base

Consensus of effectiveness of abating methane emissions from coal mines: High

There is a high level of consensus about the effectiveness of methane abatement strategies. These strategies can be deployed cost effectively in many cases and have an immediate impact on reducing global temperature rise. 

Authoritative sources such as the IEA (2024c) and UNEP (2021) agree that reducing methane emissions can noticeably slow global climate change. Methane is a short-lived climate pollutant that has a much stronger warming effect than CO₂ over a given time period. IEA (2023d) identified that close to 55% (22 Mt) of CMM emissions could be abated with existing technologies. However, there are significant challenges in measuring and recovering methane emissions in the coal sector. Analysis from Assan & Whittle (2023) found that global CMM emissions could be significantly higher than reported, 38–67 Mt/yr compared with the 40 Mt/yr reported by the IEA (2025).

The IEA (2023a) noted that more than half of CMM emissions could be abated through utilization, flaring, or oxidation technologies, with abatement being more practical for underground mines. Many studies (DeFabrizio et al., 2021; Malley et al., 2023; Shindell et al., 2024) have shown that methane abatement strategies can use existing technologies, often at low cost. In some countries, coal operators already identify the location and sources of CMM to meet health and safety regulations (Assan & Whittle, 2023); Setiawan & Wright (2024) noted that existing technologies such as pre-mine drainage and VAM mitigation have been proven in various places around the world over the past 25 years. According to UNEP (2021), coal methane abatement could reduce emissions by 12–25 Mt/yr, with up to 98% of the measures implemented at low cost. However, costs may vary significantly based on the available infrastructure and characteristics of an individual coal mine.

The results presented in this document summarize findings from 21 reviews and meta-analyses and 20 original studies reflecting current evidence from three countries (Australia, China, and the United States) as well as from sources examining global CMM emissions. We recognize this limited geographic scope creates bias, and hope this work inspires research and data sharing on this topic in underrepresented regions.

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Appendix

CMM abatement strategy constraints:

The type of coal mine, the amount of methane produced, and the available infrastructure greatly affect which abatement strategies are economical. Underground coal mines often produce more CMM and are likely to capture CMM using degasification systems and use it for productive purposes such as electricity generation or selling captured methane. However, VAM, which is a major part of CMM emissions, can be challenging to use for productive purposes due to the low methane concentrations. VAM requires regenerative thermal oxidation technology to effectively destroy and with more gassy coal mines. According to the IEA (2023b), technologies such as flaring and drained CMM can be used at less gassy mines with lower initial capital cost. Capturing methane for destruction has the disadvantage of not creating a source of revenue to offset the capital cost of methane abatement without a form of carbon markets in place. 

More than 60% of methane-related emissions from coal mining are from the ventilation of underground coal mines. Large amounts of fresh air are used to lower the concentration of methane and reduce the risk of explosions in underground mines. This makes it challenging to destroy or use the low concentrations of VAM (UNEP, 2022). It is also challenging to capture methane from surface mines because the coal is in direct contact with the atmosphere and over a larger surface area. However, thermal oxidation systems have been used to destroy VAM (U.S. EPA, 2019) and there have been examples of degasification systems used for surface mines as well (IEA, 2023b). Methane emissions from AMM can be dealt with by flooding underground mines with water (Kholod et al., 2020) or by sealing and using capture and utilization projects (Zhu et al., 2023). 

Technologies for reducing methane emissions can be divided between underground and surface coal mines:

Underground mines
  • Predainage prior to mining
  • VAM capture and utilization
  • Capture of abandoned mine gas
  • Sealing or flooding of abandoned mines 
Surface mines
  • Degasification of surface mines
  • Predrainage of surface mines

Appendix References

CNX. (2024, March 20). Jumpstarting coal mine methane capture projects for beneficial end use [PowerPoint slides].Global Methane Initiative. https://www.globalmethane.org/resources/details.aspx?resourceid=5386 

United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). (2019). Best practice guidance for effective methane recovery and use from abandoned coal mines. https://unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/energy/images/CMM/CMM_CE/Best_Practice_Guidance_for_Effective_Methane_Recovery_and_Use_from_Abandoned_Coal_Mines_FINAL__with_covers_.pdf 

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Updated Date

Mobilize Electric Cars

Submitted by Drawdown Admin on
Sector
Transportation
Mode
Cut Emissions
Cluster
Electrify Vehicles Fuel Switching
Image
Electric car plugged into charging station
Coming Soon
Off
Summary

Electric cars are four-wheeled passenger cars that run on electricity, usually from the electricity grid and stored in onboard batteries (i.e., not including fuel cell electric cars). This definition includes electric pickup trucks, motorhomes, and other such vehicles. It does not include two-wheeled vehicles or hybrid cars (which combine an electric motor with a gasoline or diesel engine). It also does not include freight and commercial vehicles, such as electric heavy trucks, buses, and ambulances. We define Mobilizing Electric Cars as replacing fossil fuel–powered cars (i.e., those powered by internal combustion engines) with electric equivalents, as well as building out the necessary infrastructure (especially charging stations) to support them.

Income & work,Health
Water quality,Air quality
Description for Social and Search
We define Mobilizing Electric Cars as replacing fossil fuel–powered cars (i.e., those powered by internal combustion engines) with electric equivalents, as well as building out the necessary infrastructure (especially charging stations) to support them.
Overview

Electric cars provide the same functionality as fossil fuel–powered cars, but use electric motors rather than fuel-burning engines. The energy for the motors comes from an onboard battery, which is normally charged using electricity from the grid.

Electric cars have no direct tailpipe emissions, since electric motors do not burn fuel to function. The grid electricity used to charge their batteries may have come from fossil fuel-burning power plants, meaning electric cars are not entirely free of direct emissions. However, in most electrical grids, even those that mainly generate electricity from fossil fuels, electric cars usually still produce fewer emissions per pkm than fossil fuel–powered cars. This is for three reasons. First, large, fixed power plants and efficient electric grids can convert fossil fuels into useful energy more efficiently than smaller, mobile internal combustion engines in cars. In extreme cases, such as grids powered entirely by coal, this might not be the case, particularly if the grid has a lot of transmission and distribution losses. Second, the powertrain of an electric car delivers electricity from the battery to the wheels much more efficiently than the powertrain of a fossil fuel–powered car, which wastes much more energy as heat (International Transport Forum, 2020; Mofolasayo, 2023; Verma et al., 2022). Third, electric cars’ powertrains enable regenerative braking, where the kinetic energy of the car’s motion is put back into the battery when the driver brakes (Yang et al., 2024).

Electric cars reduce emissions of CO₂,  methane, and nitrous oxide to the atmosphere by replacing fuel-powered cars, which emit these gases from their tailpipes.

APEC. (2024). Connecting Traveler Choice with Climate Outcomes: Innovative Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reduction Policies and Practices in the APEC Region through Traveler Behavioral Change. https://www.apec.org/publications/2024/09/connecting-traveler-choice-with-climate-outcomes--innovative-greenhouse-gas-emissions-reduction-policies-and-practices-in-the-apec-region-through-traveler-behavioral-change 

Agusdinata, D. B., Liu, W., Eakin, H., & Romero, H. (2018). Socio-environmental impacts of lithium mineral extraction: Towards a research agenda. Environmental Research Letters, 13(12). Scopus. https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/aae9b1

Anenberg, S. C., Miller, J., Henze, D., & Minjares, R. (2019, February 26). A global snapshot of the air pollution-related health impacts of transportation sector emissions in 2010 and 2015. International Council on Clean Transportation. https://theicct.org/publication/a-global-snapshot-of-the-air-pollution-related-health-impacts-of-transportation-sector-emissions-in-2010-and-2015/

Bloomberg New Energy Finance. (2024). Electric Vehicle Outlook 2024. Bloomberg. https://about.bnef.com/electric-vehicle-outlook/

Carey, J. (2023). The other benefit of electric vehicles. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 120(3), e2220923120. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2220923120

Castelvecchi, D. (2021). Electric cars and batteries: How will the world produce enough? Nature, 596(7872), 336–339. https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-021-02222-1

Choma, E. F., Evans, J. S., Hammitt, J. K., Gómez-Ibáñez, J. A., & Spengler, J. D. (2020). Assessing the health impacts of electric vehicles through air pollution in the United States. Environment International, 144, 106015. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envint.2020.106015

Dillman, K. J., Árnadóttir, Á., Heinonen, J., Czepkiewicz, M., & Davíðsdóttir, B. (2020). Review and Meta-Analysis of EVs: Embodied Emissions and Environmental Breakeven. Sustainability, 12(22), Article 22. https://doi.org/10.3390/su12229390

Electric vehicle database. (2024). Energy consumption of full electric vehicles. Electric Vehicle Database. https://ev-database.org/cheatsheet/energy-consumption-electric-car

Fakhrooeian, P., Pitz, V., & Scheppat, B. (2024). Systematic Evaluation of Possible Maximum Loads Caused by Electric Vehicle Charging and Heat Pumps and Their Effects on Common Structures of German Low-Voltage Grids. World Electric Vehicle Journal, 15(2), 49. https://doi.org/10.3390/wevj15020049

Garcia, E., Johnston, J., McConnell, R., Palinkas, L., & Eckel, S. P. (2023). California’s early transition to electric vehicles: Observed health and air quality co-benefits. The Science of the Total Environment, 867, 161761. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2023.161761

Goetzel, N., & Hasanuzzaman, M. (2022). An empirical analysis of electric vehicle cost trends: A case study in Germany. Research in Transportation Business & Management, 43, 100825. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rtbm.2022.100825

Guarnieri, M., & Balmes, J. R. (2014). Outdoor air pollution and asthma. Lancet, 383(9928), 1581–1592. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(14)60617-6

IEA. (2022). Electric Vehicles: Total Cost of Ownership Tool. IEA. https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/data-tools/electric-vehicles-total-cost-of-ownership-tool

IEA. (2024). Global EV Outlook 2024. International Energy Agency. https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2024

International Council on Clean Transportation. (2024). Clearing the air: Why EVs can outperform conventional vehicles in freezing temperatures. International Council on Clean Transportation. https://theicct.org/clearing-the-air-why-evs-can-outperform-conventional-vehicles-in-freezing-temperatures-oct24/

International Transport Forum. (2020). Good to Go? Assessing the Environmental Performance of New Mobility (Corporate Partnership Board). OECD. https://www.itf-oecd.org/sites/default/files/docs/environmental-performance-new-mobility.pdf

IPCC. (2022). Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge. https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg3/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGIII_FullReport.pdf

Jones, S. J. (2019). If electric cars are the answer, what was the question? British Medical Bulletin, 129(1), 13–23. https://doi.org/10.1093/bmb/ldy044

Kerr, G. H., Goldberg, D. L., & Anenberg, S. C. (2021). COVID-19 pandemic reveals persistent disparities in nitrogen dioxide pollution. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 118(30), e2022409118. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2022409118

Kittner, N., Tsiropoulos, I., Tarvydas, D., Schmidt, O., Staffell, I., & Kammen, D. M. (2020). Chapter 9—Electric vehicles. In M. Junginger & A. Louwen (Eds.), Technological Learning in the Transition to a Low-Carbon Energy System (pp. 145–163). Academic Press. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-818762-3.00009-1

Larson, E., Grieg, C., Jenkins, J., Mayfield, E., Pascale, A., Zhang, C., Drossman, J., Williams, R., Pacala, S., Socolow, R., Baik, E., Birdesy, R., Duke, R., Jones, R., Haley, B., Leslie, E., Paustain, K., & Swan, A. (2021). Net-Zero America: Potential Pathways, Infrastructure, and Impacts. Princeton University. https://lpdd.org/resources/princeton-report-net-zero-america/

Melaina, M., Bush, B., Eichman, J., Wood, E., Stright, D., Krishnan, V., Keyser, D., Mai, T., & McLaren, J. (2016). National Economic Value Assessment of Plug-in Electric Vehicles: Volume I (No. NREL/TP-5400-66980). National Renewable Energy Lab. (NREL), Golden, CO (United States). https://doi.org/10.2172/1338175

Milovanoff, A., Posen, I. D., & MacLean, H. L. (2020). Electrification of light-duty vehicle fleet alone will not meet mitigation targets. Nature Climate Change, 1–6. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-020-00921-7

Mofolasayo, A. (2023). Assessing and Managing the Direct and Indirect Emissions from Electric and Fossil-Powered Vehicles. Sustainability, 15(2), Article 2. https://doi.org/10.3390/su15021138

Nguyen, C. T. P., Nguyễn, B.-H., Ta, M. C., & Trovão, J. P. F. (2023). Dual-Motor Dual-Source High Performance EV: A Comprehensive Review. Energies, 16(20), Article 20. https://doi.org/10.3390/en16207048

Nickel Institute. (2021a). Asia Pacific and UK Automotive ICE vs EV Total Cost of Ownership. https://nickelinstitute.org/media/8d993d1b8165b23/tco-asia-pacific-automotive.pdf

Nickel Institute. (2021b). European Union and UK Automotive ICE vs EV Total Cost of Ownership. https://nickelinstitute.org/media/8d9058c08d2bcf2/avicenne-study-tco-eu-and-uk-automotive.pdf

Nickel Institute. (2021c). North American Automotive ICE vs EV Total Cost of Ownership. https://nickelinstitute.org/media/8d993d0fd3dfd5b/tco-north-american-automotive-final.pdf

Pan, S., Yu, W., Fulton, L. M., Jung, J., Choi, Y., & Gao, H. O. (2023). Impacts of the large-scale use of passenger electric vehicles on public health in 30 US. metropolitan areas. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 173, 113100. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2022.113100

Pennington, A. F., Cornwell, C. R., Sircar, K. D., & Mirabelli, M. C. (2024). Electric vehicles and health: A scoping review. Environmental Research, 251, 118697. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envres.2024.118697

Peters, D. R., Schnell, J. L., Kinney, P. L., Naik, V., & Horton, D. E. (2020). Public health and climate benefits and trade‐offs of U.S. vehicle electrification. GeoHealth, 4, e2020GH000275. https://doi.org/10.1029/2020GH000275 

Ravi, S. S., & Aziz, M. (2022). Utilization of Electric Vehicles for Vehicle-to-Grid Services: Progress and Perspectives. Energies, 15(2), Article 2. https://doi.org/10.3390/en15020589

Ren, Y., Sun, X., Wolfram, P., Zhao, S., Tang, X., Kang, Y., Zhao, D., & Zheng, X. (2023). Hidden delays of climate mitigation benefits in the race for electric vehicle deployment. Nature Communications, 14(1), 3164. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-023-38182-5

Requia, W. J., Mohamed, M., Higgins, C. D., Arain, A., & Ferguson, M. (2018). How clean are electric vehicles? Evidence-based review of the effects of electric mobility on air pollutants, greenhouse gas emissions and human health. Atmospheric Environment, 185, 64–77. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.atmosenv.2018.04.040

Roberts, C. (2022). Easy Street for Low-Carbon Mobility? The Political Economy of Mass Electric Car Adoption. In G. Parkhurst & W. Clayton (Eds.), Electrifying Mobility: Realising a Sustainable Future for the Car (Vol. 15, pp. 13–31). Emerald Publishing Limited. https://doi.org/10.1108/S2044-994120220000015004

Sovacool, B. K. (2019). The precarious political economy of cobalt: Balancing prosperity, poverty, and brutality in artisanal and industrial mining in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Extractive Industries and Society, 6(3), 915–939. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2019.05.018

Szyszkowicz, M., Kousha, T., Castner, J., & Dales, R. (2018). Air pollution and emergency department visits for respiratory diseases: A multi-city case crossover study. Environmental Research, 163, 263–269. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envres.2018.01.043

Vega-Perkins, J., Newell, J. P., & Keoleian, G. (2023). Mapping electric vehicle impacts: Greenhouse gas emissions, fuel costs, and energy justice in the United States. Environmental Research Letters, 18(1), 014027. https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/aca4e6

Verma, S., Dwivedi, G., & Verma, P. (2022). Life cycle assessment of electric vehicles in comparison to combustion engine vehicles: A review. Materials Today: Proceedings, 49, 217–222. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.matpr.2021.01.666

Weiss, M., Dekker, P., Moro, A., Scholz, H., & Patel, M. K. (2015). On the electrification of road transportation – A review of the environmental, economic, and social performance of electric two-wheelers. Transportation Research Part D: Transport and Environment, 41, 348–366. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trd.2015.09.007

WHO. (2024). Number of registered vehicles. https://www.who.int/data/gho/data/indicators/indicator-details/GHO/number-of-registered-vehicles

Yang, C., Sun, T., Wang, W., Li, Y., Zhang, Y., & Zha, M. (2024). Regenerative braking system development and perspectives for electric vehicles: An overview. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 198, 114389. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2024.114389

Yoder, K. (2023, June 14). The environmental disaster lurking beneath your neighborhood gas station. Grist. https://grist.org/accountability/gas-stations-underground-storage-tank-leaks-environmental-disaster/

Credits

Lead Fellow

  • Cameron Roberts, Ph.D.

Contributors

  • Ruthie Burrows, Ph.D.

  • James Gerber, Ph.D.

  • Daniel Jasper

  • Heather Jones, Ph.D.

  • Heather McDiarmid, Ph.D.

  • Alex Sweeney

Internal Reviewers

  • Aiyana Bodi

  • James Gerber, Ph.D.

  • Hannah Henkin

  • Jason Lam

  • Ted Otte

  • Amanda D. Smith, Ph.D.
Effectiveness

Every million pkm shifted from fossil fuel–powered cars to electric cars reduces 48.52 t CO₂‑eq on a 100-yr basis (Table 1), or 49.13 t CO₂‑eq on a 20-yr basis. 

We found this by collecting data on electricity consumption for a range of electric car models (Electric Vehicle Database, 2024) and multiplying it by the global average emissions per kWh of electricity generation. Fossil fuel–powered cars emit 115.3 t CO₂‑eq/pkm on a 100-yr basis (116.4 t CO₂‑eq/pkm on a 20-yr basis). Electric cars already have lower emissions in countries with large shares of renewable, nuclear, or hydropower generation in their electricity grids (International Transport Forum, 2020; Verma et al., 2022).

These data come disproportionately from North America and Europe, and, notably, leave out China, which has made major progress on electric cars in recent years and has many of its own makes and models. 

Electric cars today are disproportionately used in high- and upper-middle-income countries, whose electricity grids emit fewer GHG emissions than the global average per unit of electricity generated (IEA, 2024). Electric cars in use today reduce more emissions on average than the figure we have calculated. 

Electric cars have higher embodied emissions than fossil fuel–powered cars, due to the GHG-intensive process of manufacturing batteries. This gives them a carbon payback period which ranges from zero to over 10 years (Dillman et al., 2020; Ren et al., 2023).

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Table 1. Effectiveness at reducing emissions.

Unit: t CO₂‑eq/million pkm, 100-yr basis

25th percentile 38.95
mean 49.54
median (50th percentile) 48.52
75th percentile 62.82

Shifted from fossil fuel–powered cars to electric cars, 100-yr basis.

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Cost

Including purchase price, financing, fuel and electricity costs, maintenance costs, and insurance, electric cars cost on average US$0.05 less per pkm (US$49,442.19/million pkm) than fuel-powered cars. This is based on a population-weighted average of the cost differential between electric and fossil fuel–powered cars in seven countries: Japan, South Korea, China, the United States, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (Nickel Institute, 2021b, 2021c, 2021a). 

While this analysis found that electric cars are less expensive than fossil fuel–powered cars almost everywhere, the margin is often quite small. The difference is less than US$0.01/pkm (US$10,000/million pkm) in South Korea, the United States, and Germany. In some markets, electric cars are more expensive per pkm than fossil fuel–powered cars (IEA, 2022).

This amounts to savings of US$1,019/t CO₂‑eq on a 100-yr basis (Table 2), or US$1,006/t CO₂‑eq avoided emissions on a 20-yr basis). 

Our analysis does not include costs that are the same for both electric and fossil fuel–powered cars, including taxes, insurance costs, and public costs of building road infrastructure.

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Table 2. Cost per unit climate impact.

Unit: 2023 US$/t CO₂‑eq, 100-yr basis

median -1,019
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Learning Curve

For every doubling in electric car production, costs decline by approximately 23% (Table 3; Goetzel & Hasanuzzaman, 2022; Kittner et al., 2020; Weiss et al., 2015). 

In addition to manufacturing improvements and economies of scale, this reflects rapid technological advancements in battery production, which is a significant cost component of an electric powertrain (Weiss et al., 2015).

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Table 3. Learning rate: drop in cost per doubling of the installed solution base.

Unit: %

25th percentile 23.00
mean 22.84
median (50th percentile) 23.00
75th percentile 24.00
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Speed of Action

Speed of action refers to how quickly a climate solution physically affects the atmosphere after it is deployed. This is different from speed of deployment, which is the pace at which solutions are adopted.

At Project Drawdown, we define the speed of action for each climate solution as emergency brake, gradual, or delayed.

Mobilize Electric Cars is a GRADUAL climate solution. It has a steady, linear impact on the atmosphere. The cumulative effect over time builds as a straight line.

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Caveats

The effectiveness of electric cars in mitigating GHG emissions is critically dependent on the emissions associated with electricity production. In electricity grids dominated by fossil fuels, electric cars have far higher emissions than in jurisdictions with low-emission electricity generation (International Transport Forum, 2020; IPCC, 2022; Milovanoff et al., 2020).

Electric car adoption faces a major obstacle in the form of constraints on battery production. While electric car battery production is being aggressively upscaled (IEA, 2024), building enough batteries to replace a significant fraction of fossil fuel–powered cars is an enormous challenge and will likely slow down a transition to electric cars, even if there is very high consumer demand (Milovanoff et al., 2020). 

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Current Adoption

Approximately 28 million electric cars are in use worldwide (IEA, 2024). This corresponds to about 819,000 million pkm traveled by electric car worldwide each year (Table 4). We assume that all of this travel would be undertaken by a fossil fuel–powered car if the car’s occupants did not use an electric car. Adoption is much higher in some countries, such as Norway, where the share of electric cars was 29% in 2023.

To convert the IEA’s electric car estimates into pkm traveled, we needed to determine the average passenger-distance that each passenger car travels per year. Using population-weighted data from several different countries, the average car carries 1.5 people and travels an average of 29,250 pkm/yr. Multiplying this number by the number of electric cars in use gives the total travel distance shift from fossil fuel–powered cars to electric cars.

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Table 4. Current (2024) adoption level.

Unit: million pkm/yr

Population-weighted mean 818,900

Implied travel shift from fossil fuel-powered cars to electric cars.

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Adoption Trend

Globally, about 104 billion pkm are displaced from fossil fuel–powered cars by electric cars every year (Table 5). The number of new electric cars purchased each year is growing at an average rate of over 10% (Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2024; IEA, 2024), although purchase rates have declined slightly from record highs between 2020–2022. Global purchases of electric cars are still increasing by around 3.6 million cars/yr. This is based on globally representative data (Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2024; IEA, 2024).

Despite this impressive rate of growth, electric cars still have a long way to go before they replace a large percentage of the more than 2 billion cars currently driven (WHO, 2024).

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Table 5. 2023-2024 adoption trend.

Unit: million pkm/yr

Median, or population-weighted mean 104,000

Implied travel shift from fossil fuel-powered cars to electric cars.

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Adoption Ceiling

The adoption ceiling for electric cars is equal to the total passenger-distance driven by the more than 2 billion cars worldwide (WHO, 2024). Using a population-weighted mean of the average distance (in pkm) traveled per car annually, this translates to about 59 trillion pkm (Table 6).

Replacing every single fossil fuel–powered car with an electric car would require an enormous upscaling of electric car production capacity, rapid development of charging infrastructure, cost reductions to increase affordability, and technological improvements to improve suitability for more kinds of drivers and trips. It would also face cultural obstacles from drivers who are attached to fossil fuel–powered cars (Roberts, 2022).

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Table 6. Adoption ceiling.

Unit: million pkm/yr

Median, or population-weighted mean 59,140,000

Implied travel shift from fossil fuel-powered cars to electric cars.

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Achievable Adoption

The achievable adoption of electric car travel ranges from about 26–47 trillion pkm displaced from fossil fuel–powered cars (Table 7).

Various organizations have produced forecasts for electric car adoption. These are not assessments of feasible adoption per se; they are instead trying to predict likely rates of adoption, given various assumptions about the future (Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2024; IEA, 2024). However, they are useful in that they take a large number of different variables into account to make their estimates. To convert these estimates of future likely adoption into estimates of the achievable adoption range, we apply some assumptions to the numbers in the scenario projections. 

To find a high rate of electric car adoption, we assume that every country could reach the highest rate of adoption projected to occur for any country. Bloomberg New Energy Finance’s (2024) Economic Transition scenario predicts that Norway will reach an 80% electric vehicle stock share by 2040. We therefore set our high adoption rate at 80% worldwide. This corresponds to 1,617 million total electric cars in use, or 47 trillion pkm traveled by electric car. An important caveat is that with a global supply constraint in the production of electric car batteries, per-country adoption rates are somewhat zero-sum. Every electric car purchased in Norway is one that cannot be purchased elsewhere. Therefore, for the whole world to achieve an 80% electric car stock share, global electric car and battery production would have to increase radically. While this might be possible due to technological improvements or radical increases in investment, it should not be taken for granted.

To identify a lower feasible rate of electric car adoption, we simply take the highest estimate for global electric car adoption. Bloomberg’s Economic Transition scenario predicts 44% global electric car adoption by 2050. This corresponds to 890 million electric cars, or 26 trillion pkm.

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Table 7. Range of achievable adoption levels.

Unit: million pkm/yr.

Current Adoption 818,900
Achievable – Low 26020000
Achievable – High 47310000
Adoption ceiling (physical limit) 59140000
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Electric cars are currently displacing 0.040 Gt CO₂‑eq of GHG emissions from the transportation system on a 20-yr basis (Table 8), or 0.040 Gt CO₂‑eq on a 100-yr basis. 

If electric cars reach 44% of the global car stock share by 2040, as Bloomberg (2024) projects, without any change in the total number of cars on the road, they will displace 1.263 Gt CO₂‑eq GHG emissions on a 100-yr basis (1.279 Gt CO₂‑eq  on a 20-yr basis).

If electric cars globally reach 80% of car stock share, as Bloomberg projects might happen in Norway by 2040, they will displace 2.296 Gt CO₂‑eq GHG emissions on a 100-yr basis (2.325 Gt CO₂‑eq on a 20-yr basis).

If electric cars replace 100% of the global car fleet, they will displace 2.870 Gt CO₂‑eq  GHG emissions on a 100-yr basis (2.906 Gt CO₂‑eq on a 20-yr basis).

These numbers are based on the present-day average emissions intensity from electrical grids in countries with high rates of electric car adoption. If more clean energy is deployed on electricity grids, the total climate impact from electric cars will increase considerably.

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Table 8. Climate impact at different levels of adoption.

Unit: Gt CO₂‑eq/yr, 100-yr basis

Current Adoption 0.040
Achievable – Low 1.263
Achievable – High 2.296
Adoption ceiling (physical limit) 2.870
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Additional Benefits

Health

Since electric cars do not have tailpipe emissions, they can mitigate traffic-related air pollution, which is associated with asthma, lung cancer, increased emergency department visits for respiratory disease, and increased mortality (Anenberg et al., 2019; Guarnieri & Balmes, 2014; Pan et al., 2023; Pennington et al., 2024; Requia et al., 2018; Szyszkowicz et al., 2018). Transitioning to electric cars can reduce exposure to air pollution, improve health, and prevent premature mortality (Garcia et al., 2023; Larson et al., 2021; Peters et al., 2020).

The health benefits of adopting electric cars vary spatially and partly depend upon how communities generate electricity (Choma et al., 2020), but there is evidence that they have improved health. A study in California found a reduction in emergency department visits in ZIP codes with an increase in zero-emissions cars (Garcia et al., 2023). By 2050, projections estimate that about 64,000–167,000 deaths could be avoided by adopting electric cars (Larson et al., 2021).

Communities rich in racial and ethnic minorities tend to be located near highways and major traffic corridors and so are disproportionately exposed to air pollution (Kerr et al., 2021). Transitioning to electric cars could improve health in marginalized urban neighborhoods that are located near highways, industry, or ports (Pennington et al., 2024). These benefits depend upon an equitable distribution of electric cars and infrastructure to support the adoption of electric cars (Garcia et al., 2023). Low-income households may not see the same savings from an electric car due to the cost and stability of electricity prices and distance to essential services (Vega-Perkins et al., 2023)

Income and Work

Adopting electric cars can reduce a household’s energy burden, or the proportion of income spent on residential energy (Vega-Perkins et al., 2023). About 90% of United States households that use a car could see a reduction in energy burden by transitioning to an electric car. Money spent to charge electric cars is more likely to stay closer to the local community where electricity is generated, whereas money spent on fossil fuels often benefits oil-producing regions. This benefits local and national economies by improving their trade balance (Melaina et al., 2016).

Water Quality

Substituting electric car charging points for gas stations can eliminate soil and water pollution from leaking underground gas tanks (Yoder, 2023). 

Air Quality

The adoption of electric cars reduces emissions of air pollutants, including sulfur oxides, sulfur dioxide, and nitrous oxides, and especially carbon monoxide and volatile organic compounds. It has a smaller impact on particulate emissions (Requia et al., 2018). Some air pollution reductions are limited (particularly PM and ozone) due to heavier electric cars and pollution from brakes, tires, and wear on the batteries (Carey, 2023; Jones, 2019).

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Risks

Mining minerals necessary to produce electric car batteries carries environmental and social risks. This has been associated with significant harms, particularly in lower-income countries that supply many of these minerals (Agusdinata et al., 2018; Sovacool, 2019).

Electric cars might also pose added safety risks due to their higher weight, which means they have longer stopping distances and can cause more significant damage in collisions and to pedestrians and cyclists (Jones, 2019). This risk includes dual-motor electric cars that incorporate two electric motors – one for the front axle and one for the rear – providing all-wheel drive (AWD) capabilities. The addition of a second motor increases the vehicle's weight and complexity, which can lead to higher energy consumption and reduced overall efficiency. Moreover, the increased manufacturing costs associated with dual-motor systems can result in higher purchase prices for consumers (Nguyen et al., 2023). However, this configuration enhances vehicle performance, offering improved acceleration, traction, and handling, particularly in adverse weather conditions, which are valued by some consumers. 

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Interactions with Other Solutions

Reinforcing

Electric car batteries can potentially be used as stationary batteries for use as energy storage to balance electrical grids, either through vehicle-to-grid (V2G) technology or with degraded electric car batteries being installed in stationary battery farms as a form of reuse (Ravi & Aziz, 2022). 

The effectiveness of electric cars in reducing GHG emissions increases as electricity grids become cleaner, since lower-carbon electricity further reduces the emissions associated with car charging. 

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Competing

Electric cars compete with heat pumps for electricity. Installing both heat pumps and electric cars could strain the electric grid’s capacity (Fakhrooeian et al., 2024).

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Scaling up the production of electric cars requires more mining of critical minerals, which could affect ecosystems that are valuable carbon sinks (Agusdinata et al., 2018).

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Getting travelers onto bicycles, sidewalks, public transit networks, or smaller electric vehicles (such as electric bicycles) provides a greater climate benefit than getting them into electric cars. There is an opportunity cost to deploying electric cars because those resources could otherwise be used to support these more effective solutions (APEC, 2024).

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Dashboard

Solution Basics

million passenger-kilometers (million pkm)

t CO₂-eq (100-yr)/unit
038.9548.52
units/yr
Current 818,9002.602×10⁷4.731×10⁷
Achievable (Low to High)

Climate Impact

Gt CO₂-eq (100-yr)/yr
Current 0.04 1.2632.296
US$ per t CO₂-eq
-1,019
Gradual

CO₂, CH₄, N₂O, BC

Trade-offs

Electric car batteries are currently quite emissions-intensive to produce, resulting in high embodied emissions. While the embodied emissions are higher for electric cars than fossil fuel–powered cars, the results are mixed when coupling these with operating emissions. Dillman et al.’s (2020) review of the literature on this topic found that producing the average battery-electric car emits 63% more GHG emissions than the average gasoline-powered car, and 77% more GHG emissions than the average diesel-powered car. Taking their lower tailpipe emissions into account, this gives them a GHG payback period of zero to more than 10 years. In some cases, the emissions payback period is longer than the expected lifespan of the electric car, meaning it will have higher life cycle GHG emissions than a comparable gasoline or diesel-powered car. However, the ITF (2020) found that the lifetime emissions from manufacturing, operation, and infrastructure are lower for electric cars. All of these studies relied on assumptions, including the type of car, size of battery, electricity grid, km/yr, and lifetime. 

There is some criticism against any solution that advocates for car ownership, contending that the focus should be on solutions such as Enhance Public Transit that reduce car ownership and usage. Jones (2019) noted “there is little evidence to suggest that EVs can offer the universal solution that global governments are seeking,” and that efforts to popularize electric cars “may be better directed at creating more efficient public transport systems, rather than supporting personal transportation, if the significant health disbenefits of car use during the past 150 years are to be in any way reduced.”

Milovanoff et al. (2020) offered similar criticism: “Closing the mitigation gap solely with EVs would require more than 350 million on-road EVs (90% of the fleet), half of national electricity demand, and excessive amounts of critical materials to be deployed in 2050. Improving [the] average fuel consumption of fossil fuel–powered vehicles, with stringent standards and weight control, would reduce the requirement for alternative technologies, but is unlikely to fully bridge the mitigation gap. There is therefore a need for a wide range of policies that include measures to reduce vehicle ownership and usage.”

Allocating the limited global battery supply to privately owned electric cars might undermine the deployment of other solutions that also require batteries, but are more effective at avoiding GHG emissions (Castelvecchi, 2021). These could include electric buses, electric rail, and electric bicycles.

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Mt CO2-eq
0–4
4–8
8–12
12–16
16–20
> 20
No data

Annual road transportation emissions, 2024

Cars are the largest source of vehicle emissions, which are shown here for urban areas.

Kott, T., Foster, K., Villafane-Delgado, M., Loschen, W., Sicurello, P., Ghebreselassie, M., Reilly, E., and Hughes, M. (2024). Transportation sector - Global road emissions. [Data set]. The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL), Climate TRACE Emissions Inventory. Retrieved March 12, 2025 from Link to source: https://climatetrace.org

Mt CO2-eq
0–4
4–8
8–12
12–16
16–20
> 20
No data

Annual road transportation emissions, 2024

Cars are the largest source of vehicle emissions, which are shown here for urban areas.

Kott, T., Foster, K., Villafane-Delgado, M., Loschen, W., Sicurello, P., Ghebreselassie, M., Reilly, E., and Hughes, M. (2024). Transportation sector - Global road emissions. [Data set]. The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL), Climate TRACE Emissions Inventory. Retrieved March 12, 2025 from Link to source: https://climatetrace.org

Maps Introduction

Electric cars can effectively mitigate climate change in all geographic regions, although there is spatial variability that influences per-pkm effectiveness and potential solution uptake. Effectiveness heavily depends on the carbon intensity of the charging source, which varies greatly between and within countries. The effectiveness of electric cars decreases for larger vehicles, favored in some countries (Jones, 2019; Nguyen et al., 2023).  

The uptake of electric cars can be significantly influenced by socioeconomic factors, including the relative costs of fuels and electricity, the capacity of civil society to provide adequate charging infrastructure, and the availability of subsidies for electric vehicles.

Extreme temperatures can negatively impact vehicle range, both by slowing battery chemistry and increasing energy demands for regulating passenger compartment temperature, which can adversely affect consumers’ perceptions of electric car suitability in locations with such climates (International Council on Clean Transportation, 2024).

Electric cars are most effective in regions with low-carbon electricity grids (International Transport Forum, 2020; Verma et al., 2022). This includes countries with high hydro power (including Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and parts of Canada such as British Columbia and Quebec), nuclear energy (such as France), and renewables (including Portugal, New Zealand, and parts of the United States, including California and some of the Northwest) (IEA, 2024). Electric car adoption is growing rapidly in a number of regions. For future scaling, targeting countries with supportive policies, renewable energy potential, and growing urban populations will deliver the greatest climate benefits.

Action Word
Mobilize
Solution Title
Electric Cars
Classification
Highly Recommended
Lawmakers and Policymakers
  • Create government procurement policies to transition government fleets to electric cars.
  • Provide financial incentives such as tax breaks, subsidies, or grants for electric car production and purchases that gradually reduce as market adoption increases.
  • Provide complimentary benefits for electric car drivers, such as privileged parking areas, free tolls, and access schemes.
  • Use targeted financial incentives to assist low-income communities in purchasing electric cars and to incentivize manufacturers to produce more affordable options.
  • Develop charging infrastructure, ensuring adequate spacing between stations and equitable distribution of stations.
  • Invest in R&D or implement regulations to improve manufacturing, adoption, supply chain standards, and circularity of electric cars, particularly batteries.
  • Transition fossil fuel electricity production to renewables while promoting the transition to electric cars.
  • Disincentivize fossil fuel–powered car ownership by gradually introducing taxes, penalties, buy-back programs, or other mechanisms.
  • Offer educational resources and one-stop shops for information on electric vehicles, including demonstrations, cost savings, environmental impact, and maintenance.
  • Work with industry and labor leaders to construct new electric car plants and to transition fossil fuel–powered car manufacturing into electric car production.
  • Set regulations for sustainable use of electric car batteries and improve recycling infrastructure.
  • Join international efforts to promote and ensure that environmental and human rights standards are met for supply chains.
  • Incentivize or mandate life-cycle assessments and product labeling (e.g., Environmental Product Declarations).
  • Create, support, or join partnerships that offer information, training, and general support for electric car adoption.

Further information:

Practitioners
  • Produce and sell affordable electric car models.
  • Collaborate with dealers to provide incentives, low-interest financing, or income-based payment options.
  • Develop charging infrastructure, ensuring adequate spacing between stations and equitable distribution of stations.
  • Invest in R&D to improve manufacturing, adoption, supply chain standards, and circularity of electric cars, particularly batteries.
  • Offer educational resources and one-stop shops for information on electric cars, including demonstrations, cost savings, environmental impact, and maintenance.
  • Work with policymakers and labor leaders to construct new electric car plants and to transition fossil fuel–powered car manufacturing into electric car production.
  • Join international efforts to promote and ensure that environmental and human rights standards are met for supply chains.
  • Invest in recycling and circular economy infrastructure.
  • Conduct life-cycle assessments and ensure product labeling (e.g., Environmental Product Declarations).
  • Create, support, or join partnerships that offer information, training, and general support for electric car adoption.

Further information:

Business Leaders
  • Set company procurement policies to transition corporate fleets to electric cars.
  • Take advantage of any financial incentives such as tax breaks, subsidies, or grants for electric car purchases.
  • Create long-term purchasing agreements with electric car manufacturers to support stable demand and improve economies of scale.
  • Install charging stations and offer employee benefits for electric car drivers, such as privileged parking areas.
  • Invest in R&D to improve manufacturing, adoption, supply chain standards, and circularity of electric cars, particularly batteries.
  • Work with industry and labor leaders to transition fossil fuel–powered car manufacturing into electric car production.
  • Advocate for financial incentives and policies that promote electric car adoption.
  • Join international efforts to promote and ensure that environmental and human rights standards are met for supply chains.
  • Educate customers and investors about the company's transition to electric cars and encourage them to learn more about them.
  • Create, support, or join partnerships that offer information, training, and general support for electric car adoption.

Further information:

Nonprofit Leaders
  • Set organizational procurement policies to transition fleets to electric cars.
  • Take advantage of financial incentives such as tax breaks, subsidies, or grants for electric car purchases.
  • Advocate for financial incentives and policies that promote electric car adoption.
  • Install charging stations and offer employee benefits for electric car drivers, such as privileged parking areas.
  • Advocate for or provide improved charging infrastructure.
  • Offer workshops or support to low-income communities for purchasing and owning electric cars.
  • Work with industry and labor leaders to transition fossil fuel–powered car manufacturing into electric car production.
  • Join international efforts to promote and ensure that environmental and human rights standards are met for supply chains.
  • Advocate for regulations on lithium-ion batteries and investments in recycling facilities.
  • Offer educational resources and one-stop shops for information on electric cars, including demonstrations, cost savings, environmental impact, and maintenance.
  • Create, support, or join partnerships that offer information, training, and general support for electric car adoption.

Further information:

Investors
  • Invest in electric car companies.
  • Support portfolio companies in transitioning their corporate fleets.
  • Invest in companies that provide charging equipment or installation.
  • Invest in R&D to improve manufacturing, adoption, supply chain standards, and circularity of electric cars, particularly batteries.
  • Invest in electric car companies, associated supply chains, and end-user businesses like rideshare apps.
  • Join international efforts to promote and ensure that environmental and human rights standards are met for supply chains.
  • Create, support, or join partnerships that offer information, training, and general support for electric car adoption. 

Further information:

Philanthropists and International Aid Agencies
  • Set organizational procurement policies to transition fleets to electric cars.
  • Install charging stations and offer employee benefits for electric car drivers, such as privileged parking areas.
  • Take advantage of any financial incentives such as tax breaks, subsidies, or grants for electric car purchases.
  • Advocate for financial incentives and policies that promote electric car adoption.
  • Advocate for or provide improved charging infrastructure.
  • Offer financial services such as low-interest loans or grants for purchasing electric cars and charging equipment.
  • Offer workshops or support to low-income communities for purchasing and owning electric cars.
  • Work with industry and labor leaders to transition fossil fuel–powered car manufacturing into electric car production.
  • Join international efforts to promote and ensure that environmental and human rights standards are met for supply chains.
  • Advocate for regulations on lithium-ion batteries and investments in recycling facilities.
  • Offer educational resources and one-stop shops for information on electric cars, including demonstrations, cost savings, environmental impact, and maintenance.
  • Create, support, or join partnerships that offer information, training, and general support for electric car adoption.

Further information:

Thought Leaders
  • If purchasing a new car, buy an electric car.
  • Take advantage of financial incentives such as tax breaks, subsidies, or grants for electric car purchases.
  • Share your experiences with electric cars through social media and peer-to-peer networks, highlighting the cost savings, benefits, incentive programs, and troubleshooting tips.
  • Advocate for financial incentives and policies that promote electric car adoption.
  • Advocate for improved charging infrastructure.
  • Help improve the circularity of electric car supply chains through design, advocacy, or implementation.
  • Conduct in-depth life-cycle assessments of electric cars in particular geographies.
  • Research ways to reduce weight and improve the performance of electric cars while appealing to customers.
  • Join international efforts to promote and ensure that environmental and human rights standards are met for supply chains.
  • Create, support, or join partnerships that offer information, training, and general support for electric car adoption.

Further information:

Technologists and Researchers
  • Improve the circularity of supply chains for electric car components.
  • Reduce the amount of critical minerals required for electric car batteries.
  • Innovate low-cost methods to improve safety, labor standards, and supply chains in mining for critical minerals.
  • Research ways to reduce weight and improve the performance of electric cars while appealing to customers.
  • Develop vehicle-grid integration and feasible means of using the electrical capacity of electric cars to manage the broader grid.
  • Improve techniques to repurpose used electric car batteries for stationary energy storage.
  • Develop methods of converting fossil fuel–powered car manufacturing and infrastructure to electric.

Further information:

Communities, Households, and Individuals
  • If purchasing a new car, purchase an electric car.
  • Take advantage of any financial incentives such as tax breaks, subsidies, or grants for electric car purchases.
  • Share your experiences with electric cars through social media and peer-to-peer networks, highlighting the cost-savings, benefits, incentive programs, and troubleshooting tips.
  • Help shift the narrative around electric cars by demonstrating capability and performance.
  • Advocate for financial incentives and policies that promote electric car adoption.
  • Advocate for improved charging infrastructure.
  • Help improve ciricularity of electric car supply chains.
  • Join international efforts to promote and ensure that environmental and human rights standards are met for supply chains.
  • Create, support, or join partnerships that offer information, training, and general support for electric car adoption.

Further information:

Sources
Evidence Base

Consensus of effectiveness in reducing emissions: Mixed

There is a high level of consensus among major organizations and researchers working on climate solutions that electric cars offer a substantial reduction in GHG emissions compared to fossil fuel–powered cars. This advantage is strongest in places where electricity in the grid comes from sources with low GHG emissions, but it persists even if fossil fuels play a major role in energy production. 

Major climate research organizations generally see electric cars as the primary means of reducing GHG emissions from passenger transportation. This perspective has received criticism from some scholars who argue that electric cars have been overstated as a climate solution, pointing to supply constraints, embodied emissions, and emissions from electricity generation (Jones, 2019; Milovanoff et al., 2020). Embodied emissions are outside the scope of this assessment. 

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2022) estimated well-to-wheel (upstream and downstream emissions) GHG emissions intensity from gasoline and diesel cars at 139 g CO₂‑eq/pkm and 107 g CO₂‑eq/pkm, respectively. They estimated that electric cars running on low-carbon electricity (solar, wind, and nuclear sourced) emit 9 g CO₂‑eq/pkm; electric cars running on natural gas electricity emit 104 g CO₂‑eq/pkm; and electric cars running entirely on coal electricity emit 187 g CO₂‑eq/pkm. These estimates include upstream emissions, such as those from oil refining and coal mining.

The International Energy Agency (IEA, 2024) noted that “[a] battery electric car sold in 2023 will emit half as much as fossil fuel–powered equivalents over its lifetime. This includes full life-cycle emissions, including those from producing the car.” 

The International Transport Forum (ITF) (2020) estimated that fossil fuel–powered cars emit 162 g CO₂‑eq/pkm, while electric cars emit 125 g CO₂‑eq/pkm. This included embodied and upstream emissions, which are outside the scope of this assessment.

The results presented in this document summarize findings from 15 reviews and meta-analyses and 24 original studies reflecting current evidence from 52 countries, primarily the IEA’s Electric Vehicle Outlook 2024), the Electric Vehicle Database 2024), the International Transportation Forum’s life cycle analysis on sustainable transportation 2020), the Nickel Institute’s cost estimates on electric cars (Nickel Institute, 2021b, 2021c, 2021a). We recognize this limited geographic scope creates bias, and hope this work inspires research and data sharing on this topic in underrepresented regions.

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Updated Date

Mobilize Electric Bicycles

Submitted by Drawdown Admin on
Sector
Transportation
Mode
Cut Emissions
Cluster
Electrify Vehicles
Image
Parent riding electric bicycle with children seated in back carrier
Coming Soon
Off
Summary

We define the Mobilize Electric Bicycles solution as increased travel by bicycles that have an electric motor to supplement the effort of the rider, but require the rider to turn the pedals to activate the motor. Some sources refer to electric mopeds or motorcycles as electric bicycles, but those modes of transportation fall within Project Drawdown’s Mobilize Electric Scooters & Motorcycles solution and are not covered here. Also known as pedelecs or e-bikes, electric bicycles can be deployed as privately owned electric bicycles or as shared electric bicycles, which are available as part of bicycle sharing networks typically operated at the city level for short-term rental on a per-trip basis.

Income & work,Health
Air quality
Description for Social and Search
We define the Mobilize Electric Bicycles solution as increased travel by bicycles that have an electric motor to supplement the effort of the rider, but require the rider to turn the pedals to activate the motor.
Overview

Electric bicycles use electric power to supplement the muscular effort of the rider. Like conventional bicycles and other forms of nonmotorized transportation, electric bicycles get some of their motive power from human muscle power, which in turn comes from food calories – a form of closed-loop biomass power with no emissions (see Project Drawdown’s Improve Nonmotorized Transportation solution). Unlike conventional bicycles, however, electric bicycles get added power from electricity, which comes from the grid and is stored in a battery.

This partial reliance on grid electricity, as well as the production of the battery and electric motors, increases the carbon emissions and cost of an electric bicycle compared to those of a conventional bicycle. Nevertheless, electric bicycle emissions remain far lower than the emissions of cars (including electric cars), meaning that every passenger-kilometer (pkm) moved from a car to an electric bicycle achieves significant GHG emissions savings. 

Since the additional electric power enables electric bicycle riders to cover longer distances at greater speeds, climb larger hills, and carry heavier loads – and do it all with substantially less physical effort – electric bicycles can substitute for more car trips than conventional bicycles can. This can amplify electric bicycles’ potential carbon savings relative to conventional bicycles, even if the savings per pkm traveled are lower. Electric bicycles also tend to get used at high rates, and a large proportion of pkm by electric bicycle are pkm that would otherwise have been by car (Bigazzi & Wong, 2020; Bourne et al., 2020; Cairns et al., 2017; Fukushige et al., 2021).

Shared electric bicycles can enhance this effect. The need for docking stations and rebalancing services (i.e., the use of larger vehicles to reposition bicycles to avoid one-way trips that create shortages in some places and surpluses in others) increases the carbon emissions of electric bicycles per pkm compared with private electric bicycles. By renting out electric bicycles one trip at a time, however, bicycle-share systems can make electric bicycles affordable to a larger percentage of the public, further increasing the number of pkm that can be shifted to electric bicycles.

The adoption of electric bicycles reduces emissions of CO₂ and methane from cars by displacing pkm traveled via car. When electric bicycles replace a trip by a gasoline- or diesel-powered car, they also eliminate reliance on fossil fuels to complete that trip. Even if the electricity used to power electric bicycles comes from fossil fuels, those emissions are relatively small and could eventually be replaced with low-emission electricity through the deployment of renewables or similar technologies.

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WHO. (2022). Number of registered vehicles. Link to source: https://www.who.int/data/gho/data/indicators/indicator-details/GHO/number-of-registered-vehicles 

WHO. (2023). Despite notable progress, road safety remains urgent global issue. Link to source: https://www.who.int/news/item/13-12-2023-despite-notable-progress-road-safety-remains-urgent-global-issue

World Bank. (2024). World Development Indicators. Link to source: https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/search/dataset/0037712/World-Development-Indicators

Weiss, M., Dekker, P., Moro, A., Scholz, H., & Patel, M. K. (2015). On the electrification of road transportation – A review of the environmental, economic, and social performance of electric two-wheelers. Transportation Research Part D: Transport and Environment, 41, 348-366. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trd.2015.09.007

Yang, Y., Okonkwo, E. G., Huang, G., Xu, S., Sun, W., & He, Y. (2021). On the sustainability of lithium ion battery industry – A review and perspective. Energy Storage Materials, 36, 186-212. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ensm.2020.12.019

Credits

Lead Fellows

  • Cameron Roberts, Ph.D.

  • Heather Jones, Ph.D.

Contributors

  • Ruthie Burrows, Ph.D.

  • James Gerber, Ph.D.

  • Yusuf Jameel, Ph.D.

  • Daniel Jasper

  • Heather McDiarmid, Ph.D.

  • Alex Sweeney

Internal Reviewers

  • Aiyana Bodi

  • Hannah Henkin

  • Ted Otte

  • Amanda D. Smith, Ph.D.

Effectiveness

Per 1,000 private electric bicycles, approximately 110.5 t CO₂‑eq/yr is offset by displacing trips taken by higher-emission transportation modes such as cars and public transit (Table 1a). 

Per 1,000 shared electric bicycles, approximately 14.44 t CO₂‑eq/yr is offset (Table 1b). This lower value is due to the additional emissions produced in the operation of a shared electric-bicycle system (e.g., due to the need to reposition bicycles after they accumulate in some locations while becoming depleted in others). Additionally, other modes of transportation are shifted to shared electric bicycles at different rates than privately owned electric bicycles – notably shifted less from car travel. These factors limit the total GHG emissions reduced per shared electric bicycle.

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Table 1. Effectiveness at reducing emissions.

Unit: t CO₂‑eq /1,000 electric bicycles, 100-yr basis

25th percentile 55.87
mean 136.1
median (50th percentile) 110.5
75th percentile 220.5

Unit: t CO₂‑eq /1,000 electric bicycles, 100-yr basis

25th percentile 1.415
mean 14.62
median (50th percentile) 14.44
75th percentile 34.31
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Cost

Electric bicycles vary significantly in cost, but generally are more expensive than traditional bicycles due to the cost of batteries, motors, and other electronic components, as well as the need for more durable mechanical components. 

Private electric bicycles cost about US$2,700, plus another few hundred dollars per year in maintenance costs. All told, assuming a 10-year lifespan, electric bicycles cost about US$600/yr to operate . The average privately owned electric bicycle is ridden 2,400 km/yr; since 28.67% of that distance is shifted from car trips, electric bicycles displace approximately 688 pkm/yr traveled by car. Car travel costs US$0.53/pkm while electric bicycle travel costs US$0.25/pkm, meaning every pkm traveled via electric bicycle saves US$0.28. Multiplied over 688 pkm/yr, this translates to every electric bicycle saving its owner approximately US$193/yr in avoided car trips (Bucher et al., 2019; Carracedo & Mostofi, 2022; eBicycles, 2025a; Ebike Canada, 2025; Gössling et al., 2019; Helton, 2025; Huang et al., 2022; International Transport Forum, 2020; Jones, 2019; Luxe Digital, 2025; Mellino et al., 2017; N, 2023; So, 2024; Weiss et al., 2015).

Most of the costs of riding an electric bicycle are up-front costs. As a result, electric bicycle owners who shift more trips from a car onto their electric bicycle will significantly increase their savings. Privately owned electric bicycles save US$1,748 for every t CO₂‑eq they avoid (Table 2a).

Shared electric bicycles are more expensive to the system provider than privately owned electric bicycles due to greater needs for infrastructure, maintenance, operating expenses, and services, such as rebalancing. Shared electric bicycles cost US$2.42/pkm and displace an average of 156 pkm/yr from car trips per bicycle. The same distance traveled by car costs US$83, meaning that shared electric bicycles cost an additional US$295/yr compared to traveling the same distance by car (Gössling et al., 2019; Guidon et al., 2018; Hanna, 2023; Matasyan, 2015; Summit Bike Share, 2023). Shared electric bicycles cost US$22,860/t CO₂‑eq avoided due to their higher costs, higher emissions, and the lower chance that riders on shared electric bicycles would otherwise have been traveling by car (Table 2b).

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Table 2. Cost per climate impact.

Unit: US$ (2023) per t CO₂‑eq , 100-year basis

median (50th percentile) –1,748

Unit: US$ (2023) per t CO₂‑eq , 100-year basis

median (50th percentile) 22,860

*Cost to the provider of the system, not the user

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Learning Curve

Learning rates for electric bicycles are often negative (i.e., prices increase with cumulative production). This is largely because electric bicycle batteries have grown larger over time, causing the bicycles to become more expensive (Dekker, 2013; Weiss et al., 2015). The learning rate per electric bicycle ranges from 15% to –43% (Table 3a). This range has improved the general value proposition of electric bicycles, however, since larger batteries enable electric bicycles to go further and faster than before.

To compensate for this, it is useful to calculate the learning rate per kWh battery capacity rather than per bicycle. On this measure, Dekker (2013) calculates a learning rate of 7.9% cost reduction per kWh of electric bicycle battery capacity for every doubling of cumulative production (Table 3b).

These estimates are based on analyses published in 2013 and 2015, respectively, and therefore do not take into account more recent advances in electric bicycle production. More up-to-date research on electric bicycle learning rates is needed to inform future assessments on this topic.

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Table 3. Learning rate: drop in cost per doubling of cumulative electric bicycle production.*

Unit: %

25th percentile –43.50
mean –26.86
median (50th percentile) –36.00
75th percentile 15

* These data are from 2013 and 2015, due to a lack of available research on this topic.

Unit: %

median (50th percentile) 7.9

* These data are from 2013 and 2015, due to a lack of available research on this topic.

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Speed of Action

Speed of action refers to how quickly a climate solution physically affects the atmosphere after it is deployed. This is different from speed of deployment, which is the pace at which solutions are adopted.

At Project Drawdown, we define the speed of action for each climate solution as emergency brake, gradual, or delayed.

Mobilize Electric Bicycles is a GRADUAL climate solution. It has a steady, linear impact on the atmosphere. The cumulative effect over time builds as a straight line.

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Caveats

Electric bicycles do not only compete with cars for the total passenger transport demand; a given electric bicycle trip might also substitute for public transit. This can sometimes still be beneficial since, as electric bicycles often have lower per-kilometer emissions than public transit vehicles (International Transport Forum, 2020). However, an electric bicycle trip might also substitute for a conventional bicycle trip or for a pedestrian journey, in which case electric bicycle usage would actually increase emissions. Finally, some electric bicycle trips are new journeys, meaning that they would not occur at all if the traveler did not have an electric bicycle, which also increases emissions (Astegiano et al., 2019; Berjisian & Bigazzi, 2019; Bourne et al., 2020; Cairns et al., 2017; Dekker, 2013).

Generally speaking however, electric bicycles still shift enough passenger car trips to make up for this effect, although the scale can be more marginal with shared electric bicycle systems. However, electric bicycles are more likely to substitute more for whichever forms of transportation their users were already using previously (Wamburu et al., 2021). This means that wider adoption of electric bicycles in car-dependent North American suburbs, for example, will have a much clearer and more beneficial climate impact than in a dense, pedestrianized European city center, or in a low-income country where most people do not have access to a car (although in these contexts electric bicycles could still produce major social and economic benefits).

Our estimates of the total adoption ceiling potential of electric bicycles (described in the Adoption section) are based on the ratio of adoption between electric bicycles and cars, on the grounds that each electric bicycle avoids some amount of car travel. However, the relationship is not necessarily quite so simple. Car trips with passengers might require more than one electric bicycle trip to replace them (unless the passengers are children, who can be carried as passengers on electric bicycles). On the other side of the equation, some households own more than one car per person. Having more than one electric bicycle per car would therefore not meaningfully reduce car trips. Lastly, our approach of tracking electric bicycle adoption in relation to car ownership neglects people whose use of an electric bicycle enables them to avoid owning a car at all. Estimates of adoption should be taken as rough guesses, rather than authoritative forecasts.

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Current Adoption

Private electric bicycles have experienced significant growth since 2015. We estimate there are approximately 278 million private electric bicycles in use in the world today (Table 4a). 

Data on this subject typically include throttle-assisted electric bicycles, e-scooter/trotinettes, and sometimes mopeds and motorcycles; these are not included in this solution. Data from China, the highest adopter of electric bicycles, does not usually distinguish between types of electric two-wheelers. For this reason, we used more conservative estimates, preferring to understate adoption than overstate it. We used several global estimates, data on electric bicycle sales in Canada, the United States, and Europe, and stock estimates from the Asia-Pacific region (eBicycles, 2025b; Mordor Intelligence, 2022; Precedence Research, 2024; Stewart & Ramachandran, 2022; Strategic Market Research, 2024; The Freedonia Group, 2024). To convert from European and American sales data to stocks data, we assumed that all electric bicycles sold over the past 10 years (the lifespan of an electric bicycle) are still in use today. We then calculated the number of electric bicycles per 1,000 people in each of the three regions, used those three values to calculate a population-weighted global mean adoption rate, and multiplied the result by the number of residents of high- and upper-middle income countries worldwide (where we assume most electric bicycle adoption takes place). This calculation provided a global estimate.

Shared electric bicycle schemes now exist in many cities around the world, with at least 2 million shared electric bicycles currently in use as part of electric bicycle sharing systems (Table 4b; eBicycles, 2025b; Innovation Origins, 2023; PBSC Urban Solutions, 2022; Strategic Market Research, 2024). This is a conservative estimate because research published in a reputable academic journal claimed that China has 8.7 million shared electric bicycles in 2022 (Shi et al., 2024). 

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Table 4. Current (2024) adoption level.

Unit: 1,000 electric bicycles

mean* 277600

* Population-weighted

Unit: 1,000 electric bicycles

mean* 2000

* Population-weighted

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Adoption Trend

Private electric bicycles are being adopted at a rate of about 37 million new bicycles every year (Table 5a; eBicycles, 2025b; Mordor Intelligence, 2022; Precedence Research, 2024; Stewart & Ramachandran, 2022; Strategic Market Research, 2024; The Freedonia Group, 2024). Electric bicycles are also attracting interest from consumers who do not normally ride bicycles, including people in rural areas (Philips et al., 2022) and members of vulnerable groups, such as the elderly. 

Shared electric bicycles are being added to cities at a rate of approximately 413,000/yr (Table 5b; eBicycles, 2025b; Innovation Origins, 2023; PBSC Urban Solutions, 2022; Strategic Market Research, 2024). Cities and private companies are adding shared electric bicycle systems at a rate of around 30/yr (Galatoulas et al., 2020). Based on these data, we calculate a 37.97% compounding annual growth rate in electric bicycle sharing system installations around the world. 

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Table 5. 2023–2024 adoption trend.

Unit: 1,000 electric bicycles/yr

25th percentile 34000
population-weighted mean 37330
median (50th percentile) 38000
75th percentile 40000

Unit: 1,000 electric bicycles/yr

median (50th percentile) 412.5
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Adoption Ceiling

Because we model electric bicycles as a solution primarily due to their ability to shift travel from fossil fuel–powered cars, we estimate adoption by reference to the ratio of electric bicycles to cars. This does not mean that people without access to a car will not use electric bicycles; it means that they are not shifting their pkm from fossil fuel–powered cars and therefore are not included in the calculations of shifting from car to electric bicycle. 

Private electric bicycles’ adoption ceiling (Table 6a) would be approximately 2 billion around the world: one for every car (World Health Organization, 2021). This would mean that every motorist has an electric bicycle as a ready alternative to a car.

Shared electric bicycles’ adoption ceiling can be measured similarly, except that we assume these systems are only viable in cities. Therefore, we set the maximum adoption ceiling of shared electric bicycles to be 1.3 billion (Table 6b) – the number of cars in cities around the world. we estimated by multiplying the global urban population (4.45 billion) by the global average car registrations per 1,000 people (286.2) (World Health Organization, 2021; World Bank, 2024).

This upper-bound scenario faces many of the same caveats as the upper-bound scenario for the Improve Nonmotorized Transportation solution. It would require a revolution in support for electric bicycles: new infrastructure, new traffic laws, a substantial increase in electric battery production capacity, and major changes to built environments, including increases in population and land-use density to make more journeys feasible by electric bicycle. However, this scenario would require less dramatic change than a similar upper-bound scenario for the Improve Nonmotorized Transportation solution because electric bicycles go faster, have higher carrying capacities, can travel longer distances, and are easier to use than nonmotorized travel modes (Weiss et al., 2015).

A limitation of this analysis is that one electric bicycle per car does not necessarily correspond to one electric bicycle per person traveling in a car. For example, it is possible that replacing one car trip with electric bicycles would result in multiple electric bicycle trips in order to carry multiple passengers. Our estimates should therefore be seen as approximate. 

It is also possible for total electric bicycle adoption and usage to exceed car use (i.e., electric bicycles also replace other modes of transportation or generate new trips). We do not consider this scenario in our adoption ceiling because additional adoption above car adoption would not produce a major climate benefit.

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Table 6. Adoption ceiling.

Unit: 1,000 electric bicycles

Adoption ceiling 2022000

Unit: 1,000 electric bicycles

Adoption ceiling 1273000
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Achievable Adoption

Private electric bicycles are currently in use across the Asia-Pacific region at a rate of approximately 0.07 electric bicycles for every car. A low achievable adoption rate might see every country in the world achieve this same ratio, which would lead to a global electric bicycle fleet of 421 million (Table 7a). For a higher rate of adoption, we posit one electric bicycle in use for every two cars. This would see just more than 1 billion electric bicycles in use worldwide.

Using the median and 75th percentile of the ratio of shared electric bicycles to cars (for which we have data) as the rate of adoption seen in every city in the world leads to 22 to 69 million shared electric bicycles in cities worldwide (Table 7b).

Note: We based these estimates on electric bicycles per car rather than electric bicycles per person because the climate impact of electric bicycle adoption in a given place depends on the availability of cars to replace. 

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Table 7. Range of achievable adoption levels.

Unit: 1,000 electric bicycles

Current Adoption 277600
Achievable – Low 421300
Achievable – High 1011000
Adoption Ceiling 2022000

Unit: 1,000 electric bicycles

Current Adoption 2000
Achievable – Low 22010
Achievable – High 69260
Adoption Ceiling 1273000
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If every motorist had an electric bicycle they used to replace at least some car trips, it would mitigate 224 Mt CO₂‑eq/yr – equal to the total global carbon emissions produced by cars, minus the emissions that would be produced due to electric bicycles traveling the same distance. If there were one electric bicycle for every two cars, it would avoid 117 Mt CO₂‑eq/yr. And if global electric bicycle adoption reached the rate currently seen in the Asia-Pacific region (China, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand), it would avoid 47 Mt CO₂‑eq/yr (Table 8a).

Our Achievable – Low scenario of 22 million shared electric bicycles in cities worldwide would save 284 kt CO₂‑eq/yr (Table 8b). Our Achievable – High scenario of 69.3 million shared electric bicycles worldwide would save 895 kt CO₂‑eq/yr. The maximum possible shared electric bicycle deployment would save approximately 16.6 Mt CO₂‑eq/yr.

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Table 8. Climate impact at different levels of adoption.

Unit: Gt CO₂-eq/yr, 100-yr basis

Current Adoption 0.0307
Achievable – Low 0.0466
Achievable – High 0.1117
Adoption Ceiling 0.2235

Unit: Gt CO₂-eq/yr, 100-yr basis

Current Adoption 0.00002584
Achievable – Low 0.0002844
Achievable – High 0.0008949
Adoption Ceiling 0.01645
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Additional Benefits

Income and Work

In addition to being cheaper than car travel, electric bicycles allow people to travel farther and faster than they could on foot, on a conventional bicycle, or (often) on public transit. Time savings from quick, longer trips, reduced traffic congestion, and money savings provide an economic benefit (Bourne, 2020). 

Health

Electric bicycles provide quality-of-life benefits for some people who use them (Bourne, 2020; Carracedo & Mostofi, 2022; Teixeira et al., 2022; Thomas, 2022). Electric assistance reduces the physical fitness and other health benefits of cycling. However, electric bicycles still require pedaling, and studies show that this level of effort required can still have substantial health benefits (Berjisian & Bigazzii, 2019; Langford et al., 2017). Electric bicycles can also enable people to cycle who might not otherwise be able to (Bourne et al., 2020). Additionally, electric bicycles can reduce total car traffic, which could reduce the risk of injury and death from car crashes, which kill 1.2 million people annually (WHO, 2023). Similarly, electric bicycles can reduce health impacts of traffic noise (de Nazelle et al., 2011).

Air Quality

The fossil fuel–powered vehicles most similar to electric bicycles (motorcycles, scooters, etc.) are extremely polluting (Platt et al., 2014). Substituting electric bicycles for these can substantially reduce air pollution.

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Risks

Electric bicycles pose some safety concerns, centering on an ongoing debate over whether electric cyclists ride more recklessly than other cyclists (Fishman & Cherry, 2016; Langford et al., 2015). While electric bicycles have a lower injury rate than conventional bicycles, when injuries do happen during electric bicycle travel the health consequences tend to be more severe due to the higher speed (Berjisian & Bigazzi, 2019). There may also be risks related to the bicycles’ lithium-ion batteries catching fire. Strong regulations can minimize this risk (Pekow, 2024). Improved infrastructure, such as separated bike lanes and paths, can also reduce the safety risks associated with electric bicycles (Roberts, 2020).

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Interactions with Other Solutions

Reinforcing

Electric bicycles can complement other forms of low-carbon mobility, especially those that reduce dependence on private cars. People who rely on public transit, conventional travel, pedestrian travel, carpools, or other sustainable modes of transportation for some kinds of trips can use electric bicycles to fill in some of the gaps in their personal transportation arrangements (Roberts, 2023). For public transit in particular, electric bicycles can play an important last-mile role, enabling transit riders to more easily access stops. This is important because research suggests that the key to a low-carbon mobility system is to enable people to live high-quality lives without owning cars (Van Acker & Witlox, 2010).

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Electric bicycles require a lot less space than private cars. If sufficient adoption of electric bicycles and other alternatives to private cars enables a reduction in car lanes, parking spaces, and related infrastructure, then some of this space could be reallocated to ecosystem conservation through revegetation and other land-based methods of GHG sequestration (Rodriguez Mendez et al., 2024). 

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Competing

Electric bicycles compete with electric and hybrid cars for adoption.

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Dashboard

Solution Basics

1,000 electric bicycles

t CO₂-eq (100-yr)/unit/yr
058.87110.5
units
Current 277,600421,3001.01×10⁶
Achievable (Low to High)

Climate Impact

Gt CO₂-eq (100-yr)/yr
Current 0.031 0.0470.112
US$ per t CO₂-eq
-1,748
Gradual

CO₂, CH₄, N₂O, BC

Solution Basics

1,000 electric bicycles

t CO₂-eq (100-yr)/unit/yr
01.41514.44
units
Current 2,00022,01069,260
Achievable (Low to High)

Climate Impact

Gt CO₂-eq (100-yr)/yr
Current 2.583×10⁻⁵ 2.843×10⁻⁴8.949×10⁻⁴
US$ per t CO₂-eq
22,860
Gradual

CO₂, CH₄, N₂O, BC

Trade-offs

If an electric bicycle replaces primarily car trips, it provides an unambiguous climate benefit. If it replaces public transit, the size of the benefit will depend on the specifics of the public transit system it replaces. If it replaces pedestrian trips or conventional cycling trips, or generates new trips, the net climate benefit is negative. Travel survey data suggest that electric bicycles replace enough car journeys to more than offset any journeys by the more sustainable modes of transportation they replace (Bigazzi & Wong, 2020; Bourne et al., 2020; Cairns et al., 2017; Fukushige et al., 2021). However, electric bicycles in cities that already have very low-carbon mobility systems, or in lower-income countries where car ownership is rare, might have a net negative climate impact. 

Electric bicycles also require batteries, the production and disposal of which generates pollution (Yang et al., 2021). However, electric bicycles require much less battery capacity than many other electrification technologies, such as electric vehicles (Weiss et al., 2015).

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Mt CO2–eq
0–4
4–8
8–12
12–16
16–20
> 20
No data

Annual road transportation emissions, 2024

Cars are the largest source of road transportation vehicle emissions, which are shown here for urban areas.

Kott, T., Foster, K., Villafane-Delgado, M., Loschen, W., Sicurello, P., Ghebreselassie, M., Reilly, E., and Hughes, M. (2024). Transportation sector - Global road emissions [Data set]. The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL), Climate TRACE Emissions Inventory. Retrieved March 12, 2025 from Link to source: https://climatetrace.org

Mt CO2–eq
0–4
4–8
8–12
12–16
16–20
> 20
No data

Annual road transportation emissions, 2024

Cars are the largest source of road transportation vehicle emissions, which are shown here for urban areas.

Kott, T., Foster, K., Villafane-Delgado, M., Loschen, W., Sicurello, P., Ghebreselassie, M., Reilly, E., and Hughes, M. (2024). Transportation sector - Global road emissions [Data set]. The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL), Climate TRACE Emissions Inventory. Retrieved March 12, 2025 from Link to source: https://climatetrace.org

Maps Introduction

Electric bicycle effectiveness in mitigating climate change varies by region, depending on the carbon intensity of the charging electricity, the extent to which they replace higher-emission travel (such as cars, motorcycles, or taxis), and the need and type of vehicle used for rebalancing shared electric bicycles (International Transport Forum, 2020). They are most effective in areas with cleaner electricity grids and where they can substitute for cars. 

Since electric bicycles are more effective when replacing cars, this means that wider adoption of electric bicycles in car-dependent regions, such as North American suburbs, will have a much more significant climate impact than in a dense, pedestrianized European city center or in a low-income country where most people do not have access to a car (although in these contexts electric bicycles could still produce significant social and economic benefits) (Wamburu et al., 2021).

Socio-economic and infrastructural factors play a major role in adoption. These include upfront costs of private electric bicycles, availability and affordability of shared electric bicycles, supportive cycling infrastructure, and policies such as subsidies or rebates. In many countries, electric bicycles increase the accessibility of nonmotorized transport to older adults, people with disabilities, and those commuting longer distances or in hilly areas by reducing physical effort (Bourne et al., 2020).

Future geographic targets for scaling adoption with strong climate and equity outcomes include South and Southeast Asian cities (e.g., Dhaka, Jakarta, Ho Chi Minh City) with high trip density, short trip lengths, and growing pollution concerns, all of which make them ideal for adoption. Sub-Saharan African cities (e.g., Kampala, Accra) where electric bicycles could complement or replace informal motorcycle taxis, reducing emissions and improving affordability and safety, are also important targets. North America has potential as both private and shared programs are beginning to expand in urban areas, helped by municipal investment and rising consumer interest.

Action Word
Mobilize
Solution Title
Electric Bicycles
Classification
Highly Recommended
Lawmakers and Policymakers
  • Establish policies that reduce the associated time, distance, risk, and risk perception for users and potential users.
  • Provide financial incentives such as tax breaks, subsidies, or grants for electric bicycle production and purchases.
  • Use targeted financial incentives to assist low-income communities in purchasing electric bicycles and to incentivize manufacturers to produce more affordable options.
  • Develop local bicycle and charging infrastructure, such as building physically separated bicycle lanes.
  • Have locking posts installed in public spaces that can accommodate electric bicycles.
  • Increase maintenance of bicycle infrastructure, such as path clearing.
  • Create international standards for the manufacturing and classification of electric bicycles.
  • Transition fossil fuel electricity production to renewables while promoting the transition to electric bicycles.
  • Offer one-stop shops for information on electric and non-motorized bicycles, including demonstrations and educational resources on cost savings, environmental impact, and maintenance.
  • Set regulations for sustainable use of electric bicycle batteries and improve recycling infrastructure.
  • Join international efforts to promote and ensure supply chain environmental and human rights standards – particularly, for the production of batteries.
  • Create, support, or join partnerships that offer information, training, and general support for electric and non-motorized bicycle adoption.

Further information:

Practitioners
  • Share your experiences with electric bicycles, providing tips and reasons for choosing this mode of transportation..
  • Participate in local bike groups, public events, and volunteer opportunities.
  • Advocate tor local officials for infrastructure improvements and note specific locations where improvements can be made.
  • Encourage local businesses to create employee incentives.
  • Provide information and resources to help individuals, households, and business owners take advantage of state and local tax benefits or rebates for electric bicycle purchases.

Further information:

Business Leaders
  • Advocate for better cycling infrastructure and sharing systems with city officials.
  • Educate customers about local bicycle infrastructure and encourage them to engage public officials.
  • Offer employees who agree to forgo a free parking space the annualized cash value or cost of that parking space as a salary increase.
  • Provide battery recycling services.
  • Offer free classes for electric bicycle maintenance and repair; educate employees about what they should know before purchasing an electric bicycle.
  •  
  • Install locking posts, parking, and security for electric bicycles.
  • Provide adequate onsite storage and charging, create educational materials on best practices for commuting, and offer pre-tax commuter benefits to encourage employee ridership.
  • Encourage electric bicycle use in company fleets by replacing or supplementing vehicles for local deliveries or transiting between office locations.
  • Incorporate electric bicycle programs into company sustainability and emission reduction initiatives;communicate how those programs support broader company goals. 

Further information:

Nonprofit Leaders
  • Inform the public about the health and environmental benefits of electric bicycles.
  • Educate the public on government incentives for electric bicycles and how to take advantage of them.
  • Provide impartial information on local electric bicycle infrastructure, best practices for maintenance, and factors to consider when renting or buying electric bicycles.
  • Advocate to policymakers for improved infrastructure and incentives.
  • Administer public initiatives such as ride-share or buy-back programs.

Further information:

Investors
  • Invest in electric bicycle companies and start-ups, including battery and component suppliers.
  • Explore investment opportunities that address supply chain issues such as battery suppliers and maintenance providers.
  • Invest in companies conducting R&D to improve electric bicycle performance, decrease the need for materials, and reduce maintenance costs.
  • Invest in public or private electric bicycle sharing systems.
  • Finance electric bicycle purchases via low-interest loans.
  • Invest in charging infrastructure for electric bicycles.

Further information:

Philanthropists and International Aid Agencies
  • Award grants to local organizations advocating for improved bicycle infrastructure and services.
  • Support access through the distribution or discounting of electric bicycles and help educate community members about relevant incentives.
  • Strengthen local infrastructure and build local capacity for infrastructure design and construction.
  • Ensure that donated bicycles are appropriate for the environment and that recipients have access to maintenance and supplies.
  • Sponsor community engagement programs such as group bike rides or free maintenance classes.
  • Assist with local policy design.

Further information:

Thought Leaders
  • Lead by example and use an electric bicycle as a regular means of transport.
  • Focus public messages on key decision factors for commuters, such as associated health and fitness benefits, climate and environmental benefits, weather forecasts, and traffic information.
  • Showcase principles of safe urban design and highlight dangerous areas.
  • Share detailed information on local bike routes, general electric bicycle maintenance tips, items to consider when purchasing a bike, and related educational information.
  • Collaborate with schools to teach bicycle instruction, including safe riding habits and maintenance tips.

Further information:

Technologists and Researchers
  • Examine and improve elements of battery design and maintenance.
  • Improve electric bicycle infrastructure design.
  • Improve circularity, repairability, and ease of disassembly for electric bicycles.
  • Increase the physical carrying capacities for users of electric bicycles to facilitate shopping and transporting children, pets, and materials.
  • Improve other variables that increase the convenience, safety, and comfort levels of nonmotorized transportation.

Further information:

Communities, Households, and Individuals
  • Share your experiences with electric bicycles; provide tips and reasons for choosing this mode of transportation.
  • Participate in local bike groups, public events, and volunteer opportunities.
  • Advocate to employers and local businesses to provide incentives for electric bicycle usage and help start local initiatives.
  • Advocate to local officials for infrastructure improvements and note specific locations where improvements can be made.
  • Encourage local businesses to create employee incentives.

Further information:

Sources
Evidence Base

Consensus of effectiveness in reducing emissions: High

When people purchase electric bicycles, they tend to use them often, with many of the trips they take on electric bicycles replacing trips that would otherwise have been taken via private car (Bigazzi & Wong, 2020; Bourne et al., 2020; Cairns et al., 2017; Fukushige et al., 2021). The evidence is similarly conclusive regarding the ability of shared electric bicycles to replace a large number of car trips. However, evidence regarding the carbon benefits of shared electric bicycles is more mixed due to the additional emissions required to run a shared electric-bicycle system.

Berjiisian and Bigazzi (2019) reviewed much of the literature on electric bicycles. and found that electric bicycle trips are shifted from car trips (44%) and transit trips (12%) providing significant emissions benefits. Other net benefits include less travel by cars, lower GHG emissions and more physical activity. “E-bike adoption is expected to provide net benefits in the forms of reduced motor vehicle travel, reduced greenhouse gas emissions, and increased physical activity. A little more than half of e-bike trips are expected to shift travel from motor vehicles (44% car trips and 12% transit trips), which is sufficient to provide significant emissions benefits.”

Weiss et al. (2015) surveyed evidence of the economic, social, and environmental impacts of electric bicycles. They found that electric bicycles are more efficient and less polluting than cars. They reduce exposure to pollution as their environmental impacts come mainly from being produced and the electricity that they use, both of which are usually outside of urban areas.

Philips et al. (2022) investigated the potential for electric bicycles to replace car trips in the UK. Their geospatial model provided a good indication of what might be possible in other places and showed that electric bicycles have considerable potential in rural areas as well as urban ones. 

Li et al. (2023) reported that based on the mix of mode share replaced, shared electric bicycle trips decreased carbon emissions by 108–120 g/km carbon emissions than fossil fuel-powered cars per kilometer.”

This research is biased toward high-income countries. While there is substantial research on electric bicycles in China, that country often considers e-scooters (which do not have pedals) and throttle-assisted electric bikes as interchangeable with pedelecs electric bicycles. This made it hard to include Chinese research in our analysis. We recognize this limited geographic scope creates bias, and hope this work inspires research harmonization and data sharing on this topic in underrepresented regions in the future.

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Updated Date

Enhance Public Transit

Submitted by Drawdown Admin on
Sector
Transportation
Mode
Cut Emissions
Cluster
Shift to Alternatives
Image
Train with city in the distance
Coming Soon
On
Summary

We define the Enhance Public Transit solution as increasing the use of any form of passenger transportation that uses publicly available vehicles (e.g., buses, streetcars, subways, commuter trains, and ferries) operating along fixed routes. It does not include increasing the use of publicly available forms of transportation without fixed routes, such as taxis, except when these transport options supplement a larger public transit system (for example, to help passengers with disabilities). It also does not include increasing the use of vehicles traveling over long distances, such as intercity trains, intercity buses, or aircraft. The cost per climate unit is the cost to the transit provider, not the passenger.

Income & work,Health,Equality
Nature protection,Air quality
Description for Social and Search
The Enhance Public Transit solution is coming soon.
Overview

Public transit vehicles are far more fuel-efficient – and thus less GHG-intensive – on a per-pkm basis than fossil fuel–powered cars. Diesel-powered buses emit fewer GHGs/pkm than cars because of their much higher occupancy. Electric buses further reduce GHG emissions (Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2018), as do forms of public transit that already run on electricity. Finally, a fleet of large, centralized public transit vehicles operating along fixed routes is usually easier to electrify than a fleet of fossil fuel–powered cars. 

Enhancing public transit to reduce emissions from transportation relies on two processes. First is increasing the modal share of existing public transit networks by encouraging people to travel by public transit rather than car. This requires building new public transit capacity while also overcoming political, sociocultural, economic, and technical hurdles. Second is improving the emissions performance of public transit networks through electrification and efficiency improvements. We accommodate the latter in this solution by assuming that all shifted trips to buses are electric buses.

These two processes are linked in complex ways. For example, construction of the new public transit networks needed to accommodate additional demand creates an opportunity to install low-carbon vehicles and infrastructures, and bringing additional passengers onto an underused public transit network generates close to zero additional GHG emissions. However, since these complexities are difficult to calculate, we assume that all increases in public transit ridership are supported by a linear increase in capacity.

Buses, trains, streetcars, subways, and other public-transit vehicles predate cars. During the 19th century, most cities developed complex and efficient networks of streetcars and rail that carried large numbers of passengers (Norton, 2011; Schrag, 2000). As a result, it’s clear that a good public transit network can provide for the basic mobility needs of most people, and can therefore substitute for most – if not all – transportation that fossil fuel–powered cars currently provide. Today, public transit networks worldwide already collectively deliver trillions of pkm, not only in big cities but also in small towns and rural areas. 

We identified several different types of public transit:

Buses

Low-capacity vehicles running on rubber tires on roads. Buses in the baseline are a mix of diesel and electric. For the purposes of this solution, we assume that all buses serving shifted trips are electric.

Trams or streetcars

Mid-capacity vehicles running on steel rails that for at least part of their routes run on roads with traffic, rather than in a dedicated rail corridor or tunnel.

Metros, subways, or light rail

High-capacity urban train systems using their own dedicated right-of-way that may or may not be underground.

Commuter rail

Large trains running mostly on the surface designed to bring large numbers of commuters from the suburbs into the core of a city that often overlap with regional or intercity rail.

Other modes

Ferries, cable cars, funiculars, and other forms of public transit that generally play a marginal role.

We assessed all modes together rather than individually because public transit relies on the interactions among different vehicles to maximize the reach, speed, and efficiency of the system. Public transit reduces emissions of CO₂,  methane, and nitrous oxide to the atmosphere by replacing fuel-powered cars, which emit these gases from their tailpipes. Some diesel-powered buses in regions that have low quality diesel emit black carbon. The black carbon global annual total emissions from transportation is negligible compared with carbon emissions and is therefore not quantified in our study. 

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Litman, T. (2024). Evaluating Public Transit Benefits and Costs. Link to source: https://www.vtpi.org/tranben.pdf 

Loukaitou-Sideris, A. (2014). Fear and safety in transit environments from the women’s perspective. Security Journal, 27(2), 242–256. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1057/sj.2014.9

Mahmoud, M., Garnett, R., Ferguson, M., & Kanaroglou, P. (2016). Electric buses: A review of alternative powertrains. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 62, 673–684. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2016.05.019

Martinez, D., Mitnik, O., Salgado, E., Yãnez-Pagans, P., & Scholl, L. (2020). Connecting to Economic Opportunity: The Role of Public Transport in Promoting Women’s Employment in Lima | Journal of Economics, Race, and Policy. Link to source: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s41996-019-00039-9 

Mees, P. (2010). Transport for Suburbia: Beyond the Automobile Age. Earthscan. Link to source: https://www.routledge.com/Transport-for-Suburbia-Beyond-the-Automobile-Age/Mees/p/book/9781844077403?srsltid=AfmBOoqLpikgSll7C5BzwVRtvO9Ji0JgM1XAHe60uh_s1qGh3YxCr018 

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Credits

Lead Fellow

  • Cameron Roberts, Ph.D.

Contributors

  • Ruthie Burrows, Ph.D.

  • James Gerber, Ph.D.

  • Yusuf Jameel, Ph.D. 

  • Daniel Jasper

  • Heather Jones, Ph.D.

  • Heather McDiarmid, Ph.D.

  • Alex Sweeney

Internal Reviewers

  • Aiyana Bodi

  • Hannah Henkin

  • Ted Otte

  • Amanda D. Smith, Ph.D.

  • Chrstina Swanson, Ph.D.

Effectiveness

Our calculations suggest that an efficiently designed public transit system using the best available vehicle technologies (especially battery-electric buses) would save 58 t CO₂‑eq /million pkm (0.000058 t CO₂‑eq /pkm) on a 100-yr basis compared with fossil fuel–powered cars, in line with the estimates by other large transportation focused organizations (International Transport Forum, 2020; US Department of Transportation, 2010). This number is highly sensitive to public transit vehicle occupancy, which we estimated using the most recent available data (American Public Transit Association, 2021). Increasing the number of trips taken via public transit would likely increase occupancy, although ideally not to the point of passenger discomfort. This elevated ridership would significantly reduce public transit’s pkm emissions.

To arrive at this figure, we first estimated the emissions of fossil fuel–powered cars as 115 t CO₂‑eq /million pkm (0.000115 t/pkm, 100-yr basis). We then separately calculated the emissions of commuter rail, metros and subways, trams and light rail systems, and electric buses. We used data on the modal share of different vehicles within public transit systems around the world (although much of the available data are biased towards systems in the United States and Europe) to determine what each transit system’s emissions would be per million pkm given our per-million-pkm values for different transit vehicles (UITP, 2024). The median of these city-level values is 58 t CO₂‑eq /pkm (0.000058 t/pkm, 100-yr basis). Subtracting this value from the per-pkm emissions for cars gives us the public transit GHG savings figure cited above. Note that none of these values includes embodied emissions (such as emissions from producing cars, buses, trains, roads, etc.), or upstream emissions (such as those from oil refineries).

Pessimistic assumptions regarding the emissions and occupancy of public transit vehicles, and optimistic assumptions about emissions from cars, can suggest a much more marginal climate benefit from public transit (see the 25th percentile row in Table 1). In most cases, however, well-managed public transit is likely to produce a meaningful climate benefit. Such an outcome will depend on increasing the average occupancy of vehicles, which faces a challenge because transit has seen declining occupancies since the COVID-19 pandemic (Qi et al., 2023). For this reason, encouraging additional use of public transit networks without expanding these networks can have an outsized impact because it will allow the substitution of fossil fuel–powered car trips by trips on public transit vehicles for which emissions would not change meaningfully as a result of adding passengers.

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Table 1. Effectiveness at reducing emissions.

Unit: t CO₂‑eq/million pkm, 100-yr basis

25th percentile 0.127
mean 61.76
median (50th percentile) 58.27
75th percentile 106.7

The extremely large range of values between the 25th and 75th percentile is the result of 1) the large diversity of public transit systems in the world and 2) multiplying multiple layers of uncertainty (e.g., varying estimates for occupancy, energy consumption per vehicle kilometer (vkm), percent of pkm reliant on buses vs. trains).

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Cost

Under present-day public transit costs and revenues, it costs the transit provider US$0.23 to transport a single passenger one kilometer. In comparison, travel by car costs the consumer US$0.42/pkm. On a per passenger basis, for the transit provider, public transit is almost 50% cheaper than car transportation, costing US$0.20/pkm less. Combined with the emissions reductions from using public transit, this means that the emissions reductions from shifting people out of cars onto public transit has a net negative cost, saving US$3,300/t CO₂‑eq mitigated (Table 2). 

This figure includes all relevant direct costs for travel by public transit and by car, including the costs of infrastructure, operations, vehicle purchase, and fuel. It does not include external costs, such as medical costs resulting from car crashes. Capital costs (i.e., the large fixed costs of building public transit infrastructure) are accounted for via the annualized capital costs listed in public transit agencies’ financial reports. 

A very large proportion of the total costs of providing public transit is labor (e.g., wages for bus drivers and station attendants). This cost is unlikely to come down as a result of technological innovations (Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2018).

For an individual passenger, however, the marginal costs of public transit (i.e., the fares they pay) can sometimes be higher than the marginal costs of driving. This is in large part due to many external costs of driving which are borne by society at large (Litman, 2024). However, increasing the public transit availability would likely increase occupancy, which would in turn drive costs down.

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Table 2. Cost per unit of climate impact.

Unit: 2023 US$/t CO₂‑eq , 100-yr basis

median –3300

Transit provider cost, not passenger cost.

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Learning Curve

Public transit is a largely mature technology with limited opportunities for radical cost-saving innovation. While our research did not find any papers reporting a learning curve in public transit as a whole, battery-electric buses are in fact subject to many of the same experience effects of other battery-electric vehicles. Although there are no studies assessing declines in the cost of electric buses as a whole, there are studies assessing learning curves for their batteries, which is the most costly component. The cost of batteries used in battery-electric buses has declined 19.25% with each doubling of installed capacity (Table 3).

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Table 3. Learning rate: drop in cost per doubling of the installed solution base.

Unit: %

25th percentile 18.63
mean 19.25
median (50th percentile) 19.25
75th percentile 19.88

This applies only to the cost of batteries in electric buses, not to public transportation as a whole.

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Speed of Action

Speed of action refers to how quickly a climate solution physically affects the atmosphere after it is deployed. This is different from speed of deployment, which is the pace at which solutions are adopted.

At Project Drawdown, we define the speed of action for each climate solution as emergency brake, gradual, or delayed.

Enhance Public Transit is a GRADUAL climate solution. It has a steady, linear impact on the atmosphere. The cumulative effect over time builds as a straight line.

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Caveats

Public transit competes for passengers not just with cars, but also with other transportation modes – some of which have lower emissions on average. If an increase in public transit’s modal share comes at the expense of nonmotorized transportation (i.e., pedestrian travel or cycling), or electric bicycles, this will result in a net increase in emissions. Similarly, public transit could generate additional trips that would not have occurred if the public transit network those trips were taken on did not exist. Under this scenario, a net increase in emissions would occur; however, these new trips might bring additional social benefits that would outweigh these new emissions.

Low occupancy could also diminish the climate benefit of enhancing public transit. While it is certainly possible to build effective and efficient public transit networks in suburban and rural areas, there is a risk that such networks could have high per-pkm GHG emissions if they have low average occupancy (Mees, 2010). It is therefore important to efficiently plan public transit networks, ensure vehicles are right-sized and have efficient powertrains, and promote high levels of ridership even in rural areas to maximize the climate benefit of these kinds of networks.

Upscaling public transit networks – and, crucially, convincing more motorists to use them – is an enduring challenge that faces cultural resistance in some countries, issues with cost, and sometimes a lack of political will. Successfully enhancing public transit will require that these hurdles are overcome.

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Current Adoption

In cities around the world surveyed over the last 15 years, public transit has an average modal share of approximately 26.2% of trips. In comparison, fossil fuel–powered cars account for 51.4% of all trips, while nonmotorized transportation accounts for 22.4% (Prieto-Curiel & Ospina, 2024). The 26.2% of trips taken via public transit corresponds to approximately 16.7 trillion pkm traveled on public transit in cities every year (Table 4).

We calculated adoption from modal share data (i.e., the percentage of trips in a given city taken via various modes of transportation). We estimated total pkm traveled by assuming a global average daily distance traveled based on travel surveys from the United States as well as several European countries (Christensen & Vázquez, 2013; Department for Transport, 2024; Ecke, 2023; Federal Highway Administration, 2022; Statistics Netherlands, 2024). Most of these data did not account for population, and therefore gave too much weight to small cities and skewed the results. Therefore, we used Prieto-Curiel and Ospina’s (2024) global population-weighted mean modal share as our global adoption value. 

We assumed that Prieto-Curiel and Ospina’s data refer only to urban modal share. Public transit can be useful in rural areas (Börjesson et al., 2020), but we did not attempt to estimate rural public transit adoption in this assessment.

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Table 4. Current (2024) adoption level.

Unit: million pkm/yr 

population-weighted mean 16720000

We used the population-weighted mean calculated by Prieto-Curiel and Ospina (2024) as our authoritative estimate to carry forward to other calculations.

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Adoption Trend

Based on data from Prieto-Curiel and Ospina (2024) and the UITP (2024) for 1,097 cities worldwide, the rate of adoption of public transit has not changed since 2010, with the median annual growth rate equal to 0 (Table 5). This was calculated using all of the cities in Prieto-Curiel and Ospina’s (2024) database for which modal share data exist.

Despite the lack of a global trend in public transit use, some cities, including Amsterdam, Edinburgh, and Leeds, report double-digit growth rates in the use of public transit.

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Table 5. 2023–2024 adoption trend.

Unit: million pkm/yr

25th percentile -697,100
mean 71,490
median (50th percentile) 0.00
75th percentile 1791000
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Adoption Ceiling

Public transit could theoretically replace all trips currently undertaken by fossil fuel–powered cars. This would amount to 75 trillion pkm on public transit annually, worldwide (Table 6). This would not be feasible to achieve in practice, as it would require construction of new public transit vehicles and infrastructure on an unfeasibly large scale, and massive changes to living patterns for many people. It would also be much more expensive than we calculated above, because such a change would require extending public transit coverage into areas where it would be highly uneconomic. Public transit is capable of providing a good transportation option in rural areas, but there is a limit to its benefits when population densities are low even by rural standards. Even in cities, this scenario would require a radical redesign of some neighborhoods to prioritize public transit. Such large public transit coverage would also inevitably shift other modes of transportation, such as pedestrian travel and cycling, leading to an even higher pkm total than that suggested by current adoption of fossil fuel–powered cars.

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Table 6. Adoption ceiling.

Unit: million pkm/yr

median (50th percentile) 75000000
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Achievable Adoption

The achievable range of public transit adoption is 22.2–41.9 trillion pkm traveled by public transit in cities globally.

To estimate the upper bound of achievable adoption, we assumed that urban trips taken by fossil fuel–powered car (currently 51.4% of trips globally) can be shifted to public transit until public transit increases to 76.6% of trips (the current highest modal share of public transit in any city with a population of more than 1 million) or until car travel decreases to 12.0% of trips (the current lowest modal share of fossil fuel–powered cars in any city with a population of more than 1 million). This equals a shift of 25.2 trillion pkm from fossil fuel–powered car travel to public transit, which, added to present-day public transit trips (16.7 trillion trips/yr), equals 41.9 trillion pkm/yr (Table 7).

To set the lower bound, we performed the same calculation as above, but on a regional basis, adding up all the resultant modal shifts to get a global figure. For example, every northern European city might reach the public transit modal share of London (44.5% of trips), while every South Asian city might reach that of Mumbai (52.0% of trips). Having done that, we then added together the public transit adoption rates from all world regions, apart from three (Polynesia, Micronesia, and Melanesia) for which we did not find any modal share data. This corresponds to a shift of 5.5 trillion pkm/yr from cars to public transit, and a total achievable public transit adoption rate of 22.2 trillion pkm/yr.

Achieving both of these levels of adoption would require not only major investments in expanding public transit networks, but also major changes in how cities are planned so as to allow more areas to be effectively served by transit. These levels of adoption would also require overcoming cultural and political resistance to abandoning cars in favor of public modes. However, unlike the scenario discussed under Adoption Ceiling, these scenarios are feasible, since they are based on real achievements by cities around the world.

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Table 7. Range of achievable adoption levels.

Unit: million pkm/yr

Current Adoption 16720000
Achievable – Low 21980000
Achievable – High 41910000
Adoption Ceiling 75000000
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If all public transit trips were taken by fossil fuel–powered cars instead of by public transit, they would result in an additional 0.97 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr of emissions (Table 8).

The global potential climate impact of enhancing public transit, if all car trips were shifted onto public transit systems, is 4.37 Gt. As discussed under Adoption Ceiling, this is an unrealistic scenario.

In a more realistic scenario, if every city in the world shifted car traffic onto public transit until it reached the public transit modal share of Hong Kong (i.e., the high estimate of achievable adoption), it would save 2.44 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr globally. Meanwhile, if every city shifts car trips to public transit until it reaches the car modal share of the region’s least car-dependent city (i.e., the low estimate of achievable adoption), it would save 1.28 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr.

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Table 8. Climate impact at different levels of adoption.

Unit: Gt CO₂‑eq/yr, 100-yr basis

Current Adoption 0.97
Achievable – Low 1.28
Achievable – High 2.44
Adoption Ceiling 4.37
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Additional Benefits

Income and Work

Investment in enhancing public transit can also generate substantial economic returns. The APTA estimated that each US$1 billion invested in transit can create 49,700 jobs and yield a five-to-one economic return (APTA, 2020). According to another study, shifting 50% of highway funds to mass transit systems in 20 U.S. metropolises could generate more than 1 million new transit jobs within five years (Swanstrom et al., 2010). 

Health

Improved air quality due to enhanced public transit has direct health benefits, such as lowering cardiovascular disease risk, and secondary health benefits, such as increased physical activity (Xiao et al., 2019), fewer traffic-related injuries, lower rates of cancer, and enhanced access to health-care facilities and nutritious food (Gouldson et al., 2018; Health Affairs, 2021).

Equality

Limited access to transportation restricts labor participation, particularly for women. Expanding public transit can foster gender equity by improving women’s access to employment opportunities. For example, in Peru expansion of public transit has led to improvements in women’s employment and earnings (Martinez et al., 2020). Similarly, in India, the extension of the light rail system in Delhi has increased women’s willingness to commute for work (Tayal & Mehta, 2021).

Public transit enhances community connectivity by providing accessible transportation options. Expanded mobility allows individuals to reach employment, health-care, education, and recreational sites with greater ease, heightening social inclusion. The social equity benefits of public transit are especially significant for low-income people in terms of time and cost savings and safety and health benefits (Serulle & Cirillo, 2016; Venter et al., 2017). 

Nature Protection

An indirect benefit of enhanced public transit is its contribution to reducing resource consumption, such as the minerals used in manufacturing personal vehicles. Enhanced public transit can also improve land-use efficiency by curbing urban sprawl, which helps reduce pollution and limit biodiversity loss (Ortiz, 2002). 

Air Quality

GHG emissions from transportation are often emitted with other harmful air pollutants. Consequently, reducing fuel consumption by replacing transport by fossil fuel–powered cars with public transit can lead to cleaner air. The scale of this benefit varies by location and is influenced by differences in emission levels between private and public transit travels and the relative demand substitutability between modes (Beaudoin et al., 2015). For U.S. cities, significant investment in public transit could cut pollution around 1.7% on average (Borck, 2019). The benefits are more significant in low- and middle-income countries, where fossil fuel–powered cars are more polluting due to lenient air quality regulations (Goel & Gupta, 2017; Guo & Chen, 2019).

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Risks

If expanded service on high-quality public transit systems replaced journeys from nonmotorized transportation or electric bicycles rather than from cars – or if expanded service on high-quality public transit systems generated journeys that would not have otherwise happened – this will have a net-negative climate impact, since public transit has higher per-pkm GHG emissions than electric bicycles or not traveling (International Transport Forum, 2020). 

There may be cases where public transit networks cannot be implemented efficiently enough to provide a meaningful benefit compared to fossil fuel–powered cars in terms of GHG emissions. This would occur in places where there are so few potential riders that most trips would have a very low occupancy. The result would be a much higher rate of emissions per pkm. However, effective public transit networks can be built in suburban and even rural areas (Börjesson et al., 2020; Mees, 2010).

Finally, expanding public transit networks has proven very difficult in recent years. Entrenched preferences for car travel, reluctance on the part of governments to invest heavily in new transit infrastructure, and local political challenges over land use, noise, gentrification, and similar issues are all obstacles to increased public transit use. Public transit expansion has faced stronger headwinds in recent years in particular, due to both the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and competition from new (and mostly less sustainable) mobility services, such as app-based ride-hailing (Shaller, 2017).

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Interactions with Other Solutions

Reinforcing

For people living without cars, public transit provides a crucial service that is hard to replace for certain kinds of trips, such as trips over long distances, with small children, or carrying large objects. As a result, public transit plays a large role in making it more viable for people to live without owning a car (Brown, 2017). Research suggests that the key to a low-carbon mobility system is to reduce the need for people to own cars altogether (Van Acker & Witlox, 2010).

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Public transit requires a lot less space than cars. Some of this space could be reallocated to ecosystem conservation through revegetation and other land-based methods of GHG sequestration (Rodriguez Mendez et al., 2024).

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Competing 

Electric cars and public transit compete for pkm. Consequently, increased use of public transit could reduce kilometers traveled using electric cars. 

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Dashboard

Solution Basics

million passenger kilometers (million pkm)

t CO₂-eq (100-yr)/unit
00.12758.27
units/yr
Current 1.672×10⁷2.198×10⁷4.191×10⁷
Achievable (Low to High)

Climate Impact

Gt CO₂-eq (100-yr)/yr
Current 0.97 1.282.44
US$ per t CO₂-eq
-3,300
Gradual

CO₂, CH₄, N₂O, BC

Trade-offs

Public transit vehicles are sometimes unsafe, particularly for vulnerable groups such as women (Loukaitou-Sideris, 2014). In some circumstances – although this remains controversial – new public transit routes can also lead to gentrification of neighborhoods, forcing people to move far away from city centers and use cars for travel (Padeiro et al., 2019). 

Expansion of public transit networks could also have negative consequences in areas directly adjacent to transit infrastructure. Diesel buses create air pollution (Lovasi et al., 2022), and public transit networks of all types can create noise pollution (Hemmat et al., 2023).

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Population (millions)
1
10
30
Active Mobility
Public Transport
Private Cars

Primary mode of transport

Mapping the primary mode of transportation reveals mobility patterns and opportunities to shift travel toward lower-emitting modes.

Prieto-Curiel, R. and Ospina, Juan P. (2024). The ABC of mobility [Data set]. Environmental International, Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envint.2024.108541. Retrieved May 9, 2025 from Link to source: https://github.com/rafaelprietocuriel/ModalShare

Population (millions)
1
10
30
Active Mobility
Public Transport
Private Cars

Primary mode of transport

Mapping the primary mode of transportation reveals mobility patterns and opportunities to shift travel toward lower-emitting modes.

Prieto-Curiel, R. and Ospina, Juan P. (2024). The ABC of mobility [Data set]. Environmental International, Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envint.2024.108541. Retrieved May 9, 2025 from Link to source: https://github.com/rafaelprietocuriel/ModalShare

Maps Introduction

Public transit is most effective in urban areas with high population density, where buses, subways, trams, and commuter rail can efficiently carry large numbers of passengers. Electrified or low-emission transit modes achieve the greatest climate impact, especially in regions with clean electricity grids (Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2018). However, even diesel-based public transit systems can outperform fossil fuel-powered cars on a per-pkm basis if they have high ridership and operate efficiently.

Socioeconomic and political factors, including investment capacity, institutional coordination, and public perceptions of reliability, safety, and comfort, highly influence the adoption and effectiveness of public transit. Regions with well-funded public infrastructure, integrated fare systems, and strong governance tend to have the highest adoption and climate benefits. Conversely, underinvestment, informal transit dominance, or poorly maintained systems can undermine public transit’s potential (Börjesson et al., 2020; Mees, 2010).

High public transit adoption is seen in Western and Northern Europe, Post-Soviet countries, East Asia (including Japan, South Korea, and China), and some Latin American cities, like Bogotá and Santiago. In contrast, many developing regions face barriers to public transit expansion, such as inadequate funding, urban sprawl, or a reliance on informal minibus systems. However, these same areas offer some of the highest potential for impact. Rapid urbanization, growing demand for mobility, and severe air quality challenges create strong incentives to expand and modernize transit networks.

Action Word
Enhance
Solution Title
Public Transit
Classification
Highly Recommended
Lawmakers and Policymakers
  • Use public transit and create incentive programs for government employees to use public transit.
  • Improve and invest in local public transit infrastructure, increasing routes and frequency while improving onboard safety, especially for women.
  • Electrify public buses, vans, and other vehicles used in the public transit system.
  • Implement the recommendations of transit-oriented development, such as increasing residential and commercial density, placing development near stations, and ensuring stations are easily accessible.
  • Provide online information, ticketing, and payment services.
  • Implement regional or nationwide public transit ticketing systems.
  • Consider a wide range of policy options that include demand-side options, such as free fare or fare reductions, and that are informed by citizen-centered approaches.
  • Create dedicated coordinating bodies across government agencies, businesses, and the public to develop public transit.
  • Disincentivize car trips in areas serviced by public transit through reduced access, increases in parking fares, congestion charges, taxes, or other means.
  • Incorporate social signaling in public transit information and signage, such as smiley faces and “sustainable transport” labels.
  • Develop public transit awareness campaigns – starting from early childhood – focusing on internally motivating factors such as money saved, health benefits, reduced pollution, free time while traveling, and lifestyle sustainability.

Further information:

Practitioners
  • Use public transit and create incentive programs for government employees to utilize public transit.
  • Increase routes and frequency while also improving onboard safety, especially for women.
  • Electrify public buses, vans, and other vehicles used in the public transit system.
  • Incorporate social signaling in public transit information and signage, such as smiley faces and “sustainable transport” labels.
  • Provide online information, ticketing, and payment services
  • Implement regional or nationwide public transit ticketing systems.
  • Consider a wide range of policy options that include demand-side options, such as free fare or fare reductions, and that are informed through citizen-centered approaches.
  • Create dedicated coordinating bodies across government agencies, businesses, and the public to develop public transit.
  • Develop public transit awareness campaigns – starting from early childhood – focusing on internally motivating factors such as money saved, health benefits, reduced pollution, free time while traveling, and a sustainable lifestyle.

Further information:

Business Leaders
  • Use public transit and encourage employees to do so when feasible.
  • Encourage public transit use for company purposes.
  • Offer employees who agree to forego a free parking space the annualized cash value or cost of that parking space as a salary increase.
  • Incorporate company policies on public transit use into company sustainability and emission reduction initiatives and communicate how they support broader company goals.
  • Ensure your business is accessible via public transit and offer information on nearest access points both online and in person.
  • Offer employees pre-tax commuter benefits to include reimbursement for public transit expenses.
  • Create and distribute educational materials for employees on commuting best practices.
  • Partner with, support, and/or donate to infrastructure investments and public transit awareness campaigns.
  • Advocate for better public transit systems with city officials.

Further information:

Nonprofit Leaders
  • Use public transit and encourage staff to do so when feasible.
  • Offer staff pre-tax commuter benefits to include reimbursement for public transit expenses.
  • Offer employees who agree to forego a free parking space the annualized cash value or cost of that parking space as a salary increase.
  • Expand access to underserved communities by providing fare assistance through microgrants and/or public-private partnerships.
  • Create, support, or partner with existing public transit awareness campaigns that – starting from early childhood – focus on internally motivating factors such as money saved, health benefits, reduced pollution, free time while traveling, and a sustainable lifestyle.
  • Ensure your office is accessible via public transit and offer information – online and in person – on the nearest access points.
  • Advocate to policymakers for improved infrastructure and incentives for riders.
  • Advocate for infrastructure improvements and note specific locations where improvements can be made.
  • Encourage local businesses to create employee incentives.
  • Host or support community participation in local public transit infrastructure design.
  • Join public-private partnerships to encourage, improve, or operate public transit.

Further information:

Investors
  • Use public transit and encourage staff to do so when feasible.
  • Encourage public transit use for company purposes.
  • Invest in electric battery and component suppliers for public buses and vehicle fleets.
  • Deploy capital to efforts that improve public transit comfort, convenience, access, and safety.
  • Seek investment opportunities that reduce material and maintenance costs for public transit.

Further information:

Philanthropists and International Aid Agencies
  • Use public transit and encourage staff to do so when feasible.
  • Award grants to local organizations advocating for improved public transit and services.
  • Expand access to underserved communities by providing fare assistance through microgrants and/or public-private partnerships.
  • Improve and finance local infrastructure and public transit capacity.
  • Build local capacity for infrastructure design, maintenance, and construction.
  • Assist with local policy design or provide means for assessments, data collection, citizen participation, and other steps in the policymaking process.
  • Create, support, or partner with existing public transit awareness campaigns that – starting from early childhood – focus on internally motivating factors such as money saved, health benefits, reduced pollution, free time while traveling, and a sustainable lifestyle.

Further information:

Thought Leaders
  • Lead by example and use public transit regularly.
  • Create, support, or partner with existing public transit awareness campaigns that – starting from early childhood – focus on internally motivating factors such as money saved, health benefits, reduced pollution, free time while traveling, and a sustainable lifestyle.
  • Share detailed information on local public transit routes.
  • Assist with local policy design or provide means for assessments, data collection, citizen participation, and other steps in the policymaking process.
  • Advocate to policymakers for improved infrastructure, noting specific locations that need improvements and incentives for riders.

Further information:

Technologists and Researchers
  • Use public transit and encourage your colleagues to use public transit when feasible.
  • Improve electric batteries and electrification infrastructure for public buses and vehicles.
  • Develop models for policymakers to demonstrate the impact of public transit policies on pollutant emissions, health, and other socioeconomic variables.
  • Conduct randomized control trials and collect longitudinal data on the impacts of interventions to increase public transit usage.
  • Innovate better, faster, and cheaper public transit networks – focusing on infrastructure, operations, and public transit vehicles.

Further information:

Communities, Households, and Individuals
  • Use public transit and encourage your household and neighbors to use public transit when feasible.
  • Share your experiences with public transit, as well as tips and reasons for choosing this mode of transportation.
  • Advocate to local officials for infrastructure improvements and note specific locations where improvements can be made.
  • Advocate to employers and local businesses to provide incentives and start local initiatives.

Further information:

Sources
Evidence Base

Consensus of effectiveness in reducing transportation emissions: High

Experts agree that public transit usually produces fewer GHG/pkm than fossil fuel–powered cars (Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2018; Brunner et al., 2018; Ilie et al., 2014; International Transport Forum, 2020; Kennedy, 2002; Kuminek, 2013; Lim et al., 2021; Mahmoud et al., 2016; Rodrigues & Seixas, 2022; Sertsoz et al., 2013). There is also consensus on two points: First, shifting people from cars to public transit even under status-quo emissions levels will reduce transport emissions overall; second, opportunities exist to decarbonize the highest-emitting parts of public transit systems through electrification, especially buses (Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2018).

According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2023), public transit can help decrease vehicle travel and lower GHG emissions by reducing both the number and length of trips made in fossil fuel–powered cars (medium confidence). Adjustments to public transportation operations – such as increasing bus stop density, reducing the distance between stops and households, improving trip duration and frequency, and lowering fares – can encourage a shift from fossil fuel–powered car use to public transit.

Bloomberg New Energy Finance (2018) provides a good overview of the state of electric buses – a technology crucial to reduce the public transit fleet’s fossil fuel consumption, and help transition these fleets entirely to electric power. It determined that electric buses have significantly lower operating costs and can be more cost-effective than conventional buses when considering total ownership costs.

Litman (2024) found that “High quality (relatively fast, convenient, comfortable, and integrated) transit can attract discretionary passengers who would otherwise drive, which reduces traffic problems including congestion, parking costs, accidents, and pollution emissions. This provides direct user benefits, since they would not change mode if they did not consider themselves better off overall.”

The results presented in this document summarize findings from 28 reviews and meta-analyses and 23 original studies reflecting current evidence from 32 countries, primarily the American Public Transit Association (APTA, 2020), Bloomberg New Energy Finance (2018), International Transport Forum (2020), and UITP (2024). We recognize this limited geographic scope creates bias, and hope this work inspires research and data sharing on this topic in underrepresented regions.

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Updated Date

Improve Nonmotorized Transportation

Submitted by Drawdown Admin on
Sector
Transportation
Mode
Cut Emissions
Cluster
Shift to Alternatives
Image
Many people in a crosswalk viewed from above
Coming Soon
On
Summary

We define Improve Nonmotorized Transportation as increasing any form of travel that does not use a motor or engine. In theory, this includes a huge range of transportation modes, including horses, cross-country skis, sailboats, hand-operated rickshaws, and animal-drawn carriages. In practice, pedestrian travel and cycling account for most nonmotorized utilitarian passenger travel.

Income & work,Health
Nature protection,Air quality
Description for Social and Search
The Improve Nonmotorized Transportation solution is coming soon.
Overview

Travel shifted from motorized to nonmotorized transportation saves GHG emissions – mostly CO₂, but also small amounts of nitrous oxide and methane (Center for Sustainable Systems, 2023) – that a fossil fuel-powered car would otherwise emit. 

We divided nonmotorized transportation into three subcategories: 1) pedestrian travel, including walking and the use of mobility aids such as wheelchairs; 2) private bicycles owned by the user, meaning that they are typically used for both the outgoing and return legs of a trip; and 3) shared bicycles, which are sometimes used for only one leg of a trip and so have to be repositioned by other means.

Pedestrian travel

Pedestrian travel (including both walking and travel using mobility aids such as wheelchairs) has the advantage of being something that most people can do and often does not require special equipment or dedicated infrastructure (although some infrastructure, such as sidewalks, can be helpful). Pedestrian travel is 81.7% of global urban nonmotorized pkm. 

Private bicycles

Private bicycles cost money and require maintenance but enable travel at much faster speeds and therefore longer distances. Private bicycles are 13% of global urban nonmotorized pkm.

Shared bicycles 

Shared bicycles eliminate the financial overhead of bicycle ownership, but usually only permit travel within specific urban areas and sometimes between established docking stations. Shared bicycles are 5.1% of global urban nonmotorized pkm. 

Note that we did not include electric bicycles in this analysis. Electric bicycles are analyzed as a separate solution.

While improving nonmotorized transportation can be a valuable climate solution virtually anywhere, we limit our analysis to cities due to the high number of relatively short-distance trips and the abundance of available data compared with rural locations.

The fuel for cycling and pedestrian travel is the food the traveler eats. When the traveler metabolizes the food, they produce CO₂. Some studies factor the GHG emissions produced by the added metabolism required by nonmotorized transportation into its climate impact because of the emissions that come from the food system (Mizdrak et al., 2020). This is controversial, however, because it is unclear whether pedestrians and cyclists have a higher calorie intake than people who travel in other ways (Noussan et al., 2022). Furthermore, additional food eaten to fuel physical labor is not typically counted in life-cycle analyses. This analysis, therefore, does not consider the upstream climate impacts of food calories that fuel cycling, pedestrian travel, driving, or any other activity.

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Christensen, L., & Vázquez, N. S. (2013). Post-harmonised european national travel surveys. Proceedings from the Annual Transport Conference at Aalborg University, 20(1), Article 1. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.5278/ojs.td.v1i1.5701

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Mizdrak, A., Cobiac, L. J., Cleghorn, C. L., Woodward, A., & Blakely, T. (2020). Fuelling walking and cycling: Human powered locomotion is associated with non-negligible greenhouse gas emissions. Scientific Reports, 10(1), Article 1. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-020-66170-y

Montoya-Torres, J., Akizu-Gardoki, O., & Iturrondobeitia, M. (2023). Measuring life-cycle carbon emissions of private transportation in urban and rural settings. Sustainable Cities and Society, 96, 104658. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scs.2023.104658

Mueller, N., Rojas-Rueda, D., Cole-Hunter, T., de Nazelle, A., Dons, E., Gerike, R., Götschi, T., Int Panis, L., Kahlmeier, S., & Nieuwenhuijsen, M. (2015). Health impact assessment of active transportation: A systematic review. Preventive Medicine, 76, 103–114. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ypmed.2015.04.010

Münzel, T., Molitor, M., Kuntic, M., Hahad, O., Röösli, M., Engelmann, N., Basner, M., Daiber, A., & Sørensen, M. (2024). Transportation noise pollution and cardiovascular health. Circulation Research, 134(9), 1113–1135. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1161/CIRCRESAHA.123.323584

de Nazelle, A., Nieuwenhuijsen, M., Antó, J., Brauer, M., Briggs, D., Charlotte Braun-Fahrlander, C., Cavill, N., Cooper, A., Desqueyroux, H., Fruin, S., Hoek, G., Panis, L., Janssen, N., Jerrett, M., Joffe, M., Andersen, Z., van Kempen, E., Kingham, S., Kubesch, N., Leyden, K., Marshall, J., Matamala, J., Mellios, G., Mendez, M., Nassif, H., Ogilvie, D., Peiró, R., Pérez, K., Rabl, A., Ragettli, M., Rodríguez, D., Rojas, D., Ruiz, P., Sallis, J., Terwoert, J., Toussaint, J., Tuomisto, J., Zuurbier, M., & Lebret, E. (2011). Improving health through policies that promote active travel: A review of evidence to support integrated health impact assessment. Environment International, 37(4), 767-777. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envint.2011.02.003 

Noussan, M., Campisi, E., & Jarre, M. (2022). Carbon intensity of passenger transport modes: A review of emission factors, their variability and the main drivers. Sustainability, 14(17), Article 17. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.3390/su141710652

Prieto-Curiel, R., & Ospina, J. P. (2024). The ABC of mobility. Environment International, 185, 108541. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envint.2024.108541

Pro Cycling Coaching. (2025). Bike Time Calculator: How Long Does It Take to Bike Any Distance. https://www.procyclingcoaching.com/resources/bike-time-calculator 

Rodriguez Mendez, Q., Fuss, S., Lück, S., & Creutzig, F. (2024). Assessing global urban CO2 removal. Nature Cities, 1(6), 413–423. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1038/s44284-024-00069-x

Roser, M. (2024). Data review: How many people die from air pollution? Our World in Data. Link to source: https://ourworldindata.org/data-review-air-pollution-deaths

Seum, S., Schulz, A., & Phleps, P. (2020). The future of driving in the BRICS countries (study update 2019). Institute for Mobility Research. Link to source: https://elib.dlr.de/135710/1/2019_ifmo_BRICS_reloaded_en1.pdf 

Shindell, D. T., Lee, Y., & Faluvegi, G. (2016). Climate and health impacts of US emissions reductions consistent with 2 °C. Nature Climate Change, 6(5), 503–507. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2935

Staatsen, B., Nijland, H., Kempen, E., van Hollander, A., de Franssen, A., & Kamp, I. (2004). Assessment of health impacts and policy options in relation to transport-related noise exposures (815120002).

State of Colorado. (2016). Economic and health benefits of cycling and walking. Colorado Office of Economic Development and International Trade. Link to source: https://choosecolorado.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Economic-and-Health-Benefits-of-Bicycling-and-Walking-in-Colorado-4.pdf

Statistics Netherlands. (2024). Mobility; per person, personal characteristics, modes of travel and regions [webpage]. Statistics Netherlands. Link to source: https://www.cbs.nl/en-gb/figures/detail/84709ENG

TNMT. (2021). The environmental impact of today’s transport types. TNMT. Link to source: https://tnmt.com/infographics/carbon-emissions-by-transport-type/

Van Acker, V., & Witlox, F. (2010). Car ownership as a mediating variable in car travel behaviour research using a structural equation modelling approach to identify its dual relationship. Journal of Transport Geography, 18(1), 65–74. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtrangeo.2009.05.006

Verma, S., Dwivedi, G., & Verma, P. (2022). Life cycle assessment of electric vehicles in comparison to combustion engine vehicles: A review. Materials Today: Proceedings, 49, 217–222. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.matpr.2021.01.666

Volker, J. M. B., & Handy, S. (2021). Economic impacts on local businesses of investments in bicycle and pedestrian infrastructure: A review of the evidence. Transport Reviews, 41(4), 401–431. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1080/01441647.2021.1912849

WHO. (2023). Despite notable progress, road safety remains urgent global issue. Link to source: https://www.who.int/news/item/13-12-2023-despite-notable-progress-road-safety-remains-urgent-global-issue

Xia, T., Zhang, Y., Crabb, S., & Shah, P. (2013). Cobenefits of replacing car trips with alternative transportation: A review of evidence and methodological issues. Journal of Environmental and Public Health, 2013(1), 797312. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1155/2013/797312

Credits

Lead Fellow

  • Cameron Roberts, Ph.D.

Contributors

  • James Gerber, Ph.D.

  • Yusuf Jameel , Ph.D.

  • Daniel Jasper

  • Heather Jones, Ph.D.

  • Heather McDiarmid, Ph.D.

  • Alex Sweeney

Internal Reviewers

  • Aiyana Bodi

  • Hannah Henkin

  • Yusuf Jameel, Ph.D. 

  • Heather McDiarmid, Ph.D.

  • Ted Otte

  • Amanda D. Smith, Ph.D.
Effectiveness

Nonmotorized transportation can save 115.6 t CO₂‑eq /million pkm, compared with fossil fuel–powered cars (Table 1). This makes it a highly effective climate solution. Every trip shifted from a fossil fuel–powered car to cycling or pedestrian travel avoids most, if not all, of the GHG emissions associated with car travel. Nonmotorized transportation effectiveness is calculated by taking the share of each mode and multiplying it by its effectiveness, and adding this value from all three modes. 

Cars produce 116 t CO₂‑eq /million pkm (International Transport Forum, 2020; IPCC, 2023; Montoya-Torres et al., 2023; TNMT, 2021; Verma et al., 2022). Note that this value does not correspond directly to the estimates arrived at in most of these references because it is common practice to include embodied and upstream emissions in life-cycle calculations. Because we do not include embodied and upstream emissions (which are accounted for in other solutions), our estimate for the current emissions from the global vehicle fleet comes from an original calculation using values from these sources and arrives at a lower figure than they do.

Pedestrian travel and private bicycles have negligible direct emissions (Bonilla-Alicea et al., 2020; Brand et al., 2021; International Transport Forum, 2020; Noussan et al., 2022; TNMT, 2021). This means people avoid all direct GHG emissions from driving fossil fuel–powered cars when they use nonmotorized transportation instead. Thus, shifting from cars to nonmotorized transportation saves 116 t CO₂‑eq /million pkm, not including indirect emissions, such as those from manufacturing the equipment and infrastructure necessary for those forms of mobility. Life-cycle emissions from cycling are approximately 12 t CO₂‑eq /million pkm, most of which come from manufacturing bicycles (Bonilla-Alicea et al., 2019; Brand et al., 2021; ITF, 2020; Montoya-Torres et al., 2023; Noussan et al., 2020; TNMT, 2021), while emissions from pedestrian travel are negligible (TNMT, 2021). These life-cycle emissions are not quantified for this analysis, but may be addressed by other solutions in the industrial sector.

Shared bicycles provide fewer emissions savings than privately owned bicycles do. Shared bicycle schemes have direct GHG emissions of 7.49 t CO₂‑eq /million pkm, about 109 fewer than the average fossil fuel-powered car. Because people sometimes use shared bicycles for one-way trips, the bike-sharing system can become unbalanced, with fewer bicycles in places where people start their journeys and more bicycles in places where people end them. This is fixed by driving the shared bicycles from places with surplus to places with shortage, which increases emissions. The total increase in emissions caused by this can be mitigated through measures such as using electric vehicles to reposition the bikes or incentivizing riders to reposition the bicycles themselves without the use of a vehicle. 

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Table 1. Effectiveness at reducing emissions.

Unit: t CO₂‑eq /million pkm, 100-yr basis

Nonmotorized Transportation
25th percentile 99.33
mean 118.8
median (50th percentile) 115.6
75th percentile 136.9
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Cost

Driving a fossil fuel–powered car has private costs (i.e., those that accrue to the motorist themselves) of US$0.25/pkm and public costs (for roads, lights, traffic enforcement, etc.) of US$0.11/pkm. It generates public revenues of US$0.03/pkm from taxes, fees, fines, etc. (AAA, 2024; Burnham et al., 2021; Gössling et al., 2019). This means that its net cost to the passenger is US$0.32/pkm. Cars also have externality costs, such as the cost of health care due to road injuries or air pollution (Litman, 2024). We do not factor these externalities into our cost analysis.

Nonmotorized transportation (costs weighted by mode share) has private costs of US$0.08/pkm and public costs US$0.04/pkm. It produces no revenues to the user. It has a net cost of US$0.12/pkm and saves US$0.21/pkm compared with car travel. This equals a savings of US$1,771/t CO₂‑eq (Table 2).

Pedestrian travel has private costs of US$0.09/pkm (mostly for shoes) and public costs of US$0.1/pkm (for sidewalks, staircases, bridges, etc.). It produces no new revenues. It has a net cost of US$0.10/pkm and saves US$0.23/pkm compared to car travel (Gössling et al., 2019; Litman, 2024). 

Private bicycles have private costs of US$0.06/pkm (for the cost of the bicycle itself, as well as repairs, clothing, etc.) and public costs of US$0.002/pkm (for bike lanes and other infrastructure). They produce no new revenues. They have net costs of US$0.07/pkm and save US$0.26/pkm compared to car travel (Gössling et al., 2019; Litman, 2024). These costs are cheaper than those of pedestrian travel on a per-pkm basis because, while a bicycle costs more than a pair of shoes, it can also travel much farther.

Shared bicycle systems have different cost structures. They can be very expensive (US$9.00/km in London), free (Buenos Aires) and very inexpensive (less than US$0.00 in Tehran) based on what operators charge users. Rides are usually priced by time rather than distance (DeMaio, 2009). Calculations were made as to distance covered by time to arrive at a price per km (CityTransit Data, 2025; Fishman & Schepers, 2016; Pro Cycling Coaching, 2025). Assuming that this roughly covered operating costs, it means that these systems cost US$0.22/pkm more than car travel.

An important consideration for each of these is that we must divide the cost of a bicycle, car, pair of shoes, or piece of infrastructure (road, bike lane, sidewalk) by the pkm of travel it supports over its lifespan. This means that nonmotorized transportation, which is cheaper but slower than cars, can have less of a cost advantage per pkm than might seem intuitive, and is part of the reason why cycling is cheaper per pkm than pedestrian travel. In addition, all of these estimates are based on very limited data and research and should be treated as approximate. Lastly, per-pkm infrastructural costs of cycling and pedestrian travel will decrease as cyclists and pedestrians use the infrastructure more intensively.

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Table 2. Cost per unit of climate impact.

Unit: 2023 US$/t CO₂‑eq , 100-yr basis

Nonmotorized Transportation
median -1,771
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Learning Curve

Walking and cycling are mature technologies, so the concept of a learning rate is not applicable.

There is also limited opportunity for cost reductions in cycling or pedestrian infrastructure built using construction techniques very similar to those used in the road industry. However, while learning effects might not do much to reduce the costs of nonmotorized transportation infrastructure, they could do a great deal to improve its effectiveness. Safe cycling infrastructure, in particular, has improved considerably over the past few decades. This could continue into the future as best practices are further improved.

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Speed of Action

Speed of action refers to how quickly a climate solution physically affects the atmosphere after it is deployed. This is different from speed of deployment, which is the pace at which solutions are adopted.

At Project Drawdown, we define the speed of action for each climate solution as emergency brake, gradual, or delayed.

Improve Nonmotorized Transportation is a GRADUAL climate solution. It has a steady, linear impact on the atmosphere. The cumulative effect over time builds as a straight line.

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Caveats

Increases to the modal share of nonmotorized transportation only have the benefits discussed here if they replace travel by car. Replacing public transit travel with travel using nonmotorized transportation will have a much smaller climate benefit. The climate benefit of nonmotorized mobility will also diminish if the average emissions of the global car fleet shrink, for example, due to the wider adoption of electric vehicles. 

There are also uncertainties around trip length. A small number of long trips taken by car will not be replaceable by nonmotorized transportation. Replacing the average trip by car with cycling or pedestrian travel will, in many cases, require that trip to be shortened (for example, by placing businesses closer to people’s homes). If this is not possible, increased adoption of nonmotorized transportation will apply to only some trips, reducing the impact on both emissions and costs.

Weather and climate pose significant challenges and risks for nonmotorized transportation. Extreme heat or cold, wind, rain, or storms can make people reluctant to travel without the protection of a vehicle and, in some cases, can make doing so unsafe (Gössling et al., 2023). This will reduce the adoption of nonmotorized transportation in some places, although it can be mitigated through measures such as providing information and subsidies for proper clothing, removing or grooming snow on bicycle paths, and providing indoor/covered paths that allow pedestrians to travel through a city without exposure to the elements.

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Current Adoption

Analysts most frequently report adoption of nonmotorized transportation as a percentage modal share of all trips taken in a city. Cities around the world have radically different modal shares of bicycle and pedestrian trips. Cities in LMICs often have a high nonmotorized modal share because many people cannot afford cars. Cities in high-income countries are often difficult to navigate without a car, resulting in low modal shares for nonmotorized transportation (Prieto-Curiel & Ospina, 2024). 

Prieto-Curiel and Ospina (2024) estimated that northern North America (the United States and Canada) had the lowest modal share of nonmotorized transportation, at 3.5%. Western Europe reached 29% modal share, while Western and Eastern Africa reached 42.9% and 46%, respectively.

Converting these numbers into vehicle-kilometers traveled on a national level for various countries requires assumptions. A population-weighted average of data available from the United States and several Western European countries finds that people take approximately three 13.2 km trips per day, totaling 39.7 km of daily travel with considerable variation between countries (Christensen & Vázquez, 2013; Department for Transport, 2024; Federal Highway Administration, 2022; Statistics Netherlands, 2024). For example, English people in 2022 traveled an average of 25.5 km/day, while Americans in 2020 traveled 53.5 km/day. The value we use in our analysis comes from a population-weighted average that excludes data from 2020 and 2021 to exclude data skewed by the COVID-19 pandemic. Because the United States has by far the highest population of the countries for which we found data, it skews the average much higher than many of the European countries. World data (ITF, 2021) reports that nonmotorized transportation is 14.4% of all urban pkm.

We assumed that in urban environments, each trip taken by nonmotorized transportation corresponds to one fewer car trip of this average length. This implies that nonmotorized transportation currently shifts approximately 12.9 trillion pkm from cars (Table 3). However, it should be noted that this figure includes low-income countries, where some residents have less access to private vehicles.

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Table 3. Current (2024) adoption level.

Unit: million pkm/yr*

25th percentile 1,913,000
mean 12,860,000
median (50th percentile) 8,617,000
75th percentile 22,340,000

*These data are extrapolated from a range of individual city estimates from 2010 to 2020 and are limited by the fact that not all cities have accurate data on passenger travel modal share. We used the mean value from Prieto-Curiel and Ospina (2024) as the authoritative estimate of current adoption here and for calculations in future sections.

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Adoption Trend

In all cities for which appropriate data exist, nonmotorized transportation showed a growth rate of 0.45% of all passenger trips per year (Prieto-Curiel & Ospina, 2024). This amounts to 114 billion pkm (Table 4) according to our estimation procedure outlined above. In some cities, adoption has grown much more quickly. For example, Hanover, Germany, achieved an average growth of 7.8%/yr in 2011–2017, which amounts to approximately 593 million additional pkm traveled by bicycle every year during that time. However, the rate of adoption is extremely variable. The 25th percentile of estimates shows a global decline in nonmotorized transportation to the tune of 312 billion fewer pkm shifted to nonmotorized modes every year.

Adoption rates of nonmotorized transportation vary widely within a country and between different years within the same city (Prieto-Curiel & Ospina, 2024).

Many people, particularly in LMICs, walk or cycle because they have limited access to a vehicle. When countries become wealthier, travel often shifts from nonmotorized transportation to cars (Seum et al., 2020). If transportation policy in these countries prioritizes car-free mobility, high levels of nonmotorized transportation adoption could potentially be preserved even as living standards increase.

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Table 4. 2023–2024 adoption trend.

Unit: million pkm/yr

25th percentile -311,800
mean 68,450
median (50th percentile) 114,400
75th percentile 687,200
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Adoption Ceiling

We estimated that 20.2% of all trips in cities worldwide, or approximately 12.9 trillion pkm/yr, are traveled by nonmotorized transportation, while 66.2%, or approximately 42.2 trillion pkm/yr, are traveled by fossil fuel–powered car. This suggests that switching all urban trips currently taken by car to nonmotorized transportation would lead to a nonmotorized modal share of 86.4% in cities globally, or 55 trillion pkm/yr (Table 5).

This calculation uses the same assumptions discussed under Current Adoption above. In this case, however, our assumption that every nonmotorized trip is shifted from a car trip of the same length requires further justification. We are not assuming that very long car trips, trips on highways, etc., are replaced directly by bicycle or pedestrian trips. Instead, we assume that shorter nonmotorized trips can substitute for longer car trips with appropriate investment in better urban planning and infrastructure. So, for example, a 10 km drive to a large grocery store could be replaced by a 1 km walk to a neighborhood grocery store. 

This would require replanning many cities so they better accommodate shorter trips. It would also require improving options for people with disabilities or those carrying heavy loads. And it would face climatic and topographic constraints. Furthermore, it is unlikely that all car traffic would ever be substituted by any single alternative mode. Other sustainable modes, particularly public transit, are likely to play a role.

It is also possible for rural trips to be undertaken by nonmotorized transportation. Indeed, this is already very common in low-and middle-income countries. However, rural data are sparse, and discerning how many trips could be shifted to nonmotorized travel in these areas is highly speculative. Therefore, we omit rural areas from our analysis.

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Table 5. Adoption ceiling.

Unit: million pkm/yr

median (50th percentile) 55,090,000
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Achievable Adoption

To estimate the upper bound of feasible adoption, we assumed that urban trips taken by fossil fuel–powered cars can be shifted to nonmotorized transportation until the latter accounts for 65% of trips (the current highest modal share of nonmotorized transportation in any city with a population of more than one million) or until car travel decreases to 7% of trips (the current lowest modal share of fossil fuel–powered cars in any city with a population of more than one million). 

The global modal share of car travel is 51.4% of trips, or 37.6 trillion pkm/yr, and the global modal share of nonmotorized transportation in cities is 22.4% of trips, or 12.9 trillion pkm/yr. If we shift modal share from cars to nonmotorized transportation until it reaches 65% of travel in cities, that leaves the modal share of cars in cities at 8.8%, still higher than the 7% modal share mentioned above. This amounts to a total modal share shift of 42.6% in all global cities. Multiplying this by the global urban population of 4.4 billion and factoring in the average annual travel distance per capita of 16,590 pkm/yr results in a total of 31.2 million pkm/yr shifted from car travel to nonmotorized transportation in cities around the world, for a total of 41.5 trillion pkm/yr (Table 6).

To set the lower bound, we do the same calculation as above, but for each individual region, adding up all the resultant modal shifts to get a global figure. So, for example, every East Asian city might reach the nonmotorized transportation modal share of Singapore (23% of trips), while every northern European city might reach that of Copenhagen, Denmark (41% of trips). This corresponds to a total achievable nonmotorized transportation modal share of 28.6 trillion pkm/yr.

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Table 6. Range of achievable adoption levels.

Unit: million pkm/yr

Current Adoption 12,860,000
Achievable – Low 28,630,000
Achievable – High 41,490,000
Adoption Ceiling 55,090,000
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If all cycling and pedestrian trips undertaken today would otherwise have happened by car, they are currently displacing approximately 1.5 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr emissions (Table 7). This is an overestimate, however, since this figure includes data from places where most people have low access to cars.

Walking and private bicycles have a different effectiveness than shared bicycles. To calculate the climate impacts of different levels of adoption, we applied the effectiveness in the share of each mode of nonmotorized transportation. Walking and private bicycling are 94.4% of nonmotorized pkm and shared bicycling is 5.3%. This gives nonmotorized transportation effectiveness at reducing emissions 115.6 t CO₂‑eq /million pkm.

On the lower end, if every city achieved a pedestrian and cycling modal share equivalent to the least-motorized city in its region, it would save 3.3 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr. On the higher end, if every city shifted enough passenger car traffic to achieve a car modal share as low as Hong Kong, China, it would save 4.8 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr. If all trips taken by car were shifted onto nonmotorized transportation (an unrealistic scenario), it would save 6.4 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr.

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Table 7. Climate impact at different levels of adoption.

Unit: Gt CO₂‑eq/yr, 100-yr basis

Current Adoption 1.487
Achievable – Low 3.310
Achievable – High 4.797
Adoption Ceiling 6.370
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Additional Benefits

Health and Air Quality

Air pollution kills approximately 7 million people yearly (Roser, 2024). By reducing vehicle emissions, nonmotorized transportation can alleviate related air pollution (Mailloux et al., 2021) and thereby reduce premature deaths. For example, cutting U.S. transportation emissions by 75% by 2030 could prevent 14,000 premature deaths annually due to decreased exposure to PM2.5 and ozone (Shindell et al., 2016). 

Nonmotorized transportation has other health and safety benefits (Blondiau et al., 2016; European Commission, 2019; Glazener & Khreis, 2019; Gössling et al., 2023; Mueller et al., 2015; State of Colorado, 2016; Xia et al., 2013). Switching from driving to walking or cycling boosts health by promoting physical activity and decreasing risks of cardiovascular issues, diabetes, and mental disorders (Mailloux et al., 2021).

Noise pollution from motorized vehicles has significant impacts on cardiovascular health, mental health, and sleep disturbances, contributing to 1.6 million lost healthy life years in 2004 and up to 1,100 deaths attributable to hypertension in Europe in 2024 (Staatsen et al., 2004; Munzel et al., 2024). Enhancing nonmotorized transportation can reduce the health impacts of traffic noise (de Nazelle et al., 2011).

Finally, nonmotorized transportation improves quality of life. It increases opportunities for human connection, integrates physical activity and fun into daily commutes, and increases the autonomy of less mobile groups such as children and elders. Cities with high modal shares for nonmotorized transportation generally have high quality of life (Adamos et al., 2020; Günther & Krems, 2022; Glazener and Khreis, 2019).

The use of nonmotorized transportation can reduce car crashes, which kill around 1.2 million people annually (WHO, 2023).

Income and Work

Nonmotorized transportation infrastructure tends to be good for local businesses. Cyclists and pedestrians are more likely to stop at businesses they pass and therefore spend more money locally, creating more jobs (Volker & Handy, 2021). 

Nature Protection

In 2011, roads and associated infrastructure accounted for 10–30% of land in residential areas and 50–70% of land in commercial areas (Litman, 2011). Transforming these lands into green spaces could provide additional habitats and reduce biodiversity loss while increasing the protection of land, soil, and water resources (European Commission, 2019).

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Risks

Some literature suggested that nonmotorized transportation can lead to gentrification because bike lanes and pleasant walkable streets can increase property values, driving people who used to live in a neighborhood into other places that might still be car-dependent (Flanagan et al., 2016). This risk can be addressed by ensuring that nonmotorized transportation infrastructure is built in an equitable way, connecting different neighborhoods regardless of their social and economic status. Increasing the number of neighborhoods accessible without a car will mean that people do not have to pay a premium to live in those neighborhoods. This will avoid making accessibility without a car a privilege that only the wealthy can afford.

Cycling in a city with lots of traffic and poor cycling infrastructure puts cyclists at risk of injury from collisions with cars. This risk, however, comes mainly from the presence of cars on roads. Reducing the number of cars on the road by shifting trips to other modes can improve safety for cyclists and pedestrians (Bopp et al., 2018).

The positive impacts that nonmotorized transportation have on traffic congestion could be self-defeating if not managed well. This is because less congestion will make driving more appealing, which can, in turn, lead to additional induced demand, increasing car use and congestion (Hymel et al., 2010).

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Interactions with Other Solutions

Reinforcing

Nonmotorized transportation can help passengers access public transit systems, train stations, and carpool pickup points. This is important because research suggests that the key to a low-carbon mobility system is to reduce the need for people to own cars (Van Acker & Witlox, 2010).

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Electric bicycles use the same infrastructure as nonmotorized transportation – especially conventional bicycles. Building bike lanes, bike paths, mixed-use paths, and similar infrastructure for cyclists and pedestrians can also help with the uptake of electric bicycles. This is even more true for shared electric bicycles, which can and often do use the same sharing systems as shared conventional bicycles.

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One way to encourage the adoption of electric cars is through electric car–sharing services, in which people can access a communal electric car when they need it. This has the additional benefit of reducing the need for car ownership, which is closely correlated with car use (Van Acker and Witlox, 2010). Good nonmotorized transportation infrastructure can make it easier for users of these services to access shared vehicles parked at central locations.

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Nonmotorized transportation requires a lot less space than cars. Some of this space could be reallocated to ecosystem conservation and other land-based methods of GHG sequestration. In 2011, roads and parking accounted for 10–30% of land in residential areas and 50–70% of land in commercial areas (Litman, 2011). Transforming 35% of the land area of European cities alone into green spaces could sequester an additional 26 Mt CO₂‑eq/yr. Globally, this kind of effort could sequester 0.1–0.3 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr (Rodriguez Mendez et al., 2024).

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Competing

Electric cars, hybrid cars, and nonmotorized transportation compete for the same pool of total pkm. Increased use of nonmotorized transportation could reduce kilometers traveled using electric cars. 

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Consensus

Consensus of effectiveness in decarbonizing the transport sector: High

The large reductions in emissions that come from shifting passenger transportation from fossil fuel-powered cars to nonmotorized modes are not controversial. There is some disagreement, however, over how many pkm traveled by car can be realistically shifted to nonmotorized transportation.

Brand et al. (2021) compared the GHG emissions of active transportation with those of cars. They concluded that “locking in, investing in and promoting active travel should be a cornerstone of sustainability strategies, policies and planning.”

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2023) sixth assessment report mentioned nonmotorized transportation as a solution in its transportation chapter. The authors expressed high confidence in the potential of these transportation modes to reduce emissions and recommended policy and infrastructural measures to support them.

Litman’s (2024) study of the costs and benefits of active transportation summarized the direct financial costs as well as externalities associated with pedestrian and bicycle travel compared with travel by fossil fuel–powered car. Litman noted that “active transport can provide relatively large energy savings if it substitutes for short urban trips that have high emission rates per mile due to cold starts (engines are inefficient during the first few minutes of operation) and congestion. As a result, each 1% shift from automobile to active travel typically reduces fuel consumption 2–4%.”

This research is, unfortunately, heavily biased toward richer countries, especially in Europe and North America, even though nonmotorized transportation plays a very important role in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). The research on this topic is also biased toward cities, even though nonmotorized transportation can be a valuable means of mobility in rural areas. 

The results presented in this document summarize findings from 19 reviews and meta-analyses and 14 original studies reflecting current evidence from 84 countries, primarily the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union. We recognize this limited geographic scope creates bias, and hope this work inspires research and data sharing on this topic in underrepresented regions.

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Dashboard

Solution Basics

million passenger-kilometers (million pkm)

t CO₂-eq (100-yr)/unit
099.33115.6
units/yr
Current 1.286×10⁷2.863×10⁷4.149×10⁷
Achievable (Low to High)

Climate Impact

Gt CO₂-eq (100-yr)/yr
Current 1.487 3.314.797
US$ per t CO₂-eq
-1,771
Gradual

CO₂, CH₄, N₂O, BC

Trade-offs

Production of equipment (such as bicycles) and infrastructure (such as sidewalks) creates some emissions, but these are small when divided by the total distance traveled by pedestrians and cyclists. On a per-pkm basis, this makes little difference in the emissions saved by nonmotorized transportation. 

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% population
0–20
20–40
40–60
60–80
> 80

Percentage of city population living near protected bikeways, 2023

Proximity to related infrastructure, such as protected bikeways, facilitates the safe and convenient use of nonmotorized modes of transportation.

Reich, D. T. & Braga, K. (2024). Atlas of Sustainable City Transport [Data set]. Institute for Transportation and Development Policy. Retrieved June 2, 2025 from atlas.itdp.org

% population
0–20
20–40
40–60
60–80
> 80

Percentage of city population living near protected bikeways, 2023

Proximity to related infrastructure, such as protected bikeways, facilitates the safe and convenient use of nonmotorized modes of transportation.

Reich, D. T. & Braga, K. (2024). Atlas of Sustainable City Transport [Data set]. Institute for Transportation and Development Policy. Retrieved June 2, 2025 from atlas.itdp.org

Maps Introduction

Nonmotorized transportation effectiveness is high across all geographic regions, though the built environment, safety, and socio-cultural norms heavily shape its adoption and impact. Key determinants of effectiveness include the extent of safe and connected infrastructure (e.g., sidewalks, bike lanes, protected intersections), land-use patterns supporting short trips, and public policies prioritizing nonmotorized transportation.

Overall, effectiveness depends on adoption. In many cities across Europe and Asia, walking and cycling remain integral to daily travel. Cities like Amsterdam, Copenhagen, and Tokyo have successfully integrated nonmotorized modes into their broader transport systems through dedicated infrastructure and supportive urban design. In contrast, cities in North America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and parts of Latin America often lack safe, accessible infrastructure, which limits adoption.

Socioeconomic factors, including income levels, urban design, and perceptions of status, also influence the adoption of nonmotorized transport. In wealthier regions, cycling may be viewed as a lifestyle choice or an environmental statement, whereas in lower-income settings, it may be perceived as a necessity or even a sign of economic disadvantage, influencing user behavior and policy support (Seum et al., 2020).

Although shared bicycles have a lower effectiveness than walking or private bicycles, they are much more effective than cars. Increasing the number of shared bicycle systems in any geographic area can increase adoption and, therefore, make them more effective. This is particularly effective in lower-income areas where owning a private bicycle might be cost-prohibitive (Litman, 2024). Increasing shared systems in less urban and more suburban areas can be more effective, as they often replace trips made by car (Brand et al., 2021).

Nonmotorized modes are generally resilient and functional in a wide range of climates. Extreme weather conditions, including high heat, heavy rainfall, or snow, can reduce walking and cycling, although these can be mitigated through appropriate infrastructure (e.g., shaded or covered walkways, snow clearing, bike shelters).

Action Word
Improve
Solution Title
Nonmotorized Transportation
Classification
Highly Recommended
Lawmakers and Policymakers
  • Use nonmotorized transportation.
  • Reduce the associated time, distance, risk, and risk perception of nonmotorized transportation.
  • Improve infrastructure such as sidewalks, footpaths, and bike lanes.
  • Implement traffic-calming methods such as speed bumps.
  • Increase residential and commercial density.
  • Use a citizen-centered approach when designing infrastructure.
  • Enact infrastructure standards for nonmotorized transportation, such as curb ramp designs, and train contractors to implement them.
  • Establish public bike-sharing programs.
  • Create dedicated coordinating bodies across government agencies, businesses, and the public to develop nonmotorized infrastructure.
  • Disincentivize car ownership through reduced access, increases in parking fares, taxes, or other means. 

Further information:

Practitioners
  • Use nonmotorized transportation.
  • Share your experiences, tips, and reasons for choosing your modes of transportation.
  • Participate in local bike groups, public events, and volunteer opportunities.
  • Advocate to local officials for infrastructure improvements and note specific locations for improvements.
  • Encourage local businesses to create employee incentives.
  • Create “bike buses” or “walking buses” for the community and local schools.

Further information:

Business Leaders
  • Use nonmotorized transportation.
  • Ensure your business is accessible via nonmotorized transportation.
  • Advocate for better infrastructure for nonmotorized transportation.
  • Educate customers about the local infrastructure.
  • Partner with other businesses to encourage employees to cycle or walk.
  • Encourage employees to walk or cycle to and from work as their circumstances allow.
  • Create educational materials for employees on commuting best practices.
  • Offer employees pre-tax commuter benefits to include reimbursement for nonmotorized travel expenses.
  • Organize staff bike rides to increase familiarity and comfort with bicycling.
  • Install adequate bike storage, such as locking posts.
  • Emphasize walking and biking as part of company-wide sustainability initiatives and communicate how walking and biking support broader GHG emission reduction efforts.

Further information:

Nonprofit Leaders
  • Use nonmotorized transportation.
  • Ensure your office is accessible to nonmotorized transportation.
  • Advocate for infrastructure improvements and note specific locations where improvements can be made.
  • Encourage local businesses to create employee incentives.
  • Create “bike buses” or “walking buses” for the community and/or local schools.
  • Offer free classes on subjects such as bike maintenance, local bike routes, or what to know before purchasing a bike.
  • Host or support community participation in local infrastructure design.
  • Join public-private partnerships to encourage biking and walking, emphasizing the health and savings benefits.

Further information:

Investors
  • Use nonmotorized transportation.
  • Deploy capital to efforts that improve bicycle and walking comfort, convenience, access, and safety.
  • Invest in public or private bike-sharing systems.
  • Invest in local supply chains for bicycles and other forms of nonmotorized transportation.
  • Seek investment opportunities that reduce material and maintenance costs for bicycles.
  • Finance bicycle purchases via low-interest loans.
  • Consider investments in nonmotorized transportation start-ups.

Further information:

Philanthropists and International Aid Agencies
  • Use nonmotorized transportation.
  • Award grants to local organizations advocating for improved walking and bicycle infrastructure.
  • Build capacity for walking and bicycle infrastructure design and construction.
  • Support organizations that distribute, refurbish, and/or donate bikes in your community.
  • Facilitate access to bicycle maintenance and supplies.
  • Host or support community education or participation efforts.
  • Donate fixtures such as street lights, guardrails, and road signs.
  • Educate the public and policymakers on the benefits and best practices of nonmotorized transportation.

Further information:

Thought Leaders
  • Use nonmotorized transportation.
  • Focus messages on key decision factors for nonmotorized commuters, such as the associated health benefits and importance of fitness, climate and environmental benefits, weather forecasts, and traffic information.
  • Highlight principles of safe urban design and point out dangerous areas.
  • Share information on local bike and walking routes, general bike maintenance tips, items to consider when purchasing a bike, and related educational information.
  • Collaborate with schools on bicycle instruction, including safe riding habits and maintenance.

Further information:

Technologists and Researchers
  • Use nonmotorized transportation.
  • Examine and improve elements of infrastructure design.
  • Improve circularity, repairability, and ease of disassembly for bikes.
  • Increase the physical carrying capacities (storage) for walkers and bicyclists to facilitate shopping and transporting children, pets, and materials.
  • Identify and encourage the deployment of messaging that enhances nonmotorized transportation use.

Further information:

Communities, Households, and Individuals
  • Use nonmotorized transportation.
  • Share your experiences, tips, and reasons for choosing nonmotorized transportation.
  • Participate in local bike groups, public events, and volunteer opportunities.
  • Advocate to local officials for infrastructure improvements and note specific locations where improvements can be made.
  • Encourage local businesses to create employee incentives for using nonmotorized transportation.
  • Create “bike buses” or “walking buses” for the community and local schools.

Further information:

Sources
Evidence Base

Consensus of effectiveness in decarbonizing the transport sector: High

The large reductions in emissions that come from shifting passenger transportation from fossil fuel-powered cars to nonmotorized modes are not controversial. There is some disagreement, however, over how many pkm traveled by car can be realistically shifted to nonmotorized transportation.

Brand et al. (2021) compared the GHG emissions of active transportation with those of cars. They concluded that “locking in, investing in and promoting active travel should be a cornerstone of sustainability strategies, policies and planning.”

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2023) sixth assessment report mentioned nonmotorized transportation as a solution in its transportation chapter. The authors expressed high confidence in the potential of these transportation modes to reduce emissions and recommended policy and infrastructural measures to support them.

Litman’s (2024) study of the costs and benefits of active transportation summarized the direct financial costs as well as externalities associated with pedestrian and bicycle travel compared with travel by fossil fuel–powered car. Litman noted that “active transport can provide relatively large energy savings if it substitutes for short urban trips that have high emission rates per mile due to cold starts (engines are inefficient during the first few minutes of operation) and congestion. As a result, each 1% shift from automobile to active travel typically reduces fuel consumption 2–4%.”

This research is, unfortunately, heavily biased toward richer countries, especially in Europe and North America, even though nonmotorized transportation plays a very important role in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). The research on this topic is also biased toward cities, even though nonmotorized transportation can be a valuable means of mobility in rural areas. 

The results presented in this document summarize findings from 19 reviews and meta-analyses and 14 original studies reflecting current evidence from 84 countries, primarily the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union. We recognize this limited geographic scope creates bias, and hope this work inspires research and data sharing on this topic in underrepresented regions.

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Updated Date

Mobilize Hybrid Cars

Submitted by Drawdown Admin on
Sector
Transportation
Mode
Cut Emissions
Cluster
Enhance Efficiency
Image
Start button on a hybrid vehicle
Coming Soon
On
Summary

The Mobilize Hybrid Cars solution entails shifting trips from fossil fuel–powered internal combustion engine (ICE) cars to more efficient, lower emitting hybrid cars. Hybrid cars include hybrid electric cars (HEVs) and plug-in hybrid electric cars (PHEVs). They are four-wheeled passenger cars that combine an ICE with an electric motor and battery to improve fuel efficiency and reduce emissions. This definition includes hybrid sedans, sport utility vehicles (SUVs), and pickup trucks, but excludes fully electric cars, two-wheeled vehicles, and hybrid commercial or freight vehicles, such as hybrid buses and delivery trucks. Hybrid cars are a transitional climate solution because they are more efficient and produce fewer emissions per distance traveled than do fossil fuel–powered ICE cars but still rely on fossil fuel combustion.

Income & work,Health
Air quality
Description for Social and Search
The Mobilize Hybrid Cars solution is coming soon.
Overview

Hybrid cars reduce fuel consumption and tailpipe emissions by relying on electric propulsion for part of their operation. There are currently more than 45 million hybrids making up 2.2% of the more than two billion global car stock. HEVs provide the same functionality as fossil fuel–powered ICE cars, but combine an ICE with an electric motor and battery to improve fuel efficiency. Unlike electric cars, HEVs do not require external charging; instead, they recharge their battery using regenerative braking and energy from the engine. This allows them to use electric power at low speeds and in stop-and-go traffic, reducing fuel consumption and emissions compared to traditional gasoline or diesel cars. PHEVs work similarly but have larger batteries that can be charged using the electricity grid. This enables them to operate in full-electric mode for a limited distance before switching to hybrid mode when the battery is depleted.

Hybrid cars typically offer better acceleration than their purely fossil fuel–powered ICE counterparts, especially at lower speeds. This is because electric motors deliver instant torque, allowing hybrids to respond quickly when accelerating from a stop. PHEVs tend to have stronger electric motors and thus better acceleration. The high torque at low speeds eliminates the need for inefficient gear changes and allows near-constant operation at optimal conditions because the ICE is usually engaged at efficient conditions. This improves the real-world fuel economy 39–58% compared to fossil fuel–powered ICE cars of similar size (Zhang et al., 2025).

While hybrid cars reduce fuel consumption and tailpipe emissions by relying on electric propulsion for part of their operation, their overall emissions depend on how much they use the ICE versus the electric motor, and, for PHEVs, on the emissions intensity of the electricity source used for charging. PHEVs can offer greater potential for emission reductions if charged from low-carbon electricity sources. If driven primarily in electric mode, PHEVs can significantly reduce GHG emissions compared to fossil fuel–powered ICE cars, but if the battery is not regularly charged, their fuel consumption may be similar to or even higher than standard HEVs (Dornoff, 2021; Plötz et al., 2020).

Hybrid technologies also improve car efficiency by reducing energy losses. First, both HEVs and PHEVs recover energy through regenerative braking, converting kinetic energy into electricity and storing it in the battery (Yang et al., 2024). Second, their electric powertrains are more efficient than those of traditional ICEs, particularly in urban driving conditions where frequent stops and starts are common (Verma et al., 2022). These advantages contribute to lower fuel consumption and emissions compared to fossil fuel–powered ICE cars. However, the environmental benefits of hybrids depend on driving patterns, battery charging habits, and the carbon intensity of the electricity grid used to charge PHEVs.

Hybrid cars reduce emissions of CO₂, methane, and nitrous oxide to the atmosphere by increasing fuel efficiency compared to fossil fuel–powered ICE cars, which emit these gases from their tailpipes. Because they are typically fueled by gasoline, hybrid cars produce more methane than any diesel-fueled cars they might be replacing. As a result, their 20-yr effectiveness at addressing climate change is lower than their 100-yr effectiveness. 

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Credits

Lead Fellow

  • Heather Jones, Ph.D.

  • Cameron Roberts, Ph.D.

Contributors

  • Ruthie Burrows, Ph.D.

  • James Gerber, Ph.D.

  • Yusuf Jameel, Ph.D.

  • Daniel Jasper

  • Alex Sweeney

Internal Reviewers

  • Aiyana Bodi

  • Hannah Henkin

  • Zoltan Nagy, Ph.D. 

  • Ted Otte

  • Amanda D. Smith, Ph.D.

  • Christina Swanson, Ph.D.

Effectiveness

Each million pkm shifted from fossil fuel–powered cars to hybrid cars saves 27.1 t CO₂‑eq on a 100-yr basis (27.1 t CO₂‑eq on a 20-yr basis, Table 1). Fossil fuel–powered cars emit 115.3 t CO₂‑eq /million pkm on a 100-yr basis (116.4 t CO₂‑eq /million pkm on a 20-yr basis). The emissions from fossil fuel–powered ICE cars are calculated from the current global fleet mix which is mostly gasoline and diesel powered cars. PHEVs have lower emissions in countries with large shares of renewable, nuclear, or hydropower generation in their electricity grids (International Transport Forum, 2020; Verma et al., 2022).

We found this by collecting data on fuel consumption per kilometer for a range of HEV and PHEV models (IEA, 2021; International Transport Forum, 2020) and multiplying it by the emissions intensity of the fuel the vehicle uses (weighting PHEVs for percentage traveled using fuel). Simultaneously, we collected data on electricity consumption for a range of PHEV models (IEA, 2021; International Transport Forum, 2020), and multiplied them by the global average emissions per kWh of electricity generation. This was then weighted by the share of HEVs (73.4%) and PHEVs (26.6%) of the global hybrid car stock.

The amount of emissions savings for PHEVs depends on how often they are charged, the distance traveled using the electric motor, and the emissions intensity of the electrical grid from which they are charged. Hybrid cars today are disproportionately used in high and upper-middle income countries, where electricity grids emit less than the global average per unit of electricity generated (IEA, 2024). HEVs and PHEVs benefit from braking so are more efficient (relative to fossil fuel–powered ICE cars) in urban areas. 

Hybrid cars have higher embodied emissions than fossil fuel–powered ICE cars due to the presence of both an ICE and electric motor with a battery that has a GHG-intensive manufacturing process. This gives them a carbon payback period of 2.6 to under 16 years (Alberini et al., 2019; Duncan et al., 2019) for HEVS and as low as one year for PHEVs (Fulton, 2020). Embodied emissions are outside the scope of this assessment. 

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Table 1. Effectiveness at reducing emissions.

Unit: t CO₂‑eq /million pkm, 100-yr basis

25th percentile 19.51
mean 22.36
median (50th percentile) 27.11
75th percentile 65.85
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Cost

Hybrid cars cost on average US$0.01 more per pkm (US$7,200/million pkm) than fossil fuel–powered ICE cars, including purchase price, financing, fuel and electricity costs, and maintenance costs. This is based on a population-weighted average of the cost differential between hybrid and fossil fuel–powered ICE cars in the EU and 11 other countries: Argentina, China, Czechia, India, Indonesia, Lithuania, Malaysia, South Africa, Thailand, Ukraine, and the United States (Element Energy for BEUC, 2021; Furch et al., 2022; IEA, 2022; Isenstadt & Slowik, 2025; Lutsey et al., 2021; Mittal & Shah, 2024; Mustapa et al., 2020; Ouyang et al., 2021; Petrauskienė et al., 2021; Suttakul et al., 2022). The hybrid cost is weighted by the share of car stock of HEVs and PHEVs. 

While this analysis found that hybrid cars are slightly more expensive than fossil fuel–powered ICE cars almost everywhere, the margin is often quite small and hybrids are less expensive in China, Czechia, India, Thailand, and the United States.

This amounts to a cost of US$264/t CO₂‑eq on a 100-yr basis (US$266/t CO₂‑eq avoided emissions on a 20-yr basis, Table 2).

This analysis did not include costs that are the same for both hybrid and fossil fuel–powered ICE cars, including taxes, insurance costs, public costs of building road infrastructure, etc.

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Table 2. Cost per unit of climate impact.

Unit: 2023 US$/t CO₂‑eq , 100-yr basis

median 264
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Learning Curve

Hybrid car prices are declining. For every doubling in hybrid car production, costs decline in accordance with the learning rate of approximately 10% (Table 3).

The learning curve for hybrids is expected to continue its historical trend of 6–17% declines in production costs with each generation (Kittner et al., 2020; Ouyang et al., 2021; Weiss et al., 2019). For hybrid cars, production costs are driven more by the integration of electric and internal combustion powertrain components than by advancements in battery technology. Because they still rely on ICEs, hybrids do not experience the same rapid cost declines from battery improvements as fully electric cars. Instead, their cost reductions stem from manufacturing efficiencies, economies of scale, and advancements in hybrid powertrain efficiency and electric components (Weiss et al., 2019).

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Table 3. Learning rate: drop in cost per doubling of the installed solution base %.

Unit: %

25th percentile 8.00
mean 11.00
median (50th percentile) 10.00
75th percentile 13.50
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Speed of Action

Speed of action refers to how quickly a climate solution physically affects the atmosphere after it is deployed. This is different from speed of deployment, which is the pace at which solutions are adopted. 

At Project Drawdown, we define the speed of action for each climate solution as emergency brake, gradual, or delayed.

Mobilize Hybrid Cars is a GRADUAL climate solution. It has a steady, linear impact on the atmosphere. The cumulative effect over time builds as a straight line.

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Caveats

Hybrid cars are often considered a transitional technology for climate change mitigation. While they offer immediate reductions in fuel consumption and emissions compared to fossil fuel–powered ICE cars as the world transitions to fully electric transportation, hybrids still rely on the combustion of fossil fuels. The Mobilize Hybrid Cars solution is a move toward lower emissions – not zero emissions. By combining electric and gasoline powertrains, hybrids improve efficiency and reduce GHG emissions without requiring extensive charging infrastructure, making them a practical short-term solution (IEA, 2021). However, as battery costs decline, renewable energy expands, and charging networks improve, fully electric cars (EVs) are expected to replace hybrids as the dominant low-emission transportation option (Plötz, 2022).

The effectiveness of hybrid cars in reducing fuel consumption and emissions depends significantly on their ability to use electric power, which is influenced by charging habits and regenerative braking efficiency. PHEVs achieve the greatest fuel savings and emissions reductions when they are regularly charged from a low-emissions-intensity electricity grid because this maximizes their electric driving capability and minimizes reliance on the ICE. However, studies show that real-world charging behaviors vary, with some PHEV users failing to charge frequently, leading to higher-than-expected fuel consumption. Regenerative braking also plays a crucial role because it recaptures kinetic energy during deceleration and converts it into electricity to recharge the battery, improving overall efficiency. The extent of these benefits depends on driving conditions, with stop-and-go urban traffic allowing for more energy recovery than highway driving, where regenerative braking opportunities are limited (Plötz et al., 2020).

Hybrid car adoption faces a major obstacle in the form of constraints on battery production. While electric car battery production is being aggressively upscaled (IEA, 2024), building enough batteries to build enough cars to replace a significant fraction of fossil fuel–powered ICE cars is an enormous challenge. This will likely slow down a transition to hybrids, even if consumer demand is high (Milovanoff et al., 2020). This suggests that EV batteries should be prioritized for users whose transport needs are harder to serve with other forms of low-emissions transportation (such as nonmotorized transportation, public transit, etc.). This could include emergency vehicles, commercial vehicles, and vehicles for people who live in rural areas or have disabilities. 

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Current Adoption

Approximately 12 million PHEVs (IEA, 2024) and more than 33 million HEVs (IEA, 2023) are in use worldwide. This corresponds to about 2.2% of the total car stock of 2,022,057,847 (WHO, 2022) and means that hybrid cars worldwide travel about 1.3 trillion pkm/yr. We assumed this travel would occur in a fossil fuel–powered ICE car if the car’s occupants did not use a hybrid car. Adoption is much higher in some countries, such as Japan, where the global hybrid car stock share was 20–30% in 2023.

To convert this number into pkm traveled by hybrid car, we need to determine the average passenger-distance that each passenger car travels per year. Using population-weighted data from several different countries, the average car carries 1.5 people and travels about 19,500 vkm (vehicle kilometer)/yr, or an average of 29,250 pkm/yr. Multiplying this number by the number of hybrid cars in use 48.5 million) gives the total travel distance shifted (1.3 trillion pkm) from fossil fuel–powered ICE cars to hybrid cars (Table 4).

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Table 4. Current (2024) adoption level.

Unit: million pkm/yr

Population-weighted mean 1,318,000

Implied travel shifted from fossil fuel–powered cars to hybrid cars.

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Adoption Trend

Globally, the pkm driven in hybrid cars rather than fossil fuel–powered ICE cars increases by an average of about 178,200 million pkm/yr (Table 5). PHEV car purchases between 2019–2023 grew 45%/yr (IEA, 2024), while HEV purchases increased 10% annually 2021–2023 (IEA, 2021, 2023). Global purchases of hybrid cars are increasing by around 6.1 million cars/yr. This is based on globally representative data (Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2024; Fortune Business Insights, 2025; IEA, 2024; Menes, 2021).

It is worth noting that despite this impressive rate of growth, hybrid cars still have a long way to go before they replace a large percentage of the more than two billion cars currently driven (WHO, 2022).

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Table 5. 2023–2024 adoption trend.

Unit: million pkm/yr

Population-weighted mean 178,200

Implied travel shifted from fossil fuel–powered cars to hybrid cars.

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Adoption Ceiling

The total adoption ceiling for hybrid cars is equal to the total passenger-distance driven by private cars worldwide. Using a population-weighted mean of the average distance (in pkm) traveled per car annually, this translates to about 59 trillion pkm traveled (Table 6).

Replacing every single fossil fuel–powered ICE passenger car with a hybrid car would require an enormous upscaling of hybrid car production capacity, rapid development of charging infrastructure for PHEVs, cost reductions to make hybrid cars more affordable for more people, and technological improvements to make them more suitable for more kinds of drivers and trips. This shift would also face cultural obstacles from drivers who are attached to fossil fuel–powered cars (Roberts, 2022).

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Table 6. Adoption ceiling.

Unit: million pkm/yr

Population-weighted mean 59,140,000

Implied travel shifted from fossil fuel–powered cars to hybrid cars.

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Achievable Adoption

The achievable adoption of hybrid car travel is about 12–21 trillion pkm shifted from fossil fuel–powered ICE vehicles.

Various organizations have produced forecasts of future hybrid car adoption. These are not assessments of feasible adoption per se; they are instead predictions of likely rates of adoption, given various assumptions about the future (Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2024; Fortune Business Insights, 2025; IEA, 2021, 2023, 2024). But they are useful in that they take a large number of variables into account. To convert these estimates of future likely adoption into estimates of the achievable adoption range, we applied some optimistic assumptions to the numbers in the scenario projections. 

To find a high rate of hybrid car adoption, we assumed that every country could reach the highest rate of adoption projected to occur for any country. Bloomberg (Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2024) predicts that some countries will reach 20–50% hybrid vehicle stock share by 2030. We therefore set our high adoption rate at 50% adoption worldwide. This corresponds to 1.011 trillion total hybrid cars in use, or 29.6 trillion pkm traveled by hybrid cars (Table 7). An important caveat is that with a global supply constraint in the production of electric car batteries that are also used by hybrids, per-country adoption rates are somewhat zero-sum. Every hybrid car purchased in Japan is one that cannot be purchased somewhere else. This means that for the whole world to achieve 50% hybrid car stock share, global hybrid car production (especially battery production) would have to radically increase. 

To identify a lower feasible rate of electric car adoption, we took the lower end of Bloomberg’s 20–50% global hybrid car adoption ceiling. This is also the current adoption rate in the most intensive country (Japan at 20%), proving it feasible. This translates to 404 million hybrid cars, or 11.8 trillion pkm traveled by hybrid car.

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Table 7. Range of achievable adoption levels.

Unit: million pkm/yr

Current Adoption 1,317,000
Achievable – Low 11,830,000
Achievable – High 29,570,000
Adoption Ceiling 59,140,000
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Hybrid cars currently displace 0.036 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr of GHG emissions from the transportation system on a 100-yr basis (Table 8; 0.036 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr on a 20-yr basis). 

If hybrid cars reach 20% of the global private car stock share as Bloomberg (2024) projects, then with the current number of cars on the road, they will displace 0.321 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr GHG emissions on a 100-yr basis (0.319 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr on a 20-yr basis).

If hybrid cars globally reach 50% of global private car stock share, as Bloomberg estimates might happen in some markets, they will displace 0.802 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr GHG emissions on a 100-yr basis (0.796 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr on a 20-yr basis).

If hybrid cars replace 100% of the global car fleet, they will displace 1.614 Gt CO₂‑eq  GHG/yr emissions on a 100-yr basis (1.603 Gt CO2-eq/yr on a 20-yr basis).

These numbers are based on the present-day average fuel consumption for hybrids and include emissions intensity from electrical grids for PHEVs. If fuel efficiency continues to improve (including hybrids getting lighter) and grids become cleaner, the total climate impact from hybrids cars will increase.

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Table 8. Climate impact at different levels of adoption.

Unit: Gt CO₂‑eq/yr, 100-yr basis

Current Adoption 0.036
Achievable – Low 0.321
Achievable – High 0.802
Adoption Ceiling 1.603
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Additional Benefits

Air Quality

HEVs and PHEVs cars can reduce emissions of air pollutants, including sulfur oxides, sulfur dioxide, particulate matter, nitrogen oxides, and especially carbon monoxide and volatile organic compounds (Requia et al., 2018). Some air pollution reductions are limited (particularly particulate matter and ozone) because hybrid cars are heavy. The added weight can increase emissions from brakes, tires, and wear on the batteries (Carey, 2023; Jones, 2019).

Health

Because hybrid cars have lower tailpipe emissions than fossil fuel–powered ICE cars, they can reduce traffic-related air pollution, which is associated with asthma, lung cancer, increased emergency department visits for respiratory disease, and increased mortality (Anenberg et al., 2019). Transitioning to hybrid cars can reduce exposure to air pollution, improve health, and prevent premature mortality (Garcia et al., 2023; Larson et al., 2021; Peters et al., 2020) .

The health benefits of lower traffic-related air pollution vary spatially and – for PHEVs – partly depend on how communities generate electricity (Choma et al., 2020). Racial and ethnic minority communities located near highways and major traffic corridors are disproportionately exposed to air pollution (Kerr et al., 2021). Transitioning to HEVs and PHEVs could improve health in marginalized urban neighborhoods located near highways, industry, or ports (Pennington et al., 2024). These benefits depend on an equitable distribution of hybrid cars and infrastructure to support the adoption of plug-in hybrid cars (Garcia et al., 2023). 

Income and Work

Adopting hybrid cars can lead to savings in a household’s energy burden spent on fuel, or the proportion of income spent on fuel for transportation (Vega-Perkins et al., 2023). Plug-in hybrids can be charged during off-peak times, leading to further reductions in transportation costs (Romm & Frank, 2006). Savings from HEVs and PHEVs may be especially important for low-income households because they have the highest energy burdens (Bell-Pasht, 2024). 

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Risks

There is some criticism against any solution that advocates for car ownership (electric cars in particular and hybrids – which use fossil fuels – by extension) and that the focus should be on solutions such as public transport systems that reduce car ownership and usage (Jones, 2019; Milovanoff et al., 2020).

There is potential for a rebound effect, where improved fuel efficiency encourages people to drive more, potentially offsetting some of the expected fuel and emissions savings. This can occur because lower fuel costs per kilometer make driving more affordable and so increase vehicle use.

There is a risk that allocating the limited global battery supply to hybrid cars might undermine the deployment of solutions that also require batteries but are more effective at avoiding GHG emissions (Castelvecchi, 2021). These could include electric buses, electric rail, and electric bicycles.

Mining minerals necessary to produce hybrid car batteries carries environmental and social risks. Such mining has been associated with significant harm, particularly in lower-income countries that supply many of these minerals (Agusdinata et al., 2018; Sovacool, 2019).

Hybrid cars might also pose additional safety risks due to their higher weight, which means that they have longer stopping distances and can cause greater damage in collisions and to pedestrians and cyclists (Jones, 2019). 

The operating efficiency depends on charging for PHEVs and braking intensity for all hybrids. The results of efficiency studies also depend on assumptions such as car type, fuel efficiency, battery size, electricity grid, km/yr, and car lifetime. 

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Interactions with Other Solutions

Reinforcing

The effectiveness of PHEVs in reducing GHG emissions increases as electricity grids become cleaner, since lower-carbon electricity further reduces the emissions associated with car charging. 

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Competing

Hybrid cars compete directly with electric cars for adoption as well as for batteries, public resources, and infrastructural investment.

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Scaling up the production of hybrid cars requires more mining of critical minerals, which could affect ecosystems that are valuable carbon sinks (Agusdinata et al., 2018).

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Traveling by bicycle, sidewalk, public transit network, fully electric car, or smaller electric vehicle (such as electric bicycle) provides a greater climate benefit than traveling by hybrid car. There is an opportunity cost to deploying hybrid cars because those resources could otherwise be used to support these more effective solutions (APEC, 2024).

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Dashboard

Solution Basics

million passenger kilometers (million pkm)

t CO₂-eq (100-yr)/unit
019.5127.11
units/yr
Current 1.318×10⁶1.183×10⁷2.957×10⁷
Achievable (Low to High)

Climate Impact

Gt CO₂-eq (100-yr)/yr
Current 0.036 0.3210.802
US$ per t CO₂-eq
264
Gradual

CO₂ , CH₄, N₂O, BC

Trade-offs

Hybrid cars have higher embodied emissions than fossil fuel–powered ICE cars due to the presence of both an ICE and electric motor with a battery that has a GHG-intensive manufacturing process. While the embodied emissions are higher for hybrid cars than ICE cars, coupling them with operating emissions yields a carbon payback period of several years. Embodied emissions were outside the scope of this assessment.

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Action Word
Mobilize
Solution Title
Hybrid Cars
Classification
Highly Recommended
Lawmakers and Policymakers
  • Create time-bound government procurement policies and targets to transition government fleets to hybrid cars when fully electric cars aren’t possible.
  • Provide financial incentives such as tax breaks, subsidies, or grants for hybrid car production and purchases that gradually reduce as market adoption increases.
  • Provide complimentary benefits for hybrid car drivers, such as privileged parking areas, free tolls, and access schemes.
  • Use targeted financial incentives to help low-income communities buy hybrid cars and incentivize manufacturers to produce more affordable options.
  • Develop charging infrastructure, ensuring adequate spacing between stations and equitable distribution of stations.
  • Invest in R&D or implement regulations to improve manufacturing, adoption, supply chain standards, and circularity of hybrid cars – particularly batteries.
  • Transition fossil fuel electricity production to renewables while promoting the transition to hybrid cars.
  • Disincentivize fossil fuel–powered ICE car ownership by gradually introducing taxes, penalties, buy-back programs, or other mechanisms.
  • Offer one-stop shops for information on hybrid vehicles, including demonstrations and educational resources on cost savings, environmental impact, and maintenance.
  • Work with industry and labor leaders to construct new hybrid car plants and transition fossil fuel–powered ICE car manufacturing into hybrid car production.
  • Set regulations for sustainable use of hybrid car batteries and improve recycling infrastructure.
  • Join international efforts to promote and ensure supply chain environmental and human rights standards.
  • Incentivize or mandate life-cycle assessments and product labeling (e.g., Environmental Product Declarations).
  • Create, support, or join partnerships that offer information, training, and general support for hybrid car adoption.

Further information:

Practitioners
  • Produce and sell affordable hybrid car models.
  • Collaborate with dealers to provide incentives, low-interest financing, or income-based payment options.
  • Develop charging infrastructure, ensuring adequate spacing between stations and equitable distribution of stations.
  • Offer lifetime warranties for hybrid batteries and easy-to-understand maintenance instructions.
  • Invest in R&D to improve manufacturing, adoption, supply chain standards, and circularity of hybrid cars, particularly batteries.
  • Provide customers with real-world data to help alleviate fuel efficiency concerns.
  • Offer one-stop shops for information on hybrid cars, including educational resources on cost savings, environmental impact, optimal charging, and maintenance.
  • Work with policymakers and labor leaders to construct new hybrid car plants and transition fossil fuel–powered ICE car manufacturing into hybrid car production.
  • Join international efforts to promote and ensure supply chain environmental and human rights standards.
  • Invest in recycling and circular economy infrastructure.
  • Conduct life-cycle assessments and ensure product labeling (e.g., Environmental Product Declarations).
  • Create, support, or join partnerships that offer information, training, and general support for hybrid car adoption.

Further information:

Business Leaders
  • Set time-bound company procurement policies and targets to transition corporate fleets to hybrid cars when fully electric cars aren’t feasible and report on these metrics regularly.
  • Encourage supply chain partners to transition their delivery fleets to hybrid vehicles when fully electric cars aren’t feasible.
  • Take advantage of financial incentives, such as tax breaks, subsidies, or grants for hybrid car purchases.
  • Create purchasing agreements with hybrid car manufacturers to support stable demand and improve economies of scale.
  • Install charging stations and offer employee benefits for hybrid car drivers, such as privileged parking areas.
  • Invest in R&D to improve manufacturing, adoption, supply chain standards, and circularity of hybrid cars – particularly batteries.
  • Work with industry and labor leaders to transition fossil fuel–powered ICE car manufacturing into hybrid car production.
  • Advocate for financial incentives and policies that promote hybrid car adoption.
  • Join international efforts to promote and ensure supply chain environmental and human rights standards.
  • Educate employees, customers, and investors about the company's transition to hybrid cars and encourage them to learn more about them.
  • Offer one-stop shops for information on hybrid cars, including demonstrations and educational resources on cost savings, environmental impact, and maintenance.
  • Create, support, or join partnerships that offer information, training, and general support for hybrid car adoption.

Further information:

Nonprofit Leaders
  • Set time-bound organizational procurement policies and targets to transition fleets to hybrid cars when fully electric cars aren’t feasible.
  • Take advantage of financial incentives, such as tax breaks, subsidies, or grants for hybrid car purchases.
  • Advocate for financial incentives and policies that promote hybrid car adoption.
  • Install charging stations and offer employee benefits for hybrid car drivers, such as privileged parking areas.
  • Advocate for or provide improved charging infrastructure.
  • Offer workshops or support to low-income communities for purchasing and owning hybrid cars.
  • Work with industry and labor leaders to transition fossil fuel–powered ICE car manufacturing into hybrid car production.
  • Join international efforts to promote and ensure supply chain environmental and human rights standards.
  • Advocate for regulations on lithium-ion batteries and investments in recycling facilities.
  • Offer one-stop shops for information on hybrid cars, including demonstrations and educational resources on cost savings, environmental impact, and maintenance.
  • Create, support, or join partnerships that offer information, training, and general support for hybrid car adoption.

Further information:

Investors
  • Invest in hybrid car companies and companies that provide charging equipment or installation.
  • Pressure and support portfolio companies in transitioning their corporate fleets.
  • Pressure portfolio companies to establish and report on time-bound targets for corporate fleet transition and roll-out of employee incentives
  • Invest in R&D to improve manufacturing, adoption, supply chain standards, and circularity of hybrid cars – particularly batteries.
  • Invest in hybrid car companies, associated supply chains, and end-user businesses like rideshare apps.
  • Join international efforts to promote and ensure supply chain environmental and human rights standards.
  • Create, support, or join partnerships that offer information, training, and general support for hybrid car adoption.
  • Offer low-interest loans for purchasing hybrid cars or charging infrastructure.

Further information:

Philanthropists and International Aid Agencies
  • Set time-bound organizational procurement policies to transition fleets to hybrid cars when fully electric cars aren’t feasible.
  • Install charging stations and offer employee benefits for hybrid car drivers, such as privileged parking areas.
  • Take advantage of financial incentives, such as tax breaks, subsidies, or grants for hybrid car purchases.
  • Advocate for financial incentives and policies that promote hybrid car adoption.
  • Advocate for or provide improved charging infrastructure.
  • Advocate for regulations on lithium-ion batteries and public investments in recycling facilities.
  • Offer financial services such as low-interest loans or grants for purchasing hybrid cars and charging equipment.
  • Offer workshops or support to low-income communities for purchasing and owning hybrid cars.
  • Work with industry and labor leaders to transition fossil fuel–poweredICE car manufacturing into hybrid car production.
  • Join international efforts to promote and ensure supply chain environmental and human rights standards.
  • Offer one-stop shops for information on hybrid vehicles, including demonstrations and educational resources on cost savings, environmental impact, and maintenance.
  • Create, support, or join partnerships that offer information, training, and general support for hybrid car adoption.

Further information:

Thought Leaders
  • If purchasing a new car, buy a hybrid car if fully electric isn’t feasible.
  • Take advantage of financial incentives, such as tax breaks, subsidies, or grants for hybrid car purchases.
  • Share your experiences with hybrid cars through social media and peer-to-peer networks, highlighting the cost savings, benefits, incentive programs, and troubleshooting tips.
  • Advocate for financial incentives and policies that promote hybrid car adoption.
  • Advocate for improved charging infrastructure.
  • Help improve circularity of hybrid car supply chains.
  • Conduct in-depth life-cycle assessments of hybrid cars in particular geographies.
  • Research ways to reduce weight and improve the performance of hybrid cars while appealing to customers.
  • Join international efforts to promote and ensure supply chain environmental and human rights standards.
  • Create, support, or join partnerships that offer information, training, and general support for hybrid car adoption.

Further information:

Technologists and Researchers
  • Improve circularity of hybrid car supply chains.
  • Reduce the amount of critical minerals required for hybrid car batteries.
  • Innovate low-cost methods to improve safety, labor standards, and supply chains in mining for critical minerals.
  • Increase the longevity of batteries.
  • Research ways to reduce weight and improve the performance of hybrid cars while appealing to customers.
  • Improve techniques to repurpose used hybrid car batteries for stationary energy storage.
  • Develop methods of adapting fossil fuel–powered car manufacturing and infrastructure to include electric components.

Further information:

Communities, Households, and Individuals
  • If purchasing a new car, buy a hybrid car when fully electric cars aren’t feasible.
  • Take advantage of financial incentives, such as tax breaks, subsidies, or grants for hybrid car purchases.
  • Share your experiences with hybrid cars through social media and peer-to-peer networks, highlighting the cost savings, benefits, incentive programs, and troubleshooting tips.
  • Help shift the narrative around hybrid cars by demonstrating capability and performance.
  • Advocate for financial incentives and policies that promote hybrid car adoption.
  • Advocate for improved charging infrastructure.
  • Help improve circularity of supply chains for hybrid car components.
  • Join international efforts to promote and ensure supply chain environmental and human rights standards.
  • Create, support, or join partnerships that offer information, training, and general support for hybrid car adoption.

Further information:

Sources
Evidence Base

Consensus of effectiveness in reducing emissions: Mixed

There is a high level of consensus that hybrid cars emit fewer GHGs per kilometer traveled compared to fossil fuel–powered ICE cars. Hybrid cars achieve these reductions by combining an ICE with an electric motor that improves fuel efficiency and, for some models, allow for limited all-electric driving, further reducing fuel consumption and emissions. This advantage is strongest in places where trips are short and require a lot of braking, such as in cities. 

Globally, cars and vans were responsible for 3.8 Gt of CO₂‑eq emissions in 2023 – more than 60% of road transport emissions (IEA, 2024).

Major climate research organizations generally see hybrid cars as a transitional means of reducing GHG emissions from passenger transportation. These technologies offer immediate emissions reductions while the electricity grid decarbonizes and battery technology improves. Any improvement to fuel efficiency or time spent driving electrically reduces emissions. These technologies can be a gateway to fully electric cars by eliminating range anxiety and allowing drivers the experience of electric driving without fully committing to the limitations of current EV infrastructure. 

Hybrid cars, while more fuel-efficient than fossil fuel–powered ICE cars, still rely on gasoline or diesel, meaning they continue to produce tailpipe emissions and contribute to air pollution. Additionally, their dual powertrains add complexity, leading to higher embodied emissions, manufacturing costs, increased maintenance requirements, and potential long-term reliability concerns. The added weight from both an ICE and an electric motor, along with a battery pack, can reduce overall efficiency and raise safety concerns. Embodied emissions are outside the scope of this assessment.

The International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT; Isenstadt & Slowik, 2025) estimated that HEVs reduce tailpipe GHG emissions by 30% while costing an average of US$2,000 more upfront. Over a 10-yr period, they offered an estimated fuel cost savings of US$4,500. ICCT expected future HEVs to achieve an additional 15% reduction in GHG emissions, with a decrease in the price premium of US$300–800. PHEVs reduce GHG emissions 11–30%, depending on emissions intensity of the electric grid and the proportion of distance driven electrically. 

The IEA (2024) noted that a PHEV bought in 2023 will emit 30% less GHGs than a fossil fuel–powered ICE car over its lifetime. This includes full life cycle impacts, including those from producing the car. 

The International Transport Forum (2020) estimated that fossil fuel–powered ICE cars emit 162 g CO₂‑eq /pkm, while HEVs emit 132 g CO₂‑eq /pkm and PHEVs emit 124 g CO₂‑eq /pkm. This includes embodied and upstream emissions.

The results presented in this document summarize findings from 12 reviews and meta-analyses and 29 original studies reflecting current evidence from 72 countries, primarily from the IEA’s Electric Vehicle Outlook (2024) and Electric Vehicles: Total Cost of Ownership Tool (2022) and the International Transportation Forum’s life-cycle analysis on sustainable transportation (2020). We recognize this limited geographic scope creates bias, and hope this work inspires research and data sharing on this topic in underrepresented regions.

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