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Use Smart & Programmable Thermostats

Sector
Buildings & Electricity
Mode
Cut Emissions
Cluster
Enhance Efficiency
Image
Hand pointing to smart thermostat on the wall
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Key Takeaways

  • Smart and programmable thermostats reduce energy use and associated GHG emissions from heating and cooling by automatically adjusting the set temperature of a residential building.
  • A single smart or programmable thermostat can reduce heating GHG emissions by 0.23 t CO₂‑eq/yr and cooling emissions by 0.091 t CO₂‑eq/yr (100-yr basis).
  • To be effective, a smart or programmable thermostat must be used to automatically adjust temperatures; most in the U.S. are not used this way. 
  • An estimated 140 million households own and use smart or programmable thermostats for heating while 30 million do so for cooling. 
  • We estimate the achievable impact for smart or programmable thermostats to be 0.065–0.12 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr for heating and 0.017-0.046 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr for cooling (100-yr basis). 
Summary

We define Use Smart & Programmable Thermostats as reducing energy use and associated GHG emissions from heating and cooling by automatically making adjustments to the set temperature of a residential building. Smart thermostats can be remotely controlled and can adjust indoor temperature settings in response to learned occupancy patterns, while programmable thermostats require a user to manually program a temperature schedule.

Income & work,Health
Air quality
Description for Social and Search
Using smart or programmable thermostats to adjust residential temperature settings for energy savings also reduces GHG emissions.
Overview

Residential buildings directly and indirectly generate GHG emissions through the fuels and electricity used for heating, cooling, and other functions. These emissions accounted for 12.5% of global emissions in 2021 (Ge et al., 2026). Heating is the largest residential source of operational emissions, with cooling being another major contributor (Energy Transitions Commission, 2025).

Smart and programmable thermostats reduce energy use by allowing temperatures to drift when occupants are away or asleep and restoring optimal temperatures in anticipation of occupants returning or waking. Since heating systems often rely on burning fossil fuels for heat (International Energy Agency [IEA], 2023), the emissions affected are primarily CO₂. Similarly, the emissions affected when cooling demands are reduced are primarily CO₂ from the electricity generated to power heat pumps and air conditioners. 

The amount of CO₂ saved with smart and programmable thermostats can vary substantially with occupant behavior, set points, occupancy levels, and climate (Pritoni et al., 2015; Stopps & Touchie, 2021). We used the minimum performance standard for Energy Star–certified smart thermostats, namely 8% run-time reduction for heating and 10% for cooling (Energy Star, 2017), with run time being used as a proxy for energy savings. This is a conservative value; many studies have measured or modeled higher savings (Alhamayani et al., 2021; Pang et al., 2021). 

Owning a smart or programmable thermostat does not guarantee it will be used to adjust temperatures to save energy (Pritoni et al., 2015; Stopps & Touchie, 2021). For example, while 53% of U.S. homes own a smart or programmable thermostat, only 16% report using a smart or programmable thermostat to automatically adjust temperatures (U.S. Energy Information Administration [U.S. EIA], 2023a). We also assumed that households that do not have a smart or programmable thermostat are not manually adjusting temperatures to save energy. 

As societies electrify, smart and programmable thermostats may play an increasingly important role in shifting demand away from grid peak periods (Stopps & Touchie, 2022). This can reduce emissions even further because grids often depend more on fossil fuel peaker plants during these times. This analysis does not include such emissions reductions. 

References

Alhamayani, A. D., Sun, Q., & Hallinan, K. P. (2021). Estimating smart Wi-Fi thermostat-enabled thermal comfort control savings for any residence. Clean Technologies, 3(4), 743–760. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.3390/cleantechnol3040044  

Allcott, H., & Rogers, T. (2014). The short-run and long-run effects of behavioral interventions: Experimental evidence from energy conservation. American Economic Review, 104(10), 3003–3037. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.10.3003  

Bergeron, R. (2024, May 9). Installation obligatoire d’un thermostat connecté en 2027. Expertise Rénovation. Link to source: https://www.expertise-renovation.com/actualites/installation-thermostat-connecte  

Bielig, M., Kutzner, F., Klingert, S., & Kacperski, C. (2025). Understanding intention to adopt smart thermostats: The role of individual predictors and social beliefs across five EU countries: Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Smart Cities and Green ICT Systems, 1, 36–47. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.5220/0013356200003953  

Blonz, J., Palmer, K., Wichman, C. J., & Wietelman, D. C. (2025). Smart thermostats, automation, and time-varying prices. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 17(1), 90–125. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20210618  

Chassin, D. P., Stoustrup, J., Agathoklis, P., & Djilali, N. (2015). A new thermostat for real-time price demand response: Cost, comfort and energy impacts of discrete-time control without deadband. Applied Energy, 155, 816–825. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2015.06.048 

EGIA Contractor University. (2025). Average service life of residential HVAC equipment. Link to source: https://library.mycontractoruniversity.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/EGIA-AverageServiceLife.pdf  

Ellsworth, R. (2026, February 12). Residential HVAC industry statistics. ZipDo Education Reports. Link to source: https://zipdo.co/residential-hvac-industry-statistics/  

Energy Star. (2017). Energy Star® program requirements for connected thermostat products: Partner commitments. Link to source: https://www.energystar.gov/sites/default/files/asset/document/ENERGY%20STAR%20Program%20Requirements%20for%20Connected%20Thermostats%20Version%201.0_0.pdf  

Energy Transitions Commission. (2025). Achieving zero-carbon buildings: Electric, efficient and flexible [Report]. Link to source: https://static.energy-transitions.org/uploads/resources/ETC_Buildings-Decarbonisation-Report_DIGITALFINAL.pdf  

Falchetta, G., Cian, E. D., Pavanello, F., & Wing, I. S. (2024). Inequalities in global residential cooling energy use to 2050. Nature Communications, 15(1), Article 7874. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-024-52028-8  

Fine, J. P., & Touchie, M. F. (2020). A grouped control strategy for the retrofit of post-war multi-unit residential building hydronic space heating systems. Energy and Buildings, 208, Article 109604. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enbuild.2019.109604  

Ge, M., Friedrich, J., & Vigna, L. (2026, April 27). Where do emissions come from? These charts explain greenhouse gas emissions by sector. World Resources Institute. Link to source: https://www.wri.org/insights/4-charts-explain-greenhouse-gas-emissions-countries-and-sectors   

Government of Canada. (2025). Heating and cooling with a heat pump. Link to source: https://natural-resources.canada.ca/energy-efficiency/energy-star/heating-cooling-heat-pump#hds  

Hendron, R., German, A., & Pereira, J. (2021). Modeling savings for Energy Star smart home energy management systems. National Renewable Energy Laboratory. Link to source: https://docs.nlr.gov/docs/fy21osti/79534.pdf 

Henneman, L., Choirat, C., Dedoussi, I., Dominici, F., Roberts, J., & Zigler, C. (2023). Mortality risk from United States coal electricity generation. Science, 382(6673), 941–946. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1126/science.adf4915  

International Energy Agency. (2023). Space heating. Link to source: https://www.iea.org/reports/space-heating#dashboard  

Kini, R. L., Vlachokostas, A., Brambley, M. R., & Rogers, A. (2025). Occupant-centric demand response for thermostatically-controlled home loads. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 16(3), 2234–2245. Link to source: http://doi.org/10.1109/TSG.2025.3540427  

Lee, Z. E., & Max Zhang, K. (2022). Unintended consequences of smart thermostats in the transition to electrified heating. Applied Energy, 322, Article 119384. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2022.119384  

Lee, Z. E., Sun, Q., Ma, Z., Wang, J., MacDonald, J. S., & Max Zhang, K. (2020). Providing grid services with heat pumps: A review. ASME Journal of Engineering for Sustainable Buildings and Cities, 1(1), Article 011007. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1115/1.4045819  

Lu, J., Sookoor, T., Srinivasan, V., Gao, G., Holben, B., Stankovic, J., Field, E., & Whitehouse, K. (2010). The smart thermostat: Using occupancy sensors to save energy in homes. Proceedings of the 8th ACM Conference on Embedded Networked Sensor Systems, SenSys ’10, 211–224. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1145/1869983.1870005

Mourshed, M. (2016). Climatic parameters for building energy applications: A temporal-geospatial assessment of temperature indicators. Renewable Energy, 94, 55–71. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.renene.2016.03.021  

Nägele, F., Kasper, T., & Girod, B. (2017). Turning up the heat on obsolete thermostats: A simulation-based comparison of intelligent control approaches for residential heating systems. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 75, 1254–1268. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2016.11.112  

Lockheed Martin Energy. (2017). Home energy management system savings validation pilot [NYSERDA Report 17-16]. New York State Energy Research and Development Authority. Link to source: https://www.ashb.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/IS-2019-05.pdf  

Pang, Z., Chen, Y., Zhang, J., O’Neill, Z., Cheng, H., & Dong, B. (2021). How much HVAC energy could be saved from the occupant-centric smart home thermostat: A nationwide simulation study. Applied Energy, 283, Article 116251. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2020.116251  

Peffer, T., Perry, D., Pritoni, M., Aragon, C., & Meier, A. (2013). Facilitating energy savings with programmable thermostats: Evaluation and guidelines for the thermostat user interface. Ergonomics, 56(3), 463–479. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1080/00140139.2012.718370  

Pew Research Center. (2019). Religion and living arrangements around the world. Link to source: https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/20/2019/12/PF_12.12.19_religious.households.FULL_.pdf  

Pritoni, M., Meier, A. K., Aragon, C., Perry, D., & Peffer, T. (2015). Energy efficiency and the misuse of programmable thermostats: The effectiveness of crowdsourcing for understanding household behavior. Energy Research & Social Science, 8, 190–197. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2015.06.002  

Pritoni, M., Woolley, J. M., & Modera, M. P. (2016). Do occupancy-responsive learning thermostats save energy? A field study in university residence halls. Energy and Buildings, 127, 469–478. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enbuild.2016.05.024  

Statistics Canada. (2025). Use of thermostats [Data set]. Link to source: https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=3810004901  

Stopps, H., & Touchie, M. F. (2021). Residential smart thermostat use: An exploration of thermostat programming, environmental attitudes, and the influence of smart controls on energy savings. Energy and Buildings, 238, Article 110834. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enbuild.2021.110834  

Stopps, H., & Touchie, M. F. (2022). Load shifting and energy conservation using smart thermostats in contemporary high-rise residential buildings: Estimation of runtime changes using field data. Energy and Buildings, 255, Article 111644. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enbuild.2021.111644  

Tamas, R., O’Brien, W., & Quintero, M. S. (2021). Residential thermostat usability: Comparing manual, programmable, and smart devices. Building and Environment, 203, Article 108104. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.buildenv.2021.108104  

World Bank. (n.d.). Mapping energy efficiency: A global dataset on building code effectiveness and compliance [Methodology note]. Link to source: https://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/sites/buildinggreen/doc/building_green_methodology.pdf  

United Nations. (2024). World population prospects 2024 - Special aggregates [Data set]. Link to source: https://population.un.org/wpp/downloads?folder=Special%20Aggregates&group=UN-related%20groups   

U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2018a). Table HC6.1 Space heating in U.S. homes, by housing unit type, 2015 [Data set]. Link to source: https://www.eia.gov/consumption/residential/data/2015/  

U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2018b). Table HC7.1 Air conditioning in U.S. homes by housing unit type, 2015 [Data set]. Link to source: https://www.eia.gov/consumption/residential/data/2015/  

U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2023a). Table HC6.1 Space heating in U.S. homes, by housing unit type, 2020 [Data set]. Link to source: https://www.eia.gov/consumption/residential/data/2020/hc/pdf/HC%206.1.pdf  

U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2023b). Table HC7.1 Air conditioning in U.S. homes, by housing unit type, 2020 [Data set]. Link to source: https://www.eia.gov/consumption/residential/data/2020/hc/pdf/HC%207.1.pdf  

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. (2026). Power sector programs—Progress report. Link to source: https://www.epa.gov/power-sector/progress-report  

Wang, C., Pattawi, K., & Lee, H. (2020). Energy saving impact of occupancy-driven thermostat for residential buildings. Energy and Buildings, 211, Article 109791. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enbuild.2020.109791  

Yuan, Y., Song, C., Gao, L., Zeng, K., & Chen, Y. (2024). A review of current research on occupant-centric control for improving comfort and energy efficiency. Building Simulation, 17(10), 1675–1692. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12273-024-1170-1  

Credits

Lead Fellow

  • Heather McDiarmid, Ph.D

Contributors

  • Ruthie Burrows, Ph.D.

  • James Gerber, Ph.D.

  • Daniel Jasper

  • Alex Sweeney

Internal Reviewers

  • Henry Igugu, Ph.D.

  • Amanda D. Smith, Ph.D.

  • Christina Swanson, Ph.D.

Effectiveness

For heating, 0.23 t CO₂‑eq/yr (20- and 100-yr basis) is reduced for every smart or programmable thermostat in use (Table 1a). This is a weighted global average based on the proportion of homes that use different sources of energy for space heating and assumes an 8% reduction in heating energy with a smart or programmable thermostat (Energy Star, 2017). 

For cooling, 0.091 t CO₂‑eq/yr is reduced for every smart or programmable thermostat in use (100-year basis, 0.092 t CO₂‑eq/yr on a 20-yr basis) (Table 1b). This is a weighted global average based on regional electricity demand for space cooling and regional electricity grid emission factors. The analysis assumes a 10% reduction in cooling energy with a smart or programmable thermostat (Energy Star, 2017).

The effectiveness of smart or programmable thermostats at reducing emissions will vary based on total heating and cooling demand. This is a function of climate and building performance as well as occupant behaviors (Hendron et al., 2021). Occupants may, for example, differ in how much they allow temperatures to drift while away or at night, how frequently overrides are used, and the schedules on which programming is based (Hendron et al., 2021).

Table 1. Effectiveness at reducing emissions.

Unit: t CO₂‑eq /smart or programmable thermostat used to save energy for heating/yr, 100-yr basis

Mean 0.23

Unit: t CO₂‑eq )/smart or programmable thermostat used to save energy on cooling/yr, 100-yr basis

Mean 0.091
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Cost

A smart or programmable thermostat for heating will save an average household US$370/t CO₂‑eq reduced (Table 2a). A smart or programmable thermostat for heating has an average initial cost of US$74, and households that adopt and use these thermostats to save on energy will spend on average US$89 less per year on heating. Assuming a 15-year lifespan (EGIA Contractor University, 2025), this results in a net US$84/yr savings.

We assumed that half of adopting households worldwide purchase a smart or programmable thermostat to use in their homes and the other half already own a smart or programmable thermostat and start using them to save energy with programmed setbacks. This is consistent with US statistics that show 55% of households with heating have a smart or programmable thermostat but only 16% use one to adjust heating temperatures, with most using one set temperature most of the time (U.S. EIA, 2023a). 

A smart or programmable thermostat for cooling will save a household US$230/t CO₂‑eq reduced (see Table 2b). The average initial cost for a smart or programmable thermostat for cooling is US$58, and will save a household an average of US$25/yr on cooling. Assuming a 15-year lifespan, this results in a net US$21/yr savings for the household.

For cooling, the initial cost assumes one-third of homes purchase a smart or programmable thermostat for a central air conditioning system, one-third purchase such a thermostat for a window or portable air conditioner, and one third use an existing smart or programmable thermostat but change behaviors to start using the programming feature. Similar to heating, 60% of U.S. households with cooling have a smart or programmable thermostat but only 15% use one to adjust cooling temperatures (U.S. EIA, 2023b). 

Table 2. Cost per unit climate impact. Negative values reflect cost savings.

Unit: 2023 US$/t CO₂‑eq , 100-year basis

Mean -370

Unit: 2023 US$/t CO₂‑eq , 100-year basis

Mean -230
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Methods and Supporting Data

Methods and Supporting Data

Learning Curve

Insufficient data exist to quantify the learning curve for smart or programmable thermostats. 

Speed of Action

Speed of action refers to how quickly a climate solution physically affects the atmosphere after it is deployed. This is different from speed of deployment, which is the pace at which solutions are adopted.

At Project Drawdown, we define the speed of action for each climate solution as emergency brake, gradual, or delayed.

Use Smart & Programmable Thermostats is a GRADUAL climate solution. It has a steady, linear impact on the atmosphere. The cumulative effect over time builds as a straight line.

Caveats

Smart or programmable thermostats may be more difficult to implement in multiunit residential buildings with centralized heating and cooling systems in which units do not have temperature control (Fine & Touchie, 2020). Additionally, some existing space heating systems such as fireplaces and wood stoves may not be compatible with programmable thermostats. 

The Government of Canada (2025) recommends minimizing temperature setbacks for heat pumps or programming the return to normal temperatures in stages to avoid triggering the use of less efficient backup heating systems. 

This solution depends on households programming their thermostat or directing a smart thermostat to save energy. As with any outcome that depends on behavior change, post-intervention persistence can decay over time (Allcott & Rogers, 2014). Comfort concerns, changes to schedules, low perceived benefits, and lack of perceived control over heating and cooling systems are common reasons why households inactivate thermostat programming (Heatherly et al., 2023; Peffer et al., 2013; Pritoni et al., 2015; Stopps & Touchie, 2021). 

Some studies show little to no change in energy use with programmable thermostats, particularly if the thermostats are not easy to use (Peffer et al., 2013). Energy savings setbacks are more likely to be used with smart thermostats than programmable ones (Stopps & Touchie, 2021; Tamas et al., 2021), likely because of improved ease of use and increased automation. 

Use of smart and programmable thermostats reduces the emissions from operating buildings. However, these reductions pale in comparison to those offered by heat pumps and decarbonizing the electricity sector by adopting solutions such as distributed solar PV, utility-scale solar PV, onshore wind, and offshore wind.

Current Adoption

We estimated that 140 million households worldwide use smart or programmable thermostats to save energy for heating (Table 3a) and 30 million use them to save energy for cooling (Table 3b). 

The climate impact of this solution depends on households not only adopting the technology, but also using it to regularly adjust temperatures with the goal of saving energy. Where only adoption values exist, we assumed use patterns are similar to those in the United States, where 25–29% of households that own a smart or programmable thermostat are using the programming feature (U.S. EIA, 2023a; U.S. EIA, 2023b).

For adoption, we estimated the number of households with smart or programmable thermostats in high-income countries separately from low- and middle-income countries and combined them to get a global total. In each case, we applied the average smart or programmable thermostat use rate for the group of countries to their estimated number of households that require heating or cooling. 

These estimates are based on data from seven studies covering different geographies and spanning 2017–2025. 

Table 3. Current adoption level (2025).

Unit: smart or programmable thermostats used for the purposes of saving energy on heating 

Total 140,000,000

Unit: smart or programmable thermostats used for the purposes of saving energy on cooling

Total 30,000,000
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Adoption Trend

We estimate that globally, each year 1.4 million households start using smart or programmable thermostats to save on heating (Table 4a) and 0.60 million households start using them to save on cooling (Table 4b).

These data are based on surveys for heating and cooling covering 2015–2020 in the United States (U.S. EIA 2018b, 2018a, 2023b, 2023a) and 2007–2023 in Canada (Statistics Canada, 2025). Due to lack of data, we were not able to estimate adoption trends for low- and middle-income countries, and assumed the trend is negligible. 

Table 4. Adoption trend (2007–2023).

Unit: smart or programmable thermostats put to use for saving energy on heating/yr 

Total 1,400,000

Unit: smart or programmable thermostats put to use for saving energy on cooling/yr

Total 600,000
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Adoption Ceiling

If every household that currently relies on heating were to adopt and use smart or programmable thermostats to save energy, the total adoption would be 650 million households (Table 5a). This is based on the IEA’s estimate that 40% of households worldwide require space heating (World Bank, n.d.), combined with regional population estimates (United Nations, 2024), and estimates for household sizes by region (Pew Research Center, 2019).

Similarly for cooling, if every household that currently uses air conditioning were to adopt and use smart or programmable thermostats to save energy, the total adoption would be 580 million households (Table 5b). This is based on Falchetta et al.’s (2024) estimate that 35% of households worldwide currently have space cooling, combined with population and household size estimates (Pew Research Center, 2019; United Nations, 2024). This analysis does not reflect anticipated growing demand for space cooling with rising populations, rising affluence in low- and middle-income countries, and rising temperatures (Falchetta et al., 2024).

Table 5. Adoption ceiling.

Unit: smart or programmable thermostats put to use for saving energy on heating

Total 650,000,000

Unit: smart or programmable thermostats put to use for saving energy on cooling

Total 580,000,000
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Achievable Adoption

For heating, we estimate that use of smart or programmable thermostats to save on energy could reach 290 to 510 million households globally (Table 6a). In high income countries, this assumes 65–100% of households with heating needs adopt and use thermostats to save energy. At the low end, this represents the reported rate of regular setback use for heating homes in the state of New York (Lockheed Martin Energy, 2017), and we assume all heating households could program thermostats to save energy at the high end. In low and middle income countries, we assume 16–48% of households with heating needs adopt and use smart or programmable thermostats to save energy. This is based on today’s estimated smart and programmable thermostat adoption and use rate in the United States and Canada respectively (Statistics Canada, 2025; U.S. EIA, 2023a).

For cooling, we estimate that use of smart or programmable thermostats to save on energy could reach 190–510 million households globally (see Table 6b). In high income countries, this assumes 75–100% of households with cooling systems use thermostats to save energy for cooling. At the low end, this represents the reported rate of regular setback use for cooling homes in the state of New York (Lockheed Martin Energy, 2017) and we assume all households adopt and use smart or programmable thermostats at the high end. In low and middle income countries, we assume households adopt and use smart and programmable thermostats at a rate of 15 and 75%, representing the current rates for the United States and the state of New York, respectively (Lockheed Martin Energy, 2017; U.S. EIA, 2023a).

Table 6. Range of achievable adoption levels. 

Unit: smart or programmable thermostats put to use for saving energy on heating

Current adoption 140,000,000
Achievable – low 290,000,000
Achievable – high 510,000,000
Adoption ceiling 650,000,000

Unit: smart or programmable thermostats put to use for saving energy on cooling

Current adoption 30,000,000
Achievable – low 190,000,000
Achievable – high 510,000,000
Adoption ceiling 580,000,000
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For space heating, current adoption and use of a smart or programmable thermostat to save energy has an estimated climate impact of 0.033 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr globally (100- and 20-year basis; Table 7a). If all households with heating were to adopt and use these thermostats, the estimated climate impact would be 0.15 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr (100- and 20-year basis). We estimate the achievable range to be 0.065–0.12 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr (100- and 20-year basis). 

For space cooling, current adoption and use of a smart or programmable thermostat to save energy has an estimated climate impact of 0.0028 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr globally (100- and 20-year basis; Table 7b). If all households with cooling were to adopt and use these thermostats, the estimated climate impact would be 0.052 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr (100-year basis) and 0.053 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr (20-year basis). We estimate the achievable range to be 0.017–0.46 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr (100-year basis) and 0.018–0.47 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr (20-year basis). 

The impact from heating is greater than the impact from cooling because there are more households that use heating and more energy is needed on average per household for heating. 

Table 7. Climate impact at different levels of adoption.

Unit: Gt CO₂‑eq/yr, 100-yr basis

Current adoption 0.033
Achievable – low 0.065
Achievable – high 0.12
Adoption ceiling 0.15

Unit: Gt CO₂‑eq/yr, 100-yr basis

Current adoption 0.0028
Achievable – low 0.017
Achievable – high 0.046
Adoption ceiling 0.052
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Additional Benefits

Income and Work

When used as intended, smart and programmable thermostats can save money by reducing energy use (Blonz et al., 2025; Lu et al., 2010; Wang et al., 2020). The cost savings can vary depending on the type of thermostat, fuel used for heating, geographic location, and sources of energy used to generate electricity. In our estimates, on average, households using smart or programmable thermostats could save US$84/yr on heating and US$21/yr on cooling (see Table 2). Where time-of-use electricity pricing exists, smart and programmable thermostats can be used to heat or cool a home in advance of peak periods to save even more (Chassin et al., 2015). 

Health

A reduction in energy demand from smart thermostats may lower air pollution and limit exposure to pollutants such as lead and fine particulate matter generated by fossil fuel-based power plants, thereby improving health in nearby communities (Henneman et al., 2023; U.S. Environmental Protection Agency [U.S. EPA], 2026). 

Air Quality

Reducing energy use can reduce climate and air pollutants associated with burning fossil fuels, such as CO₂, nitrogen oxides, methane, lead, and fine particulate matter (U.S. EPA, 2026).

Risks

Smart and programmable thermostats have the potential to increase peak demand for electricity when programmed around common schedules. For example, thermostats may be programmed to raise temperatures in the early morning in winter when electricity grids are already strained (Lee & Max Zhang, 2022). Conversely, grid-integrated thermostats can reduce grid peaks by optimizing when heating or cooling occurs while maintaining occupant comfort (Kini et al., 2025).

Interactions with Other Solutions

Competing

There are diminishing returns as solutions that reduce heating and cooling loads are combined. When smart or programmable thermostats reduce the energy and emissions from heating and cooling, they also reduce the emissions savings these other solutions achieve. 

Consensus
Dashboard

Solution Basics

smart or programmable thermostat programmed to adjust temperatures for the purposes of saving energy

t CO₂-eq (100-yr)/unit/yr
0.23
units
Current 1.4×10⁸ 02.9×10⁸5.1×10⁸
Achievable (Low to High)

Climate Impact

Gt CO₂-eq (100-yr)/yr
Current 0.033 0.0650.12
US$ per t CO₂-eq
-370
Gradual

CO₂ , CH₄, N₂O

Solution Basics

smart or programmable thermostat programmed to adjust temperatures

t CO₂-eq (100-yr)/unit/yr
0.091
units
Current 3.0×10⁷ 01.9×10⁸5.1×10⁸
Achievable (Low to High)

Climate Impact

Gt CO₂-eq (100-yr)/yr
Current 0.003 0.0170.046
US$ per t CO₂-eq
-230
Gradual

CO₂ , CH₄, N₂O

Trade-offs

When large numbers of households use smart or programmable thermostats to save energy, it can unintentionally cause spikes in electricity demand when heating systems are simultaneously turned on to return temperatures to normal (Lee & Max Zhang, 2022). These spikes can increase overall grid capacity needs and increase demand from fossil-fueled peaking generation. Grid-interactive smart thermostats can reduce these spikes through grid level energy management (Lee et al., 2020). 

Action Word
Use
Solution Title
Smart & Programmable Thermostats
Classification
Highly Recommended

Lawmakers and Policymakers
  • Offer one-stop educational resources for thermostats; offer demonstrations for installation and programming through online videos and in-person demos; clearly state benefits of smart and programmable thermostats, highlighting the cost savings, social benefits, and environmental impacts.
  • Set clear and measurable targets for building efficiency, emissions reduction, and deployment of smart and programmable thermostats.
  • Ensure public procurement standards require smart and programmable thermostats for new construction; require retrofits for existing public buildings.
  • Create regulatory standards and building codes that encourage, incentivize, and/or require the use of smart and programmable thermostats, especially in new construction.
  • Periodically update codes, policies, and public guidance to keep pace with adoption and technology advances.
  • Encourage utilities to incentivize smart and programmable thermostat uptake and use for demand management.
  • Consider offering subsidies that allow for flexible implementation or selective applicability within national systems; ensure subsidy programs are designed based on scientific evidence showing they will have a positive impact on adoption for the intended beneficiaries; target subsidies to low- and middle-income households and simultaneously offer incentives for broadband and digital connectivity; ensure financial incentives cover both new installations and retrofits.
  • Focus broader policies on energy efficiency through the use of intelligent control.
  • Create regulatory standards and building codes that encourage, incentivize, and/or require the use of smart and programmable thermostats, especially in new construction.

Further information:

Practitioners
  • Offer one-stop educational resources for thermostats; offer demonstrations for installation and programming through online videos and in-person demos; clearly state benefits of smart and programmable thermostats highlighting the cost savings, social benefits, and environmental impacts.
  • Offer free or discounted thermostats in electrically heated homes and homes with cooling in exchange for control when the electricity grid is strained. 
  • Ensure customers know they can upgrade their thermostats; provide recommendations to customers on purchasing, installing, and using smart and programmable thermostats; inform customers of public or private incentives for purchases and/or installation; educate customers on the savings, social, and environmental benefits of installation. 
  • Develop or offer easy-to-use smart and programmable thermostat systems; provide scheduled maintenance services for customers; bundle services with heating and cooling system services when possible; ensure customers have the option to review products and services online.
  • Offer thermostats that are compatible with widely used electronic devices such as laptops and smart phones; incorporate Wi-Fi, bluetooth, and the Internet of Things into thermostats, allow for remote control and visibility via smartphone apps.
  • Provide 0% financing options for bundled services, including thermostats and/or related energy efficiency measures.
  • Ease the learning curve for customers by providing clear, concise instructions; ensure elderly customers are comfortable with using the thermostat before leaving after installation.
  • Use customer feedback and work with manufacturers to simplify interface designs and improve functionality. 
  • Advertise for smart and programmable thermostats depicting individual savings on heating and cooling; use social media to reach broader audiences.
  • Create algorithms that can save energy and money for consumers by responding to time of use, customer behavior, and current weather; ensure thermostats have the ability to be updated for future improvements to the software.
  • When installing a thermostat, ensure it is easily accessible and will not be obstructed.
  • Create or join green building certification schemes, green building councils, and/or public-private partnerships that offer information, training, and general support for smart and programmable thermostats.

Further information:

Business Leaders
  • Help socialize the importance of smart and programmable thermostats by incorporating them into corporate net zero strategies; highlight the use of smart and programmable thermostats in public communications.
  • Invest in or offer grants to start-ups seeking to deploy smart and programmable thermostats; invest in research and development to determine optimal user interfaces and/or algorithms for smart and programmable thermostats.
  • Offer pro bono business advice to nonprofit organizations working to improve building efficiency and deploy smart and programmable thermostats.
  • Offer employees information or benefits for upgrading their thermostats at home.
  • Create or join green building certification schemes, green building councils, and/or public-private partnerships that offer information, training, and general support for smart and programmable thermostats.

Further information:

Nonprofit Leaders
  • Offer one-stop educational resources for thermostats; offer demonstrations for installation and programming through online videos and in-person demos; clearly state benefits of smart and programmable thermostats highlighting the cost savings, social benefits, and environmental impacts.
  • Help policymakers set clear and measurable targets for building efficiency, emissions reduction, and the deployment of smart and programmable thermostats.
  • Advocate for and help design regulatory standards and building codes that encourage, incentivize, and/or require the use of smart and programmable thermostats, especially in new construction.
  • Assist regulators in periodically updating codes, policies, and public guidance to keep pace with adoption and technology advances.
  • Advocate for subsidies that allow for flexible implementation or selective applicability within national systems; help ensure subsidy programs are designed based on scientific-evidence showing they will have a positive impact on adoption for the intended beneficiaries; recommend that subsidies be targeted to low- and middle-income households and simultaneously offer incentives for broadband and digital connectivity; help ensure financial incentives cover both new installations and retrofits.
  • Help shift policy frameworks to focus on energy efficiency through the use of intelligent control.
  • Conduct research to improve adoption and use of smart and programmable thermostats, paying close attention to how user interfaces impact behavior.
  • Create or join green building certification schemes, green building councils, and/or public-private partnerships that offer information, training, and general support for smart and programmable thermostats.

Further information:

Investors
  • Finance only new construction and retrofits that use smart or programmable thermostats as well as other energy-efficient heating and cooling technologies and practices.
  • Invest in research and development to improve smart and programmable thermostat design and user interface.
  • Invest in or offer grants to start-ups seeking to deploy smart and programmable thermostats.
  • Issue or buy green bonds to deploy capital to projects that use smart or programmable thermostats and integrate other energy-efficient heating and cooling technologies and practices.
  • Offer preferential loan agreements for developers using smart or programmable thermostats, energy efficient building practices, and other related climate solutions.
  • Create or join green building certification schemes, green building councils, and/or public-private partnerships that offer information, training, and general support for smart and programmable thermostats.

Further information:

Philanthropists and International Aid Agencies
  • Offer one-stop educational resources for thermostats; offer demonstrations for installation and programming through online videos and in-person demos; clearly state benefits of smart and programmable thermostats, highlighting the cost savings, social benefits, and environmental impacts.
  • Offer grants or access to no-interest financing for retrofits and installations of smart and programmable thermostats; ensure financial support for projects involving building retrofits or new construction; require the use of smart or programmable thermostats.
  • Offer grants or financing for research and development to improve smart and programmable thermostat design and user interface.
  • Invest in or offer grants to start-ups seeking to deploy smart or programmable thermostats.
  • Issue or buy green bonds to deploy capital to projects that use smart or programmable thermostats and integrate other energy-efficient heating and cooling technologies and practices.
  • Offer preferential loan agreements for developers using smart or programmable thermostats, energy efficient building practices, and other related climate solutions.
  • Help policymakers set clear and measurable targets for building efficiency, emissions reduction, and deployment of smart and programmable thermostats.
  • Advocate for and help design regulatory standards and building codes that encourage, incentivize, and/or require the use of smart and programmable thermostats, especially in new construction.
  • Help regulators periodically update codes, policies, and public guidance to keep pace with adoption and technology advances.
  • Advocate for subsidies that allow for flexible implementation or selective applicability within national systems; help ensure subsidy programs are designed based on scientific evidence showing they will have a positive impact on adoption for the intended beneficiaries; recommend that subsidies be targeted to low- and middle-income households and simultaneously offer incentives for broadband and digital connectivity; help ensure financial incentives cover both new installations and retrofits.
  • Help shift policy frameworks to focus on energy efficiency through the use of intelligent control.
  • Conduct research to improve adoption and use of smart and programmable thermostats, paying close attention to how user interfaces impact behavior.
  • Create or join green building certification schemes, green building councils, and/or public-private partnerships that offer information, training, and general support for smart and programmable thermostats.

Further information:

Thought Leaders
  • Help create educational efforts and resources for smart and programmable thermostats; offer demonstrations for installation and programming through online videos and in-person demos; clearly state benefits of smart and programmable thermostats, highlighting the cost savings, social benefits, and environmental impacts.
  • Help policymakers set clear and measurable targets for building efficiency, emissions reduction, and deployment of smart and programmable thermostats.
  • Advocate for and help design regulatory standards and building codes that encourage, incentivize, and/or require the use of smart or programmable thermostats, especially in new construction.
  • Help regulators periodically update codes, policies, and public guidance to keep pace with adoption and technology advances.
  • Advocate for subsidies that allow for flexible implementation or selective applicability within national systems; help ensure subsidy programs are designed based on scientific evidence showing they will have a positive impact on adoption for the intended beneficiaries; recommend that subsidies be targeted to low- and middle-income households and simultaneously offer incentives for broadband and digital connectivity; help ensure financial incentives cover both new installations and retrofits.
  • Help shift policy frameworks to focus on energy efficiency through the use of intelligent control.
  • Conduct research to improve adoption and use of smart and programmable thermostats, paying close attention to how user interfaces impact behavior.
  • Create or join green building certification schemes, green building councils, and/or public-private partnerships that offer information, training, and general support for smart and programmable thermostats.

Further information:

Technologists and Researchers
  • Develop smart systems that integrate thermostats into a systems level perspective, allowing thermostats to make adjustments based on household energy consumption; design these systems for automatic adjustments to energy usage depending on price signals, energy spikes, appliance use, charging time (e.g., for EVs), weather patterns, occupancy, and related factors; ensure thermostats can automatically update utility rates, weather forecasts, and other data that support cost- and energy-efficient use.
  • Develop smart thermostats and smart home systems that can be grid-integrated for demand management. 
  • Design software for smart and programmable thermostats that provides detailed feedback and individualized suggestions to consumers on energy usage, costs, and estimated savings.
  • Research how users interact with smart and programmable thermostats; examine impact of user interfaces (UIs) on consumer use; develop simplified UIs to facilitate adoption.
  • Research the relationship between household decision-making and smart or programmable thermostat adoption; highlight recommendations for reaching household decision-makers.

Further information:

Communities, Households, and Individuals
  • Upgrade to a smart or programmable thermostat, learn how to use its features, set the programming accordingly, and override the system as little as possible.
  • Consult and work with licensed heating and cooling system installers to determine best available options for smart or programmable thermostats, installation, and maintenance.
  • Make sure your thermostat is installed in a position that allows for easy, unobstructed access.
  • Take advantage of public incentives such as subsidies or low-interest financing for installation, retrofits, and/or maintenance.
  • If provided by your smart thermostat or energy provider, opt into alerts that inform you of abnormally high energy usage which can be an early warning of problems with a heating and cooling system.
  • Take time to understand your smart or programmable thermostat; use profile settings and scheduling to optimize energy and money savings.
  • If you own a smart thermostat, opt into demand response programs to lower energy consumption during peak times; turn on notifications for heating and cooling system maintenance.
  • Share your experience with your neighbors, community, and social networks, and offer help in programming a thermostat where appropriate.
  • If possible, regularly schedule heating and cooling system maintenance and upgrades, including for related equipment such as thermostats. 
  • If smart or programmable thermostats are not an option, manually adjust your thermostat to reduce energy consumption when you’re not home, during peak hours, or to reflect weather conditions; consult your energy provider for tips on thermostat adjustments that can save money and energy.

Further information:

“Take Action” Sources
Evidence Base

Consensus of effectiveness in reducing GHG emissions: High 

There is strong consensus that smart and programmable thermostats will reduce energy use and associated emissions when used to regularly adjust temperatures. 

Numerous studies have demonstrated that energy savings with smart or programmable thermostats can be significant but also vary significantly. For example, A review by Yuan et al. (2024) of occupancy-based control studies for heating, air conditioning and ventilation systems found energy savings of 7–44%. Pang et al. (2021) noted that factors such as climate conditions, building characteristics, occupant behaviors, and setback temperatures can affect energy savings outcomes. 

Pritoni et al. (2016) found that field study outcomes for smart thermostats can differ from the outcomes predicted by models, which are the most common approach to estimating energy savings and, by extension, emissions savings. Factors that can account for some of this discrepancy include comfort preferences, overrides, poor programming, and occupancy (Pritoni et al., 2015; Stopps & Touchie, 2021). 

A major barrier to realizing energy savings with smart or programmable thermostats is getting households to use the programming feature. Bielig et al. (2025) demonstrated that smart thermostat adoption and use are tied to perceived value, usefulness, and ease of use in European Union countries. Meanwhile, Pritoni et al. (2015) highlighted how many U.S. households have a poor understanding of how and when programmed set points save energy, and identified challenges with programming thermostats and comfort concerns as barriers to their use. Smart thermostats that learn occupant behaviors and preferences have shown to be easier to use than programmable thermostats (Tamas et al., 2021) and can achieve higher energy savings with higher thermal comfort (Nägele et al., 2017).

The results presented in this document summarize findings from five original studies, 10 reports, nine databases, two market research reports, and 11 product information web pages. This reflects current evidence from 11 countries, primarily high-income countries, and seven global regions. We recognize this limited geographic scope creates bias, and hope this work inspires research and data sharing on this topic in underrepresented regions.

Updated Date
Coming Soon Label
Coming Soon

Deploy Agrivoltaics

Sector
Electricity
Mode
Cut Emissions
Cluster
Shift Production
Image
Sheep in a pasture with solar panels
Coming Soon
On

Key Takeaways

  • Deploying agrivoltaics on just 1% of global agricultural land could offset 21 PWh/yr of electricity demand, equivalent to total global electricity consumption in 2019.
  • Agrivoltaics systems generate clean, renewable electricity without displacing agricultural activities, potentially increasing overall land use efficiency up to 200%.
  • By shading crops and livestock, solar panels installed as part of an agrivoltaics system moderate soil temperatures and reduce evapotranspiration, improving agricultural water-use efficiency by 150–300% compared with conventional farming.
  • Agrivoltaics can diversify income sources for farmers and expand rural employment opportunities.
  • Agrivoltaic systems have the greatest adoption potential in arid, dry, and land-constrained regions – particularly Africa, the Asia-Pacific, and South and Central America – where solar resources are abundant and the crop-protection benefits of shading are most pronounced.
Summary

Agrivoltaics is the dual use of land for simultaneous solar photovoltaic (PV) power generation and agricultural production. It reduces GHG emissions by shifting electricity production from fossil fuels to renewables. Agrivoltaic systems can be categorized by system type, PV configuration, module tilt, and agricultural activity. These systems operate at both utility and distributed scales. We consider all combinations of system type, PV structure, module tilt, and agricultural activity in this solution.

Heat stress
Income & work,Food security,Energy availability,Health
Nature protection,Animal well-being,Land resources,Water resources,Air quality
Description for Social and Search
​​Agrivoltaics makes it possible to grow food and generate clean solar power on the same land. It can improve land-use efficiency, stabilize crop yields in suitable climates, and add new revenue for farmers.
Overview

Electricity generation accounts for an estimated 23% of GHG emissions on a 100-year basis (Clarke et al., 2022), with fossil fuel–based sources supplying more than 60% of electricity generated in 2023 (International Energy Agency [IEA], 2024b). Since solar PV is a clean and renewable resource, agrivoltaics produces electricity without contributing to GHG emissions or air pollution during operation. Unlike conventional utility-scale solar PV, which often competes with agriculture for space, agrivoltaics combines solar PV electricity generation and agricultural production without requiring additional land use change or sacrificing arable land (Trommsdorff et al., 2025).

The primary climate benefit is the reduction of CO₂ emissions and smaller amounts of methane and nitrous oxide from displacing fossil fuel–based electricity from the grid. This solution quantifies only emissions avoided through electricity generation and does not include emissions from agricultural activities beneath or between the solar panels.

Agrivoltaic systems come in several configurations to coexist with different agricultural activities, including crop production, animal husbandry or grazing, ecosystem services, aquaculture, and pollinator habitat (Macknick et al., 2022). As shown in Figure 1, these systems range from standard ground-mounted arrangements – with crops growing between rows or livestock grazing underneath – to more specialized alternative designs such as elevated panels, vertical bifacial mounts, stilt-mounted trackers, and solar-integrated greenhouses. Overhead configurations elevate panels 2–6 meters above ground to allow standard farm operations while providing shade and weather protection for crops or livestock. Interspace (or interrow) configurations leave wide alleys between ground-mounted PV arrays for vegetation. Rooftop and structure-mounted configurations place panels on greenhouses, barns, or other farm infrastructure, using rigid or flexible panels (Campana et al., 2025; Macknick et al., 2022; Solar Power Europe, 2024a; Trommsdorff et al., 2021).

Each configuration involves different trade-offs between energy output, crop performance, land compatibility, and cost (Campana et al., 2025; Horowitz et al., 2020; Trommsdorff et al., 2025). Well-designed systems often achieve higher overall productivity with a land equivalent ratio exceeding 1 (Trommsdorff et al., 2025). Successful implementation typically requires partnerships among farmers, agricultural cooperatives, solar developers, and utilities, supported by government policies such as subsidies, tax credits, or zoning support (Trommsdorff et al., 2025). 

Figure 1. Agrivoltaic configurations range from standard ground-mounted arrangements (top row) to more specialized alternative designs (bottom row), including elevated overhead systems, vertical mounts, stilt-mounted trackers, and solar-integrated greenhouses. These systems can support agricultural activities – including crop production, grazing, ecosystem services, and habitats – on the same land. 

Diagram demonstrating Agrivoltaic configurations

Source: Macknick, J., et al. (2022). The 5 Cs of agrivoltaic success factors in the United States: Lessons from the InSPIRE research study (No. NREL/TP-6A20-83566). National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), Golden, Colo. (United States). Copyrighted.

Solution in Action

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Credits

Lead Fellow

  • Al-Amin Bugaje, Ph.D.

Contributors

  • Ruthie Burrows, Ph.D.

  • James Gerber, Ph.D.

  • Daniel Jasper

  • Alex Sweeney

Internal Reviewers

  • Amanda D. Smith, Ph.D.

  • Christina Swanson, Ph.D.

  • Megan Matthews, Ph.D.

Effectiveness

We estimate that agrivoltaics reduces GHG emissions by 720 t CO₂‑eq /MW/yr (730 t CO₂‑eq /MW/yr, 20-year basis) (Table 1). This assumes that newly installed agrivoltaics displace an equivalent MWh of the 2023 global electricity grid mix (estimated at 530 kg CO₂‑eq /MWh (540 kg CO₂‑eq /MWh, 20-year basis; IEA, 2024b; see Methodology: Appendix A for calculation details). We used a median capacity factor of 15% based on country-level estimates (Ember, 2024; Ferreira Junior et al., 2025; McCall et al., 2024; Patel et al., 2023; Williams et al., 2024) to convert annual emissions reductions from per MWh to per MW installed capacity. 

Actual avoided emissions will depend on local grid conditions and the specific power sources displaced (see Methodology: Appendix A). Studies in the U.S. show that from 2007–2015, solar deployment avoided approximately 0.5 t CO₂ /MWh (613 t CO₂ /MW/yr; Millstein et al., 2017) emissions, and a 15% increase in deployment avoided 8.54 Mt CO₂ /yr (Biswas et al., 2025). 

Although solar PV emits negligible GHGs during operations, emissions arise during manufacturing, transportation, installation, maintenance, and decommissioning. However, these embodied emissions are paid back in approximately 1–2 yr (Badza et al., 2023; M. Ahmad et al., 2023; Mehedi et al., 2022; Pincelli et al., 2024; Smith et al., 2024). While total life-cycle emissions remain far below those of fossil fuels (National Renewable Energy Laboratory [NREL], 2021; Smith et al., 2024), decarbonizing industrial supply chains is essential to maximize climate impact (Pehl et al., 2017). In our analysis, we focused solely on emissions avoided during electricity generation. Carbon payback time, embodied life-cycle emissions, and on-farm agricultural emissions from ruminant grazing were excluded from the effectiveness and climate impact estimates. 

Table 1. Effectiveness at reducing emissions. 

Unit: t CO₂‑eq /MW/yr, 100-yr basis

Estimate 720
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Cost

We estimated a mean levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) for agrivoltaics of US$69/MWh based on industry reports and journal articles (Bhatta et al., 2025; Fraunhofer ISE, 2024; Gadhiya & Chakraborty, 2025; Hwang & Lee, 2024; Sojib Ahmed et al., 2022; U.S. Department of Energy [U.S. DOE], n.d.; see Methodology: Appendix A for details). LCOE values represent the average cost of producing one MWh of electricity over the operational lifetime of a power plant, allowing investors to compare their expected revenue to a standard set of costs. This cost metric has been used by international agencies for cost comparison across generation technologies, incorporating installed capital costs, operation and maintenance, project lifespan, and energy output. The agrivoltaics LCOE describes costs to utility-scale generators and does not include agricultural output.

The LCOE for agrivoltaics is generally higher than that for utility-scale solar PV (Trommsdorff et al., 2025), due to higher capital expenditure requirements for overhead configurations and specialized partially see-through PV modules. However, agrivoltaics has a lower LCOE than distributed solar PV. For instance, a study conducted by the U.S. DOE (n.d.) showed that the LCOE of distributed solar PV was US$142/MWh (0.006 MWdc system) compared to agrivoltaics’ US$75/MWh (3 MWdc system). In the same study, a 100 MWdc utility-scale solar PV had an LCOE of US$47/MWh. These costs do not consider any subsidies or revenue. 

In practice, revenues and costs will vary based on the ownership model structure. In developer-owned models, farmers receive fixed lease payments of US$250–2,500 per acre, while the solar provider bears the up-front cost (Daniels, 2022; Trommsdorff et al., 2025). In farmer-owned models, the farmers incur the initial investment burden and generate revenue by selling power to the grid or reducing their on-farm energy bills (Pandey et al., 2025).

Methods and Supporting Data

Methods and Supporting Data

Learning Curve

Agrivoltaics does not have an empirically derived learning rate. The technology has only scaled meaningfully since the early 2010s, and its configurations vary too widely for a clean cost reduction curve to be fitted to the data. However, agrivoltaics is built from several existing technologies with well-understood learning dynamics. 

We estimated the current global learning rate for module costs at about 34% (DNV, 2024; Masson, 2024). This high rate is heavily influenced by the accelerated growth of solar PV from 2012–2022; however, this number comes down over a longer period of time. Projections suggest it will slow to around 17% by 2050 as cost components stabilize and the largest gains from scaling are realized (DNV, 2024). Because agrivoltaic systems draw their modules from the same global supply chain as any other solar PV project, we expect that they inherit this curve directly.

What distinguishes agrivoltaics economically from utility-scale solar PV is the cost premium of its elevated or specialized mounting structures, more complex permitting, dual-use legal frameworks, and crop-specific engineering (Trommsdorff et al., 2025). These components follow slower learning curves than electronics, constrained by manufacturing scale-up and standardization of elevated racking/tracking systems. However, hardware innovations such as vertical bifacial or open-source designs, module reuse from decommissioned plants, and policy incentives (feed-in tariffs, grants, regulatory clarity) have potential to accelerate deployment and cross-sector learning (Pandey et al., 2025). 

Speed of Action

Speed of action refers to how quickly a climate solution physically affects the atmosphere after it is deployed. This is different from speed of deployment, which is the pace at which solutions are adopted.

At Project Drawdown, we define the speed of action for each climate solution as emergency brake, gradual, or delayed.

Deploy Agrivoltaics is a GRADUAL climate solution. It has a steady, linear impact on the atmosphere. As installed capacity of agrivoltaics increases over time, emissions from electricity generation are expected to decrease assuming solar PV displaces fossil fuel sources.

Caveats

Implementing agrivoltaics requires careful site and crop selection to avoid unintended consequences. In temperate climates, excessive shading can reduce yields of shade-intolerant crops such as wheat, corn, and tomatoes (Pandey et al., 2025). Significant yield declines may displace food production to other land, triggering land conversion and emissions that offset climate gains (Agostini et al., 2021; Wagner et al., 2023). The greatest benefits occur when agrivoltaics is deployed on marginal or low-productivity farmland, where dual-use systems can improve efficiency up to 200% without compromising high yield agriculture (Pandey et al., 2025). 

Farming activities also increase panel soiling from dust, pollen, or harvest residue, necessitating frequent maintenance to prevent energy losses, especially in arid or high-wind regions (Campana et al., 2025; Chirinda et al., 2024; Jung et al., 2022).

We acknowledge the partial overlap of agrivoltaics with utility-scale and distributed solar PV estimates; to avoid double-counting capacity, we treat it as a complementary pathway that expands solar adoption while mitigating land-use competition (Sorensen et al., 2022; Smith, 2024). Policy frameworks that differentiate dual-use systems through incentives, performance standards, or land-use regulations will determine the extent of overlap (Pandey et al., 2025). While proximity to the grid is essential, deployment is limited by transmission capacity and interconnection queue delays (Campana et al., 2025). Large utility-scale projects often face multi-year queues to connect to regional grids, with transmission costs sometimes approaching 50–100% of total project costs (Daniels, 2023; Macknick et al., 2022)

Our assessment assumed that each additional MWh from agrivoltaics displaces an equivalent MWh of the existing grid mix. In reality, avoided emissions vary by regional grid dynamics, marginal generation sources, and the timing and location of production. New solar generation can sometimes displace other renewables rather than fossil-based sources, especially in grids with high existing renewable, nuclear, or geothermal capacity (Baik et al., 2021; Suri et al., 2025). Because agrivoltaics is constrained to agriculturally suitable land – which is unevenly distributed globally – the degree to which these dynamics affect emissions reductions will vary by region. 

Current Adoption

As of 2023, the global installed capacity for agrivoltaics reached approximately 140,000 MW (Table 2). China leads global adoption, accounting for roughly 91% of this estimated total. The U.S. represents 8.4%, while Europe accounts for the remainder (Masson et al., 2024; Solar Power Europe, 2024b; Zhang & Ma, 2026). 

Table 2. Current adoption level (2023).

Unit: MW installed capacity

Estimate 140,000
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We estimated this global capacity by aggregating data from industry reports, journal papers, and public datasets across these three regions. However, tracking remains challenging because agrivoltaics deployment estimates partially overlap with utility-scale and distributed solar PV totals. Existing databases often count dual-use projects within broader solar capacity figures, particularly when configurations resemble conventional solar PV systems (Daniels, 2023; Smith, 2024; Sorensen et al., 2022; Trommsdorff et al., 2025). The precise degree of overlap cannot yet be quantified, but developers increasingly adopt dual-use designs to minimize land-use conflict (Campana et al., 2025; Masson et al., 2024; Trommsdorff et al., 2025). While agrivoltaics adoption is present in other regions (e.g., Japan, South Korea, and India), consistent and credible datasets to estimate accurate current adoption and growth trends are limited. Consequently, this estimate likely underestimates current global adoption. 

Adoption Trend

We estimated the median global adoption trend for agrivoltaics at 9,800 MW/yr of additional installed capacity (Table 3) by summing regional adoption values for each year from 2010–2023 and taking the year-to-year difference. Because this analysis relied primarily on data from China and the U.S., the results reflect a geographic distribution skewed toward these leading markets. 

Table 3. Adoption trend (2010–2023).

Unit: MW installed capacity/yr

25th percentile 2300
Mean 9400
Median (50th percentile) 9800
75th percentile 15000
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Estimated global agrivoltaics capacity grew roughly 200-fold from 580 MW in 2010 to approximately 140,000 MW in 2023 (Figure 2). While agrivoltaics adoption is still in its early stages – with global installed capacity roughly five times lower than distributed solar PV and seven times lower than utility-scale solar PV – growth is expected to accelerate. Supportive policies in pioneer regions such as Europe, China, Japan, and Korea have driven recent expansion. These policies address both the need for clean energy and the rising climate stresses on farmlands, including heat and drought (Trommsdorff et al., 2025). 

Figure 2. Estimated global adoption of agrivoltaics, 2010–2023.

Sources: Zhang & Ma, 2026; Agrivoltaics Map, n.d.

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Market momentum has also strengthened over the past decade. From 2010–2015, global agrivoltaics added an average of about 4,100 MW/yr. Post 2015, that rate jumped to around 14,000 MW/yr, fueled by targeted incentives. For instance, agrivoltaics capacity in the United States. more than doubled from 2020–2024 (National Laboratory of the Rockies [NLR], 2024). In Italy, the government launched a competitive bidding process in 2023 to award contracts and funding for 500 MW of agrivoltaics projects (Masson et al., 2024); the country aims to reach 1,000 MW of capacity by 2026 (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD], 2023). We expect that continued cost declines of elevated structures and bifacial modules and improved profitability (Pandey et al., 2025; Keiner et al., 2025) will drive future adoption.

Adoption Ceiling

We estimated the median technical potential for agrivoltaics to arrive at an adoption ceiling of 250 million MW of installed capacity (Table 4). We determined the adoption ceiling for agrivoltaics by considering the global technical potential of solar PV and the availability of cropland or grazing land suited to shading (Yeligeti et al., 2023).

Table 4. Adoption ceiling.

Unit: MW installed capacity

25th percentile 230,000,000
Mean 250,000,000
Median (50th percentile) 250,000,000
75th percentile 270,000,000
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Cropland accounts for only one-third of total agricultural land (Food and Agricultural Organization [FAO], 2023) and global estimates for agrivoltaics across cropland vary depending on assumptions about crop suitability, panel density, and grid access. A global suitability assessment of 18 major crops found approximately 4.64 million km² (464 million ha) of cropland suitable for agrivoltaics in an optimistic scenario, corresponding to a maximum installable capacity of around 217 million MW (Yeligeti et al., 2023). This technological ceiling aligns closely with the analysis of Campana et al. (2025), which projects annual electricity output of 385 PWh (≈ 284 million MW/yr). These optimistic figures assume favorable policy environments, technological advancement in panel design, financing, grid proximity and availability, and adoption of shade-tolerant crop varieties.

Despite the abundant 1.6 billion ha of global arable land (Chirinda et al., 2024), the adoption ceiling is unlikely to be reached due to other constraints (Yeligeti et al., 2023). Considerations for technoeconomic, political, and social effects, including land use changes, economic value of land, and shading effect, determine the actual upper limit for adoption. 

Achievable Adoption

In the low achievable scenario, agrivoltaics is projected to grow more than 20-fold, from 140,000 MW in 2023 to 2.5 million MW in 2050 (Table 5). This scenario accounts for real-world constraints, including fragmented land tenure, uneven grid access, regulatory barriers, and high up-front costs.

Table 5. Range of achievable adoption levels.

Unit: MW installed capacity

Current adoption 140,000
Achievable – low 2,500,000
Achievable – high 5,600,000
Adoption ceiling 250,000,000
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In the high achievable scenario, agrivoltaics is projected to grow more than 40-fold, from 140,000 MW in 2023 to 5.6 million MW in 2050 (Table 5). This scenario assumes the continuation of supportive government policies, with adoption primarily constrained by transmission availability. 

We estimated the achievable adoption ranges from scenarios reflecting technical limits (Campana et al., 2025; Yeligeti et al., 2023). These scenarios combine crop suitability and geospatial analysis to estimate annual potential electricity supply from agrivoltaics, constrained by electricity infrastructure. We then applied a mean scaling factor of 9.2% from previous work (Beck et al., 2012; Christ & Wagner, 2025; Trommsdorff et al., 2024) to convert these potential estimates to realizable scenarios. This scaling aligns with historical patterns and complementary international assessments.

Our low and high achievable scenarios fall within the observed market trends, reflecting a still nascent industry with significant but unevenly distributed growth potential.

Beyond the technical and financial considerations, achievable adoption is shaped and often superseded by non-quantitative social forces, where cultural norms, agricultural heritage, and local traditions fundamentally shape stakeholder acceptance (Asa’a et al., 2024; Walsh et al., 2026). Rural residents can perceive solar infrastructure as an industrial intrusion that is incompatible with the pastoral identity and landscape ideology of their communities (de Falco et al., 2025; Mahim et al., 2026; Morash & Pavao-Zuckerman, 2026; Swanson et al., 2025;). If agrivoltaics is framed merely as a technological fix without regard for these cultural values, it can lead to a social gap where broad societal approval for renewables fails to translate into local project success (Pascaris et al., 2021; Walsh et al., 2026).

The achievable adoption range of 2.5–5.6 million MW represents approximately 1–2.3% of the adoption ceiling of 250 million MW. The current adoption is roughly 0.06% of that ceiling. 

The current estimated climate impact of agrivoltaics is approximately 0.1 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr of reduced emissions (Table 6), based on 140,000 MW of global installed capacity and effectiveness of 720 t CO₂‑eq /MW/yr.

Table 6. Climate impact at different levels of adoption.

Unit: Gt CO₂‑eq/yr, 100-yr basis

Current adoption 0.1
Achievable – low 1.80
Achievable – high 4.10
Adoption ceiling 180
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Under the low achievable adoption scenario (2.5 million MW), annual emissions reductions could grow to about 1.8 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr.  

In the high achievable scenario (5.6 million MW), reductions could reach approximately 4.1 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr.  

We based the adoption ceiling solely on the technical potential of agrivoltaics, while neglecting social and economic constraints and realistic scenarios of future power demand. The electricity sector in 2023 emitted 15.6 Gt CO₂ ‑eq (International Energy Agency [IEA], 2024b); therefore, even if agrivoltaics could meet all current electricity demand, emissions reductions could not surpass this value without increased demand. Consequently, agrivoltaic systems are unlikely to reach 250 million MW of installed capacity in the next 100 years. But if current grid emissions were to remain constant while capacity increases, GHG emission reductions would be approximately 180 Gt CO₂ ‑eq/yr. This maximum is unrealistic as a forward-looking climate impact because it treats grid carbon intensity as permanently fixed at 2023 levels and ignores future decarbonization and corresponding decreases in marginal avoided emissions. Real-world climate impacts will depend on not only grid decarbonization and policy support, but also on system design choices and regional agricultural contexts.

By using only 1% of global agricultural land, agrivoltaics could offset 21 PWh/yr of electricity demand, equivalent to global electricity consumption in 2019 (Adeh et al., 2019). Even as demand grows, reaching ~29 PWh in 2023 (Ember, n.d.), the opportunity remains massive. 

Additional Benefits

Heat Stress

Daytime air temperatures surrounding agrivoltaics are lower than traditional utility PV systems that are usually installed over gravel (Pandey et al., 2025). This cooling effect is mostly attributed to evapotranspiration from the crops underneath PV panels (Barron-Gafford et al., 2019). 

Income and Work

Agrivoltaics can diversify income sources for farmers (Campana et al., 2025) by allowing them to export excess power to the grid to generate revenue (Dinesh & Pearce, 2016; Trommsdorff et al., 2025). PV revenue often outweighs revenue from agriculture (Malu et al., 2017; Lytle et al., 2021). Because agrivoltaics are more expensive to install than traditional PV systems, they are often installed at larger scales on larger farms (Campana et al., 2025). In these cases, the income and revenue benefits may be shared between the farmer and a third-party investor. 

New roles in installation, maintenance, and agrivoltaics management also create rural employment opportunities, particularly in regions where energy poverty and food insecurity overlap (Chirinda et al., 2024).

Food Security

Because agrivoltaics lower daytime temperatures, they can increase yields of crops that are sensitive to high temperatures, such as fruits and seed-bearing vegetables (Scarano et al., 2025). This is especially pertinent to drought-prone areas, where agrivoltaics have been shown to increase crop yields in water-stressed systems. For example, a study of crop yields in semi-arid southwestern United States found that yields of peppers and cherry tomatoes were double in agrivoltaic systems relative to those under traditional agriculture (Barron-Gafford, 2019). In addition to shade, agrivoltaic systems can protect crops from weather events such as hail and wind (Pandey et al., 2025). Agrivoltaic fields can also be used for livestock grazing, such as cattle and sheep, maintaining meat and dairy production on solar land while panel shading relieves animal heat stress and improves forage digestibility (Andrew et al., 2021).

Energy Availability

The efficiency of PV panels starts to decrease as cell temperatures rise above 25 °C (Chirinda et al., 2024). The cooler temperatures surrounding agrivoltaic systems can increase electricity production per panel (Adeh et al., 2019). In many environments, vegetation below the PV panels provides a cooling effect that boosts annual electricity output by 1–3% (Barron-Gafford et al., 2019).

Health

Solar PV reduces the emission of pollutants such as nitrogen oxides, sulfur dioxide, and PM2.5 from fossil-fuel energy generation (Abel et al., 2018; Millstein et al., 2024; Millstein et al., 2017; Wiser et al., 2016). This offers health benefits, including reduced premature mortality. The magnitude and distribution of these benefits depend on the local electricity grid mix, the fuels used to generate electricity, and atmospheric conditions that determine how far pollutants travel (Buonocore et al., 2019). Regions with a higher proportion of coal-powered electricity generation will often see more health benefits (Buonocore et al., 2019). Pollutants can travel long distances after they are emitted, so air pollution benefits can be widespread (Millstein et al., 2024).

These health benefits often translate into cost savings associated with reductions in hospital admissions, improved respiratory and cardiovascular conditions, and work and school days that might have otherwise been missed due to illness (Millstein et al., 2017; Wiser et al., 2016).

Nature Protection

Agrivoltaic systems that integrate pollinator-friendly habitats can increase pollination and may even increase crop yields in surrounding farmland (Macknick 2022; Walston et al., 2018).

Animal Well-being

Shade from the panels can relieve heat stress for livestock when temperatures are high (Maia et al., 2020; Carvalho Fonsêca et al., 2023) 

Land Resources

Agrivoltaics can help avoid land use conflicts because the PV panels are placed on land already used for agriculture (Swanson et a., 2025). 

Water Resources

Agrivoltaics may reduce water use up to 50% compared to traditional agricultural systems (Scarano et al., 2025). Reduced solar radiation from shading can reduce soil evaporation rates and enhance water savings for crops (Amaducci et al., 2018). Additionally, water used to clean panels and suppress dust can be reused for irrigation (Patel et al., 2019 ).

Air Quality

For air quality benefits, please refer to the “health” section. 

Risks

Large-scale rollout of agrivoltaics carries several risks. Rapid deployment without adequate storage, grid flexibility, or transmission can elevate curtailment rates. This undermines financial returns and emissions reductions, creating financial risks from high solar deployment and integration (Firoozi et al., 2025; Zubi et al., 2024). Higher up-front capital requirements also expose farmers and developers to revenue risk if crop yields decrease or electricity prices fluctuate (Campana et al., 2025). These financial risks can be mitigated with policy levers, including carbon taxes, though different levers are needed at different adoption levels (Brown & Reichenberg, 2021). 

Lack of regulatory clarity regarding dual-use land may stall adoption (Campana et al., 2025). This lack of legal status often leads to reclassification of agricultural land to energy or industrial use, creating ambiguity over property-tax rates and potentially triggering farmland occupation taxes (Chirinda et al., 2024). Furthermore, reclassification can result in the loss of agricultural subsidies, such as the European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) payments, and jeopardize eligibility for crop insurance programs (Smith, 2024; Trommsdorff et al., 2025). Without a clear regulatory framework to differentiate agrivoltaics from standard ground-mounted solar, conflicting goals between energy and agricultural ministries can cause substantial administrative delays and financial uncertainty (Chirinda et al., 2024). 

Agricultural and environmental risks include soil compaction from construction and machinery traffic, reducing infiltration, root growth, and long-term soil fertility. This effect is amplified where heavy equipment must navigate under elevated panels (Campana et al., 2025; Chirinda et al., 2024). Poorly managed end-of-life PV components also risk chemical pollution (Chirinda et al., 2024). 

Finally, social and distributive justice risks can impede adoption. Visual landscape impacts and inequitable benefit-sharing between energy developers and tenant farmers can spark opposition and erode community support. The potential displacement of tenant farmers is a major socioeconomic risk (Campana et al., 2025; Chirinda et al., 2024). Because solar developers offer lease rates that significantly outbid traditional agricultural rents, landowners are increasingly incentivized to prioritize energy production over farming (Morash & Pavao-Zuckerman, 2026 Sorensen et al., 2022; Swanson et al., 2025). Furthermore, high solar leases can drive up overall land prices, making it difficult for new or disadvantaged farmers to access land (Morash & Pavao-Zuckerman, 2026). Without inclusive participatory processes and clear land use agreements, agrivoltaics expansion risks eroding social cohesion and economic viability of the farming communities it is intended to sustain (Campana et al., 2025; Trommsdorff et al., 2025). Ensuring that projects reflect local values, such as community stewardship over simple ownership, is crucial to mitigating the risk of eroding social cohesion of agricultural communities (Seay-Fleming et al., 2025; Trommsdorff et al., 2025).

Interactions with Other Solutions

Reinforcing

The microclimate effects of agrivoltaics can reduce the volume of water required to achieve equivalent crop yields, amplifying the impact of farm-level irrigation efficiency improvements. Electricity generated by solar PV can power irrigation pumps.

By reducing evapotranspiration and moderating temperate and water stress on crops, agrivoltaic systems can reduce agricultural water demand. In water-stressed and arid regions, this interaction can improve food system resilience.

Increased availability of renewable energy from agrivoltaics helps reduce emissions from the electricity grid as a whole. Reduced emissions from the electricity grid lead to lower downstream emissions for solutions that rely on electricity use. Deploying agrivoltaics also supports increased integration of wind power technologies by diversifying the renewable energy mix and reducing exposure to wind variability.

Electrification of transportation systems will be more beneficial in reducing global emissions if the underlying grid includes a higher proportion of non-emitting power sources. Electric transportation systems can also reduce curtailment of solar energy through controlled-time charging and other load-shifting technologies.

Competing

Since wind and solar can generate electricity at the same times of day, deploying agrivoltaics could create competition for grid connections, lower daytime electricity revenues, and suppress adoption of additional wind power.

Use of agricultural land for dedicated bioenergy crop production represents a competing land use, albeit agrivoltaics may offer higher combined energy and food productivity per hectare.

Widespread agrivoltaic deployment on high irradiance agricultural land could reduce the land base available for utility-scale concentrated solar in regions where both are technically viable, albeit the two solutions target different land type and scales.

Consensus
Dashboard

Solution Basics

MW installed capacity

t CO₂-eq (100-yr)/unit/yr
720
units
Current 140,000 02.5×10⁶5.6×10⁶
Achievable (Low to High)

Climate Impact

Gt CO₂-eq (100-yr)/yr
Current 0.1 1.84.1
Gradual

CO₂ , CH₄, N₂O

Trade-offs

Agrivoltaics may involve an inherent trade-off between agricultural productivity and energy conversion efficiency. Well-sited and properly designed systems typically cause no significant declines in agricultural productivity and can even stabilize or increase biomass production in certain conditions (Pandey et al., 2025). Poorly designed systems, however, can underperform both stand-alone agriculture and stand-alone PV on key sustainability metrics (Campana et al., 2025; Trommsdorff et al., 2025).

Elevated panels require extra steel and aluminum, increasing embodied emissions by roughly 20% compared with utility-scale solar PV (Busch & Wydra, 2023). These embodied emissions are modest, up to 100 times lower than the operational savings from displacing fossil fuel–based electricity (Pandey et al., 2025). 

The net climate benefit is greatest in carbon-intensive grids. It diminishes, however, where grid decarbonization is already rapid or where yield losses on prime farmland shift food production to other land, triggering indirect land use change emissions (Agostini et al., 2021; Campana et al., 2025). Water-use efficiency and microclimate cooling can partially offset yield penalties in hot, dry climates, but gains may be small or negative in temperate or wet climates (Campana et al., 2025; Pandey et al., 2025). Overall benefits depend on careful siting, crop selection, and policies that offset higher installation costs while avoiding land-use competition.

Action Word
Deploy
Solution Title
Agrivoltaics
Classification
Highly Recommended

Lawmakers and Policymakers
  • Set ambitious long-term renewable energy goals in national climate plans and multilateral agreements; incorporate agrivoltaics into national climate, energy, and agriculture plans. 
  • Create clear and easy-to-understand regulations that support agrivoltaics deployment and attract investment; use flexible definitions to encourage innovation; ground policies in scientific evidence, incorporating the latest data on the impacts to grid stability, microgrids development, soil carbon, biodiversity, and water management; avoid rigid annual yield requirements; allow flexibility in subsidy programs and regulations to give farmers using agrivoltaics greater choice in crop selection.
  • Create clear guidelines for installing and operating agrivoltaics to optimize land productivity while minimizing soil compaction and other environmental impacts.
  • Coordinate agrivoltaic policies horizontally (e.g., across agencies) and vertically (e.g., across subnational, national, and international efforts); align social and environmental safeguards with agrivoltaic policies.
  • Provide financial incentives to developers and farmers, such as subsidies (especially to reduce up-front cost), feed-in tariffs, tax credits, grants, green bonds, waived grid connection fees, and forgivable or concessional loans; gradually reduce subsidies as markets mature; offer farmers increased incentives for farmer-owned systems; prioritize smallholder and low- to middle-income farmers.
  • Streamline permitting procedures for agrivoltaic projects; standardize documents such as templates for power purchase agreements (PPAs).
  • Develop long-term, flexible partnership frameworks with industry, including adaptable or aggregated PPAs, aligned with national decarbonization targets and timelines.
  • Implement or strengthen renewable portfolio standards, clean energy standards, or other similar policy mechanisms with carve-outs for agrivoltaics.
  • Implement carbon taxes and redirect fossil-fuel subsidy savings into agrivoltaics and renewables.
  • Invest in grid-enhancing technologies, flexibility, storage, and transmission infrastructure to manage variable generation.
  • Work with industry to diversify solar panel supply chains; design incentives and policies to stimulate local or regional production, and advance R&D for solar and related equipment, such as batteries.
  • Strengthen labor and human rights laws and standards around solar PV supply chains; invest in enforcement mechanisms – particularly for the extraction and use of critical minerals and panel manufacturing.
  • Strengthen land tenure rights; clarify rules allowing agrivoltaics on agricultural land; differentiate agrivoltaics from conventional ground-mounted solar panels; create supportive policies to deploy agrivoltaic systems for restoring abandoned or contaminated land.
  • Require environmental and health impact assessments before installation and during operation.
  • Co-design agrivoltaic projects with relevant stakeholders; ensure the stakeholder engagement process starts early and is transparent, inclusive, and ongoing; solicit feedback from the local community on location, design, and finance; ensure finalized projects address relevant sociological, agriculture, and ecological considerations.
  • Ensure regulations support diverse development and ownership models (e.g., build-own-operate, public-private partnerships, energy communities, and cooperatives).
  • Establish strong quality control requirements for all stages of deployment, including resource extraction, manufacturing, installation, maintenance, and end-of-life service for solar panels used in agrivoltaics; create certification programs for each stage of the process.
  • Require or encourage manufacturers to provide minimum warranties; establish independent grievance mechanisms to resolve customer disputes and help foster trust in the industry.
  • Work with the private sector on workforce training programs, professional certifications, and capacity development for all project phases.
  • Partner with insurance agencies to develop tailored products for farmers adopting agrivoltaics.
  • Implement strong end-of-life regulations for solar panels, including extended producer responsibility (EPR) for manufacturers; support markets for reuse, refurbishment, and recycling.
  • Join, create, or participate in public-private partnerships dedicated to de-risking markets, deployment, technology transfers, education, and other relevant areas.
  • Expand extension services with agrivoltaics-specific guidance, demonstration projects, and peer learning; work with energy agencies to raise awareness; create accessible one-stop-shop educational programs (online and in-person) on regulations, benefits, and best practices, tailored to local contexts. 

Further information:

Practitioners
  • Farmer / Solar Provider: Take advantage of government incentives such as subsidies, grants, tax credits, or waived-connection fees; as the market matures, gradually reduce reliance on these incentives to create long-term market stability.
  • Solar Provider: Conduct careful planning and thorough consultation with farmers to determine the best installation practices; minimize disruption to farming operations and customize configurations to each farmer’s needs and planting schedules.
  • Farmer / Solar Provider: AMinimize soil compaction during installation and servicing with techniques such as scheduling installations during farming off seasons or using specialized equipment.
  • Solar Provider: Use a variety of panel systems, including vertical, single-axis, and dual-axis tracking systems in addition to fixed-tilt systems; improve optimization strategies for single-axis and dual-axis systems and integrate sun-tracking with agricultural strategies, crop selectivity, and soil and weather monitoring systems.
  • Solar Provider: Offer tools or services to help farmers navigate solar arrays more easily, such as geospatial navigation systems, remote sensors, and vision-assisted navigation systems.
  • Solar Provider: Avoid the use of concrete and permanent structures when installing PV systems on farmland.
  • Solar Provider: Offer a variety of business arrangements for farmers, such as pay-as-you-go build-own-operate models, revenue-sharing agreements, and flat lease payments.
  • Solar Provider: Provide options and guidance to improve visual attractiveness of agrivoltaic systems, such as hedges, strategic spacing, and panel coloring.
  • Solar Provider: Standardize agrivoltaic system designs for different geographies and agriculture applications.
  • Farmer / Solar Provider: Consult on maintenance and cleaning protocols, accounting for food safety, the need to reduce soil compaction, and other relevant environmental or health regulations.
  • Solar Provider: Use geospatial and satellite data to assess landscape, market dynamics, and potential customer base.
  • Solar Provider: Design agrivoltaic minigrid systems for compatibility with the main grid to enable future connection. 
  • Solar Provider: Reduce customer acquisition costs using machine learning models to identify potential customers and eligible sites.
  • Solar Provider / Regulator: Collaborate with the public sector to diversify solar panel supply chains; leverage incentives and policies that stimulate local or regional production and advance R&D.
  • Solar Provider: Ensure supply chains comply with international labor and human rights laws and standards, particularly for the extraction of critical minerals and panel manufacturing.
  • Solar Provider: Work to decarbonize the full life cycle, including supply chains, production, installation, recycling, and disposal.
  • Solar Provider / Regulator: Partner with the public sector and private organizations to develop workforce training programs; ensure capacity development for all stages of deployment, including installation best practices and end-of-life services.
  • Farmer / Solar Provider: Stay abreast of and engage with changing policies, regulations, zoning laws, tax incentives, and related developments to help remove commercial barriers.
  • Farmer / Solar Provider: Join, create, or participate in public-private partnerships dedicated to de-risking markets, deployment, technology transfers, education, and other relevant areas.
  • [Farmer / Solar Provider] Help expand extension services and create educational opportunities, including demonstration projects and peer-to-peer learning, in agrivoltaics; work with energy agencies to raise awareness.

Further information:

Business Leaders
  • Set ambitious long-term renewable energy goals; incorporate agrivoltaics, where feasible, into corporate net-zero strategies.
  • Support long-term, stable contracts (e.g., PPAs) that de-risk investment in agrivoltaic technologies and incentivize local supply chain development.
  • Invest in companies that produce, deploy, or provide end-of-life servicing for solar panels used for agrivoltaic systems; seek to diversify and localize supply chains.
  • Invest in R&D and related technology, such as batteries, navigation systems for farmers, and software to manage agrivoltaic systems.
  • Support workforce development programs, offer employee scholarships, and/or sponsor training for careers in agrivoltaics; help ensure capacity development for all stages of deployment, including installation and end-of-life services.
  • Offer pro bono business advice or general support for community and cooperative agrivoltaic projects.
  • Join, create, or participate in public-private partnerships dedicated to de-risking markets, deployment, technology transfers, education, and other relevant areas.

Further information:

Nonprofit Leaders
  • Advocate for ambitious long-term renewable energy goals in national climate plans and multilateral agreements; help incorporate agrivoltaics into national climate, energy, and agriculture plans. 
  • Operate or support agrivoltaic demonstration projects, equipment testing, certification, market information disclosures, and onsite supervision.
  • Conduct open-access research to improve the performance of solar PVs in agrivoltaic systems; research optimal crops and panel arrangements, forecasting, and related technologies; help standardize models across geographies and agricultural applications. 
  • Advocate for clear and easy-to-understand regulations that enable agrivoltaics deployment and investment; promote flexible definitions to allow for innovation; provide scientific evidence on the impacts to grid stability, microgrids, soil carbon, biodiversity, and water management; recommend avoiding rigid annual yield requirements and allowing farmers flexibility in crop selection in subsidy and insurance programs.
  • Contribute to clear guidelines for installing and operating agrivoltaics to optimize land productivity while minimizing soil compaction and other environmental impacts.
  • Urge governments to coordinate agrivoltaic policies horizontally (e.g., across agencies) and vertically (e.g., across subnational, national, and international efforts); help align social and environmental safeguards with agrivoltaic policies.
  • Advocate for streamlined permitting procedures and standardize documents such as templates for PPAs.
  • Offer financial assistance to farmers, cooperatives, or communities seeking to deploy agrivoltaics; advocate for targeted incentives to developers and farmers, such as subsidies (especially to reduce up-front cost), feed-in tariffs, tax credits, grants, green bonds, waived grid connection fees, and forgivable or concessional loans; recommend subsidies be gradually reduced as the market stabilizes; earmark funds and/or urge governments to earmark incentives for smallholder and low- and middle-income farmers.
  • Advocate for carbon taxes and redirection of fossil fuel subsidies into agrivoltaics and renewables.
  • Urge policymakers to invest in and subsidize grid-enhancing technologies, flexibility, storage, and transmission infrastructure to manage variable generation.
  • Work with policymakers and industry to diversify solar panel supply chains; help design incentives and policies to stimulate local or regional production; urge policymakers to invest in R&D for solar panels and related equipment such as batteries.
  • Help strengthen labor and human rights laws and standards around solar PV supply chains; invest in enforcement mechanisms – particularly for the extraction and use of critical minerals and panel manufacturing.
  • Help strengthen land tenure rights through documentation and advocacy; help policymakers clarify and allow agrivoltaics on agricultural land; differentiate agrivoltaics from conventional ground-mounted solar panels; create supportive policies to deploy agrivoltaic systems for restoring abandoned or contaminated land.
  • Offer services to conduct environmental and health impact assessments before installation and during operations of agrivoltaics.
  • Participate in community feedback sessions and co-design agrivoltaic projects with farmers, developers, and other relevant stakeholders.
  • Help create or support community agrivoltaics using a variety of development models and benefit-sharing arrangements (e.g., build-own-operate, publicly owned businesses, developer-owned businesses, public-private partnerships, energy communities, and cooperatives).
  • Create certification programs for all stages of deployment, including resource extraction, manufacturing, installation, maintenance, and end-of-life service for solar panels used in agrivoltaic systems.
  • Work with policymakers and the private sector to develop workforce training programs; ensure capacity development for all stages of deployment, including end-of-life services; create professional certifications for the full spectrum of roles.
  • Help create strong regulations for end-of-life services for solar panels; advocate for EPR for manufacturers; work with industry to foster a market for used, refurbished, and recycled panels.
  • Join, create, or participate in public-private partnerships dedicated to de-risking markets, deployment, technology transfers, education, and other relevant areas.
  • Help expand extension services and create educational opportunities, including demonstration projects and peer-to-peer learning in agrivoltaics; work with energy agencies to raise awareness.

Further information:

Investors
  • Offer low-interest loans and concessional financing to farmers, panel manufacturers, developers, operators, recyclers, and others involved in agrivoltaics.
  • Invest directly in agrivoltaics projects.
  • Invest in companies that produce, deploy, or provide end-of-life servicing for solar panels used in agrivoltaics; support supply chain localization and diversification.
  • Invest in supportive infrastructures, such as utility companies and grid development.
  • Invest in green bonds and/or explore blended finance structures to mobilize capital for agrivoltaics and enabling infrastructure.
  • Invest in solar panel recycling infrastructure and circular supply chains.
  • Invest in R&D for component technology and related equipment, such as batteries.
  • Help de-risk agrivoltaics adoption in low- and middle-income communities through low-interest loans, concessional financing, and/or favorable terms.
  • Align investments with existing public-private partnerships, voluntary agreements, or voluntary guidance that may apply in the location of the investment.

Further information:

Philanthropists and International Aid Agencies
  • Advocate for ambitious long-term renewable energy goals in national climate plans and multilateral agreements; help incorporate agrivoltaics into national climate, energy, and agriculture plans. 
  • Operate agrivoltaic demonstration projects, equipment testing, certification systems, market information disclosures, and onsite supervision.
  • Offer low-interest loans and concessional financing for farmers, panel manufacturers, developers, operators, recyclers, and others involved in agrivoltaics.
  • Award grants for the development of agrivoltaics projects and/or adjacent areas such as mini-grids.
  • Award grants to or invest in companies that produce, deploy, or provide end-of-life servicing for solar panels used in agrivoltaics; seek to diversify and localize supply chains.
  • Provide financing for supportive infrastructures, such as utility companies and grid development.
  • Invest in green bonds and/or explore blended finance structures to mobilize capital for companies developing or deploying agrivoltaics and supportive infrastructure.
  • Finance recycling infrastructure for solar panels and circular supply chains.
  • Help de-risk transitions to agrivoltaic systems in low- and middle-income communities by earmarking a percentage of grant funds and/or offering low-interest loans, concessional financing, and/or favorable terms.
  • Conduct open-access research to improve the performance of solar PVs in agrivoltaic systems; research optimal crops and panel arrangements, forecasting, and related technologies; help standardize models across geographies and agricultural applications. 
  • Help create clear and easy-to-understand regulations that enable agrivoltaics deployment and investment; promote flexible definitions to allow for innovation; provide scientific evidence for the impacts to grid stability, microgrids, soil carbon, biodiversity, and water management; recommend avoiding rigid annual yield requirements and allowing farmers flexibility in crop selection in subsidy and insurance programs.
  • Contribute to clear guidelines for installing and operating agrivoltaics to optimize land productivity while minimizing soil compaction and other environmental impacts.
  • Urge governments to coordinate agrivoltaic policies horizontally (e.g., across agencies) and vertically (e.g., across subnational, national, and international efforts); help align social and environmental safeguards with agrivoltaic policies.
  • Advocate for streamlined permitting procedures and standardize documents such as templates for PPAs.
  • Call on governments to provide financial incentives to developers and farmers, such as subsidies (especially to reduce up-front cost), feed-in tariffs, tax credits, grants, green bonds, waived grid connection fees, and forgivable or concessional loans; recommend subsidies be gradually reduced as the market stabilizes; urge governments to earmark incentives for smallholder, low- and middle-income farmers.
  • Advocate for carbon taxes and redirection of fossil fuel subsidies into agrivoltaics and renewables.
  • Urge policymakers to invest in and subsidize grid enhancing technologies, flexibility, storage, and transmission infrastructure to manage variable generation.
  • Work with policymakers and industry to diversify solar panel supply chains; help design incentives and policies to stimulate local or regional production and advance R&D for solar panels and related equipment such as batteries.
  • Help strengthen labor and human rights laws and standards around solar PV supply chains; invest in enforcement mechanisms – particularly for the extraction and use of critical minerals and panel manufacturing.
  • Help strengthen land tenure rights through documentation and advocacy; help policymakers clarify and allow agrivoltaics on agricultural land; differentiate agrivoltaics from conventional ground-mounted solar panels; create supportive policies to deploy agrivoltaic systems for restoring abandoned or contaminated land.
  • Offer or support services to conduct environmental and health impact assessments before installation and during operations of agrivoltaics.
  • Participate in community feedback sessions and co-design agrivoltaic projects with farmers, developers, and other relevant stakeholders.
  • Help create or support community agrivoltaics using a variety of development models and benefit-sharing arrangements (e.g., build-own-operate, publicly owned businesses, developer-owned businesses, public-private partnerships, energy communities, and cooperatives).
  • Finance or create certification programs for all stages of deployment, including resource extraction, manufacturing, installation, maintenance, and end-of-life service for agrivoltaic systems. 
  • Work with policymakers and the private sector to develop workforce training programs; ensure capacity development for all stages of deployment, including end-of-life services; create professional certifications for the full spectrum of roles.
  • Help create strong regulations for end-of-life services for solar panels; advocate for EPR for manufacturers; work with industry to foster a market for used, refurbished, and recycled panels.
  • Join, create, or participate in public-private partnerships dedicated to de-risking markets, deployment, technology transfers, education, and other relevant areas.
  • Help expand extension services or create educational opportunities that offer options for deployment, technical guidance, demonstration projects, and peer-to-peer learning opportunities in agrivoltaics; work with energy agencies to raise awareness.

Further information:

Thought Leaders
  • Advocate for ambitious long-term renewable energy goals in national climate plans and multilateral agreements; help incorporate agrivoltaics into national climate, energy, and agriculture plans. 
  • Operate agrivoltaic demonstration projects, equipment testing, certification systems, market information disclosures, and onsite supervision.
  • Conduct open-access research to improve the performance of solar PV in agrivoltaic systems; research optimal crops and panel arrangements, forecasting, and related technologies; help standardize models across geographies and agricultural applications. 
  • Help create clear and easy-to-understand regulations that enable agrivoltaics deployment and investment; promote flexible definitions to allow for innovation; provide scientific evidence on the impacts to grid stability, microgrids, soil carbon, biodiversity, and water management; recommend avoiding rigid annual yield requirements and allowing farmers flexibility in crop selection in subsidy and insurance programs. 
  • Contribute to clear guidelines for installing and operating agrivoltaics to optimize land productivity while minimizing soil compaction and other environmental impacts.
  • Urge governments to coordinate agrivoltaic policies horizontally (e.g., across agencies) and vertically (e.g., across subnational, national, and international efforts); help align social and environmental safeguards with agrivoltaic policies.
  • Advocate for streamlined permitting procedures and standardize documents such as templates for PPAs.
  • Call on governments to provide financial incentives to developers and farmers, such as subsidies (especially to reduce up-front cost), feed-in tariffs, tax credits, grants, green bonds, waived grid connection fees, and forgivable or concessional loans; recommend subsidies be gradually reduced as the market stabilizes; urge policymakers to earmark incentives for smallholder, low- and middle-income farmers.
  • Advocate for carbon taxes and redirection of fossil fuel subsidies into agrivoltaics and renewables.
  • Urge policymakers to invest in and subsidize grid-enhancing technologies, flexibility, storage, and transmission infrastructure to manage variable generation.
  • Help strengthen labor and human rights laws and standards around solar PV supply chains; invest in enforcement mechanisms –particularly, for the extraction and use of critical minerals and panel manufacturing.
  • Help strengthen land tenure rights through documentation and advocacy; help policymakers clarify and allow agrivoltaics on agricultural land; differentiate agrivoltaics from conventional ground-mounted solar panels; create supportive policies to deploy agrivoltaic systems for restoring abandoned or contaminated land.
  • Offer services to conduct environmental and health impact assessments before installation and during operations of agrivoltaics.
  • Participate in community feedback sessions and co-design agrivoltaic projects with farmers, developers, and other relevant stakeholders.
  • Help create certification programs for all stages of deployment, including resource extraction, manufacturing, installation, maintenance, and end-of-life service for agrivoltaic systems.
  • Work with policymakers and the private sector to develop workforce training programs; ensure capacity development for all stages of deployment, including end-of-life services; create professional certifications for the full spectrum of roles.
  • Help create strong regulations for end-of-life services for solar panels; advocate for EPR for manufacturers; work with industry to foster a market for used, refurbished, and recycled panels.
  • Join, create, or participate in public-private partnerships dedicated to de-risking markets, deployment, technology transfers, education, and other relevant areas.
  • Help expand extension services or create educational opportunities that offer options for deployment, technical guidance, demonstration projects, and peer-to-peer learning opportunities in agrivoltaics; work with energy agencies to raise awareness.

Further information:

Technologists and Researchers
  • Design solar panels and mounting systems that reduce material requirements and overall system weight.
  • Research lighter-weight materials for agrivoltaic systems and evaluate their technical, economic, and environmental feasibility. 
  • Advance scientific understanding of optimal crop selection for agrivoltaic systems; improve solar panel wavelength selectivity; develop standardized system configurations for specific geographies and agricultural applications; identify optimal spacing requirements for various arrangements.
  • Research soil compaction impacts in agrivoltaic systems, ways to prevent or minimize it during site preparation and installation, and ways to alleviate or reverse it post-installation – with priority on approaches compatible with ongoing PV operations and long-term soil health.
  • Identify ways to reduce the impact of agrivoltaic systems on satellite signals to improve navigation technology.
  • Improve semi-transparent photovoltaic panels to increase efficiency and reduce costs for agrivoltaic systems.
  • Examine the impacts of agrivoltaics on soil health, water management, biodiversity, and other environmental factors.
  • Create publicly accessible databases of agrivoltaic models, performance data, and best practices.
  • Assess policy frameworks and regulations that enable or inhibit agrivoltaics adoption. 
  • Identify barriers to adoption for farmers; research impacts of agrivoltaics on property value and land classification.
  • Improve and update spatial data on power grid locations and available transmission capacities, especially in rural and underserved areas.
  • Examine the impacts of agrivoltaics on food security, energy access, and rural communities.
  • Advance the use of AI or other technological tools for predictive analytics, yield forecasting, and power system control.
  • Improve recycling infrastructure and scalable technologies to repair, reuse, or recover materials from solar panels.
  • Improve related mining technologies for critical minerals, making the extraction process safer, less disruptive to local communities and ecosystems, and less energy intensive.
  • Develop ways of eliminating, reducing, reusing, and/or safely disposing of hazardous by-products of PV manufacturing.
  • Research social factors that drive community acceptance and the role of agrivoltaics in a fair and just energy transition. 

Further information:

Communities, Households, and Individuals
  • Help create or support community agrivoltaic projects using models such as build-own-operate, public-private partnerships, energy communities, and cooperatives.
  • Take advantage of available government incentives such as subsidies, tax breaks, and forgivable or concessional loans for community agrivoltaic projects.
  • Advocate for ambitious long-term renewable energy goals in national climate plans and multilateral agreements.
  • Call on governments to provide financial incentives to developers and farmers, such as subsidies (especially to reduce up-front cost), feed-in tariffs, tax credits, grants, green bonds, waived grid connection fees, and forgivable or concessional loans; recommend subsidies be gradually reduced as the market stabilizes; urge policymakers to earmark incentives for smallholder, low- and middle-income farmers.
  • Advocate for carbon taxes and the redirection of fossil fuel subsidies into agrivoltaics and renewables.
  • Urge policymakers to invest in and subsidize improvements to grid integration and flexibility, storage, and infrastructure to manage variable generation.
  • Participate in community feedback sessions and co-design agrivoltaic projects with farmers, developers, and other relevant stakeholders.
  • Join, create, or participate in public-private partnerships dedicated to de-risking markets, deployment, technology transfers, education, and other relevant areas.
  • Volunteer with community agrivoltaic projects; participate in public awareness campaigns; share information with your community and networks regarding the benefits of agrivoltaic systems.

Further information:

“Take Action” Sources
Evidence Base

Consensus of overall effectiveness of agrivoltaics: High

A wide range of peer-reviewed studies, meta-analyses, and life-cycle assessments provide strong evidence that agrivoltaics reduce GHG emissions. International organizations such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and IEA identify rapid solar PV deployment as a critical component in mitigation pathways and net-zero scenarios. Life-cycle assessments show that, despite 20% higher embodied emissions from elevated structures compared with conventional solar PV, agrivoltaic systems deliver significant net emissions reductions by displacing fossil generation while maintaining agricultural output on the same footprint (Agostini et al., 2021; Barron-Gafford et al., 2019; Campana et al., 2025).

There is sufficient evidence that well-sited agrivoltaic systems increase land-use efficiency, and can provide additional benefits including reduced water stress, avoided land-use conflict, and improved solar PV performance in suitable climates (Barron-Gafford et al., 2019; Campana et al., 2025; Dupraz et al., 2011; Trommsdorff et al., 2025). Meta-analyses show manageable yield responses for shade-tolerant or neutral crops, especially in arid and semi-arid regions (Chirinda et al., 2024; Mamun et al., 2022); however yields for shade-intolerant crops or in temperate and humid climates are less consistent. Higher capital costs, site-specific challenges, and limited long-term data beyond two to three growing seasons create economic uncertainty. 

Consensus is mixed regarding net emissions savings of solar PV, given the diurnal nature of solar energy and the need for storage or other energy resources to meet peak evening demand. There is also a lack of global scientific or regulatory consensus regarding the definition of agrivoltaics, with qualification thresholds for which agricultural activities and what level of activity constitutes dual-use land varying substantially across jurisdictions (Trommsdorff et al., 2025).

This summary draws from 5 reviews and meta-analyses, 25 institutional reports, 6 market reports, and 32 original studies covering more than 25 countries, with strongest evidence from Europe, North America, East Asia, and select arid regions. We recognize this limited geographic scope creates bias toward higher-income and temperate-to-arid settings. Further research and data sharing in underrepresented low-income regions is required, where land, water, and energy pressures makes agrivoltaic systems potentially most impactful.

Updated Date
Coming Soon Label
Coming Soon

Produce Biochar

Sector
Industrial Carbon Removal
Mode
Remove Carbon
Cluster
Biomass Carbon Removal & Storage
Image
Biochar
Coming Soon
On

Key Takeaways

  • By transforming carbon absorbed by plants and animals into a highly stable form, large-scale biochar production and application to soils could potentially remove 0.13–0.47 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr.
  • The carbon permanence of biochar can range from hundreds to thousands of years when applied to soil, but more research is needed to understand durability in response to real-world soil and environmental factors.
  • Biochar increases soil health and nutrient availability. This can increase yields of a variety of staple crops, but benefits vary across soil types.
Summary

Producing biochar is the process of taking organic matter such as crop residues, animal manure, and forest residues and converting it into a charcoal-like substance known as biochar. Producing biochar removes carbon from the atmosphere by transforming carbon absorbed by plants and animals and into a highly stable form, preventing it from quickly returning to the atmosphere (Belmont & Sanchez, 2025). Biochar can be used as a soil amendment, a replacement for certain construction materials, or for filtration or pollution remediation. This solution focuses on large-scale production of biochar for soil application.

Food security,Health
Nature protection,Land resources,Water resources,Water quality,Air quality
Description for Social and Search
Producing biochar takes the carbon from organic wastes (agricultural and forestry wastes) and converts it into a stable form that will sequester the carbon for hundreds of years. Biochar is mainly used as a soil amendment where it can improve soil fertility.
Overview

Biochar is a charcoal-like substance that is mainly produced by burning organic matter in an oxygen-deficient environment, a process called pyrolysis (Spears, 2018; Figure 1). Biochar production converts the carbon in the organic matter into a stable form that is not readily released into the atmosphere. 

This solution considers producing biochar from agricultural (crop residue, manure) or industrial (forest residue) waste feedstocks. It does not include using purpose-grown plants, edible portions of food or feed crops, or other non-waste feedstocks, which could compete for land use and reduce the climate benefits. We focused on biochar facilities that process 1,000 or more metric tons of waste per year (Amonette et al., 2021). We included both pyrolysis and gasification in our analysis; however, the proportion of carbon that is turned into biochar can differ between processes (NorthX, 2025). We excluded hydrothermal processing of wet biomass that produces hydrochar from our analysis because the carbon storage properties differ from those of typical biochar (Lehmann & Joseph, 2015).

Co-products such as bio-oil or syngas can be produced during biochar production and used as energy or sold. Using biochar can have climate benefits in addition to storing carbon, such as avoiding the production of methane from waste (Afshar & Mofatteh, 2024) and enhancing soil carbon sequestration in certain soil types (Yang et al., 2025). This solution focuses only on the carbon sequestered in biochar. We do not quantify potential avoided waste emissions, reduced energy use from co-products, or any enhanced sequestration after soil application. 

Figure 1. Example of a biochar production process. The conversion of 100% of biomass carbon to 50% biochar is specific to the pyrolysis process and can vary with different temperatures and methods used.

Diagram of biochar process.

Source: International Biochar Initiative. (n.d.). Why Biochar. Retrieved 6 March 2026.

This solution focuses on biochar use as a soil additive in soils where it can improve soil organic matter as well as help retain water and nutrients. The carbon permanence of biochar can range from hundreds to thousands of years when applied to soil (Belmont & Sanchez, 2025). Biochar also can be used in filtration or remediation applications or as a filler material in building materials such as asphalt or concrete (Amonette et al., 2022).

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Yang, J., Xia, L., van Groenigen, K. J., Zhao, X., Ti, C., Wang, W., Du, Z., Fan, M., Zhuang, M., Smith, P., Lal, R., Butterbach-Bahl, K., Han, X., Meng, J., Liu, J., Cai, H., Cheng, Y., Liu, X., Shu, X., … Yan, X. (2025). Sustained benefits of long-term biochar application for food security and climate change mitigation. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 122(33), Article e2509237122. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2509237122

Credits

Lead Fellow

  • Jason Lam

Contributors

  • Ruthie Burrows, Ph.D.

  • James Gerber, Ph.D.

  • Daniel Jasper

  • Megan Matthews, Ph.D.

  • Alex Sweeney

Internal Reviewers

  • Amanda D. Smith, Ph.D.

  • Emily Cassidy

Effectiveness

We estimated that 1 metric ton of biochar produced and incorporated into soil will remove 0.84 t CO₂‑eq (0.82 t CO₂‑eq , 20-yr), after subtracting production emissions (Table 1). This assumes the primary feedstock is agricultural waste and forestry residue. Due to very limited direct production emissions data, we estimated that any carbon not stabilized in biochar is emitted as CO₂ or methane.

Producing and using biochar may have various additional benefits after application in different soil types (Yang et al., 2025). Afshar & Mofatteh (2024) found biochar applied to soils can reduce the production of methane from rice paddies, and Kabir et al. (2023) observed decreased nitrous oxide emissions from some soils treated with biochar. Because these additional benefits of biochar are context specific, our analysis of effectiveness in reducing GHGs focused only on the amount of carbon sequestered with biochar.

Biochar's carbon sequestration potential depends in part on the feedstock used, because carbon content varies with type of organic waste. Woolf et al. (2021) examined several globally abundant feedstocks and found that the carbon content of biochar can also vary depending on how the biochar is produced, ranging from 10–81% of the carbon found in the dry mass feedstocks. 

Table 1. Effectiveness at sequestering carbon.

Unit: t CO₂‑eq /t biochar, 100-yr basis

25th percentile 0.81
Mean 0.63
Median (50th percentile) 0.84
75th percentile 1.30
Left Text Column Width
Cost

To sequester 1 t CO₂‑eq with biochar, a biochar production facility will have an initial cost of around US$200/t biochar, an operating cost of roughly US$510/t biochar, and revenue of US$120/t biochar. However, these values do not include potential costs for applying biochar to soils. Globally, the net cost of producing and using biochar is roughly US$190/t biochar, based on literature estimates of abatement costs. Table 2 shows the cost per unit climate impact, based on net cost.

Our cost data only include revenue from the sale of biochar for soil amendment and do not include revenue from increased crop yield, carbon credit systems, or other by-products such as the thermal energy, syngas or bio-oils, which can be used to reduce energy costs or sold as fuel (Amonette et al., 2021). We found limited capital cost and revenue data; many sources (Buss et al., 2022; British Columbia Centre for Innovation & Clean Energy [CICE] & Deloitte, 2023; Fuss et al., 2018; IPCC, 2018; Liang & Chen, 2025; Russel et al., 2025) focused on the overall costs of biochar production. Operating costs include labor, feedstocks, transportation, and application of biochar, and can vary significantly (Liang & Chen, 2025; Shackley et al., 2014; Xiao et al, 2019). Xiao et al. (2019) found that it is possible to achieve low-cost biochar production at small scales. Some facilities may have a feedstock cost near zero with local organic waste, while others may have a high cost due to transportation and processing (International Renewable Energy Agency [IRENA], 2018).

We considered the baseline scenario where biomass is left to naturally decompose or is collected and processed for conventional disposal. We assumed baseline initial costs, operational costs, and revenue to be 0.

Table 2. Cost per unit climate impact.

Unit: 2023 US$/t CO₂‑eq , 100-yr basis

Median 230
Left Text Column Width

Methods and Supporting Data

Methods and Supporting Data

Learning Curve

The processes and technologies for producing biochar are mature, and we were unable to find literature suggesting the costs to implement these solutions will fall in the future (The Institute for Carbon Removal, 2020). Even if technology costs drop over time, competition for feedstocks with bioenergy producers or composters could also increase production costs.

Speed of Action

Speed of action refers to how quickly a climate solution physically affects the atmosphere after it is deployed. This is different from speed of deployment, which is the pace at which solutions are adopted.

At Project Drawdown, we define the speed of action for each climate solution as emergency brake, gradual, or delayed.

Producing biochar is a GRADUAL climate solution. It has a steady, linear impact on the atmosphere. 

Caveats

Biochar properties may vary depending on the feedstock and production process. The carbon content of biochar can range from 10–81% of the carbon found in the feedstock (Woolf et al., 2021). Production processes also affect what co-products are produced: Slow pyrolysis generates more biochar, while fast pyrolysis boosts bio-oil production, and producing biochar with gasification will have syngas as the largest output (Afshar & Mofatteh, 2024). 

While strong evidence suggests that biochar sequesters carbon for hundreds to thousands of years, some uncertainties about permanence remain. Short-duration experiments have shown carbon loss over years or decades due to exposure to oxygen, water, and ultraviolet light, but these might not reflect real-world soil and environmental factors (Belmont & Sanchez, 2025). There is also evidence that co-application of biochar with nitrogen fertilizer can mitigate methane emissions in rice paddies (Baek et al., 2025). 

Current Adoption

We estimated that 380,000 t of biochar were produced in 2023 (Table 3).

We found only one source for current global annual production of biochar (International Biochar Initiative, 2024). These data were based on voluntary surveys of biochar producers with more than 1,000 respondents in 2023; we assumed it is an underestimate because it likely doesn’t include all biochar production facilities. 

Table 3. Current adoption level (2023).

Unit: t biochar produced and added to soil/yr

25th percentile 370,000
Mean 380,000
Median (50th percentile) 380,000
75th percentile 400,000
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Adoption Trend

We were only able to find adoption trend data for 2013, 2014, 2015, 2021, and 2023, all from the International Biochar Initiative (2014, 2015, 2016, 2024). These data rely on voluntary surveys; the source noted that some companies did not respond to the survey every year and that some biochar producers did not respond to the survey.

These adoption data show that biochar production has increased over time; however, it’s not clear whether this is due to increasing biochar production or increasing response rates from producers. 

Adoption Ceiling

Producing biochar has an estimated adoption ceiling of 1.3 billion t/yr (Table 4) based on reports from Energy Transition Commission (2022), Fuss et al. (2018), International Biochar Initiative (2024), IPCC (2022), Lehmann et al. (2021), Lenton (2010), NorthX, (2025), Smith et al. (2019), and Woolf et al. (2010). 

The adoption ceiling for biochar is often stated in terms of CO₂‑eq/yr removed. To convert this into metric tons of biochar we used the value of 1.9 t CO₂‑eq removed per mewtric ton of biochar produced given by the International Biochar Initiative (2024). In practice, the amount of carbon sequestered will depend on the feedstock used as well as the method used for producing biochar.

We based our analysis on the current level of organic waste produced by agriculture and industry. Many projections (Energy Transition Commission, 2022; Fuss et al., 2018; International Biochar Initiative, 2024; IPCC 2022; Lehmann et al., 2021; Lenton, 2010; NorthX, 2025; Smith et al., 2019; Woolf et al., 2010) show the technical potential of biochar production using all available waste biomass from agriculture or industry feedstocks. If biochar production is increased, we would expect to see more waste feedstocks used for biochar and less available for other climate solutions that use organic waste feedstocks.

Table 4. Adoption ceiling.

Unit: t biochar produced and added to soil/yr

25th percentile 530,000,000
Mean 1,100,000,000
Median (50th percentile) 1,300,000,000
75th percentile 1,600,000,000
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Achievable Adoption

Biochar production depends on the source and volume of feedstock. We estimate an achievable adoption of 160–570 Mt of biochar (Table 5). The low value was based on the projected biochar ceiling from Griscom et al. (2017), which excludes avoided emissions and partially accounts for restrictions in biomass availability. The high value aligns with IPCC (2022)’s estimate for the mitigation potential of biochar based on a US$100/t CO₂‑eq carbon price. The US$100/t CO₂‑eq carbon price is an indicator that biochar production will require economic support for widespread adoption and assumes that achievable biochar production is constrained more by economics than by biomass availability.

Large-scale biochar production will likely be limited by biomass competition with other climate solutions. Many sources do not specify how they calculated the amount of biomass available for biochar production, making it difficult to determine where achievable adoption would fall between the current adoption and the full technical adoption ceiling. We have chosen to be conservative for the high achievable adoption to reduce the chance of biochar production being restricted by feedstock constraints.

Table 5. Range of achievable adoption levels.

Unit: t biochar produced and added to soil/yr

Current adoption 380,000
Achievable – low 160,000,000
Achievable – high 570,000,000
Adoption ceiling 1,300,000,000
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Producing and using biochar has the potential to sequester a large amount of carbon emissions. While biochar currently sequesters 0 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr, we estimated 0.13–0.47 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr on a 100-yr basis (0.13–0.46 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr, 20-yr) could be sequestered (Table 6). The economics of building, operating, and maintaining biochar production facilities, along with biomass feedstock availability, will greatly affect how biochar production and use grows in the future. 

Producing biochar requires the use of biomass as a feedstock. Multiple climate solutions require biomass, and projected demand across solutions greatly exceeds supply. The deforestation that would be required to meet demand would produce emissions far greater than any mitigation gains from full deployment of these solutions (Searchinger, 2024). In addition to deforestation, there would also be costs and emissions incurred to transport biomass from where it is produced to where it can be processed and used. Thus, the estimated climate impacts presented here are only possible if feedstocks are prioritized for this solution. If feedstocks are instead prioritized for other climate solutions (see Interactions for examples), adoption and impact will be lower for this solution. It is not possible to set all biomass-dependent solutions to high adoption levels, add up their impacts, and determine an accurate combined emissions impact.

Table 6. Climate impact at different levels of adoption.

Unit: Gt CO₂‑eq/yr, 100-yr basis

Current adoption 0.00
Achievable – low 0.13
Achievable – high 0.47
Adoption ceiling 1.10
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Additional Benefits

Food Security

When used as a soil amendment, biochar has been found to increase soil health and yields of a variety of staple crops (Agegnehu et al., 2016; Kabir et al., 2023; Yang et al., 2025).

Health

Producing biochar can benefit health by mitigating the impacts of crop residue burning. Poor air quality from crop residue burning is harmful to health and can lead to premature mortality, especially in Southeast Asia, where residue burning is more common (Lan et al. 2022). Air pollution from burning crop residue has been linked to eye irritation, headaches, nausea, skin irritation, allergies, respiratory infections, increased risk of lung cancer, and reduced lung function (Gupta, 2019; Huang et al., 2022; Raza et al., 2022). 

Nature Protection

Using biochar can reduce nutrient-rich runoff from manure that can lead to eutrophication and hypoxic zones in aquatic ecosystems (Bijay-Singh & Craswell, 2021). Nitrogen pollution also harms terrestrial biodiversity through soil acidification and increases the productivity of fast-growing species, including invasives, which can outcompete native species (Porter et al., 2013).

Land Resources

By using crop residues instead of burning them, producing biochar can improve soils that would otherwise be degraded from crop residue burning (Bhuvaneshwari et al., 2019). 

When used as a soil amendment, biochar has been found to increase soil quality (Agegnehu et al., 2016). Biochar can aid in nutrient retention, including nitrogen, phosphorus, and soil organic carbon, and can improve soil water content (Agegnehu et al., 2016; Kabir et al., 2023; Yang et al., 2025). Some benefits depend on soil type; for example, amending biochar to mineral soils can increase soil pH, organic matter, and nutrient availability, especially in sandy and acidic soils, but soils with high pH could see a reduction in micronutrient availability (Yang et al., 2025).

Water Resources

Amending soil with biochar can increase soil water content, which can improve plant growth (Agegnehu et al., 2016; Kabir et al., 2013). 

Water Quality

Producing biochar can mitigate the use of manure on agriculture fields, which can improve water quality. Manure contains nutrients such as nitrogen and phosphorus as well as drug residues, heavy metals, and pathogens (Steinfeld et al., 2006). Manure can also leach into water sources when used as a fertilizer on croplands (Porter & Cox, 2020).

Air Quality

Producing biochar can benefit air quality by mitigating crop residue burning and the use of manure as fertilizer. Reducing the amount of manure applied as a fertilizer on croplands can improve air quality by reducing nitrogen and ammonia emissions associated with manure application (Grossi et al., 2019; Peterson et al., 2013; Steinfeld et al., 2006).

Crop residue burning is a major source of air pollution, including fine particulate matter, CO₂, and carbon monoxide, in South and Southeast Asia (Lan et al., 2022; Na Talang et al., 2024; Singh et al., 2021). Because fine particulate matter and black carbon make up a large part of the pollution, crop residue burning can lead to poor air quality far from agricultural fields (Kaskaoutis et al., 2014). Poor air quality associated with burning crop residues could be improved by instead producing biochar. 

Risks

The environmental impact of high adoption of biochar application in soils is unknown. Feasibility, long-term mitigation potential, side effects, and trade-offs are uncertain. Resolving these uncertainties will require biochar application on different soil types, environments, and management conditions in real-world settings for long periods (Fuss et al., 2018; Belmont & Sanchez, 2025).

The application of biochar could potentially change the microbial composition of the soils or lower the ability of plants to defend against insects, pathogens, and environmental stresses (Viger et al., 2014). It also could darken the soil surface, altering the land surface radiation balance. Fine biochar particles could get released into the atmosphere during production, transportation, or handling, leading to poor air quality, disrupted local hydrological cycles, and potential health concerns (Genesio et al., 2016; Ravi et al., 2016). GHG emissions from producing biochar differ across scales and technologies. Strategies to minimize the potentially negative impacts of biochar will need to be developed in order to guarantee that biochar has an overall positive impact on global climate change.

Interactions with Other Solutions

Reinforcing

Sayara & Sánchez (2021) observed reduced nitrogen emissions when biochar was added to compost.

Competing

Biochar production can compete with solutions that use biomass, specifically wood and crop residues, in other processes. Because the total projected demand for biomass for climate solutions exceeds the supply, not all of these solutions will be able to achieve their potential adoption. This solution competes with the following solutions for raw material:

Dashboard

Solution Basics

t biochar produced and added to soil

t CO₂-eq (100-yr)/unit/yr
00.810.84median
units/yr
Current 380,000 01.6×10⁸5.7×10⁸
Achievable (Low to High)

Climate Impact

Gt CO₂-eq (100-yr)/yr
Current 0 0.130.47
US$ per t CO₂-eq
230
Gradual

CO₂

Trade-offs

To preserve soil health and nutrient recovery, some agricultural and industrial forestry waste must be left on the land. If revenues from biochar production are very high, producers may be incentivized to convert additional land to grow crops for biochar. This could affect food security and soil health (CICE & Innovative Breakthrough Energy Technologies [IBET], 2023). 

Pyrolytic production of biochar can generate heat and power. However, different processes produce different outputs, and it is important to understand the economic considerations for biochar production (Afshar & Mofatteh, 2024). 

Biochar can be used to replace a small amount of cement in concrete production or incorporated into other building materials (Aman et al., 2022), but this limits its usage as a soil amendment and potential for enhanced soil carbon sequestration. However, using biochar in durable building materials stores carbon for multiple decades, while some agricultural applications could involve further combustion or decomposition of biochar and so release stored carbon back into the atmosphere within a few years. 

Action Word
Produce
Solution Title
Biochar
Classification
Highly Recommended

Lawmakers and Policymakers
  • Create strong regulatory frameworks and streamline permitting processes; if necessary, revise classification schemes for biochar production systems from “incinerators” to “carbon stabilizers”; fund necessary scientific assessments and convenings to develop robust regulatory framework.
  • Provide financial incentives such as payment for ecosystem services (PES), tax breaks, subsidies, or tax exemptions to support production, infrastructure, and biomass collection and delivery; offer subsidies for equipment purchases, equipment rentals, and biochar products such as soil amendments, construction materials, and other local uses.
  • Limit incentives for eligible feedstocks and biochar production to avoid unintended consequences such as land grabbing, deforestation, and land conversion.
  • Institute a carbon tax to incentivize the production of biochar while also discouraging burning crop residue and biomass.
  • Create or improve robust certification schemes for biochar – include clear governance models, standards for testing, systems and timelines for evaluation, and enforcement and verification mechanisms. 
  • Work with industry to develop products, supply chains, and markets; use public procurement when possible to help stabilize biochar markets.
  • Offer or subsidize biomass collection services; seek to establish local production and supply chains, aiming to minimize transportation of biomass and biochar products.
  • Co-design biochar projects with the local community; ensure community engagement starts early and is transparent, inclusive, and ongoing; solicit feedback from the local community – including from opposition groups – on location, design, finance, and mitigation; ensure finalized projects address sociological, agriculture, and ecological considerations.
  • Ensure projects operating in or with Indigenous communities only do so under Free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC); codify FPIC into legal systems.
  • Invest in R&D to optimize feedstock collection, biochar production, and biochar application to meet needs of local soils and/or rice paddies.
  • Invest in R&D for other uses of biochar beyond soil amendments, such as building materials and water treatment; research other land use applications, such as flood mitigation in upstream soils.
  • Establish one-stop-shop educational programs that use online and in-person methods to educate the industry and public on regulations, benefits of biochar, best practices, and other relevant information; ensure the material is sufficient and appropriate for local contexts, paying close attention to language barriers. 
  • Offer demonstration projects at relevant events and venues; expand agricultural extension services and ensure farmers are aware of biochar options, benefits, and incentives.
  • Work with industry to create high-integrity carbon markets that do not allow for deforestation and/or incentivize growing trees or crops solely for the production of biochar.
  • Join, create, or participate in public-private partnerships dedicated to de-risking markets, deployment, technology transfers, education, and other relevant areas.

Further information:

Practitioners
  • Fuel pyrolysis with by-products such as syngas and bio-oils and low-emission fuels.
  • Work to achieve consistent product quality; experiment with different equipment designs, feedstocks, applications, and products to identify locally optimal processes. 
  • Produce and/or invest in R&D to develop a variety of products beyond soil amendments, such as building materials and water filtration systems.
  • Invest in short- and long-term market analyses on entry points and possible products to meet local needs; help coordinate long-term research between public and private stakeholder groups. 
  • Secure written contracts for biomass feedstocks from suppliers to ensure consistent delivery.
  • Create and promote technical workforce and professional development programs; develop the full range of capacity to address every step of the value chain, including engineering, collection, biochemical sciences, product design, and business development.
  • Foster consumer awareness of biochar’s use and benefits through advertising and professional relationships.
  • Rent equipment for onsite production; offer a range of products that can accommodate different budgets and needs; offer services or rent equipment for post-production treatment processes and application.
  • Co-design biochar projects with the local community; ensure community engagement starts early and is transparent, inclusive, and ongoing; solicit feedback from the local community – including from opposition groups – on location, design, finance, and mitigation; ensure finalized projects address sociological, agriculture, and ecological considerations.
  • Ensure projects operating in or with Indigenous communities only do so under FPIC; codify FPIC into legal systems.
  • Create or improve robust certification schemes for biochar – include clear governance models, standards for testing, systems and timelines for evaluation, and enforcement and verification mechanisms. 
  • Advocate for favorable regulatory frameworks and incentives such as PES, tax breaks, subsidies, or exemptions to support production, infrastructure, and biomass collection and delivery; advocate for subsidies for equipment purchases, equipment rentals, and biochar products such as soil amendments, construction materials, and other local uses.
  • Establish one-stop-shop educational programs that use online and in-person methods to educate the industry and public on regulations, the benefits of biochar, best practices, and other relevant information; ensure the material is sufficient and appropriate for local contexts, paying close attention to language barriers. 
  • Offer demonstration projects at relevant events and venues; work with or advocate to expand agricultural extension services to ensure stakeholders are aware of biochar options, benefits, and incentives.
  • Work with policymakers and other stakeholders to create high-integrity carbon markets that do not allow for deforestation and/or incentivize growing trees or crops solely for the production of biochar.
  • Seek to establish local production and supply chains, aiming to minimize transportation of biomass and biochar products.
  • Join, create, or participate in public-private partnerships dedicated to de-risking markets, deployment, technology transfers, education, and other relevant areas.

Further information:

Business Leaders
  • If relevant, establish long-term procurement contracts with biochar producers; work with local producers to develop products and services.
  • Take advantage of government incentives such as tax credits, if possible; seek to gradually reduce reliance on these incentives to create long-term market stability.
  • Participate in community engagement processes; help co-design biochar projects with the local community; ensure community engagement starts early and is transparent, inclusive, and ongoing; solicit feedback from the local community – including from opposition groups – on location, design, finance, and mitigation; ensure finalized projects address sociological, agriculture, and ecological considerations.
  • Offer financial services, including low-interest loans, microfinancing, and grants, to support biochar initiatives.
  • Only purchase carbon credits from high-integrity, verifiable carbon markets, and do not use them as replacements for reducing emissions.
  • Support workforce development programs, offer employee scholarships, and/or sponsor training for careers in biochar.
  • Offer pro bono business advice or general support for community biochar projects using structures such as cooperative business models.
  • Join, create, or participate in public-private partnerships dedicated to de-risking markets, deployment, technology transfers, education, and other relevant areas.

Further information:

Nonprofit Leaders
  • Help operate or establish biochar collection, distribution, production, and/or processing facilities; advocate for government support in these areas when necessary; help ensure production and supply chains remain local, aiming to minimize transportation of biomass and biochar products.
  • If relevant, establish long-term procurement contracts with biochar producers; work with local producers to develop products and services.
  • Advocate for and help develop strong regulatory frameworks and streamlined permitting processes; if necessary, suggest revising classification of biochar production systems from incinerators to carbon stabilizers; advocate for funding necessary scientific assessments and convenings to develop a robust regulatory framework.
  • Advocate for favorable regulatory frameworks and incentives, such as PES, tax breaks, subsidies, or exemptions to support production, infrastructure, and biomass collection and delivery; advocate for subsidies for equipment purchases, equipment rentals, and biochar products, such as soil amendments, construction materials, and other local uses.
  • Advocate for carbon taxes and for restrictions, taxes, or bans on burning crop residue and biomass.
  • Help create or improve robust certification schemes for biochar; include clear governance models, standards for testing, systems and timelines for evaluation, and enforcement and verification mechanisms. 
  • Work with industry to develop products, supply chains, and markets; help coordinate public procurement when possible to help stabilize biochar markets.
  • Participate in community engagement processes; help co-design biochar projects with the local community; ensure community engagement starts early and is transparent, inclusive, and ongoing; solicit feedback from the local community – including from opposition groups – on location, design, finance, and mitigation; ensure finalized projects address sociological, agriculture, and ecological considerations.
  • Ensure projects operating in or with Indigenous communities only do so under FPICt; advocate to codify FPIC into legal systems.
  • Conduct R&D to match biochar production and post-treatment processes that can produce the type of biochar that meet the needs of local soils and/or rice paddies; help collect and share optimal feedstock, production, methods, and application combinations for various soil types.
  • Research other uses for biochar, such as building materials and water treatment; research other land use applications such as flood mitigation in upstream soils.
  • Establish one-stop-shop educational programs that use online and in-person methods to educate the industry and public on regulations, the benefits of biochar, best practices, and other relevant information; ensure the material is sufficient and appropriate for local contexts, paying close attention to language barriers. 
  • Offer demonstration projects at relevant events and venues; work with or advocate to expand agricultural extension services to ensure stakeholders are aware of biochar options, benefits, and incentives.
  • Work with industry to create high-integrity carbon markets that do not allow for deforestation and/or incentivize growing trees or crops solely for the production of biochar.
  • Join, create, or participate in public-private partnerships dedicated to de-risking markets, deployment, technology transfers, education, and other relevant areas.

Further information:

Investors
  • Invest in companies involved in the production biochar; ensure projects include thorough community engagement. 
  • Offer low-interest loans and concessional financing for companies developing biochar production facilities.
  • Invest in green bonds and/or explore blended finance structures to mobilize capital for companies involved in the production of biochar.
  • Align investments with existing public-private partnerships, voluntary agreements, or voluntary guidance that may apply in the location of the investment (including those that apply to biodiversity).

Further information:

Philanthropists and International Aid Agencies
  • Award grants directly to companies involved in biochar production; ensure projects include thorough community engagement. 
  • Offer low-interest loans and concessional financing for companies developing biochar production facilities.
  • Invest in or offer green bonds and/or explore blended finance structures to mobilize capital for companies involved in biochar production.
  • Help operate or establish biochar collection, distribution, production, and/or processing facilities; advocate for government support in these areas when necessary; help ensure production and supply chains remain local to minimize transportation of biomass and biochar products.
  • If relevant, establish long-term procurement contracts with biochar producers; work with local producers to develop products and services.
  • Advocate for and help develop strong regulatory frameworks and streamlined permitting processes; if necessary, suggest revising classification of biochar production systems from incinerators to carbon stabilizers; advocate for funding scientific assessments and convenings needed to develop a robust regulatory framework.
  • Advocate for favorable regulatory frameworks and incentives, such as PES, tax breaks, subsidies, or exemptions to support production, infrastructure, and biomass collection and delivery; advocate for subsidies for equipment purchases, equipment rentals, and biochar products, such as soil amendments, construction materials, and other local uses.
  • Advocate for carbon taxes and for restrictions, taxes, or bans on burning crop residue and biomass.
  • Help create or improve robust certification schemes for biochar – include clear governance models, standards for testing, systems and timelines for evaluation, and enforcement and verification mechanisms. 
  • Work with industry to develop products, supply chains, and markets; help coordinate public procurement when possible to help stabilize biochar markets.
  • Participate in community engagement processes; help co-design biochar projects with the local community; ensure community engagement starts early and is transparent, inclusive, and ongoing; solicit feedback from the local community – including from opposition groups – on location, design, finance, and mitigation; ensure finalized projects address sociological, agriculture, and ecological considerations.
  • Ensure projects operating in or with Indigenous communities only do so under FPIC; advocate to codify FPIC into legal systems.
  • Conduct R&D to match biochar production and post-treatment processes that can produce the type of biochar that meet the needs of local soils and/or rice paddies; help collect and share optimal feedstock, production, methods, and application combinations for various soil types.
  • Research other uses for biochar, such as building materials and water treatment; research other land use applications, such as flood mitigation in upstream soils.
  • Establish one-stop-shop educational programs that use online and in-person methods to educate the industry and public on regulations, the benefits of biochar, best practices, and other relevant information; ensure the material is sufficient and appropriate for local contexts, paying close attention to language barriers. 
  • Offer demonstration projects at relevant events and venues; work with or advocate to expand agricultural extension services to ensure stakeholders are aware of biochar options, benefits, and incentives.
  • Work with industry to create high-integrity carbon markets that do not allow for deforestation and/or incentivize growing trees or crops solely for the production of biochar.
  • Join, create, or participate in public-private partnerships dedicated to de-risking markets, deployment, technology transfers, education, and other relevant areas.

Further information:

Thought Leaders
  • Help operate or establish biochar collection, distribution, production, and/or processing facilities; advocate for government support in these areas when necessary; help ensure production and supply chains remain local to minimize transportation of biomass and biochar products.
  • Advocate for and help develop strong regulatory frameworks and streamlined permitting processes; if necessary, suggest revising classification of biochar production systems from incinerators to carbon stabilizers; advocate for funding necessary scientific assessments and convenings to develop a robust regulatory framework.
  • Advocate for favorable regulatory frameworks and incentives such as PES, tax breaks, subsidies, or exemptions to support production, infrastructure, and biomass collection and delivery; advocate for subsidies for equipment purchases, equipment rentals, and biochar products such as soil amendments, construction materials, and other local uses.
  • Advocate for carbon taxes and for restrictions, taxes, or bans on burning crop residue and biomass.
  • Help create or improve robust certification schemes for biochar – include clear governance models, standards for testing, systems and timelines for evaluation, and enforcement and verification mechanisms. 
  • Work with industry to develop products, supply chains, and markets; help coordinate public procurement when possible to help stabilize biochar markets.
  • Participate in community engagement processes; help co-design biochar projects with the local community; ensure community engagement starts early and is transparent, inclusive, and ongoing; solicit feedback from the local community – including from opposition groups – on location, design, finance, and mitigation; ensure finalized projects address sociological, agriculture, and ecological considerations.
  • Ensure projects operating in or with Indigenous communities only do so under FPIC; advocate to codify FPIC into legal systems.
  • Conduct R&D to match biochar production and post-treatment processes that can produce the type of biochar that meet the needs of local soils and/or rice paddies; help collect and share optimal feedstock, production, methods, and application combinations for various soil types.
  • Research other uses for biochar, such as building materials and water treatment; research other land use applications, such as flood mitigation in upstream soils.
  • Establish one-stop-shop educational programs that use online and in-person methods to educate the industry and public on regulations, the benefits of biochar, best practices, and other relevant information; ensure the material is sufficient and appropriate for local contexts, paying close attention to language barriers. 
  • Offer demonstration projects at relevant events and venues; work with or advocate to expand agricultural extension services to ensure stakeholders are aware of biochar options, benefits, and incentives.
  • Work with industry to create high-integrity carbon markets that do not allow for deforestation and/or incentivize growing trees or crops solely for the production of biochar.
  • Join, create, or participate in public-private partnerships dedicated to de-risking markets, deployment, technology transfers, education, and other relevant areas.

Further information:

Technologists and Researchers
  • Help standardize production and post-treatment processes; identify feedstocks and processes that align with needs such as soil additives, construction material, and water filtration. 
  • Help measure pollutants and GHGs from the biochar production process, including black carbon, methane, and nitrous oxide.
  • Create publicly accessible databases of biochar production processes and products; help model production methods to identify optimal engineering. 
  • Collect and catalog data on biophysical processes, biochar properties, feedstock formulas, application procedures, and biochar supply chains and markets.
  • Investigate potential impacts of biochar use on crops yields and biomass production; impacts on soil carbon stocks; GHG emissions reductions and fluxes; competition for biomass availability; carbon permanence; effects on nature, air quality, and biodiversity; and changes in application of other agricultural inputs such as fertilizers and herbicides.
  • Improve understanding of the role biochar can play in regenerating soils and microbial life.
  • Research and seek to improve the ability of biochar to remove heavy metals, plastics, PFAS, and other contaminants from soils.
  • Run long-term field investigations on the performance of biochar in asphalt and concrete; examine impacts on the urban heat island effect.

Further information:

Communities, Households, and Individuals
  • Explore uses for biochar in your garden or lawn; use biochar building materials or other biochar products.
  • Advocate for and help develop strong regulatory frameworks and streamlined permitting processes; if necessary, suggest revising classification of biochar production systems from incinerators to carbon stabilizers; advocate for funding necessary scientific assessments and convenings to develop a robust regulatory framework.
  • Advocate for favorable regulatory frameworks and incentives such as PES, tax breaks, subsidies, or exemptions to support production, infrastructure, and biomass collection and delivery; advocate for subsidies for equipment purchases, equipment rentals, and biochar products such as soil amendments, construction materials, and other local uses.
  • Advocate for carbon taxes and for restrictions, taxes, or bans on burning crop residue and biomass.
  • Help ensure projects operating in or with Indigenous communities only do so under FPIC; advocate to codify FPIC into legal systems.
  • Participate in community engagement processes; help co-design biochar projects with the local community; ensure community engagement starts early and is transparent, inclusive, and ongoing; solicit feedback from the local community – including from opposition groups – on location, design, finance, and mitigation; ensure finalized projects address sociological, agriculture, and ecological considerations.

Further information:

“Take Action” Sources
Evidence Base

Consensus of effectiveness in sequestering carbon: High

A wide variety of organic feedstocks can be used to produce biochar, mainly from the agricultural and industrial forestry sectors. Converting biomass into biochar using pyrolysis converts a portion of the carbon into a stable form, thereby slowing its release into the atmosphere. When biochar is used as a soil amendmen,t it improves soil fertility by retaining water and nutrients (Woolley & Hallowell, 2018).

The process used to create biochar can have varying efficiencies because the conversion of organic carbon in the feedstock to biochar can range from 30–55% with slow pyrolysis or be as low as 3% with regular combustion (Amonette et al., 2021). In addition, different biomass feedstocks contain different amounts of carbon, which will affect the carbon content of the biochar (Joseph et al., 2021).

Using biochar can also have additional benefits. Biochar can be used as filter material for remediation of soil or water pollution, an additive for composting or anaerobic digestion (Alayaki et al., 2025), or a supplement to concrete and other building materials, packaging, and bio-oils (Russell, 2025).

The results presented in this document summarize findings from 21 reviews and meta-analyses and 17 original studies reflecting current evidence from two countries (the United States and Canada) and from sources examining global biochar production. We recognize this limited geographic scope creates bias, and we hope this work inspires research and data sharing on this topic in underrepresented regions.

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Reduce Crop Residue Burning

Sector
Food, Agriculture, Land & Ocean (FALO)
Mode
Cut Emissions
Cluster
Shift Agriculture Practices
Image
Cornfield with crop residue
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Off
Summary

Crop residues are plant materials left after harvest, such as stalks, leaves, and seed husks. Many farmers burn crop residues in the field, which emits CO₂, , methane, and nitrous oxide. Black carbon – a form of air pollution that contributes to hundreds of thousands of deaths annually– is also produced. This solution avoids the burning of crop residues through the adoption of lower-emission options including straw balers, no-till seeders that can plant through residues, and developing markets for residue products. Some promising new techniques are also under development that could further increase future adoption and effectiveness of this solution.

Income & work,Health
Land resources,Air quality
Description for Social and Search
Reducing crop residue burning is a highly recommended climate solution.
Overview

When left in the field, crop residues improve soil fertility. But when burned, the residues cause serious health problems and reduce air quality. So why do so many farmers burn crop residues? In fields in which multiple crops are sown in succession in the same year, there is often not enough time for residues to decompose before the next crop is sown, making seeding difficult (Dutta et al., 2022). In many countries – including those with vast agricultural sectors, such as India and Indonesia – crop harvesting has become mechanized, but residue removal equipment has not. Low labor availability poses a further challenge, because manual residue removal is highly labor-intensive (Dutta et al., 2022). Meanwhile, a lack of markets and processing infrastructure for residues remains a barrier in many regions as well (Dutta et al., 2022). For many farmers facing the challenges noted above, burning crop residues is often the lowest-cost option (Krishna & Mkondiwa, 2023). 

Crop residue burning produces CO₂, nitrous oxide, and methane (Dong et al., 2019). It also produces black carbon – a form of particulate matter that contributes to climate change and poses very serious health concerns. In India alone, an estimated 600,000 people die each year from air pollution, which is severely impacted by widespread crop residue burning (Krishna & Mkondiwa, 2023). 

There are many alternatives to crop residue burning that produce fewer climate pollutants. One approach leaves residues in the field but circumvents seed planting issues. For example, conservation agriculture and other reduced tillage techniques – described in the Improve Annual Cropping solution – use modern equipment capable of seeding through crop residues without difficulty (Dutta et al., 2022, Kabange et al., 2023). Some promising new techniques can accelerate residue decomposition in the field to facilitate seed planting, though these techniques may generate associated emissions of their own (Krishna & Mkondiwa, 2023). 

Another approach uses straw baling equipment to harvest residues for off-farm uses. In countries with developed markets, residues that are baled or otherwise collected from the field can be used or sold for compost production, bioenergy applications, livestock feed and bedding, natural building materials, feedstock for manufacturing of paper and other products, mushroom growing substrate, and more (Dutta et al., 2022). Given that many climate solutions require biomass feedstocks, there is likely to be mounting competition for this limited resource in the near future, so increasing availability of crop residues via reduced burning is strategically advantageous (Toensmeier & Garrity, 2020).

In this analysis, we assume different approaches for the three primary sources of crop residues: maize, rice, and wheat. For maize and wheat, we assume adoption of no-till seeding equipment; for rice, we assume the use of balers. 

References

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Bhuvaneshwari, S., Hettiarachchi, H., & Meegoda, J. N. (2019). Crop residue burning in India: Policy challenges and potential solutions. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 16(5), 832. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph16050832

Bikkina, S., Andersson, A., Kirillova, E. N., Holmstrand, H., Tiwari, S., Srivastava, A. K., Bisht, D. S., & Gustafsson, Ö. (2019). Air quality in megacity Delhi affected by countryside biomass burning. Nature Sustainability, 2(3), 200–205. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-019-0219-0

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Clapp, J. (2021). Explaining growing glyphosate use: The political economy of herbicide-dependent agriculture. Global Environmental Change, 67, Article 102239. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2021.102239

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Dey, D., Gyeltshen, T., Aich, A., Naskar, M., & Roy, A. (2020). Climate adaptive crop-residue management for soil-function improvement; recommendations from field interventions at two agro-ecological zones in South Asia. Environmental Research, 183, 109164. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envres.2020.109164

Dong, H., MacDonald, J. D., Ogle, S. M., Sanz Sanchez, M. J., & Rocha, M. T. (2019). Agriculture, forestry, and other land use. In E. Calvo Buendia, K. Tanabe, A. Kranjc, J. Baasansuren, M. Fukuda, S. Ngarize, A. Osako, Y. Pyrozhenko, P. Shermanau, & S. Federici (Eds.), 2019 Refinement to the 2006 IPCC guidelines for national greenhouse gas inventories (Vol. 4). Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Link to source: https://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/public/2019rf/vol4.html 

Dutta, A., Patra, A., Hazra, K. K., Nath, C. P., Kumar, N., & Rakshit, A. (2022). A state of the art review in crop residue burning in India: Previous knowledge, present circumstances and future strategies. Environmental Challenges, 8, Article 100581. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envc.2022.100581

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. (n.d.). FAO-FAOSTAT: Food and agriculture data [Data set]. Retrieved December 12, 2025, from Link to source: https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#home 

Fu, B., Chen, L., Huang, H., Qu, P., & Wei, Z. (2021). Impacts of crop residues on soil health: A review. Environmental Pollutants and Bioavailability, 33(1), 164–173. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1080/26395940.2021.1948354

Gupta, S. (2019). Agriculture crop residue burning and its consequences on respiration health of school-going children. Global Pediatric Health, 6, 2333794X19874679. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1177/2333794X19874679

Huang, T., Ma, J., Song, S., Ling, Z., Macdonald, R. W., Gao, H., Tao, S., Shen, H., Zhao, Y., Liu, X., Tian, C., Li, Y., Jia, H., Lian, L., & Mao, X. (2022). Health and environmental consequences of crop residue burning correlated with increasing crop yields midst India’s Green Revolution. Npj Climate and Atmospheric Science, 5(1), 81. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41612-022-00306-x

Jain, N., Bhatia, A., & Pathak, H. (2014). Emission of air pollutants from crop residue burning in India. Aerosol and Air Quality Research, 14(1), 422–430. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.4209/aaqr.2013.01.0031

Kabange, N. R., Kwon, Y., Lee, S.-M., Kang, J.-W., Cha, J.-K., Park, H., Dzorkpe, G. D., Shin, D., Oh, K.-W., & Lee, J.-H. (2023). Mitigating greenhouse gas emissions from crop production and management practices, and livestock: A review. Sustainability, 15(22), Article 15889. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.3390/su152215889

Kaskaoutis, D. G., Kumar, S., Sharma, D., Singh, R. P., Kharol, S. K., Sharma, M., Singh, A. K., Singh, S., Singh, A., & Singh, D. (2014). Effects of crop residue burning on aerosol properties, plume characteristics, and long‐range transport over northern India. Journal of Geophysical Research: Atmospheres, 119(9), 5424–5444. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1002/2013JD021357

Kaur, M., Malik, D. P., Malhi, G. S., Sardana, V., Bolan, N. S., Lal, R., & Siddique, K. H. M. (2022). Rice residue management in the Indo-Gangetic Plains for climate and food security: A review. Agronomy for Sustainable Development, 42(92). Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13593-022-00817-0

Krishna, V. V., & Mkondiwa, M. (2023). Economics of crop residue management. Annual Review of Resource Economics, 15(1), 19–39. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-resource-101422-090019 

Kumar, P., Kumar, S., & Joshi, L. (2015). Socioeconomic and Environmental Implications of Agricultural Residue Burning. Springer India. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-81-322-2014-5

Lan, R., Eastham, S. D., Liu, T., Norford, L. K., & Barrett, S. R. H. (2022). Air quality impacts of crop residue burning in India and mitigation alternatives. Nature Communications, 13(1), 6537. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-022-34093-z

Lorenz, K., & Lal, R. (2018). Carbon sequestration in agricultural ecosystems (1st ed.). Springer. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92318-5 

Nabuurs, G.-J., Mrabet, R., Hatab, A. A., Bustamante, M., Clark, H., Havlík, P., House, J. I., Mbow, C., Ninan, K. N., Popp, A., Roe, S., Sohngen, B., & Towprayoon, S. (2022). Agriculture, forestry and other land uses (AFOLU). In P. R. Shukla, J. Skea, R. Slade, A. Al Khourdajie, R. van Diemen, D. McCollum, M. Pathak, S. Some, P. Vyas, R. Fradera, M. Belkacemi, A. Hasija, G. Lisboa, S. Luz, & J. Malley (Eds.), Climate change 2022: Mitigation of climate change. Contribution of working group III to the sixth assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change (pp. 747–860). Cambridge University Press. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009157926.009 

Prateep Na Talang, R., Na Sorn, W., Polruang, S., & Sirivithayapakorn, S. (2024). Alternative crop residue management practices to mitigate the environmental and economic impacts of open burning of agricultural residues. Scientific Reports, 14(1), 14372. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-024-65389-3

Raza, M. H., Abid, M., Faisal, M., Yan, T., Akhtar, S., & Adnan, K. M. M. (2022). Environmental and health impacts of crop residue burning: Scope of sustainable crop residue management practices. International Journal of Environmental Research for Public Health, 19(8), Article 4753. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph19084753

Sarkar, S., Singh, R. P., & Chauhan, A. (2018). Increasing health threat to greater parts of India due to crop residue burning. The Lancet Planetary Health, 2(8), e327–e328. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/S2542-5196(18)30166-9

Sharma, A. R., Kharol, S. K., K. V. S. Badarinath, & Darshan Singh. (2010). Impact of agriculture crop residue burning on atmospheric aerosol loading – a study over Punjab State, India. Annales Geophysicae, 28(2), 367–379. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.5194/angeo-28-367-2010

Singh, D., Dhiman, S. K., Kumar, V., Babu, R., Shree, K., Priyadarshani, A., Singh, A., Shakya, L., Nautiyal, A., & Saluja, S. (2022). Crop residue burning and its relationship between health, agriculture value addition, and regional finance. Atmosphere, 13(9), Article 1405. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.3390/atmos13091405

Toensmeier, E., & Garrity, D. (2020). The biomass bottleneck. Scientific American, 323(2), 64–72. Link to source: https://www.jstor.org/stable/27411753 

Turmel, M.-S., Speratti, A., Baudron, F., Verhulst, N., & Govaerts, B. (2015). Crop residue management and soil health: A systems analysis. Agricultural Systems, 134, 6–16. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.agsy.2014.05.009

Credits

Lead Fellows 

  • Eric Toensmeier

Contributors

  • Daniel Jasper

  • Ruthie Burrows, Ph.D.

Internal Reviewers

  • James Gerber Ph.D.

  • Sarah Gleeson Ph.D.

  • Paul West, Ph.D.

Effectiveness

We used the IPCC methodology to determine CO₂, methane, and nitrous oxide emissions per metric ton of burning avoided, for the three main crops whose burning is tracked by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO): maize, rice, and wheat. These three crops collectively account for the majority of crop residue burning worldwide (Dong et al., 2019). We then weighted these emissions by the percentage of total burned residues that each crop represents. 

  • For methane, 0.06 t CO₂‑eq is reduced per metric ton of avoided burning of crop residues in GWP-100, and 0.18 t CO₂‑eq in GWP-20. 
  • For nitrous oxide, 0.02 t CO₂‑eq is reduced per metric ton of avoided burning of crop residues in both GWP-100 and GWP-20.
  • For CO₂, 1.27 t CO₂‑eq is reduced per metric ton of avoided burning of crop residues in both GWP-100 and GWP-20. We note that many estimates of emissions from crop residue burning do not include CO₂ because it is in balance with CO₂ removals through crop growth. We chose to include it here to ensure consistency with analysis of solutions related to biofuels. However, this approach makes the results of our analysis less comparable with national GHG inventories. 
  • The combined GWP-100 GHG total (CO₂,  nitrous oxide, and methane) is 1.34 t CO₂‑eq per metric ton of avoided burning. For GWP-20, the combined GHG total is 1.47. 

Note that we do not account for emissions stemming from alternative activities, such as the use of fuel for straw balers.

Table 1. Effectiveness at reducing emissions.

Unit: t CO₂‑eq /t burning avoided, 100-yr basis

Methane 0.06
Nitrous oxide 0.02
CO₂ 1.27
Combined total 1.34

Unit: t CO₂‑eq /t burning avoided, 20-yr basis

Methane 0.18
Nitrous oxide 0.02
CO₂ 1.27
Combined total 1.47
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Cost

Agricultural financial data are generally reported in land units (US$/ha/yr). In this analysis, we convert these units to US$/t of crop residues using standard t residue/ha values from the IPCC Guidelines (Aalde et al., 2006). 

For baseline rice, we assume the initial cost to be US$0.0/t because rice production is already established. Profit per hectare is based on regional figures from Damania et al. (2023), with a weighted average of US$82.5/t. Because initial cost is zero, net cost is US$82.5/t. Initial cost of reduced rice straw burning is based on purchase of rice baling equipment, assuming each baler serves 500 ha. The initial cost is US$4.55/t, profit is US$87.3/t, and net cost is –US$87.3/t.

For wheat, we assume adoption of no-till seeders, an important strategy to reduce burning given that it permits planting into crop residues (Dutta et al., 2022, Kabange et al., 2023, Kaur et al., 2022). The cost is based on purchase of a no-till seeder. Baseline initial cost is US$0.00/t. Profit per hectare is based on regional figures from Damania et al. (2023). Baseline profit is US$7.69/t and net cost is –US$7.69/t. No-till wheat’s initial cost is US$2.32/t, profit is US$40.7/t, and net cost is –US$43.0/t.

For maize, we assume no-till seeders, as for wheat. The prices per metric ton are different because of different values for t/ha of residue from IPCC (Dong et al., 2019). The cost is based on purchase of a no-till seeder. Baseline initial cost per metric ton is US$0.0. Profit per hectare is based on regional figures from Damania et al. (2023); profit is US$7.69/t, and net cost is –US$7.69/t. No-till maize’s initial cost is US$0.93/t. Profit is US$16.20/t, and net cost is –US$17.2/t.

We used a weighted average based on total t burned globally. Baseline initial values are US$0.0/t, profits are US$25.1/t, and net cost is –US$25.1/t. For reduced burning, the weighted initial cost is US$2.0/t, profit is US$3.4/t, and net cost is –US$38.8/t. 

Finally, cost per metric ton CO₂ is –US$10.2/t CO₂‑eq. Note that these are costs to the farmer; including the negative costs of health improvements and environmental benefits associated with reduced burning would make the practice even more economically desirable. See table 2.

Table 2. Cost per unit of climate impact.

Unit: 2023 US$/t CO₂‑eq , 100-yr basis

Median -10.2
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Methods and Supporting Data

Methods and Supporting Data

Learning Curve

Learning curve data are not available for reduced crop residue burning. However, it is likely that learning curves do exist for the baling and no-till seeding equipment modeled.

Speed of Action

Speed of action refers to how quickly a climate solution physically affects the atmosphere after it is deployed. This is different from speed of deployment, which is the pace at which solutions are adopted.

At Project Drawdown, we define the speed of action for each climate solution as emergency brake, gradual, or delayed.

Reduce Crop Residue Burning is an EMERGENCY BRAKE climate solution. It has the potential to deliver a more rapid impact than gradual and delayed solutions. Because emergency brake solutions can deliver their climate benefits quickly, they can help accelerate our efforts to address dangerous levels of climate change. For this reason, they are a high priority.

Caveats

Caveats such as additionality and permanence do not apply to reduced crop residue burning.

Current Adoption

Because the amount of crop residues burned each year globally is on the rise, we have not quantified current adoption (FAO, n.d.). From 2002–2022, residues burned increased 22% (67 Mt). See Table 3.

Table 3. Current adoption level.

Unit: t of crop residue burning avoided

Median (50th percentile) not determined
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Adoption Trend

We used FAO data showing metric tons burned for each year by country, for the three crops – maize, rice, and wheat – that account for the majority of burning (FAO, n.d.). We compared this to metric tons of those crops produced each year, and calculated the ratio of metric tons burned to metric tons produced, to make sure that reduced production of those crops did not appear as reduced burning. We express this as the “burn ratio,” which is metric tons of residues burned over total metric tons of residues produced.

During the past 20 years, the total metric tons of crop residues burned per year has increased, even as the percent of residues burned has decreased. This is because the total amount of crop residues has grown as the total cropping area – and crop yields per hectare – have increased. 

Adoption Ceiling

French Polynesia, Haiti, and Cameroon share the lowest burn ratios (ratio of metric tons of residue burned to metric tons of crops produced). Each country burns only 1% of crop residues. We have chosen this rate of 99% of residues unburned as our adoption ceiling. Applying this 99% reduction to our total metric tons burned per year provides an adoption ceiling of 364 Mt of burning avoided per year. See Table 4.

Table 4. Adoption ceiling.

Unit: Mt of crop residue burning avoided/yr

Median (50th percentile) 364
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Achievable Adoption

The FAO (n.d.) found that Turkmenistan has the highest percent reduction of total crop residue burning of any country, with 77.8% over a 20-year period – a reduction of 18,900 t. We use Turkmenistan’s rate of reduction as our Achievable – High level of adoption. Note that other countries had higher total metric tonnage of burning avoided – with South Africa at the highest, at 894,000 t of burning avoided, but this was a smaller percent reduction than that of Turkmenistan. Applying Turkmenistan’s rate to the total global amount burned would provide a reduction of 287 Mt/yr.

While total global metric tons of crop residues burned is increasing, the burn rate decreased 23% between 1998–2002 and 2018–2022. We used this global average reduction rate of 23% for our Achievable – Low level of adoption. Applying this rate to the total global amount burned would provide a reduction of 85 Mt/yr. See Table 5.

Table 5. Range of achievable adoption levels.

Unit: Mt of avoided crop residue burning/yr

Current adoption 0
Achievable – low 85
Achievable - high 287
Adoption ceiling 364
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The GHG climate impact of current adoption is 0.00 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr for all cases because current adoption is not determined (Table 6a–d). 

The GHG climate impact for Achievable – Low adoption is 0.11 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr (100-yr basis). The climate impact for Achievable – High adoption is 0.39 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr (100-yr basis). The climate impact for the Adoption Ceiling is 0.49 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr (100-yr basis). See Table 6a.

Meanwhile, climate impacts for GWP-20 at Achievable – Low adoption levels in GWP-20 are 0.12 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr, while climate impacts for GWP-20 at Achievable – High adoption levels in GWP-20 are 0.42 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr. Climate impacts for GWP-20 for the Adoption Ceiling in GWP-20 are 0.53 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr. See Table 6b.

Table 6. Climate impact at different levels of adoption.

Unit: GtCO₂‑eq/yr

Current adoption 0.00
Achievable – low 0.11
Achievable – high 0.39
Adoption ceiling 0.49

Unit: GtCO₂‑eq/yr

Current adoption 0.00
Achievable – low 0.12
Achievable – high 0.42
Adoption ceiling 0.53
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Additional Benefits

Income and Work

Sustainable crop residue management can not only reduce morbidity and mortality, but also significantly reduce health costs associated with crop residue burning (Raza et al., 2022). Farmers can increase revenues by adopting alternative practices that use crop residues instead of burning them, such as selling residues or producing biochar or bio-oils (Na Talang et al., 2024). 

Health

Poor air quality stemming from crop residue burning is harmful to health, and has demonstrably contributed to premature mortality in Southeast Asia (Lan et al., 2022). Air pollution from burning crop residue has been linked to eye irritation, headaches, nausea, skin irritation, allergies, respiratory infections, increased risk of lung cancer, and reduced lung function (Gupta, 2019; Huang et al., 2022; Raza et al., 2022). During burning season, farmers have reported increased severity of chronic illnesses as well as poorer productivity at work due to illness (Raza et al., 2022). Exposure to air pollution is particularly harmful for children because it can harm their development; Gupta et al. (2019) found that children living near agricultural fields had poorer lung function during periods of crop burning.

Land Resources

Crop residue burning can significantly degrade soils because burning leads to a loss of nutrients – especially nitrogen – that might otherwise be retained in the soil (Bhuvaneshwari et al., 2019). For example, in areas in northern India where crop residue burning is common, soils have very low nitrogen content compared with those in other regions of the country where crop burning is less common (Kumar et al., 2015). Burning also raises soil temperatures, which can kill beneficial microorganisms (Bhuvaneshwari et al., 2019). 

Studies have found that retaining crop residue on agricultural fields can benefit soil quality, soil organic carbon, soil moisture, nutrient cycling, and soil retention (Fu et al., 2021; Turmel et al., 2015). In experimental field sites in India and Bhutan, crop residue was used as mulch rather than burned, and agricultural production subsequently increased 36–64% (Dey et al., 2020).

Air Quality

Crop residue burning is a major source of air pollution because it generates fine particulate matter, CO₂, and carbon monoxide across regions such as South and Southeast Asia, and especially in countries including India, Pakistan, Nepal, and Bangladesh (Jain et al., 2014; Kaskaoutis et al., 2014; Lan et al., 2022; Na Talang et al., 2024; Sharma et al., 2010, Singh et al., 2022). The burning of rice straw is often the largest contributor to air pollution, followed by wheat straw, sugarcane, and corn (Jain et al., 2014; Na Talang et al., 2024). In India, crop residue burning is most common in northern states such as Punjab, Haryana, and Uttar Pradesh (Sakar et al., 2018). Because fine particulate matter and black carbon constitute a large percentage of the pollution, crop residue burning can trigger poor air quality hundreds of kilometers away from agricultural fields (Kaskaoutis et al., 2014). In fact, several studies have found that crop residue burning in northern India threatens the air quality throughout the country – especially in Delhi, the densely populated capital region (Bikkina et al., 2019; Lan et al., 2022; Sarkar et al., 2018).

Risks

For rice – mechanically harvesting of residues for off-farm use risks losses of soil fertility. There is also a risk that harvested residues will be burned off-farm, producing the same emissions and health concerns as on-field residue burning. (Dutta et al.,2022; Krishna and Mkondiwa, 2023; Raza et al., (2022); Singh et al., 2022. 

We assume wheat and maize production shifts to retaining residue in fields and subsequently uses no-till seeding equipment to plant through the residues. Risks associated with this practice include increased herbicide use (Clapp, 2021). 

Interactions with Other Solutions

Reinforcing

This solution increases the supply of crop residues. In turn, this makes more raw material available for the following solutions:

Dashboard

Solution Basics

t of crop residue burning avoided

t CO₂-eq (100-yr)/unit
1.34
units/yr
Current Not Determined 08.5×10⁷2.87×10⁸
Achievable (Low to High)

Climate Impact

Gt CO₂-eq (100-yr)/yr
Current 0 0.110.39
US$ per t CO₂-eq
-10
Emergency Brake

CO₂,  CH₄ , N₂O

Trade-offs

To maintain soil organic carbon levels, it is necessary to retain half of crop residues on the field. This practice applies to maize, rice, and wheat (Lorenz & Lal, 2018).

Action Word
Reduce
Solution Title
Crop Residue Burning
Classification
Highly Recommended

Lawmakers and Policymakers
  • Set national targets for reducing crop burning and incorporate them into planning documents, such as Nationally Determined Contributions.
  • Consult with farmers, businesses, and the public to determine the best way to reduce crop residue burning.
  • Use disincentives and incentives to stop crop residue burning, such as bans coupled with subsidies, no-interest loans, and educational programs.
  • Ensure bans are effectively enforced, but make sure that they are not the sole means of action.
  • Make sure subsidy programs are simple, disburse quickly, provide significant, practical assistance for farmers, and empower farmers to choose how they reduce burning. 
  • Work with businesses to ensure they don’t raise prices after introducing subsidies, using price caps if necessary and appropriate.
  • Collaborate with equipment rental companies to strengthen services, improve infrastructure, and apply financial incentives, such as subsidies to rentals.
  • Ensure educational programs provide ongoing technical support and offer farmers access to local academics and scientists.
  • Amend legislation and regulations that may inadvertently incentivize crop burning; allow farmers greater flexibility in selecting crops and choosing planting times.
  • Enhance infrastructure and education around alternatives to burning crop residue, such as composting, baling, mulching, introducing microorganisms, incorporating residue into the soil, or other off-field applications, such as animal feed or biochar.
  • Invest in R&D to find innovative uses for crop residue and identify the most impactful interventions at the local level.
  • Invest in R&D to develop applications for crop residue in building materials, such as cement mixes, insulation, and paper products; build out the infrastructure for these programs, if optimal.
  • Work with the private sector to develop markets for crop residue in order to limit burning.
  • Create model farms to demonstrate techniques, conduct experiments, and educate local farmers with regard to alternatives to crop residue burning.
  • Implement government programs that can collect and/or manage crop residue at no cost to farmers.
  • Join, create, or participate in partnerships or certification programs dedicated to the sustainable use of crop residue.

Further information:

Practitioners
  • View crop residue as a valuable output – and potential direct or indirect revenue source – rather than as a waste product.
  • Avoid burning crop residue, and find alternative methods for using residue, such as composting, mulching, introducing microorganisms, incorporating residue into the soil, or other off-field applications, such as biochar.
  • Engage with policymakers and advocate for policy and legal changes to facilitate crop residue burning alternatives.
  • Take advantage of financial incentives, such as tax rebates and subsidies, that advance alternatives to crop residue burning.
  • Collaborate with the private sector to develop markets for crop residue in order to limit burning.
  • Work with policymakers and private organizations to strengthen data collection related to crop residue quantities and feasible alternatives to burning.
  • Explore options for crop residue use, such as anaerobic digesters, and work with policymakers and businesses to form relevant partnerships to advance these alternatives to crop residue burning.
  • Help revise existing – or create new – high-integrity carbon markets, institutions, rules, and norms to grow demand for high-quality carbon credits.
  • Join, create, or participate in partnerships or certification programs dedicated to the sustainable use of crop residue.

Further information:

Business Leaders
  • Work with agricultural supply chain sources to ensure partners employ, measure, and report on methods to reduce burning crop residue.
  • Integrate the reduction of burning crop residue into supply chain targets and policies.
  • Prioritize and monitor suppliers who commit to eliminate or reduce crop residue burning.
  • Do not raise prices on farmers if your products or services are subsidized. 
  • Help innovate uses for crop residue, develop markets, and promote products that offer alternatives to burning. 
  • Educate consumers about the importance of finding alternative uses for crop residue.
  • Enter into offtake agreements for crop residue with alternative uses, as well as for crop residue derivative products.
  • Offer financial services – including low-interest loans, microfinancing, and grants – to support alternatives to burning crop residue.
  • Help revise existing – or create new – high-integrity carbon markets, institutions, rules, and norms for crop residue.
  • Invest in companies that develop technologies supporting alternatives to crop residue burning, such as equipment, circular supply chains, and consumer products.
  • Fund startups that aim to improve markets for crop residue, develop innovative applications for the material, or improve crop residue removal practices.
  • Invest in R&D to develop applications for crop residue in building materials, such as cement mixes, insulation, and paper products; build out the infrastructure for these programs, if optimal.
  • Work with farmers, policymakers, and private organizations to strengthen data collection related to crop residue quantities and feasible alternatives to burning.
  • Engage with policymakers to make the case for policy and legal changes that can facilitate adoption of alternatives to crop burning.
  • Join, create, or participate in partnerships or certification programs dedicated to the sustainable use of crop residue.

Further information:

Nonprofit Leaders
  • Work with farm owners to ensure partners employ methods to reduce burning crop residue, if relevant.
  • Manage and operate government programs to collect and manage crop residue.
  • Consult with farmers, policymakers, businesses, and the public to determine the best way to reduce crop residue burning at the local level.
  • Start cooperatives that provide or rent equipment and/or services for crop residue management.
  • Create model farms to demonstrate techniques, conduct experiments, and educate local farmers with regard to alternatives to crop residue burning.
  • Help revise existing – or create new – high-integrity carbon markets, institutions, rules, and norms for crop residue.
  • Engage with businesses to encourage corporate responsibility and/or monitor agriculture supply chains.
  • Help innovate uses for crop residue, develop markets, and promote products that offer alternatives to burning. 
  • Engage with policymakers to make the case for policy and legal changes that can facilitate adoption of alternatives to crop burning.
  • Educate farmers, policymakers, businesses, and consumers about the importance of using crop residue.
  • Manage local extension programs or implement government programs that collect and/or manage crop residue, at no cost to farmers.
  • Work with farmers, policymakers, and other private organizations to strengthen data collection on crop residue quantities and feasible alternatives to burning.
  • Join, create, or participate in partnerships or certification programs dedicated to the sustainable use of crop residue.

Further information:

Investors
  • Ensure relevant portfolio companies use alternatives to crop burning; place pressure on noncompliant portfolio companies.
  • Enter into offtake agreements for crop residue or associated products.
  • Offer financial services – including low-interest loans, microfinancing, and grants – to support alternatives to burning crop residue.
  • Invest in companies developing technologies that support alternatives to crop residue burning, such as equipment, circular supply chains, and consumer products.
  • Fund start-ups that aim to improve markets for crop residue, develop innovative applications for the material, or improve crop residue removal practices.
  • Invest in R&D to develop applications for crop residue in building materials, such as cement mixes, insulation, and paper products; build out the infrastructure for these programs, if optimal.
  • Join, create, or participate in partnerships or certification programs dedicated to the sustainable use of crop residue.

Further information:

Philanthropists and International Aid Agencies
  • If relevant, work with agricultural supply chain sources to ensure partners employ various methods to reduce crop residue burning.
  • Enter into offtake agreements for crop residue or associated products.
  • Offer financial services – including low-interest loans, micro-financing, and grants – to support alternatives to burning crop residue.
  • Invest in companies developing technologies that support alternatives to crop residue burning, such as equipment, circular supply chains, and consumer products.
  • Fund startups that aim to improve markets for crop residue, develop innovative applications for the material, or improve crop residue removal practices.
  • Invest in R&D to develop applications for crop residue in building materials, such as cement mixes, insulation, and paper products; build out the infrastructure for these programs, if optimal.
  • Manage and operate government programs to collect and manage crop residue.
  • Conduct robust consultations with farmers, policymakers, businesses, and the public to determine the best way to reduce burning crop residue at the local level.
  • Start cooperatives that provide equipment and/or services for crop residue management.
  • Create model farms to demonstrate techniques, conduct experiments, and educate local farmers with regard to alternatives to crop residue burning.
  • Help revise existing – or create new – high-integrity carbon markets, institutions, rules, and norms for crop residue.
  • Engage with businesses to encourage corporate responsibility and/or monitor agriculture supply chains.
  • Help innovate uses for crop residue, develop markets, and promote products that offer alternatives to burning. 
  • Engage with policymakers to make the case for policy and legal changes that can facilitate adoption of alternatives to crop burning.
  • Educate farmers, policymakers, businesses, and consumers about the importance of using crop residue.
  • Manage local extension programs or implement government programs that collect and/or manage crop residue, at no cost to farmers.
  • Work with farmers, policymakers, and other private organizations to strengthen data collection on crop residue quantities and feasible alternatives to burning.
  • Join, create, or participate in partnerships or certification programs dedicated to the sustainable use of crop residue.

Further information:

Thought Leaders
  • Start cooperatives that provide equipment and/or services for crop residue management.
  • Create model farms to demonstrate techniques, conduct experiments, and educate local farmers with regard to alternatives to crop residue burning.
  • Engage with businesses to encourage corporate responsibility and/or monitor agriculture supply chains.
  • Engage with policymakers to make the case for policy and legal changes that can facilitate alternatives to crop burning.
  • Help develop markets for crop residue and promote products that offer alternatives to burning. 
  • Educate farmers, policymakers, businesses, and consumers about the importance of using crop residue.
  • Help innovate uses for crop residue, develop markets, and promote products that offer alternatives to burning. 
  • Help revise existing – or create new – high-integrity carbon markets, institutions, rules, and norms for crop residue.
  • Work with farmers, policymakers, and other private organizations to strengthen data collection on crop residue quantities and feasible alternatives to burning.
  • Join, create, or participate in partnerships or certification programs dedicated to the sustainable use of crop residue.

Further information:

Technologists and Researchers
  • Quantify estimates of crop residue by geography and differentiate data by full or partial burning.
  • Research organic no-till methods of cultivation to retain residue in-field without herbicide use.
  • Create tracking and monitoring software to support farmers' decision-making for planting, real-time market information, and locally available services.
  • Research potential applications of AI and robotics to achieve optimal uses for crop residue, considering factors such as local soil quality and markets.
  • Improve data and analytics to monitor available crop residue, assist farmers in residue management, support policymaking, and assess the impacts of policies.
  • Research and develop innovative uses of crop residue, particularly in Africa, where data is currently lacking.
  • Research the impact of interventions in specific geographies and identify the most impactful means of reducing crop residue burning.
  • Research crop residue use for enzyme production and refine the process to make it scalable and easily accessible to farmers.
  • Develop verifiable carbon credits using technology such as blockchain to improve the integrity of carbon markets.

Further information:

Communities, Households, and Individuals
  • Buy produce from farms that use their crop residue in alternative ways, or ask merchants to supply these products to increase demand.
  • Educate farmers, policymakers, businesses, and consumers about the impact of crop residue burning at the local level – especially if it impacts you or your community.
  • Engage with businesses to encourage corporate responsibility and/or monitor agriculture supply chains.
  • Work with farmers, policymakers, and other private organizations to strengthen data collection on crop residue quantities and feasible alternatives to burning.
  • Engage with policymakers to make the case for policy and legal changes that can facilitate adoption of alternatives to crop burning.
  • Join, create, or participate in partnerships or certification programs dedicated to the sustainable use of crop residue.

Further information:

“Take Action” Sources
Evidence Base

Consensus of effectiveness in reducing GHG emissions: High 

There is high consensus on the effectiveness and potential of reducing crop residue burning. The 2019 Refinement to the 2006 U.N. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories provides clear formulas to calculate the impact of crop residue burning as well as the impact of limiting the practice (Dong et al., 2019). With the latest IPCC chapter on agricultural mitigation identifying crop residue burning as an important driver of global warming, advancing viable alternatives to the practice is vital (Nabuurs et al., 2022). Overviews of the alternatives to crop residue burning are provided by Dutta e. al. (2022), Krishna and Mkondiwa (2023), Singh et al. (2022), and Raza et al. (2022). 

The results presented in this analysis summarize findings from five reviews and meta-analyses reflecting current evidence at the global scale. Nonetheless, not all countries are represented. We recognize this limited geographic scope creates bias, and hope this work inspires research and data sharing on this topic in underrepresented regions. 

Updated Date
Coming Soon Label
Coming Soon

Improve Diets

Sector
Food, Agriculture, Land & Ocean (FALO)
Mode
Cut Emissions
Cluster
Curb Growing Demands
Image
Plates of food
Coming Soon
Off

Key Takeaways

  • Reducing beef consumption to one serving per week could reduce GHG emissions and improve health outcomes. 
  • Beef and lamb are especially emissions-intensive because ruminant animals emit methane, a powerful GHG, during digestion.
  • Producing beef and other red meat generates 30% of food-related GHG emissions but provides only 5% of global dietary calories. 
  • If everyone in high and middle-income countries reduced beef to one serving a week – and ate any other protein-rich food instead – up to 2.8 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr of GHG emissions could be avoided.
Summary

Agriculture produces about 12 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr, or 21% of total human-caused GHG emissions (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], 2023). Animal agriculture contributes more than half of these emissions (Halpern et al., 2022; Poore and Nemecek, 2018). 

Ruminant animals, such as cattle, sheep, and goats produce methane – a GHG with 80 times the warming potential of CO₂ in the near term – in their digestive system (Jackson et al., 2024). Since agriculture is the leading driver of tropical deforestation, particularly for cattle and animal feed production, reducing ruminant meat consumption can avoid additional forest loss and associated GHG emissions.

We define improved diets as a reduction in ruminant meat consumption and a replacement with other protein-rich foods. Such a diet shift can be adopted incrementally through small behavioral changes that together lead to globally significant reductions in GHG emissions.

Food security,Health,Equality
Nature protection,Land resources,Water resources,Water quality,Air quality
Description for Social and Search
Improve Diets is a Highly Recommended climate solution. Reducing ruminant meat consumption reduces methane production and pressure to destroy tropical forests.
Overview

Reducing ruminant meat consumption, especially in high-consuming regions, has a globally significant potential for climate change mitigation. Red meat production (including beef, lamb, and pork) contributes 30% of food-related emissions but generates only 5% of global dietary calories (Li et al., 2024). 

Ruminant animals have digestive systems with multiple chambers that allow them to ferment grass and leaves. However, this digestion generates methane emissions through a process called enteric fermentation. In addition, clearing forests and grasslands for pastures and cropland to feed livestock emits CO₂, and livestock manure emits methane and nitrous oxide. 

In 2019, an international team of scientists called the EAT-Lancet Commission developed benchmarks for a healthy, sustainable diet based on peer-reviewed information on human health and environmental sustainability (Willett et al., 2019). The commission estimated that red meat (beef, lamb, and pork) should be limited to 14 grams (30 calories) per day per person, or 5.1 kg/person/yr. Although the EAT-Lancet diet includes pork, our analysis looked specifically at limiting ruminant meat to 5.1 kg/person/yr because it has much higher GHG emissions than pork (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Greenhouse gas emissions associated with the production of protein-rich foods. Beef has the highest emissions per kilogram. These emissions data are from Poore & Nemecek (2018), with the exception of  "Ruminant meat," which was calculated based on the amount of beef and lamb consumed in 2022. 

Poore, J., &  Nemecek, T. (2018). Reducing food’s environmental impacts through producers and consumers. Science, 360(6392), 987–992.

In this solution, we explored reducing ruminant meat consumption in middle- and high-income countries in which consumption exceeds 5.1 kg/person/yr. Furthermore, our analysis assumed ruminant meat is replaced with approximately the same amount of protein-rich plant- or animal-based foods, which are estimated to be about 20% protein by weight (Poore and Nemecek, 2018).

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Norwood, F. B., & Lusk, J. L. (2011). Compassion, by the pound: The economics of farm animal welfare. Oxford University Press. Link to source: https://global.oup.com/academic/product/compassion-by-the-pound-9780199551163?cc=ca&lang=en& 

Pan, A., Sun, Q., Bernstein, A. M., Schulze, M. B., Manson, J. E., Willett, W. C., & Hu, F. B. (2011). Red meat consumption and risk of type 2 diabetes: 3 cohorts of US adults and an updated meta-analysis. The American Journal of Clinical Nutrition, 94(4), 1088–1096. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.3945/ajcn.111.018978

Pan, A., Sun, Q., Bernstein, A. M., Schulze, M. B., Manson, J. E., Stampher, M. J., Willett, W. C., & Hu, F. B. (2012). Red meat consumption and mortality: Results from 2 prospective cohort studies. Archives of Internal Medicine, 172(7), 555–563. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1001/archinternmed.2011.2287

Pimentel, D., & Pimentel, M. (2003). Sustainability of meat-based and plant-based diets and the environment. The American Journal of Clinical Nutrition, 78(3), 660S–663S. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1093/ajcn/78.3.660S

Poore, J., & Nemecek, T. (2018) Reducing food’s environmental impacts through producers and consumers. Science, 360(6392), 987–992. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aaq0216

Porter, S., & Cox, C. (2020, May 28). Manure overload: Manure plus fertilizer overwhelms Minnesota’s land and water. Environmental Working Group. Link to source: https://www.ewg.org/interactive-maps/2020-manure-overload/

Ripple, W. J., Smith, P., Haberl, H., Montzka, S. A., McAlpine, C., & Boucher, D. H. (2014a). Ruminants, climate change and climate policy. Nature Climate Change, 4(1), 2–5. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2081

Ripple, W. J., Estes, J. A., Beschta, R. L., Wilmers, C. C., Ritchie, E. G., Hebblewhite, M., Berger, J., Elmhagen, B., Letnic, M., Nelson, M. P., Schmitz, O. J., Smith, D. W., Wallach, A. D., & Wirsing, A. J. (2014b). Status and ecological effects of the world’s largest carnivores. Science, 343(6167), Article 1241484. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1241484

Ripple, W. J., Newsome, T. M., Wolf, C., Dirzo, R., Everatt, K. T., Galetti, M., Hayward, M. W., Kerley, G. I. H., Levi, T., Lindsey, P. A., Macdonald, D. W., Malhi, Y., Painter, L. E., Sandom, C. J., Terborgh, J., & Van Valkenburgh, B. (2015). Collapse of the world’s largest herbivores. Science Advances, 1(4), Article e1400103. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1126/sciadv.1400103

Searchinger, T., Waite, R., Hanson, C., Ranganathan, J., Dumas, P., Matthews, E., & Klirs, C. (2019). Creating a sustainable food future: A menu of solutions to feed nearly 10 billion people by 2050 [Report]. World Resources Institute. Link to source: https://research.wri.org/wrr-food

Sinha, R., Cross, A. J., Graubard, B. I., Leitzmann, M. F., & Schatzkin, A. (2009). Meat intake and mortality: A prospective study of over half a million people. Archives of Internal Medicine, 169(6), 562–571. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1001/archinternmed.2009.6

Springmann, M., Clark, M. A., Rayner, M., Scarborough, P., & Webb, P. (2021). The global and regional costs of healthy and sustainable dietary patterns: A modelling study. The Lancet Planetary Health, 5(11), e797–e807. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/S2542-5196(21)00251-5 

Steinfeld, H., Gerber, P., Wassenaar, T., Castel, V., Rosales, M., & de Haan, C. (2006). Livestock’s long shadow: Environmental issues and options [Report]. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Link to source: https://www.fao.org/4/a0701e/a0701e00.htm 

Sun, J., Liao, X.-P., D’Souza, A. W., Boolchandani, M., Li, S.-H., Cheng, K., Luis Martínez, J., Li, L., Feng, Y.-J., Fang, L.-X., Huang, T., Xia, J., Yu, Y., Zhou, Y.-F., Sun, Y.-X., Deng, X.-B., Zeng, Z.-L., Jiang, H.-X., Fang, B.-H., … Liu, Y.-H. (2020). Environmental remodeling of human gut microbiota and antibiotic resistome in livestock farms. Nature Communications, 11(1), Article 1427. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-15222-y

Tang, K. L., Caffrey, N. P., Nóbrega, D. B., Cork, S. C., Ronksley, P. E., Barkema, H. W., Polachek, A. J., Ganshorn, H., Sharma, N., Kellner, J. D., & Ghali, W. A. (2017). Restricting the use of antibiotics in food-producing animals and its associations with antibiotic resistance in food-producing animals and human beings: A systematic review and meta-analysis. The Lancet Planetary Health, 1(8), e316–e327. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/S2542-5196(17)30141-9

Toumpanakis, A., Turnbull, T., & Alba-Barba, I. (2018). Effectiveness of plant-based diets in promoting well-being in the management of type 2 diabetes: A systematic review. BMJ Open Diabetes Research & Care, 6(1), Article e000534. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1136/bmjdrc-2018-000534

Van Boeckel, T. P., Brower, C., Gilbert, M., Grenfell, B. T., Levin, S. A., Robinson, T. P., Teillant, A., & Laxminarayan, R. (2015). Global trends in antimicrobial use in food animals. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 112(18), 5649–5654. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1503141112 

Vergnaud, A.-C., Norat, T., Romaguera, D., Mouw, T., May, A. M., Travier, N., Luan, J., Wareham, N., Slimani, N., Rinaldi, S., Couto, E., Clavel-Chapelon, F., Boutron-Ruault, M.-C., Cottet, V., Palli, D., Agnoli, C., Panico, S., Tumino, R., Vineis, P., … Peeters, P. H. M. (2010). Meat consumption and prospective weight change in participants of the EPIC-PANACEA study. The American Journal of Clinical Nutrition, 92(2), 398–407. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.3945/ajcn.2009.28713

Westhoek, H., Lesschen, J. P., Rood, T., Wagner, S., De Marco, A., Murphy-Bokern, D., Leip, A., van Grinsven, H., Sutton, M. A., & Oenema, O. (2014). Food choices, health and environment: Effects of cutting Europe’s meat and dairy intake. Global Environmental Change, 26, 196–205. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2014.02.004

Willett, W., Rockström, J., Loken, B., Springmann, M., Lang, T., Vermeulen, S., Garnett, T., Tilman, D., DeClerck, F., Wood, A., Jonell, M., Clark, M., Gordon, L. J., Fanzo, J., Hawkes, C., Zurayk, R., Rivera, J. A., De Vries, W., Majele Sibanda, L., ... Murray, C. J. L. (2019). Food in the Anthropocene: The EAT–Lancet Commission on healthy diets from sustainable food systems. The Lancet, 393(10170), 447–492. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0140-6736(18)31788-4

Willits-Smith, A., Odinga, H., O’Malley, K., & Rose, D. (2023). Demographic and socioeconomic correlates of disproportionate beef consumption among US adults in an age of global warming. Nutrients, 15(17), Article 3795. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.3390/nu15173795 

Credits

Lead Fellows

  • Emily Cassidy

Contributors

  • Ruthie Burrows, Ph.D.
  • James Gerber, Ph.D.
  • Daniel Jasper
  • Alex Sweeney

Internal Reviewers

  • Paul C. West, Ph.D.
  • James Gerber, Ph.D.
  • Megan Matthews, Ph.D
  • Ted Otte
Effectiveness

We estimated that replacing 1 kg of ruminant meat with the same weight of other meat or protein-rich food reduces emissions by about 0.065 t CO₂‑eq (100-yr basis). 

We derived GHG emissions from 1 kg of ruminant meat, 0.075 t CO₂‑eq (100-yr basis), from Poore and Nemecek’s (2018) database and modeling from Kim et al. (2020). Our calculation was based on the GHG footprint of a kg of meat from beef cattle, dairy cattle, and sheep. We weighted the average GHG footprint based on the fact that beef makes up the majority (83%) of ruminant meat consumption, with sheep meat making up a smaller proportion (17%), according to data from the United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Food Balances (FAO, 2025).

From Poore and Nemecek’s database, we also derived the average GHG emissions from consuming 1 kg of other protein-rich foods in place of ruminant meat. These foods were: pig meat (pork), poultry meat, eggs, fish (farmed), crustaceans (farmed), peas, other pulses, groundnuts, nuts, and tofu, which are all around 20% protein by weight. Using FAO data on food availability in 2022 as a proxy for consumption, we calculated that the weighted average of these substitutes is 0.01 t CO₂‑eq /kg. 

We subtracted the weighted average emissions of these protein-rich foods (0.01 t CO₂‑eq /kg) from the weighted average emissions from ruminant meat production (0.075 t CO₂‑eq /kg) to calculate the emissions savings (0.065 t CO₂‑eq /kg) (Table 1). Our analysis assumed that substituting a serving of plant- or animal-based protein for ruminant meat reduces the production of that meat (see Caveats). 

Kim et al. (2020) did not provide species-specific emissions, but we assumed that for ruminant meat, the breakdown of CO₂, nitrous oxide, and methane was the same as in Poore and Nemecek (2018) – 43% methane and 57% CO₂ and nitrous oxide. 

Table 1. Effectiveness at reducing emissions.

Unit: t CO₂‑eq /kg avoided ruminant meat

Mean (weighted average) 0.065

Unit: t CO₂‑eq /kg avoided ruminant meat

Mean (weighted average) 0.13
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Cost

Based on our analysis, the average cost of 1 kg of ruminant meat was US$21.29 compared with the weighted average US$20.73 for other protein-rich foods. This resulted in a savings of US$0.56/kg of food. This translates to an estimated savings of US$8.54/t CO₂ eq (Table 2).

Since the publication of the EAT-Lancet Commission's dietary benchmarks, several studies have been published on the affordability of shifting to the diet (Gupta et al., 2021; Hirvonen et al., 2020; Li et al., 2024; Springmann et al., 2021). Research findings have been mixed on whether this diet shift reduces costs for consumers. One modeling study found that while the diet may cost less in upper-middle-income to high-income countries, on average, it may be more expensive in lower-middle-income to low-income countries (Springmann et al., 2021). 

As opposed to the EAT-Lancet commission, our analysis focused solely on the shift from ruminant meat toward other protein-rich foods, which doesn’t include other dietary shifts, such as reducing other kinds of meat, reducing dairy, or increasing fruits and vegetables. We found no published evidence on the economic impacts of the shift away from ruminant meat alone. However, we used data from Bai et al. (2020), which used food price data from the World Bank’s International Comparison Program (ICP) (2011), to estimate cost differences between ruminant meat and substitutes.

We converted these prices into 2023 US$ and calculated a weighted average cost of food substitutes, based on food availability from the FAO Food Balances (2025). 

The limited information used for this estimate can create bias, and we hope this work inspires research and data sharing on the economic impact of reduced ruminant consumption.

Table 2. Cost per unit climate impact. Negative values reflect cost savings.

Unit: 2023 US$/t CO₂‑eq , 100-year basis

Mean -8.54
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Methods and Supporting Data

Methods and Supporting Data

Learning Curve

Improve Diets does not have a learning curve associated with falling costs of adoption. This solution does not address synthetically derived animal products, such as lab-grown meat, which could serve as replacements for ruminant meat. See Advance Cultivated Meat for more information

Speed of Action

Speed of action refers to how quickly a climate solution physically affects the atmosphere after it is deployed. This is different from speed of deployment, which is the pace at which solutions are adopted.

At Project Drawdown, we define the speed of action for each climate solution as emergency brake, gradual, or delayed.

Improve Diets is an EMERGENCY BRAKE climate solution. It has the potential to deliver a more rapid impact than nominal and delayed solutions. The impact of this solution is two-fold: first, it reduces methane from enteric fermentation and manure management. Second, the solution reduces pressure on natural ecosystems, reducing deforestation and other land use changes, which create a large, sudden “pulse” of CO₂ emissions.

Because emergency brake solutions can deliver their climate benefits quickly, they can help accelerate our efforts to address dangerous levels of climate change. For this reason, they are a high priority.

Caveats

We did not include Low-Income Food-Deficit countries (FAO, 2023) in this analysis because the solution does not apply to people who do not have access to affordable and healthy alternatives to ruminant meat or those with micronutrient deficiencies. 

Although some amino acids, which are building blocks of protein, are present in lower-than-optimal proportions for human needs in some plant-based foods, mixing plant protein sources, as is typically done in vegetarian diets, can address deficiencies (Mariotti & Gardner, 2019).

Additionality is a concern for this solution. While ruminant meat consumption in middle- to high-income countries remained fairly stable between 2010 and 2022, some high-income countries have recently started reducing their ruminant consumption (see Adoption Trends). However, it’s difficult to determine current adoption and trends from national-level statistics, which average out low and high consumers within a country.

Another consideration is that the decision to eat less ruminant meat will ultimately lead farmers to produce fewer ruminant animals, but the substitution may not be one-to-one. For example, one modeling study found that cutting beef consumption by 1 kg may only reduce beef production by 0.7 kg (Norwood & Lusk, 2011).

Humans use more land for animal agriculture than for any other activity. However, the potential to remove and store carbon from the atmosphere by freeing up the land used in food production, as estimated by Mbow et al. (2019), was not included in this analysis.

Current Adoption

Household-level data on food consumption are limited and not often comparable. In this analysis, we summarized current levels of food consumption on a national level, based on data on food availability from FAO Food Balances (2025). Because the data are averaged at a country level, we couldn’t estimate the current level of adoption for individuals of reduced ruminant meat consumption or the EAT-Lancet diet. 

The EAT-Lancet recommended threshold of 5.1 kg of ruminant meat per person per year is in edible, retail weight. However, available data on per capita food availability from the FAO Food Balances is measured in carcass weight, which, for beef cattle, is about 1.4 times larger than a retail cut of meat. Therefore, in this analysis, we set the threshold of excess consumption in the Food Balances as greater than 7.2 kg carcass weight per person per year, which is 5.1 kg of retail ruminant meat per person per year.

In 110 of the 146 countries tracked by FAO, average annual consumption was more than 5.1 kg of ruminant meat per person per year. Some of the highest consuming nations include Mongolia (70.1 kg/person/yr), Argentina (33.3 kg/person/yr), the United States (27.5 kg/person/yr), Australia (25.3 kg/person/yr), and Brazil (25 kg/person/yr). 

The 36 high- and middle-income countries with low (<5.1 kg/person/year) ruminant meat consumption include India (2 kg/person/yr), Peru (3.6 kg/person/yr), Poland (0.2 kg/person/yr), Vietnam (3.9 kg/person/yr), and Indonesia (2.4 kg/person/yr). 

Adoption Trend

Ruminant meat consumption in high- and middle-income countries remained fairly stable between 2010 and 2022, according to data from FAO’s Food Balances, increasing only 3% overall from 8.2 to 8.5 kg/person/yr.

However, per capita ruminant meat consumption across high-consuming regions (the Americas, Europe, and Oceania) decreased. Consumption in South America and North America declined by 13% and 2%, respectively. Europe and Oceania saw the greatest declines, at 18% and 38%, respectively.

Adoption Ceiling

The adoption ceiling for this solution is the amount of total ruminant meat consumption across all 146 high- and middle-income countries tracked by the FAO. In 2022, the consumption of ruminant meat totaled 81.2 billion kg (Table 3).

Table 3. Adoption ceiling.

Unit: kg avoided ruminant meat/yr

Estimate 81,200,000,000
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Achievable Adoption

If all of the 110 countries consuming more than the EAT-Lancet recommendation cut consumption to 5.1 kg/person/yr (which is about an 85 g serving of ruminant meat every six days), that would lower annual global ruminant meat consumption by about half (53%), or 42.9 billion kg/yr. We used this as the estimated high achievable adoption value. The low achievable adoption value we estimated to be half of this reduction (26%), or 21.4 billion kg/yr (Table 4). 

Table 4. Range of achievable adoption levels.

Unit: kg avoided ruminant meat/yr

Current adoption Not Determined
Achievable – low 21,400,000,000
Achievable – high 42,900,000,000
Adoption ceiling 81,200,000,000
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Improving diets by reducing ruminant meat consumption globally could mitigate emissions by 1.4–5.3 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr (Table 5). 

Therefore, reducing ruminant meat consumption and replacing it with any other form of plant or animal protein can have a substantial impact on GHG emissions. Such a diet shift can be adopted incrementally with small behavioral changes that together lead to globally significant reductions in GHG emissions.

Table 5. Climate impact at different levels of adoption.

Unit: Gt CO₂‑eq/yr

Current adoption Not Determined
Achievable – low 1.40
Achievable – high 2.80
Adoption ceiling 5.30

Unit: Gt CO₂‑eq/yr

Current adoption Not Determined
Achievable – low 2.88
Achievable – high 5.76
Adoption ceiling 10.90
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Additional Benefits

Food Security

Reducing ruminant meat in diets of high-income countries can improve food security (Searchinger et al., 2019). Productive cropland that is used to grow animal feed could instead be used to produce food for human consumption (Ripple et al., 2014a).

Health

Reducing ruminant meat consumption has multiple health benefits. Diets high in red meat have been linked to increased risk of overall mortality and mortality from cancer (Pan et al., 2012; Sinha et al., 2009). Excess red meat consumption is also associated with increased risk of cardiovascular disease, stroke, type 2 diabetes, colorectal cancer, and weight gain (Bouvard et al., 2015; Bradbury et al., 2020; Kaluza et al., 2012; Pan et al., 2011; Vergnaud et al., 2010). Diets that incorporate other sources of protein such as fish, poultry, nuts, legumes, low-fat dairy, and whole grains are associated with a lower risk of mortality and a reduction in dietary saturated fat, and can improve the management of diabetes (Pan et al., 2012; Nelson et al., 2016; Toumpanakis et al., 2018). 

Reducing demand for meat also has implications for health outcomes associated with livestock production. Animal agriculture, especially industrial and confined feeding operations, commonly uses antibiotics to prevent and treat infections in livestock (Casey et al., 2013). Consistent direct contact with livestock exposes people, especially farmworkers, to antibiotic-resistant bacteria, which can lead to antibiotic-resistant health outcomes (Sun et al., 2020; Tang et al., 2017). Moreover, these exposures are not limited to farmworkers. In fact, a study in Pennsylvania found that people living near dairy/veal and swine industrial agriculture had a higher risk of developing methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) infections (Casey et al., 2013).

Equality

A lower demand for ruminant meat could promote environmental justice by reducing the amount of industrial animal agriculture operations. This may benefit communities near these operations by reducing exposure to air and water pollution, pathogens, and odors (Casey et al., 2013; Heederik et al., 2007; Steinfeld et al., 2006).

Nature Protection

Agricultural expansion for livestock production is a major driver of deforestation (Ripple et al., 2014b). Deforestation is associated with biodiversity loss through habitat degradation and destruction, as well as forest fragmentation (Steinfeld et al., 2006). Livestock farming can reduce the diversity of landscapes and can contribute to the loss of large carnivore, herbivore, and bird species (Ripple et al., 2015; Steinfeld et al., 2006). The clearing of forests for animal agriculture is especially prevalent in the tropics, and a lower demand for meat, particularly ruminant meat, could reduce tropical deforestation (Ripple et al., 2014b).

Land Resources

Animal agriculture, especially ruminants such as cattle, requires a lot of land (Nijdam et al., 2012). Life-cycle analyses have found that beef consistently requires the most land use among animal-based proteins (Nijdam et al., 2012; Meier & Christen, 2013; Searchinger et al., 2019). This high land use is mostly due to the amount of land needed to grow crops that eventually feed livestock (Ripple et al., 2014a). In the European Union, Westhoek et al. (2014) estimated that halving consumption of meat, dairy, and eggs would result in a 23% reduction in per capita cropland use.

Water Resources

While livestock is directly responsible for a small proportion of global water usage, a significant amount of water is required to produce forage and grain for animal feed (Steinfeld et al., 2006). In the United States, livestock production is the largest source of freshwater consumption, and producing 1 kg of animal protein uses 100 times more water than 1 kg of grain protein (Pimentel & Pimentel, 2003). Ruminant meats have some of the highest water usage rates of all animal protein sources (Kim et al., 2020; Searchinger et al., 2019; Steinfed et al., 2006).

Water Quality

Livestock production can contribute to water pollution directly and indirectly through feed production and processing (Steinfeld et al., 2006). Manure contains nutrients such as nitrogen and phosphorus, as well as drug residues, heavy metals, and pathogens (Steinfeld et al., 2006). Manure can pollute water directly from feedlots and can also leach into water sources when used as a fertilizer on croplands (Porter & Cox, 2020). For example, animal agriculture is one of the top polluters of water basins in central California (Harter et al., 2012) 

Air Quality

In addition to CO₂, ruminant agriculture is a source of air pollutants such as methane, nitrous oxides, ammonia, and volatile organic compounds (Gerber et al., 2013). Fertilization of feed crops and deposition of manure on crops are the primary sources of nitrogen emissions from ruminant agriculture (Steinfeld et al., 2006). Air pollution in nearby communities can lead to poor odors and respiratory issues, which may affect stress levels and quality of life (Domingo et al., 2021; Heederik et al., 2007).

Risks

A total replacement of ruminant meat with other food may reduce food availability in arid climates, where ruminants graze on land not suitable for crop production. 

While the shift from ruminant meat consumption to chicken and pork would curtail some of the demand for animal feed, it would not be reduced as much as a shift from ruminants to plant-based foods. 

Interactions with Other Solutions

Reinforcing

Pastures for grazing ruminants occupy 3400 million ha of land, more than any other human activity (Foley et al., 2011). Curtailing ruminant consumption can significantly reduce demand for land and facilitate the protection of carbon-rich ecosystems. If the adoption of this solution is aggressive, it could open up opportunities for the restoration of land-based ecosystems and some coastal wetlands.

This solution increases the supply of food. This makes more raw material available to increase the adoption potential of the following solutions:

(mixed) Reducing ruminant consumption could lead to less manure production and, therefore, nutrient pollution in proximal and downstream receiving ecosystems. However, if ruminant meat is replaced with food sources that generate more manure or require more fertilizer/pesticides, pollution could increase in proximal or downgradient receiving ecosystems.

Reducing ruminant meat consumption can reduce the amount of nutrients and manure available to manage, depending on whether it is substituted with plant-based foods or other meat.

Dashboard

Solution Basics

kg avoided ruminant meat

t CO₂-eq (100-yr)/unit
0.065
units/yr
Current Not Determined 02.14×10¹⁰4.29×10¹⁰
Achievable (Low to High)

Climate Impact

Gt CO₂-eq (100-yr)/yr
Current Not Determined 1.42.8
US$ per t CO₂-eq
-9
Emergency Brake

CO₂, CH₄ , N₂O

Trade-offs

There are climate and environmental trade-offs associated with the production of different kinds of protein. Producing ruminant meat is land-intensive and contributes to the conversion of natural ecosystems to pasture and animal feed. However, ruminants can live on land that is too dry for crop production and graze on plants not suitable for human consumption. In some low-income food-insecure countries (not included in this analysis), grazing animals may be an important source of protein. 

Substituting ruminant meat with chicken, fish, or other meat can substantially reduce methane emissions, but comes with some environmental and animal welfare trade-offs. 

kg/person/yr
0-10
10–20
20–30
30–40
> 40

Per capita ruminant meat consumption

Per capita ruminant meat consumption varies greatly around the world. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), Mongolia had the highest per-person ruminant meat consumption (99 kg/person/yr) in 2022, followed by Argentina (47 kg/person/yr) and Turkmenistan (46 kg/person/yr).

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). (2025). FAO‑FAOSTAT: Food balances (2010–) [Data set, food balances for individual countries for the year 2022]. Retrieved March 25, 2025, from Link to source: https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/FBS

kg/person/yr
0-10
10–20
20–30
30–40
> 40

Per capita ruminant meat consumption

Per capita ruminant meat consumption varies greatly around the world. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), Mongolia had the highest per-person ruminant meat consumption (99 kg/person/yr) in 2022, followed by Argentina (47 kg/person/yr) and Turkmenistan (46 kg/person/yr).

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). (2025). FAO‑FAOSTAT: Food balances (2010–) [Data set, food balances for individual countries for the year 2022]. Retrieved March 25, 2025, from Link to source: https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/FBS

Maps Introduction

The emissions intensity of beef production varies considerably between countries, due to the contribution of regional deforestation and other land changes (Kim et al. 2020; Poore and Nemecek, 2018) and the intensity of different cattle raising systems, with extensive, pasture-based systems relatively less efficient (in terms of land and CO₂‑eq /kg beef) (Herrero et al. 2016). For example, GHG emissions per kilogram of bovine meat from Brazil and Paraguay were five and 17 times higher, respectively, than those of Danish bovine meat (Kim et al. 2020). These differences were attributable to higher deforestation for grazing lands and methane emissions from enteric fermentation.

Emissions from beef production are skewed by producers with particularly high impacts. About a quarter of beef producers contribute more than 56% (an estimated 1.3 Gt CO₂‑eq ) of all GHGs attributable to beef cattle production.

Beef consumption per person in Mongolia and North and South America is especially high, and reducing it can benefit human health (see Benefits to People & Nature). According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), Mongolia had the highest per-person ruminant meat consumption (99 kg/person/yr) in 2022, followed by Argentina (47 kg/person/yr) and Turkmenistan (46 kg/person/yr). 

For this analysis, we examined high- and middle-income countries that consume more than 5.1 kg/person/yr of ruminant meat (what we define as “excess consumption”). The United States has more excess ruminant meat consumption than any other country. A 2023 assessment of health survey data found that in the United States, about 12% of the population ate about half of all beef supplies (Willits-Smith et al., 2023).

Maps are based on global average emissions per kg of ruminant meat, which keeps the focus on consumption.

Action Word
Improve
Solution Title
Diets
Classification
Highly Recommended

Lawmakers and Policymakers
  • Use a comprehensive approach to improving diets including both “hard” (e.g., regulations) and “soft” (e.g., educational programs) policies.
  • Ensure public procurement avoids ruminant meat and favors plant-rich diets as the default, especially in schools, hospitals, and cafeterias for public workers.
  • Require companies that sell food to the government to disclose Scope 3 supply-chain emissions and adopt science-based targets, including a no-deforestation commitment.
  • Develop national dietary guidelines based on health and environmental factors; ensure the guidelines are integrated throughout procurement policies, public education programs, and government food aid programs.
  • Establish coordination bodies with stakeholders, such as farmers, distributors, storage facilities, food processors, transportation companies, retail, and waste management services, to design the most optimal policy package.
  • Set ambitious local, national, and international goals and climate plans to improve diets and include the agricultural sector in emissions reduction targets.
  • Establish safety nets for growers, such as access to grants or low-interest capital, reliable access to price information, early warning systems for price fluctuations, and insurance programs.
  • Use financial instruments such as grants, subsidies, or tax exemptions to support farmers, producers, start-ups, infrastructure, and related technology.
  • Reallocate subsidies for ruminant animal agriculture to alternatives; provide extensive support to farmers and ranchers transitioning to more sustainable agriculture systems through financial assistance, buyout programs, and education programs.
  • Remove or reconfigure other subsidies that artificially deflate the price of meat, such as animal feed and manure storage facilities.
  • Require carbon footprint labels on food and produce.
  • Limit or prohibit the expansion of agricultural lands, especially for animal agriculture.
  • Restrict advertising for unhealthy foods and/or require disclosures for health and environmental impacts for adverts.
  • Work with the health-care industry to integrate plant-rich diets into public health programs, and educate the public on the benefits of plant-rich diets.
  • Expand extension services to help food retailers develop plant-based items, design menus, develop marketing materials, and provide other assistance to improve the profitability of plant-rich diets.
  • Implement a carbon tax on livestock or meat products in food-secure areas and ensure there is proper monitoring and enforcement capacity.
  • Use zoning laws to give plant-based and healthy food outlets better visibility or higher traffic locations; designate favorable spaces for plant-based food trucks and street vendors.
  • Create robust educational programs for schools and adults on plant-based and healthy cooking.
  • Create, support, or join education campaigns and/or public-private partnerships that teach the importance of plant-based diets and the environmental impacts of common foods.

Further information:

Practitioners
  • Scale up production of nutrient-dense plant-based foods.
  • Create peer-to-peer networks to exchange best practices and local or industry troubleshooting tips.
  • Increase the visibility of plant-based diets through repetitive ad campaigns, product placement, and displays.
  • Design menus to avoid ruminant meat and center plant-based products.
  • Invest in R&D to improve plant-based products.
  • Develop culturally relevant plant-based products to support acceptance and uptake.
  • Develop mobile or web apps that help consumers plan and cook plant-based meals, find plant-based retailers, and learn about plant-rich diets.
  • Take advantage of financial incentives such as grants, subsidies, or tax exemptions.
  • Participate or help establish coordination bodies with stakeholders, such as farmers, distributors, storage facilities, food processors, transportation companies, retail, and waste management services, to design the most optimal food systems transformation.
  • Work with the health-care industry to integrate plant-rich diets into public health programs, and educate the public on the benefits of plant-rich diets.
  • Use labels to show the environmental and emissions impact of food and menu items.
  • Hold local plant-based culinary challenges to promote products and services.
  • Create, support, or join education campaigns and/or public-private partnerships that promote plant-rich diets.

Further information:

Business Leaders
  • Establish company goals for ruminant substitution and incorporate them into corporate net-zero strategies.
  • Ensure company procurement avoids ruminant meat and favors plant-rich diets as the default.
  • Participate in or help establish coordination bodies with stakeholders, such as farmers, distributors, storage facilities, food processors, transportation companies, retail, and waste management services, to design the most optimal food systems transformation.
  • Take advantage of financial incentives such as grants, subsidies, or tax exemptions.
  • Offer financial services, including low-interest loans, micro-financing, and grants, to support initiatives promoting plant-rich diets.
  • Use labels to show the environmental and emissions impact of food and menu items.
  • Increase the visibility of plant-based diets through repetitive ad campaigns, product placement, and displays.
  • Fund start-ups or existing companies that are improving plant-based proteins and alternatives to animal agriculture.
  • Develop mobile or web apps that help consumers plan and cook plant-based meals, find plant-based retailers, and learn about plant-rich diets.
  • Hold local plant-based culinary challenges to promote products and services.
  • Create, support, or join education campaigns and/or public-private partnerships that promote plant-rich diets.
  • Include ruminant-free and plant-rich dietary support in employee wellness and benefits programs.

Further information:

Nonprofit Leaders
  • Ensure organization procurement avoids ruminant meat and favors plant-rich diets.
  • Help develop and advocate for ambitious local, national, and international goals and climate plans to improve diets.
  • Participate or help establish coordination bodies with stakeholders, such as farmers, distributors, storage facilities, food processors, transportation companies, retail, and waste management services, to design the most optimal food systems transformation.
  • Advocate to reallocate subsidies for ruminant agriculture to plant-based alternatives.
  • Advocate for financial instruments such as taxes, subsidies, or exemptions to support farmers, producers, start-ups, infrastructure, and related technology.
  • Advocate for standardized and mandatory carbon footprint labels on food and produce.
  • Advocate for a carbon tax on livestock or meat products in food-secure areas and ensure there is proper monitoring and enforcement capacity.
  • Offer comprehensive training and technical assistance programs for farmers and producers supporting plant-rich diets.
  • Implement campaigns promoting divestment from major animal agriculture polluters and challenge misleading claims on high-emissions meat products.
  • Work with the health-care industry to integrate plant-rich diets into public health programs, and educate the public on the benefits of plant-rich diets.
  • Create demonstration farms to show local examples, strategies to generate income, and how to use government programs.
  • Create robust educational programs for schools and adults on plant-based and healthy cooking.
  • Hold local plant-based culinary challenges to promote plant-rich diets.
  • Create, support, or join education campaigns and/or public-private partnerships that promote plant-rich diets.

Further information:

Investors
  • Ensure relevant portfolio companies avoid ruminant meat production and support plant-rich diets; avoid investing in animal agriculture in high-income countries or work with them to transition to plant-rich alternatives.
  • Invest in companies developing plant-based foods or technologies that support processing, such as equipment, transportation, and storage.
  • Fund start-ups or existing companies that are improving plant-based proteins and alternatives to animal agriculture.
  • Offer financial services, including low-interest loans, micro-financing, and grants, for plant-based food initiatives.
  • Participate or help establish coordination bodies with stakeholders, such as farmers, distributors, storage facilities, food processors, transportation companies, retail, and waste management services, to design the most optimal food systems transformation.
  • Create, support, or join education campaigns and/or public-private partnerships that promote plant-rich diets.

Further information:

Philanthropists and International Aid Agencies
  • Ensure organization procurement avoids ruminant meat and favors plant-rich diets.
  • Help develop and advocate for ambitious local, national, and international goals and climate plans to improve diets.
  • Participate or help establish coordination bodies with stakeholders, such as farmers, distributors, storage facilities, food processors, transportation companies, retail, and waste management services, to design the most optimal food systems transformation.
  • Invest in companies developing plant-based foods or technologies that support processing, such as equipment, transportation, and storage.
  • Fund start-ups or existing companies that are improving plant-based proteins and alternatives to ruminant animal agriculture.
  • Offer financial services, including low-interest loans, micro-financing, and grants, for plant-based food initiatives.
  • Advocate to reallocate subsidies for animal agriculture to plant-based alternatives.
  • Advocate for financial instruments such as taxes, subsidies, or exemptions to support plant-based farmers, producers, start-ups, infrastructure, and related technology.
  • Advocate for standardized and mandatory environmental impact labels on food and produce.
  • Advocate for a carbon tax on livestock or meat products in food-secure areas and ensure there is proper monitoring and enforcement capacity.
  • Offer comprehensive training and technical assistance programs for farmers and producers supporting plant-rich diets.
  • Create demonstration farms to show local examples, strategies to generate income, and how to use government programs.
  • Create robust educational programs for schools and adults on plant-based and healthy cooking.
  • Work with the health-care industry to integrate plant-rich diets into public health programs and educate the public on the benefits of plant-rich diets.
  • Integrate plant-rich diets with ecosystem protection and restoration efforts such as education campaigns, national plans, and international agreements, when relevant.
  • Create, support, or join education campaigns and/or public-private partnerships that promote plant-rich diets.

Further information:

Thought Leaders
  • Help develop and advocate for ambitious local, national, and international goals and climate plans to improve diets.
  • Participate or help establish coordination bodies with stakeholders, such as farmers, distributors, storage facilities, food processors, transportation companies, retail, and waste management services, to design the most optimal local food systems transformation.
  • Help shift policy and academic goals around agriculture from quantity of outputs to nutritional quality of outputs.
  • Help market and brand plant-based items appealing to average and/or conventional tastes.
  • Find new ways to appeal to high-red-meat consumers and new markets – particularly, men and athletic communities.
  • Highlight the social and environmental impacts of animal-based products in high-income countries.
  • Design and implement robust educational programs for schools and adults on plant-based and healthy cooking.
  • Advocate to reallocate subsidies for animal agriculture to plant-based alternatives.
  • Advocate for financial instruments such as taxes, subsidies, or exemptions to support plant-based farmers, producers, start-ups, infrastructure, and related technology.
  • Advocate for standardized and mandatory carbon footprint labels on food and produce.
  • Create, support, or join education campaigns and/or public-private partnerships that promote plant-rich diets.

Further information:

Technologists and Researchers
  • Research connections between plant-based agriculture and human well-being indicators such as nutrition, income, and human rights.
  • Develop new or improve existing plant-based or lab-grown alternatives to ruminant meat and other animal-based proteins.
  • Develop plant-based proteins that account for local supply chains and cultural preferences.
  • Analyze the full suite of interventions that encourage plant-based diets and offer recommendations to policy and lawmakers on the most effective options.
  • Use market data on food purchases and preferences to improve marketing and attractiveness of plant-based options.
  • Develop mobile or web apps that help consumers plan and cook plant-based meals, find plant-based retailers, and learn about plant-rich diets.
  • Research connections between plant-rich diets, food security, cultural cuisine preferences, and health indicators.
  • Help develop national dietary guidelines based on health and environmental factors.

Further information:

Communities, Households, and Individuals
  • Eat plant-rich diets and avoid ruminant meat as much as possible.
  • Offer alternatives to ruminant meat at social gatherings and request plant-based options at public events.
  • Talk to family, friends, and coworkers about avoiding beef; recommend your favorite restaurants, recipes, and cooking tips.
  • Support educational programs for schools and adults on plant-based and healthy cooking.
  • Advocate to reallocate subsidies for animal agriculture to plant-based alternatives.
  • Advocate for financial instruments such as taxes, subsidies, or exemptions to support plant-based farmers, producers, start-ups, infrastructure, and related technology.
  • Create, support, or join education campaigns and/or public-private partnerships that promote plant-rich diets.

Further information:

“Take Action” Sources
Evidence Base

Consensus of effectiveness in reducing ruminant meat: High

There is a high level of consensus in the scientific literature that shifting diets away from ruminant meat mitigates GHG emissions. An IPCC special report on land found “broad agreement” that meat – particularly ruminant meat – was the single food with the greatest impact on the environment on a global basis, especially in terms of GHG emissions and land use (Mbow et al., 2019). The IPCC found that the range of cumulative emissions mitigation from diet shifts by 2050, depending on the type of shift, was as much as 2.7–6.4 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr. This estimate included shifts away from all meat, whereas our analysis focused on shifting away from ruminant meat alone.

The emissions associated with the production of different food products in this solution came from Poore and Nemecek (2018) and Kim et al. (2020). Poore and Nemecek developed a database of emissions footprints for different foods based on a meta-analysis of 570 studies with a median reference year of 2010 (Figure 1). It covers ~38,700 commercially viable farms in 119 countries and 40 products representing ~90% of global protein and calorie consumption. 

According to Poore and Nemecek (2018), producing 1 kg of beef emits 33 times the GHGs emitted by producing protein-rich plant-based foods, such as beans, nuts, and lentils. But beef can also be replaced with any other non-ruminant meat (poultry, pork, or fish) to cut emissions. Substituting ruminant meat with any other kind of meat reduces average emissions by roughly 85%.

A 2024 study on dietary emissions from 140 food products in 139 countries found that shifting consumption toward the EAT-Lancet guidelines could reduce emissions from the food system 17%, or about 1.94 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr (Li, Y. et al., 2024). 

The results presented in this document summarize findings from 42 studies (34 academic reviews and original studies, three reports from NGOs, and five reports from public and multilateral organizations). The results reflect current evidence from 119 countries, but observations are concentrated in Europe, North America, Oceania, Brazil, and China, and limited in Africa and parts of Asia. We recognize this limited geographic scope creates bias, and hope this work inspires research and data sharing on this topic in underrepresented regions.

Updated Date
Coming Soon Label
Coming Soon

Manage Oil & Gas Methane

Sector
Other Energy
Mode
Cut Emissions
Cluster
Cut Fugitive Emissions
Image
Oil wells and flame coming from flare stack
Coming Soon
On
Summary

Oil and gas methane management is the process of reducing methane emissions from oil and gas (O&G) supply chains. These supply chains release methane when pipes and other system parts leak or methane is intentionally vented for operation and safety reasons. We define the Manage Oil & Gas Methane solution as adopting approaches to reduce methane emissions, including fixing leaks in components, upgrading control equipment, changing procedures, and destroying methane by burning methane as a fuel or in flares.

Health
Air quality
Description for Social and Search
Manage Oil & Gas Methane is a Highly Recommended climate solution. It reduces methane emissions, and destroying methane by burning methane as a fuel or in flares.
Overview

Methane can be unintentionally released due to imperfections and faults along the supply chain or intentionally released as part of operations and maintenance. Atmospheric methane has a GWP of 81 over a 20-yr time basis and a GWP of 28 over a 100-yr time basis (IPCC, 2023). This means methane is 81 times more effective at trapping heat than CO₂.  Because methane is a short-lived climate pollutant that has a much stronger warming effect than CO₂ over a given time period, abating methane will have a relatively large near-term impact on slowing global climate change (IEA, 2023b).

The first step to reduce methane releases from O&G production is to identify where releases occur along the supply chain. Many occur during O&G extraction as methane is either intentionally vented or unintentionally emitted. The International Energy Agency (IEA, 2024) estimated more than 60% of global energy-related methane emissions originated from the O&G sector in 2023, with the remaining emissions mostly coming from coal use and some bioenergy (Figure 1). The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) has formed a transparency and accountability initiative whose members are responsible for 42% of global O&G production. It reported that activities involved in exploration and processing of O&G accounted for 83% of total reported O&G emissions from 2020 to 2023, with production processes being responsible for 90% of those emissions (UNEP 2024). Alvarez et al. (2018) found that in the United States, more than 58% of O&G methane emissions came from production and about 20% came from extraction in 2015. 

Figure 1. Methane emissions (kt) from energy sources (IEA, 2025).

Source: International Energy Agency. (2025). Methane tracker: Data tools. https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/data-tools/methane-tracker 

O&G producers can reduce their methane emissions by preventing its release or by converting it to CO₂ through combustion. Strategies for reducing O&G methane emissions can be put into three broad categories (Climate & Clean Air Coalition [CCAC], 2021):

Device conversion, replacement, and installation is the practice of fixing leaks in pipes, valves, compressors, pumps, and other equipment. This can include converting natural gas–powered devices to electric, driving compressors/pneumatics with air instead of natural gas, or replacing emitting components with non-emitting ones (Pembina Institute, 2024).

Changes to operations and maintenance practices seek to reduce the intentional venting of methane. They include eliminating the need for blow-down (releasing gases during the maintenance or operation of pipe infrastructure), reducing venting, and capturing methane before it is released into the atmosphere, then using it as fuel for product refining or burning it to convert it into CO₂.

Leak detection and repair (LDAR) is the practice of regularly monitoring for methane leaks and modifying or replacing leaking equipment. 

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Project Drawdown. (2024, May 29). Unsung (climate) hero: The business case for curbing methane | presented by Stephan Nicoleau [video]. YouTube. Link to source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y5y0i-RMfJ0 

Ramya, A., Dhevagi, P., Poornima, R., Avudainayagam, S., Watanabe, M., & Agathokleous, E. (2023). Effect of ozone stress on crop productivity: A threat to food security. Environmental Research, 236(2), 116816. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envres.2023.116816 

Ravikumar, A. P., & Brandt, A. R. (2017). Designing better methane mitigation policies: The challenge of distributed small sources in the natural gas sector. Environmental Research Letters, 12(4), 044023. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/aa6791

Rissman, J. (2021). Benefits of the build back better act’s methane fee. Energy Innovation. Link to source: https://energyinnovation.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Benefits-of-the-Build-Back-Better-Act-Methane-Fee.pdf 

Sampedro, J., Waldhoff, S., Sarofim, M., & Van Dingenen, R. (2023). Marginal damage of methane emissions: Ozone impacts on agriculture. Environmental and Resource Economics, 84(4), 1095-1126. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-022-00750-6 

Schiffner, D., Kecinski, M., & Mohapatra, S. (2021). An updated look at petroleum well leaks, ineffective policies and the social cost of methane in Canada’s largest oil-producing province. Climatic Change, 164(3-4). Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-021-03044-w

Schmeisser, L., Tecza, A., Huffman, M., Bylsma, S., Delang, M., Stanger, J., Conway, TJ, and Gordon, D. (2024). Fossil Fuel Operations Sector: Oil and Gas Production and Transport Emissions [Data set]. RMI, Climate TRACE Emissions Inventory. Retrieved April 18, 2025, from Link to source: https://climatetrace.org 

Shindell, D., Sadavarte, P., Aben, I., Bredariol, T. O., Dreyfus, G., Höglund-Isaksson, L., Poulter, B., Saunois, M., Schmidt, G. A., Szopa, S., Rentz, K., Parsons, L., Qu, Z., Faluvegi, G., & Maasakkers, J. D. (2024). The methane imperative. Frontiers. Link to source: https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/science/articles/10.3389/fsci.2024.1349770/full

Smith, C., Nicholls, Z. R. J., Armour, K., Collins, W., Forster, P., Meinshausen, M., Palmer, M. D., & Watanabe, M. (2021). The earth’s energy budget, climate feedbacks, and climate sensitivity supplementary material (climate change 2021: The physical science basis. Contribution of working group I to the sixth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change). Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Link to source: https://www.ipcc.ch/ 

Tai, A. P., Sadiq, M., Pang, J. Y., Yung, D. H., & Feng, Z. (2021). Impacts of surface ozone pollution on global crop yields: Comparing different ozone exposure metrics and incorporating co-effects of CO2. Frontiers in Sustainable Food Systems, 5, 534616. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.3389/fsufs.2021.534616 

Tradewater. (2023). Methane. Retrieved August 16, 2024, from Link to source: https://www.ogci.com/progress-report/building-towards-net-zero 

Tran, H., Polka, E., Buonocore, J. J., Roy, A., Trask, B., Hull, H., & Arunachalam, S. (2024). Air quality and health impacts of onshore oil and gas flaring and venting activities estimated using refined satellite‐based emissions. GeoHealth, 8(3), e2023GH000938. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1029/2023GH000938 

UN Environment Program. (2021). Global methane assessment: Benefits and costs of mitigating methane emissions. Link to source: https://www.unep.org/resources/report/global-methane-assessment-benefits-and-costs-mitigating-methane-emissions 

UN Environment Program. (2024). An eye on methane: Invisible but not unseen. Link to source: https://www.unep.org/interactives/eye-on-methane-2024/ 

U.S. Department of Commerce, Commercial Law Development Programme. (2023). Methane abatement for oil and gas - handbook for policymakers. Link to source: https://cldp.doc.gov/sites/default/files/2023-09/CLDP%20Methane%20Abatement%20Handbook.pdf

U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2024). What countries are the top producers and consumers of oil? Link to source: https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=709&t=6 

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. (2019). Global non-CO2 greenhouse gas emission projections & mitigation 2015 - 2050. Link to source: https://www.epa.gov/ozone-layer-protection/transitioning-low-gwp-alternatives-residential-and-commercial-air

Van Dingenen, R., Crippa, M., Maenhout, G., Guizzardi, D., & Dentener, F. (2018). Global trends of methane emissions and their impacts on ozone concentrations. Joint Research Commission (European Commission). Link to source: https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/c40e6fc4-dbf9-11e8-afb3-01aa75ed71a1/language-en

Wang, J., Fallurin, J., Peltier, M., Conway, TJ, and Gordon, D. (2024). Fossil Fuel Operations Sector: Refining Emissions [Data set]. RMI, Climate TRACE Emissions Inventory. Retrieved April 18, 2025, from Link to source: https://climatetrace.org 

World Bank Group. (2023). What you need to know about abatement costs and decarbonization. Link to source: https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2023/04/20/what-you-need-to-know-about-abatement-costs-and-decarbonisation 

World Bank Group. (2024). Global flaring and methane reduction partnership (GFMR). Retrieved August 16, 2024, from Link to source: https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/gasflaringreduction 

Credits

Lead Fellow

  • Jason Lam

Contributors

  • Ruthie Burrows, Ph.D.

  • James Gerber, Ph.D.

  • Yusuf Jameel, Ph.D.

  • Daniel Jasper

  • Alex Sweeney

Internal Reviewers

  • Aiyana Bodi

  • Hannah Henkin

  • Ted Otte

  • Amanda D. Smith, Ph.D.

  • Paul C. West, Ph.D.

  • James Gerber, Ph.D.

Effectiveness

Each Mt of methane that is not emitted avoids 81.2 million t CO₂‑eq on a 20-yr basis and 27.9 million t CO₂‑eq on a 100-yr basis (Smith et al., 2021). The GWP of methane is shown in Table 1. If the methane is burned (converted into CO₂ ), the contribution to climate change will still be less than that of methane released directly into the atmosphere. Methane abatement can have a more immediate impact on future global temperature rise because it has a larger and faster warming effect than CO₂. Mitigating methane emissions in the near term can give us more time for reducing GHG emissions in hard-to-abate sectors.

Table 1. Effectiveness at reducing emissions.

Unit: t CO₂‑eq /Mt of methane abated

100-yr GWP 27,900,000
20-yr GWP 81,200,000
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Cost

The cost of methane abatement will vary depending on the type of O&G production, the methane content of the O&G resource, and the strategies used to address it. We averaged the costs for various abatement strategies; methane content is sufficiently high to utilize methane abatement strategies, and energy infrastructure is available to utilize abated methane. The initial cost to abate 1 Mt of methane is US$594 million, the revenue is about US$193 million, and the overall net savings over a 30-yr amortization period is US$173 million. This means that reducing O&G methane emissions offers a net economic gain for O&G producers. We were not able to find operating cost information for the solution, meaning the net economic gain may be lower in practice. 

We considered the baseline scenario where O&G producers do not have systems or practices in place to monitor or stop methane from escaping to the atmosphere and found very limited cost data. We assumed baseline costs to be 0 for initial costs, operational costs, and revenue because current practices and infrastructure are releasing methane to the atmosphere as a part of their existing cost of doing business. 

Many of the initial cost data for methane abatement come from studies estimating how much capital would be required to reach methane emission targets for the O&G industry. These costs are for the global scale of O&G methane abatement and not from the point of view of an individual O&G producer. These studies do not go into detail about the cost of specific abatement strategies or their potential revenues. The context and assumptions are difficult to identify, since the abatement strategies must be tailored to each site. Ocko et al (2021) noted that most (around 80%) of economically feasible methane abatement actions are from the O&G sector. 

Table 2 shows the costs per t CO₂‑eq. The value of the methane sold, instead of released, will often bring in revenue that covers the costs of abatement. Refer to the Appendix for information on the proportion of strategies that O&G producers could implement at low to no cost.

Table 2. Net cost per unit of climate impact.

Unit: 2023 US$/t CO₂‑eq

Median (100-yr basis) -6.20
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Methods and Supporting Data

Methods and Supporting Data

Learning Curve

Many of the technology solutions for reducing methane emissions are mature, and we were unable to find literature suggesting the costs to implement these solutions will fall in the future. There may be efficiencies to be gained in LDAR, but little research offers insights into the costs of LDAR programs (Delphi Group, 2017, ICF, 2016). 

Speed of Action

Speed of action refers to how quickly a climate solution physically affects the atmosphere after it is deployed. This is different from speed of deployment, which is the pace at which solutions are adopted.

At Project Drawdown, we define the speed of action for each climate solution as emergency brake, gradual, or delayed.

Manage OIl & Gas Methane is an EMERGENCY BRAKE climate solution. It has the potential to deliver a more rapid impact than gradual and delayed solutions. Because emergency brake solutions can deliver their climate benefits quickly, they can help accelerate our efforts to address dangerous levels of climate change. For this reason, they are a high priority.

Caveats

Burning methane produces CO₂. Though the GWP is far less than that of releasing methane into the atmosphere, the practice still creates a negative climate impact. Depending on the type of O&G production, methane abatement is already practiced with natural gas production and is likely to bring added profit. However, oil producers who are not already producing methane for profit may not be able to abate methane at a profit. 

Avoiding fossil fuel extraction, transport, and use is the only way to permanently reduce emissions from O&G production. For many low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), O&G is the main source of energy, and it is challenging for them to completely eliminate O&G from their energy mix while they are simultaneously working to improve living standards. High-income countries can help LMICs develop clean energy infrastructure by providing financial and technological support. This will prevent new investments in O&G infrastructure (Laan, et al., 2024), which would result in ongoing emissions for decades. It would also allow LMICs a realistic pathway to transition away from their existing O&G usage. O&G demand must fall by 80% between 2022 and 2050 to stay in alignment with the net-zero emissions scenarios modeled by IEA (2023c). O&G methane abatement will decrease over time as the O&G industry produces less methane to be abated.

Our assessment does not include the impact of the CO₂ created from the destruction of methane.

Current Adoption

We found little literature quantifying the current adoption of methane management; much of the methane abatement research revolves around the amount of methane that needs to be abated to reach certain climate targets. Based on data from Global Methane Initiative (GMI, 2024), 0 Mt of methane was abated in 2023 but due to lack of data we consider current adoption to be not determined in Table 3.

GMI (2024) provided a conservative estimate of cumulative methane emissions abated each year, with a total of 153.6 Mt CO₂‑eq (5.51 Mt methane) abated as of 2023. The methane is given as a cumulative value to show the incremental increase in total methane abated and to avoid double counting methane abated. GMI members only cover 70% of human-caused methane emissions, and the organization does not capture methane mitigation that occurs outside of GMI members. This suggests that even in years where methane was abated, it would likely still be an underestimate of what may have actually occurred globally. The untapped potential for methane abatement suggests that O&G companies are investing in increasing natural gas production, which may be due to relatively smaller profits from abatement and nonbinding regulations (Shindell et al., 2024). 

Table 3. Current (2023) adoption level.

Unit: Mt of methane abated/yr

Median (50th percentile) not determined
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Adoption Trend

Although there is little research specifically quantifying the adoption of methane abatement strategies over time, we estimate the average adoption trend in recent years to be about 0.35 Mt/yr of methane abated. To create this estimate, we relied on GMI analysis (GMI, 2024). GMI showed methane abatement gradually increasing from 2011 to 2023, then tapering off around 2020 and beginning to decrease among its member organizations. Table 4 shows the adoption trend for O&G methane abatement.

The IEA (2025) compiled country-level reporting for GHG emissions with data up to 2024. However, we were not able to use the data for the adoption trend because the changes in methane emissions could have been due to reasons other than methane abatement. In reality, methane emissions may be affected by multiple factors such as natural disasters, political conditions, changes in O&G demand, and changes in O&G industry practices.

Oil and Gas Climate Initiative (2023) data on methane abatement to date for 12 major O&G companies indicate that methane emissions decreased 50% from 2017 to 2022; however, we cannot assume the rest of the O&G industry has made the same level of progress. 

Table 4. Adoption trend, 2011–2022.

Unit: Mt methane abated/yr

Median (50th percentile) 0.35
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Adoption Ceiling

We found an adoption ceiling of 80.7 Mt/yr of methane based on the IEA’s (2025) estimate for total methane emissions from the O&G sector. We assumed that current O&G methane emissions would remain the same into the future with no changes in O&G production or demand. Table 5 shows the adoption ceiling for O&G methane abatement.

Even in the IEA’s (2023c) highest methane abatement energy scenario, only 93% of the methane emissions are reduced by 2050. This would still leave methane emissions being released into the atmosphere by the O&G sector. Reduced O&G production will reduce the amount of methane emissions produced by the O&G sector and consequently reduce the amount of methane that needs to be controlled with methane abatement. 

Table 5. Adoption ceiling.

Unit: Mt methane abated/yr

Median (50th percentile) 80.7
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Achievable Adoption

Based on the limited data available for current adoption and adoption trend, we expect 3.26–8.84 Mt/yr of methane abated. The Achievable – Low value aligns with the IEA (2023c) baseline energy scenario (STEPS), in which partial methane abatement is used but not all technically possible methane is abated. The Achievable – High value aligns with the IEA (2023c) baseline scenario (STEPS), in which full methane abatement is employed (all technically possible methane is abated). We determined this range by taking the total methane abated in these scenarios and dividing by the difference between the target year and 2024 to determine an average amount of methane abated each year to reach the scenario target. Under both scenarios, reduced demand for O&G would reduce methane emissions produced and lower the adoption ceiling possible for methane abatement. Even in scenarios where there is reduced O&G demand, methane abatement would still be required to control fugitive methane emissions from O&G infrastructure and limit global climate change. 

The amount of methane that can be abated varies greatly depending on how much methane the O&G industry produces. If O&G production remains steady, cumulative methane abatement could be 21–81 Mt, according to the IEA energy scenarios. If O&G demand drops 80% (IEA’s Net Zero Emissions scenario), total methane emissions would decline to 18 Mt, and the use of methane abatement would reduce methane emissions further by 17 Mt, leaving only 1 Mt of methane emitted in 2050. 

There has been growing interest from governments and academia to more accurately identify methane emissions using technologies such as satellite sensing (MethaneSat, 2024); UNEP (2024) has set up a monitoring and operator’s alliance group that will share best practices among O&G producers. This alliance group has identified more than 1,200 methane releases, but only 15 responses from government or companies provided detail about the source of the emissions or whether any mitigation action was considered or taken. This shows there are still many opportunities to abate methane emissions. 

More than 150 countries (representing 50% of the world’s human-caused methane emissions) have joined the Global Methane Pledge to reduce methane emissions 30% from 2020 to 2030 (UNEP, 2021). The IEA (2023b) found that many governments already have announced or put into place measures to cut methane emissions, so we expect global methane abatement to grow. 

Conrad et al. (2023) found that the emission inventories reported by the Alberta, Canada, government underestimate the methane emissions from the O&G sector, with a large portion coming from venting. These sources of methane are relatively easier to address and can allow the O&G sector to quickly reduce methane emissions. Table 6 shows the statistical low and high achievable ranges for O&G methane abatement based on different sources for future uptake of O&G methane abatement.

Table 6. Achievable adoption.

Unit: Mt methane abated/yr

Current adoption not determined
Achievable – low 3.26
Achievable – high 8.84
Adoption ceiling 80.66
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We estimate that the O&G industry is currently abating approximately 0 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr on a 100-yr basis and 0 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr on a 20-yr basis using methane abatement strategies. 

As the O&G industry grows or shrinks its emissions, the amount of methane available to abate will change accordingly. If O&G demand and production stay constant to 2050, we estimate 0.09–0.25 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr of methane could be abated. 

However, if O&G demand drops, the methane abatement potential would drop because the O&G sector is producing less methane. This is projected in the different energy scenarios modeled by the IEA (2023). The range between the current O&G methane abatement and the adoption ceiling is shown in Table 7.

Table 7. Climate impact at different levels of adoption.

Unit: Gt CO₂‑eq/yr, 100-yr basis

Current adoption not determined
Achievable – low 0.09
Achievable – high 0.25
Adoption ceiling 2.25
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Additional Benefits

Air Quality and Health

Methane reacts with other pollutants to create ground-level ozone (Mar et al., 2022), and incomplete combustion of methane (Figure 2) releases other pollutants such as CO₂, carbon monoxide, black carbon, and volatile organic compounds (Fawole et al., 2016; Johnson and Coderre, 2012; Motte et al., 2021). These pollutants cause respiratory, reproductive, and neurological diseases; cancer; and premature death (Michanowicz et al., 2021; Motte et al., 2021; Tran et al., 2024), so reducing methane release can improve human health. Reducing or stopping flaring at a small number of the largest active sites can significantly reduce air pollution (Anejionu et al., 2015; Johnson and Coderre, 2012). Van Dingenen et al. (2018) estimate that ambitious methane reduction could prevent 70,000 to 130,000 ozone-related deaths worldwide each year.

Figure 2. Air pollutants emitted along the O&G life cycle (Moore et al., 2014). BTEX = benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene, xylene.

Diagram listing air pollutants emitted along the oil and gas life cycle

Source: Moore, C. W., Zielinska, B., Pétron, G., & Jackson, R. B. (2014). Air impacts of increased natural gas acquisition, processing, and use: A critical review. Environmental Science & Technology, 48(15), 8349–8359. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1021/es4053472

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Risks

If natural gas prices drop there would be less economic reason for industries to voluntarily abate methane (IEA, 2021). Without policy support enforcing the use of methane abatement technologies, methane could continue to be released into the atmosphere. The use of methane abatement will be needed regardless of whether O&G demand remains the same or decreases over time because it has an immediate effect on reducing global temperature rise in the near term.

Interactions with Other Solutions

Reinforcing

Managing O&G methane can reinforce other solutions that reduce the amount of methane released to the atmosphere. The use of solutions such as applying changes to operations and maintenance; converting, replacing, and installing devices; and LDAR in the O&G industry can help demonstrate the effectiveness and economic case for methane abatement elsewhere and build momentum for adoption of methane abatement in other sectors. 

Competing

Managing O&G methane has the potential to compete with solutions that provide clean electricity and solutions that focus on fuel switching in transportation because this solution increases O&G supply and can reduce the cost of O&G products. As a result, it could prolong the use of fossil fuels and slow down the transition to clean electricity.

Dashboard

Solution Basics

Mt methane abated

t CO₂-eq (100-yr)/unit
2.79×10⁷
units/yr
Current Not Determined 03.268.84
Achievable (Low to High)

Climate Impact

Gt CO₂-eq (100-yr)/yr
Current Not Determined 0.090.25
US$ per t CO₂-eq
-6
Emergency Brake

CH₄, N₂O

Trade-offs

Methane abatement could increase the use of O&G resources without a broader strategy to reduce reliance on O&G as an energy resource. The use of methane abatement strategies to extend the use of existing O&G infrastructure, or building new O&G infrastructure, will not result in a net decrease in emissions. Beck et al. (2020) found that more than 57% of the GHG emissions from the O&G supply chain are from methane emissions, while the rest is due to CO₂ emissions (15% from the extraction process and 28% from O&G energy use). Even with methane mitigation, continued use of O&G will generate CO₂ emissions and will contribute to global temperature rise. 

Mt CO2–eq/yr
< 50
50–100
100–200
200–300
> 300
Refining
Production
Transport

Annual emissions from oil and gas sources, 2024

Globally, oil and gas sources, including production, refining, and transport, were responsible for 81 Mt out of the 354 Mt of anthropogenic methane emissions in 2024. This is equivalent to 2,250 Mt CO2-eq based on a 100-year GWP time scale. Methane emissions occur throughout the supply chain due to equipment imperfections, leaks, and intentional venting.

International Energy Agency. (2025). Global Methane tracker 2025: Data tools. Link to source: https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/data-tools/methane-tracker

Schmeisser, L., Tecza, A., Huffman, M., Bylsma, S., Delang, M., Stanger, J., Conway, TJ, and Gordon, D. (2024). Fossil fuel operations sector: Oil and gas production and transport emissions [Data set]. RMI, Climate TRACE Emissions Inventory. Retrieved April 18, 2025 from Link to source: https://climatetrace.org

Wang, J., Fallurin, J., Peltier, M., Conway, TJ, and Gordon, D. (2024). Fossil fuel operations sector: Refining emissions [Data set]. RMI, Climate TRACE Emissions Inventory. Retrieved April 18, 2025 from Link to source: https://climatetrace.org

Mt CO2–eq/yr
< 50
50–100
100–200
200–300
> 300
Refining
Production
Transport

Annual emissions from oil and gas sources, 2024

Globally, oil and gas sources, including production, refining, and transport, were responsible for 81 Mt out of the 354 Mt of anthropogenic methane emissions in 2024. This is equivalent to 2,250 Mt CO2-eq based on a 100-year GWP time scale. Methane emissions occur throughout the supply chain due to equipment imperfections, leaks, and intentional venting.

International Energy Agency. (2025). Global Methane tracker 2025: Data tools. Link to source: https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/data-tools/methane-tracker

Schmeisser, L., Tecza, A., Huffman, M., Bylsma, S., Delang, M., Stanger, J., Conway, TJ, and Gordon, D. (2024). Fossil fuel operations sector: Oil and gas production and transport emissions [Data set]. RMI, Climate TRACE Emissions Inventory. Retrieved April 18, 2025 from Link to source: https://climatetrace.org

Wang, J., Fallurin, J., Peltier, M., Conway, TJ, and Gordon, D. (2024). Fossil fuel operations sector: Refining emissions [Data set]. RMI, Climate TRACE Emissions Inventory. Retrieved April 18, 2025 from Link to source: https://climatetrace.org

Maps Introduction

Methane abatement is recommended for all oil and gas (O&G) production. The levels of achievable abatement can vary geographically, depending on the extraction technology used (i.e., conventional drilling versus hydraulic fracturing). The Middle East, Europe, Asia, and North America are among the largest O&G producers and have the highest related methane emissions, according to the IEA (2025). Research from Shindell et al. (2024) found that North America, Russia, and several countries in the Middle East and Africa have the most methane abatement potential in O&G. O&G methane abatement could be accelerated if technologies and strategies used in high-income countries are shared with other O&G producing countries.

Action Word
Manage
Solution Title
Oil & Gas Methane
Classification
Highly Recommended

Lawmakers and Policymakers
  • Hold well owners accountable for harm caused to the public and environment.
  • Introduce performance goals for emissions reductions.
  • Use economic measures such as taxes or financial incentives.
  • Regulate key aspects of abatement, such as the use of LDAR, and enforce existing regulations.
  • Utilize data-driven public information programs such as collecting and publishing monitoring and reporting data (“naming and shaming”).
  • Distribute information to operators, such as technology options that fit relevant regulations. 

Further information:

Practitioners
  • Shift business models toward 100% renewable energy.
  • Detect and repair methane leaks.
  • Implement device conversion, replacement, and installation and LDAR.
  • Change operations and maintenance practices to reduce or recover vented methane.
  • Implement zero-tolerance policies for methane leaks.
  • Increase transparency on emissions and practices.
  • Join cross-company and industry coalitions that facilitate implementation.

Further information:

Business Leaders
  • Eliminate major methane O&G emitters in your value chains or pressure them to improve performance.
  • Create a plan to transition to renewable energy.
  • Center methane in net-zero strategies, such as establishing internal methane pricing mechanisms and requiring suppliers to meet standards for monitoring and reducing methane emissions in your operations.
  • Identify technology partners that are monitoring and reducing methane emissions and make market commitments.
  • If your company is participating in the voluntary carbon market, look into funding projects that plug methane leaks.
  • Proactively collaborate with government and regulatory actors to support methane abatement policies.
  • Join or support transparency initiatives led by trusted third parties, such as the Oil and Gas Methane Partnership 2.0.

Further information:

Nonprofit Leaders
  • Help with monitoring and reporting by, for example, utilizing satellite data.
  • Help design policies and regulations that support methane abatement.
  • Educate the public on the urgent need to abate methane.
  • Join or support efforts such as the Global Methane Alliance.
  • Encourage policymakers to create ambitious targets and regulations.
  • Pressure O&G companies to improve their practices.
  • Take or support legal action when companies do not follow relevant regulations.
  • Work with journalists and the media to support public education on the importance of methane abatement.

Further information:

Investors
  • Pressure and influence portfolio companies to incorporate methane abatement into their operations, noting that this saves money and adds value for investors.
  • Provide capital for nascent methane abatement strategies and leak detection and monitoring instruments.
  • Invest in green bonds and other financial instruments that support methane abatement projects.
  • Seek impact investment opportunities such as sustainability-linked loans in entities that set methane abatement targets.
  • Invest in projects that plug methane leaks. 

Further information:

Philanthropists and International Aid Agencies
  • Provide capital for methane monitoring, de-risking, and abatement in the early stages of implementation.
  • Support global, national, and local policies that reduce methane emissions.
  • Support accelerators or multilateral initiatives like the Global Methane Hub.
  • If working in a fossil fuel–producing nation, support sustainable developments in other sectors of the economy.
  • Explore opportunities to fund the plugging of abandoned oil or gas wells that leak methane.
  • Advance awareness of the public health and climate threats from the O&G industry.
  • Join, create, or participate in partnerships or certification programs dedicated to managing oil and gas methane.

Further information:

Thought Leaders
  • Provide technical assistance (e.g., monitoring and reporting) to businesses, government agencies, and other entities working to reduce methane emissions.
  • Help design policies and regulations that support methane abatement.
  • Analyze historical emissions patterns to identify and publicize successful programs.
  • Educate the public on the urgent need to abate methane.
  • Advocate to policymakers for more ambitious targets and regulations.
  • Pressure O&G companies to improve their practices.
  • Join, create, or participate in partnerships or certification programs dedicated to managing oil and gas methane.

Further information:

Technologists and Researchers
  • Develop new LDAR technologies that reduce cost and required capacity.
  • Develop new technologies for measuring and verifying emissions.
  • Conduct longitudinal studies to measure emissions against objectives or means of enforcement. 

Further information:

Communities, Households, and Individuals
  • If you are impacted by harmful O&G methane management practices, document your experiences.
  • Reduce household consumption of fossil fuels by adopting clean energy sources, increasing energy efficiency, and replacing fossil fuel-powered equipment with electricity-powered equipment.
  • Share documentation of harmful practices and/or other key messages with policymakers, the press, and the public.
  • Encourage policymakers to improve regulations.
  • Support public education efforts on the urgency and need to address the issue.

Further information:

“Take Action” Sources
Evidence Base

Consensus of effectiveness of abating methane emissions in the O&G sector: High

There is a high level of consensus about the effectiveness of methane abatement strategies. These strategies can be deployed cost effectively in many cases and have an immediate impact on reducing global temperature rise. 

Authoritative sources such as the IEA (2023d), UNEP (2021), and Global Methane Hub (2024) agree that reducing methane emissions can noticeably reduce the rate of global temperature rise. DeFabrizio et al. (2021) identified that methane abatement strategies such as LDAR, switching from natural gas fuel to electric power, using air for pneumatic devices, and using vapor recovery units could reduce O&G methane emissions by 40% by 2030 based on global 2017 O&G emissions. With methane being the second largest contributor to climate change after CO₂, reductions in methane emissions can quickly reduce global temperature rise.

Others (Marks Levi, 2022; DeFabrizio et al., 2021; Malley et al., 2023) have identified that many methane abatement strategies can use existing technologies, often at low cost. Dunsky (2023) found that implementing 24 of the least expensive abatement measures in the exploration and production phases of Canada’s O&G industry could help Canada achieve its 2030 methane target. The IEA (2023a) noted that the O&G industry was responsible for 80 Mt of methane in 2022 and had the largest potential for abatement in the near term. The O&G industry has the potential to abate 60 Mt of methane by 2030 using abatement strategies; 40% of that could be abated at no net cost based on average natural gas prices from 2017 to 2021 (IEA, 2023a).

The results presented in this document summarize findings from more than 15 reviews and meta-analyses and more than 10 original studies reflecting current evidence from two countries, primarily from the United States and Canada, and from global sources. We recognize this limited geographic scope creates bias, and hope this work inspires research and data-sharing on this topic in underrepresented regions.

Appendix

Data describing methane abatement potential in the O&G industry are often shown in marginal abatement cost curves (MACCs), which incorporate the initial cost, operating cost, revenue, and any extra costs per unit of emissions reduced as one value.

Figure A1. Marginal abatement cost curves (MACC) for methane abatement in the O&G industry (IEA, 2024).

Cost curve chart.

Source: International Energy Agency (Global Methane Tracker 2024).

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MACCs indicate a range of potential climate actions and show at a glance the magnitude of financial return or financial cost across that range. In Figure A1, for the blocks below the horizontal axis, the value received from the sale of the captured methane is greater than the cost of the solution employed. The width of a block shows the annual amount of emissions a technology can abate, with wider blocks abating more emissions than narrower blocks.

MACCs are useful for identifying which climate action could have the most impact at reducing emissions or which options have a net economic gain. However, they do not illustrate the intricacies that may be in play among different climate actions and can lead users to ignore hard-to-abate emissions. The World Bank (2023) identified that MACCs are useful to find which option will reduce emissions by a set percentage but less useful for reducing absolute emissions to near zero. 

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Manage Coal Mine Methane

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Cut Fugitive Emissions
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Worker in a coal mine
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Summary

Managing coal mine methane (CMM) is the process of reducing methane emissions released from coal deposits and surrounding rock layers due to mining activities. CMM is naturally found in coal seams and released into the atmosphere when the coal seams are disturbed. Coal mines can continue to emit methane even after being closed or abandoned, which is known as abandoned mine methane (AMM). CMM and AMM can be captured and then utilized as a fuel source or destroyed before they reach the atmosphere [U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA), 2024a].

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Air quality
Description for Social and Search
Managing coal mine methane is the process of reducing methane emissions released from coal deposits and surrounding rock layers due to mining activities.
Overview

CMM is released from coal mines before, during, and after active coal mining and from coal being transported (U.S. EPA, 2024a). Atmospheric methane has a GWP of 81 on a 20-yr basis and a GWP of 28 on a 100-yr basis (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], 2023). This means methane is 81 times more effective at trapping heat than CO₂. Because methane is a short-lived climate pollutant that has a much stronger warming effect than CO₂ over a given time period, abating methane from coal mines will have a powerful near-term impact on slowing global climate change. If capturing methane is not possible, destroying the methane by burning it is preferable to releasing it.

CMM comes from five major sources throughout the coal mine’s life cycle (Figure 1): 

  1. Degasification systems – pipes installed in the ground to move methane into the atmosphere before starting mining
  2. Ventilation air – air escaping from underground mines when fresh air is used to push out underground methane during mining
  3. Surface mines – exposed coal seams that emit methane directly into the atmosphere during mining
  4. Fugitive emissions – already mined coal that emits methane while being transported or stored
  5. Abandoned or closed mines – coal seams and rock strata that are exposed to air, allowing AMM to escape through existing vents or cracks after mine closure. 

Figure 1. Percent breakdown of CMM sources in the United States, 2021.

Source: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2024d). Sources of coal mine methane. Retrieved November 5, 2024. https://www.epa.gov/cmop/sources-coal-mine-methane

CMM management relies on several practices and technologies to reduce the amount of methane released into the atmosphere. The CMM that is captured can be used as a fuel at high concentrations and destroyed through flaring or oxidation at low concentrations. The methane captured from degasification systems typically has a high concentration while fugitive and ventilation methane sources are low concentration. CMM management also includes leak detection and repair using satellites, drones, or other technologies to prevent methane from escaping into the atmosphere.

Underground coal mines have more methane abatement strategies available due to higher average methane concentrations and relative ease of capture. Surface coal mines are exposed directly to the atmosphere and can cover large areas, making them more difficult to abate methane, though there are technologies that can reduce CMM emissions. See the Appendix for more details on the abatement technologies specific to underground and surface coal mines.

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International Energy Agency. (2023c). The imperative of cutting methane from fossil fuels. Link to source: https://www.iea.org/reports/the-imperative-of-cutting-methane-from-fossil-fuels 

International Energy Agency. (2023d). Global methane tracker 2023: Overview. Link to source: https://www.iea.org/reports/global-methane-tracker-2023/overview 

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International Energy Agency. (2024c). World energy outlook 2024. Link to source: https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-outlook-2024 

International Energy Agency. (2025). Global methane tracker documentation 2025 version. Link to source: https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/2c0cf2d5-3910-46bc-a271-1367edfed212/GlobalMethaneTracker2025.pdf 

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Credits

Lead Fellow

  • Jason Lam

Contributors

  • James Gerber, Ph.D.

  • Yusuf Jameel, Ph.D. 

  • Ruthie Burrows, Ph.D.

  • Daniel Jasper

  • Alex Sweeney

Internal Reviewers

  • Sarah Gleeson, Ph.D.

  • Aiyana Bodi

  • Hannah Henkin

  • Ted Otte

  • Amanda D. Smith, Ph.D.

  • Paul C. West, Ph.D.

Effectiveness

Each 1 Mt of methane that is not emitted avoids 81.2 Mt CO₂‑eq on a 20-yr basis and 27.9 Mt CO₂‑eq on a 100-yr basis (Smith et al., 2021). The GWP of methane is shown in Table 1. If methane is converted into CO₂ through burning, the contribution to global climate change will still be less than if it were released into the atmosphere. Methane abatement can have a more immediate impact on future global temperature rise because it has a larger and faster warming effect than CO₂. Mitigating methane emissions in the near term can give us more time for reducing GHG emissions in hard-to-abate sectors.

Table 1. Effectiveness at reducing emissions.

Unit: t CO₂‑eq/Mt methane abated

100-yr GWP 27,900,000
20-yr GWP 81,200,000
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Cost

The cost of methane abatement will vary depending on the type of coal mine, the methane content of the coal seam, the strategies used, and the availability of financial support for methane abatement. For our analysis, we average the costs for various feasible abatement strategies under two general assumptions: sufficiently high methane content for any of the major abatement strategies to be applied (International Energy Agency [IEA], 2024a) and the ability to use the abated methane on-site or sell it to natural gas companies. The initial cost to abate 1 Mt of methane is US$1.5 billion, the operating cost is about US$130 million, revenue is about US$260 million and the overall net savings over a 30-yr amortization period is US$90 million. We were only able to find revenue information from the IEA (2023b, 2024a), meaning the net cost could be different than shown here due to the site specific nature of methane abatement strategies. 

We considered the baseline scenario to be coal mining practices without methane abatement; all cost estimates here are relative to that scenario.

Cost data were limited for this solution. The available costs for a specific abatement strategy were normalized according to the cost of abating one Mt of methane, and it was assumed that a single strategy abated all of the methane for the coal mine. This results in an overestimate of the effectiveness of any individual strategy. In reality, multiple strategies are likely to be used. The costs shown in Table 2 are for the global scale of coal methane abatement and not from the point of view of an individual coal producer. Many studies that look at global coal methane abatement put multiple abatement strategies together and do not go into detail about the individual technology costs. The IEA (2024a) included costs for individual CMM abatement strategies; however, the costs were only applicable for coal mines that produce enough methane for it to be economically feasible to deploy the specific abatement strategy. Flaring is an effective strategy for destroying captured methane, but will not create revenue in the absence of a carbon market. For more details on important aspects for coal methane abatement strategies, refer to the Appendix.

Table 2. Cost per unit climate impact.

Unit: 2023 US$/t CO₂‑eq, 100-yr basis

Median -3.17
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Methods and Supporting Data

Methods and Supporting Data

Learning Curve

Many of the solutions for reducing methane emissions from coal mining are mature. Research from Rystad (2023) found that technologies for abating CMM emissions, such as drainage gas utilization, sealing and rerouting, and flaring, were considered mature in Australian coal mines. Regenerative thermal oxidation technology is in commercial use for destroying volatile organic compounds and can be used for destroying ventilation air methane (VAM), but the manufacturers have little interest in improving the technology for use in coal mines without confirmed markets (GMI, 2018; Rystad, 2023). We do not foresee the costs of implementing these solutions falling in the future. CMM regulations may encourage manufacturers to improve oxidation technology, but the technology is already used commercially, so there may not be large efficiency gains.

Speed of Action

Speed of action refers to how quickly a climate solution physically affects the atmosphere after it is deployed. This is different from speed of deployment, which is the pace at which solutions are adopted.

At Project Drawdown, we define the speed of action for each climate solution as emergency brake, gradual, or delayed.

Manage Coal Mine Methane is an EMERGENCY BRAKE climate solution. It has the potential to deliver a more rapid impact than gradual and delayed solutions. Because emergency brake solutions can deliver their climate benefits quickly, they can help accelerate our efforts to address dangerous levels of climate change. For this reason, they are a high priority.

Caveats

CMM abatement consists of capturing methane that would otherwise be released into the atmosphere. If the methane is burned, CO₂ will be emitted as a byproduct; however, this provides a net climate benefit compared to the methane that would be emitted. CMM emissions management can be avoided by not extracting, transporting, or using coal in the first place. 

As coal demand drops, the number of closed or abandoned coal mines will increase. These mines will continue to release AMM into the atmosphere for many decades. Sealing underground mines can stop methane from being released, but seals have been known to fail and require ongoing monitoring to verify methane is not escaping (Kholod et al., 2020). Gas collection systems can be used to capture AMM, but the CO₂ produced will need to be captured for complete emission reductions. Flooding underground coal mines is very effective at stopping methane from being released; however, there are concerns about water contamination (McKinsey, 2021).

Our assessment does not include the impact of the CO₂ created from the destruction of methane.

Current Adoption

We estimated that the coal sector abated 0.59 Mt of methane in 2023 and released 40 Mt in 2024 (IEA, 2025). Reports from U.S. EPA (2022), and Global Methane Initiative (GMI, 2023) estimated the amount of CMM abated to date, and the statistical ranges from the sources are shown in Table 3. However, most of the data focused on coal mines in the United States. The U.S. EPA (2024b) stated that 0.3 Mt of methane was captured in 2021 due to the Coalbed Methane Outreach Program. CMM is controlled at coal mines for health and safety reasons, but only in 2024 was regulation introduced for reducing methane emissions from the energy sector in the European Union (Assan, 2024).


GMI (2024a) reports that 0.79 Mt of methane was abated from coal mines in 2023 among its member countries. The organization includes 48 GMI member countries but covers only 70% of human-caused methane emissions and does not track methane mitigation that has occurred outside of the group. GMI (2024b) currently lists more than 471 CMM abatement projects in 20 countries worldwide. According to Global Energy Monitor (n.d.), more than 6,000 coal mines were active in more than 70 countries as of April 2024. With these data sources, we consider our analysis of the current adoption of CMM abatement as conservative. 

Table 3. Current (2023) adoption level.

Unit: Mt/yr of methane abated

25th percentile 0.49
Mean 0.59
Median (50th percentile) 0.59
75th percentile 0.69
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Adoption Trend

Although there are few data specifically quantifying the adoption trend of methane abatement strategies, we estimate the median adoption trend to be about 0.60 Mt/yr of methane abated.  Table 4 shows the adoption trend for CMM abatement.

GMI (2024) reported methane abatement staying relatively stable 2016–2023 at about 0.8 Mt/yr, with a small increase to 1.0 Mt of methane in 2019–2022 before decreasing back to 0.8 Mt in 2023, causing the adoption trend to be higher than the current adoption value we state above. The U.S. EPA (2024a) Coalbed Methane Outreach Program showed fairly stable emission reductions of around 0.33 Mt/yr between 2016 and 2022. The annual methane emission abatement from this program gradually increased 2003–2011, followed by a continued trend of methane abatement at a slower rate 2011–2022. The IEA (2024b) found that the U.S. coal industry emitted almost 2.0 Mt of methane in 2023, and 60% of those emissions could be abated.

Table 4. (2016–2023) adoption trend.

Unit: Mt/yr methane abated

25th percentile 0.46
Mean 0.60
Median (50th percentile) 0.60
75th percentile 0.73
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Adoption Ceiling

We found an adoption ceiling of about 40.3 Mt/yr of methane based on the IEA’s (2025) estimate for total methane emissions from the coal mine sector. We assumed that current CMM emissions would remain the same into the future with no changes in coal production or demand. Table 5 shows the adoption ceiling for coal mine methane abatement.

Even in the IEA’s (2023c) highest methane abatement energy scenario, only 93% of the methane emissions are reduced by 2050. This would still leave the coal sector releasing methane into the atmosphere. Reduced coal production will reduce the amount of methane emissions produced by the coal sector and consequently reduce the amount of methane that needs to be controlled with methane abatement. However, methane abatement will still be important for abating the remaining CMM emissions and the growing proportion of AMM emissions (IEA, 2023c, Kholod et al., 2020). 

Table 5. Adoption ceiling.

Unit: Mt/yr of methane abated

Median (50th percentile) 40.30
Left Text Column Width
Achievable Adoption

The amount of methane that could be abated from CMM varies greatly depending on global coal demand. We estimate an achievable adoption range of 2.83–4.40 Mt/yr of methane abated. The Achievable – Low value aligns with the IEA (2023c) Announced Pledges scenario, in which all announced climate policies are met and full methane abatement is employed, but net-zero emissions are not achieved. This range of high and low values was determined by taking the total methane abated in these scenarios and dividing by the difference between the target year and 2024 to determine an average amount of methane abated each year to reach the scenario target. 

The Achievable – High value aligns with Ocko et al.(2021), where all economically and technically feasible methane abatement is employed by 2030. DeFabrizio et al. (2021) estimated that the degasification of underground mines and flaring would be the source of most methane abatement from coal mining, with degasification of surface mines abating a smaller proportion of methane over time. However, research from Kholod et al. (2020) suggested there will be an increase in AMM emissions as coal mines are closed. Methane emissions from AMM are not extensively monitored right now, and there is limited research on the topic. Methane abatement strategies will be needed to abate growing AMM emissions (Zhu et al, 2023). 

In addition, some research suggested CMM is being underestimated, with global emissions being as high as 67 Mt/yr (Assan & Whittle, 2023). If coal demand drops by 90%, as outlined in IEA’s Net Zero Emissions scenario, total coal methane emissions would decline to 3 Mt/yr, and the use of methane abatement would reduce emissions by 2 Mt/yr, leaving only 1 Mt/yr of CMM emitted in 2050. 

With growing interest and investment from governments and academia in identifying methane leaks using technologies such as satellite sensing (MethaneSAT, 2024), the opportunities for methane abatement will increase. Over 150 countries have joined the Global Methane Pledge (representing 50% of the world’s human-caused methane) to reduce methane emissions by 30% of 2020 emissions by 2030 (United Nations Environment Programme [UNEP], 2021). The IEA (2023a) found that even in a baseline scenario, many governments have announced or put in place measures to cut methane emissions; we would expect a growing trend in global methane abatement to occur. The IEA (2024c) states that in all scenarios global coal demand will decrease. Table 6 shows the statistical low and high achievable ranges for CMM abatement based on different sources for future uptake of CMM abatement.

Table 6. Range of achievable adoption levels.

Unit: Mt/yr methane abated

Current adoption 0.59
Achievable – low 2.83
Achievable – high 4.40
Adoption ceiling 40.30
Left Text Column Width

We estimate that the coal industry is currently abating approximately 0.02 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr on a 100-yr basis and 0.03 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr on a 20-yr basis using methane abatement strategies. This is about 1% of total methane emissions emitted in 2024 (IEA, 2025). 

As the coal industry opens or closes coal mines due to changing coal demand, the opportunities for CMM abatement projects will change along with it. If coal demand gradually drops by 2050, more than 0.12 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr of methane could be abated. However, if coal demand drops more quickly from the implementation of energy and climate policies, the methane abatement potential would drop because the coal sector is producing less methane. This is projected in the different energy scenarios modeled by the IEA (2023c). The range between the current CMM abatement and the adoption ceiling is shown in Table 7.

Table 7. Climate impact at different levels of adoption.

Unit: Gt CO₂‑eq/yr, 100-yr basis

Current adoption 0.02
Achievable – low 0.08
Achievable – high 0.12
Adoption ceiling 1.12
Left Text Column Width
Additional Benefits

Health and Air Quality

Around 10% of anthropogenic methane comes from coal mines (IEA, 2024a). Methane released from coal mines contributes to ground-level ozone pollution, which can harm lung function, exacerbating conditions like asthma, bronchitis, and emphysema, and can contribute to premature mortality (Mar et al., 2022). Domingo et al. (2024) estimated that ground-level ozone accounted for about 6,600 excess deaths per year in about 400 cities globally. 

Methane released from coal mines also endangers workers’ safety in the mines, increasing the possibility of explosions, which are a significant source of fatalities and injuries (CDC, 2024). In the United States, from 2006 to 2011, mine explosions were responsible for about 25% of fatalities in the mining industry (CDC, 2024). While advances in methane mitigation technologies can prevent explosions and fatalities, mines across LMICs usually do not have methane mitigation protocols in place. Installing methane abatement strategies can potentially protect workers from such explosions (Tate, 2022).

Risks

CMM abatement strategies could be implemented on a voluntary basis due to favorable natural gas prices, but if natural gas prices drop there is less economic incentive to abate methane (IEA, 2021). Without policy support enforcing methane abatement, emissions could continue, especially from VAM and AMM, which are more difficult to capture and use. Ensuring long-term monitoring and abatement of CMM can be challenging if coal mines are abandoned due to owners going bankrupt, leaving environmental damages unpaid for and remediation up to nearby communities or taxpayers (Ward et al., 2023). 

Interactions with Other Solutions

Reinforcing

Managing coal methane can have a positive impact on other solutions that reduce methane release to the atmosphere. The use of technologies such as degasification systems, methane destruction, and Leak Detection and Repair (LDAR) in the coal mine sector can demonstrate the effectiveness and economic case for employing methane abatement. This would build momentum for the widespread adoption of methane abatement because successes in the coal sector can be leveraged and applied to other sectors. In addition, LDAR is a key part in identifying where we can abate methane emissions and lessons learned from the coal sector can be applied to other sites, as well as identifying methane leaks in general. 

Competing

CMM management interacts negatively with solutions that provide clean electricity as this solution captures methane that can be used as an energy source, prolonging the use of natural gas infrastructure and reducing the cost of methane as a fuel source. 

Dashboard

Solution Basics

Mt methane abated

t CO₂-eq (100-yr)/unit
2.79×10⁷
units/yr
Current 0.59 02.834.4
Achievable (Low to High)

Climate Impact

Gt CO₂-eq (100-yr)/yr
Current 0.02 0.080.12
US$ per t CO₂-eq
-3
Emergency Brake

CH₄ , N₂O

Trade-offs

Methane abatement strategies are a powerful tool to reduce methane emissions; however, providing a secondary source of revenue for coal mining could increase the profitability and longevity of some coal mines. A broad strategy to reduce reliance on coal as an energy resource is needed to reduce the amount of CMM generated. Even with methane abatement strategies in place, methane used as a fuel or destroyed through flaring will still emit GHGs and contribute to global climate change.

Mt CO2–eq/yr
< 1
1–3
3–5
5–7
7–9
> 9

Annual emissions from coal mine sources, 2024

Globally, coal mines are responsible for 40 of the 354 Mt of anthropogenic methane emissions in 2024. This is equivalent to 1,116 Mt CO2-eq based on a 100-year GWP time scale. Methane emissions occur throughout the life of a coal mine and can continue after mines are closed or abandoned.

Lewis, C., Tate, R.D., and Mei, D.L. (2024). Fuel operations sector: Coal mining emissions methodology [Data set]. WattTime and Global Energy Monitor, Climate TRACE Emissions Inventory. Retrieved April 18, 2025, from Link to source: https://climatetrace.org

International Energy Agency. (2025). Global methane tracker documentation 2025 version. Link to source: https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/2c0cf2d5-3910-46bc-a271-1367edfed212/GlobalMethaneTracker2025.pdf

Mt CO2–eq/yr
< 1
1–3
3–5
5–7
7–9
> 9

Annual emissions from coal mine sources, 2024

Globally, coal mines are responsible for 40 of the 354 Mt of anthropogenic methane emissions in 2024. This is equivalent to 1,116 Mt CO2-eq based on a 100-year GWP time scale. Methane emissions occur throughout the life of a coal mine and can continue after mines are closed or abandoned.

Lewis, C., Tate, R.D., and Mei, D.L. (2024). Fuel operations sector: Coal mining emissions methodology [Data set]. WattTime and Global Energy Monitor, Climate TRACE Emissions Inventory. Retrieved April 18, 2025, from Link to source: https://climatetrace.org

International Energy Agency. (2025). Global methane tracker documentation 2025 version. Link to source: https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/2c0cf2d5-3910-46bc-a271-1367edfed212/GlobalMethaneTracker2025.pdf

Maps Introduction

Coal mine methane abatement is applicable in any area with coal mines. While China and the United States are the largest coal producers, Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and India also generated more than 10 Mt CO₂‑eq (100-yr) from coal mines in 2015 (GMI, 2015).

Levels of methane emissions from coal mines can vary geographically. The greatest abatement potential is in China, Kazakhstan, Australia, and several countries in Eastern Europe and Africa (Shindell et al., 2024). However, methane abatement is recommended for all coal mining activities, and high-income countries are in a position to share supportive technologies and practices for coal mine methane abatement with other coal-producing countries to reduce methane emissions from active and abandoned or closed mines.

Action Word
Manage
Solution Title
Coal Mine Methane
Classification
Highly Recommended

Lawmakers and Policymakers
  • Create policies based on global best practices, such as the IEA’s roadmap to implementing CMM regulations.
  • Require all coal mines to measure and report on methane emissions.
  • Invest in monitoring, reporting, and verification technologies, such as satellites, and support low-income countries in monitoring emissions.
  • Provide financial incentives, such as reduced taxes, subsidies, grants, low-interest loans, and feed-in tariffs, for adopting drainage and capture technologies suitable for the region.
  • Require closed and abandoned mines to be sealed and monitored.
  • Compile or update global inventories of the status of abandoned and closed mines.
  • When possible, do not approve the construction of new coal mines.
  • Require low-emitting technologies for equipment, coal processing, storage, and transportation.
  • Develop infrastructure to use captured CMM, including gas processing, grid connections, and industry capacity.
  • Establish clear resource rights to methane emitted from active and abandoned mines.
  • Include CMM recovery in Nationally Determined Contributions and other international reporting instruments.
  • Provide educational resources to industry leaders, including potential reduction options, workshops, actionable reports, direct engagements, and demonstrations.
  • Join, support, or create public initiatives such as the Global Methane Initiative, Global Methane Pledge, or Global Methane Hub.

Further information:

Practitioners
  • Use or destroy CMM to the maximum extent.
  • Work with policymakers to create policies based on global best practices, such as the IEA’s roadmap to implementing CMM regulations.
  • Measure and report on methane emissions.
  • Invest in monitoring, reporting, and verification technologies, such as satellites, and support low-income countries to monitor emissions.
  • Take advantage of any financial incentives, such as reduced taxes, subsidies, grants, low-interest loans, and feed-in tariffs, to adopt drainage and capture technologies suitable for the region.
  • Ensure abandoned and closed mines are sealed and monitored.
  • Compile or update global inventories of the status of abandoned and closed mines.
  • When possible, do not approve the construction of new coal mines.
  • Develop infrastructure to use captured CMM, including gas processing, grid connections, and industry capacity.
  • Assist policymakers in establishing clear resource rights to methane emitted from active and abandoned mines.
  • Use existing drainage systems for gas capture, utilization, and sale.
  • Improve technologies, such as thermal oxidizers, for the purposes of VAM destruction.
  • Partner with carbon markets that are linked to CMM abatement.
  • Improve CMM emissions modeling and monitoring, including satellites and on-the-ground methods.
  • Invest in research and development to improve extraction, capture, storage, transportation, and utilization technologies.
  • Join, support, or create public initiatives such as the GMI, Global Methane Pledge, or Global Methane Hub.
  • Educate industry leaders, including sharing potential reduction options, through workshops, actionable reports, direct engagements, and demonstrations.

Further information:

Business Leaders
  • Ensure that operations or investments that include coal mines utilize or destroy methane emissions.
  • Do not invest, plan to use, or create agreements with new coal mines.
  • Invest in high-integrity carbon markets that are linked to CMM abatement.
  • Invest in R&D to improve the efficiency of extraction, capture, storage, transportation, and utilization technologies.
  • Develop infrastructure to use captured CMM, including gas processing, grid connections, and industry capacity.
  • Utilize existing data sets such as the UN’s International Methane Emissions Observatory to inform current and future decisions.
  • Join, support, or create public initiatives such as the Global Methane Initiative, Global Methane Pledge, or Global Methane Hub.

Further information:

Nonprofit Leaders
  • Advocate for regulating CMM emissions and local policies based on global best practices, such as the IEA’s roadmap to implementing CMM regulations.
  • Assist coal mines in measuring and reporting or conducting independent studies on CMM emissions.
  • Advocate for financial incentives, such as reduced taxes, subsidies, grants, low-interest loans, and feed-in tariffs, for the adoption of drainage and capture technologies suitable for the region.
  • Advocate to stop the construction of new coal mines.
  • Compile or update global inventories of the status of abandoned and closed mines.
  • Help create high-integrity carbon markets that are linked to CMM abatement.
  • Provide educational resources to industry leaders, including potential reduction options, workshops, actionable reports, direct engagements, and demonstrations.
  • Join, support, or create public initiatives such as the Global Methane Initiative, Global Methane Pledge, or Global Methane Hub.

Further information:

Investors
  • Invest in monitoring, reporting, and verification technologies, such as satellites, and support low-income countries to monitor emissions.
  • Provide financial support through low-interest loans or green bonds to adopt drainage and capture technologies suitable for the region.
  • Do not invest in constructing new coal mines and require any existing investments to provide transparent emissions data and time-based reduction strategies.
  • Invest in R&D to improve the efficiency of extraction, capture, storage, transportation, and utilization technologies.
  • Develop infrastructure to use captured CMM, including gas processing, grid connections, and industry capacity.
  • Invest in high-integrity carbon markets that are linked to CMM abatement.
  • Join, support, or create public initiatives such as the Global Methane Initiative, Global Methane Pledge, or Global Methane Hub.

Further information:

Philanthropists and International Aid Agencies
  • Invest in monitoring, reporting, and verification technologies, such as satellites, and support low-income countries to monitor emissions.
  • Provide financial support to adopt drainage and capture technologies suitable for the region.
  • Invest in R&D to improve the efficiency of extraction, capture, storage, transportation, and utilization technologies.
  • Assist in establishing clear resource rights to methane emitted from active and abandoned mines.
  • Help create high-integrity carbon markets that are linked to CMM abatement.
  • Join, support, or create public initiatives such as the Global Methane Initiative, Global Methane Pledge, or Global Methane Hub.
  • Provide educational resources to industry leaders, including potential reduction options, workshops, actionable reports, direct engagements, and demonstrations.
  • Advocate for regulating CMM emissions and local policies based on global best practices, such as the IEA’s roadmap to implementing CMM regulations.
  • Compile or update global inventories of the status of abandoned and closed mines.

Further information:

Thought Leaders
  • Advocate for regulating CMM emissions and local policies based on global best practices, such as the IEA’s roadmap to implementing CMM regulations.
  • Assist coal mines in measuring and reporting or conducting independent studies on CMM emissions.
  • Advocate for financial incentives, such as reduced taxes, subsidies, grants, low-interest loans, and feed-in tariffs, for adopting drainage and capture technologies suitable for the region.
  • Assist in establishing clear resource rights to methane emitted from active and abandoned mines.
  • Advocate to stop the construction of new coal mines.
  • Compile or update global inventories of the status of abandoned and closed mines.
  • Help create high-integrity carbon markets that are linked to CMM abatement.
  • Provide educational resources to industry leaders, including potential reduction options, workshops, actionable reports, direct engagements, and demonstrations.
  • Join, support, or create public initiatives such as the Global Methane Initiative, Global Methane Pledge, or Global Methane Hub.

Further information:

Technologists and Researchers
  • Improve CMM emissions modeling and monitoring, including satellites and on-the-ground methods.
  • Compile or update global inventories of the status of abandoned and closed mines.
  • Develop infrastructure to use captured CMM, including gas processing, grid connections, and industry capacity.
  • Discover ways to utilize existing drainage systems for gas capture, utilization, and sale.
  • Improve technologies, such as thermal oxidizers, for the purposes of VAM destruction.
  • Develop new ways to improve extraction, capture, storage, transportation, and utilization technologies.
  • Develop verifiable carbon credits using technology such as blockchain to improve the integrity of carbon markets.
  • Improve the efficiency of mining equipment to reduce maintenance requirements and costs.

Further information:

Communities, Households, and Individuals
  • Advocate for regulating CMM emissions and local policies based on global best practices, such as the IEA’s roadmap to implementing CMM regulations.
  • Advocate for financial incentives, such as reduced taxes, subsidies, grants, low-interest loans, and feed-in tariffs, for the adoption of drainage and capture technologies suitable for the region.
  • Advocate to stop the construction of new coal mines.
  • Assist coal mines in measuring and reporting or conducting independent studies on CMM emissions.
  • Provide educational resources to industry leaders, including potential reduction options, workshops, actionable reports, direct engagements, and demonstrations.
  • Join, support, or create public initiatives such as the Global Methane Initiative, Global Methane Pledge, or Global Methane Hub.

Further information:

“Take Action” Sources
Evidence Base

Consensus of effectiveness of abating methane emissions from coal mines: High

There is a high level of consensus about the effectiveness of methane abatement strategies. These strategies can be deployed cost effectively in many cases and have an immediate impact on reducing global temperature rise. 

Authoritative sources such as the IEA (2024c) and UNEP (2021) agree that reducing methane emissions can noticeably slow global climate change. Methane is a short-lived climate pollutant that has a much stronger warming effect than CO₂ over a given time period. IEA (2023d) identified that close to 55% (22 Mt) of CMM emissions could be abated with existing technologies. However, there are significant challenges in measuring and recovering methane emissions in the coal sector. Analysis from Assan & Whittle (2023) found that global CMM emissions could be significantly higher than reported, 38–67 Mt/yr compared with the 40 Mt/yr reported by the IEA (2025).

The IEA (2023a) noted that more than half of CMM emissions could be abated through utilization, flaring, or oxidation technologies, with abatement being more practical for underground mines. Many studies (DeFabrizio et al., 2021; Malley et al., 2023; Shindell et al., 2024) have shown that methane abatement strategies can use existing technologies, often at low cost. In some countries, coal operators already identify the location and sources of CMM to meet health and safety regulations (Assan & Whittle, 2023); Setiawan & Wright (2024) noted that existing technologies such as pre-mine drainage and VAM mitigation have been proven in various places around the world over the past 25 years. According to UNEP (2021), coal methane abatement could reduce emissions by 12–25 Mt/yr, with up to 98% of the measures implemented at low cost. However, costs may vary significantly based on the available infrastructure and characteristics of an individual coal mine.

The results presented in this document summarize findings from 21 reviews and meta-analyses and 20 original studies reflecting current evidence from three countries (Australia, China, and the United States) as well as from sources examining global CMM emissions. We recognize this limited geographic scope creates bias, and hope this work inspires research and data sharing on this topic in underrepresented regions.

Appendix

CMM abatement strategy constraints:

The type of coal mine, the amount of methane produced, and the available infrastructure greatly affect which abatement strategies are economical. Underground coal mines often produce more CMM and are likely to capture CMM using degasification systems and use it for productive purposes such as electricity generation or selling captured methane. However, VAM, which is a major part of CMM emissions, can be challenging to use for productive purposes due to the low methane concentrations. VAM requires regenerative thermal oxidation technology to effectively destroy and with more gassy coal mines. According to the IEA (2023b), technologies such as flaring and drained CMM can be used at less gassy mines with lower initial capital cost. Capturing methane for destruction has the disadvantage of not creating a source of revenue to offset the capital cost of methane abatement without a form of carbon markets in place. 

More than 60% of methane-related emissions from coal mining are from the ventilation of underground coal mines. Large amounts of fresh air are used to lower the concentration of methane and reduce the risk of explosions in underground mines. This makes it challenging to destroy or use the low concentrations of VAM (UNEP, 2022). It is also challenging to capture methane from surface mines because the coal is in direct contact with the atmosphere and over a larger surface area. However, thermal oxidation systems have been used to destroy VAM (U.S. EPA, 2019) and there have been examples of degasification systems used for surface mines as well (IEA, 2023b). Methane emissions from AMM can be dealt with by flooding underground mines with water (Kholod et al., 2020) or by sealing and using capture and utilization projects (Zhu et al., 2023). 

Technologies for reducing methane emissions can be divided between underground and surface coal mines:

Underground mines
  • Predainage prior to mining
  • VAM capture and utilization
  • Capture of abandoned mine gas
  • Sealing or flooding of abandoned mines 
Surface mines
  • Degasification of surface mines
  • Predrainage of surface mines

Appendix References

CNX. (2024, March 20). Jumpstarting coal mine methane capture projects for beneficial end use [PowerPoint slides].Global Methane Initiative. https://www.globalmethane.org/resources/details.aspx?resourceid=5386 

United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). (2019). Best practice guidance for effective methane recovery and use from abandoned coal mines. https://unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/energy/images/CMM/CMM_CE/Best_Practice_Guidance_for_Effective_Methane_Recovery_and_Use_from_Abandoned_Coal_Mines_FINAL__with_covers_.pdf 

Updated Date
Coming Soon Label
Under Revision

Mobilize Electric Cars

Sector
Transportation
Mode
Cut Emissions
Cluster
Electrify Vehicles
Image
Electric car plugged into charging station
Coming Soon
Off

Key Takeaways

  • Electric cars generally produce fewer GHGs per passenger-kilometer than fossil fuel–powered cars, particularly when charged with low-carbon electricity.
  • Global adoption of electric cars is growing rapidly, but it remains small relative to the more than 2 billion cars currently in use.
  • Electric cars can lower operating costs and eliminate tailpipe emissions compared with fossil fuel–powered cars, improving urban air quality and health.
  • Battery production, mineral extraction, charging infrastructure, and electricity-grid emissions can limit the overall benefits of electric cars.
Summary

Electric cars are four-wheeled passenger cars that run on electricity, usually from the electricity grid and stored in onboard batteries (i.e., not including fuel cell electric cars). This definition includes electric pickup trucks, motorhomes, and other such vehicles. It does not include two-wheeled vehicles or hybrid cars (which combine an electric motor with a gasoline or diesel engine). It also does not include freight and commercial vehicles, such as electric heavy trucks, buses, and ambulances. We define Mobilize Electric Cars as replacing fossil fuel–powered cars (i.e., those powered by internal combustion engines) with electric equivalents, as well as building out the necessary infrastructure (especially charging stations) to support them.

Income & work,Health
Water quality,Air quality
Description for Social and Search
Mobilize Electric Cars is a Highly Recommended climate solution. Electric cars slash air pollution and greenhouse gases, especially when powered by clean grids.
Overview

Electric cars provide the same functionality as fossil fuel–powered cars, but use electric motors rather than fuel-burning engines. The energy for the motors comes from an onboard battery, which is normally charged using electricity from the grid.

Electric cars have no direct tailpipe emissions, since electric motors do not burn fuel to function. The grid electricity used to charge their batteries may have come from fossil fuel-burning power plants, meaning electric cars are not entirely free of direct emissions. However, in most electrical grids, even those that mainly generate electricity from fossil fuels, electric cars usually still produce fewer emissions per pkm than fossil fuel–powered cars. This is for three reasons. First, large, fixed power plants and efficient electric grids can convert fossil fuels into useful energy more efficiently than smaller, mobile internal combustion engines in cars. In extreme cases, such as grids powered entirely by coal, this might not be the case, particularly if the grid has a lot of transmission and distribution losses. Second, the powertrain of an electric car delivers electricity from the battery to the wheels much more efficiently than the powertrain of a fossil fuel–powered car, which wastes much more energy as heat (International Transport Forum, 2020; Mofolasayo, 2023; Verma et al., 2022). Third, electric cars’ powertrains enable regenerative braking, where the kinetic energy of the car’s motion is put back into the battery when the driver brakes (Yang et al., 2024).

Electric cars reduce emissions of CO₂,  methane, and nitrous oxide to the atmosphere by replacing fuel-powered cars, which emit these gases from their tailpipes.

References

APEC. (2024). Connecting Traveler Choice with Climate Outcomes: Innovative Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reduction Policies and Practices in the APEC Region through Traveler Behavioral Change. Link to source: https://www.apec.org/publications/2024/09/connecting-traveler-choice-with-climate-outcomes--innovative-greenhouse-gas-emissions-reduction-policies-and-practices-in-the-apec-region-through-traveler-behavioral-change 

Agusdinata, D. B., Liu, W., Eakin, H., & Romero, H. (2018). Socio-environmental impacts of lithium mineral extraction: Towards a research agenda. Environmental Research Letters, 13(12). Scopus. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/aae9b1

Anenberg, S. C., Miller, J., Henze, D., & Minjares, R. (2019). A global snapshot of the air pollution-related health impacts of transportation sector emissions in 2010 and 2015. International Council on Clean Transportation. Link to source: https://theicct.org/publication/a-global-snapshot-of-the-air-pollution-related-health-impacts-of-transportation-sector-emissions-in-2010-and-2015/

Bloomberg New Energy Finance. (2024). Electric Vehicle Outlook 2024. Bloomberg. Link to source: https://about.bnef.com/electric-vehicle-outlook/

Carey, J. (2023). The other benefit of electric vehicles. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 120(3), e2220923120. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2220923120

Castelvecchi, D. (2021). Electric cars and batteries: How will the world produce enough? Nature, 596(7872), 336–339. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-021-02222-1

Choma, E. F., Evans, J. S., Hammitt, J. K., Gómez-Ibáñez, J. A., & Spengler, J. D. (2020). Assessing the health impacts of electric vehicles through air pollution in the United States. Environment International, 144, 106015. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envint.2020.106015

Dillman, K. J., Árnadóttir, Á., Heinonen, J., Czepkiewicz, M., & Davíðsdóttir, B. (2020). Review and Meta-Analysis of EVs: Embodied Emissions and Environmental Breakeven. Sustainability, 12(22), Article 22. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.3390/su12229390

Electric vehicle database. (2024). Energy consumption of full electric vehicles. Electric Vehicle Database. Link to source: https://ev-database.org/cheatsheet/energy-consumption-electric-car

Fakhrooeian, P., Pitz, V., & Scheppat, B. (2024). Systematic Evaluation of Possible Maximum Loads Caused by Electric Vehicle Charging and Heat Pumps and Their Effects on Common Structures of German Low-Voltage Grids. World Electric Vehicle Journal, 15(2), 49. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.3390/wevj15020049

Garcia, E., Johnston, J., McConnell, R., Palinkas, L., & Eckel, S. P. (2023). California’s early transition to electric vehicles: Observed health and air quality co-benefits. The Science of the Total Environment, 867, 161761. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2023.161761

Goetzel, N., & Hasanuzzaman, M. (2022). An empirical analysis of electric vehicle cost trends: A case study in Germany. Research in Transportation Business & Management, 43, 100825. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rtbm.2022.100825

Guarnieri, M., & Balmes, J. R. (2014). Outdoor air pollution and asthma. Lancet, 383(9928), 1581–1592. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(14)60617-6

IEA. (2022). Electric Vehicles: Total Cost of Ownership Tool. IEA. Link to source: https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/data-tools/electric-vehicles-total-cost-of-ownership-tool

IEA. (2024). Global EV Outlook 2024. International Energy Agency. Link to source: https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2024

International Council on Clean Transportation. (2024). Clearing the air: Why EVs can outperform conventional vehicles in freezing temperatures. International Council on Clean Transportation. Link to source: https://theicct.org/clearing-the-air-why-evs-can-outperform-conventional-vehicles-in-freezing-temperatures-oct24/

International Transport Forum. (2020). Good to Go? Assessing the Environmental Performance of New Mobility (Corporate Partnership Board). OECD. Link to source: https://www.itf-oecd.org/sites/default/files/docs/environmental-performance-new-mobility.pdf

IPCC. (2022). Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge. Link to source: https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg3/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGIII_FullReport.pdf

Jones, S. J. (2019). If electric cars are the answer, what was the question? British Medical Bulletin, 129(1), 13–23. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1093/bmb/ldy044

Kerr, G. H., Goldberg, D. L., & Anenberg, S. C. (2021). COVID-19 pandemic reveals persistent disparities in nitrogen dioxide pollution. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 118(30), e2022409118. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2022409118

Kittner, N., Tsiropoulos, I., Tarvydas, D., Schmidt, O., Staffell, I., & Kammen, D. M. (2020). Chapter 9—Electric vehicles. In M. Junginger & A. Louwen (Eds.), Technological Learning in the Transition to a Low-Carbon Energy System (pp. 145–163). Academic Press. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-818762-3.00009-1

Larson, E., Grieg, C., Jenkins, J., Mayfield, E., Pascale, A., Zhang, C., Drossman, J., Williams, R., Pacala, S., Socolow, R., Baik, E., Birdesy, R., Duke, R., Jones, R., Haley, B., Leslie, E., Paustain, K., & Swan, A. (2021). Net-Zero America: Potential Pathways, Infrastructure, and Impacts. Princeton University. Link to source: https://lpdd.org/resources/princeton-report-net-zero-america/

Melaina, M., Bush, B., Eichman, J., Wood, E., Stright, D., Krishnan, V., Keyser, D., Mai, T., & McLaren, J. (2016). National Economic Value Assessment of Plug-in Electric Vehicles: Volume I (No. NREL/TP-5400-66980). National Renewable Energy Lab. (NREL), Golden, CO (United States). Link to source: https://doi.org/10.2172/1338175

Milovanoff, A., Posen, I. D., & MacLean, H. L. (2020). Electrification of light-duty vehicle fleet alone will not meet mitigation targets. Nature Climate Change, 1–6. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-020-00921-7

Mofolasayo, A. (2023). Assessing and Managing the Direct and Indirect Emissions from Electric and Fossil-Powered Vehicles. Sustainability, 15(2), Article 2. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.3390/su15021138

Nguyen, C. T. P., Nguyễn, B.-H., Ta, M. C., & Trovão, J. P. F. (2023). Dual-Motor Dual-Source High Performance EV: A Comprehensive Review. Energies, 16(20), Article 20. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.3390/en16207048

Nickel Institute. (2021a). Asia Pacific and UK Automotive ICE vs EV Total Cost of Ownership. Link to source: https://nickelinstitute.org/media/8d993d1b8165b23/tco-asia-pacific-automotive.pdf

Nickel Institute. (2021b). European Union and UK Automotive ICE vs EV Total Cost of Ownership. Link to source: https://nickelinstitute.org/media/8d9058c08d2bcf2/avicenne-study-tco-eu-and-uk-automotive.pdf

Nickel Institute. (2021c). North American Automotive ICE vs EV Total Cost of Ownership. Link to source: https://nickelinstitute.org/media/8d993d0fd3dfd5b/tco-north-american-automotive-final.pdf

Pan, S., Yu, W., Fulton, L. M., Jung, J., Choi, Y., & Gao, H. O. (2023). Impacts of the large-scale use of passenger electric vehicles on public health in 30 US. metropolitan areas. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 173, 113100. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2022.113100

Pennington, A. F., Cornwell, C. R., Sircar, K. D., & Mirabelli, M. C. (2024). Electric vehicles and health: A scoping review. Environmental Research, 251, 118697. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envres.2024.118697

Peters, D. R., Schnell, J. L., Kinney, P. L., Naik, V., & Horton, D. E. (2020). Public health and climate benefits and trade‐offs of U.S. vehicle electrification. GeoHealth, 4, e2020GH000275. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1029/2020GH000275 

Ravi, S. S., & Aziz, M. (2022). Utilization of Electric Vehicles for Vehicle-to-Grid Services: Progress and Perspectives. Energies, 15(2), Article 2. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.3390/en15020589

Ren, Y., Sun, X., Wolfram, P., Zhao, S., Tang, X., Kang, Y., Zhao, D., & Zheng, X. (2023). Hidden delays of climate mitigation benefits in the race for electric vehicle deployment. Nature Communications, 14(1), 3164. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-023-38182-5

Requia, W. J., Mohamed, M., Higgins, C. D., Arain, A., & Ferguson, M. (2018). How clean are electric vehicles? Evidence-based review of the effects of electric mobility on air pollutants, greenhouse gas emissions and human health. Atmospheric Environment, 185, 64–77. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.atmosenv.2018.04.040

Roberts, C. (2022). Easy Street for Low-Carbon Mobility? The Political Economy of Mass Electric Car Adoption. In G. Parkhurst & W. Clayton (Eds.), Electrifying Mobility: Realising a Sustainable Future for the Car (Vol. 15, pp. 13–31). Emerald Publishing Limited. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1108/S2044-994120220000015004

Sovacool, B. K. (2019). The precarious political economy of cobalt: Balancing prosperity, poverty, and brutality in artisanal and industrial mining in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Extractive Industries and Society, 6(3), 915–939. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2019.05.018

Szyszkowicz, M., Kousha, T., Castner, J., & Dales, R. (2018). Air pollution and emergency department visits for respiratory diseases: A multi-city case crossover study. Environmental Research, 163, 263–269. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envres.2018.01.043

Vega-Perkins, J., Newell, J. P., & Keoleian, G. (2023). Mapping electric vehicle impacts: Greenhouse gas emissions, fuel costs, and energy justice in the United States. Environmental Research Letters, 18(1), 014027. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/aca4e6

Verma, S., Dwivedi, G., & Verma, P. (2022). Life cycle assessment of electric vehicles in comparison to combustion engine vehicles: A review. Materials Today: Proceedings, 49, 217–222. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.matpr.2021.01.666

Weiss, M., Dekker, P., Moro, A., Scholz, H., & Patel, M. K. (2015). On the electrification of road transportation – A review of the environmental, economic, and social performance of electric two-wheelers. Transportation Research Part D: Transport and Environment, 41, 348–366. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trd.2015.09.007

WHO. (2024). Number of registered vehicles. Link to source: https://www.who.int/data/gho/data/indicators/indicator-details/GHO/number-of-registered-vehicles

Yang, C., Sun, T., Wang, W., Li, Y., Zhang, Y., & Zha, M. (2024). Regenerative braking system development and perspectives for electric vehicles: An overview. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 198, 114389. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2024.114389

Yoder, K. (2023, June 14). The environmental disaster lurking beneath your neighborhood gas station. Grist. Link to source: https://grist.org/accountability/gas-stations-underground-storage-tank-leaks-environmental-disaster/

Credits

Lead Fellow

  • Cameron Roberts, Ph.D.

Contributors

  • Ruthie Burrows, Ph.D.

  • James Gerber, Ph.D.

  • Daniel Jasper

  • Heather Jones, Ph.D.

  • Heather McDiarmid, Ph.D.

  • Alex Sweeney

Internal Reviewers

  • Aiyana Bodi

  • James Gerber, Ph.D.

  • Hannah Henkin

  • Jason Lam

  • Ted Otte

  • Amanda D. Smith, Ph.D.
Effectiveness

Every million pkm shifted from fossil fuel–powered cars to electric cars reduces 48.52 t CO₂‑eq on a 100-yr basis (Table 1), or 49.13 t CO₂‑eq on a 20-yr basis. 

We found this by collecting data on electricity consumption for a range of electric car models (Electric Vehicle Database, 2024) and multiplying it by the global average emissions per kWh of electricity generation. Fossil fuel–powered cars emit 115.3 t CO₂‑eq/million pkm on a 100-yr basis (116.4 t CO₂‑eq/million pkm on a 20-yr basis). Electric cars already have lower emissions in countries with large shares of renewable, nuclear, or hydropower generation in their electricity grids (International Transport Forum, 2020; Verma et al., 2022).

These data come disproportionately from North America and Europe, and, notably, leave out China, which has made major progress on electric cars in recent years and has many of its own makes and models. 

Electric cars today are disproportionately used in high- and upper-middle-income countries, whose electricity grids emit fewer GHG emissions than the global average per unit of electricity generated (International Energy Agency [IEA], 2024). Electric cars in use today reduce more emissions on average than the figure we have calculated. 

Electric cars have higher embodied emissions than fossil fuel–powered cars, due to the GHG-intensive process of manufacturing batteries. This gives them a carbon payback period which ranges from zero to over 10 years (Dillman et al., 2020; Ren et al., 2023).

Table 1. Effectiveness at reducing emissions.

Unit: t CO₂‑eq/million pkm, 100-yr basis

25th percentile 38.95
Mean 49.54
Median (50th percentile) 48.52
75th percentile 62.82

Shifted from fossil fuel–powered cars to electric cars, 100-yr basis.

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Cost

Including purchase price, financing, fuel and electricity costs, maintenance costs, and insurance, electric cars cost on average US$0.05 less per pkm (US$49,440/million pkm) than fuel-powered cars. This is based on a population-weighted average of the cost differential between electric and fossil fuel–powered cars in seven countries: Japan, South Korea, China, the United States, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (Nickel Institute, 2021b, 2021c, 2021a). 

While this analysis found that electric cars are less expensive than fossil fuel–powered cars almost everywhere, the margin is often quite small. The difference is less than US$0.01/pkm (US$10,000/million pkm) in South Korea, the United States, and Germany. In some markets, electric cars are more expensive per pkm than fossil fuel–powered cars (IEA, 2022).

This amounts to savings of US$1,019/t CO₂‑eq on a 100-yr basis (Table 2), or US$1,006/t CO₂‑eq avoided emissions on a 20-yr basis). 

Our analysis does not include costs that are the same for both electric and fossil fuel–powered cars, including taxes, insurance costs, and public costs of building road infrastructure.

Table 2. Cost per unit climate impact.

Unit: 2023 US$/t CO₂‑eq, 100-yr basis

Median -1,019
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Methods and Supporting Data

Methods and Supporting Data

Learning Curve

For every doubling in electric car production, costs decline by approximately 23% (Table 3; Goetzel & Hasanuzzaman, 2022; Kittner et al., 2020; Weiss et al., 2015). 

In addition to manufacturing improvements and economies of scale, this reflects rapid technological advancements in battery production, which is a significant cost component of an electric powertrain (Weiss et al., 2015).

Table 3. Learning rate: drop in cost per doubling of the deployed solution.

Unit: %

25th percentile 23.00
Mean 22.84
Median (50th percentile) 23.00
75th percentile 24.00
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Speed of Action

Speed of action refers to how quickly a climate solution physically affects the atmosphere after it is deployed. This is different from speed of deployment, which is the pace at which solutions are adopted.

At Project Drawdown, we define the speed of action for each climate solution as emergency brake, gradual, or delayed.

Mobilize Electric Cars is a GRADUAL climate solution. It has a steady, linear impact on the atmosphere. The cumulative effect over time builds as a straight line.

Caveats

The effectiveness of electric cars in mitigating GHG emissions is critically dependent on the emissions associated with electricity production. In electricity grids dominated by fossil fuels, electric cars have far higher emissions than in jurisdictions with low-emission electricity generation (International Transport Forum [ITF], 2020; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], 2022; Milovanoff et al., 2020).

Electric car adoption faces a major obstacle in the form of constraints on battery production. While electric car battery production is being aggressively upscaled (IEA, 2024), building enough batteries to replace a significant fraction of fossil fuel–powered cars is an enormous challenge and will likely slow down a transition to electric cars, even if there is very high consumer demand (Milovanoff et al., 2020). 

Current Adoption

Approximately 28 million electric cars are in use worldwide (IEA, 2024). This corresponds to about 819,000 million pkm traveled by electric car worldwide each year (Table 4). We assume that all of this travel would be undertaken by a fossil fuel–powered car if the car’s occupants did not use an electric car. Adoption is much higher in some countries, such as Norway, where the share of electric cars was 29% in 2023.

To convert the IEA’s electric car estimates into pkm traveled, we needed to determine the average passenger-distance that each passenger car travels per year. Using population-weighted data from several different countries, the average car carries 1.5 people and travels an average of 29,250 pkm/yr. Multiplying this number by the number of electric cars in use gives the total travel distance shift from fossil fuel–powered cars to electric cars.

Table 4. Current (2024) adoption level.

Unit: million pkm/yr

Population-weighted mean 818,900

Implied travel shift from fossil fuel-powered cars to electric cars.

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Adoption Trend

Globally, about 104 billion pkm are displaced from fossil fuel–powered cars by electric cars every year (Table 5). The number of new electric cars purchased each year is growing at an average rate of over 10% (Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2024; IEA, 2024), although purchase rates have declined slightly from record highs between 2020–2022. Global purchases of electric cars are still increasing by around 3.6 million cars/yr. This is based on globally representative data (Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2024; IEA, 2024).

Despite this impressive rate of growth, electric cars still have a long way to go before they replace a large percentage of the more than 2 billion cars currently driven (WHO, 2024).

Table 5. 2023-2024 adoption trend.

Unit: million pkm/yr

Median, or population-weighted mean 104,000

Implied travel shift from fossil fuel-powered cars to electric cars.

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Adoption Ceiling

The adoption ceiling for electric cars is equal to the total passenger-distance driven by the more than 2 billion cars worldwide (WHO, 2024). Using a population-weighted mean of the average distance (in pkm) traveled per car annually, this translates to about 59 trillion pkm (Table 6).

Replacing every single fossil fuel–powered car with an electric car would require an enormous upscaling of electric car production capacity, rapid development of charging infrastructure, cost reductions to increase affordability, and technological improvements to improve suitability for more kinds of drivers and trips. It would also face cultural obstacles from drivers who are attached to fossil fuel–powered cars (Roberts, 2022).

Table 6. Adoption ceiling.

Unit: million pkm/yr

Median, or population-weighted mean 59,140,000

Implied travel shift from fossil fuel-powered cars to electric cars.

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Achievable Adoption

The achievable adoption of electric car travel ranges from about 26–47 trillion pkm displaced from fossil fuel–powered cars (Table 7).

Various organizations have produced forecasts for electric car adoption. These are not assessments of feasible adoption per se; they are instead trying to predict likely rates of adoption, given various assumptions about the future (Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2024; IEA, 2024). However, they are useful in that they take a large number of different variables into account to make their estimates. To convert these estimates of future likely adoption into estimates of the achievable adoption range, we apply some assumptions to the numbers in the scenario projections. 

To find a high rate of electric car adoption, we assume that every country could reach the highest rate of adoption projected to occur for any country. Bloomberg New Energy Finance’s (2024) Economic Transition scenario predicts that Norway will reach an 80% electric vehicle stock share by 2040. We therefore set our high adoption rate at 80% worldwide. This corresponds to 1,617 million total electric cars in use, or 47 trillion pkm traveled by electric car. An important caveat is that with a global supply constraint in the production of electric car batteries, per-country adoption rates are somewhat zero-sum. Every electric car purchased in Norway is one that cannot be purchased elsewhere. Therefore, for the whole world to achieve an 80% electric car stock share, global electric car and battery production would have to increase radically. While this might be possible due to technological improvements or radical increases in investment, it should not be taken for granted.

To identify a lower feasible rate of electric car adoption, we simply take the highest estimate for global electric car adoption. Bloomberg’s Economic Transition scenario predicts 44% global electric car adoption by 2050. This corresponds to 890 million electric cars, or 26 trillion pkm.

Table 7. Range of achievable adoption levels.

Unit: million pkm/yr

Current adoption 818,900
Achievable – low 26020000
Achievable – high 47310000
Adoption ceiling (physical limit) 59140000
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Electric cars are currently displacing 0.040 Gt CO₂‑eq of GHG emissions from the transportation system on a 20-yr basis (Table 8), or 0.040 Gt CO₂‑eq on a 100-yr basis. 

If electric cars reach 44% of the global car stock share by 2040, as Bloomberg (2024) projects, without any change in the total number of cars on the road, they will displace 1.263 Gt CO₂‑eq GHG emissions on a 100-yr basis (1.279 Gt CO₂‑eq  on a 20-yr basis).

If electric cars globally reach 80% of car stock share, as Bloomberg projects might happen in Norway by 2040, they will displace 2.296 Gt CO₂‑eq GHG emissions on a 100-yr basis (2.325 Gt CO₂‑eq on a 20-yr basis).

If electric cars replace 100% of the global car fleet, they will displace 2.870 Gt CO₂‑eq  GHG emissions on a 100-yr basis (2.906 Gt CO₂‑eq on a 20-yr basis).

These numbers are based on the present-day average emissions intensity from electrical grids in countries with high rates of electric car adoption. If more clean energy is deployed on electricity grids, the total climate impact from electric cars will increase considerably.

Table 8. Climate impact at different levels of adoption.

Unit: Gt CO₂‑eq/yr, 100-yr basis

Current adoption 0.040
Achievable – low 1.263
Achievable – high 2.296
Adoption ceiling (physical limit) 2.870
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Additional Benefits

Health

Since electric cars do not have tailpipe emissions, they can mitigate traffic-related air pollution, which is associated with asthma, lung cancer, increased emergency department visits for respiratory disease, and increased mortality (Anenberg et al., 2019; Guarnieri & Balmes, 2014; Pan et al., 2023; Pennington et al., 2024; Requia et al., 2018; Szyszkowicz et al., 2018). Transitioning to electric cars can reduce exposure to air pollution, improve health, and prevent premature mortality (Garcia et al., 2023; Larson et al., 2021; Peters et al., 2020).

The health benefits of adopting electric cars vary spatially and partly depend upon how communities generate electricity (Choma et al., 2020), but there is evidence that they have improved health. A study in California found a reduction in emergency department visits in zip codes with an increase in zero-emissions cars (Garcia et al., 2023). By 2050, projections estimate that about 64,000–167,000 deaths could be avoided by adopting electric cars (Larson et al., 2021).

In the United States, communities with higher proportions of racial and ethnic minorities tend to be located near highways and major traffic corridors and so are disproportionately exposed to air pollution (Kerr et al., 2021). Transitioning to electric cars could improve health in marginalized urban neighborhoods that are located near highways, industry, or ports (Pennington et al., 2024). These benefits depend upon an equitable distribution of electric cars and infrastructure to support the adoption of electric cars (Garcia et al., 2023). Low-income households may not see the same savings from an electric car due to the cost and stability of electricity prices and distance to essential services (Vega-Perkins et al., 2023)

Income and Work

Adopting electric cars can reduce a household’s energy burden, or the proportion of income spent on residential energy (Vega-Perkins et al., 2023). About 90% of United States households that use a car could see a reduction in energy burden by transitioning to an electric car. Money spent to charge electric cars is more likely to stay closer to the local community where electricity is generated, whereas money spent on fossil fuels often benefits oil-producing regions. This benefits local and national economies by improving their trade balance (Melaina et al., 2016).

Water Quality

Substituting electric car charging points for gas stations can eliminate soil and water pollution from leaking underground gas tanks (Yoder, 2023). 

Air Quality

The adoption of electric cars reduces emissions of air pollutants, including sulfur oxides, sulfur dioxide, and nitrous oxides, and especially carbon monoxide and volatile organic compounds. It has a smaller impact on particulate emissions (Requia et al., 2018). Some air pollution reductions are limited (particularly PM and ozone) due to heavier electric cars and pollution from brakes, tires, and wear on the batteries (Carey, 2023; Jones, 2019).

Risks

Mining minerals necessary to produce electric car batteries carries environmental and social risks. This has been associated with significant harms, particularly in lower-income countries that supply many of these minerals (Agusdinata et al., 2018; Sovacool, 2019).

Electric cars might also pose added safety risks due to their higher weight, which means they have longer stopping distances and can cause more significant damage in collisions and to pedestrians and cyclists (Jones, 2019). This risk includes dual-motor electric cars that incorporate two electric motors – one for the front axle and one for the rear – providing all-wheel drive (AWD) capabilities. The addition of a second motor increases the vehicle's weight and complexity, which can lead to higher energy consumption and reduced overall efficiency. Moreover, the increased manufacturing costs associated with dual-motor systems can result in higher purchase prices for consumers (Nguyen et al., 2023). However, this configuration enhances vehicle performance, offering improved acceleration, traction, and handling, particularly in adverse weather conditions, which are valued by some consumers. 

Interactions with Other Solutions

Reinforcing

Electric car batteries can potentially be used as stationary batteries for use as energy storage to balance electrical grids, either through vehicle-to-grid (V2G) technology or with degraded electric car batteries being installed in stationary battery farms as a form of reuse (Ravi & Aziz, 2022). 

The effectiveness of electric cars in reducing GHG emissions increases as electricity grids become cleaner, since lower-carbon electricity further reduces the emissions associated with car charging. 

Competing

Electric cars compete with heat pumps for electricity. Installing both heat pumps and electric cars could strain the electric grid’s capacity (Fakhrooeian et al., 2024).

Getting travelers onto bicycles, sidewalks, public transit networks, or smaller electric vehicles (such as electric bicycles) provides a greater climate benefit than getting them into electric cars. There is an opportunity cost to deploying electric cars because those resources could otherwise be used to support these more effective solutions (APEC, 2024).

Dashboard

Solution Basics

million passenger kilometers (million pkm)

t CO₂-eq (100-yr)/unit
038.9548.52median
units/yr
Current 818,900 02.602×10⁷4.731×10⁷
Achievable (Low to High)

Climate Impact

Gt CO₂-eq (100-yr)/yr
Current 0.04 1.2632.296
US$ per t CO₂-eq
-1,019
Gradual

CO₂ , CH₄, N₂O

Trade-offs

Electric car batteries are currently quite emissions-intensive to produce, resulting in high embodied emissions. While the embodied emissions are higher for electric cars than fossil fuel–powered cars, the results are mixed when coupling these with operating emissions. Dillman et al.’s (2020) review of the literature on this topic found that producing the average battery-electric car emits 63% more GHG emissions than the average gasoline-powered car, and 77% more GHG emissions than the average diesel-powered car. Taking their lower tailpipe emissions into account, this gives them a GHG payback period of zero to more than 10 years. In some cases, the emissions payback period is longer than the expected lifespan of the electric car, meaning it will have higher life cycle GHG emissions than a comparable gasoline or diesel-powered car. However, the International Transport Forum (ITF, 2020) found that the lifetime emissions from manufacturing, operation, and infrastructure are lower for electric cars. All of these studies relied on assumptions, including the type of car, size of battery, electricity grid, km/yr, and lifetime. 

There is some criticism against any solution that advocates for car ownership, contending that the focus should be on solutions such as Enhance Public Transit that reduce car ownership and usage. Jones (2019) noted “there is little evidence to suggest that EVs can offer the universal solution that global governments are seeking,” and that efforts to popularize electric cars “may be better directed at creating more efficient public transport systems, rather than supporting personal transportation, if the significant health disbenefits of car use during the past 150 years are to be in any way reduced.”

Milovanoff et al. (2020) offered similar criticism: “Closing the mitigation gap solely with EVs would require more than 350 million on-road EVs (90% of the fleet), half of national electricity demand, and excessive amounts of critical materials to be deployed in 2050. Improving [the] average fuel consumption of fossil fuel–powered vehicles, with stringent standards and weight control, would reduce the requirement for alternative technologies, but is unlikely to fully bridge the mitigation gap. There is therefore a need for a wide range of policies that include measures to reduce vehicle ownership and usage.”

Allocating the limited global battery supply to privately owned electric cars might undermine the deployment of other solutions that also require batteries, but are more effective at avoiding GHG emissions (Castelvecchi, 2021). These could include electric buses, electric rail, and electric bicycles.

Mt CO2-eq/yr
0–4
4–8
8–12
12–16
16–20
> 20
No data

Annual road transportation emissions, 2024

Cars are the largest source of vehicle emissions, which are shown here for urban areas.

Kott, T., Foster, K., Villafane-Delgado, M., Loschen, W., Sicurello, P., Ghebreselassie, M., Reilly, E., and Hughes, M. (2024). Transportation sector - Global road emissions. [Data set]. The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL), Climate TRACE Emissions Inventory. Retrieved March 12, 2025, from Link to source: https://climatetrace.org

Mt CO2-eq/yr
0–4
4–8
8–12
12–16
16–20
> 20
No data

Annual road transportation emissions, 2024

Cars are the largest source of vehicle emissions, which are shown here for urban areas.

Kott, T., Foster, K., Villafane-Delgado, M., Loschen, W., Sicurello, P., Ghebreselassie, M., Reilly, E., and Hughes, M. (2024). Transportation sector - Global road emissions. [Data set]. The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL), Climate TRACE Emissions Inventory. Retrieved March 12, 2025, from Link to source: https://climatetrace.org

Maps Introduction

Electric cars can effectively mitigate climate change in all geographic regions, although there is spatial variability that influences per-pkm effectiveness and potential solution uptake. Effectiveness heavily depends on the carbon intensity of the charging source, which varies greatly between and within countries. The effectiveness of electric cars decreases for larger vehicles, favored in some countries (Jones, 2019; Nguyen et al., 2023).  

The uptake of electric cars can be significantly influenced by socioeconomic factors, including the relative costs of fuels and electricity, the capacity of civil society to provide adequate charging infrastructure, and the availability of subsidies for electric vehicles.

Extreme temperatures can negatively impact vehicle range, both by slowing battery chemistry and increasing energy demands for regulating passenger compartment temperature, which can adversely affect consumers’ perceptions of electric car suitability in locations with such climates (International Council on Clean Transportation, 2024).

Electric cars are most effective in regions with low-carbon electricity grids (International Transport Forum, 2020; Verma et al., 2022). This includes countries with high hydro power (including Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and parts of Canada such as British Columbia and Quebec), nuclear energy (such as France), and renewables (including Portugal, New Zealand, and parts of the United States, including California and some of the Northwest) (IEA, 2024). Electric car adoption is growing rapidly in a number of regions. For future scaling, targeting countries with supportive policies, renewable energy potential, and growing urban populations will deliver the greatest climate benefits.

Action Word
Mobilize
Solution Title
Electric Cars
Classification
Highly Recommended

Lawmakers and Policymakers
  • Create government procurement policies to transition government fleets to electric cars.
  • Provide financial incentives such as tax breaks, subsidies, or grants for electric car production and purchases that gradually reduce as market adoption increases.
  • Provide complimentary benefits for electric car drivers, such as privileged parking areas, free tolls, and access schemes.
  • Use targeted financial incentives to assist low-income communities in purchasing electric cars and to incentivize manufacturers to produce more affordable options.
  • Develop charging infrastructure, ensuring adequate spacing between stations and equitable distribution of stations.
  • Invest in R&D or implement regulations to improve manufacturing, adoption, supply chain standards, and circularity of electric cars, particularly batteries.
  • Transition fossil fuel electricity production to renewables while promoting the transition to electric cars.
  • Disincentivize fossil fuel–powered car ownership by gradually introducing taxes, penalties, buy-back programs, or other mechanisms.
  • Offer educational resources and one-stop shops for information on electric vehicles, including demonstrations, cost savings, environmental impact, and maintenance.
  • Work with industry and labor leaders to construct new electric car plants and to transition fossil fuel–powered car manufacturing into electric car production.
  • Set regulations for sustainable use of electric car batteries and improve recycling infrastructure.
  • Join international efforts to promote and ensure that environmental and human rights standards are met for supply chains.
  • Incentivize or mandate life-cycle assessments and product labeling (e.g., Environmental Product Declarations).
  • Create, support, or join partnerships that offer information, training, and general support for electric car adoption.

Further information:

Practitioners
  • Produce and sell affordable electric car models.
  • Collaborate with dealers to provide incentives, low-interest financing, or income-based payment options.
  • Develop charging infrastructure, ensuring adequate spacing between stations and equitable distribution of stations.
  • Invest in R&D to improve manufacturing, adoption, supply chain standards, and circularity of electric cars, particularly batteries.
  • Offer educational resources and one-stop shops for information on electric cars, including demonstrations, cost savings, environmental impact, and maintenance.
  • Work with policymakers and labor leaders to construct new electric car plants and to transition fossil fuel–powered car manufacturing into electric car production.
  • Join international efforts to promote and ensure that environmental and human rights standards are met for supply chains.
  • Invest in recycling and circular economy infrastructure.
  • Conduct life-cycle assessments and ensure product labeling (e.g., Environmental Product Declarations).
  • Create, support, or join partnerships that offer information, training, and general support for electric car adoption.

Further information:

Business Leaders
  • Set company procurement policies to transition corporate fleets to electric cars.
  • Take advantage of any financial incentives such as tax breaks, subsidies, or grants for electric car purchases.
  • Create long-term purchasing agreements with electric car manufacturers to support stable demand and improve economies of scale.
  • Install charging stations and offer employee benefits for electric car drivers, such as privileged parking areas.
  • Invest in R&D to improve manufacturing, adoption, supply chain standards, and circularity of electric cars, particularly batteries.
  • Work with industry and labor leaders to transition fossil fuel–powered car manufacturing into electric car production.
  • Advocate for financial incentives and policies that promote electric car adoption.
  • Join international efforts to promote and ensure that environmental and human rights standards are met for supply chains.
  • Educate customers and investors about the company's transition to electric cars and encourage them to learn more about them.
  • Create, support, or join partnerships that offer information, training, and general support for electric car adoption.

Further information:

Nonprofit Leaders
  • Set organizational procurement policies to transition fleets to electric cars.
  • Take advantage of financial incentives such as tax breaks, subsidies, or grants for electric car purchases.
  • Advocate for financial incentives and policies that promote electric car adoption.
  • Install charging stations and offer employee benefits for electric car drivers, such as privileged parking areas.
  • Advocate for or provide improved charging infrastructure.
  • Offer workshops or support to low-income communities for purchasing and owning electric cars.
  • Work with industry and labor leaders to transition fossil fuel–powered car manufacturing into electric car production.
  • Join international efforts to promote and ensure that environmental and human rights standards are met for supply chains.
  • Advocate for regulations on lithium-ion batteries and investments in recycling facilities.
  • Offer educational resources and one-stop shops for information on electric cars, including demonstrations, cost savings, environmental impact, and maintenance.
  • Create, support, or join partnerships that offer information, training, and general support for electric car adoption.

Further information:

Investors
  • Invest in electric car companies.
  • Support portfolio companies in transitioning their corporate fleets.
  • Invest in companies that provide charging equipment or installation.
  • Invest in R&D to improve manufacturing, adoption, supply chain standards, and circularity of electric cars, particularly batteries.
  • Invest in electric car companies, associated supply chains, and end-user businesses like rideshare apps.
  • Join international efforts to promote and ensure that environmental and human rights standards are met for supply chains.
  • Create, support, or join partnerships that offer information, training, and general support for electric car adoption. 

Further information:

Philanthropists and International Aid Agencies
  • Set organizational procurement policies to transition fleets to electric cars.
  • Install charging stations and offer employee benefits for electric car drivers, such as privileged parking areas.
  • Take advantage of any financial incentives such as tax breaks, subsidies, or grants for electric car purchases.
  • Advocate for financial incentives and policies that promote electric car adoption.
  • Advocate for or provide improved charging infrastructure.
  • Offer financial services such as low-interest loans or grants for purchasing electric cars and charging equipment.
  • Offer workshops or support to low-income communities for purchasing and owning electric cars.
  • Work with industry and labor leaders to transition fossil fuel–powered car manufacturing into electric car production.
  • Join international efforts to promote and ensure that environmental and human rights standards are met for supply chains.
  • Advocate for regulations on lithium-ion batteries and investments in recycling facilities.
  • Offer educational resources and one-stop shops for information on electric cars, including demonstrations, cost savings, environmental impact, and maintenance.
  • Create, support, or join partnerships that offer information, training, and general support for electric car adoption.

Further information:

Thought Leaders
  • If purchasing a new car, buy an electric car.
  • Take advantage of financial incentives such as tax breaks, subsidies, or grants for electric car purchases.
  • Share your experiences with electric cars through social media and peer-to-peer networks, highlighting the cost savings, benefits, incentive programs, and troubleshooting tips.
  • Advocate for financial incentives and policies that promote electric car adoption.
  • Advocate for improved charging infrastructure.
  • Help improve the circularity of electric car supply chains through design, advocacy, or implementation.
  • Conduct in-depth life-cycle assessments of electric cars in particular geographies.
  • Research ways to reduce weight and improve the performance of electric cars while appealing to customers.
  • Join international efforts to promote and ensure that environmental and human rights standards are met for supply chains.
  • Create, support, or join partnerships that offer information, training, and general support for electric car adoption.

Further information:

Technologists and Researchers
  • Improve the circularity of supply chains for electric car components.
  • Reduce the amount of critical minerals required for electric car batteries.
  • Innovate low-cost methods to improve safety, labor standards, and supply chains in mining for critical minerals.
  • Research ways to reduce weight and improve the performance of electric cars while appealing to customers.
  • Develop vehicle-grid integration and feasible means of using the electrical capacity of electric cars to manage the broader grid.
  • Improve techniques to repurpose used electric car batteries for stationary energy storage.
  • Develop methods of converting fossil fuel–powered car manufacturing and infrastructure to electric.

Further information:

Communities, Households, and Individuals
  • If purchasing a new car, purchase an electric car.
  • Take advantage of any financial incentives such as tax breaks, subsidies, or grants for electric car purchases.
  • Share your experiences with electric cars through social media and peer-to-peer networks, highlighting the cost-savings, benefits, incentive programs, and troubleshooting tips.
  • Help shift the narrative around electric cars by demonstrating capability and performance.
  • Advocate for financial incentives and policies that promote electric car adoption.
  • Advocate for improved charging infrastructure.
  • Help improve ciricularity of electric car supply chains.
  • Join international efforts to promote and ensure that environmental and human rights standards are met for supply chains.
  • Create, support, or join partnerships that offer information, training, and general support for electric car adoption.

Further information:

“Take Action” Sources
Evidence Base

Consensus of effectiveness in reducing emissions: Mixed

There is a high level of consensus among major organizations and researchers working on climate solutions that electric cars offer a substantial reduction in GHG emissions compared to fossil fuel–powered cars. This advantage is strongest in places where electricity in the grid comes from sources with low GHG emissions, but it persists even if fossil fuels play a major role in energy production. 

Major climate research organizations generally see electric cars as the primary means of reducing GHG emissions from passenger transportation. This perspective has received criticism from some scholars who argue that electric cars have been overstated as a climate solution, pointing to supply constraints, embodied emissions, and emissions from electricity generation (Jones, 2019; Milovanoff et al., 2020). Embodied emissions are outside the scope of this assessment. 

The IPCC (2022) estimated well-to-wheel (upstream and downstream emissions) GHG emissions intensity from gasoline and diesel cars at 139 g CO₂‑eq/pkm and 107 g CO₂‑eq/pkm, respectively. They estimated that electric cars running on low-carbon electricity (solar, wind, and nuclear sourced) emit 9 g CO₂‑eq/pkm; electric cars running on natural gas electricity emit 104 g CO₂‑eq/pkm; and electric cars running entirely on coal electricity emit 187 g CO₂‑eq/pkm. These estimates include upstream emissions, such as those from oil refining and coal mining.

The IEA (2024) noted that “[a] battery electric car sold in 2023 will emit half as much as fossil fuel–powered equivalents over its lifetime. This includes full life-cycle emissions, including those from producing the car.” 

The ITF (2020) estimated that fossil fuel–powered cars emit 162 g CO₂‑eq/pkm, while electric cars emit 125 g CO₂‑eq/pkm. This included embodied and upstream emissions, which are outside the scope of this assessment.

The results presented in this document summarize findings from 15 reviews and meta-analyses and 24 original studies reflecting current evidence from 52 countries, primarily the IEA’s Electric Vehicle Outlook (2024), the Electric Vehicle Database (2024), the International Transportation Forum’s life cycle analysis on sustainable transportation (2020), and the Nickel Institute’s cost estimates on electric cars (Nickel Institute, 2021a, 2021b, 2021c). We recognize this limited geographic scope creates bias, and hope this work inspires research and data sharing on this topic in underrepresented regions.

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Mobilize Electric Seated Scooters & Motorcycles

Sector
Transportation
Mode
Cut Emissions
Cluster
Electrify Vehicles
Image
a pack of electric motorcycles
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Key Takeaways

  • Electric seated scooters and motorcycles represent the most electrified road transport segment globally, with electric models representing about 9% of the fleet. 
  • Electric scooters and motorcycles produce substantially fewer GHG emissions than comparable fossil fuel–powered models.
  • Electric scooter and motorcycle adoption is growing rapidly, led by China and India but expanding across Latin America  and other emerging markets.
  • Electric scooters’ and motorcycles’ low operating costs, compact size, and charging flexibility make them well suited to urban and peri-urban travel, delivery, and passenger services.
  • Wider adoption of electric scooters and motorcycles requires affordable vehicles, safe and reliable charging, battery standards, and stronger road-safety measures.
Summary

Electric scooters and motorcycles are battery-powered two- and three-wheeled vehicles that provide low-emissions mobility. This category of transport includes electric mopeds, motorbikes, seated motor scooters, motorcycles, and three-wheel vehicles, such as e-rickshaws and e-tuk-tuks. Electric scooters and motorcycles run on rechargeable batteries and are powered by electric motors rather than fossil fuel–powered internal combustion engines (ICEs), helping reduce transport-related GHG emissions. Pedal-assist (pedelecs) are covered in our Mobilize Electric Bicycles solution. Standing e-scooters/trotinettes and throttle-assisted bicycles are excluded because shared models have a short life cycle and in general are less beneficial from a climate standpoint than walking and biking, which they tend to replace (Fearnley & Veisten, 2025).

Income & work,Health
Air quality
Description for Social and Search
Mobilize Electric Scooters & Motorcycles is a highly recommended climate solution.
Overview

Electric scooters and motorcycles use electricity stored in batteries to power an electric motor, providing mobility similar to conventional fossil fuel–powered two- and three-wheelers while generating significantly lower GHG emissions because they replace fossil-fuel combustion with electricity (Barreiros, 2020; Carranza et al., 2022; Cox & Mutel, 2018; International Transport Forum, 2020, 2023b; La Fleur et al., 2024; Mera & Bieker, 2023; Montoya-Torres et al., 2023; Schneider at al., 2023; Tuayharn et al., 2015). 

Because of their efficiency, compact size, and affordability, electric scooters and motorcycles are particularly effective as transportation modes in urban and peri-urban areas. These vehicles are a low-emissions transport mode, especially when powered with renewable electricity. Electric scooters and motorcycles are also increasingly used for delivery services, shared fleets, ride-hailing, and formal and informal shared rental systems, helping displace car or fossil fuel–powered motorcycle trips that typically result in high per-person GHG emissions.

Safety issues, informal charging infrastructure, and concerns surrounding equitable access are the principal challenges standing in the way of broader adoption of electric scooters and motorcycles, particularly in emerging economies where most electric two- and three-wheelers operate (La Fleur et al., 2024). Meanwhile, emissions benefits related to electric scooters and motorcycles are typically lower in regions with carbon-intensive electricity. These vehicles may also offer fewer GHG emissions reductions benefits in areas with strong pre-existing public transportation systems, especially if broader adoption of electric scooters and motorcycles triggers a decrease in public transit use. Finally, electric two- and three-wheelers generate higher GHG emissions and provide fewer health benefits than do pedal-assisted electric bicycles; nevertheless, electric scooters and motorcycles remain far more efficient than cars in terms of GHG emissions (International Transport Forum, 2020).

In addition to reducing emissions of GHGs such as CO₂, methane, and nitrous oxide, electric scooters and motorcycles eliminate tailpipe pollutants such as nitrogen oxides and particulate matter, lower fossil-fuel use, and reduce noise (International Transport Forum, 2023a). They also provide an immediate and practical pathway for creating cleaner, more equitable cities.

References

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International Energy Agency. (2025b). Breakthrough agenda report 2025 [Report]. Link to source: https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/6f3b4ad7-b1aa-4791-b363-e4efe58cbb83/BreakthroughAgendaReport2025.pdf 

International Transport Forum. (2020). Good to go? Assessing the environmental performance of new mobility [Corporate partnership board report]. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/International Transport Forum. Link to source: https://www.itf-oecd.org/good-to-go-environmental-performance-new-mobility 

International Transport Forum. (2023a). ITF transport outlook 2023 [Report]. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1787/b6cc9ad5-en 

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Jaramillo, P., Ribeiro, S. K., Newman, P., Dhar, S., Diemuodeke, O. E., Kajino, T., Lee, D. S., Nugroho, S. B., Ou, X., Strømman, A. H., & Whitehead, J. (2022). Transport. In P. R. Shukla, J. Skea, R. Slade, A. Al Khourdajie, R. van Diemen, D. McCollum, M. Pathak, S. Some, P. Vyas, R. Fradera, M. Belkacemi, A. Hasija, G. Lisboa, S. Luz, & J. Malley (Eds.), Climate change 2022: Mitigation of climate change. Contribution of working group III to the sixth assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change (pp. 1049–1160). Cambridge University Press. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009157926.012

Kamakaté, F., & Gordon, D. (2009). Managing motorcycles: Opportunities to reduce pollution and fuel use from two- and three-wheeled vehicles [Report]. International Council on Clean Transportation. Link to source: https://theicct.org/publication/managing-motorcycles-opportunities-to-reduce-pollution-and-fuel-use-from-two-and-three-wheeled-vehicles/

Kerr, G. H., Goldberg, D. L., & Anenberg, S. C. (2021). COVID-19 pandemic reveals persistent disparities in nitrogen dioxide pollution. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 118(30), Article e2022409118. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2022409118

Kumar, P. (2020, November 3). Busting the cost barrier: Why electric three-wheelers make business sense. World Resources Institute India. Link to source: https://wri-india.org/blogs/busting-cost-barrier-why-electric-three-wheelers-make-business-sense

Kumar, P., & Chakrabarty, S. (2020). Total cost of ownership analysis of the impact of vehicle usage on the economic viability of electric vehicles in India. Transportation Research Record: Journal of the Transportation Research Board, 2674(11), 563–572. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1177/0361198120947089 

Kumar, P., & Singh, A. (2024). Emerging opportunities for battery swapping in the electric two-wheeler segment in India. Transportation Research Record: Journal of the Transportation Research Board, 2678(1), 568–582. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1177/03611981231171916

La Fleur, L., Lindkvist, E., Trångteg, R., Winter, S., & Thollander, P. (2024). Riding the future: Environmental, primary energy and economic analysis of an electric motorcycle - A Kenyan case study. Energy for Sustainable Development, 83, Article 101573. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esd.2024.101573

Mera, Z., & Bieker, G. (2023). Comparison of the life-cycle greenhouse gas emissions of combustion engine and electric passenger cars and two-wheelers in Indonesia [ICCT report]. International Council on Clean Transportation. Link to source: https://theicct.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/ID-17-%E2%80%93-LCA-Indonesia_report_final2.pdf 

Montoya-Torres, J., Akizu-Gardoki, O., & Iturrondobeitia, M. (2023). Measuring life-cycle carbon emissions of private transportation in urban and rural settings. Sustainable Cities and Society, 96, Article 104658. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scs.2023.104658

Pan, S., Yu, W., Fulton, L. M., Jung, J., Choi, Y., & Gao, H. O. (2023). Impacts of the large-scale use of passenger electric vehicles on public health in 30 US. metropolitan areas. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 173, Article 113100. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2022.11310

Patil, M., Bandhu Majumdar, B., & Kumar Sahu, P. (2022). A comparative evaluation of the total cost of ownership between electric two-wheelers and motorized two-wheelers from an Indian perspective. Transportation Research Record: Journal of the Transportation Research Board, 2676(5), 526–550. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1177/03611981221077087 

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Schneider, F., Castillo Castro, D. S., Weng, K.-C., Shei, C.-H., & Lin, H.-T. (2023). Comparative life cycle assessment (LCA) on battery electric and combustion engine motorcycles in Taiwan. Journal of Cleaner Production, 406, Article 137060. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2023.137060

Sheng, N., Zhou, X., & Zhou, Y. (2016). Environmental impact of electric motorcycles: Evidence from traffic noise assessment by a building-based data mining technique. Science of The Total Environment, 554–555, 73–82. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2016.02.148

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Credits

Lead Fellows

  • Heather Jones, Ph.D.

Contributors

  • Ruthie Burrows, Ph.D.

  • James Gerber, Ph.D.

  • Daniel Jasper

  • Alex Sweeney

Internal Reviewers

  • Nina-Francesca Farac, Ph.D.

  • Heather McDiarmid, Ph.D.

  • Amanda D. Smith, Ph.D.

Effectiveness

Electric scooters and motorcycles offer savings of 54.4 t CO₂‑eq /million pkm on a 100-year basis, compared with fossil fuel–powered models (Table 1) (Ayetor et al., 2023; Barreiros, 2020; Carranza et al., 2022; Cox & Mutel, 2018; International Transport Forum, 2020, 2023b; Mera & Bieker, 2023; Montoya-Torres et al., 2023; Polanco Vásquez et al., 2025; Schneider et al., 2023; Tuayharn et al., 2015). Every trip shifted from fossil fuel–powered models to electric models helps avoid GHG emissions by eliminating tailpipe emissions and replacing gasoline combustion with electricity use. Effectiveness is calculated by subtracting the per-pkm operating-phase emissions of electric models from the per-pkm operating-phase emissions of conventional fossil fuel–powered models. Furthermore, per-pkm emissions decrease as vehicle occupancy increases.

The extent of electric scooters and motorcycles’ long-term climate benefits across the vehicles’ life cycle depends on the local charging electricity grid mix. Widespread adoption of electric scooters and motorcycles supported by low-carbon grids delivers large GHG emissions reductions, while electric scooter and motorcycle usage supported by fossil fuel–dominant grids narrows the emissions advantage over ICE models (Jaramillio et al., 2022). The effectiveness of electric scooters and motorcycles is likely an underestimate in many cities, particularly in Africa, where these vehicles are well positioned to replace old two-stroke motorcycles that generate high levels of pollution due to poor maintenance, counterfeit spare parts, and weak GHG emissions enforcement (Wanyama et al., 2024).

Table 1. Effectiveness at reducing emissions.

Unit: t CO₂‑eq /million pkm, 100-yr basis

25th percentile 29.9
Mean 48.2
Median (50th percentile) 54.4
75th percentile 60.6
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Cost

While it costs US$0.08/pkm to operate a fossil fuel–powered scooter or motorcycle, it costs only US$0.06/pkm for an electric model. This results in savings of US$0.02/pkm (US$20,800/million pkm) (Ayetor et al., 2023; Carranza et al., 2022; Cox & Mutel, 2018; Kumar, 2020; Kumar & Chakrabarty, 2020; La Fleur et al., 2024; Patil et al., 2022). These direct financial costs include vehicle purchase, maintenance expenses, and fuel. As a result, relying on electric models instead of their fossil fuel–powered counterparts generates a savings of US$382/t CO₂‑eq on a 100-year basis (Table 2).

Electric scooters and motorcycles also have a lower total operating cost than do fossil fuel–powered models, despite a higher initial purchase price. This is evident in a few African countries – including Ghana, Mauritius, Rwanda, Kenya, and South Africa – due to the high cost of gasoline compared with electricity (Ayetor et al., 2023). In Ghana, gasoline cost US$7.13/gallon in 2023 while electricity cost US$0.04/kWh (Ayetor et al., 2023). However, the price difference between gasoline and electricity is much less in other countries, such as Egypt, India, and Spain (Ayetor et al., 2023; Carranza et al., 2022; Cox & Mutel, 2018; Kumar & Chakrabarty, 2020; La Fleur et al., 2024; Patil et al., 2022; United Nations Environment Programme [UNEP], 2023).

In most countries, the payback period for electric scooter and motorcycle users is about three to four years (IEA, 2020) and as short as one year with intensive use (UNEP, 2023). Other countries, such as Pakistan, have reported a payback period as low as four to six months, while India reports a payback period ranging from one to eight years (Zia et al., 2025; Patil et al., 2022).

Table 2. Cost per unit of climate impact.

Unit: 2023 US$/t CO₂‑eq ,100-year basis

Median -382
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Methods and Supporting Data

Methods and Supporting Data

Learning Curve

Very little literature exists exploring learning rates for electric scooters and motorcycles. In this analysis, we estimated a learning rate of just over 5% based on the median battery learning rate (13.5%) applied to the median battery portion (40%) of total cost (Table 3). Weiss et al. (2015) calculated a learning rate of 8% for all electric two-wheelers combined, including electric bicycles, scooters, and motorcycles. 

Lithium-ion battery prices fell 97% during the past three decades, plummeting from US$7,500/kWh in 1991 to US$181/kWh in 2018. More importantly, lithium-ion battery costs halved between 2014–2018, while capacity increased by a factor of 50,000 over the same period. 

Continuing the recent trend, battery prices declined another 8% from 2024 to 2025, dropping to US$108/kWh in 2025 (BloombergNEF, 2025). While the component of the learning rate linked to decreases in the price of lithium-ion batteries is expected to diminish in the coming years, advances in materials, design, technology, and the use of different battery types may contribute to future learning rate increases. 

Table 3. Learning rate: Drop in cost per doubling of the installed solution base.

Unit: %

25th percentile 4.2
Mean 5.4
Median (50th percentile) 5.4
75th percentile 6.7
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Speed of Action

Speed of action refers to how quickly a climate solution physically affects the atmosphere after it is deployed. This is different from speed of deployment, which is the pace at which solutions are adopted.

At Project Drawdown, we define the speed of action for each climate solution as emergency brake, gradual, or delayed.

Mobilize Electric Seated Scooters & Motorcycles is a GRADUAL climate solution. It has a steady, linear impact on the atmosphere. The cumulative effect over time builds as a straight line.

Caveats

The climate effectiveness of electric scooters and motorcycles depends strongly on the GHG emissions intensity of the electricity used for charging (Jaramillo et al., 2022). Additionally, it is important to consider that real-world performance and user acceptance of electric scooters and motorcycles can hinge on charging convenience and reliability. Even though many models can charge from standard sockets and some can use swapping, limited access to safe, affordable charging at home, work, or in public can constrain the degree to which electric scooters and motorcycles can be driven in practice (IEA, 2025b). Finally, in places where battery swapping is part of the charging strategy for electric scooters and motorcycles, the lack of common standards and interoperability (including battery form factors, connectors, communication protocols, and locking interfaces) can fragment markets and limit cross-brand usability, reducing the convenience benefits that swapping is meant to provide. 

Current Adoption

With approximately 79 million electric scooters and motorcycles in use worldwide – which corresponds to roughly 9% of the total global stock of nearly 859 million scooters and motorcycles (IEA, 2025a) – we estimated that electric scooters and motorcycles travel 865 billion pkm/yr (Table 4). We assumed this travel would occur on fossil fuel–powered scooters and motorcycles if electric scooters and motorcycles were not used. Adoption rates of electric scooters and motorcycles are much higher in countries such as China, where the global electric scooters and motorcycles stock share in 2024 was 39%.

To convert this number into pkm traveled via electric scooters and motorcycles, we needed to determine the median distance that each scooter and motorcycle travels per year. Using data from several different countries, the median scooter and motorcycle travels about 10,950 vehicle-kilometers (vkm)/yr. The vehicle occupancy was assumed to be one passenger per vehicle (International Transport Forum, 2020), making vkm equal to pkm. While occupancy is likely higher, reliable data are scarce; however, generally speaking increases in occupancy reduce GHG emissions and lower cost per pkm. Multiplying this number by the number of electric scooters and motorcycles in use (79 million) provides the total travel distance shifted (865 billion pkm/yr) from fossil fuel–powered scooters and motorcycles to their electric equivalents.

Table 4. Current (2024) adoption level.

Unit: million pkm/yr

25th percentile 409,000
Mean 1,336,000
Median (50th percentile) 865,000
75th percentile 1,580,000
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Adoption Trend

Globally, the pkm driven via electric scooters and motorcycles rather than via fossil fuel–powered scooters and motorcycles increases by a median of about 110 billion pkm/yr (Table 5). Electric scooters and motorcycles purchases grew 22%/yr between 2019–2024 (IEA, 2025a). Global purchases of electric scooters and motorcycles are increasing by roughly 10 million vehicles/yr (IEA, 2025a).

Table 5. 2019–2024 adoption trend.

Unit: million pkm/yr

25th percentile 41,000
Mean 166,000
Median (50th percentile) 110,000
75th percentile 200,000
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Adoption Ceiling

The total adoption ceiling for electric scooters and motorcycles is equal to the total passenger distance driven via scooters and motorcycles worldwide. Using the median distance traveled per vehicle annually, this translates to about 9.4 trillion pkm traveled per year (Table 6).

Replacing every fossil fuel–powered scooter and motorcycle with an electric scooter or motorcycle would require not only a major scale-up of electric scooter and motorcycle manufacturing (both vehicles and batteries), but also the rapid deployment of convenient charging options at homes, workplaces, and public locations, and cost reductions to make the purchase price of electric models affordable across income groups. While ambitious, this transition is technically possible. Electric scooters and motorcycles are already being produced at scale in several markets with new capacity being quickly added. Meanwhile, continued declines in battery cost – plus expanding charging and battery-swapping networks – can make widespread replacement both practical and cost-effective (IEA, 2025a).

Table 6. Adoption ceiling

Unit: million pkm/yr

25th percentile 4,444,000
Mean 14,526,000
Median (50th percentile) 9,403,000
75th percentile 17,174,000
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Achievable Adoption

The achievable adoption of electric scooter and motorcycle travel is roughly 6–8 trillion pkm/yr shifted from fossil fuel–powered ICE vehicles.

Various organizations and researchers have forecast future electric scooter and motorcycle adoption trends. These are not assessments of feasible adoption per se; rather, they are predictions of likely rates of adoption, given various assumptions about the future (Anup et el., 2021; Gupta et al., 2023; IEA, 2025a; Kumar & Singh, 2024; UNEP, 2023). Nevertheless, these forecasts are useful considering the sheer number of variables they take into account. To convert these estimates of future likely adoption into estimates of the achievable adoption range, we applied some optimistic assumptions to the numbers in the scenario projections. 

To identify a lower feasible rate of adoption of electric scooters and motorcycles, we took the highest projected rate of electric scooters and motorcycles stock share by 2030, which was 60% in India according to Anup et al. (2021). This translates to 515 million electric scooters and motorcycles – or 5.6 trillion pkm/yr traveled via electric scooters and motorcycles.

To identify a high rate of adoption of electric scooters and motorcycles, we assumed that every country could reach the highest rate of adoption projected to occur for any country. Kumar and Singh (2024) predict that India could reach 80% electric scooters and motorcycles sales share by 2030; such a high share of sales would allow the stock share to quickly approach the rate of sales. We therefore set our high adoption rate at 80% adoption worldwide, which corresponds to 687 million electric scooters and motorcycles in use and 7.5 trillion pkm/yr traveled via electric scooters and motorcycles (Table 7). 

Table 7. Range of achievable adoption levels.

Unit: million pkm/yr

Current adoption 865,000
Achievable – low 5,642,000
Achievable – high 7,522,000
Adoption ceiling (physical limit) 9,403,000
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Electric scooters and motorcycles currently displace 0.05 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr of GHG emissions from the transportation system on a 100-yr basis (Table 8). 

If electric scooters and motorcycles achieve 60% of the global scooters and motorcycles stock share – as Anup et al. (2021) projects will take place in India (our low achievable adoption estimate) – then with the current total number of scooters and motorcycles on the road, electric scooters and motorcycles will displace 0.31 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr of GHG emissions on a 100-yr basis.

If electric scooters and motorcycles reach 80% of global scooters and motorcycles stock share – our high achievable adoption estimate, as Kumar and Singh (2024) estimate might eventually happen in sales (that would lead to stock) in India – they will displace 0.41 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr of GHG emissions on a 100-yr basis.

And if electric scooters and motorcycles replace 100% of the global fleet of scooters and motorcycles – the adoption ceiling – they will displace 0.51 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr of GHG emissions on a 100-yr basis.

These estimates are based on the present-day emissions intensity from electrical grids; if grids become cleaner over time, the cumulative climate benefits of electric scooters and motorcycles would be even greater.

Table 8. Climate impact at different levels of adoption.

Unit: Gt CO₂‑eq/yr, 100-yr basis

Current adoption 0.05
Achievable – low 0.31
Achievable – high 0.41
Adoption ceiling (physical limit) 0.51
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Additional Benefits

Income and Work

While the up-front cost of electric scooters and motorcycles is generally higher than that of fossil fuel–powered ICE scooters and motorcycles, electric scooter users and motorcyclists can save money on fuel costs once the initial costs are covered. Depending on mileage driven and fuel costs, the up-front cost can usually be recouped in three to four years (IEA, 2020) or if used intensively, in about one year (UNEP, 2023).

Health

Since electric scooters and motorcycles do not have tailpipe emissions, they can mitigate exposure to traffic-related air pollution, which is associated with asthma, lung cancer, increased emergency department visits for respiratory disease, and increased mortality (Anenberg et al., 2019; Guarnieri & Balmes, 2014; Pan et al., 2023; Pennington et al., 2024; Requia et al., 2018; Szyszkowicz et al., 2018). Fossil fuel–powered motorcycles also emit toxic compounds such as benzene, formaldehyde, and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, which are associated with increased cancer risk and short-term respiratory conditions (Kamakaté & Gordon, 2009). 

Communities rich in racial and ethnic minorities tend to be located near highways and major traffic corridors, making those communities disproportionately exposed to air pollution compared to neighboring areas (Kerr et al., 2021). As a result, transitioning to electric scooters and motorcycles could improve community health in marginalized urban neighborhoods near highways (Pennington et al., 2024). These health benefits would prove particularly important for people in densely populated cities – especially in low- and middle-income countries where scooters and motorcycles are widely used and where air quality is often poor (La Fleur et al., 2024). It should be noted some of these benefits depend on the type of fuel used for electricity generation and could displace air pollution from urban centers to more rural areas near power plants. 

Fossil fuel–powered ICE scooters and motorcycles can be very noisy, especially if they are not maintained regularly. In urban areas where motorcycles are a common choice for transportation, adopting electric motorcycles could improve noise pollution, which is a major chronic concern in cities across Asia and Africa (Kamakaté & Gordon, 2009; Hernandez et al., 2019; Sheng et al., 2016).

Air Quality

With the rapid growth of scooter use in urban areas of low- and middle-income countries, more widespread adoption of electric scooters could improve air pollution in densely populated areas where air quality is often a major concern. Increased adoption of electric scooters and motorcycles also reduces emissions of air pollutants associated with tailpipes, including particulate matter, sulfur oxides, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide, and volatile organic compounds (Requia et al., 2018). 

Risks

Electricity often costs less per pkm than gasoline, and electric scooter and motorcycle maintenance can be cheaper than maintenance for fossil fuel–powered ICE scooters and motorcycles. These factors lower marginal travel costs, which may increase pkm traveled for some users – partially offsetting GHG emissions benefits. This is a form of the rebound effect, where efficiency gains are offset by increased travel demand (Jaramillo et al., 2022).

If electric scooter and motorcycle fleets grow at a rate that outpaces the implementation of relevant safety measures, road safety could worsen given scooters and motorcycles already account for a large share of road traffic deaths worldwide. Rapid uptake of electric scooters and motorcycles in the absence of safer infrastructure, speed management, helmets, and enforcement could increase injuries and fatalities (World Health Organization [WHO], 2022). 

Interactions with Other Solutions

Reinforcing

Electric scooters and motorcycles reinforce non-car transportation modes by extending reach, offering first- and last-mile connections, and providing flexible options where fixed-route services are limited.

Competing 

Electric scooters and motorcycles compete with alternatives to cars for the same traffic share. Once people have access to a scooter or motorcycle – electric or otherwise – they tend to use it frequently, to the detriment of other modes of transportation.

Dashboard

Solution Basics

million passenger kilometers (million pkm)

t CO₂-eq (100-yr)/unit
029.954.4median
units/yr
Current 865,000 05.642×10⁶7.522×10⁶
Achievable (Low to High)

Climate Impact

Gt CO₂-eq (100-yr)/yr
Current 0.05 0.310.41
US$ per t CO₂-eq
-382
Gradual

CO₂ , CH₄, N₂O

Trade-offs

Many electric scooters and motorcycles can charge from a standard household socket. Some areas also have battery swapping, meaning that infrastructure requirements for electric scooters and motorcycles are much lower than those for electric cars. However, there are still infrastructure requirements associated with electric scooter and motorcycle usage because riders need reliable, safe, and affordable access to charging or swapping, which can be a barrier for people who park on-street, live in multi-unit housing, or lack secure electricity access. For high-utilization commercial users such as delivery riders or motorcycle taxis, availability and uptime are critical, whereas downtime can lead to reduced earnings and weaken the business case for electrification (IEA, 2025b).

Action Word
Mobilize
Solution Title
Electric Seated Scooters & Motorcycles
Classification
Highly Recommended

Lawmakers and Policymakers
  • Set national goals for transitioning transportation to low- and no-emission vehicles; include ambitious targets for shifting to electric models of scooters and motorcycles.
  • Create government procurement policies to transition government fleets to electric models of scooters and motorcycles.
  • Provide financial incentives – such as subsidies, tax breaks, grants, and low-interest loans – for consumers, retailers, and manufacturers; provide targeted incentives and support for battery-swapping stations to help develop the market for electric scooters and motorcycles; offer financial assistance to low- and middle-income communities to purchase electric scooters and motorcycles.
  • Collaborate at the international level to develop manufacturing and safety standards to facilitate trade and adoption.
  • Simultaneously transition fossil-fuel electricity production to renewables while promoting the transition to electric scooters and motorcycles.
  • Implement performance and emissions standards; gradually increase stringency of standards; consider phasing out fossil fuel–powered ICE vehicles; simultaneously unroll incentive policies to make adoption both easier and more affordable for retailers and drivers alike.
  • Develop charging and battery-swapping infrastructure, ensuring adequate spacing between stations and equitable distribution of stations; consider regulations to require standard sockets in electric scooters and motorcycles.
  • Construct dedicated lanes for scooters and motorcycles in addition to protected lanes for nonmotorized vehicles and e-bikes; include guardrails and/or demarcations to separate dedicated lanes from other traffic; construct bypasses around bus stops and public transportation; dedicate tunnels and passages, if necessary, to improve safety; optimize traffic signals to ensure traffic flow isn’t disrupted.
  • Set green manufacturing standards – including incentives or requirements for products such as green aluminum and steel – if possible and practicable. 
  • Develop recovery and recycling programs for both electric and fossil fuel–powered ICE models; implement buyback programs to facilitate upgrades to electric scooters and motorcycles; set minimum standards for recyclability and to guarantee the inclusion of recycled materials in electric scooters and motorcycles, and gradually increase the stringency of those standards; set clear guidelines for collection points for recycled materials and adhere to standards for acceptable origins of recycled materials. 
  • Collaborate with industry leaders to develop battery standards for performance, interoperability, and battery-swapping stations, and diversify supply chains for batteries and other necessary components to enhance domestic production capabilities.
  • Set standards for carbon emissions, raw material usage, water footprint, and environmental impact for batteries on the market; gradually increase stringency of those standards to reduce environmental impact; encourage or require battery components to be recyclable and use recycled material when possible; set legal requirements for batteries to be replaceable; consider requiring the use of product passports for batteries, ensuring the passport includes operationally-relevant information such as diagnostics, individual identification numbers, and information on repair, reuse, and recycling (in addition to environmental impact information). 
  • Increase funding for agencies responsible for road safety and ensure strong enforcement of safety regulations; rapidly expand safety measures such as improving infrastructure and road conditions, enforcing speed management, implementing legal requirements for helmets, and introducing load limits to reduce risks; support public education initiatives and the creation of visible road signage; encourage the use of reflective gear and protective clothing for drivers and passagers; develop and enforce laws related to alcohol impairment while driving; consider mandating speed governors.
  • Create and/or mandate dedicated parking spots for electric scooters and motorcycles, ensuring equitable distribution; include incentives for placing charging and battery-swapping stations at these lots if possible.
  • Extend vehicle recall and audit programs to include electric scooters and motorcycles.
  • Require compulsory skill testing for licenses or permits to drive scooters and motorcycles; offer retraining programs for drivers upgrading to electric scooters and motorcycles from their fossil fuel–powered equivalents; require vehicle registration and offer green vehicle designations for preferential treatment for parking and access to recreational parks.
  • Support workforce development programs to improve technician and retailer skills and knowledge; create focused programs for handling and repairing batteries and tire repair; ensure workforce development programs include and seek to recruit women technicians; create dedicated hotlines for discrimination in the sector.
  • Expand taxi regulations to include electric scooters and motorcycles; require specific permits and safety features for these taxis.
  • Join international efforts to promote environmental and human rights standards and ensure those standards are met with regard to electric scooter and motorcycle supply chains.
  • Offer one-stop shops for information on electric scooters and motorcycles, including demonstrations and educational resources on cost savings, environmental impact, and maintenance; include information helpdesks to support retailers and consumers. 
  • Create, support, or join partnerships that offer information, training, and general support for electric scooters and motorcycle adoption.

Further information:

Practitioners
  • Help policymakers set national goals for transitioning transportation to low- and no-emission vehicles; assist policymakers in developing ambitious targets for shifting to electric scooter and motorcycle models.
  • Take advantage of financial incentives to sell, repair, recycle, or manufacture electric scooters and motorcycles.
  • Ensure electric scooters and motorcycles include standard safety features such as anti-lock brake systems, daytime running headlights, and diagnostic dashboards to alert drivers to maintenance issues.
  • Develop charging and battery-swapping infrastructure, ensuring adequate spacing between stations and equitable distribution of stations.
  • Sell safety equipment and consider offering deals that include helmets, reflective gear, and protective clothing for those purchasing an electric scooter or motorcycle.
  • Invest in R&D to improve manufacturing, adoption, supply chain standards, and circularity of electric scooters and motorcycles, particularly batteries.
  • Offer warranties for both vehicles and batteries comparable or better than warranties offered for fossil fuel–powered ICE models.
  • Create vehicle- and ride-sharing schemes for electric scooters and motorcycles.
  • Work with policymakers and other industry leaders to diversify supply chains and create domestic production capabilities.
  • Recycle and recover material from batteries as quickly as possible – and avoid hoarding batteries in expectation of future compensation – to improve the circularity of the industry. 
  • Gather consent-based data on rider information and patterns; make onboard interfaces compatible with WiFi; update software regularly to improve performance, facilitate driver feedback, and increase product longevity. 
  • Develop, create, or work with battery-swapping businesses, helping promote interoperability and customer awareness; consider models such as leasing and battery-as-a-service, which allow customers to use and swap batteries without owning them.
  • Join international efforts to promote environmental and human rights standards and ensure those standards are met with regard to electric scooter and motorcycle supply chains.
  • Offer one-stop shops for information on electric scooters and motorcycles, including demonstrations and educational resources on cost savings, environmental impact, and maintenance; include information helpdesks to support retailers and consumers. 
  • Create, support, or join partnerships that offer information, training, and general support for electric scooters and motorcycle adoption.

Further information:

Business Leaders
  • Set company procurement policies to transition corporate fleets to electric models of scooters and motorcycles.
  • Take advantage of any financial incentives, such as tax breaks, subsidies, or grants for electric scooter and motorcycle purchases.
  • Create long-term purchasing agreements with manufacturers to support stable demand and improve economies of scale.
  • Install charging and battery-swapping stations; offer employee benefits for electric scooter or motorcycle drivers, such as privileged parking areas.
  • Invest in R&D to improve manufacturing, adoption, supply chain standards, and circularity of electric scooters and motorcycles, particularly batteries.
  • Advocate for financial incentives and policies that promote electric scooter and motorcycle adoption.
  • Join international efforts to promote environmental and human rights standards and ensure those standards are met with regard to electric scooter and motorcycle supply chains.
  • Educate customers and investors about the company's transition to electric models of scooters and motorcycles; encourage them to learn more about these alternatives to fossil fuel–powered scooters and motorcycles.
  • Create, support, or join partnerships that offer information, training, and general support for electric scooters and motorcycle adoption.

Further information:

Nonprofit Leaders
  • Work with policymakers to help set national goals for transitioning transportation to low- and no-emission vehicles; assist policymakers in developing ambitious targets for shifting to electric scooter and motorcycle model adoption.
  • Advocate for financial incentives for consumers, retailers, and manufacturers, such as subsidies, tax breaks, grants, and low-interest loans; recommend providing targeted incentives and support for battery-swapping stations to help develop the market for electric scooters and motorcycles; offer financial assistance to low- and middle-income communities to purchase electric scooters and motorcycles.
  • Work at the international level to develop manufacturing and safety standards to facilitate trade and adoption.
  • Advocate to transition fossil fuel electricity production to renewables while promoting the transition to electric scooters and motorcycles.
  • Push for ambitious performance and emissions standards; suggest gradually increasing stringency of standards; consider advocating for the phasing out of fossil fuel–powered ICE vehicles; advocate simultaneously for public incentives to make adoption easier and affordable for retailers and drivers alike.
  • Help develop, plan, and design charging and battery-swapping infrastructure, ensuring adequate spacing between stations and equitable distribution of stations; advocate for regulations to require standard sockets in electric scooters and motorcycles.
  • Develop recovery and recycling programs for both electric and fossil fuel–powered ICE models; offer buyback programs to facilitate upgrades to electric scooters and motorcycles; advocate for minimum standards for recyclability and to guarantee the inclusion of recycled materials in electric scooters and motorcycles, and gradually increase the stringency of those standards; help set clear guidelines for collection points for recycled materials and adhere to standards for acceptable origins of recycled materials. 
  • Collaborate with policymakers and key industry players to develop battery standards for performance, interoperability, and battery swapping stations. 
  • Work with policymakers and industry leaders to diversify supply chains for batteries and other necessary components and create domestic production capabilities.
  • Help set standards for carbon emissions, raw material use, water footprint, and environmental impact for batteries on the market; advocate for the gradual increase of standards to reduce environmental impact; advocate for requirements for battery components to be recyclable and use recycled material when possible; help set legal requirements for batteries to be replaceable; advocate for the use of product passports for batteries, ensuring the passport includes operationally-relevant information such as diagnostics, individual identification numbers, and information on repair, reuse, and recycling (in addition to environmental impact information). 
  • Advocate for increased funding for agencies responsible for road safety and encourage strong enforcement of safety regulations; help plan for expanding safety measures, such as improving infrastructure and road conditions, enforcing speed management, implementing legal requirements for helmets, and introducing load limits to reduce risks; support public education initiatives and the creation of visible road signage; encourage the use of reflective gear and protective clothing for drivers and passengers; develop and enforce laws for alcohol impairment while driving; consider mandating speed governors.
  • Call on policymakers to require dedicated parking spots for electric scooters and motorcycles, ensuring equitable distribution; advocate for incentives for placing charging and battery-swapping infrastructure at these lots if possible.
  • Administer vehicle recall and audit programs for electric scooters and motorcycles.
  • Offer road-safety retraining programs for drivers upgrading to electric scooters and motorcycles; advocate for green vehicle designations and preferential treatment for parking and access to recreational parks.
  • Develop and/or support workforce development programs to improve technician and retailer skills and knowledge; create focused programs for handling and repairing batteries and tire repair; ensure workforce development programs include and seek to recruit women technicians; create dedicated hotlines for discrimination in the sector.
  • Offer one-stop shops for information on electric scooters and motorcycles, including demonstrations and educational resources on cost savings, environmental impact, and maintenance; include information helpdesks to support retailers and consumers. 
  • Join international efforts to promote environmental and human rights standards and ensure those standards are met with regard to electric scooter and motorcycle supply chains.
  • Create, support, or join partnerships that offer information, training, and general support for electric scooters and motorcycle adoption.

Further information:

Investors
  • Invest in electric scooter and motorcycle companies and start-ups, including battery and component suppliers.
  • Explore investment opportunities that address supply chain issues such as battery suppliers and maintenance providers.
  • Invest in companies conducting R&D to improve electric scooter and motorcycle performance, decrease the need for materials, and reduce maintenance costs.
  • Invest in electric scooter- and motorcycle-sharing systems.
  • Offer concessional financing for companies transitioning fleets to electric scooters and motorcycles.
  • Invest in companies developing charging and battery-swapping infrastructure for electric scooters and motorcycles.
  • Join international efforts to promote environmental and human rights standards and ensure those standards are met with regard to electric scooter and motorcycle supply chains.
  • Create, support, or join partnerships that offer information, training, and general support for electric scooters and motorcycle adoption.

Further information:

Philanthropists and International Aid Agencies
  • Work with policymakers to help set national goals for transitioning transportation to low- and no-emission vehicles; assist policymakers in developing ambitious targets for shifting to electric models of scooters and motorcycles.
  • Advocate for financial incentives for consumers, retailers, and manufacturers, such as subsidies, tax breaks, grants, and low-interest loans; recommend providing targeted incentives and support for battery-swapping stations to help develop the market for electric scooters and motorcycles; offer financial assistance to low- and middle-income communities to purchase electric scooters and motorcycles.
  • Provide grants for electric scooter and motorcycle companies and start-ups, including battery and component suppliers.
  • Explore opportunities that address supply chain issues such as battery suppliers and maintenance providers.
  • Offer financing for companies conducting R&D to improve electric scooter and motorcycle performance, decrease the need for materials, and reduce maintenance costs.
  • Support systems for sharing electric scooters and motorcycles.
  • Offer grants or financing for companies developing charging and battery-swapping infrastructure for electric scooters and motorcycles.
  • Work at the international level to develop manufacturing and safety standards to facilitate trade and adoption.
  • Advocate to transition fossil-fuel electricity production to renewables while promoting the transition to electric scooters and motorcycles.
  • Push for ambitious performance and emissions standards; suggest gradually increasing stringency of standards; consider advocating for the phasing out of fossil fuel–powered ICE vehicles; advocate simultaneously for public incentives to make adoption easier and affordable for retailers and drivers alike.
  • Help develop, plan, and design charging and battery-swapping infrastructure, ensuring adequate spacing between stations and equitable distribution of stations; advocate for regulations to require standard sockets in electric scooters and motorcycles.
  • Develop recovery and recycling programs for both electric and fossil fuel–powered ICE models; offer buyback programs to facilitate upgrades to electric scooters and motorcycles; advocate for minimum standards for recyclability and to guarantee the inclusion of recycled materials in electric scooters and motorcycles, and gradually increase the stringency of those standards; help set clear guidelines for collection points for recycled materials and adhere to standards for acceptable origins of recycled materials. 
  • Collaborate with policymakers and the industry to develop battery standards for performance, interoperability, and battery-swapping stations.
  • Work with policymakers and industry leaders to diversify supply chains for batteries and other necessary components and create domestic production capabilities.
  • Help set standards for carbon emissions, raw material use, water footprint, and environmental impact for batteries on the market; advocate for the gradual increase of standards to reduce impact; advocate for requirements for battery components to be recyclable and use recycled material when possible; help set legal requirements for batteries to be replaceable; advocate for the use of product passports for batteries, ensuring the passport includes operationally relevant information such as diagnostics, individual identification numbers, and information on repair, reuse, and recycling (in addition to environmental impact information). 
  • Advocate for or provide increased funding for agencies responsible for road safety and encourage strong enforcement of safety regulations; help plan for expanding safety measures such as improving infrastructure and road conditions, enforcing speed management, implementing legal requirements for helmets, and introducing load limits to reduce risks; support public education initiatives and the creation of visible road signage; encourage the use of reflective gear and protective clothing for drivers and passengers; advocate for laws for alcohol impairment while driving; consider mandating speed governors.
  • Call on policymakers to require dedicated parking spots for electric scooters and motorcycles, ensuring equitable distribution; advocate for incentives for placing charging and battery swapping infrastructure at these lots if possible.
  • Support or help administer vehicle recall and audit programs for electric scooters and motorcycles.
  • Offer or support road safety retraining programs for drivers upgrading to electric scooters and motorcycles; advocate for green vehicle designations and preferential treatment for parking and access to recreational parks.
  • Develop and/or support workforce development programs to improve technician and retailer skills and knowledge; create focused programs for handling and repairing batteries and tire repair; ensure workforce development programs include and seek to recruit women technicians; create dedicated hotlines for discrimination in the sector.
  • Offer one-stop shops for information on electric scooters and motorcycles, including demonstrations and educational resources on cost savings, environmental impact, and maintenance; include information helpdesks to support retailers and consumers. 
  • Join international efforts to promote environmental and human rights standards and ensure those standards are met with regard to electric scooter and motorcycle supply chains.
  • Create, support, or join partnerships that offer information, training, and general support for electric scooters and motorcycle adoption.

Further information:

Thought Leaders
  • Help policymakers set national goals for transitioning transportation to low- and no-emission vehicles; assist policymakers in developing ambitious targets for shifting to electric models of scooters and motorcycles.
  • Advocate for financial incentives for consumers, retailers, and manufacturers, such as subsidies, tax breaks, grants, and low-interest loans; recommend providing targeted incentives and support for battery-swapping stations to help develop the market for electric scooters and motorcycles; advocate for financial assistance for low- and middle-income communities to purchase electric scooters and motorcycles.
  • Work at the international level to develop manufacturing and safety standards to facilitate trade and adoption.
  • Advocate to transition fossil fuel electricity production to renewables while promoting the transition to electric scooters and motorcycles.
  • Push for ambitious performance and emissions standards; suggest gradually increasing stringency of standards; consider advocating for the phasing out of fossil fuel–powered ICE vehicles; advocate simultaneously for public incentives to make adoption easier and affordable for retailers and drivers alike.
  • Help develop, plan, and design charging and battery-swapping infrastructure, ensuring adequate spacing between stations and equitable distribution of stations; advocate for regulations to require standard sockets in electric scooters and motorcycles.
  • Help develop certification programs for manufacturers of electric scooters and motorcycles to ensure quality and safety before mass production.
  • Develop recovery and recycling programs for both electric and fossil fuel–powered ICE models; offer buyback programs to facilitate upgrades to electric scooters and motorcycles; advocate for minimum standards for recyclability and to guarantee the inclusion of recycled materials in electric scooters and motorcycles, and gradually increase the stringency of those standards; help set clear guidelines for collection points for recycled materials and adhere to standards for acceptable origins of recycled materials. 
  • Collaborate with policymakers and the industry to develop battery standards for performance, interoperability, and battery-swapping stations.
  • Help set standards for carbon emissions, raw material use, water footprint, and environmental impact for batteries on the market; advocate for the gradual increase of standards to reduce impact; advocate for requirements for battery components to be recyclable and use recycled material when possible; help set legal requirements for batteries to be replaceable; advocate for the use of product passports for batteries, ensuring the passport includes operationally-relevant information such as diagnostics, individual identification numbers, and information on repair, reuse, and recycling (in addition to environmental impact information). 
  • Advocate for increased funding for agencies responsible for road safety and encourage strong enforcement of safety regulations; help plan for expanding safety measures, such as improving infrastructure and road conditions, enforcing speed management, implementing legal requirements for helmets, and introducing load limits to reduce risks; support public education initiatives and the creation of visible road signage; encourage the use of reflective gear and protective clothing for drivers and passengers; develop and enforce laws for alcohol impairment while driving; consider mandating speed governors.
  • Call on policymakers to require dedicated parking spots for electric scooters and motorcycles, ensuring equitable distribution; advocate for incentives for placing charging stations at these lots if possible.
  • Help create one-stop shops for information on electric scooters and motorcycles, including demonstrations and educational resources on cost savings, environmental impact, and maintenance; include information helpdesks to support retailers and consumers. 
  • Join international efforts to promote environmental and human rights standards and ensure those standards are met with regard to electric scooter and motorcycle supply chains.
  • Create, support, or join partnerships that offer information, training, and general support for electric scooters and motorcycle adoption.

Further information:

Technologists and Researchers
  • Conduct research and development on promising battery technology, such as sodium-ion and solid-state batteries.
  • Help create modular designs for batteries to improve maintenance, recovery of materials, and battery swapping.
  • Create more durable batteries to withstand high heat; create safeguards against overcharging and electrolyte leaks; improve performance, range, and rate of discharge of batteries.
  • Improve recyclability and circularity of supply chains for electric scooter and motorcycle vehicles and batteries.
  • Design batteries to reduce the required amount of critical minerals.
  • Innovate low-cost methods to improve safety, labor standards, and supply chains in mining for critical minerals.
  • Develop methods of converting fossil fuel–powered scooter and motorcycle manufacturing and infrastructure to electric.

Further information:

Communities, Households, and Individuals
  • If purchasing a new scooter or motorcycle, purchase an electric model; consider upgrading fossil fuel–powered ICE models to their electric counterparts.
  • Take advantage of any financial incentives offered, such as tax breaks, subsidies, or grants for purchases.
  • Share your experiences with electric scooters and motorcycles through social media and peer-to-peer networks, highlighting cost savings, benefits, incentive programs, and troubleshooting tips.
  • Help shift the narrative around electric scooters and motorcycles by demonstrating the vehicles’ capability and performance.
  • Advocate for financial incentives for consumers, retailers, and manufacturers, such as subsidies, tax breaks, grants, and low-interest loans; recommend providing targeted incentives and support for battery swapping stations to help develop the market for electric scooters and motorcycles; advocate for financial assistance to low- and middle-income communities to purchase electric scooters and motorcycles.
  • Propose increased funding for agencies responsible for road safety and encourage strong enforcement of safety regulations; help plan for expanding safety measures, such as improving infrastructure and road conditions, enforcing speed management, implementing legal requirements for helmets, and introducing load limits to reduce risks; support public education initiatives and the creation of visible road signage; encourage the use of reflective gear and protective clothing for drivers and passengers; develop and enforce laws for alcohol impairment while driving; consider mandating speed governors.
  • Call on policymakers to require dedicated parking spots for electric scooters and motorcycles, ensuring equitable distribution; advocate for incentives for placing charging and battery-swapping infrastructure at these lots if possible.

Further information:

“Take Action” Sources
Evidence Base

Consensus of effectiveness in decarbonizing the transport sector: High

A high level of consensus exists among major organizations working in the climate solutions arena that mobilizing electric scooters and motorcycles can offer a substantial reduction in GHG emissions. This segment of the transportation sector is already the most electrified in road transport globally, with roughly 79 million electric scooters and motorcycles on the road – or about 9% of the global fleet. IEA (2024) notes that full electrification of this segment is “within reach” with stronger policy support. Worldwide, road transport was responsible for more than 6 Gt CO₂ ‑eq emissions in 2024; more than 90% of those emissions came from cars and vans (60%) and trucks (33%), whereas only 7% of those emissions were generated by scooters and motorcycles (IEA, 2025a). 

Electric scooters and motorcycles have been found to reduce external environmental costs as well, suggesting they can help accelerate the shift toward more sustainable transport systems (Carranza et al., 2022). Electric scooters and motorcycles generally outperform fossil fuel–powered scooter and motorcycle models in terms of environmental indicators (Montoya-Torres et al., 2023), and can retain advantages even when charged using electricity generated primarily from coal (Cox & Mutel, 2018).

The results presented in our analysis summarize findings from 14 original studies and seven reports reflecting current evidence from 23 countries. We recognize this limited geographic scope creates bias, and hope this work inspires research and data sharing on this topic in underrepresented regions.

Updated Date
Coming Soon Label
Coming Soon

Mobilize Electric Bicycles

Sector
Transportation
Mode
Cut Emissions
Cluster
Electrify Vehicles
Image
Parent riding electric bicycle with children seated in back carrier
Coming Soon
Off
Summary

We define the Mobilize Electric Bicycles solution as increased travel by bicycles that have an electric motor to supplement the effort of the rider, but require the rider to turn the pedals to activate the motor. Some sources refer to electric mopeds or motorcycles as electric bicycles, but those modes of transportation fall within Project Drawdown’s Mobilize Electric Scooters & Motorcycles solution and are not covered here. Also known as pedelecs or e-bikes, electric bicycles can be deployed as privately owned electric bicycles or as shared electric bicycles, which are available as part of bicycle sharing networks typically operated at the city level for short-term rental on a per-trip basis.

Income & work,Health
Air quality
Description for Social and Search
Mobilize Electric Bicycles is a Highly Recommended climate solution. Electric bikes reduce the need for car trips and so cut GHG emissions.
Overview

Electric bicycles use electric power to supplement the muscular effort of the rider. Like conventional bicycles and other forms of nonmotorized transportation, electric bicycles get some of their motive power from human muscle power, which in turn comes from food calories – a form of closed-loop biomass power with no emissions (see Improve Nonmotorized Transportation). Unlike conventional bicycles, however, electric bicycles get added power from electricity, which comes from the grid and is stored in a battery.

This partial reliance on grid electricity, as well as the production of the battery and electric motors, increases the carbon emissions and cost of an electric bicycle compared to those of a conventional bicycle. Nevertheless, electric bicycle emissions remain far lower than the emissions of cars (including electric cars), meaning that every passenger-kilometer (pkm) moved from a car to an electric bicycle achieves significant GHG emissions savings. 

Since the additional electric power enables electric bicycle riders to cover longer distances at greater speeds, climb larger hills, and carry heavier loads – and do it all with substantially less physical effort – electric bicycles can substitute for more car trips than conventional bicycles can. This can amplify electric bicycles’ potential carbon savings relative to conventional bicycles, even if the savings per pkm traveled are lower. Electric bicycles also tend to get used at high rates, and a large proportion of pkm by electric bicycle are pkm that would otherwise have been by car (Bigazzi & Wong, 2020; Bourne et al., 2020; Cairns et al., 2017; Fukushige et al., 2021).

Shared electric bicycles can enhance this effect. The need for docking stations and rebalancing services (i.e., the use of larger vehicles to reposition bicycles to avoid one-way trips that create shortages in some places and surpluses in others) increases the carbon emissions of electric bicycles per pkm compared with private electric bicycles. By renting out electric bicycles one trip at a time, however, bicycle-share systems can make electric bicycles affordable to a larger percentage of the public, further increasing the number of pkm that can be shifted to electric bicycles.

The adoption of electric bicycles reduces emissions of CO₂ and methane from cars by displacing pkm traveled via car. When electric bicycles replace a trip by a gasoline- or diesel-powered car, they also eliminate reliance on fossil fuels to complete that trip. Even if the electricity used to power electric bicycles comes from fossil fuels, those emissions are relatively small and could eventually be replaced with low-emission electricity through the deployment of renewables or similar technologies.

References

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Bigazzi, A., & Wong, K. (2020). Electric bicycle mode substitution for driving, public transit, conventional cycling, and walking. Transportation Research Part D: Transport and Environment, 85, 102412. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trd.2020.102412

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Hanna, J. (2023). Bike Share Toronto 2023 business review. Link to source: https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2023/pa/bgrd/backgroundfile-240804.pdf 

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Huang, Y., Jiang, L., Chen, H., Dave, K., & Parry, T. (2022). Comparative life cycle assessment of electric bikes for commuting in the UK. Transportation Research Part D: Transport and Environment, 105, 103213. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trd.2022.103213 

Innovation Origins. (2023). The booming rise of shared e-bikes in urban mobility. Link to source: https://innovationorigins.com/en/the-booming-rise-of-shared-e-bikes-in-urban-mobility/ 

International Transport Forum. (2020). Good to Go? Assessing the Environmental Performance of New Mobility (Corporate Partnership Board). OECD. Link to source: https://www.itf-oecd.org/sites/default/files/docs/environmental-performance-new-mobility.pdf

Jones, B. (2019). Electric Bike Maintenance Cost. BicycleVolt. Link to source: https://bicyclevolt.com/electric-bike-maintenance-cost/ 

Koning, M., & Conway, A. (2016). The good impacts of biking for goods: Lessons from Paris city. Case Studies on Transport Policy, 4(4), 259-268. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cstp.2016.08.007

Langford, B. C., Chen, J., & Cherry, C. R. (2015). Risky riding: Naturalistic methods comparing safety behavior from conventional bicycle riders and electric bike riders. Accident Analysis & Prevention, 82, 220-226. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aap.2015.05.016

Langford, B. C., Cherry, C. R., Bassett, D. R., Fitzhugh, E. C., & Dhakal, N. (2017). Comparing physical activity of pedal-assist electric bikes with walking and conventional bicycles. Journal of Transport & Health, 6, 463–473. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jth.2017.06.002

Li, Q., Fuerst, F., & Luca, D. (2023). Do shared E-bikes reduce urban carbon emissions? Journal of Transport Geography, 112, 103697. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtrangeo.2023.103697

Luxe Digital. (2025). The best electric bikes: upgrade your commute for a sustainable ride. Luxe Digital. Link to source: https://luxe.digital/lifestyle/garage/best-electric-bikes/ 

Matasyan, A. (2015). Technical analysis and market study of electric bicycles. Link to source: https://upcommons.upc.edu/handle/2117/77272?locale-attribute=en 

Mellino, S., Petrillo, A., Cigolotti, V., Autorino, C., Jannelli, E., & Ulgiati, S. (2017). A Life Cycle Assessment of lithium battery and hydrogen-FC powered electric bicycles: Searching for cleaner solutions to urban mobility. International Journal of Hydrogen Energy, 42(3), 1830–1840. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhydene.2016.10.146 

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N, A. (2023). Maintenance costs for an electric bike. Bike LVR. Link to source: https://bikelvr.com/bikes/e-bikes/maintenance-costs-for-an-electric-bike/ 

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PBSC Urban Solutions. (2022). The Meddin Bike-sharing World Map Report 2022 edition. Link to source: https://bikesharingworldmap.com/reports/bswm_mid2022report.pdf

Pekow, C. (2024, April 1). E-bikes could cut smog, energy use and congestion globally—But will they? Mongabay Environmental News. Link to source: https://news.mongabay.com/2024/04/e-bikes-could-cut-smog-energy-use-and-congestion-globally-but-will-they/

Philips, I., Anable, J., & Chatterton, T. (2022). E-bikes and their capability to reduce car CO2 emissions. Transport Policy, 116, 11-23. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tranpol.2021.11.019

Platt, S. M., Haddad, I. E., Pieber, S. M., Huang, R.-J., Zardini, A. A., Clairotte, M., Suarez-Bertoa, R., Barmet, P., Pfaffenberger, L., Wolf, R., Slowik, J. G., Fuller, S. J., Kalberer, M., Chirico, R., Dommen, J., Astorga, C., Zimmermann, R., Marchand, N., Hellebust, S., … Prévôt, A. S. H. (2014). Two-stroke scooters are a dominant source of air pollution in many cities. Nature Communications, 5(1), 3749. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1038/ncomms4749

Precedence Research. (2024). E-bike market poised for robust expansion | CAGR of 10.16%. Link to source: https://www.precedenceresearch.com/insights/e-bike-market 

Roberts, C. (2023). Diversity in passenger mobility: Where it went and how to bring it back. One Earth, 6(1), 11-13. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.oneear.2022.12.008

Roberts, C. (2020). Into a headwind: Canadian cycle commuting and the growth of sustainable practices in hostile political contexts. Energy Research and Social Science, 70. Scopus. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2020.101679

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Credits

Lead Fellows

  • Cameron Roberts, Ph.D.

  • Heather Jones, Ph.D.

Contributors

  • Ruthie Burrows, Ph.D.

  • James Gerber, Ph.D.

  • Yusuf Jameel, Ph.D.

  • Daniel Jasper

  • Heather McDiarmid, Ph.D.

  • Alex Sweeney

Internal Reviewers

  • Aiyana Bodi

  • Hannah Henkin

  • Ted Otte

  • Amanda D. Smith, Ph.D.

Effectiveness

Per 1,000 private electric bicycles, approximately 110.5 t CO₂‑eq/yr is offset by displacing trips taken by higher-emission transportation modes such as cars and public transit (Table 1a). 

Per 1,000 shared electric bicycles, approximately 14.44 t CO₂‑eq/yr is offset (Table 1b). This lower value is due to the additional emissions produced in the operation of a shared electric-bicycle system (e.g., due to the need to reposition bicycles after they accumulate in some locations while becoming depleted in others). Additionally, other modes of transportation are shifted to shared electric bicycles at different rates than privately owned electric bicycles – notably shifted less from car travel. These factors limit the total GHG emissions reduced per shared electric bicycle.

Table 1. Effectiveness at reducing emissions.

Unit: t CO₂‑eq /1,000 electric bicycles/yr, 100-yr basis

25th percentile 55.87
Mean 136.1
Median (50th percentile) 110.5
75th percentile 220.5

Unit: t CO₂‑eq /1,000 electric bicycles/yr, 100-yr basis

25th percentile 1.415
Mean 14.62
Median (50th percentile) 14.44
75th percentile 34.31
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Cost

Electric bicycles vary significantly in cost, but generally are more expensive than traditional bicycles due to the cost of batteries, motors, and other electronic components, as well as the need for more durable mechanical components. 

Private electric bicycles cost about US$2,700, plus another few hundred dollars per year in maintenance costs. All told, assuming a 10-year lifespan, electric bicycles cost about US$600/yr to operate . The average privately owned electric bicycle is ridden 2,400 km/yr; since 28.67% of that distance is shifted from car trips, electric bicycles displace approximately 688 pkm/yr traveled by car. Car travel costs US$0.53/pkm while electric bicycle travel costs US$0.25/pkm, meaning every pkm traveled via electric bicycle saves US$0.28. Multiplied over 688 pkm/yr, this translates to every electric bicycle saving its owner approximately US$193/yr in avoided car trips (Bucher et al., 2019; Carracedo & Mostofi, 2022; eBicycles, 2025a; Ebike Canada, 2025; Gössling et al., 2019; Helton, 2025; Huang et al., 2022; International Transport Forum, 2020; Jones, 2019; Luxe Digital, 2025; Mellino et al., 2017; N, 2023; So, 2024; Weiss et al., 2015).

Most of the costs of riding an electric bicycle are up-front costs. As a result, electric bicycle owners who shift more trips from a car onto their electric bicycle will significantly increase their savings. Privately owned electric bicycles save US$1,748 for every t CO₂‑eq they avoid (Table 2a).

Shared electric bicycles are more expensive to the system provider than privately owned electric bicycles due to greater needs for infrastructure, maintenance, operating expenses, and services, such as rebalancing. Shared electric bicycles cost US$2.42/pkm and displace an average of 156 pkm/yr from car trips per bicycle. The same distance traveled by car costs US$83, meaning that shared electric bicycles cost an additional US$295/yr compared to traveling the same distance by car (Gössling et al., 2019; Guidon et al., 2018; Hanna, 2023; Matasyan, 2015; Summit Bike Share, 2023). Shared electric bicycles cost US$22,860/t CO₂‑eq avoided due to their higher costs, higher emissions, and the lower chance that riders on shared electric bicycles would otherwise have been traveling by car (Table 2b).

Table 2. Cost per climate impact.

Unit: US$ (2023) per t CO₂‑eq , 100-year basis

Median (50th percentile) –1,748

Unit: US$ (2023) per t CO₂‑eq , 100-year basis

Median (50th percentile) 22,860

*Cost to the provider of the system, not the user

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Methods and Supporting Data

Methods and Supporting Data

Learning Curve

Learning rates for electric bicycles are often negative (i.e., prices increase with cumulative production). This is largely because electric bicycle batteries have grown larger over time, causing the bicycles to become more expensive (Dekker, 2013; Weiss et al., 2015). The learning rate per electric bicycle ranges from 15% to –43% (Table 3a). This range has improved the general value proposition of electric bicycles, however, since larger batteries enable electric bicycles to go further and faster than before.

To compensate for this, it is useful to calculate the learning rate per kWh battery capacity rather than per bicycle. On this measure, Dekker (2013) calculates a learning rate of 7.9% cost reduction per kWh of electric bicycle battery capacity for every doubling of cumulative production (Table 3b).

These estimates are based on analyses published in 2013 and 2015, respectively, and therefore do not take into account more recent advances in electric bicycle production. More up-to-date research on electric bicycle learning rates is needed to inform future assessments on this topic.

Table 3. Learning rate: drop in cost per doubling of cumulative electric bicycle production.*

Unit: %

25th percentile –43.50
Mean –26.86
Median (50th percentile) –36.00
75th percentile 15

* These data are from 2013 and 2015, due to a lack of available research on this topic.

Unit: %

Median (50th percentile) 7.9

* These data are from 2013 and 2015, due to a lack of available research on this topic.

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Speed of Action

Speed of action refers to how quickly a climate solution physically affects the atmosphere after it is deployed. This is different from speed of deployment, which is the pace at which solutions are adopted.

At Project Drawdown, we define the speed of action for each climate solution as emergency brake, gradual, or delayed.

Mobilize Electric Bicycles is a GRADUAL climate solution. It has a steady, linear impact on the atmosphere. The cumulative effect over time builds as a straight line.

Caveats

Electric bicycles do not only compete with cars for the total passenger transport demand; a given electric bicycle trip might also substitute for public transit. This can sometimes still be beneficial since, as electric bicycles often have lower per-kilometer emissions than public transit vehicles (International Transport Forum, 2020). However, an electric bicycle trip might also substitute for a conventional bicycle trip or for a pedestrian journey, in which case electric bicycle usage would actually increase emissions. Finally, some electric bicycle trips are new journeys, meaning that they would not occur at all if the traveler did not have an electric bicycle, which also increases emissions (Astegiano et al., 2019; Berjisian & Bigazzi, 2019; Bourne et al., 2020; Cairns et al., 2017; Dekker, 2013).

Generally speaking however, electric bicycles still shift enough passenger car trips to make up for this effect, although the scale can be more marginal with shared electric bicycle systems. However, electric bicycles are more likely to substitute more for whichever forms of transportation their users were already using previously (Wamburu et al., 2021). This means that wider adoption of electric bicycles in car-dependent North American suburbs, for example, will have a much clearer and more beneficial climate impact than in a dense, pedestrianized European city center, or in a low-income country where most people do not have access to a car (although in these contexts electric bicycles could still produce major social and economic benefits).

Our estimates of the total adoption ceiling potential of electric bicycles (described in the Adoption section) are based on the ratio of adoption between electric bicycles and cars, on the grounds that each electric bicycle avoids some amount of car travel. However, the relationship is not necessarily quite so simple. Car trips with passengers might require more than one electric bicycle trip to replace them (unless the passengers are children, who can be carried as passengers on electric bicycles). On the other side of the equation, some households own more than one car per person. Having more than one electric bicycle per car would therefore not meaningfully reduce car trips. Lastly, our approach of tracking electric bicycle adoption in relation to car ownership neglects people whose use of an electric bicycle enables them to avoid owning a car at all. Estimates of adoption should be taken as rough guesses, rather than authoritative forecasts.

Current Adoption

Private electric bicycles have experienced significant growth since 2015. We estimate there are approximately 278 million private electric bicycles in use in the world today (Table 4a). 

Data on this subject typically include throttle-assisted electric bicycles, e-scooter/trotinettes, and sometimes mopeds and motorcycles; these are not included in this solution. Data from China, the highest adopter of electric bicycles, does not usually distinguish between types of electric two-wheelers. For this reason, we used more conservative estimates, preferring to understate adoption than overstate it. We used several global estimates, data on electric bicycle sales in Canada, the United States, and Europe, and stock estimates from the Asia-Pacific region (eBicycles, 2025b; Mordor Intelligence, 2022; Precedence Research, 2024; Stewart & Ramachandran, 2022; Strategic Market Research, 2024; The Freedonia Group, 2024). To convert from European and American sales data to stocks data, we assumed that all electric bicycles sold over the past 10 years (the lifespan of an electric bicycle) are still in use today. We then calculated the number of electric bicycles per 1,000 people in each of the three regions, used those three values to calculate a population-weighted global mean adoption rate, and multiplied the result by the number of residents of high- and upper-middle income countries worldwide (where we assume most electric bicycle adoption takes place). This calculation provided a global estimate.

Shared electric bicycle schemes now exist in many cities around the world, with at least 2 million shared electric bicycles currently in use as part of electric bicycle sharing systems (Table 4b; eBicycles, 2025b; Innovation Origins, 2023; PBSC Urban Solutions, 2022; Strategic Market Research, 2024). This is a conservative estimate because research published in a reputable academic journal claimed that China has 8.7 million shared electric bicycles in 2022 (Shi et al., 2024). 

Table 4. Current (2024) adoption level.

Unit: 1,000 electric bicycles

Population-weighted mean 277600

Unit: 1,000 electric bicycles

Population-weighted mean 2000
Left Text Column Width
Adoption Trend

Private electric bicycles are being adopted at a rate of about 37 million new bicycles every year (eBicycles, 2025b; Mordor Intelligence, 2022; Precedence Research, 2024; Stewart & Ramachandran, 2022; Strategic Market Research, 2024; The Freedonia Group, 2024; see Table 5a). Electric bicycles are also attracting interest from consumers who do not normally ride bicycles, including people in rural areas (Philips et al., 2022) and members of vulnerable groups, such as the elderly. 

Shared electric bicycles are being added to cities at a rate of approximately 413,000/yr (eBicycles, 2025b; Innovation Origins, 2023; PBSC Urban Solutions, 2022; Strategic Market Research, 2024; see Table 5b). Cities and private companies are adding shared electric bicycle systems at a rate of around 30/yr (Galatoulas et al., 2020). Based on these data, we calculate a 37.97% compounding annual growth rate in electric bicycle sharing system installations around the world. 

Table 5. 2023–2024 adoption trend.

Unit: 1,000 electric bicycles/yr

25th percentile 34000
Population-weighted mean 37330
Median (50th percentile) 38000
75th percentile 40000

Unit: 1,000 electric bicycles/yr

Median (50th percentile) 412.5
Left Text Column Width
Adoption Ceiling

Because we model electric bicycles as a solution primarily due to their ability to shift travel from fossil fuel–powered cars, we estimate adoption by reference to the ratio of electric bicycles to cars. This does not mean that people without access to a car will not use electric bicycles; it means that they are not shifting their pkm from fossil fuel–powered cars and therefore are not included in the calculations of shifting from car to electric bicycle. 

Private electric bicycles’ adoption ceiling (Table 6a) would be approximately 2 billion around the world: one for every car (World Health Organization, 2021). This would mean that every motorist has an electric bicycle as a ready alternative to a car.

Shared electric bicycles’ adoption ceiling can be measured similarly, except that we assume these systems are only viable in cities. Therefore, we set the maximum adoption ceiling of shared electric bicycles to be 1.3 billion (Table 6b) – the number of cars in cities around the world. we estimated by multiplying the global urban population (4.45 billion) by the global average car registrations per 1,000 people (286.2) (World Health Organization, 2021; World Bank, 2024).

This upper-bound scenario faces many of the same caveats as the upper-bound scenario for the Improve Nonmotorized Transportation solution. It would require a revolution in support for electric bicycles: new infrastructure, new traffic laws, a substantial increase in electric battery production capacity, and major changes to built environments, including increases in population and land-use density to make more journeys feasible by electric bicycle. However, this scenario would require less dramatic change than a similar upper-bound scenario for the Improve Nonmotorized Transportation solution because electric bicycles go faster, have higher carrying capacities, can travel longer distances, and are easier to use than nonmotorized travel modes (Weiss et al., 2015).

A limitation of this analysis is that one electric bicycle per car does not necessarily correspond to one electric bicycle per person traveling in a car. For example, it is possible that replacing one car trip with electric bicycles would result in multiple electric bicycle trips in order to carry multiple passengers. Our estimates should therefore be seen as approximate. 

It is also possible for total electric bicycle adoption and usage to exceed car use (i.e., electric bicycles also replace other modes of transportation or generate new trips). We do not consider this scenario in our adoption ceiling because additional adoption above car adoption would not produce a major climate benefit.

Table 6. Adoption ceiling.

Unit: 1,000 electric bicycles

Adoption ceiling 2022000

Unit: 1,000 electric bicycles

Adoption ceiling 1273000
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Achievable Adoption

Private electric bicycles are currently in use across the Asia-Pacific region at a rate of approximately 0.07 electric bicycles for every car. A low achievable adoption rate might see every country in the world achieve this same ratio, which would lead to a global electric bicycle fleet of 421 million (Table 7a). For a higher rate of adoption, we posit one electric bicycle in use for every two cars. This would see just more than 1 billion electric bicycles in use worldwide.

Using the median and 75th percentile of the ratio of shared electric bicycles to cars (for which we have data) as the rate of adoption seen in every city in the world leads to 22 to 69 million shared electric bicycles in cities worldwide (Table 7b).

Note: We based these estimates on electric bicycles per car rather than electric bicycles per person because the climate impact of electric bicycle adoption in a given place depends on the availability of cars to replace. 

Table 7. Range of achievable adoption levels.

Unit: 1,000 electric bicycles

Current adoption 277600
Achievable – low 421300
Achievable – high 1011000
Adoption ceiling 2022000

Unit: 1,000 electric bicycles

Current adoption 2000
Achievable – low 22010
Achievable – high 69260
Adoption ceiling 1273000
Left Text Column Width

If every motorist had an electric bicycle they used to replace at least some car trips, it would mitigate 224 Mt CO₂‑eq/yr – equal to the total global carbon emissions produced by cars, minus the emissions that would be produced due to electric bicycles traveling the same distance. If there were one electric bicycle for every two cars, it would avoid 117 Mt CO₂‑eq/yr. And if global electric bicycle adoption reached the rate currently seen in the Asia-Pacific region (China, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand), it would avoid 47 Mt CO₂‑eq/yr (Table 8a).

Our Achievable – Low scenario of 22 million shared electric bicycles in cities worldwide would save 284 kt CO₂‑eq/yr (Table 8b). Our Achievable – High scenario of 69.3 million shared electric bicycles worldwide would save 895 kt CO₂‑eq/yr. The maximum possible shared electric bicycle deployment would save approximately 16.6 Mt CO₂‑eq/yr.

Table 8. Climate impact at different levels of adoption.

Unit: Gt CO₂-eq/yr, 100-yr basis

Current adoption 0.0307
Achievable – low 0.0466
Achievable – high 0.1117
Adoption ceiling 0.2235

Unit: Gt CO₂-eq/yr, 100-yr basis

Current adoption 0.00002584
Achievable – low 0.0002844
Achievable – high 0.0008949
Adoption ceiling 0.01645
Left Text Column Width
Additional Benefits

Income and Work

In addition to being cheaper than car travel, electric bicycles allow people to travel farther and faster than they could on foot, on a conventional bicycle, or (often) on public transit. Time savings from quick, longer trips, reduced traffic congestion, and money savings provide an economic benefit (Bourne, 2020). 

Health

Electric bicycles provide quality-of-life benefits for some people who use them (Bourne, 2020; Carracedo & Mostofi, 2022; Teixeira et al., 2022; Thomas, 2022). Electric assistance reduces the physical fitness and other health benefits of cycling. However, electric bicycles still require pedaling, and studies show that this level of effort required can still have substantial health benefits (Berjisian & Bigazzii, 2019; Langford et al., 2017). Electric bicycles can also enable people to cycle who might not otherwise be able to (Bourne et al., 2020). Additionally, electric bicycles can reduce total car traffic, which could reduce the risk of injury and death from car crashes, which kill 1.2 million people annually (WHO, 2023). Similarly, electric bicycles can reduce health impacts of traffic noise (de Nazelle et al., 2011).

Air Quality

The fossil fuel–powered vehicles most similar to electric bicycles (motorcycles, scooters, etc.) are extremely polluting (Platt et al., 2014). Substituting electric bicycles for these can substantially reduce air pollution.

Risks

Electric bicycles pose some safety concerns, centering on an ongoing debate over whether electric cyclists ride more recklessly than other cyclists (Fishman & Cherry, 2016; Langford et al., 2015). While electric bicycles have a lower injury rate than conventional bicycles, when injuries do happen during electric bicycle travel the health consequences tend to be more severe due to the higher speed (Berjisian & Bigazzi, 2019). There may also be risks related to the bicycles’ lithium-ion batteries catching fire. Strong regulations can minimize this risk (Pekow, 2024). Improved infrastructure, such as separated bike lanes and paths, can also reduce the safety risks associated with electric bicycles (Roberts, 2020).

Interactions with Other Solutions

Reinforcing

Electric bicycles can complement other forms of low-carbon mobility, especially those that reduce dependence on private cars. People who rely on public transit, conventional travel, pedestrian travel, carpools, or other sustainable modes of transportation for some kinds of trips can use electric bicycles to fill in some of the gaps in their personal transportation arrangements (Roberts, 2023). For public transit in particular, electric bicycles can play an important last-mile role, enabling transit riders to more easily access stops. This is important because research suggests that the key to a low-carbon mobility system is to enable people to live high-quality lives without owning cars (Van Acker & Witlox, 2010).

Competing

Electric bicycles compete with electric and hybrid cars and electric scooters and motorcycles for adoption.

Dashboard

Solution Basics

1,000 electric bicycles

t CO₂-eq (100-yr)/unit/yr
055.87110.5median
units
Current 277,600 0421,3001.01×10⁶
Achievable (Low to High)

Climate Impact

Gt CO₂-eq (100-yr)/yr
Current 0.031 0.0470.112
US$ per t CO₂-eq
-1,748
Gradual

CO₂ , CH₄, N₂O

Solution Basics

1,000 electric bicycles

t CO₂-eq (100-yr)/unit/yr
01.41514.44median
units
Current 2,000 022,01069,260
Achievable (Low to High)

Climate Impact

Gt CO₂-eq (100-yr)/yr
Current 2.583×10⁻⁵ 2.843×10⁻⁴8.949×10⁻⁴
US$ per t CO₂-eq
22,860
Gradual

CO₂ , CH₄, N₂O, BC

Trade-offs

If an electric bicycle replaces primarily car trips, it provides an unambiguous climate benefit. If it replaces public transit, the size of the benefit will depend on the specifics of the public transit system it replaces. If it replaces pedestrian trips or conventional cycling trips, or generates new trips, the net climate benefit is negative. Travel survey data suggest that electric bicycles replace enough car journeys to more than offset any journeys by the more sustainable modes of transportation they replace (Bigazzi & Wong, 2020; Bourne et al., 2020; Cairns et al., 2017; Fukushige et al., 2021). However, electric bicycles in cities that already have very low-carbon mobility systems, or in lower-income countries where car ownership is rare, might have a net negative climate impact. 

Electric bicycles also require batteries, the production and disposal of which generates pollution (Yang et al., 2021). However, electric bicycles require much less battery capacity than many other electrification technologies, such as electric vehicles (Weiss et al., 2015).

Mt CO2–eq/yr
0–4
4–8
8–12
12–16
16–20
> 20
No data

Annual road transportation emissions, 2024

Cars are the largest source of road transportation vehicle emissions, which are shown here for urban areas.

Kott, T., Foster, K., Villafane-Delgado, M., Loschen, W., Sicurello, P., Ghebreselassie, M., Reilly, E., and Hughes, M. (2024). Transportation sector - Global road emissions [Data set]. The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL), Climate TRACE Emissions Inventory. Retrieved March 12, 2025 from Link to source: https://climatetrace.org

Mt CO2–eq/yr
0–4
4–8
8–12
12–16
16–20
> 20
No data

Annual road transportation emissions, 2024

Cars are the largest source of road transportation vehicle emissions, which are shown here for urban areas.

Kott, T., Foster, K., Villafane-Delgado, M., Loschen, W., Sicurello, P., Ghebreselassie, M., Reilly, E., and Hughes, M. (2024). Transportation sector - Global road emissions [Data set]. The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL), Climate TRACE Emissions Inventory. Retrieved March 12, 2025 from Link to source: https://climatetrace.org

Maps Introduction

Electric bicycle effectiveness in mitigating climate change varies by region, depending on the carbon intensity of the charging electricity, the extent to which they replace higher-emission travel (such as cars, motorcycles, or taxis), and the need and type of vehicle used for rebalancing shared electric bicycles (International Transport Forum, 2020). They are most effective in areas with cleaner electricity grids and where they can substitute for cars. 

Since electric bicycles are more effective when replacing cars, this means that wider adoption of electric bicycles in car-dependent regions, such as North American suburbs, will have a much more significant climate impact than in a dense, pedestrianized European city center or in a low-income country where most people do not have access to a car (although in these contexts electric bicycles could still produce significant social and economic benefits) (Wamburu et al., 2021).

Socioeconomic and infrastructural factors play a major role in adoption. These include upfront costs of private electric bicycles, availability and affordability of shared electric bicycles, supportive cycling infrastructure, and policies such as subsidies or rebates. In many countries, electric bicycles increase the accessibility of nonmotorized transport for older adults, people with disabilities, and those commuting longer distances or in hilly areas by reducing physical effort (Bourne et al., 2020).

Future geographic targets for scaling adoption with strong climate and equity outcomes include South and Southeast Asian cities (e.g., Dhaka, Jakarta, Ho Chi Minh City) with high trip density, short trip lengths, and growing pollution concerns, all of which make them ideal for adoption. Sub-Saharan African cities (e.g., Kampala, Accra) where electric bicycles could complement or replace informal motorcycle taxis, reducing emissions and improving affordability and safety, are also important targets. North America has potential as both private and shared programs are beginning to expand in urban areas, helped by municipal investment and rising consumer interest.

Action Word
Mobilize
Solution Title
Electric Bicycles
Interactive Intro

Note: Even at the highest effectiveness and adoption levels, the climate impact of shared e-bikes is negligible relative to current global emissions.

Classification
Highly Recommended

Lawmakers and Policymakers
  • Establish policies that reduce the associated time, distance, risk, and risk perception for users and potential users.
  • Provide financial incentives such as tax breaks, subsidies, or grants for electric bicycle production and purchases.
  • Use targeted financial incentives to assist low-income communities in purchasing electric bicycles and to incentivize manufacturers to produce more affordable options.
  • Develop local bicycle and charging infrastructure, such as building physically separated bicycle lanes.
  • Have locking posts installed in public spaces that can accommodate electric bicycles.
  • Increase maintenance of bicycle infrastructure, such as path clearing.
  • Create international standards for the manufacturing and classification of electric bicycles.
  • Transition fossil fuel electricity production to renewables while promoting the transition to electric bicycles.
  • Offer one-stop shops for information on electric and non-motorized bicycles, including demonstrations and educational resources on cost savings, environmental impact, and maintenance.
  • Set regulations for sustainable use of electric bicycle batteries and improve recycling infrastructure.
  • Join international efforts to promote and ensure supply chain environmental and human rights standards – particularly, for the production of batteries.
  • Create, support, or join partnerships that offer information, training, and general support for electric and non-motorized bicycle adoption.

Further information:

Practitioners
  • Share your experiences with electric bicycles, providing tips and reasons for choosing this mode of transportation..
  • Participate in local bike groups, public events, and volunteer opportunities.
  • Advocate tor local officials for infrastructure improvements and note specific locations where improvements can be made.
  • Encourage local businesses to create employee incentives.
  • Provide information and resources to help individuals, households, and business owners take advantage of state and local tax benefits or rebates for electric bicycle purchases.

Further information:

Business Leaders
  • Advocate for better cycling infrastructure and sharing systems with city officials.
  • Educate customers about local bicycle infrastructure and encourage them to engage public officials.
  • Offer employees who agree to forgo a free parking space the annualized cash value or cost of that parking space as a salary increase.
  • Provide battery recycling services.
  • Offer free classes for electric bicycle maintenance and repair; educate employees about what they should know before purchasing an electric bicycle.
  •  
  • Install locking posts, parking, and security for electric bicycles.
  • Provide adequate onsite storage and charging, create educational materials on best practices for commuting, and offer pre-tax commuter benefits to encourage employee ridership.
  • Encourage electric bicycle use in company fleets by replacing or supplementing vehicles for local deliveries or transiting between office locations.
  • Incorporate electric bicycle programs into company sustainability and emission reduction initiatives;communicate how those programs support broader company goals. 

Further information:

Nonprofit Leaders
  • Inform the public about the health and environmental benefits of electric bicycles.
  • Educate the public on government incentives for electric bicycles and how to take advantage of them.
  • Provide impartial information on local electric bicycle infrastructure, best practices for maintenance, and factors to consider when renting or buying electric bicycles.
  • Advocate to policymakers for improved infrastructure and incentives.
  • Administer public initiatives such as ride-share or buy-back programs.

Further information:

Investors
  • Invest in electric bicycle companies and start-ups, including battery and component suppliers.
  • Explore investment opportunities that address supply chain issues such as battery suppliers and maintenance providers.
  • Invest in companies conducting R&D to improve electric bicycle performance, decrease the need for materials, and reduce maintenance costs.
  • Invest in public or private electric bicycle sharing systems.
  • Finance electric bicycle purchases via low-interest loans.
  • Invest in charging infrastructure for electric bicycles.

Further information:

Philanthropists and International Aid Agencies
  • Award grants to local organizations advocating for improved bicycle infrastructure and services.
  • Support access through the distribution or discounting of electric bicycles and help educate community members about relevant incentives.
  • Strengthen local infrastructure and build local capacity for infrastructure design and construction.
  • Ensure that donated bicycles are appropriate for the environment and that recipients have access to maintenance and supplies.
  • Sponsor community engagement programs such as group bike rides or free maintenance classes.
  • Assist with local policy design.

Further information:

Thought Leaders
  • Lead by example and use an electric bicycle as a regular means of transport.
  • Focus public messages on key decision factors for commuters, such as associated health and fitness benefits, climate and environmental benefits, weather forecasts, and traffic information.
  • Showcase principles of safe urban design and highlight dangerous areas.
  • Share detailed information on local bike routes, general electric bicycle maintenance tips, items to consider when purchasing a bike, and related educational information.
  • Collaborate with schools to teach bicycle instruction, including safe riding habits and maintenance tips.

Further information:

Technologists and Researchers
  • Examine and improve elements of battery design and maintenance.
  • Improve electric bicycle infrastructure design.
  • Improve circularity, repairability, and ease of disassembly for electric bicycles.
  • Increase the physical carrying capacities for users of electric bicycles to facilitate shopping and transporting children, pets, and materials.
  • Improve other variables that increase the convenience, safety, and comfort levels of nonmotorized transportation.

Further information:

Communities, Households, and Individuals
  • Share your experiences with electric bicycles; provide tips and reasons for choosing this mode of transportation.
  • Participate in local bike groups, public events, and volunteer opportunities.
  • Advocate to employers and local businesses to provide incentives for electric bicycle usage and help start local initiatives.
  • Advocate to local officials for infrastructure improvements and note specific locations where improvements can be made.
  • Encourage local businesses to create employee incentives.

Further information:

“Take Action” Sources
Evidence Base

Consensus of effectiveness in reducing emissions: High

When people purchase electric bicycles, they tend to use them often, with many of the trips they take on electric bicycles replacing trips that would otherwise have been taken via private car (Bigazzi & Wong, 2020; Bourne et al., 2020; Cairns et al., 2017; Fukushige et al., 2021). The evidence is similarly conclusive regarding the ability of shared electric bicycles to replace a large number of car trips. However, evidence regarding the carbon benefits of shared electric bicycles is more mixed due to the additional emissions required to run a shared electric-bicycle system.

Berjiisian and Bigazzi (2019) reviewed much of the literature on electric bicycles. and found that electric bicycle trips are shifted from car trips (44%) and transit trips (12%) providing significant emissions benefits. Other net benefits include less travel by cars, lower GHG emissions and more physical activity. “E-bike adoption is expected to provide net benefits in the forms of reduced motor vehicle travel, reduced greenhouse gas emissions, and increased physical activity. A little more than half of e-bike trips are expected to shift travel from motor vehicles (44% car trips and 12% transit trips), which is sufficient to provide significant emissions benefits.”

Weiss et al. (2015) surveyed evidence of the economic, social, and environmental impacts of electric bicycles. They found that electric bicycles are more efficient and less polluting than cars. They reduce exposure to pollution as their environmental impacts come mainly from being produced and the electricity that they use, both of which are usually outside of urban areas.

Philips et al. (2022) investigated the potential for electric bicycles to replace car trips in the UK. Their geospatial model provided a good indication of what might be possible in other places and showed that electric bicycles have considerable potential in rural areas as well as urban ones. 

Li et al. (2023) reported that based on the mix of mode share replaced, shared electric bicycle trips decreased carbon emissions by 108–120 g/km carbon emissions than fossil fuel-powered cars per kilometer.”

This research is biased toward high-income countries. While there is substantial research on electric bicycles in China, that country often considers e-scooters (which do not have pedals) and throttle-assisted electric bikes as interchangeable with pedelecs electric bicycles. This made it hard to include Chinese research in our analysis. We recognize this limited geographic scope creates bias, and hope this work inspires research harmonization and data sharing on this topic in underrepresented regions in the future.

Updated Date
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