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Increase Centralized Composting

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Sector
Industry, Materials & Waste
Mode
Cut Emissions
Cluster
Use Waste as a Resource
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Centralized composting facility
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Summary

A composting system diverts organic waste (OW) from landfills, reducing the production of methane and other GHG emissions. OW is defined as the combination of food waste and green waste, composed of yard and garden trimmings. Composting transforms it into a nutrient-rich soil supplement.

Our focus is on centralized (city- or regional-level) composting systems for the OW components of municipal solid waste (MSW). Decentralized (home- and community-level) and on-farm composting are also valuable climate actions, but are not included here due to limited data availability at the global level (see Increase Decentralized Composting).

Income & work,Health,Equality
Land resources,Water resources,Air quality
Description for Social and Search
Increase Centralized Composting reduces methane and other GHG emissions by diverting organic waste from landfills to facilities that turn it into soil supplements.
Overview

There are many stages involved in a composting system to convert organic MSW into finished compost that can be used to improve soil health (Figure 1). Within this system, composting is the biochemical process that transforms OW into a soil amendment rich in nutrients and organic matter. 

Figure 1. Stages of a composting system. Solution boundaries exclude activities upstream and downstream of centralized MSW composting such as waste collection and compost application. Modified from Kawai et al. (2020) and Manea et al. (2024).

Diagram demonstrating process steps for landfill and compost materials.

Sources: Kawai, K., Liu, C., & Gamaralalage, P. J. D. (2020). CCET guideline series on intermediate municipal solid waste treatment technologies: Composting. United Nations Environment Programme; Manea, E. E., Bumbac, C., Dinu, L. R., Bumbac, M., & Nicolescu, C. M. (2024). Composting as a sustainable solution for organic solid waste management: Current practices and potential improvements.  Sustainability, 16(15), Article 6329.

The composting process is based on aerobic decomposition, driven by complex interactions among microorganisms, biodegradable materials, and invertebrates and mediated by water and oxygen (see the Appendix). Without the proper balance of oxygen and water, anaerobic decomposition occurs, leading to higher methane emissions during the composting process (Amuah et al., 2022; Manea et al., 2024). Multiple composting methods can be used depending on the amounts and composition of OW feedstocks, land availability, labor availability, finances, policy landscapes, and geography. Some common methods include windrow composting, bay or bin systems, and aerated static piles (Figure 2; Amuah et al., 2022; Ayilara et al., 2020; Cao et al., 2023).

Figure 2. Examples of commonly used centralized composting methods. Bay systems (left) move organics between different bays at different stages of the composting process. Windrows (center) are long, narrow piles that are often turned using large machinery. Aerated static piles (right) can be passively aerated as shown here or actively aerated with specialized blowing equipment.

Decentralized composting examples

Credit: Bays, iStock | nikolay100; Windrows, iStock | Jeremy Christensen; Aerated static pile, iStock | AscentXmedia

Centralized composting generally refers to processing large quantities (>90 t/week) of organic MSW (Platt, 2017). Local governments often manage centralized composting as part of an integrated waste management system that can also include recycling non-OW, processing OW anaerobically in methane digesters, landfilling, and incineration (Kaza et al., 2018). 

Organic components of MSW include food waste and garden and yard trimmings (Figure 2). In most countries and territories, these make up 40–70% of MSW, with food waste as the largest contribution (Ayilara et al., 2020; Cao et al., 2023; Food and Agriculture Organization [FAO], 2019; Kaza et al., 2018; Manea et al., 2024; U.S. Environmental Protection Agency [U.S. EPA], 2020; U.S. EPA, 2023). 

Diverting OW, particularly food waste, from landfill disposal to composting reduces GHG emissions (Ayilara et al., 2020; Cao et al., 2023; FAO, 2019). Diversion of organics from incineration could also have emissions and pollution reduction benefits, but we did not include incineration as a baseline disposal method for comparison since it is predominantly used in high-capacity and higher resourced countries and contributes less than 1% to annual waste-sector emissions (Intergovernmental Panel On Climate Change [IPCC], 2023; Kaza et al., 2018). 

Disposal of waste in landfills leads to methane emissions estimated at nearly 1.9 Gt CO₂‑eq (100-yr basis) annually (International Energy Agency [IEA], 2024). Landfill emissions come from anaerobic decomposition of inorganic waste and OW and are primarily methane with smaller contributions from ammonia, nitrous oxide, and CO₂ (Cao et al., 2023; Kawai et al., 2020; Manea et al., 2024). Although CO₂, methane, and nitrous oxide are released during composting, methane emissions are up to two orders of magnitude lower than emissions from landfilling for each metric ton of waste (Ayilara et al., 2020; Cao et al, 2023; FAO, 2019; IEA, 2024; Nordahl et al., 2023; Perez et al., 2023). GHG emissions can be minimized by fine-tuning the nutrient balance during composting. 

Depending on the specifics of the composting method used, the full transformation from initial feedstocks to finished compost can take weeks or months (Amuah et al., 2022; Manea et al., 2024; Perez et al., 2023). Finished compost can be sold and used in a variety of ways, including application to agricultural lands and green spaces as well as for soil remediation (Gilbert et al., 2020; Platt et al., 2022; Ricci-Jürgensen et al., 2020a; Sánchez et al., 2025). 

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Credits

Lead Fellow

  • Megan Matthews, Ph. D.

Contributors

  • Ruthie Burrows, Ph.D.

  • James Gerber, Ph.D.

  • Daniel Jasper

  • Alex Sweeney

Internal Reviewers

  • Aiyana Bodi

  • Hannah Henkin

  • Ted Otte

  • Sarah Gleeson, Ph. D.

  • Amanda D. Smith, Ph.D.

  • Paul C. West, Ph.D.

Effectiveness

We estimated that composting reduces emissions by 3.9 t CO₂‑eq /t OW (9.3 t CO₂‑eq /t OW, 20-yr basis) based on avoided landfill emissions minus the emissions during composting of MSW OW (Table 1). In our analysis, composting emissions were an order of magnitude lower than landfill emissions.

Table 1. Effectiveness at reducing emissions. 

Unit: t CO₂‑eq (100-yr basis)/t OW

25th percentile 2.5
Mean 3.2
Median (50th percentile) 3.9
75th percentile 4.3
Left Text Column Width

Emissions data from composting and landfilling OW are geographically limited, but our analysis includes three global reports and studies from the U.S., China, Denmark, and the EU (European Energy Agency [EEA], 2024; Industrious Labs, 2024; Perez et al., 2023; U.S. EPA, 2020; Yang et al., 2017, Yasmin et al., 2022). We assumed OW was 39.6% of MSW in accordance with global averages (Kaza et al., 2018; World Bank, 2018).

We estimated that landfills emit 4.3 t CO₂‑eq /t OW (9.9 t CO₂‑eq /t OW, 20-yr basis). We estimated composting emissions were 10x lower at 0.4 t CO₂‑eq /t OW (0.6 t CO₂‑eq /t OW, 20-yr basis). We quantified emissions from a variety of composting methods and feedstock mixes (Cao et al., 2023; Perez et al., 2023; Yasmin et al., 2022). Consistent with Amuah et al. (2022), we assumed a 60% moisture content by weight to convert reported wet waste quantities to dry waste weights. We based effectiveness estimates only on dry OW weights. For adoption and cost, we did not distinguish between wet and dry OW.

Cost

Financial data were geographically limited. We based cost estimates on global reports with selected studies from the U.K., U.S., India, and Saudi Arabia for landfilling and the U.S. and Sri Lanka for composting. Transportation and collection costs can be significant in waste management, but we did not include them in this analysis. We calculated amortized net cost for landfilling and composting by subtracting revenues from operating costs and amortized initial costs over a 30-yr facility lifetime.

Landfill initial costs are one-time investments, while operating expenses, which include maintenance, wages, and labor, vary annually. Environmental costs, including post-closure operations, are not included in our analysis, but some countries impose taxes on landfilling to incentivize alternative disposal methods and offset remediation costs. Landfills generate revenue through tip fees and sales of landfill gas (Environmental Research & Education Foundation [EREF], 2023; Kaza et al., 2018). We estimated that landfilling is profitable, with a net cost of –US$30/t OW. 

Initial and operational costs for centralized composting vary depending on method and scale (IPCC, 2023; Manea et al., 2024), but up-front costs are generally cheaper than landfilling. Since composting is labor-intensive and requires monitoring, operating costs can be higher, particularly in regions that do not impose landfilling fees (Manea et al., 2024). 

Composting facilities generate revenue through tip fees and sales of compost products. Compost sales alone may not be sufficient to recoup costs, but medium- to large-scale composting facilities are economically viable options for municipalities (Kawai et al., 2020; Manea et al., 2024). We estimated the net composting cost to be US$20/t OW. The positive value indicates that composting is not globally profitable; however, decentralized systems that locally process smaller waste quantities can be profitable using low-cost but highly efficient equipment and methods (see Increase Decentralized Composting). 

We estimated that composting costs US$50/t OW more than landfilling. Although composting systems cost more to implement, the societal and environmental costs are greatly reduced compared to landfilling (Yasmin et al., 2022). The high implementation cost is a barrier to adoption in lower-resourced and developing countries (Wilson et al., 2024). 

Combining effectiveness with the net costs presented here, we estimated a cost per unit climate impact of US$10/t CO₂‑eq (US$5/t CO₂‑eq , 20-yr basis) (Table 2). 

Table 2. Cost per unit climate impact.

Unit: US$ (2023)/t CO₂‑eq (100-yr basis)

Median 10
Left Text Column Width
Methods and Supporting Data

Methods and Supporting Data

Learning Curve

Global cost data on composting are limited, and costs can vary depending on composting methods, so we did not quantify a learning rate for centralized composting.

Speed of Action

Speed of action refers to how quickly a climate solution physically affects the atmosphere after it is deployed. This is different from speed of deployment, which is the pace at which solutions are adopted.

At Project Drawdown, we define the speed of action for each climate solution as emergency brake, gradual, or delayed.

Increase Centralized Composting is an EMERGENCY BRAKE climate solution. It has the potential to deliver a more rapid impact than nominal and delayed solutions. Because emergency brake solutions can deliver their climate benefits quickly, they can help accelerate our efforts to address dangerous levels of climate change. For this reason, they are a high priority.

Caveats

The composting process has a low risk of reversal since carbon is stored stably in finished compost instead of decaying and releasing methane in a landfill (Ayilara et al., 2020; Manea et al., 2024). However, a composting system, from collection to finished product, can be challenging to sustain. Along with nitrogen-rich food and green waste, additional carbon-rich biomass, called bulking material, is critical for maintaining optimal composting conditions that minimize GHG emissions. Guaranteeing the availability of sufficient bulking materials can challenge the success of both centralized and decentralized facilities.

Financially and environmentally sustainable composting depends not only on the quality of incoming OW feedstocks, but also on the quality of the final product. Composting businesses require a market for sales of compost products (in green spaces and/or agriculture), and poor source separation could lead to low-quality compost and reduced demand (Kawai et al., 2020; Wilson et al., 2024). Improvements in data collection and quality through good feedback mechanisms can also act as leverage for expanding compost markets, pilot programs, and growing community support.

If composting facilities close due to financial or other barriers, local governments may revert to disposing of organics in landfills. Zoning restrictions also vary broadly across geographies, affecting how easily composting can be implemented (Cao et al., 2023). In regions where centralized composting is just starting, reversal could be more likely without community engagement and local government support (Kawai et al., 2020; Maalouf & Agamuthu, 2023); however, even if facilities close, the emissions savings from past operation cannot be reversed.

Current Adoption

We estimated global composting adoption at 78 million t OW/yr, as the median between two datasets (Table 3). The most recent global data on composting were compiled in 2018 from an analysis from 174 countries and territories (World Bank, 2018). We also used an Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) analysis from 45 countries (OECD, 2021). However, there were still many countries and territories that did not report composting data in one or both datasets. Although the World Bank dataset is comprehensive, it is based on data collected in 2011–2018, so more recent, high-quality, global data on composting are needed.

Table 3. Current adoption level (2021).

Unit: t OW composted/yr

25th percentile 67,000,000
Mean 78,000,000
Median (50th percentile) 78,000,000
75th percentile 89,000,000
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Globally in 2018, nearly 40% of all waste was disposed of in landfills, 19% was recovered through composting and other recovery and recycling methods, and the remaining waste was either unaccounted for or disposed of through open dumping and wastewater (Kaza et al., 2018)

We calculated total tonnage composted using the reported composting percentages and the total MSW tonnage for each country. Composting percentages were consistently lower than the total percentage of OW present in MSW, suggesting there is ample opportunity for increased composting, even in geographies where it is an established disposal method. In 2018, 26 countries/territories had a composting rate above 10% of MSW, and 15 countries/territories had a composting rate above 20% of MSW. Countries with the highest composting rates were Austria (31%), the Netherlands (27%), and Switzerland (21%) (World Bank, 2018).

Adoption Trend

We used OECD data to estimate the composting adoption trend from 2014–2021 (OECD, 2021), which fluctuated significantly from year to year (Table 4). Negative rates indicate less OW was composted globally than in the previous year. Taking the median composting rate across seven years, we estimate the global composting trend as 260,000 t OW/yr/yr. However, the mean composting trend is –1.3 Mt OW/yr/yr, suggesting that on average, composting rates are decreasing globally. 

Table 4. Adoption trend (2014–2021).

Unit: t OW composted/yr/yr

25th percentile -1,200,000
Mean -1,300,000
Median (50th percentile) 260,000
75th percentile 4,300,000
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Although some regions are increasing their composting capacity, others are either not composting or composting less over time. Germany, Italy, Spain, and the EU overall consistently show increases in composting rates year-to-year, while Greece, Japan, Türkiye, and the U.K. show decreasing composting rates. In Europe, the main drivers for consistent adoption were disposal costs, financial penalties, and the landfill directive (Ayilara et al., 2020). 

Lack of reported data could also contribute to a negative global average composting rate over the past seven years. A large decline in composting rates from 2018–2019 was driven by a lack of data in 2019 for the U.S. and Canada. If we assumed that the U.S. composted the same tonnage in 2019 as in 2018, instead of no tonnage as reported in the data, then the annual trend for 2018–2019 is much less negative (–450,000 t OW/yr/yr) and the overall mean trend between 2014–2019 would be positive (1,400,000 t OW/yr/yr).

Adoption Ceiling

We estimate the global adoption ceiling for Increase Centralized Composting to be 1.35 billion t OW/yr (Table 5). In 2016, 2.01 Gt of MSW were generated, and generation is expected to increase to 3.4 Gt by 2050 (Kaza et al., 2018). Due to limited global data availability on composting infrastructure or policies, we estimated the adoption ceiling based on the projected total MSW for 2050 and assumed the OW fraction remains the same over time.

Table 5. Adoption ceiling. upper limit for adoption level.

Unit: t OW composted/yr

Median (50th percentile) 1,350,000,000
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In reality, amounts of food waste within MSW are also increasing, suggesting that there are sufficient global feedstocks to support widespread composting adoption (Zhu et al., 2023). 

We assume that all OW could be processed via composting, but this ceiling is unlikely to be reached. In practice, organics could also be processed via methane digesters (see Deploy Methane Digesters), incinerated, or dumped, but these waste management treatments have similar environmental risks to landfilling. 

Achievable Adoption

Since the global annual trend fluctuates, we used country-specific composting rates and organic fractions of MSW from 2018 to estimate the achievable range of composting adoption (see Appendix for an example). In our analysis, achievable increases in country-specific composting rates cannot exceed the total organic fraction of 2018 MSW. 

For the 106 countries/territories that did not report composting rates, we defined achievable levels of composting relative to the fraction of OW in MSW. When countries also did not report OW percentages, the country-specific composting rate was kept at zero. For the remaining 86 countries/territories, we assumed that 25% of organic MSW could be diverted to composting for low achievable adoption and that 50% could be diverted for high achievable adoption. 

For the 68 countries/territories with reported composting rates, we define low and high achievable adoption as a 25% or 50% increase to the country-specific composting rate, respectively. If the increased rate for either low or high adoption exceeded the country-specific OW fraction of MSW, we assumed that all organic MSW could be composted (see Appendix for an example). Our Achievable – Low adoption level is 201 Mt OW/yr, or 15% of our estimated adoption ceiling (Table 6). Our Achievable – High adoption level is 301 Mt OW/yr, or 22% of our estimated adoption ceiling. 

Table 6. Range of achievable adoption levels.

Unit: t OW composted/yr

Current adoption 78,000,000
Achievable – low 201,000,000
Achievable – high 301,000,000
Adoption ceiling 1,350,000,000
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Our estimated adoption levels are conservative because some regions without centralized composting of MSW could have subnational decentralized composting programs that aren’t reflected in global data.

Although our achievable range is conservative compared to the estimated adoption ceiling, increased composting has the potential to reduce GHG emissions from landfills (Table 7). We estimated that current adoption reduces annual GHG emissions by 0.3 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr (0.73 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr, 20-yr basis). Our estimated low and high achievable adoption levels reduce 0.78 and 1.2 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr (1.9 and 2.8 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr, 20-yr basis), respectively. Using the adoption ceiling, we estimate that annual GHG reductions increase to 5.2 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr (12.6 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr, 20-yr basis).

Table 7. Climate impact at different levels of adoption.

Unit: Gt CO₂‑eq (100-yr basis)/yr

Current adoption 0.30
Achievable – low 0.78
Achievable – high 1.2
Adoption ceiling 5.2
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The IPCC estimated in 2023 that the entire waste sector accounted for 3.9% of total global GHG emissions, and solid waste management represented 36% of total waste sector emissions (IPCC, 2023). Disposal of waste in landfills leads to methane emissions estimated at nearly 1.9 Gt CO₂‑eq (100-yr basis) annually (IEA, 2024). Based on these estimates, current composting adoption reduces annual methane emissions from landfills more than 16%. 

Increasing adoption to low and high achievable levels could reduce the amount of OW going to landfills by up to 40% and avoid 32–50% of landfill emissions. Reaching our estimated adoption ceilings for Increase Centralized Composting and reduction-focused solutions like Reduce Food Loss and Waste could avoid all food-related landfill emissions.

These climate impacts can be considered underestimates of beneficial mitigation from increased composting since we did not quantify the carbon sequestration benefits of compost application and reduced synthetic fertilizer use. Our estimated climate impacts from composting are also an underestimate because we didn’t include decentralized composting. 

In addition to OW from MSW, large-scale composting also requires agricultural biomass as a feedstock. Multiple climate solutions, in addition to Increase Centralized Composting, require biomass, and projected demand across solutions greatly exceeds supply. The deforestation that would be required to meet demand would produce emissions far greater than any mitigation gains from full deployment of these solutions (Searchinger, 2024). In addition to deforestation, there would also be costs and emissions incurred to transport biomass from where it is produced to where it can be processed and used. Thus, the estimated climate impacts presented here are only possible if feedstocks are prioritized for this solution. If feedstocks are instead prioritized for other climate solutions (see Interactions for examples), adoption and impact will be lower for this solution. It is not possible to set all biomass-dependent solutions to high adoption levels, add up their impacts, and determine an accurate combined emissions impact.

Additional Benefits

Income and Work

Composting creates more jobs than landfills or incinerators and can save money compared with other waste management options (Bekchanov & Mirzabaev, 2018; Farhidi et al., 2022; Platt et al., 2013; Zaman, 2016). It is less expensive to build and maintain composting plants than incinerators (Kawai et al., 2020). According to a survey of Maryland waste sites, composting creates twice as many jobs as landfills and four times as many jobs as incineration plants (Platt et al., 2013). Composting also indirectly sustains jobs in the distribution and use of compost products (Platt et al., 2013). Compost is rich in nutrients and can also reduce costs associated with synthetic fertilizer use in agriculture (Farhidi et al., 2022).

Health

Odors coming from anaerobic decomposition landfills, such as ammonia and hydrogen sulfide, are another source of pollutants that impact human well-being, which can be reduced by aerobic composting (Cai et al., 2018).

Equality

Reducing community exposure to air pollution from landfills through composting has implications for environmental justice (Casey et al., 2021; Nguyen et al., 2023). A large review of waste sites in the United States and Europe found that landfills are disproportionately located near populations with low socioeconomic status and near racially and ethnically marginalized neighborhoods (Marzutti et al., 2010). Reducing disproportionate exposures to air pollution from landfills may mitigate poor health outcomes in surrounding communities (Brender et al., 2011)

Land Resources

Compost provides an important soil amendment that adds organic matter and nutrients to soil, reducing the need for synthetic fertilizers (Urra et al., 2019; U.S. EPA, 2025). Healthy soils that are rich in organic matter can benefit the surrounding ecosystem and watershed and lead to more plant growth through improved water retention and filtration, improved soil quality and structure, and reduced erosion and nutrient runoff (Bell & Platt, 2014; Martinez-Blanco et al., 2013; U.S. EPA, 2025). By reducing the need for synthetic fertilizers and by improving soils’ ability to filter and conserve water, compost can also reduce eutrophication of water bodies (U.S. EPA, 2025). These soil benefits are partially dependent on how compost is sorted because there may be risks associated with contamination of microplastics and heavy metals (Manea et al., 2024; Urra et al., 2019).

Water Resources

For a description of water resources benefits, please see Land Resources above. 

Air Quality

Composting can reduce air pollution such as CO₂, methane, volatile organic compounds, and particulate matter that is commonly released from landfills and waste-to-energy systems (Kawai et al., 2020; Nordahl et al., 2020; Siddiqua et al., 2022). An analysis comparing emissions from MSW systems found composting to have lower emissions than landfilling and other waste-to-energy streams (Nordahl et al., 2020). Composting can also reduce the incidence of landfill fires, which release black carbon and carbon monoxide, posing risks to the health and safety of people in nearby communities (Nguyen et al., 2023).

Risks

Before the composting process can start, feedstocks are sorted to remove potential contaminants, including nonbiodegradable materials such as metal and glass as well as plastics, bioplastics, and paper products (Kawai et al., 2020; Perez et al., 2023; Wilson et al., 2024). While most contaminants can be removed through a variety of manual and mechanical sorting techniques, heavy metals and microplastics can become potential safety hazards or reduce finished compost quality (Manea et al., 2024). Paper and cardboard should be separated from food and green waste streams because they often contain contaminants such as glue or ink, and they degrade more slowly than other OW, leading to longer processing time and lower-quality finished compost (Kawai et al., 2020; Krause et al., 2023).

Successful and safe composting requires careful monitoring of compost piles to avoid anaerobic conditions and ensure sufficient temperatures to kill pathogens and weed seeds (Amuah et al., 2022; Ayilara et al., 2020; Cao et al., 2023; Kawai et al., 2020; Manea et al., 2024). Anaerobic conditions within the compost pile increase GHGs emitted during composting. Poorly managed composting facilities can also pose safety risks for workers and release odors, leading to community backlash (Cao et al., 2023; Manea et al., 2024; UNEP, 2024). Regional standards, certifications, and composter training programs are necessary to protect workers from hazardous conditions and to guarantee a safe and effective compost product (Kawai et al., 2020). Community outreach and education on the benefits of separating waste and composting prevent “not-in-my-backyard” attitudes or “NIMBYism” (Brown, 2015; Platt & Fagundes 2018) that may lead to siting composting facilities further from the communities they serve (Souza, et al., 2023; Liu et al., 2018).

Interactions with Other Solutions

Reinforcing

Increased composting could positively impact annual cropping by providing consistent, high-quality finished compost that can reduce dependence on synthetic fertilizers and improve soil health and crop yields. 

High-quality sorting systems also allow for synergies that benefit all waste streams and create flexible, resilient waste management systems. Improving waste separation programs for composting can have spillover effects that also improve other waste streams, such as recyclables, agricultural waste, or e-waste. Access to well-sorted materials can also help with nutrient balance for various waste streams, including agricultural waste.

Composting facilities require a reliable source of carbon-rich bulking material. Agricultural waste can be diverted to composting rather than burning to reduce emissions from crop residue burning. 

Competing

Diverting OW from landfills will lead to lower landfill methane emissions and, therefore, less methane available to be captured and resold as revenue.

Composting uses wood, crop residues, and food waste as feedstocks (raw material). Because the total projected demand for biomass feedstocks for climate solutions exceeds the supply, not all solutions will be able to achieve their potential adoption. This solution is in competition with other climate solutions for raw material.

Dashboard

Solution Basics

t organic waste

t CO₂-eq (100-yr)/unit
02.53.9median
units/yr
Current 7.8×10⁷ 02.009×10⁸3.01×10⁸
Achievable (Low to High)

Climate Impact

Gt CO₂-eq (100-yr)/yr
Current 0.3 0.781.2
US$ per t CO₂-eq
10
Emergency Brake

CO₂,  CH₄

Trade-offs

Robust collection networks and source separation of OW are vital for successful composting, but they also increase investment costs. However, well-sorted OW can reduce the need for separation equipment and allow for simpler facility designs, leading to lower operational costs. The emissions from transporting OW are not included here, but are expected to be significantly less than the avoided landfill emissions. Composting facilities are typically located close to the source of OW (Kawai et al., 2020; U.S. Composting Council [USCC], 2008), but since centralized composting facilities are designed to serve large communities and municipalities, there can be trade-offs between sufficient land availability and distance from waste sources.

We also exclude emissions from onsite vehicles and equipment such as bulldozers and compactors, assuming that those emissions are small compared to the landfill itself.

t/person/yr
≤ 0.17
0.18–0.32
0.33–0.5
> 0.5
No Data

Per capita MSW generation, 2018

Annual generation of MSW per capita. Total global MSW generation exceeded 2 Gt/yr.

World Bank Group (2021). What a waste global database (Version 3) [Data set]. WBG. Retrieved March 6, 2025, from Link to source: https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/search/dataset/0039597

t/person/yr
≤ 0.17
0.18–0.32
0.33–0.5
> 0.5
No Data

Per capita MSW generation, 2018

Annual generation of MSW per capita. Total global MSW generation exceeded 2 Gt/yr.

World Bank Group (2021). What a waste global database (Version 3) [Data set]. WBG. Retrieved March 6, 2025, from Link to source: https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/search/dataset/0039597

Maps Introduction

Globally, 17 countries reported composting more than 1 Mt each of organic waste in 2018, with India, China, Germany, and France reporting more than 5 Mt each (World Bank, 2018). With the exception of Austria, which composted nearly all organic waste generated, even countries with established centralized composting could divert more organic waste to composting. 

The fate from which composting diverts organic waste varies from region to region, but globally over 40% of all waste ends up in landfills. Since organic waste makes up the largest percentage of MSW in most regions, excluding North America, parts of East Asia and the Pacific, and parts of Europe and Central Asia, there is ample opportunity to increase composting. In East Asia and the Pacific, South Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa, diverting organics to composting also avoids disposal in waterways and open dumps, which reduces pollution. In North America and Europe and Central Asia, 15–20% of MSW is incinerated (Kaza et al., 2018), so diverting all organic waste to composting would avoid harmful incineration emissions including CO, NOx, and VOCs (Abedin et al., 2025; Global Alliance for Incinerator Alternatives, 2019; Liu et al., 2021; Nubi et al., 2024).

Diversion of organic waste requires separation of waste streams, and cities with better collection and tracking networks often have more robust composting programs. Higher quality and more frequent reporting on waste generation and disposal worldwide could improve source separation and increase composting. Additionally, city-level and decentralized pilot programs allow for better control over feedstock collection and can bolster support for larger scale, centralized operations. 

Multiple cities in Latin America and the Caribbean represent a resurgence in composting markets . In the 1960s and 1970s, composting facilities were built in cities across Mexico, El Salvador, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Brazil, but many closed due to high operational costs (Ricci-Jürgensen et al., 2020a). In 2018, 15% of waste was recycled or composted in Montevideo, Uruguay, and Bogotá and Medellín, Colombia, and 10% of waste was composted in Mexico City, Mexico, and Rosario, Argentina (Kaza et al., 2018).  

Waste generation is increasing globally, with the largest increases projected to occur in sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and the Middle East and North Africa (Kaza et al., 2018). As waste generation doubles or triples in these regions, sustainable disposal methods will become more critical for human health and well-being. 

In 2018, Ethiopia reported the highest organic waste percentage in sub-Saharan Africa at 85% of MSW, but no composting (World Bank, 2018). Organic waste percentages are high in other countries in the region, so composting could be a valuable method to handle the growing waste stream. In the Middle East & North Africa, 43% of countries reported composting as of 2018 (Kaza et al., 2018), indicating the presence of infrastructure that could be scaled up to handle increased waste in the future.

Action Word
Increase
Solution Title
Centralized Composting
Classification
Highly Recommended
Lawmakers and Policymakers
  • Establish zero waste and OW diversion goals; incorporate them into local or national climate plans and soil health and conservation policies.
  • Ensure public procurement uses local compost when possible.
  • Participate in consultations with farmers, businesses, and the public to determine where to place plants, how to use compost, pricing, and how to roll out programs.
  • Establish or improve existing centralized composting facilities, collection networks, and storage facilities.
  • Establish incentives and programs to encourage both centralized and decentralized composting.
  • Work with farmers, local gardeners, the private sector, and local park systems to develop markets for compost.
  • Invest in source separation education and waste separation technology that enhances the quality of final compost products.
  • Regulate the use of waste separation technologies to prioritize source separation of waste and the quality of compost products.
  • Ensure low- and middle-income households are served by composting programs with particular attention to underserved communities such as multi-family buildings and rural households.
  • Enact extended producer responsibility approaches that hold producers accountable for waste.
  • Create demonstration projects to show the effectiveness and safety of finished compost.
  • Ensure composting plants are placed as close to farmland as possible and do not adversely affect surrounding communities.
  • Streamline permitting processes for centralized compost facilities and infrastructure.
  • Establish laws or regulations that require waste separation as close to the source as possible, ensuring the rules are effective and practical.
  • Establish zoning policies that support both centralized and decentralized composting efforts, including at the industrial, agricultural, community, and backyard scales.
  • Establish fees or fines for OW going to landfills; use funds for composting programs.
  • Use financial instruments such as taxes, subsidies, or exemptions to support infrastructure, participation, and waste separation.
  • Partner with schools, community gardens, farms, nonprofits, women’s groups, and other community organizations to promote composting and teach the importance of waste separation.
  • Establish one-stop-shop educational programs that use online and in-person methods to teach how to separate waste effectively and why it’s important.
  • If composting is not possible or additional infrastructure is needed, consider methane digesters as alternatives to composting.
  • Create, support, or join certification programs that verify the quality of compost and/or verify food waste suppliers such as hotels, restaurants, and cafes.

Further information:

Practitioners
  • Work with policymakers and local communities to establish zero-waste and OW diversion goals for local or national climate plans.
  • Participate in consultations with farmers, policymakers, businesses, and the public to determine where to place plants, how to use compost, pricing, and how to roll out programs.
  • Work with farmers, local gardeners, the private sector, and local park systems to create quality supply streams and develop markets for compost.
  • Invest in source separation education and waste separation technology that enhances the quality of final compost products.
  • Establish one-stop-shop educational programs that use online and in-person methods to teach how to separate waste effectively and why that’s important.
  • Ensure low- and middle-income households are served by composting programs with particular attention to underserved communities such as multi-family buildings and rural households.
  • Create demonstration projects to show the effectiveness and safety of finished compost.
  • Ensure composting plants are placed as close to farmland as possible and do not adversely affect surrounding communities.
  • Take advantage of financial incentives such as subsidies or exemptions to set up centralized composting infrastructure, increase participation, and improve waste separation.
  • Partner with schools, community gardens, farms, nonprofits, women’s groups, and other community organizations to promote composting and teach the importance of waste separation.
  • Consider partnerships through initiatives such as sister cities to share innovation and develop capacity.
  • If additional infrastructure is needed, consider methane digesters as alternatives to composting.
  • Create, support, or join certification programs that verify the quality of compost and/or verify food waste suppliers such as hotels, restaurants, and cafes.

Further information:

Business Leaders
  • Establish zero-waste and OW diversion goals; incorporate the goals into corporate net-zero strategies.
  • Ensure procurement uses strategies to reduce FLW at all stages of the supply chain; consider using the Food Loss and Waste Protocol.
  • Ensure corporate procurement and facilities managers use local compost when possible.
  • Participate in consultations with farmers, policymakers, and the public to determine where to place plants, how to use compost, pricing, and how to roll out programs.
  • Work with farmers, local gardeners, the private sector, and local park systems to develop markets for compost.
  • Offer employee pre-tax benefits on materials to compost at home or participate in municipal composting programs.
  • Offer financial services, including low-interest loans, microfinancing, and grants, to support composting initiatives.
  • Support extended producer responsibility approaches that hold producers accountable for waste.
  • Educate employees on the benefits of composting, include them in companywide waste diversion initiatives, and encourage them to use and advocate for municipal composting in their communities. Clearly label containers and signage for composting.
  • Partner with schools, community gardens, farms, nonprofits, women’s groups, and other community organizations to promote composting and teach the importance of waste separation.
  • Create, support, or join certification programs that verify the quality of compost and/or verify food waste suppliers such as hotels, restaurants, and cafes.

Further information:

Nonprofit Leaders
  • Help policymakers establish zero-waste and OW diversion goals; help incorporate them into local or national climate plans.
  • Ensure organizational procurement uses local compost when possible.
  • Help administer, fund, or promote local composting programs.
  • Help gather data on local OW streams, potential markets, and comparisons of alternative uses such as methane digesters.
  • Participate in consultations with farmers, policymakers, businesses, and the public to determine where to place plants, how to use compost, pricing, and how to roll out programs.
  • Work with farmers, local gardeners, the private sector, and local park systems to develop markets for compost.
  • Help ensure low- and middle-income households are served by composting programs with particular attention to underserved communities such as multi-family buildings and rural households.
  • Advocate for extended producer responsibility approaches that hold producers accountable for waste.
  • Advocate for laws or regulations that require waste separation as close to the source as possible, ensuring the rules are effective and practical.
  • Create demonstration projects to show the effectiveness and safety of finished compost.
  • Establish one-stop-shop educational programs that use online and in-person methods to teach how to separate waste effectively and why that’s important.
  • Partner with schools, community gardens, farms, nonprofits, women’s groups, and other community organizations to promote composting and teach the importance of waste separation.
  • Create, support, or join certification programs that verify the quality of compost and/or verify food waste suppliers such as hotels, restaurants, and cafes.

Further information:

Investors
  • Ensure relevant portfolio companies separate waste streams, contribute to compost programs, and/or use finished compost.
  • Invest in companies developing composting programs or technologies that support the process, such as equipment, circular supply chains, and consumer products.
  • Fund start-ups or existing companies that are improving waste separation technology that enhances the quality of final compost products.
  • Offer financial services, including low-interest loans, microfinancing, and grants, to support composting initiatives.
  • Invest in companies that adhere to extended producer responsibility or encourage portfolio companies to adopt the policies.

Further information:

Philanthropists and International Aid Agencies
  • Help policymakers establish zero-waste and OW diversion goals; help incorporate them into local or national climate plans.
  • Advocate for businesses to establish time-bound and transparent zero-waste and OW diversion goals.
  • Advocate for extended producer responsibility approaches that hold producers accountable for waste.
  • Provide financing and capacity building for low- and middle-income countries to establish composting infrastructure and programs.
  • Help administer, fund, or promote composting programs.
  • Invest in companies developing composting programs or technologies that support the process, such as equipment, circular supply chains, and consumer products.
  • Fund startups or existing companies that are improving waste separation technology that enhances the quality of final compost products.
  • Incubate and fund mission-driven organizations and cooperatives that are advancing OW composting.
  • Offer financial services, including low-interest loans, microfinancing, and grants, to support composting initiatives.
  • Participate in consultations with farmers, policymakers, businesses, and the public to determine where to place plants, how to use compost, pricing, and how to roll out programs.
  • Work with farmers, local gardeners, the private sector, and local park systems to develop markets for compost.
  • Help ensure low- and middle-income households are served by composting programs, with particular attention to underserved communities such as multifamily buildings and rural households.
  • Advocate for laws or regulations that require waste separation as close to the source as possible, ensuring the rules are effective and practical.
  • Create demonstration projects to show the effectiveness and safety of finished compost.
  • Research and enact effective composting promotional strategies.
  • Establish one-stop-shop educational programs that use online and in-person methods to teach how to separate waste effectively and why that’s important.
  • Partner with schools, community gardens, farms, nonprofits, women’s groups, and other community organizations to promote composting and teach the importance of waste separation.
  • Create, support, or join certification programs that verify the quality of compost and/or verify food waste suppliers such as hotels, restaurants, and cafes.

Further information:

Thought Leaders
  • Participate in and promote centralized, community, or household composting programs, if available, and carefully sort OW from other waste streams.
  • If no centralized composting system exists, work with local experts to establish household and community composting systems.
  • Help policymakers establish zero-waste and OW diversion goals; help incorporate them into local or national climate plans.
  • Start cooperatives that provide services and/or equipment for composting.
  • Participate in consultations with farmers, policymakers, businesses, and the public to determine where to place plants, how to use compost, pricing, and how to roll out programs.
  • Help gather data on local OW streams, potential markets, and comparisons of alternative uses such as methane digesters.
  • Help develop waste separation technology that enhances the quality of final compost products and/or improve educational programs on waste separation.
  • Develop innovative governance models for local composting programs; publicly document your experiences.
  • Work with farmers, local gardeners, the private sector, and local park systems to develop markets for compost.
  • Advocate for extended producer responsibility approaches that hold producers accountable for waste.
  • Advocate for laws or regulations that require waste separation as close to the source as possible, ensuring the rules are effective and practical.
  • Create demonstration projects to show the effectiveness and safety of finished compost.
  • Create, support, or join certification programs that verify the quality of compost.
  • Research various governance models for local composting programs and outline options for communities to consider.
  • Research and enact effective composting campaign strategies.
  • Create, support, or join certification programs that verify the quality of compost and/or verify food waste suppliers such as hotels, restaurants, and cafes.

Further information:

Technologists and Researchers
  • Quantify estimates of OW both locally and globally; estimate the associated potential compost output.
  • Improve waste separation technology to improve the quality of finished compost.
  • Create tracking and monitoring software for OW streams, possible uses, markets, and pricing.
  • Research the application of AI and robotics for optimal uses of OW streams, separation, collection, distribution, and uses.
  • Research various governance models for local composting programs and outline options for communities to consider.
  • Research effective composting campaign strategies and how to encourage participation from individuals.

Further information:

Communities, Households, and Individuals
  • Participate in and promote centralized composting programs, if available, and carefully sort OW from other waste.
  • If no centralized composting system exists, work with local experts to establish household and community composting systems.
  • Participate in consultations with farmers, policymakers, and businesses to determine where to place plants, how to use compost, pricing, and how to roll out programs.
  • Take advantage of educational programs, financial incentives, employee benefits, and other programs that facilitate composting.
  • Advocate for extended producer responsibility approaches that hold producers accountable for waste.
  • Advocate for laws or regulations that require waste separation, ensuring the rules are effective and practical.
  • Partner with schools, community gardens, farms, nonprofits, women’s groups, and other community organizations to promote composting and teach the importance of waste separation.
  • Create, support, or join certification programs that verify the quality of compost and/or verify food waste suppliers such as hotels, restaurants, and cafes.

Further information:

Sources
Evidence Base

Consensus of effectiveness as a climate solution: High

Composting reduces OW, prevents pollution and GHG emissions from landfilled OW, and creates soil amendments that can reduce the use of synthetic fertilizers (Kaza et al., 2018; Manea et al., 2024). Although we do not quantify carbon sequestration from compost use in this analysis, a full life-cycle analysis that includes application could result in net negative emissions for composting (Morris et al., 2013).

Globally, the waste sector was responsible for an estimated 3.9% of total global GHG emissions in 2023, and solid waste management represented 36% of those emissions (IPCC, 2023; UNEP, 2024). Emissions estimates based on satellite and field measurements from landfills or direct measurements of carbon content in food waste can be significantly higher than IPCC Tier 1-based estimates. Reviews of global waste management estimated that food loss and food waste account for around 6% of global emissions or approximately 2.8 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr (Wilson et al., 2024; Zhu et al., 2023). Facility-scale composting reduces emissions 38–84% relative to landfilling (Perez et al., 2023), and monitoring and managing the moisture content, aeration, and carbon to nitrogen ratios can further reduce emissions (Ayilara et al., 2020).

Unclear legislation and regulation for MSW composting can prevent adoption, and there is not a one-size-fits-all approach to composting (Cao et al., 2023). Regardless of the method used, composting converts OW into a nutrient-rich resource and typically reduces incoming waste volumes 40–60% in the process (Cao et al., 2023; Kaza et al., 2018). A comparative cost and energy analysis of MSW components highlighted that while composting adoption varies geographically and economically, environmental benefits also depend on geography and income (Zaman, 2016). Food and green waste percentages of MSW are higher in lower-resourced countries than in high-income countries due to less packaging, and more than one-third of waste in high-income countries is recovered through recycling and composting (Kaza et al., 2018).

The results presented in this document summarize findings from 22 reports, 31 reviews, 12 original studies, two books, nine web articles, one fact sheet, and three data sets reflecting the most recent evidence for more than 200 countries and territories. 

Appendix

Global MSW Generation and Disposal

Analysis of MSW in this section is based on the 2018 What a Waste 2.0 global dataset and report as well as the references cited in the report (Kaza et al., 2018; World Bank 2018). In 2018, approximately 2 Gt of waste was generated globally. Most of that went to landfills (41%) and open dumps (22%). Out of 217 countries and territories, 24 sent more than 80% of all MSW to landfills and 3 countries reported landfilling 100% of MSW. The average across all countries/territories was 28% of MSW disposed of in landfills. Both controlled and sanitary landfills with gas capture systems are included in the total landfilled percentage.

Approximately 13% of MSW was treated through recycling and 13% through incineration, but slightly more waste was incinerated than recycled per year. Incineration was predominately used in upper-middle and high-income countries with negligible amounts of waste incinerated in low- and lower-middle income countries.

Globally, only about 5% of MSW was composted and nearly no MSW was processed via methane digestion. However, OW made up nearly 40% of global MSW, so most OW was processed through landfilling, open dumping, and incineration all of which result in significant GHG emissions and pollution. There is ample opportunity to divert more OW from polluting disposal methods toward composting. Due to lack of data on open dumping, and since incineration only accounts for 1% of global GHG emissions, we chose landfilling as our baseline disposal method for comparison.

In addition to MSW, other waste streams include medical waste, e-waste, hazardous waste, and agricultural waste. Global agricultural waste generation in 2018 was more than double total MSW (Kaza et al., 2018). Although these specialized waste streams are treated separately from MSW, integrated waste management systems with high-quality source separation programs could supplement organic MSW with agricultural waste. Rather than being burned or composted on-farm, agricultural waste can provide bulking materials that are critical for maintaining moisture levels and nutrient balance in the compost pile, as well as scaling up composting operations. 

Details of a Composting System and Process

Successful centralized composting starts with collection and separation of OW from other waste streams, ideally at the source of waste generation. Financial and regulatory barriers can hinder creation or expansion of composting infrastructure. Composting systems require both facilities and robust collection networks to properly separate OW from nonbiodegradable MSW and transport OW to facilities. Mixed waste streams increase contamination risks with incoming feedstocks, so separation of waste materials at the source of generation is ideal. 

Establishing OW collection presents a financial and logistical barrier to increased composting adoption (Kawai et al., 2020; Kaza et al., 2018). However, when considering a full cost-chain analysis that includes collection, transportation, and treatment, systems that rely on source-separated OW can be more cost-effective than facilities that process mixed organics. 

OW and inorganic waste can also be sorted at facilities manually or mechanically with automated techniques including electromagnetic separation, ferrous metal separation, and sieving or screening (Kawai et al., 2020). Although separation can be highly labor-intensive, it’s necessary to remove potential contaminants, such as plastics, heavy metals, glass, and other nonbiodegradable or hazardous waste components (Kawai et al., 2020; Manea et al., 2024). After removing contaminants, organic materials are pre-processed and mixed to achieve the appropriate combination of water, oxygen, and solids for optimal aerobic conditions during the composting process. 

Regardless of the specific composting method used, aerobic decomposition is achieved by monitoring and balancing key parameters within the compost pile. Key parameters are moisture content, temperature, carbon-to-nitrogen ratio, aeration, pH, and porosity (Cao et al., 2023; Kawai et al., 2020; Manea et al., 2024). The aerobic decomposition process can be split into distinct stages based on whether mesophilic (active at 20–40 oC) or thermophilic (active at 40–70 oC) bacteria and fungi dominate. Compost piles are constructed to allow for sufficient aeration while optimizing moisture content (50–60%) and the initial carbon-to-nitrogen ratio (25:1–40:1), depending on composting method and feedstocks (Amuah et al., 2022; Manea et al, 2024). Optimal carbon-to-nitrogen ratios are achieved through appropriate mixing of carbon-rich “brown” materials, such as sawdust or dry leaves, with nitrogen-rich “green” materials, such as food waste or manure (Manea et al., 2024). During the thermophilic stage, temperatures exceeding 62 oC are necessary to kill most pathogens and weed seeds (Amuah et al., 2022; Ayilara et al., 2020).

Throughout the composting process key nutrients (nitrogen, phosphorus, potassium, calcium, magnesium, and sodium), are mineralized and mobilized and microorganisms release GHGs and heat as by-products of their activity (Manea et al., 2024; Nordahl et al., 2023). Water is added iteratively to maintain moisture content and temperature in the optimal ranges, and frequent turning and aeration are necessary to ensure microorganisms have enough oxygen. Without the proper balance of oxygen and water, anaerobic conditions can lead to higher methane emissions (Amuah et al., 2022; Manea et al., 2024). Although CO₂, methane, and nitrous oxide are released during the process, these emissions are significantly lower than associated emissions from landfilling (Ayilara et al., 2020; Cao et al., 2023; FAO, 2019; Perez et al., 2023).

Once aerobic decomposition is completed, compost goes through a maturation stage where nutrients are stabilized before finished compost can be sold or used as a soil amendment. In stable compost, microbial decomposition slows until nutrients no longer break down, but can be absorbed by plants. Longer maturation phases reduce the proportion of soluble nutrients that could potentially leach into soils. 

The baseline waste management method of landfilling OW is cheaper than composting; however it also leads to significant annual GHG emissions. Composting, although more expensive due to higher labor and operating costs, reduces emissions and produces a valuable soil amendment. Establishing a composting program can have significant financial risks without an existing market for finished compost products (Bogner et al., 2007; Kawai et al., 2020; UNEP, 2024).

Example Calculation of Achievable Adoption

In 2018, Austria had the highest composting rate of 31.2%, and Vietnam composted 15% of MSW (World Bank, 2018). 

For low adoption, we assumed composting increases by 25% of the existing rate or until all OW in MSW is composted. In Austria, OW made up 31.4% of MSW in 2018, so the Adoption – Low composting rate was 31.4%. In Vietnam, the Adoption – Low composting rate came out to 18.75%, which is still less than the total OW percentage of MSW (61.9%).

For high adoption, we assumed that composting rates increase by 50% of the existing rate or until all OW in MSW is composted. So high adoption in Austria remains 31.4% (i.e., all OW generated in Austria is composted). In Vietnam, the high adoption composting rate increases to 22.5% but still doesn’t capture all OW generated (61.9% of MSW).

Updated Date

Deploy Industrial Green Hydrogen

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Industrial Green Hydrogen Feedstock
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Summary

In this solution, green hydrogen replaces fossil fuel–based hydrogen for use as a feedstock in the production of more complex molecules such as ammonia for fertilizers and methanol for the production of other commodity chemicals. Green hydrogen production in this solution uses on-site renewable electricity or off-site renewable electricity that directly supplies the facility. It replaces hydrogen produced from fossil fuels. This solution does not include the use of green hydrogen as a fuel or as a feedstock in the production of hydrogen-based fuels.

Income & work,Health
Water resources,Air quality
Description for Social and Search
Green hydrogen is a Highly Recommended climate solution. It cuts GHG emissions by replacing hydrogen made from fossil fuels for use as an industrial feedstock.
Overview

Green hydrogen in this solution is hydrogen produced from water by electrolysis using renewable electricity generated on-site or directly supplied from an off-site location. It can reduce emissions when replacing hydrogen made from fossil fuels as an industrial feedstock. 

Today, most hydrogen is produced through a chemical reaction of methane or coal with water that generates hydrogen and CO₂. Green hydrogen, made by splitting water into hydrogen and oxygen using electricity generated from renewables, accounts for less than 1% of current production (International Energy Agency [IEA], 2025a). The process of making green hydrogen generates no direct GHGs. Therefore, replacing fossil fuel–derived hydrogen with green hydrogen avoids all direct GHGs from the hydrogen production process. 

Hydrogen prolongs the lifespan and abundance of GHGs in the atmosphere when it leaks, and so can indirectly contribute to climate change. However, because this solution substitutes one source of hydrogen for another, it will have little to no effect on this indirect climate impact. 

The manufacture of industrial hydrogen from fossil fuels for all applications was responsible for 680 Mt of emissions in 2023 (IEA, 2024), nearly all of which could be eliminated by substituting green hydrogen.

In 2023, roughly 60% of industrial feedstock hydrogen was used to produce ammonia, a vital ingredient in nitrogen fertilizers while 30% was used to produce methanol (IEA, 2024), an ingredient in the manufacture of a wide range of chemicals, including plastics, building materials, and car parts (International Renewable Energy Agency [IRENA] & Methanol Institute, 2021). Although alternative low-carbon pathways exist for ammonia and methanol, these are difficult to scale, still under development, or reliant on biomass, which is a finite resource associated with potential land-use change and competing demand (IRENA & Methanol Institute, 2021; Rodriguez, 2025). 

While there are other ways to make low-carbon hydrogen, none has demonstrated potential to cut emissions from hydrogen production as effectively as this solution. For example, harvesting naturally occurring hydrogen is a nascent industry with lots of uncertainties (The Royal Society, 2025), and hydrogen made from biomass must compete for biomass with other hard-to-abate sectors. 

The greatest hurdle to green hydrogen deployment is cost. Green hydrogen is one-and-a-half to six times more expensive to produce than hydrogen from fossil fuels (IEA, 2024). Regulatory and demand uncertainty, licensing and permitting issues, and challenges with operational scale-up are also barriers to green hydrogen projects (IEA, 2024). Nevertheless, production capacity has started to grow: installed electrolyzer capacity doubled in 2023, supported by policies and incentives (Pavan et al., n.d.). 

Ademollo, A., Calabrese, M., & Carcasci, C. (2025). An up-to-date perspective of levelized cost of hydrogen for PV-based grid-connected power-to-hydrogen plants across all Italy. Applied Energy, 379, 124958. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2024.124958  

Anand, C., Chandraja, B., Nithiya, P., Akshaya, M., Tamizhdurai, P., Shoba, G., Subramani, A., Kumaran, R., Yadav, K. K., Gacem, A., Bhutto, J. K., Alreshidi, M. A., & Alam, M. W. (2025). Green hydrogen for a sustainable future: A review of production methods, innovations, and applications. International Journal of Hydrogen Energy, 111, 319–341. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhydene.2025.02.257  

Cho, H. H., Strezov, V., & Evans, T. J. (2022). Environmental impact assessment of hydrogen production via steam methane reforming based on emissions data. Energy Reports, 8, 13585–13595. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.egyr.2022.10.053  

Douglas, M., Trilho, M., & Pellegrinelli, T. (2025). Hydrogen: The outlook to 2050. Wood Mackenzie. Link to source: https://www.woodmac.com/news/opinion/hydrogen-the-outlook-to-2050/  

Du, L., Yang, Y., Bai, X., Xu, S., Lin, L., & Liu, M. (2024). Water scarcity footprint and water saving potential for large-scale green hydrogen generation: Evidence from coal-to-hydrogen substitution in China. Science of The Total Environment, 940, 173589. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2024.173589  

European Parliament, & Council of the European Union. (2023). Directive (EU) 2023/2413 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 October 2023 amending directive (EU) 2018/2001, regulation (EU) 2018/1999 and directive 98/70/EC as regards the promotion of energy from renewable sources, and repealing council directive (EU) 2015/652 (No. 2023/2413). Link to source: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202302413 

Ganter, A., Lonergan, K. E., Büchi, H. M., & Sansavini, G. (2024). Shifting to low-carbon hydrogen production supports job creation but does not guarantee a just transition. One Earth, 7(11), 1981–1993. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.oneear.2024.10.009  

Gasparotto, J., & Da Boit Martinello, K. (2021). Coal as an energy source and its impacts on human health. Energy Geoscience, 2(2), 113–120. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.engeos.2020.07.003  

Gulli, C., Heid, B., Noffsinger, J., Waardenburg, M., & Wilthaner, M. (2024). Global energy perspectives 2023: Hydrogen outlook. McKinsey & Company. Link to source: https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/oil-and-gas/our-insights/global-energy-perspective-2023-hydrogen-outlook  

Henneman, L., Choirat, C., Dedoussi, I., Dominici, F., Roberts, J., & Zigler, C. (2023). Mortality risk from United States coal electricity generation. Science, 382(6673), 941–946. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1126/science.adf4915  

Henriksen, M. S., Matthews, H. S., White, J., Walsh, L., Grol, E., Jamieson, M., & Skone, T. J. (2024). Tradeoffs in life cycle water use and greenhouse gas emissions of hydrogen production pathways. International Journal of Hydrogen Energy, 49, 1221–1234. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhydene.2023.08.079  

Hermesmann, M., & Müller, T. E. (2022). Green, turquoise, blue, or grey? Environmentally friendly hydrogen production in transforming energy systems. Progress in Energy and Combustion Science, 90, 100996. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pecs.2022.100996  

International Energy Agency. (2023). Towards hydrogen definitions based on their emissions intensity. Link to source: https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/acc7a642-e42b-4972-8893-2f03bf0bfa03/Towardshydrogendefinitionsbasedontheiremissionsintensity.pdf  

International Energy Agency. (2024). Global hydrogen review 2024. Link to source: https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/89c1e382-dc59-46ca-aa47-9f7d41531ab5/GlobalHydrogenReview2024.pdf 

International Energy Agency. (2025a). Global hydrogen review 2025. Link to source: https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/12d92ecc-e960-40f3-aff5-b2de6690ab6b/GlobalHydrogenReview2025.pdf  

International Energy Agency. (2025b). Hydrogen production and infrastructure projects database March 2025 [Dataset]. Link to source: https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/data-product/hydrogen-production-and-infrastructure-projects-database  

International Energy Agency. (2025c). Hydrogen production and infrastructure projects database September 2025 [Dataset]. Link to source: https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/data-product/hydrogen-production-and-infrastructure-projects-database  

Irarrazaval, F., Albornoz, C., & Bogolasky, F. (2026). The troubled geography of green jobs: Examining the estimations and expectations of green hydrogen development in regional labor markets in Chile. Applied Geography, 186, 103828. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apgeog.2025.103828 

International Renewable Energy Agency, & Bluerisk. (2023). Water for hydrogen production. Link to source: https://www.irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2023/Dec/IRENA_Bluerisk_Water_for_hydrogen_production_2023.pdf  

International Renewable Energy Agency & Methanol Institute. (2021). Innovation outlook: Renewable methanol. International Renewable Energy Agency. Link to source: https://www.methanol.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/IRENA_Innovation_Renewable_Methanol_2021.pdf  

Iyer, R. K., Prosser, J. H., Kelly, J. C., James, B. D., & Elgowainy, A. (2024). Life-cycle analysis of hydrogen production from water electrolyzers. International Journal of Hydrogen Energy, 81, 1467–1478. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhydene.2024.06.355  

Johnson, N., Liebreich, M., Kammen, D. M., Ekins, P., McKenna, R., & Staffell, I. (2025). Realistic roles for hydrogen in the future energy transition. Nature Reviews Clean Technology, 1(5), 351–371. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1038/s44359-025-00050-4  

Kim, H., Song, G., & Ha, Y. (2025). Green hydrogen export potential in each Southeast Asian country based on exportable volumes and levelized cost of hydrogen. Applied Energy, 383, 125371. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2025.125371  

Li, Y., Hao, J., & Zhou, Y. (2025). Economic analysis of different hydrogen production routes under a CO2 pricing mechanism – A levelized cost of hydrogen based study. International Journal of Hydrogen Energy, 128, 47–67. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhydene.2025.04.185  

National Renewable Energy Laboratory. (2021). Life cycle greenhouse gas emissions from electricity generation: update. Link to source: https://docs.nlr.gov/docs/fy21osti/80580.pdf  

Odenweller, A., & Ueckerdt, F. (2025). The green hydrogen ambition and implementation gap. Nature Energy, 10(1), 110–123. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41560-024-01684-7  

Paardekooper, S., Lund, H., Chang, M., Nielsen, S., Moreno, D., & Thellufsen, J. Z. (2020). Heat Roadmap Chile: A national district heating plan for air pollution decontamination and decarbonisation. Journal of Cleaner Production, 272, 122744. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2020.122744  

Pavan, F., Bermudez, J. M., Pizarro, A., Remme, U., & Blanco, H. (n.d.). Electrolysers. International Energy Agency. Retrieved October 10, 2025 from Link to source: https://www.iea.org/energy-system/low-emission-fuels/electrolysers  

Rodriguez, E. (2025, January 30). Low-carbon ammonia technology: Blue, green, and beyond. Rocky Mountain Institute. Link to source: https://rmi.org/low-carbon-ammonia-technology-blue-green-and-beyond/  

Smolinka, T., Bergmann, H., Garche, J., & Kusnezoff, M. (2022). The history of water electrolysis from its beginnings to the present. In Smolinka & Garche (Eds.), Electrochemical power sources: Fundamentals, systems, and applications (pp. 83–164). Elsevier. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-819424-9.00010-0  

The Royal Society. (2025). Natural hydrogen: Future energy and resources Policy briefing. Link to source: https://royalsociety.org/-/media/policy/projects/natural-hydrogen/natural-hydrogen-policy-briefing.pdf  

U.S. Department of Energy. (n.d.). Hydrogen production: Electrolysis. Retrieved October 10, 2025, from Link to source: https://www.energy.gov/eere/fuelcells/hydrogen-production-electrolysis  

US Environmental Protection Agency. (2025). Power sector programs—Progress report. Link to source: https://www.epa.gov/power-sector/progress-report  

Vartiainen, E., Breyer, C., Moser, D., Román Medina, E., Busto, C., Masson, G., Bosch, E., & Jäger-Waldau, A. (2022). True cost of solar hydrogen. Solar RRL, 6(5), 2100487. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1002/solr.202100487  

Credits

Lead Fellow

  • Heather McDiarmid, Ph.D. 

Contributors

  • Ruthie Burrows, Ph.D.

  • James Gerber, Ph.D.

  • Daniel Jasper

  • Alex Sweeney

Internal Reviewers

  • Nina-Francesca Farac, Ph.D.

  • James Gerber, Ph.D.

  • Amanda D. Smith, Ph.D.

Effectiveness

Our analysis showed that replacing hydrogen made from fossil fuels with green hydrogen made using renewable electricity can reduce 0.012 t CO₂‑eq /kg hydrogen (20-yr and 100-yr basis, Table 1). 

This analysis does not include the emissions associated with manufacturing and installing electrolyzer equipment or the energy and emissions impacts of storing or transporting hydrogen if needed. 

Table 1. Effectiveness at reducing emissions.

Unit: t CO₂‑eq /kg green hydrogen, 100-yr basis

25th percentile 0.010
Mean 0.014
Median (50th percentile) 0.012
75th percentile 0.016
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Cost

Our estimates put the levelized cost of making hydrogen (LCOH) from coal and natural gas without any form of carbon emissions capture at US$1.90/kg hydrogen, while we estimated the LCOH of green hydrogen from renewable electricity at US$3.60/kg green hydrogen. LCOH represents the average cost to make a kilogram of hydrogen over the facility’s lifetime and includes all installation, operating, and equity costs. These values are in line with the IEA’s estimate that renewable hydrogen costs one-and-a-half to six times more than unabated fossil-fuel based production (IEA, 2024), with most of the higher cost attributed to the upfront costs (IEA, 2025a). 

The LCOH for green hydrogen shows significant variability, ranging from US$1.40/kg for hydrogen from solar in Chile (Vartiainen et al., 2022) to US$10.60/kg for hydrogen from solar in Italy (Ademollo et al., 2025). This reflects geographic differences in renewable energy generation potential and costs as well as differences in electrolyzer technologies, financing terms, and project scales (Kim et al., 2025; Li et al., 2025). Variation also arises from how renewable electricity is produced. Some modeled green hydrogen LCOH values may be underestimates due to the higher cost of operating electrolyzers at less than full capacity when intermittent renewable generation is used (Ademollo et al., 2025). 

We do not report the cost per climate impact because most of our cost data are based on theoretical values, not real projects, and because LCOH values do not include revenues. 

Methods and Supporting Data

Methods and Supporting Data

Learning Curve

Our data show a median learning rate of 18% for the electrolyzer technologies used to make green hydrogen (Table 2) based on five studies. In other words, for every doubling of electrolyzer capacity, the equipment costs decrease by 18%. This is a median value for many electrolyzer types, each of which varies in its technological maturity and rate of cost decline. Research is ongoing to reduce the capital cost of electrolyzers, improve the energy efficiency of the process, and increase operational lifetimes of the equipment (U.S. Department of Energy, n.d.). While these studies consistently indicate declining electrolyzer costs with cumulative electrolyzer capacity, IEA (2025a) reported that costs have recently risen, largely due to inflation. 

The fundamental technology for splitting water into hydrogen and oxygen using electricity was developed more than 230 years ago (Smolinka et al., 2022). The process is simple enough that it is used in high school science classes around the world, but more complex equipment is needed to make and collect hydrogen on an industrial scale. 

The production of green hydrogen requires additional equipment beyond electrolyzers, such as renewable power generators, water purification plants, and equipment to process hydrogen, all of which have their own learning rates. 

Table 2. Learning rate: drop in cost per doubling of installed electrolyzer.

Unit: %

25th percentile 15
Mean 20
Median (50th percentile) 18
75th percentile 24
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Speed of Action

Speed of action refers to how quickly a climate solution physically affects the atmosphere after it is deployed. This is different from speed of deployment, which is the pace at which solutions are adopted.

At Project Drawdown, we define the speed of action for each climate solution as emergency brake, gradual, or delayed.

Deploy Industrial Green Hydrogen Feedstock is a GRADUAL climate solution. It has a steady, linear impact on the atmosphere. 

Caveats

This analysis defines green hydrogen as hydrogen made through electrolysis using onsite renewable electricity. However, many sources only provide data for electrolytic hydrogen, clean hydrogen, or low-carbon hydrogen. Each of these includes green hydrogen but may also include electrolytic hydrogen made using grid electricity, hydrogen made from biomass, or hydrogen made from fossil fuels with carbon capture and storage. We have clearly labeled when the data refer to the more generalized low-carbon electrolytic hydrogen rather than green hydrogen.

Adoption of green hydrogen as a feedstock depends on policy support for green hydrogen, regulations to drive demand for low-carbon end products made from hydrogen (Odenweller & Ueckerdt, 2025), and standardized certification for green hydrogen, including methodologies for GHG emissions monitoring (IEA, 2025a). Regulation and permitting issues can also delay green hydrogen projects and increase overall costs. 

We assumed that manufacture of methanol, ammonia, and other industrial products currently using hydrogen as a feedstock will not shift to new processes (e.g., biological) for their production. We also assumed that naturally occurring hydrogen (sometimes called white hydrogen) and other forms of very-low-carbon hydrogen will not compete with green hydrogen for use as an industrial feedstock. 

Green hydrogen requires a supply of purified water. Removing impurities, minerals, and ions from water has a carbon footprint (Henriksen et al., 2024); that cost is not included in this analysis. 

Current Adoption

Based on IEA (2025c), we estimate that operational projects are currently making 130 million kg of green hydrogen for use as an industrial feedstock per year (Table 3). This represents less than 1% (55 Mt) of all industrial hydrogen demand in 2024 (IEA, 2025a). It may be an underestimate because we only included projects that we were able to confirm to use on-site renewable electricity or off-site renewable electricity that directly supplies the facility. 

The higher cost of green hydrogen relative to hydrogen made from fossil fuels is a major barrier to adoption, along with uncertain demand and regulatory environments (IEA, 2025a). 

Table 3. Current (2025) adoption level of green hydrogen as feedstock.

Unit: kg green hydrogen/yr

Estimate (from IEA (2025c)) 130,000,000
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Adoption Trend

The IEA (2025a) has historical data on the production of low-carbon hydrogen using electrolysis for industrial applications; this includes green hydrogen but could also include hydrogen made from grid electricity. The data give an average annual rate of increase of 8.1 million kg/yr electrolytic hydrogen for use as an industrial feedstock and are likely an overestimate for purely green hydrogen (Table 4). Much of the added industrial low-carbon hydrogen from electrolysis was produced in China (IEA, 2025a). 

This rate of adoption is slower than expected; only 7% of anticipated 2023 projects have materialized, owing in part to high costs, limited demand, and lack of supportive policies (Odenweller & Ueckerdt, 2025). However, while there has been a decline overall in hydrogen offtake agreements, more than half of agreements signed are dedicated to the manufacture of ammonia and methanol, the two main industrial products that rely on hydrogen as a feedstock (IEA, 2025a). Between March 2025 and September 2025, the estimated production volume from operational industrial green hydrogen feedstock projects increased from 32 million kg/yr to 130 million kg/yr (data extracted from IEA, 2025b, 2025c).

Table 4. Low-carbon electrolytic hydrogen as feedstock, 2021–2024 adoption trend.

Unit: kg low-carbon electrolytic hydrogen/yr/yr

Estimate (from IEA 2025a) 8,100,000
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Adoption Ceiling

Current demand for hydrogen as an industrial feedstock is 50 billion kg/yr (Table 5), all of which technically could be supplied with green hydrogen. This value is based on the IEA (2025a)’s estimate of 2024 industrial hydrogen demand, with 90% allocated to its use as a feedstock for ammonia and methanol production. Since demand for industrial hydrogen for ammonia production increased by 3.4% and for methanol production by 2.0% in 2023 (IEA, 2025a), the actual adoption ceiling will increase as the production of industrial hydrogen increases. 

Table 5. Green hydrogen as a feedstock adoption ceiling.

Unit: kg green hydrogen/yr

Estimate (from IEA 2025a) 50,000,000,000
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Achievable Adoption

We estimated that 26–50 billion kg/yr of fossil-based hydrogen could be replaced with green hydrogen as an industrial feedstock by 2050, which is 53–100% of today’s total demand (Table 6).

The Achievable – Low adoption level is an average of McKinsey & Company and Wood Mackenzie’s estimated percent of hydrogen supplied by “clean” or “low-carbon” hydrogen in 2050, which presumably includes hydrogen made from fossil fuels with capture of carbon emissions (Douglas et al., 2025; Gulli et al., 2024). Wood Mackenzie projects that only 33% of traditional carbon-intensive hydrogen will be replaced with low-carbon hydrogen, while McKinsey & Company expects at least 73% of hydrogen demand to be met with clean hydrogen. These estimates may be low, given that the EU has committed to deriving 42% of industrial hydrogen from renewable sources by 2030 and 60% by 2035 (European Parliament & Council of the European Union, 2023). 

The Achievable – High adoption level is set at 100% of today’s industrial feedstock hydrogen, consistent with McKinsey & Company’s upper-end projection that all hydrogen demand could be met by clean hydrogen by 2050 (Gulli et al., 2024). 

Table 6. Green hydrogen as a feedstock range of achievable adoption levels (kg hydrogen/yr).

Table 6. Green hydrogen as a feedstock range of achievable adoption levels.

Unit: kg green hydrogen/yr

Current adoption 130,000,000
Achievable – low 26,000,000,000
Achievable – high 50,000,000,000
Adoption ceiling 50,000,000,000
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Current adoption of green hydrogen as an alternative is too low to have a globally meaningful climate impact (less than 0.002 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr estimated on both 20- and 100-year basis). We estimate that green hydrogen could reduce 0.31 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr (100- and 20-year basis) of emissions at the Achievable – Low level and 0.60 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr (100- and 20-year basis) at the Achievable – High level (Table 7). This outcome is closely aligned with the IEA’s estimate that in 2023, industrial hydrogen use was responsible for 680 Mt CO₂‑eq/yr, 90% (0.61 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr ) of which is used as a feedstock for ammonia and methanol production (IEA, 2024). 

Table 7. Green hydrogen as a feedstock climate impact at different levels of adoption.

Unit: Gt CO₂‑eq/yr, 100-yr basis

Current adoption 0.00
Achievable – low 0.31
Achievable – high 0.60
Adoption ceiling 0.60
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Additional Benefits

Income and Work

Research on the direct linkages of green hydrogen with employment is limited; however, the development and adoption of this technology is expected to create jobs (Anand et al., 2025). One study of the expansion of green hydrogen in Europe projected that by 2050, shifting to low-carbon hydrogen would directly create 18,000–50,000 jobs (Ganter et al., 2024). This is mostly driven by the higher labor demand of the electrolysis process. Some jobs associated with green hydrogen are in the construction sector and would not be permanent (Irarrazaval et al., 2026).

Health

Reducing air pollution by switching from fossil fuels to renewable energy decreases exposure to pollutants such as lead and fine particulate matter generated when hydrogen is made from fossil fuels, thereby improving the health of nearby communities (Cho et al., 2022; U.S. Environmental Protection Agency [U.S. EPA], 2025). These pollutants have been linked to increased morbidity from cardiovascular and respiratory disease, asthma, infections, and cancer (Gasparotto & Martinello, 2021) and to increased risk of premature mortality (Henneman et al., 2023).

Water Resources

Green hydrogen production is more water-efficient than most other types of hydrogen production, but water resource benefits can vary based on geography and renewable energy source (IRENA & Bluerisk, 2023; Du et al., 2024).

Air Quality

Displacing fossil fuel–based hydrogen with renewable energy–based hydrogen will reduce climate and air pollutants associated with burning higher-carbon fuels, such as CO₂, nitrogen oxides, methane, lead, and fine particulate matter (Anand et al., 2025; Cho et al., 2022; Paardekooper et al., 2020; U.S. EPA, 2025).

Risks

Investments in green hydrogen policies and programs to support its use as a feedstock can also support its use as a fuel. Many potential applications for green hydrogen as a fuel, however, are less practical, cost-effective, and efficient than direct electrification, and investments in green hydrogen infrastructure risk diverting efforts away from these better alternatives (Johnson et al., 2025). 

Green hydrogen production requires a water supply. Many existing and planned green hydrogen projects are in water-stressed regions, including China, India, the Gulf States, and parts of the European Union (IRENA & Bluerisk, 2023). However, hydrogen production by other processes also requires a water supply and can exceed the water demand for green hydrogen (Henriksen et al., 2024). 

Interactions with Other Solutions

Competing

Methanol made from industrial green hydrogen could compete with biomass-derived methanol, a product of the Deploy Low-Emission Industrial Feedstocks solution, thereby reducing that solution’s impact. 

Dashboard

Solution Basics

kg of hydrogen produced

t CO₂-eq (100-yr)/unit/yr
00.010.012median
units/yr
Current 1.3×10⁸ 02.6×10¹⁰5.0×10¹⁰
Achievable (Low to High)

Climate Impact

Gt CO₂-eq (100-yr)/yr
Current 0 0.310.6
Gradual

CO₂ ,CH₄, N₂O, BC

Trade-offs

There are embodied emissions associated with manufacturing and installing any industrial equipment, including the equipment used to make hydrogen of all kinds and renewable energy. Such emissions are not included in the analysis here, but they can be significant and their value depends on a variety of factors (Hermesmann & Müller, 2022; Iyer et al., 2024, National Renewable Energy Laboratory [NREL], 2021).

Action Word
Deploy
Solution Title
Industrial Green Hydrogen
Classification
Highly Recommended
Lawmakers and Policymakers
  • Evaluate and implement green hydrogen feedstock proposals and policies independently of other green hydrogen solutions, such as green hydrogen fuels (see Mobilize Green Hydrogen for Aviation and Trucking).
  • Before approval, conduct thorough reviews of project proposals to ensure statistical rigor and feasibility of business plans; consider requiring beneficiaries of public incentives to have offtake agreements in place; create legal tools to claw back financial incentives if products fail to achieve targeted emissions intensities.
  • Ensure laws and regulations related to green hydrogen use as a feedstock are data-driven and adaptive with short review cycles to remain timely and relevant to the markets; avoid delays leading to loss of investments and project failures.
  • Use both demand- and supply-side interventions to help create stable markets for products made from green hydrogen, ensuring those products are suitable uses for green hydrogen given the alternatives available.
  • Seek to streamline permitting processes while aligning regulations with social and environmental safeguards.
  • Set into place policies to develop strong domestic renewable energy industries concurrently with policies promoting green hydrogen as a feedstock.
  • Offer incentives to relevant actors such as subsidies, grants, guarantees, concessional finance, public investments, tax credits, and contracts for difference for green hydrogen production for use as a feedstock and their derivatives; as the market matures and becomes competitive, gradually reduce these incentives to create long-term market stability.
  • Set into place demand-side policies such as sectoral quotas and mandates for products such as ammonia and methanol made with green hydrogen, but avoiding subsidies for uses that are better served by other low-carbon solutions.
  • Create or improve robust certification schemes for green hydrogen; include clear governance models, standards for how hydrogen would be tested, systems and timelines for evaluation, and enforcement and verification mechanisms.
  • Set deadlines for the retirement of fossil-fuel hydrogen plants for ammonia and methanol production.
  • Work with industry to develop domestic and/or diverse supply chains for electrolyzers and related components.
  • Help establish robust certification systems for low-carbon versions of common hydrogen products such as ammonia and methanol; develop information campaigns to help foster demand.
  • Design incentives and policies to stimulate local or regional production and advance R&D – particularly, to reduce costs and boost efficiency of commercial-scale electrolyzers.
  • Carefully conduct water supply and stress analyses for potential green hydrogen production sites to determine the impact a plant might have on the surrounding communities before approving; require green hydrogen facilities to regularly report on water use metrics.
  • Seek to locate green hydrogen plants near end users to facilitate transport and reduce costs.
  • Implement carbon taxes and remove subsidies from fossil fuel hydrogen.
  • Create regulations that limit the potential for hydrogen leaks and institute monitoring systems to reduce and/or eliminate leakage from infrastructure.
  • Consider creating market platforms and digital product passports that coordinate supply and demand and facilitate uptake for products made with green hydrogen such as ammonia and methanol.

Further information:

Practitioners
  • Design green hydrogen feedstock proposals independent of other green hydrogen solutions, such as green hydrogen fuels (see Mobilize Green Hydrogen for Aviation and Trucking).
  • Stay abreast of policies, regulations, developments to the enabling infrastructure, and the cost-competitiveness of green hydrogen to ensure your company is well positioned to take advantage of incentives, stays in compliance, and is able to respond to changing market conditions.
  • Take advantage of government incentives such as subsidies, grants, guarantees, concessional loans, public investments, tax credits, and contracts for difference; as the market matures and becomes competitive, gradually reduce your reliance on these incentives to create long-term market stability.
  • Take advantage of demand-side policies such as sectoral quotas and mandates.
  • Consider using green bonds to finance public projects or to de-risk markets.
  • Seek long-term flexible offtake agreements with both public and private actors; aim to establish the agreement before seeking publicly offered financial incentives.
  • Carefully conduct water supply and stress analyses for potential green hydrogen production sites to determine the impact a plant might have on the surrounding communities before approving; regularly report on water use metrics.
  • Seek to locate green hydrogen feedstock plants near end users to facilitate transport and reduce costs.
  • Identify and help foster markets in which consumers are willing to pay a premium for low-emissions products made from green hydrogen.
  • Establish programs to detect and repair leaks; invest in R&D to better detect, mitigate, and repair leaks.
  • Ensure project proposals are data-driven and statistically rigorous; do not announce green hydrogen feedstock projects prematurely or without commitments to follow through.
  • Join, help create, or improve existing certification schemes for green hydrogen, include clear governance models, standards for how hydrogen would be tested, systems and timelines for evaluation, and enforcement and verification mechanisms; voluntarily certify your operations if it is not required.
  • Commit to transparent business practices and provide publicly available data on aspects of production such as emissions intensity, cost, compliance, product life cycle, and other relevant components to facilitate policy and investment; help create open databases for hydrogen producers to share this information; verify data with third-party auditors.
  • Work with policymakers to develop domestic and/or diverse supply chains for electrolyzers and related components.
  • Invest in R&D, particularly to reduce costs and boost efficiency of commercial-scale electrolyzers.
  • Regularly monitor impacts of production facilities, – especially when using seawater for cooling, to minimize risks and harms to human well-being and/or nature.
  • Help standardize analysis for life-cycle impacts of green hydrogen to improve global comparisons.
  • Voluntarily use market platforms and digital product passports to coordinate supply and demand and facilitate uptake for products made with green hydrogen, such as ammonia and methanol.

Further information:

Business Leaders
  • Evaluate and implement green hydrogen feedstock proposals and policies independently of other green hydrogen solutions, such as green hydrogen fuels (see Mobilize Green Hydrogen for Aviation and Trucking).
  • Set realistic goals for green hydrogen as a feedstock, if relevant; incorporate them into corporate net-zero strategies.
  • Enter into long-term offtake agreements with green hydrogen producers or manufacturers that use green hydrogen; consider forming consortia to allow offtakers to act as equity partners.
  • Help cultivate demand by advertising the use of green hydrogen in your products, including end-use products such as food grown with fertilizers produced by green hydrogen.
  • Seek to de-risk green hydrogen production by investing in domestic and/or diverse supply chains, supportive infrastructure, and related equipment such as renewable energy production.
  • Take advantage of government incentives such as tax credits, if possible; seek to gradually reduce reliance on these incentives to create long-term market stability.
  • Join, help create, or improve existing certification schemes for green hydrogen, include clear governance models, standards for how hydrogen would be tested, systems and timelines for evaluation, and enforcement and verification mechanisms; voluntarily certify your operations and supply chain if certification is not required.

Further information:

Nonprofit Leaders
  • Propose green hydrogen feedstock programs and policies independent of other green hydrogen solutions, such as green hydrogen fuels (see Mobilize Green Hydrogen for Aviation and Trucking).
  • Operate or help with equipment testing and certification systems, market information disclosures, and onsite monitoring.
  • Urge governments to set into place long-term regulations, using both demand- and supply-side interventions to help create stable markets for products made from green hydrogen; when possible, urge policymakers to align regulations with international standards to facilitate trade – particularly for equipment needed to produce green hydrogen.
  • Advocate for policies that develop strong domestic renewable energy industries concurrently with policies promoting green hydrogen as a feedstock.
  • Join, help create, or improve existing certification schemes for green hydrogen, include clear governance models, standards for how hydrogen would be tested, systems and timelines for evaluation, and enforcement and verification mechanisms.
  • Advocate for financial incentives and favorable policies for products such as ammonia and methanol made from green hydrogen; urge policymakers to gradually reduce subsidies and replace them with market mechanisms such as fixed pricing or contracts for difference as the market matures.
  • Advocate for deadlines for the retirement of fossil-fuel hydrogen plants.
  • Help establish robust certification systems for common products such as ammonia and methanol; develop information campaigns to help foster demand.
  • Advocate for public incentives and policies to advance R&D, particularly to reduce costs and boost efficiency of commercial-scale electrolyzers; carry out open-access research on relevant topics to improve adoption, safety, cost, and efficiency.
  • Conduct water supply and stress analyses for potential green hydrogen production sites to determine the impact a plant might have on the surrounding communities.
  • Regularly monitor impacts of production facilities, especially when using seawater for cooling, to minimize risks and harms to human well-being and/or nature.
  • Advocate for carbon taxes and the removal of subsidies from fossil fuel hydrogen.
  • Create requirements, standards, and programs for digital product passports that coordinate supply and demand and facilitate uptake for products such as ammonia and methanol made with green hydrogen.

Further information:

Investors
  • Invest in green hydrogen feedstock projects independently of other green hydrogen solutions, such as green hydrogen fuels (see Mobilize Green Hydrogen for Aviation and Trucking).
  • Invest directly in the development of green hydrogen feedstock projects.
  • Offer low-interest loans, guarantees, and concessional financing for manufacturers, developers, and operators of green hydrogen feedstock projects; extend these investments to related technology such as renewable energy and water purification; offer these investments to products such as ammonia and methanol made from green hydrogen feedstock.
  • Directly invest in companies that produce end-use products such as food produced with fertilizers made from green hydrogen.
  • Invest in R&D, component technology, and related science, especially in areas that reduce costs, boost efficiency, improve longevity, and decrease material inputs; invest in projects or companies that improve the modularity for electrolyzers and related components to improve mass production.
  • Help de-risk green hydrogen feedstock production in low- and middle-income countries by offering low-interest loans, concessional financing, and/or favorable terms.
  • Align investments with existing voluntary agreements or voluntary guidance that might apply in the location of the investment (including those that apply to biodiversity).

Further information:

Philanthropists and International Aid Agencies
  • Provide financing directly for the development of green hydrogen feedstock projects and ensure they are independent of other green hydrogen solutions, such as green hydrogen fuels (see Mobilize Green Hydrogen for Aviation and Trucking).
  • Help de-risk green hydrogen feedstock production in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) by offering grants or access to concessional financing for green hydrogen feedstock production.
  • Offer similar grants and financing for related technologies such as renewable energy and water purification; offer the same support for production of end-use products such as ammonia and methanol.
  • Operate or support efforts for equipment testing and certification systems, market information disclosures, and onsite monitoring.
  • Enter into long-term offtake agreements with manufacturers that use green hydrogen.
  • Urge governments to set into place long-term regulations, using both demand- and supply-side interventions to help create stable markets for products of green hydrogen; when possible, urge policymakers to align regulations with international standards to facilitate trade – particularly for equipment needed to produce green hydrogen.
  • Advocate for policies that develop strong domestic renewable energy industries concurrently with policies promoting green hydrogen as a feedstock.
  • Join, help create, or improve existing certification schemes for green hydrogen, include clear governance models, standards for how hydrogen would be tested, systems and timelines for evaluation, and enforcement and verification mechanisms.
  • Advocate for financial incentives and favorable policies for equipment needed to produce green hydrogen such as renewable power generators and water purification plants.
  • Advocate for financial incentives and favorable policies for products such as ammonia and methanol made from green hydrogen; urge policymakers to gradually reduce subsidies and replace them with market mechanisms such as fixed pricing or contracts for difference as the market matures.
  • Advocate for deadlines for the retirement of fossil-fuel hydrogen plants.
  • Help establish robust certification systems for common products such as ammonia and methanol; develop information campaigns to help foster demand.
  • Advocate for public incentives and policies to advance R&D, particularly to reduce costs and boost efficiency of commercial-scale electrolyzers; carry out open-access research on relevant topics to improve adoption, safety, cost, and efficiency.
  • Fund projects that provide water supply and stress analysis for potential green hydrogen production sites to determine the impact a plant might have on the surrounding communities.
  • Provide funding or assistance to projects that regularly monitor impacts of production facilities, especially when using seawater for cooling, to minimize risks and harms to human well-being and/or nature.
  • Advocate for carbon taxes and the removal of subsidies from fossil-fuel hydrogen.
  • Help establish international standards for measuring hydrogen leaks and help collect related data.
  • Create requirements, standards, and programs for digital product passports that coordinate supply and demand and facilitate uptake of products made with green hydrogen such as ammonia and methanol.

Further information:

Thought Leaders
  • Promote green hydrogen feedstock programs and policies independently of other green hydrogen solutions, such as green hydrogen fuels (see Mobilize Green Hydrogen for Aviation and Trucking).
  • Operate or help with equipment testing and certification systems, market information disclosures, and onsite monitoring.
  • Urge governments to set into place long-term regulations, using both demand- and supply-side interventions to help create stable markets for products of green hydrogen; when possible, urge policymakers to align regulations with international standards to facilitate trade – particularly for equipment needed to produce green hydrogen.
  • Advocate for policies that develop strong domestic renewable energy industries concurrently with policies promoting green hydrogen as a feedstock.
  • Join, help create, or improve existing certification schemes for green hydrogen, include clear governance models, standards for how hydrogen would be tested, systems and timelines for evaluation, and enforcement and verification mechanisms.
  • Advocate for financial incentives and favorable policies for equipment needed to produce green hydrogen feedstocks such as renewable power generators and water purification plants.
  • Advocate for financial incentives and favorable policies for products such as ammonia and methanol made from green hydrogen; urge policymakers to gradually reduce subsidies and replace them with market mechanisms such as fixed pricing or contracts for difference as the market matures.
  • Advocate for deadlines for the retirement of fossil-fuel hydrogen plants.
  • Help establish robust certification systems for common products such as ammonia and methanol; develop information campaigns to help foster demand.
  • Advocate for public incentives and policies to advance R&D, particularly to reduce costs and boost efficiency of commercial-scale electrolyzers; carry out open-access research on relevant topics to improve adoption, safety, cost, and efficiency.
  • Advocate for and/or conduct water supply and stress analysis for potential green hydrogen production sites and advocate for measures to avoid or redress harm to surrounding communities.
  • Regularly monitor impacts of production facilities, especially when using seawater for cooling, to minimize risks and harms to human well-being and/or nature.
  • Advocate for carbon taxes and removal of subsidies from fossil-fuel hydrogen.
  • Help standardize analysis for life-cycle impacts of green hydrogen to improve global comparisons.
  • Create requirements, standards, and programs for digital product passports that coordinate supply and demand and facilitate uptake for products such as ammonia and methanol made with green hydrogen.

Further information:

Technologists and Researchers
  • Develop electrolyzer technology for commercial-scale equipment to reduce costs, boost efficiency, improve longevity, and decrease material inputs; help improve modularity for electrolyzers and related components to improve mass production.
  • Improve cooling technology to increase water efficiency, reduce costs, and mitigate impacts on human well-being and the environment.
  • Develop and further improve upon air-cooling technologies.
  • Develop more sensitive leak detection equipment to identify smaller leaks that often go undetected by current technology.

Further information:

Communities, Households, and Individuals
  • Promote green hydrogen feedstock programs and policies independently of other green hydrogen solutions, such as green hydrogen fuels (see Mobilize Green Hydrogen for Aviation and Trucking).
  • Advocate for thorough reviews of project proposals to ensure statistical rigor and feasibility of business plans; consider requiring beneficiaries of public incentives to have offtake agreements in place; suggest legal tools to claw back financial incentives if products fail to achieve targeted emissions intensities.
  • Advocate for policies that develop strong domestic renewable energy industries concurrently with policies promoting green hydrogen as a feedstock.
  • Advocate for financial incentives and favorable policies for equipment needed to produce green hydrogen such as renewable power generators and water purification plants.
  • Advocate for deadlines for the retirement of fossil-fuel hydrogen plants.
  • Advocate for carbon taxes and removal of subsidies for fossil fuel hydrogen.

Further information:

Sources
Evidence Base

Consensus of effectiveness in reducing emissions: High

Green hydrogen that replaces fossil fuel–based hydrogen is widely regarded as an important approach for reducing emissions from this industrial feedstock. Blue hydrogen, made from fossil fuels with carbon capture and storage, competes with green hydrogen as a feedstock. However, incomplete carbon capture alongside methane leaks from natural gas extraction and transportation give blue hydrogen a notably higher carbon footprint (IEA, 2023). 

The IEA publishes an annual report on global hydrogen, including updates to global demand for hydrogen by sector, production routes, trade, investments, and policies (IEA, 2024, 2025a). These reports highlight how low-carbon electrolytic hydrogen production is increasing, albeit at a slower pace than previously expected. With 65 countries now having a hydrogen strategy and new policies being implemented in key regions, low-carbon hydrogen demand is expected to grow, with most new investments focused on low-carbon hydrogen as an industrial feedstock. 

Accelerating this growth is critically important to meet established GHG emission targets. Odenweller and Ueckerdt (2025) highlighted how plans for green hydrogen should focus on hard-to-electrify sectors, including industrial hydrogen feedstocks. They also emphasized the need for policymakers to use demand-side policies such as quotas and mandates along with developing plans to transition subsidies to market mechanisms such as fixed pricing mechanisms for green hydrogen and contracts for difference. 

The results presented in this document summarize findings from four reviews and meta-analyses, two databases, three reports, and 11 original studies reflecting current evidence from 10 countries, primarily China and the United States. We recognize this limited geographic scope creates bias, and hope this work inspires research and data sharing on this topic in underrepresented regions.

Updated Date

Deploy Alternative Refrigerants

Submitted by Drawdown Admin on
Sector
Buildings & Industry
Mode
Cut Emissions
Cluster
Improve Materials
Image
Supermarket refrigerator
Coming Soon
Off
Summary

This solution involves reducing the use of high-global warming potential (GWP) refrigerants, instead deploying lower-GWP refrigerants. High-GWP (>800 on a 100-yr basis) fluorinated gases (F-gases) are currently used as refrigerants in refrigeration, air conditioning, and heat pump systems. Over the lifetime of this equipment, refrigerants escape into the atmosphere where they contribute to climate change. 

Leaked lower-GWP refrigerant gases trap less heat in the atmosphere than do higher-GWP gases, so using lower-GWP gases reduces the climate impact of refrigerant use. In our analysis, this solution is only deployed as new equipment replaces decommissioned equipment because alternative refrigerants cannot typically be retrofitted into existing systems.

Income & work
Land resources,Air quality
Description for Social and Search
Deploy Alternative Refrigerants is a Highly Recommended climate solution. Many refrigerants are potent greenhouse gases. Alternatives can reduce climate impacts.
Overview

Refrigerants are chemicals that can absorb and release heat as they move between gaseous and liquid states under changing pressure. In this solution, we considered their use in six applications: residential, commercial, industrial, and transport refrigeration as well as stationary and mobile air conditioning. Heat pumps double as heating sources, though they are included here with air conditioning appliances. Refrigerants are released to the atmosphere during manufacturing, transport, installation, operation, repair, and disposal of refrigerants and equipment. Deploy Alternative Insulation Materials covers the use of refrigerant chemicals to produce foams.

Climate impacts of emissions of refrigerants can be reduced by:

  • using lower-GWP refrigerants
  • reducing leaks during equipment manufacturing, transport, installation, use, and maintenance
  • reclaiming refrigerant at end-of-life and destroying or recycling it
  • using less refrigerant through efficiency improvements or reduction in demand.

This solution evaluated the use of lower-GWP refrigerants alone. Leak reduction and responsible disposal are covered in Improve Refrigerant Management. Lowering use of and demand for refrigerants – while outside the scope of these assessments – is the most effective way to reduce emissions.

Most refrigerants used in new equipment today are a group of F-gases called hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) (Figure 1). HFCs are GHGs and are typically hundreds to thousands of times more potent than CO₂  (Smith et al., 2021). Since high-GWP refrigerants are usually short-lived climate pollutants, their negative climate impacts tend to be concentrated in the near term (Shah et al., 2015). High-GWP HFC production and consumption are being phased down under the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol, but existing stock and production remains high worldwide (Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, 2016; United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC], 2023). Other types of refrigerants that deplete the ozone layer – including chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs) — are also being phased out of new production and use globally (Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, 1987; Figure 1).

Figure 1. Examples of common refrigerants and their climate and environmental impacts

High-GWP: red; Medium-GWP: yellow; Low-GWP: green

Type GWP
(20-yr)		 GWP
(100-yr)		 Lifetime
(yr)		 Ozone
Depleting?		 PFAS? Safety
Class*
R11CFC8,3206,23052YesA1
R12CFC12,70012,500102YesA1
R22HCFC5,6901,96011.9YesA1
R141bHCFC2,7108609.4Yes
R125HFC6,7403,74030NoYesA1
R134aHFC4,1401,53014NoYesA1
R143aHFC7,8405,81051NoYesA2L
R404AHFC
blend		7,2084,728NoYesA1
R407CHFC
blend		4,4571,908NoYesA1
R410AHFC
blend		4,7152,256NoYesA1
R452AHFC/HFO
blend		4,2732,292NoYesA1
R32HFC2,6907715.4NoNoA2L
R452BHFC/HFO
blend		2,275779NoYesA2L
R454AHFC/HFO
blend		943270NoYesA2L
R513AHFC/HFO
blend		1,823673NoYesA1
R290
(Propane)		Natural0.0720.020.036NoNoA3
R600a
(Isobutane)		Natural< 1< 10.019NoNoA3
R717
(Ammonia)		Natural< 1< 1< 1NoNoB2L
R744
(CO₂)		Natural11NoNoA1
R1234yfHFO1.810.5010.033NoYesA2L
R1234ze(E)HFO4.941.370.052NoYesA2L

*Safety classes based on ASHRAE Standard 34: 

A1: non-flammable, lower toxicity

A2L: lower flammability, lower toxicity

A3: higher flammability, lower toxicity

B2L: lower flammability, higher toxicity

 

Sources:

Baha, M., & Dupont, J.-L. (2023, September 15). Global warming potential (GWP) of HFC refrigerants. International Institute of Refrigeration. 

Behringer, D., Heydel, F., Gschrey, B., Osterheld, S., Schwarz, W., Warncke, K., Freeling, F., Nödler, K., Henne, S., Reimann, S., Blepp, M., Jörß, W., Liu, R., Ludig, S., Rüdenauer, I., & Gartiser, S. (2021). Persistent degradation products of halogenated refrigerants and blowing agents in the environment: Type, environmental concentrations, and fate with particular regard to new halogenated substitutes with low global warming potential. Final report. Umweltbundesamt [German Environment Agency]. 

Burkholder, J. B., Hodnebrog, Ø., McDonald, B. C., Orkin, V., Papadimitriou, V. C., & Van Hoomissen, D. (2023). Annex: Summary of abundances, lifetimes, ODPs, REs, GWPs, and GTPs. Scientific Assessment of Ozone Depletion 2022. 

Garry, M. (2021, June 23). Certain HFCs and HFOs are in PFAS group that five EU countries intend to restrict. 

Smith, C., Nicholls, Z. R. J., Armour, K., Collins, W., Forster, P., Meinshausen, M., Palmer, M. D., & Watanabe, M. (2021). The Earth’s energy budget, climate feedbacks, and climate sensitivity supplementary material. In Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 

Trevisan, T. (2023, July 3). Overview of PFAS refrigerants used in HVAC&R and relevance of refrigerants in the PFAS Restriction Intention. UN Montreal Protocol 45th OEWG, Bangkok. 

United Nations Environment Programme. (2023). Refrigeration, Air Conditioning and Heat Pumps Technical Options Committee: 2022 assessment report. 

United Nations Environment Programme & ASHRAE. (2025). Update on new refrigerants designations and safety classifications June 2025. 

In this solution, production and consumption of high-GWP refrigerants (which we defined as GWP>800, 100-yr basis) are avoided by the use of lower-GWP refrigerants in new equipment. These alternative refrigerants can still leak to the atmosphere, but their heat-trapping effect is much lower. Some promising alternatives have low GWPs (<5, 100-yr basis), including some hydrofluoroolefins (HFOs) as well as natural refrigerants, which include CO₂, ammonia, propane, and isobutane. (Figure 1). However, the adoption of these low-GWP refrigerants comes with challenges, including flammability, cost, building codes, and technical limitations (see Risks and Take Action sections below).

Refrigerants with medium GWPs (<800, 100-yr basis; <2,700, 20-yr basis (Smith et al., 2021)) can also be near-term alternatives that increase adoption while providing a climate benefit. In our analysis, we separately considered medium-GWP alternatives in applications where low-GWP alternatives are less common (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Alternative refrigerants used to calculate the low-GWP and medium-GWP scenarios. The low-GWP scenario assumed equipment using high-GWP refrigerants is replaced at end-of-life with equipment using alternative refrigerants with GWP<5. The medium-GWP calculations assumed GWP<800 (100-yr basis) and GWP<2,700 (20-yr basis) alternatives in applications where low-GWP replacements are currently less common (commercial refrigeration, transport refrigeration, stationary air conditioning) and assumed low-GWP replacements for the remaining applications where they are more developed technologies (residential refrigeration, industrial refrigeration, mobile air conditioning). The alternative refrigerants in the table are used for effectiveness and/or cost calculations. 

Application Scenario 1: Low-GWP only
(low GWP: < 5, 100-year basis) 		Scenario 2: Medium-GWP when low-GWP alternatives are less common, otherwise low-GWP
(medium GWP: < 800, 100-year basis)
Residential refrigeration Isobutane
Commercial refrigeration Propane, CO₂ Medium-GWP HFC and HFO blends
Industrial refrigeration Ammonia, CO₂, propane
Transport refrigeration Propane, propene, ammonia, CO₂,
low-GWP HFOs		 Medium-GWP HFC and HFO blends
Mobile air conditioning CO₂, low-GWP HFOs
Stationary air conditioning Propane, CO₂,
ammonia, low-GWP HFOs		 Medium-GWP HFC and HFO blends

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There is currently no single refrigerant that perfectly fits the climate, safety, and performance requirements for all applications. Instead, the optimal alternative refrigerant will vary depending on equipment type and location (United Nations Environment Programme [UNEP], 2023). 

Generating electricity to run heating, ventilation, air conditioning, and refrigeration (HVAC&R) equipment also produces high levels of emissions (mostly CO₂ ) at power plants – more than twice the emissions from direct release of refrigerants (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 2022). Using alternative refrigerants can impact efficiency, changing these electricity-related emissions. However, indirect emissions are not quantified in this solution.

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Credits

Lead Fellow

  • Sarah Gleeson, Ph.D.

Contributors

  • Ruthie Burrows, Ph.D.

  • James Gerber, Ph.D.

  • Daniel Jasper

  • Alex Sweeney

Internal Reviewers

  • Aiyana Bodi

  • James Gerber, Ph.D.

  • Hannah Henkin

  • Heather McDiarmid, Ph.D.

  • Ted Otte

  • Amanda D. Smith, Ph.D.

Effectiveness

For every kt high-GWP refrigerant phased out in favor of low-GWP refrigerant, approximately 460,000 t CO₂‑eq/yr of F-gas emissions will be mitigated on a 100-yr basis (Table 1). If medium-GWP refrigerants are instead adopted in certain applications (Figure 2), the effectiveness decreases to 400,000 t CO₂‑eq (100-yr)/kt high-GWP refrigerant phased out/yr (Table 1). Effectiveness is based on average GWP of the high-, low-, and medium-GWP refrigerants; the difference in refrigerant charge; and the expected percent released to the atmosphere.

Since F-gases are short-lived climate pollutants, the effectiveness of this solution on a 20-yr basis is higher than on a 100-yr basis. Switching to low-GWP refrigerants saves 860,000 t CO₂‑eq /kt high-GWP refrigerant phased out/yr on a 20-yr basis. Medium-GWP refrigerants in certain applications reduces the effectiveness to 700,000 t CO₂‑eq (20-yr)/kt high-GWP refrigerant phased out/yr.

Using low-GWP refrigerants mitigates almost all CO₂‑eq emissions from direct release of high-GWP refrigerants. Medium-GWP refrigerants potentially offer a faster path to adoption in certain applications, but yield a smaller reduction in CO₂‑eq emissions. Switching to the lowest possible GWP refrigerant appropriate for a given application will have the highest effectiveness at cutting emissions.

Table 1. Effectiveness at reducing emissions using low-GWP refrigerants only or medium-GWP refrigerants in some applications and low-GWP alternatives otherwise

Unit: t CO₂‑eq /kt high-GWP refrigerant phased out/yr, 100-yr basis

Average – low GWP only 460000
Average – medium & low GWP 400000
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Cost

We estimated the cost of purchasing and using low-GWP alternative refrigerants and equipment by taking a weighted average across all application types, averaging to US$23 million/kt high-GWP refrigerant phased out/yr. A kt of refrigerant goes a long way; a typical residential air conditioner requires only 0.6–3 kg refrigerant, depending on the country and refrigerant type (CLASP & ATMOsphere, 2022). On average across all applications, the emissions abatement cost for this solution is only US$50/t CO₂‑eq on a 100-yr basis (Table 2), or US$27/t CO₂‑eq on a 20-yr basis.

We separately evaluated the net costs of using medium-GWP refrigerants in some applications (Figure 2). Using medium-GWP refrigerants brought average costs down to US$9.4 million/kt high-GWP refrigerant phased out/yr. The emissions abatement cost is US$24/t CO₂‑eq (100-yr basis) or US$13/t CO₂‑eq (20-yr basis).

We calculated cost using values of initial cost and annual operation and maintenance costs from Purohit and Höglund-Isaksson (2017). The overall net cost is a weighted average of the average net costs of switching to alternative refrigerants for each of the six refrigerant applications (Figure 2). Costs are likely to change as the HFC phase-down continues under the Kigali Amendment. We did not evaluate external costs such as those to manufacturers. 

Although our calculated costs are averages, costs varied widely depending on the specific equipment, refrigerant type, and geographic location. Using ammonia in industrial refrigeration yields net savings of US$24 million/kt high-GWP refrigerant/yr. Low-GWP alternative refrigerants for transport refrigeration lead to cost savings over high- or medium-GWP refrigerants, as do hydrocarbons in residential and commercial air conditioning.

We did not consider energy cost differences due to changes in efficiency. Since electricity costs are the majority of the life-cycle costs for certain equipment, these changes in energy costs may be significant (Goetzler et al., 2016).

Table 2. Cost per unit of climate impact for low-GWP refrigerants.

Unit: 2023 US$/t CO₂‑eq , 100-yr basis

Average 50.00
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Methods and Supporting Data

Methods and Supporting Data

Learning Curve

We did not find a learning rate for this solution, although there is evidence that costs of equipment and refrigerant decrease as more alternative refrigerants are deployed. Zanchi et al. (2019) claim that after regulations limiting emissions from F-gases and capping allowable refrigerant GWP were enacted in Europe, component prices for natural refrigerant equipment – particularly in commercial refrigeration – became comparable with lower HFC unit prices. Equipment prices have trended downwards through other similar technological transitions in the past (JMS Consulting & Inforum, 2018).

The cost of refrigerants can change with adoption as well as the cost of equipment. Natural refrigerants tend to be inexpensive, but cost premiums for expensive HFO refrigerants could drop by more than 75% as production volumes increase (Booten et al., 2020). Certain expensive-to-produce alternative refrigerants like HFO-1234yf have limited information about possible future price reductions, but other refrigerant transitions have indicated that prices should decrease due to increased production experience, capacity, and number of producers – especially as patents expire (Sherry et al., 2017). 

Speed of Action

Speed of action refers to how quickly a climate solution physically affects the atmosphere after it is deployed. This is different from speed of deployment, which is the pace at which solutions are adopted.

At Project Drawdown, we define the speed of action for each climate solution as emergency brake, gradual, or delayed.

Deploy Alternative Refrigerants is an EMERGENCY BRAKE climate solution. It has the potential to deliver a more rapid impact than gradual and delayed solutions. Because emergency brake solutions can deliver their climate benefits quickly, they can help accelerate our efforts to address dangerous levels of climate change. For this reason, they are a high priority.

Caveats

Permanence

There is a low risk of the emissions reductions for this solution being reversed. Each kt high-GWP refrigerant phased out for a lower-GWP alternative reduces the emissions from refrigerant release during manufacturing, transport, installation, operation, repair, and disposal of equipment. 

Additionality

This solution is additional when alternative refrigerant is used in applications that would have used HFCs or other high-GWP refrigerants in recent history. HFCs are not the baseline refrigerant in every scenario: hydrocarbons, for example, have been widely used in residential refrigeration and ammonia in industrial refrigeration for many years. 

In our analysis, we considered any path to adoption of alternative refrigerants to be part of its effectiveness at reducing GHG emissions. For example, we considered all HFC reductions mandated by policy to be considered additional over baseline HFC usage. However, some GHG accounting or crediting organizations would consider this regulatory additionality; the only emissions reductions that count as additional would be those not mandated by international, regional, and application-specific policy limits.

Current Adoption

We estimated that 440 kt high-GWP refrigerants already have been phased out in favor of low-GWP alternative refrigerants worldwide (Table 3). For adoption, we did not differentiate between low- and medium-GWP alternative refrigerants due to insufficient data. 

There are limited recent and global data available to quantify the adoption of alternative refrigerants. For this reason, our approach to quantifying adoption is a simplified approximation. We used projected 2022 HFC emissions from Velders et al. (2015) as our baseline. These projections were made before any Kigali Amendment phase-down began, and we assumed they represent a reasonable 2022 emissions picture in the absence of policy-regulated HFC reductions. 

To calculate current adoption, we analyzed a Velders et al. (2022) model of 2022 HFC emissions accounting for current policies. Projected 2022 emissions in the current model were 6.4% lower than the 2015-projected baseline, which we assumed to be proportional to the amount of high-GWP HFC phased out and replaced with low-GWP alternatives. We estimated current adoption by applying this assumption to an estimated 6,480 kt bank of existing refrigerants (Climate and Ozone Protection Alliance, 2025). That bank includes all HFC and ozone-depleting refrigerants in new, in-use, and end-of-life equipment, and represents the potential refrigerant that could be replaced by alternative refrigerants. Since some alternative refrigerants were adopted before our 2015 baseline, the current adoption value is likely an underestimate.

Some applications are known to have higher levels of current adoption than others. For example, 800 million domestic refrigerators are estimated to use isobutane refrigerant globally, and most of the market for commercial supermarket plug-in cases in Europe, the United States, and Japan use hydrocarbons such as propane (Hayes et al., 2023; UNEP, 2023).

Table 3. Current (2022 modeled) adoption level of low-GWP alternative refrigerants relative to 2015 baseline levels.

Unit: kt high-GWP refrigerant phased out

Estimate 440
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Adoption Trend

We estimated that 77 kt high-GWP refrigerants are phased out for alternative low-GWP refrigerants each year (Table 4). Using the same method as current adoption, we compared baseline and policy-adjusted projections of HFC emissions from Velders et al. (2015, 2022) for 2019–2022. The difference between the projections increased by a median 1.2% year-over-year.

We applied this percent change directly to the 2022 HFC refrigerant bank estimate to determine the tonnage of high-GWP refrigerant that will be phased out as new equipment replaces decommissioned stock. We assumed the replacements all use low-GWP refrigerants.

Although more HFC is being phased out each year, the bank and associated emissions of HFCs are also growing as refrigeration and cooling equipment are more heavily used globally. Alternative refrigerant adoption will need to outpace market growth before net emissions reductions occur. The adoption trend is likely higher today than what is reflected by the data used in our calculations (prior to 2023), since 2024 was a Kigali-mandated increase in HFC phase-down for certain countries. We expect adoption trend to continue to increase as HFC restrictions tighten further in the future.

Table 4. 2019–2022 adoption trend of low-GWP alternative refrigerants.

Unit: kt high-GWP refrigerant phased out/yr

Estimate 77
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Adoption Ceiling

The adoption ceiling for this solution is phasing out all high-GWP refrigerants, or 6,900 kt globally (Table 5). This value represents the entire current bank of HFCs and ozone-depleting refrigerants added to the current adoption of low-GWP refrigerants (Climate and Ozone Protection Alliance, 2025).

This quantity assumes no increase in the total refrigerant bank above 2022 levels, while in reality the bank is projected to increase substantially as demand for cooling and refrigeration grows worldwide (International Energy Agency [IEA], 2023). Consumption of refrigerants in stationary air conditioning applications alone is projected to increase 3.5-fold between 2020–2050 (Denzinger, 2023). Additionally, new equipment that uses refrigerants (such as heat pump water heaters) is expected to replace non-refrigerant equipment, adding to future refrigerant demand. However, projecting future refrigerant demand was not part of this assessment.

We assumed that in all future cases, high-GWP refrigerants can be phased out for low-GWP alternatives. While ambitious, this ceiling is possible across all applications as new refrigerants, blends, and equipment are developed and commercialized. Since we considered implementation in new equipment, it comes with an adoption delay as existing equipment with high-GWP refrigerants finish their lifespans, which can last 10–20 years (California Public Utilities Commission, 2022; CLASP & ATMOsphere, 2022). 

Table 5. Adoption ceiling for low-GWP refrigerants.

Unit: kt high-GWP refrigerant phased out

Estimate 6,900
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Achievable Adoption

The achievable adoption range is clearly laid out by the Kigali Amendment schedule for reduction in HFC consumption and production. The Achievable – Low adoption assumes that worldwide, all countries meet the Kigali phase-down schedule and collectively reach 80% reduction from baseline emissions by 2045. Under the Kigali Amendment, all participating countries are expected to meet at least this standard by this date. It is achievable that this adoption level could be reached collectively across all nations (including higher-adopting countries and non-Kigali signatories). This comes to 5,500 kt reduction in high-GWP refrigerants, calculated as 80% of the sum of net bank and current adoption (Table 6). 

Achievable – High assumes that all countries average the highest Kigali-mandated HFC reduction levels for any country (85% reduction from baseline), which comes to 5,900 kt high-GWP refrigerant phased out when applied to our adoption ceiling. If countries continue to follow the Kigali Amendment phase-down schedule, most production and use of HFCs will be eliminated over the coming decades. Other high-GWP ozone-depleting refrigerants are mostly phased out of new production under the Montreal Protocol, although large quantities still exist in refrigerant banks (Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, 1987). 

Our achievable adoption values do not account for growth in the refrigerant bank over 2022 levels. Although refrigerant use is expected to grow substantially in the coming decades (IEA, 2023), we did not project future demand as part of our assessment. If HFC phaseout does not outpace refrigerant demand growth, emissions can increase despite more widespread adoption of this solution. Lowering the demand for refrigerant while ensuring that all people have access to refrigeration, heating, and cooling will be challenging.

Table 6. Range of achievable adoption levels for low-GWP refrigerants.

Unit: kt high-GWP refrigerant phased out

Current adoption 440
Achievable – low 5500
Achievable – high 5900
Adoption ceiling 6900
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This solution has high potential climate impact due to both the quantity and high GWP of many current refrigerants. High-GWP refrigerant already phased out for low-GWP alternatives has an estimated current climate impact of 0.20 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr on a 100-yr basis (Table 7). If the Kigali Amendment HFC phasedown schedule is followed globally, we expect the achievable-adoption climate impact to be 2.5–2.7 Gt CO₂‑eq (100-yr)/yr. Reaching the adoption ceiling could potentially mitigate 3.2 Gt CO₂‑eq (100-yr)/yr. 

Due to the short lifetime of most high-GWP refrigerants, the climate benefit of phasing them out for alternatives is higher on a 20-year time horizon, making this solution highly impactful in the short-term. The use of low-GWP refrigerants currently saves an estimated 0.38 Gt CO₂‑eq (20-yr)/yr. The achievable 20-year impact is 4.7–5.0 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr, with a ceiling of 5.9 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr.

Since medium-GWP refrigerants are less effective at reducing emissions, the climate impacts are lower. If the same achievable adoption scenarios are reached but the effectiveness is calculated for medium-GWP refrigerants in commercial refrigeration, transport refrigeration, and stationary air conditioning applications, the climate impact reduces to 2.2–2.4 Gt CO₂‑eq (100-yr)/yr or 3.9–4.1 Gt CO₂‑eq (20-yr)/yr.

Our findings for impact are higher than many estimates of the scale of current refrigerant emissions. This is because other reports of F-gas emissions typically do not include high-GWP ozone-depleting refrigerants such as CFCs and HCFCs. The IPCC Sixth Assessment (2023) estimates 1.4 ± 0.41 GtCO₂‑eq/yr of 2019 emissions were F-gases from all sources, but this value does not include CFCs or HCFCs. The UNEP (2022) estimates that CFCs and HCFCs stored in equipment produce almost twice as many CO₂‑eq emissions as HFCs do. Our calculated achievable climate impact accounts for all major high-GWP refrigerant chemicals (CFCs, HCFCs, and HFCs), and therefore an achievable climate impact much higher than 1.4 GtCO₂‑eq/yr is reasonable.

Table 7. Climate impact at different levels of adoption of low-GWP alternative refrigerants.

Unit: Gt CO₂‑eq/yr, 100-yr basis

Current adoption 0.20
Achievable – low 2.50
Achievable – high 2.70
Adoption ceiling 3.20
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Additional Benefits

Income and Work

Transitioning from HFCs to refrigerants with lower GWP can increase jobs (Colbourne et al., 2013; U.S. EPA, 2025). Reports from the Alliance for Responsible Atmospheric Policy and collaborators found that moving toward lower GWP refrigerants in the United States would increase jobs, increase manufacturing outputs of alternative refrigerants, and create more exports, strengthening the United States’ trade position (Inforum et al., 2019; JMS Consulting & Inforum, 2018). It is possible that using alternative refrigerants could lead to consumer savings on energy bills, depending on the alternative refrigerant, application, and equipment design (Colbourne et al., 2013; Purohit & Höglund-Isaksson, 2017; Shah et al., 2019; Zaelke & Borgford-Parnell, 2015). For example, an analysis of mobile air conditioning found that switching to an alternative refrigerant, such as R152a, can lead to high cost savings over its lifetime, and consumers in hotter climates would see the savings benefits (Blumberg et al., 2019). Since efficiency improvements are possible but not guaranteed in all cases, we do not consider this a guaranteed additional benefit. 

Land Resources

For a description of the benefits to land resources, please refer to Air Quality below. 

Air Quality

Some F-gases such as HFCs are considered per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) and can persist in the environment for centuries, posing serious human and ecosystem health risks (Figure 1) (Dimitrakopoulou et al., 2024; Fenton et al., 2021). PFAS can decompose in the atmosphere to produce trifluoroacetic acid (TFA), which can harm the environment and human health (UNEP, 2023). Possible impacts of high atmospheric TFA concentrations include acid rain, accumulation in terrestrial ecosystems in water and plant matter, and harmful effects on the environment and organisms (Chele et al., 2024; Hanson et al., 2024). Non-fluorinated alternative refrigerants would reduce the amount of PFAS pollution and reduce atmospheric TFA formation, lessening these harmful impacts. Some of these air quality benefits would also benefit indoor air quality because most refrigerants are used in buildings. Using alternative refrigerants avoids release of ozone-depleting substances such as HCFCs that can harm the ozone layer (Bolaji & Huan, 2013).

These benefits depend on the alternative refrigerant used – some low-GWP F-gas refrigerants such as HFOs are highly reactive, can be classified as PFAS, and can form TFA and other degradation products (Salvador et al., 2024). Therefore, the type of alternative refrigerant affects whether this is a benefit or a risk (see Risks below for more information). The thresholds at which these impacts occur are not well understood, and more research is needed to understand the potential harmful effects of TFA (Arp et al., 2024). 

Risks

Some alternative refrigerants – including propane and ammonia – can react in the atmosphere to form polluting or toxic compounds (Chele et al., 2024). Low- and medium-GWP HFO or HFC refrigerants degrade into TFA, which is considered by some regulating bodies to be a PFAS, a class of chemicals with a proposed ban in Europe (European Chemicals Agency, 2023; European Environmental Bureau, 2025; Garavagno et al., 2024). Although TFA concentrations are currently low and impacts are minimal, increased HFO use could lead to greater accumulation, making it important to further study the potential risks (Chele et al., 2024; European Environmental Bureau, 2025; Hanson et al., 2024; Holland et al., 2021). Moreover, HFOs are made from high-GWP feedstocks, perpetuating the production and release of high-GWP chemicals (Booten et al., 2020; Chele et al., 2024). The use of other alternative refrigerant chemistries will reduce these risks (see Figure 1 and Additional Benefits).

Alternative refrigerants can be flammable (e.g., propane, ammonia) and toxic (e.g., ammonia). This potentially risks the well-being of people or property due to ignition, explosion, or refrigerant leaks (Shah et al., 2017). Minimizing leaks, reducing proximity to ignition sources, enhancing leak sensing, regulating safe charge sizes, and training installation and maintenance professionals are ways to lower this risk (Secop, 2018). Many alternative refrigerants are classified in ASHRAE safety group A2L, and these refrigerants have a low risk of ignition (Gradient, 2015; Imamura et al., 2015). Many countries have updated their standards in recent years to ensure safe use of low-GWP refrigerants, but adoption can be slowed if building codes do not allow for adoption (Heubes et al., 2012; UNEP, 2023).

Some specific technological solutions are required to avoid risks – for example, ammonia corrodes copper (Dräger, n.d.), and CO₂ refrigerant requires equipment and safety mechanisms that can handle its high operating pressure (Zanchi et al., 2019).

Interactions with Other Solutions

Reinforcing

Decreasing food loss and waste could require increases in cold storage capacity, especially in commercial, residential, and transport refrigeration (Babiker, 2017; Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2019). Alternative refrigerants will lead to reduced GHG emissions from this new food refrigeration equipment, particularly for high-leakage systems such as supermarket refrigeration. However, if less food is produced to better manage food loss, this could lead to a decreased demand for cold storage (Dong et al., 2021).

Competing

Alternative refrigerants require design changes (Kim et al., 2020) that could increase the up-front cost of heat pumps.

Using alternative refrigerants will decrease the CO₂‑eq emissions from released refrigerants. This means that management practices to reduce refrigerant release will save fewer CO₂‑eq emissions.

Dashboard

Solution Basics

kt high-GWP refrigerant phased out

t CO₂-eq (100-yr)/unit/yr
460,000
units
Current 440 05,5005,900
Achievable (Low to High)

Climate Impact

Gt CO₂-eq (100-yr)/yr
Current 0.2 2.52.7
US$ per t CO₂-eq
50
Emergency Brake

F-gases

Trade-offs

For particular alternative refrigerants and applications, switching to a lower-GWP refrigerant can reduce equipment efficiency (ASHRAE, 2009). Such a switch would decrease direct emissions due to reduction in refrigerant GWP, but would increase emissions associated with electricity generation.

Less efficient refrigerants may also require larger equipment and heavier masses of refrigerants, increasing the emissions for producing and transporting appliances. Fabris et al. (2024) reported that transport refrigeration systems using CO₂ refrigerant are heavier, leading to a 9.3% increase in emissions from fuel consumption during transport.

°C days
03500

Space cooling demand (21 °C basis)

This map shows the annual average cooling degree days (CDD) for the decade ending in 2025. CDD are a measure of how much the temperature in a location exceeds 21 °C each day, summed cumulatively over a year. Regions with greater cooling degree days will likely have higher demand for space cooling equipment to maintain a comfortable indoor air temperature in buildings and vehicles.

Copernicus Climate Change Service. (2023). ERA5 hourly data on single levels from 1940 to present [Data set]. Copernicus Climate Change Service (C3S) Climate Data Store (CDS). Retrieved January 13, 2026 from Link to source: https://doi.org/10.24381/cds.adbb2d47 

Hersbach, H., Bell, B., Berrisford, P., Hirahara, S., Horányi, A., Muñoz‐Sabater, J., Nicolas, J., Peubey, C., Radu, R., Schepers, D., Simmins, A., Soci, C., Abdalla, S., Abellan, X., Balsamo, G., Bechtold, P., Biavati, G., Bidlot, J., Bonavita, M., … Thépaut, J. N. (2020). The ERA5 global reanalysis. Quarterly Journal of the Royal Meteorological Society, 146(730), 1999–2049. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1002/qj.3803

°C days
03500

Space cooling demand (21 °C basis)

This map shows the annual average cooling degree days (CDD) for the decade ending in 2025. CDD are a measure of how much the temperature in a location exceeds 21 °C each day, summed cumulatively over a year. Regions with greater cooling degree days will likely have higher demand for space cooling equipment to maintain a comfortable indoor air temperature in buildings and vehicles.

Copernicus Climate Change Service. (2023). ERA5 hourly data on single levels from 1940 to present [Data set]. Copernicus Climate Change Service (C3S) Climate Data Store (CDS). Retrieved January 13, 2026 from Link to source: https://doi.org/10.24381/cds.adbb2d47 

Hersbach, H., Bell, B., Berrisford, P., Hirahara, S., Horányi, A., Muñoz‐Sabater, J., Nicolas, J., Peubey, C., Radu, R., Schepers, D., Simmins, A., Soci, C., Abdalla, S., Abellan, X., Balsamo, G., Bechtold, P., Biavati, G., Bidlot, J., Bonavita, M., … Thépaut, J. N. (2020). The ERA5 global reanalysis. Quarterly Journal of the Royal Meteorological Society, 146(730), 1999–2049. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1002/qj.3803

Maps Introduction

Deploy Alternative Refrigerants is most effective at mitigating climate change in regions with high levels of current refrigerant use. Unfortunately, there are no comprehensive data available at the country level to estimate the quantity of high-GWP or alternative refrigerants stored in equipment. Countries report HFC stocks and emissions for refrigeration and air conditioning to the UNFCCC, but these do not include high-GWP ozone-depleting substances such as CFCs and HCFCs (UNFCCC, 2023). Since national emissions estimates such as the Emissions Database for Global Atmospheric Research (EDGAR) do not report high-GWP ozone-depleting F-gases, we do not include these data in this analysis (Crippa et al., 2025). The UNEP does track CFC, HCFC, and HFC production and consumption, but this does not provide a comprehensive use or emissions picture since many current emissions are from stock already contained in existing equipment (Ozone Secretariat, n.d.). 

Regions with greater cooling demand are likely to require more refrigerant use for refrigeration and air conditioning. Regional patterns of where this solution is most important may evolve in the future as cooling appliances become more widespread and the climate warms. 

International, national, and local policies have a large impact on the adoption of alternative refrigerants. The Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol mandates HFC phasedown schedules for participating countries through 2047. Additionally, local building codes and policies influence the use of alternative refrigerants. The Air-Conditioning, Heating, and Refrigeration Institute (AHRI) and The North American Sustainable Refrigeration Council (NASRC) give region-specific information in North America about such policies (AHRI, n.d.-a, n.d.-b; NASRC, n.d.). 

CLASP found that in 2025, China and the United States had the highest numbers of both residential air conditioners and refrigerator-freezers (CLASP, 2025). This suggests that residential refrigerant use and emissions are likely to be highest in these countries. 

Emissions from producing refrigerants will be higher in locations with more refrigerant manufacturing. Refrigerant manufacturing is more common in locations that are close to chemical feedstocks, have financial incentives, and have experienced and cheap labor (Booten et al., 2020).

Action Word
Deploy
Solution Title
Alternative Refrigerants
Classification
Highly Recommended
Lawmakers and Policymakers
  • Develop national cooling plans and integrate them into national climate plans.
  • Enact comprehensive policies that incentivize the lowest possible GWP refrigerants, penalize high-GWP refrigerants, and provide updated building code requirements.
  • Create government procurement policies that become stricter over time to mandate the use of alternative refrigerants or implement refrigerant GWP limits in government buildings and cooling systems.
  • Offer financial incentives such as subsidies, tax credits, and grants for using alternative refrigerants.
  • Implement the transition to alternative refrigerants while simultaneously working to improve equipment energy efficiency.
  • Implement an array of safety regulations that reduce the risk of leaks and exposure, such as restricting charge sizes, improving ventilation and leak sensors, and requiring certification for professionals.
  • Create free workforce training programs to improve safety around installation and maintenance.
  • Invest in R&D to improve availability, compatibility with existing equipment, and safety of alternative refrigerants.
  • Require detailed recordkeeping for vendors, contractors, and technicians to track and report on refrigerant types and amounts in use.
  • Develop refrigerant audit programs similar to energy audit programs.
  • Conduct consultations with national and local government agencies, businesses, schools, universities, farmers, healthcare professionals, research institutions, nonprofits, and the public to determine how best to transition local supply chains to alternative refrigerants.
  • Create certification schemes to identify which businesses utilize alternative refrigerants.
  • Offer educational resources, creating one-stop shops for information on alternative refrigerants and energy efficiency; offer demonstrations, highlighting their cost savings and climate benefits.
  • Create, support, or join networks or partnerships dedicated to advancing and deploying alternative refrigerants.

Further information:

Practitioners
  • Use alternative refrigerants and equipment that uses the lowest possible GWP refrigerant, and phase in alternative refrigerants throughout the rest of your supply chain.
  • Advocate for comprehensive policy plans that incentivize the lowest possible GWP refrigerants, penalize high-GWP refrigerants, and provide updated building code requirements.
  • Avoid venting or intentional releases of high-GWP refrigerants and conduct regular maintenance on equipment.
  • Maintain detailed records to track and report on refrigerant types and amounts in use.
  • Improve building, operations, and cooling designs to reduce demand for refrigerants.
  • Implement an array of safety protocols to reduce the risk of leaks and exposure, such as restricting charge sizes, improving ventilation and leak sensors, and ensuring only trained professionals service the equipment.
  • Take advantage of financial incentives such as subsidies, tax credits, and grants for using alternative refrigerants.
  • Participate in consultations with national and local government agencies, businesses, universities, farmers, healthcare professionals, research institutions, nonprofits, and the public to determine how best to transition local supply chains to alternative refrigerants.
  • Stay abreast of changing regulations, identify authoritative and trustworthy sources of legal and policy information, and invest in technology that stays ahead of the refrigerant transition curve.
  • Participate in certification schemes that identify which businesses utilize alternative refrigerants.
  • Create, support, or join networks or partnerships dedicated to advancing and deploying alternative refrigerants.

Further information:

Business Leaders
  • Establish time-bound, transparent targets for transitioning to alternative refrigerants.
  • Use alternative refrigerants and equipment that uses the lowest possible GWP refrigerant; pressure or incentivize suppliers to phase in and report on alternative refrigerants throughout your supply chain.
  • Take advantage of financial incentives such as subsidies, tax credits, and grants for using alternative refrigerants.
  • Maintain detailed records to track and report on refrigerant types and amounts in use within operations; request and maintain records from suppliers.
  • Improve building, operations, and cooling designs to reduce demand for refrigerants.
  • Participate in consultations with national and local government agencies, businesses, universities, farmers, healthcare professionals, research institutions, nonprofits, and the public to determine how best to transition local supply chains to alternative refrigerants.
  • Participate in certification schemes that identify which businesses utilize alternative refrigerants.
  • Advocate for comprehensive policy plans that incentivize the lowest possible GWP refrigerants, penalize high-GWP refrigerants, and provide updated building code requirements.
  • Advocate for bans on venting or intentional releases of high-GWP refrigerants, requirements for regular maintenance, and refrigerant or equipment tracking programs to help enforcement.
  • Create, support, or join networks or partnerships dedicated to advancing and deploying alternative refrigerants.

Further information:

Nonprofit Leaders
  • Ensure operations use alternative refrigerants and equipment that uses the lowest possible GWP refrigerant, if relevant.
  • Advocate for comprehensive policy plans that incentivize the lowest possible GWP refrigerants, penalize high-GWP refrigerants, and provide updated building code requirements.
  • Advocate for bans on venting or intentional releases of high-GWP refrigerants, requirements for regular maintenance, and refrigerant or equipment tracking programs to help enforcement.
  • Help develop national cooling plans and integrate them into national climate plans.
  • Work with public schools, health facilities, and other public venues to deploy alternative refrigerants.
  • Create free workforce training programs to improve safety around installation and maintenance.
  • Assist with technology transfer to low- and middle-income countries to help improve low-cost adoption.
  • Create public campaigns to advocate against dumping inefficient equipment in local markets – especially in low- and middle-income countries.
  • Help develop refrigerant audit programs similar to energy audit programs.
  • Participate in consultations with national and local government agencies, businesses, universities, farmers, healthcare professionals, research institutions, nonprofits, and the public to determine how best to transition local supply chains to alternative refrigerants.
  • Offer educational resources, creating one-stop shops for information on alternative refrigerants and energy efficiency; offer demonstrations, highlighting their cost savings and climate benefits.
  • Administer or participate in certification schemes that identify which businesses utilize alternative refrigerants.
  • Create, support, or join networks or partnerships dedicated to advancing and deploying alternative refrigerants.

Further information:

Investors
  • Ensure portfolio companies use or have a credible plan to use alternative refrigerants and phase in alternative refrigerants throughout the rest of their supply chain.
  • Ensure infrastructure investment projects leverage building, operations, and cooling designs that reduce demand for refrigerants.
  • Invest in start-ups working to improve and deploy alternative refrigeration technologies and refrigerant recycling.
  • Offer preferential loan agreements for developers utilizing alternative refrigerants and other climate-friendly practices.
  • Offer innovative financing methods such as microloans and green bonds to invest in projects that use alternative refrigerants.
  • Invest in R&D to improve availability, cost, compatibility with existing equipment, and safety of alternative refrigerants.
  • Create, support, or join networks or partnerships dedicated to advancing and deploying alternative refrigerants.

Further information:

Philanthropists and International Aid Agencies
  • Ensure operations use alternative refrigerants and equipment that uses the lowest possible GWP refrigerant, if relevant.
  • Advocate for comprehensive policy plans that incentivize the lowest possible GWP refrigerants, penalize high-GWP refrigerants, and provide updated building code requirements.
  • Advocate for bans on venting or intentional releases of high-GWP refrigerants, requirements for regular maintenance, and refrigerant or equipment tracking to help enforcement.
  • Invest in start-ups working to improve and deploy alternative refrigeration technologies.
  • Set requirements for alternative refrigerants when funding new construction.
  • Offer financing options such as grants, microloans, and green bonds to invest in projects that use alternative refrigerants.
  • Invest in R&D to improve availability, cost, compatibility with existing equipment, and safety of alternative refrigerants.
  • Help develop national cooling plans and integrate them into national climate plans.
  • Work with public schools, health facilities, and other public venues to deploy alternative refrigerants.
  • Create free workforce training programs to improve safety around installation and maintenance.
  • Assist with technology transfer to low- and middle-income countries to help improve adoption.
  • Create public campaigns to advocate against dumping inefficient equipment in local markets – especially in low- and middle-income countries.
  • Help develop refrigerant audit programs similar to energy audit programs.
  • Research other traditional methods of cooling and food storage, develop means of scaling relevant methods, and find practical means of integrating traditional methods with modern lifestyles.
  • Participate in consultations with national and local government agencies, businesses, universities, farmers, healthcare professionals, research institutions, nonprofits, and the public to determine how best to transition local supply chains to alternative refrigerants.
  • Offer educational resources, creating one-stop shops for information on alternative refrigerants and energy efficiency; offer demonstrations, highlighting their cost savings and climate benefits.
  • Participate in certification schemes that identify which businesses utilize alternative refrigerants.
  • Create, support, or join networks or partnerships dedicated to advancing and deploying alternative refrigerants.

Further information:

Thought Leaders
  • Advocate for comprehensive policy plans that incentivize the lowest possible GWP refrigerants, penalize high-GWP refrigerants, and provide updated building code requirements.
  • Advocate for bans on venting or intentional releases of high-GWP refrigerants, requirements for regular maintenance, and refrigerant or equipment tracking to help enforcement.
  • Help develop national cooling plans and integrate them into national climate plans.
  • Work with public schools, health facilities, and other public venues to deploy alternative refrigerants.
  • Assist with technology transfer to low- and middle-income countries to help improve adoption.
  • Create public campaigns to advocate against dumping inefficient equipment in local markets – especially in low- and middle-income countries.
  • Help develop refrigerant audit programs similar to energy audit programs.
  • Research other traditional methods of cooling and food storage, develop means of scaling relevant methods, and find practical means of integrating traditional methods with modern lifestyles.
  • Participate in consultations with national and local government agencies, businesses, universities, farmers, healthcare professionals, research institutions, nonprofits, and the public to determine how best to transition local supply chains to alternative refrigerants.
  • Create, support, or join networks or partnerships dedicated to advancing and deploying alternative refrigerants.

Further information:

Technologists and Researchers
  • Research and develop new low- and medium-GWP alternative refrigerants.
  • Find ways to optimize the charge size, cooling performance, and end-of-life management of alternative refrigerants.
  • Design better cooling and heat pump systems to reduce cost of installation and maintenance.
  • Develop software to track types and quantities of refrigerants in use.
  • Conduct R&D on improving cost-effectiveness, safety, and compatibility with existing equipment of alternative refrigerants.
  • Develop software for companies to model and simulate alternative refrigerants within various system configurations.
  • Find opportunities to achieve higher equipment efficiencies or other energy-saving designs, such as recovering and utilizing waste heat from CO₂ refrigerant systems.
  • Improve gas detection systems to improve safety protocols around alternative refrigerants.
  • Research other traditional methods of cooling and food storage; develop means of scaling relevant methods; find practical means of integrating traditional methods with modern lifestyles.

Further information:

Communities, Households, and Individuals
  • Use alternative refrigerants and equipment that uses the lowest possible GWP.
  • Explore and integrate other traditional methods of cooling and food storage, if relevant.
  • Advocate for comprehensive policy plans that incentivize the lowest possible GWP refrigerants, penalize high-GWP refrigerants, and provide updated building code requirements.
  • Advocate for bans on venting or intentional releases of high-GWP refrigerants, requirements for regular maintenance, and refrigerant or equipment tracking to help enforcement.
  • Work with public schools, health facilities, and other public venues to deploy alternative refrigerants.
  • Take advantage of financial incentives such as subsidies, tax credits, and grants for using alternative refrigerants.
  • Participate in consultations with national and local government agencies, businesses, universities, farmers, healthcare professionals, research institutions, nonprofits, and the public to determine how best to transition local supply chains to alternative refrigerants.
  • Create, support, or join networks or partnerships dedicated to advancing and deploying alternative refrigerants.

Further information:

Sources
Evidence Base

Consensus of effectiveness in reducing emissions: High

Phasing out high-GWP refrigerants for low or medium-GWP refrigerants is unquestionably effective at reducing emissions from refrigerant use.

In a report from two U.S. national laboratories, Booten et al. (2020) claim that systems using F-gas refrigerants for refrigeration and air conditioning are “the most difficult and impactful” innovation spaces for refrigerants. Zaelke and Borgford-Parnell (2015) asserted that reducing short-lived climate pollutants including HFCs “is the most effective strategy for constraining warming and associated impacts in the near term.” Utilizing low-GWP alternative refrigerants is a proven means to achieve this.

The IPCC Sixth Assessment (2023) cites the World Meteorological Organization (2018) and Höglund-Isaksson et al. (2017) in claiming that worldwide compliance with the Kigali Amendment schedule would reduce HFC emissions by 61% over baseline emissions by 2050. Velders et al. (2022) modeled future HFC emissions under the Kigali Amendment and found that these HFC reductions could save 3.1–4.4 Gt CO₂‑eq , 100-yr basis/yr by 2050. Dreyfus et al. (2020) estimate possible cumulative savings of 33–47 Gt CO₂‑eq (100-yr) through 2050, with an additional 53 Gt CO₂‑eq (100-yr) through 2060 if HFC phase-down is immediate.

Expert consensus is that the potential impact of alternative refrigerants will increase as a warming climate and increased population and development drive demand for higher use of cooling equipment (Campbell et al., 2018; Dreyfus et al., 2020; Petri & Caldeira, 2015). This will particularly be true for developing countries in already warm climates (Dong et al., 2021). 

The results presented in this document summarize findings from one review article, six original studies, two reports, one international treaty, two industry guidelines, one conference proceeding, and eight national GHG inventory submissions to the United Nations. This reflects current evidence from 34 countries, primarily Annex 1 countries as identified by the United Nations as well as China. We recognize this limited geographic scope creates bias, and hope this work inspires research and data sharing on this topic in underrepresented regions.

Updated Date

Improve Cement Production

Submitted by Drawdown Admin on
Sector
Industry, Materials & Waste
Mode
Cut Emissions
Cluster
Improve Materials
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Cement factory
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Summary

Cement is a key ingredient of concrete, a manufactured material used in massive quantities around the world. Cement production generates high CO₂ emissions from the production of clinker, a binding ingredient. These emissions come from not only the chemical reaction that produces clinker, but also burning fossil fuels to provide heat for this reaction. We define the Improve Cement Production solution as reducing GHG emissions related to cement manufacturing by substituting other materials for clinker, using alternative fuels, and improving process efficiency.

Health
Air quality
Description for Social and Search
Improve Cement Production is a Highly Recommended climate solution. It involves using low GHG-emitting materials & reducing emissions from fossil-fuel burning.
Overview

Concrete production requires the manufacturing of 4 Gt of cement annually (U.S. Geological Survey, 2024). Roughly 85% of cement industry GHG emissions come from the production of a key cement component called clinker. Both the clinker formation chemical reaction and fuel combustion for high-temperature clinker kilns release GHGs (Goldman et al., 2023). Figure 1 illustrates the manufacturing steps responsible for these emissions and highlights how three approaches – clinker substitution, use of alternative fuels, and process efficiency upgrades – could mitigate emissions.

Figure 1. Cement production GHG emissions. Some 85% of GHGs emitted during cement production are released when clinker is produced in high-temperature kilns. The three approaches analyzed in this solution – clinker substitution, alternative fuels, and process efficiency upgrades – aim to mitigate such emissions. Modified from Goldman et al. (2023) via McKinsey.

Diagram of energy used in cement production process

Source: Goldman, S., Majsztrik, P., Sgro Rojas, I., Gavvalapalli, M., Gaikwad, R., Feric, T., Visconti, K., & McMurty, B. (2023). Pathways to commercial liftoff: Low-carbon cement. U.S. Department of Energy.

Clinker substitution replaces a portion of the clinker used in cement with alternative materials, thus reducing the amount of clinker manufactured. This decreases the amount of CO₂ emitted by the chemical reaction and fuel combustion. Clinker is made by heating limestone to convert it to lime. This reaction releases CO₂. Some of the CO₂ production can be eliminated by replacing some of the clinker with substitute materials such as industrial waste products, other cementitious compounds, or available minerals. Clinker substitution also reduces energy demand, lowering emissions from burning fossil fuels. Clinker fraction in cement is often expressed as a clinker-to-cement ratio, which ranges from 0 (no clinker) to 1 (entirely clinker). The most common type of cement, Portland cement, typically has a clinker-to-cement ratio of 0.95, meaning the cement is 95% clinker by mass.

Alternative fuels that can be used to heat cement kilns in place of fossil fuels are typically biomass and waste-based fuels. Cement production uses two kilns, one heated to ~700 °C and the other to ~1,400 °C (U.S. Department of Energy, 2022). The energy needed to provide this heat typically comes from burning fossil fuels such as oil, gas, or coal on-site, which emits CO₂ as well as small amounts of other GHGs, including methane and nitrous oxide, and air pollutants, including nitrogen oxides, sulfur oxides, and particulate matter (Hottle et al., 2022; Miller & Moore, 2020). Switching to alternative fuels decreases emissions by reducing the mining and combustion of fossil fuels and recovering energy from waste streams that would have otherwise released GHG during decomposition or incineration (Georgiopoulou & Lyberatos, 2018).

Efficiency upgrades include a broad suite of technologies such as improved controls, electrically efficient equipment (e.g., mills, fans, and motors), thermally efficient and multistage kilns, and waste heat recovery. These improvements lead to less wasted heat and input energy, and therefore require less fossil fuel burning during manufacturing. In particular, upgrading kilns has the potential for high emissions mitigation (Mokhtar & Nasooti, 2020; Morrow III et al., 2014). Kiln upgrades can include processing dry raw material (which is more efficient than expending energy to remove moisture from wet feedstock), adding a preheater that uses kiln exhaust gas to dry and preheat raw material, and adding a precalciner kiln that uses some of the fuel to partially calcine raw material at a lower temperature (European Cement Research Academy, 2022; Schorcht et al., 2013). Each study included in our analysis for effectiveness and cost included a set group of technologies that were considered to be process efficiency upgrades.

The cost and avoided emissions from each approach vary depending on the other technologies in use at a particular cement plant (Glenk et al., 2023). While coupling the impacts of the approaches would provide the most accurate representation of this solution, that analysis is complex and outside the scope of this assessment. Therefore, we will consider the three approaches separately. 

5.32%
of total global emissions
4.1 Billion

Worldwide, we make 4.1 billion metric tons of cement every year.

3.2 Gt

In the process, we produce more than 3 Gt CO₂‑eq of greenhouse gases – 5.32% of global annual emissions

Take Action Intro

Would you like to help reduce the climate impacts of cement production? Below are some ways you make a difference, depending on the roles you play in your professional or personal life.

These actions are meant to be starting points for involvement and may or may not be the most important, impactful, or doable actions you can take. We encourage you to explore, get creative, and take a step that is right for you!

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Cannon, C., Guido, V., & Wright, L. (2021). Concrete solutions guide: Mix it up: Supplementary cementitious materials (SCMs). RMI. Link to source: https://rmi.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/ConcreteGuide2.pdf 

Cao, Z., Masanet, E., Tiwari, A., and Akolawala, S. (2021). Decarbonizing concrete: Deep decarbonization pathways for the cement and concrete cycle in the United States, India, and China. Industrial Sustainability Analysis Laboratory. 

Cavalett, O., Watanabe, M. D. B., Voldsund, M., Roussanaly, S., & Cherubini, F. (2024). Paving the way for sustainable decarbonization of the European cement industry. Nature Sustainability, 7, 568–580. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-024-01320-y 

CEMBUREAU. (n.d.) Clinker substitution. Retrieved August 7, 2024, from Link to source: https://lowcarboneconomy.cembureau.eu/5-parallel-routes/resource-efficiency/clinker-substitution/ 

Clark, G., Davis, M., Shibani, & Kumar, A. (2024). Assessment of fuel switching as a decarbonization strategy in the cement sector. Energy Conversion and Management, 312, 118585. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enconman.2024.118585 

ClimeCo. (2022). Low carbon cement production. Link to source: https://www.climateactionreserve.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Low-Carbon-Cement-Issue-Paper-05-20-2022_final.pdf 

Daehn, K., Basuhi, R., Gregory, J., Berlinger, M., Somjit, V., & Olivetti, E. A. (2022). Innovations to decarbonize materials industries. Nature Reviews Materials, 7, 275–294. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41578-021-00376-y 

de Puy Kamp, M. (2021, July 9). How marginalized communities in the South are paying the price for ‘green energy’ in Europe. CNN. Link to source: https://edition.cnn.com/interactive/2021/07/us/american-south-biomass-energy-invs/ 

European Cement Research Academy. (2022). The ECRA technology papers 2022: State of the art cement manufacturing, current technologies and their future development. Link to source: https://api.ecra-online.org/fileadmin/files/tp/ECRA_Technology_Papers_2022.pdf 

Georgiopoulou, M., & Lyberatos, G. (2018). Life cycle assessment of the use of alternative fuels in cement kilns: A case study. Journal of Environmental Management, 216, 224–234. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2017.07.017 

Glenk, G., Kelnhofer, A., Meier, R., & Reichelstein, S. (2023). Cost-efficient pathways to decarbonizing Portland cement production. ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 23-023. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4434830 

Global Cement and Concrete Association. (2021). Concrete future: The GCCA 2050 cement and concrete industry roadmap for net zero concrete. Link to source: https://gccassociation.org/concretefuture/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/GCCA-Concrete-Future-Roadmap-Document-AW.pdf 

Goldman, S., Majsztrik, P., Sgro Rojas, I., Gavvalapalli, M., Gaikwad, R., Feric, T., Visconti, K., & McMurty, B. (2023). Pathways to commercial liftoff: Low-carbon cement. U.S. Department of Energy. 

Gómez, D. R., & Watterson, J. D., et al. (2006). Stationary combustion. In S. Eggelston, L. Buendia, K. Miwa, T. Ngara, & K. Tanabe (Eds.), 2006 IPCC guidelines for national greenhouse gas inventories (Vol. 2). Institute for Global Environmental Strategies (IGES) for the IPCC. Link to source: https://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/public/2006gl/pdf/2_Volume2/V2_2_Ch2_Stationary_Combustion.pdf 

Griffiths, S., Sovacool, B. K., Furszyfer Del Rio, D. D., Foley, A. M., Bazilian, M. D., Kim, J., & Uratani, J. M. (2023). Decarbonizing the cement and concrete industry: A systematic review of socio-technical systems, technological innovations, and policy options. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 180, 113291. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2023.113291 

Habert, G., Miller, S. A., John, V. M., Provis, J. L., Favier, A., Horvath, A., & Scrivener, K. L. (2020). Environmental impacts and decarbonization strategies in the cement and concrete industries. Nature Reviews Earth & Environment, 1, 559–573. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1038/s43017-020-0093-3 

Hottle, T., Hawkins, T. R., Chiquelin, C., Lange, B., Young, B., Sun, P., Elgowainy, A., & Wang, M. (2022). Environmental life-cycle assessment of concrete produced in the United States. Journal of Cleaner Production, 363, 131834. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2022.131834 

International Energy Agency. (2018). Technology roadmap: Low-carbon transition in the cement industry. Link to source: https://www.iea.org/reports/technology-roadmap-low-carbon-transition-in-the-cement-industry 

International Energy Agency. (2023a). CO2 emitted and captured in the cement sector and clinker-to-cement ratio in the Net Zero Scenario, 2015–2030. Link to source: https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/co2-emitted-and-captured-in-the-cement-sector-and-clinker-to-cement-ratio-in-the-net-zero-scenario-2015-2030 

International Energy Agency. (2023b). Global cement production in the Net Zero Scenario, 2010–2030. Link to source: https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/global-cement-production-in-the-net-zero-scenario-2010-2030-5260 

International Energy Agency. (2023c). Global thermal energy intensity of clinker production by fuel in the Net Zero Scenario, 2010–2030. Link to source: https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/global-thermal-energy-intensity-of-clinker-production-by-fuel-in-the-net-zero-scenario-2010-2030 

Isabirye, A., & Sinha, A. (2023). Manufacturing sector: Cement manufacturing emissions. ClimateTRACE. Link to source: https://github.com/climatetracecoalition/methodology-documents/blob/main/2023/Manufacturing/Manufacturing%20and%20Industrial%20Processes%20sector-%20Cement%20Manufacturing%20Emissions%20methodology.docx.pdf 

Juenger, M. C. G., Snellings, R., & Bernal, S. A. (2019). Supplementary cementitious materials: New sources, characterization, and performance insights. Cement and Concrete Research, 122, 257–273. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cemconres.2019.05.008 

Miller, S. A., & Moore, F. C. (2020). Climate and health damages from global concrete production. Nature Climate Change, 10(5), 439–443. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-020-0733-0

Mokhtar, A., & Nasooti, M. (2020). A decision support tool for cement industry to select energy efficiency measures. Energy Strategy Reviews, 28, 100458. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esr.2020.100458 

Morrow III, W. R., Hasanbeigi, A., Sathaye, J., & Xu, T. (2014). Assessment of energy efficiency improvement and CO2 emission reduction potentials in India's cement and iron & steel industries. Journal of Cleaner Production, 65, 131–141. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2013.07.022 

Rissman, J., Bataille, C., Masanet, E., Aden, N., Morrow III, W. R., Zhou, N., Elliott, N., Dell, R., Heeren, N., Huckestein, B., Cresko, J., Miller, S. A., Roy, J., Fennell, P., Cremmins, B., Blank, T. K., Hone, D., Williams, E. D., de la Rue du Can, S., …Helseth, J. (2020). Technologies and policies to decarbonize global industry: Review and assessment of mitigation drivers through 2070. Applied Energy, 266, 114848. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2020.114848 

Schorcht, F., Kourti, I., Scalet, B. M., Roudier, S., & Delgado Sancho L. (2013). Best available techniques (BAT) reference document for the production of cement, lime and magnesium oxide – Industrial Emissions Directive 2010/75/EU (integrated pollution prevention and control) (Joint Research Center publication JRC 83006). European Commission, Joint Research Centre, Institute for Prospective Technological Studies. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.2788/12850 

Searchinger, T., Peng, L., Zionts, J., & Waite, R. (2024). The global land squeeze: Managing the growing competition for land. World Resources Institute. Link to source: https://www.wri.org/research/global-land-squeeze-managing-growing-competition-land

Shah, I. H., Miller, S. A., Jiang, D., & Myers, R. J. (2022). Cement substitution with secondary materials can reduce annual global CO2 emissions by up to 1.3 gigatons. Nature Communications, 13, 5758. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-022-33289-7 

Sinha, A., and Crane, V. (2024). Manufacturing and industrial processes sector: Cement manufacturing emissions. TransitionZero, UK, Climate TRACE Emissions Inventory. Link to source: https://climatetrace.org

Snellings, R. (2016). Assessing, understanding and unlocking supplementary cementitious materials. RILEM Technical Letters, 1, 50–55. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.21809/rilemtechlett.2016.12 

Snellings, R., Suraneni, P., & Skibsted, J. (2023). Future and emerging supplementary cementitious materials. Cement and Concrete Research, 171, 107199. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cemconres.2023.107199

U.S. Department of Energy. (2022). Industrial decarbonization roadmap. Link to source: https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2022-09/Industrial%20Decarbonization%20Roadmap.pdf 

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. (2016). Greenhouse gas inventory guidance: Direct emissions from stationary combustion sources. Link to source: https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2016-03/documents/stationaryemissions_3_2016.pdf 

U.S. Federal Highway Administration. (n.d.). Use of supplementary cementitious materials (SCMs) in concrete mixtures (FHWA-HIF-19-054). U.S. Department of Transportation. Link to source: https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/pavement/concrete/trailer/resources/hif19054.pdf 

U.S. Geological Survey. (2024). Mineral commodity summaries 2024. https://doi.org/10.3133/mcs2024 

Yang, X., Teng, F., & Wang, G. (2013). Incorporating environmental co-benefits into climate policies: A regional study of the cement industry in China. Applied Energy, 112, 1446–1453. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2013.03.040

Zhang, S., Ren, H., Zhou, W., Yu, Y., & Chen, C. (2018). Assessing air pollution abatement co-benefits of energy efficiency improvement in cement industry: A city level analysis. Journal of Cleaner Production, 185, 761–771. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2018.02.293

Zhang, S., Worrell, E., & Crijns-Graus, W. (2015). Evaluating co-benefits of energy efficiency and air pollution abatement in China’s cement industry. Applied Energy, 147, 192–213. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2015.02.081

Zhang, S., Xie, Y., Sander, R., Yue, H., & Shu, Y. (2021). Potentials of energy efficiency improvement and energy–emission–health nexus in Jing-Jin-Ji’s cement industry. Journal of Cleaner Production, 278, 123335. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2020.123335

Credits

Lead Fellow

  • Sarah Gleeson, Ph.D.

Contributors

  • James Gerber, Ph.D.

  • Yusuf Jameel, Ph.D.

  • Daniel Jasper

  • Alex Sweeney

Internal Reviewers

  • Aiyana Bodi

  • Hannah Henkin

  • Ted Otte

  • Amanda D. Smith, Ph.D.

  • Christina Swanson, Ph.D.

Effectiveness

Cement production currently emits 760,000 t CO₂‑eq /Mt cement produced, based on our analysis. With global cement production exceeding 4 Gt/yr (U.S. Geological Survey, 2024), the scale of emissions to be mitigated is large.

Clinker substitution is the most effective of the three approaches at reducing emissions, eliminating approximately 240,000 t CO₂‑eq /Mt cement produced. This is equivalent to 690,000 t CO₂‑eq /Mt clinker avoided (Table 1a). This estimate is based on expert predictions of GHG savings for realistic target levels of clinker replacement with material substitutes.

Alternative fuels and efficiency upgrades have carbon abatement potentials of 96,000 and 90,000 t CO₂‑eq /Mt cement produced, respectively, when calculated based on production levels (Table 1b). Since the units of adoption for process efficiency upgrades are GJ thermal energy input, when calculating climate impact we used an effectiveness per GJ of thermal energy, calculated using an emission factor for fuel combustion. This effectiveness is 0.0847 t CO₂ /GJ thermal energy input (Table 1c; Gómez & Watterson et al., 2006; International Energy Agency [IEA], 2023c). 

We calculated the effectiveness of these three approaches separately. Because the implementation of each affects the effectiveness potential of the others (Glenk et al., 2023), the actual effectiveness will be lower when the approaches are implemented together.

Emissions reductions from these approaches can be directly related to how the approach impacts GHG emissions from clinker production and fossil fuel burning. However, sourcing, processing, and transporting clinker substitutes and alternative fuels also produces GHGs. Our data sources did not always report whether such indirect emissions were accounted for, so our analysis primarily focuses on direct emissions. Further analysis of other life-cycle emissions considerations would be valuable in future research; however, indirect emission levels for both clinker substitutes and alternative fuels are reportedly small compared to direct emissions (European Cement Research Academy, 2022; Shah et al., 2022).

Additionally, cement industry members sometimes assume that there are no direct emissions from burning biomass fuels (Goldman et al., 2023). As a result, we assume that direct emissions from biomass are not fully accounted for in the data and therefore that the climate benefit of using alternative fuels may be exaggerated.

While other GHGs, including methane and nitrous oxide, are also released during cement manufacturing, these gases represent a small fraction (<3% combined) of overall CO₂‑eq emissions so we considered them negligible in our calculations (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2016; Hottle et al., 2022). 

Table 1. Effectiveness at reducing emissions.

Unit: t CO₂‑eq /Mt clinker avoided, 100-year basis

25th percentile 540,000
Mean 710,000
Median (50th percentile) 690,000
75th percentile 860,000

Unit: t CO₂‑eq /Mt cement produced (100-year basis)

25th percentile 77,000
Mean 94,000
Median (50th percentile) 96,000
75th percentile 99,000

Unit: t CO₂‑eq /GJ thermal energy input (100-year basis)

Calculated value 0.0847
Cost

All three approaches to mitigating cement emissions result in cost savings by our analysis. Despite high initial costs, when considering the long technology lifetime and annual operational savings, the net lifetime and annualized costs are lower than conventional cement production.

Clinker substitution has the highest net savings of the three approaches, with US$7 million/Mt cement produced generating savings of US$30/t CO₂‑eq (Table 2a). While initial and operating costs may vary between different substitute materials, we averaged all material types for each cost estimate. Goldman et al. (2023) and the European Cement Research Academy (2022) offer breakdowns of cost by material type.

Alternative fuels generate savings of US$5 million/Mt cement, or US$50/t CO₂‑eq mitigated (Table 2b). For both clinker substitution and alternative fuels, cost and emissions will vary based on local material availability (Cannon et al., 2021). We assumed equivalent costs for all alternative fuel types.

Efficiency upgrades save US$6 million/Mt cement and have the highest cost savings per unit climate impact (US$60/t CO₂‑eq ). While process efficiency upgrades encompass many different technologies, this cost estimate incorporates the costs of two of the technologies yielding high avoided emissions – replacing long kilns with preheater/precalciner kilns and implementing efficient clinker cooler technology. Between these technologies, upgrading to preheater/precalciner kilns represents most of the initial cost increase and the operational cost savings (European Cement Research Academy, 2022).

The costs of each approach (Table 2) were calculated as amortized initial costs of upgrading plants, added to the expected changes in annual operational costs. Only very limited data are available for price premiums on low-carbon cement. Therefore, we did not include any revenues for low-carbon cement. 

While we calculated these costs separately, in reality the cost for implementing multiple approaches will be different due to interactions between technologies (Glenk et al., 2023). For example, material processing equipment could change based on the type of clinker substitute materials. We do not expect the costs to be additive as we assumed in our analysis, and limited cost data means that this estimate is based on limited sources.

Table 2: Cost per unit climate impact.

Unit: 2023 US$/t CO₂‑eq , 100-yr basis

Clinker substitution –30

Negative values reflect cost savings.

Unit: 2023 US$/t CO₂‑eq , 100-yr basis

Alternative fuels –50

Negative values reflect cost savings.

Unit: 2023 US$/t CO₂‑eq , 100-yr basis

Process efficiency upgrades –60

Negative values reflect cost savings.

Methods and Supporting Data

Methods and Supporting Data

Learning Curve

The technologies needed for all approaches in this solution are well developed and ready to deploy at scale, so we did not consider learning curves. 

We did not find any global data on cost changes related to adoption levels for equipment, including energy-efficient processing technologies, dry-process kilns, or material storage. A portion of the solution’s initial costs come from plant downtimes, which would not be impacted by the technology learning curve. For feedstock components of the solution, including alternative fuels and clinker material substitutes, the costs will be subject to material availability, market prices, and transportation, and therefore will not necessarily decrease with adoption.

Speed of Action

Speed of action refers to how quickly a climate solution physically affects the atmosphere after it is deployed. This is different from speed of deployment, which is the pace at which solutions are adopted.

At Project Drawdown, we define the speed of action for each climate solution as emergency brake, gradual, or delayed.

Improve Cement Production is a GRADUAL climate solution. It has a steady, linear impact on the atmosphere. The cumulative effect over time builds as a straight line.

Caveats

Manufacturing emissions reductions due to clinker substitution, alternative fuels, and process efficiency upgrades are both permanent and additional. 

Permanence 

There is a low risk that the emission reductions this solution generates will be reversed in the next 100 years. This approach calls for reduced burning of fossil fuels and less calcination of limestone into clinker, thereby avoiding emissions from these activities. Meanwhile, carbon that is not released as CO₂ due to these technologies will remain stable in limestone or fossil fuel reserves indefinitely, making the emissions mitigation permanent.

Additionality 

These cement emissions reductions are additional if they are adopted in amounts higher than what is currently required and used in local or regional cement manufacturing. Afsah (2004) assessed additionality based on whether it represents “not common practice” from a national standpoint of market share or adoption. ClimeCo (2022) suggested that for clinker material substitutes to be considered additional, the substitute needs to meet two criteria: The replacement is not mandated by law, and new or emerging materials are used.

Current Adoption

Few global data are available for current adoption. Most data are from regional sources, typically the United States or Europe. As a result, we do not expect these data to be representative at the global level – China and India alone produce more than 60% of the world’s cement (U.S. Geological Survey, 2024). Therefore, we quantified adoption only from a limited number of worldwide sources, using the adoption units listed in Figure 2.

Clinker substitution is challenging to assess for adoption, since it is implemented with a broad range of materials and replacement fractions. We therefore simplified adoption in this analysis by quantifying it as the amount of global cement material that is not clinker. The adoption tonnage (Table 3a) represents Mt of clinker production avoided, using conventional Portland cement (5% non-clinker) as a baseline (CEMBUREAU, n.d.). Note that this is different from the way we considered cement tonnage for effectiveness and cost. There, we calculated emissions reductions for a Mt of cement produced including substituted material. For adoption, however, we considered tonnage to be clinker avoided (based on amount replaced with other materials).

The IEA (2023a) and the European Cement Research Academy (2022) estimated the global clinker-to-cement ratio to be approximately 0.72, meaning that 28% of cement composition is material other than clinker. This correlates to 980 Mt clinker avoided/yr used over the Portland cement baseline.

Alternative fuels are currently used to replace approximately 7% of fossil fuels in global cement production (Global Cement and Concrete Association, 2021; IEA, 2023c). We assumed this means approximately 300 Mt cement/yr are currently produced with biomass and waste fuels (Table 3b).

Efficiency upgrades encompass dozens of technological improvements, which – along with a paucity of available data – make adoption levels challenging to assess. To estimate the current state of energy usage in the cement industry, we used the IEA (2023c) estimate of 3,550,000 GJ/Mt clinker as the 2022 benchmark thermal energy input for clinker production. This value does not include electrical efficiency and can vary based on fuel mix, but approximates the current state of energy use. We converted it to GJ/yr using amounts of annual clinker production, yielding 10.5 billion GJ thermal energy consumed each year for clinker production. Since there is no baseline for efficiency, we consider this value to be the zero adoption scenario and the current adoption to be not determined (Table 3c).

For the other approaches, there is a clear baseline case of “zero adoption” where no substitutes or alternative fuels are in use. However, thermal energy input is an energy use indicator that represents a continuum with no clear baseline. We therefore had to benchmark future energy savings against an initial value, which we chose as 2022 since it provided the most recent available data. All future estimates represent annual GHG savings relative to global cement production’s 2022 GHG emissions levels.

Table 3. Current adoption level (2022).

Unit: Mt clinker avoided/yr

Median (50th percentile) 980

Unit: Mt cement produced using alternative fuels/yr

Median (50th percentile) 300

Unit: GJ thermal energy input/yr saved

Median (50th percentile) not determined
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Adoption Trend

Clinker substitution has experienced relatively unchanged adoption worldwide in recent years (Table 4a). Since 2016, there has been a small increase in clinker-to-cement ratio, indicating a slight decrease in adoption of this approach (IEA, 2023a). This corresponds to 40 Mt fewer clinker material substitutes being used each year, on average. 

Alternative fuels adoption is slowly on the rise as percent of fuel mix (Table 4b). According to the IEA (2023c), the percentage of global clinker produced by bioenergy and waste fuels increased from 6.5% in 2015 to 8.5% in 2022. This corresponds to a median annual increase of 12 Mt cement/yr produced by alternative fuels. 

The IEA (2023c) reported efficiency upgrades to have led to a median annual decrease of 5,000 GJ/Mt clinker from 2011 to 2022, representing a –0.14% annual change in energy input. This indicates that processes consuming thermal energy have become slightly more efficient in recent years. When converted to GJ/yr, this is 15 million fewer GJ thermal energy consumed each year (Table 4c).

Table 4. Adoption trend.

Unit: annual change in Mt clinker avoided/yr

Median (50th percentile) –40

2016–2022 adoption trend

Unit: annual change in Mt cement produced using alternative fuels/yr

Median (50th percentile) 12

2015–2022 adoption trend

Unit: annual change in GJ thermal energy input/yr

Median (50th percentile) –15,000,000

2011–2022 adoption trend

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Adoption Ceiling

The adoption ceiling (Table 5) is high for all approaches within this solution.

Clinker substitution adoption is likely to be limited primarily by material standards and availability. Across literature, the median adoption ceiling is considered to be 3,000 Mt clinker avoided/yr beyond the Portland cement baseline, yielding a clinker-to-cement ratio of 0.2. Snellings (2016) calculated the worldwide amount of clinker materials substitutes and found that a maximum of ~2,000 Mt/yr would be available, which would result in a clinker-to-cement ratio of approximately 0.5. In the future, some waste materials – like fly ash and ground granulated blast furnace slag – are likely to be less available so increasing the possible substitute amounts would require research on new materials or cement properties.

Alternative fuels are typically assumed to be applicable to roughly 90% of cement production globally, or approximately 4,000 Mt cement/yr at 2022 global production levels (Daehn et al., 2022). In theory, kilns can use 100% alternative fuels, although composition of the fuel can influence the trace elements or calorific value (European Cement Research Academy, 2022). In particular, several analyses point to the lower calorific value of alternative fuels as an adoption-limiting factor. Cavalett et al. (2024) considered 90% to be the maximum. A separate analysis of Canadian cement production determined that 65% is the threshold due to lower-calorie fuels only being applicable in a precalciner kiln – the equipment where fuel is used to begin decomposing limestone through the calcination process (Clark et al., 2024).

Efficiency upgrades have their adoption ceiling limited by the minimum thermal energy demand needed to run cement kilns. The European Cement Research Academy estimates this lower threshold of energy input to be approximately 2,300,000 GJ/Mt clinker, considering chemical reaction and evaporation energy needs (European Cement Research Academy, 2022). This converts to 6.9 billion GJ thermal energy used each year, or 3.6 billion GJ/yr saved over current thermal energy efficiency levels (Table 5c).

Table 5. Adoption ceiling.

Unit: Mt clinker avoided/yr

Median (50th percentile) 3,000

Unit: Mt cement produced using alternative fuels/yr

Median (50th percentile) 4,000

Unit: GJ thermal energy input/yr saved over current levels

Median (50th percentile) 3,600,000,000
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Achievable Adoption

Clinker substitution achievable adoption (Table 6a) is primarily limited by material availability and initial costs. Global estimates generally expect 30–50% of total substituted material to be reasonable, which correlates to a clinker-to-cement ratio of 0.4–0.6 and 1,000–2,000 Mt clinker avoided/yr (Habert et al., 2020; European Cement Research Academy, 2022). In a separate U.S.-specific analysis, the substitute amount was projected to vary from 5% to 45% depending on the availability and performance of the material substitute (Goldman et al., 2023).

Alternative fuels are projected to account for roughly 40% of the cement fuel mix in 2050 for both global and North American estimates. Taking the median of the global achievable adoption estimates, this correlates to 2,000 Mt cement/yr that would be produced using alternative kiln fuels. As a low estimate, if the current adoption trend holds, approximately 16% of global cement fuel (producing 610 Mt cement/yr) will come from biomass and waste (IEA, 2023c). A reasonable adoption range is 610–2,000 Mt cement/yr (Table 6b), although some European countries currently have ~80% adoption of alternative fuels, meaning that >40% adoption in an aggressive 2050 scenario may be feasible (Cavalett et al., 2024).

Little information exists on projected global adoption of efficiency upgrades between now and 2050. In an analysis of a fraction of cement plants in China, India, and the U.S., it was estimated that these three countries – which represent more than 70% of current cement production worldwide – could reach a thermal energy input of 3.15–3.25 million GJ/Mt clinker by 2060, or 9.30–9.59 billion GJ/yr, which is 0.886–1.18 billion GJ/yr saved over current adoption levels (Table 6c; Cao et al., 2021). Meanwhile, in a European analysis, the European Cement Research Academy (2022) found the same range to be possible by 2050. This is not significantly lower than the current state due to the fact that the highest-producing countries – China and India – have newer manufacturing facilities with more efficient equipment today. Countries with more room to improve in thermal energy efficiency – such as the U.S. – produce only a small fraction of the world’s cement. Approximately 92% of global plants are estimated to use more efficient dry kiln technology, indicating that some of the more energy-saving equipment upgrades are already highly adopted (Isabirye & Sinha, 2023). Therefore, there is less room for increased adoption in kiln technologies worldwide, although electrical efficiency measures could further improve these values.

 While the estimates for tonnage of cement impacted by these approaches are based on 2022 global production numbers, cement production will change through 2050, meaning the impacted mass of cement will also change as these emissions-reducing measures are adopted (IEA, 2023b).

Table 6. Range of achievable adoption levels.

Unit: Mt clinker avoided/yr

Current adoption 980
Achievable – low 1,000
Achievable – high 2000
Adoption ceiling 3000

Unit: Mt cement produced using alternative fuels/yr

Current adoption 300
Achievable – low 610
Achievable – high 2,000
Adoption ceiling 4,000

Unit: GJ thermal energy input/yr saved over current adoption levels

Current adoption not determined
Achievable – low 886,000,000
Achievable – high 1,180,000,000
Adoption ceiling 3,600,000,000

Note: High adoption in this case results in lower energy use for each unit of cement produced, and thus better efficiency. 

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Improved cement production has high potential for climate impact. By our estimate, cement production is responsible for >5% of global GHG emissions, so mitigating even a portion of these emissions will meaningfully reduce the world’s carbon output.

Clinker substitution has the highest current and potential GHG emissions savings of the three approaches (Table 7a). To calculate the climate impact, we used effectiveness and adoption on the basis of Mt clinker avoided. Climate impact was calculated as:

$$\frac{\textit{CO₂ abated}}{\textit{yr}} = \frac{\textit{CO₂ abated}}{\textit{clinker avoided}} \times \frac{\textit{clinker avoided}}{\textit{Year}}$$
  • Current GHG savings: 0.67 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr
  • GHG savings ceiling: 2 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr
  • Achievable GHG savings range: 0.7–1 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr

Alternative fuels have a low current climate impact but possess the potential to be adopted for a much greater fraction of the global kiln fuel mix (Table 7b). However, alternative fuels’ potential GHG emissions savings are lower than those for clinker substitutes because alternative fuels have a lower CO₂ mitigation effectiveness. Climate impact is calculated as:

$$\frac{\textit{CO₂ abated}}{\textit{yr}} = \frac{\textit{CO₂ abated}}{\textit{cement produced}} \times \frac{\textit{cement produced}}{\textit{Year}}$$
  • Current GHG savings: 0.03 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr
  • GHG savings ceiling: 0.4 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr
  • Achievable GHG savings range: 0.06–0.2 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr

Switching to alternative fuels requires the use of biomass as a feedstock. Multiple climate solutions, in addition to improving cement production, require biomass, and projected demand across solutions greatly exceeds supply. The deforestation that would be required to meet demand would produce emissions far greater than any mitigation gains from full deployment of these solutions (Searchinger, 2024). In addition to deforestation, there would also be costs and emissions incurred to transport biomass from where it is produced to where it can be processed and used. Thus, the achievable GHG savings range presented here is only possible if feedstocks are prioritized for this solution. If feedstocks are instead prioritized for other climate solutions (see Interactions for examples), adoption and impact will be lower for this solution. It is not possible to set all biomass-dependent solutions to high adoption levels, add up their impacts, and determine an accurate combined emissions impact.

Efficiency upgrades are the most challenging to assess for climate impact because they represent a broad range of equipment upgrades with no clear baseline efficiency. We considered adoption to be energy savings from the current (2022) baseline in GJ thermal energy input/yr. We converted adoption to climate impact using the emission factor of 0.0847 t CO₂‑eq /GJ thermal energy input (calculated using data from Gómez & Watterson et al., 2006 and IEA, 2023c). The resulting calculation is as follows:

$$\frac{\textit{CO₂ abated}}{\textit{yr}} = \frac{\textit{CO₂ emissions}}{\textit{thermal energy}} \times \frac{\textit{thermal energy savings from 2022 baseline}}{\textit{yr }}$$
  • Current GHG savings: N/A (we consider the current adoption to be the baseline)
  • GHG savings ceiling: 0.31 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr less than 2022
  • Achievable GHG savings range: 0.0760–0.101 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr less than 2022

While clinker substitution, alternative fuels, and efficiency upgrades are quantified separately here, the adoption of any of these approaches will reduce the climate impact of the others. In particular, the climate impacts for technologies that reduce emissions per Mt of clinker (such as alternative fuels and process efficiency upgrades) will be lower when implemented along with technologies that reduce the amount of clinker used (such as clinker substitution), and vice versa (Glenk et al., 2023). Therefore, these impacts will not be additive, although they will contribute to reduced emissions when implemented together.

While our analysis found clinker substitution to have the highest climate impact, cement manufacturers will have to prioritize these technologies depending on their plant’s existing equipment, local availability of materials, and regional cement standards.

Table 7. Climate impact at different levels of adoption.

Unit: Gt CO₂‑eq/yr, 100-yr basis

Current adoption 0.67
Achievable – low 0.7
Achievable – high 1
Adoption ceiling 2

Unit: Gt CO₂‑eq/yr, 100-yr basis

Current adoption 0.03
Achievable – low 0.06
Achievable – high 0.2
Adoption ceiling 0.4

Unit: Gt CO₂‑eq/yr, 100-yr basis

Current adoption not determined
Achievable – low 0.075
Achievable – high 0.100
Adoption ceiling 0.31
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Additional Benefits

Health 

Miller & Moore (2020) estimated that the health damages associated with cement production amounted to approximately US$60 billion globally in 2015. These health damages are due to air pollutants produced during cement manufacturing, which would be reduced by this solution as described above. In China, one study estimated that improving energy efficiency in the Jing Jin Ji region’s cement industry could prevent morbidity in 17,000 individuals (Zhang et al., 2021). 

Air Quality 

Cement production is a major contributor to air pollution. Globally, concrete production accounts for approximately 8% of nitrogen oxide emissions, 5% of sulfur oxide emissions, and 5% of particulate matter emissions, with a significant portion of all these emissions stemming exclusively from cement production (Miller & Moore, 2020). Cement-related air pollution is especially acute in China, which produces over 50% of the world’s cement (U.S. Geological Survey, 2024). In 2009, China's cement industry emitted 3.59 Mt of particulate matter, making the industry the leading source of particulate matter emissions in the country (Yang et al., 2013). China also released 0.88 Mt of sulfur dioxide, accounting for about 4% of the national total, and emitted 1.7 Mt of nitrogen oxides (Yang et al., 2013). Process efficiency upgrades in cement manufacturing can reduce these harmful emissions. For example, implementing energy efficiency measures in China’s cement industry could reduce particulate matter by more than 3%, lower sulfur dioxide emissions by more than 15%, and decrease nitrogen oxide emissions by more than 12% by 2030 (Zhang et al., 2015). In Jiangsu province, which is the largest cement producer in China, energy and CO₂ reduction techniques could cut particulate matter and nitrogen oxide emissions by 30% and 56%, respectively, by 2030 (Zhang et al., 2018).

Risks

According to the U.S. Federal Highway Administration (n.d.), the use of clinker material substitutes in cement slows concrete curing times. Additionally, some clinker material substitutes, such as fly ash, raise ecotoxicity concerns and require safe handling (U.S. Department of Energy, 2022). Robust research and development is needed for new compositions of cement to accelerate testing, standardization, and adoption (Griffiths et al., 2023). Since regional standards vary for cement and concrete, policy and regulatory support designed for specific locations will be necessary to influence adoption levels and rates.

Most clinker material substitutes have limited or regional availability, leading to shortages, high costs, and transportation emissions (Habert et al., 2020). Because some substitute materials are sourced from the waste streams of other industries, such as the coal and steel industries, the long-term feasibility of sourcing these materials is uncertain (Goldman et al., 2023; Juenger et al., 2019). However, one study found that most leading cement-producing countries have substitute materials available in sufficient quantities to replace at least half of their current clinker usage (Shah et al., 2022). 

In terms of risks associated with alternative fuels, they can be subject to regional scarcity. Lack of available waste fuel in particular could risk non-waste biomass burning, leading to deforestation and high net emissions (de Puy Kamp, 2021). In addition, waste fuels can have varying compositions that can lead to different heats of combustion, kiln compatibility, or emitted pollutants (Griffiths et al., 2023). Finally, the use of waste products requires cement plants to be situated near industrial waste sources, risking low adoption for cement plants that are not located near a waste source. 

Interactions with Other Solutions

Reinforcing

Lower-carbon cement will improve the effectiveness and enhance the net climate impact of any solutions that might require new construction. The embodied emissions from the cement and concrete used for new built structures or roads will be reduced.

Technological advancements and increased adoption of efficient cement manufacturing equipment will improve the rate and cost of scaling similar high-efficiency machinery.

Industrial electrification in cement plants will be faster and easier to adopt if the plants’ energy demands are lowered via reduced clinker production and more efficient processes.

Competing

This solution uses biomass as a feedstock (raw material) for kiln fuel or as a source of ash for clinker substitues, including wood, food, crop residues, and municipal waste.  Because the total projected demand for biomass feedstocks for climate solutions exceeds the supply, not all of these solutions will be able to achieve their potential adoption. This solution is in competition with the following solutions for raw material:

Dashboard

Solution Basics

Mt clinker avoided

t CO₂-eq (100-yr)/unit
0540,000690,000median
units/yr
Current 980 01,0002,000
Achievable (Low to High)

Climate Impact

Gt CO₂-eq (100-yr)/yr
Current 0.67 0.71
US$ per t CO₂-eq
-30
Gradual

CO₂

Solution Basics

Mt cement produced using alternative fuels

t CO₂-eq (100-yr)/unit
077,00096,000median
units/yr
Current 300 06102,000
Achievable (Low to High)

Climate Impact

Gt CO₂-eq (100-yr)/yr
Current 0.03 0.060.2
US$ per t CO₂-eq
-50
Gradual

CO₂

Solution Basics

GJ thermal energy input reduced from current levels/yr

t CO₂-eq (100-yr)/unit
0.085
units/yr
Current Not Determined 08.86×10⁸1.18×10⁹
Achievable (Low to High)

Climate Impact

Gt CO₂-eq (100-yr)/yr
Current Not Determined 0.0760.1
US$ per t CO₂-eq
-60
Gradual

CO₂

Trade-offs

Wider adoption of clinker material substitutes, alternative fuels, and process efficiency upgrades could generate new GHG emissions, including emissions stemming from the transportation of clinker material substitutes and alternative fuels as well as embodied emissions from manufacturing and installing new cement plant equipment. Nevertheless, the overall solution effectiveness is not expected to be significantly impacted. In some of the largest cement-producing countries, the emissions from transport of clinker material substitutes has been calculated to be an order of magnitude less than the emissions savings from the use of those substitutes in place of clinker (Shah et al., 2022). 

In terms of environmental impact, some clinker substitutes such as calcined clays and natural pozzolans can increase water use (Juenger et al., 2019; Snellings et al., 2023). Additionally, the use of biomass as an alternative fuel source could lead to trade-offs – such as increased water use and land use, or diminished resource availability – although the risk of this outcome is low since biomass for kiln fuels tends to be agricultural by-products or other waste (Clark et al., 2024; Georgiopoulou & Lyberatos, 2018). 

Mt CO2-eq
< 2
2 - 4
4 - 6
6 - 8
8 - 10
> 10

Annual cement plant emissions, 2024

Cement production emissions are partly due to burning fossil fuels to run kilns and partly due to CO2 emissions associated with the chemistry of producing clinker, a key component of cement.

Sinha, A. and Crane, V. (2024). Manufacturing and industrial processes sector: Cement manufacturing emissions [Data set]. TransitionZero, Climate TRACE Emissions Inventory. Retrieved February 11, 2025, from Link to source: https://climatetrace.org

Mt CO2-eq
< 2
2 - 4
4 - 6
6 - 8
8 - 10
> 10

Annual cement plant emissions, 2024

Cement production emissions are partly due to burning fossil fuels to run kilns and partly due to CO2 emissions associated with the chemistry of producing clinker, a key component of cement.

Sinha, A. and Crane, V. (2024). Manufacturing and industrial processes sector: Cement manufacturing emissions [Data set]. TransitionZero, Climate TRACE Emissions Inventory. Retrieved February 11, 2025, from Link to source: https://climatetrace.org

Maps Introduction

There are no location-specific constraints to the effectiveness of the Improve Cement Production solution as there are for solutions dependent on climatic factors. However, there is geographic variation associated with current uptake of solutions and feasibility/expense of future uptake. Moreover, the distribution of cement-producing facilities around the world is non-uniform, thus the solution set naturally has the greatest applicability in regions with the greatest concentration of cement production. China and India have particularly high production of cement at 51% and 8% of global totals in 2024, respectively (Sinha & Crane, 2024).

Newer cement plants are more likely to have high thermal efficiencies, and the age of cement plants varies around the world, with average ages of cement plants less than 20 years in much of Asia, and greater than 40 years in much of the U.S. and Europe.

Uptake of alternative fuels is relatively high in Europe and low in the Americas.  

While use of clinker substitutes is in principle possible anywhere, the materials themselves are not readily available everywhere, thus transportation costs and associated emissions can place constraints on their viability (Shah et al., 2022).

Action Word
Improve
Solution Title
Cement Production
Current State Introduction

Our analysis of the current state of solutions for improved cement production included three separate approaches to reducing emissions: clinker substitution, alternative fuels, and process efficiency upgrades. Each approach had adoption units chosen based on data availability and consistency between calculated values. Figure 2 summarizes the units and conversions used for all approaches.

Figure 2. Units of quantification used in the Current State, Adoption, and Impacts analyses below.

Approach Clinker substitution Alternative fuels Process efficiency upgrades
Effectiveness

t CO₂-eq abated/Mt clinker avoided*

t CO₂ abated/Mt cement produced*

 t CO₂-eq abated/Mt cement produced

t CO₂-eq abated/GJ thermal energy input**

t CO₂-eq abated/Mt cement produced**
Cost US$/Mt cement produced US$/Mt cement produced US$/Mt cement produced
Adoption Mt clinker avoided/yr Mt cement/yr produced using alternative fuels GJ thermal energy input saved/yr
Climate impact Gt CO₂-eq/yr Gt CO₂-eq/yr Gt CO₂-eq/yr

*Clinker substitution effectiveness was calculated in two different adoption units using the same source data. Effectiveness in t CO₂‑eq abated/Mt cement produced was used to calculate cost per climate impact. Effectiveness was converted to t CO₂‑eq abated/Mt clinker avoided using the clinker-to-cement ratio for each individual study in the analysis, and this was used to calculate climate impact.

**Process efficiency upgrades effectiveness in units of t CO₂‑eq abated/Mt cement produced was used to calculate cost per climate impact. Separately, a calculated fuel emission factor effectiveness in units of t CO₂‑eq abated/GJ thermal energy was used to quantify climate impact.

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Highly Recommended
Lawmakers and Policymakers
  • Hold cement manufacturers accountable for safety standards.
  • Regulate clinker substitution, alternative fuel usage, and process efficiency upgrades.
  • Set standards for low-carbon cement and reporting on embodied carbon for new projects.
  • Provide financial incentives such as grants, subsidies, and/or carbon taxes.
  • Set low-carbon cement standards for public procurement.
  • Implement building codes and standards that allow for the safe, tested use of low-clinker cement while accounting for regional variability in cement compositions.
  • When possible integrate low-carbon cement standards into industry standards such as LEED certification or CALGreen.
  • Increase investment in research and development of clinker material substitutes.
  • Promote a circular economy by creating reverse supply chains to collect industrial and biomass waste to be used as feedstocks for cement kilns and products.
  • Require labels for low-carbon products and materials.
  • Engage impacted communities and incorporate public feedback into policy design.
  • Ensure permit processes for mining or collecting clinker substitutes allow local supply chains to develop.
  • Integrate water management into policy planning when adopting new cement technologies, especially in drought-prone areas.

Further information:

Practitioners
  • Increase the fraction of clinker substitutes in cement, which will reduce production costs.
  • Use alternative fuels as manufacturing energy sources, ideally from renewable sources when possible, which will reduce production costs.
  • Upgrade equipment and production process to be more efficient, which will reduce production costs.
  • Invest in research and development for clinker material substitutes and process improvements.
  • Work to form national and regional industrial strategies for low-carbon cement.
  • Engage with local community members and use their feedback to create safer and healthier production facilities.
  • Increase transparency and reporting around energy usage, fuel composition, and the material composition of cement products.
  • Integrate water management safeguards when adopting new cement technologies, especially in drought-prone areas.
  • Join, create, or participate in partnerships or certification programs dedicated to improving cement production.

Further information:

Business Leaders
  • Source from low-carbon cement producers.
  • Advocate for low-carbon cement during project design and construction.
  • Promote concrete alternatives in high-profile projects.
  • Purchase, promote, and/or invest in local manufacturing and supply chains not only for materials and equipment used to make low-carbon cement, but also for low-carbon cementitious products.
  • Create off-take agreements for emerging cement technologies.
  • Create training and capacity-building programs for industry professionals related to the use and benefits of low-carbon cement and concrete.
  • Launch education and awareness campaigns that share case studies and pilot projects with industry media and other key stakeholders.
  • Leverage carbon markets to help subsidize the cost of low-carbon cement.
  • Work with governments and financial institutions to establish standards and incentives for utilizing low-carbon materials.

Further information:

Nonprofit Leaders
  • Assist with monitoring and reporting related to energy usage, fuel composition, and the material composition of cement products.
  • Help design policies and regulations that support low-carbon cement production.
  • Educate the public about the urgent need for low-carbon cement while showcasing its many benefits.
  • Encourage policymakers to create ambitious targets and regulations.
  • Encourage cement manufacturers to improve their practices.
  • Join, create, or participate in partnerships or certification programs dedicated to improving cement production.

Further information:

Investors
  • Invest in low-carbon cement producers, low-carbon cement research and development, and shared recycling infrastructure for cement materials.
  • Invest in supply chains for new clinker substitutes, alternative fuels, and technologies that improve production efficiency.
  • Encourage portfolio companies to produce low-carbon cement or source from low-carbon cement producers, noting that low-carbon retrofits will save money for producers.
  • Seek impact investment opportunities, such as low-interest loans for construction or renovation projects that use low-carbon cement, or favorable loans for entities that set low-carbon cement policies or targets.

Further information:

Philanthropists and International Aid Agencies
  • Set low-carbon cement standards for construction-related grants, loans, and awards.
  • Provide capital for local supply chains and the acquisition or production of clinker material substitutes.
  • Support global, national, and local policies that promote low-carbon cement use.
  • Explore opportunities to fund low-carbon cement start-ups.
  • Advance awareness of the public health and climate benefits of low-carbon cement.
  • Join, create, or participate in partnerships or certification programs dedicated to improving cement production.

Further information:

Thought Leaders
  • Provide technical assistance (e.g., circular economy design) to producers, government agencies, and other entities working to reduce cement emissions.
  • Help design policies and regulations that support the adoption of low-carbon cement.
  • Educate the public through campaigns emphasizing the urgent need to reduce cement production emissions.
  • Encourage policymakers to create more ambitious targets and regulations.
  • Pressure the cement industry to improve its production practices.
  • Join, create, or participate in partnerships or certification programs dedicated to improving cement production.

Further information:

Technologists and Researchers
  • Develop new separation technology for recycling cement material.
  • Assess new clinker substitutes and improve supply chains for known substitutes.
  • Improve the efficiency of processing technology and equipment.
  • Increase the safety of extraction, transport, handling, and processing of clinker material substitutes.
  • Develop on-site testing and reporting methods for tracking the energy use of manufacturing processes, fuel composition, and the material composition of cement products.
  • Examine and refine understandings of the potential revenue and price premiums of low-carbon cement products.

Further information:

Communities, Households, and Individuals
  • Purchase low-carbon cement and concrete products when possible.
  • Document your experiences if harmful cement production practices impact you. Share documentation of harmful cement production practices and/or other key messages with policymakers, the media, and your community.
  • Encourage policymakers to improve regulations related to cement production.
  • Support public education efforts to raise awareness about the urgent need to make cement production practices more environmentally sustainable.
  • Pressure the cement industry to improve its production practices.

Further information:

Sources
Evidence Base

Consensus of effectiveness in reducing cement industry emissions: High

The U.S. Department of Energy reports that the cement industry produces an estimated 7–8% of global CO₂ emissions (Goldman et al., 2023), so this is an important area to target. There is high scientific consensus that clinker substitution, alternative fuels, and process efficiency upgrades can be immediately and effectively implemented. Other emissions reduction strategies – including hydrogen kiln fuel, electrification, and carbon capture and storage technologies – have generated mixed scientific opinions on their potential for immediate impact and were not considered in this analysis. 

The U.S. Department of Energy (2022) highlighted cement as one of five high-emitting industries with potential for mitigation. The technologies identified as having the highest level of maturity and market readiness were energy efficiency measures, biomass and natural gas fuels, material efficiency measures, and blended-material cements. 

An extensive review of industrial decarbonization points to four technologies that could be implemented in the near term across global industries: electrification, material efficiency, energy efficiency, and circularity (Rissman et al., 2020). The European Cement Research Academy (2022) classified the three cement industry approaches considered in this solution – clinker substitution, alternative fuels, and process efficiency upgrades – as meeting the highest technology readiness level.

Goldman et al. (2023) identified clinker substitution, alternative fuels, and efficiency improvements as deployable today, estimating that these three approaches could abate 30% of U.S. cement industry emissions by 2030. Habert et al. (2020) proposed technologies that could reduce emissions up to 50% in the next few decades, including “cement improvements” of supplementary clinker materials, alternative fuels, and more efficient technologies. The IEA (2018) estimated that clinker material replacement, alternative fuels, and efficiency improvements could provide 37%, 12%, and 3% of cement emissions savings by 2050, respectively.

The results presented in this document summarize findings from two reviews and meta-analyses, eight original studies, nine reports, and several data sets reflecting current evidence from 33 countries, primarily high cement-producing countries in North America, Europe, and Asia. We recognize this limited geographic scope creates bias, and hope this work inspires research and data sharing on this topic in underrepresented regions.

Updated Date

Improve Landfill Management

Submitted by Drawdown Admin on
Sector
Industry, Materials & Waste
Mode
Cut Emissions
Cluster
Cut Fugitive Emissions
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Methane tap valve from a landfill
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Summary

Landfill management is the process of reducing methane emissions from landfill gas (LFG). As bacteria break down organic waste in an environment without oxygen, they produce methane and release it into the atmosphere if there are no controls in place. This solution focuses on two methane abatement strategies: 1) methane capture/use/destruction and 2) biocovers. When methane is used or destroyed it is converted into CO₂ (Garland et al., 2023).

Income & work,Health,Equality
Air quality
Description for Social and Search
Improve Landfill Management is a Highly Recommended climate solution. It focuses on abating landfill methane through methane capture and biocovers.
Overview

Landfill management relies on several practices and technologies that prevent methane from being released into the atmosphere. When organic material is broken down, it creates LFG, which usually is half methane and half CO₂, and water vapor (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency [U.S. EPA], 2024a). Methane that is directly released into the atmosphere has a GWP of 81 over a 20-yr basis and a GWP of 28 over a 100-yr basis (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], 2023). This means methane is 81 times more effective at trapping heat than CO₂. Because methane is a short-lived climate pollutant that has a much stronger warming effect than CO₂ over a given time period, abating methane will have a relatively large near-term impact on slowing global climate change (International Energy Agency [IEA], 2023). LFG contains trace amounts of oxygen, nitrogen, sulfides, hydrogen, and other organic compounds that can negatively affect nearby environments with odors, acid rain, and smog (New York State Government, 2024).

This solution focuses on two methane abatement strategies: 1) gas collection and control systems (GCCSs) and methane use/destruction, and 2) biocovers. Figure 1 illustrates in which parts of a landfill the strategies can be used (Garland et al., 2023).

GCCS and methane capture uses pipes to route LFG to be used as an energy source or to flare. The gas can be used on-site for landfill equipment or refined into biomethane and sold; unrefined LFG can also be sold to local utilities or industries for their own use. In areas where electricity generation is carbon intensive, the LFG can help to reduce local emissions by displacing fossil fuels. Methane that cannot be used for energy is burned in a flare during system downtime or at the end of the landfill life, when LFG production has decreased and collecting it no longer makes economic sense. High-efficiency (enclosed) flares have a 99% methane destruction rate. Open flares can be used but research from Plant et al. (2022) has found that the methane destruction rate in practice is much lower than the 90% value the U.S. EPA assumes. 

Biocovers are a type of landfill cover designed to promote bacteria that convert methane to CO₂ and water. Biocovers have an organic layer that provides an environment for the bacteria to grow and a gas distribution layer to separate the landfill waste from the organic layer. Non-biocover landfill covers – made with impermeable material like clay or synthetic materials – can also be used to prevent methane from being released. The methane oxidation from these covers will be minimal – they mostly serve to limit LFG from escaping – but they can then be used in conjunction with GCCS to improve gas collection. Landfills also use daily and interim landfill covers. It is important to note that studies on biocover abatement potential and cost are limited and biocovers may not be appropriate for all situations.

Leak Detection and Repair (LDAR) involves regularly monitoring for methane leaks and modifying or replacing leaking equipment. LDAR does not directly reduce emissions but is used to determine where to apply the above technology and practices and is considered a critical part of methane abatement strategies. Methane can be monitored through satellites, drones, continuous sensors, or on-site walking surveys (Carbon Mapper, 2024). LDAR is an important step in identifying where methane escapes from the gas collection infrastructure or landfill cover. Quick repairs help reduce GHG emissions while allowing more methane to be used for energy or fuel. The Appendix shows where methane can escape from landfills.

Figure 1. Areas where different on-site landfill methane abatement strategies can take place. Source: Garland et al. (2023)

Landfill Methane: Key Problems and Solutions diagram

Source: Garland E., Alves O., Frankiewicz T., & Ayandele E. (2023). Mitigating landfill methane. RMI. 

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New York State Government. (2024). Important things to know about landfill gas. Retrieved September 3, 2024. Link to source: https://www.health.ny.gov/environmental/outdoors/air/landfill_gas.htm 

Nisbet, E. G., Fisher, R. E., Lowry, D., France, J. L., Allen, G., Bakkaloglu, S., Broderick, T. J., Cain, M., Coleman, M., Fernandez, J., Forster, G., Griffiths, P. T., Iverach, C. P., Kelly, B. F. J., Manning, M. R., Nisbet-Jones, P. B. R., Pyle, J. A., Townsend-Small, A., al-Shalaan, A., Warwick, N., & Zazeri, G. (2020). Methane mitigation: Methods to reduce emissions,on the path to the Paris agreement. Review of Geophysics, 58(1). Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1029/2019RG000675 

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Olaguer, E. P. (2021). The potential ozone impacts of landfills. Atmosphere, 12(7), 877. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.3390/atmos12070877 

Plant, G., Kort, E. A., Brandt, A. R., Chen, Y., Fordice, G., Negron, A. M. G., Schwietzke, S., Smith, M., & Zavala-araiza, D. (2022). Estimates of solid waste disposal rates and reduction targets for landfill gas emissions. Science, 377(6614), 1566–1571. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1126/science.abq0385 

Powell J. T., Townsend, T. G., & Zimmerman, J. B. (2015). Estimates of solid waste disposal rates and reduction targets for landfill gas emissions. Nature Climate Change, 6, 162-165. Link to source: https://www.nature.com/articles/nclimate2804

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Scarapelli, T. R., Cusworth, D. H., Duren, R. M., Kim, J., Heckler, J., Asner, G. P., Thoma, E., Krause, M. J., Heins, D., & Thorneloe, S. (2024). Investigating major sources of methane emissions at US landfills. Environmental Science & Technology. 58(29). Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1021/acs.est.4c07572

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Scheutz, C., Pedersen, R. B., Petersen, P. H., Jørgensen, J. H. B., Ucendo, I. M. B., Mønster, J. G., Samuelsson, J., Kjeldsen, P. (2014). Mitigation of methane emission from an old unlined landfill in Klintholm, Denmark using a passive biocover system. Waste Management. 34(7), 1179–1190. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wasman.2014.03.015 

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Credits

Lead Fellow

  • Jason Lam

Contributors

  • Yusuf Jameel, Ph.D.

  • Daniel Jasper

  • James Gerber, Ph.D.

  • Alex Sweeney

Internal Reviewers

  • Erika Luna

  • Paul C. West, Ph.D.

  • Amanda D. Smith, Ph.D.

  • Aiyana Bodi

  • Hannah Henkin

  • Ted Otte

Effectiveness

According to the IPCC, preventing 1 Mt of emitted methane avoids 81.2 Mt CO₂‑eq on a 20-yr basis and 27.9 Mt CO₂‑eq on a 100-yr basis (Smith et al., 2021, Table 1). If the methane is burned (converted into CO₂), the contribution to GHG emissions is still less than that of methane released directly into the atmosphere. Methane abatement can immediately limit future global climate change because of methane’s outsized impact on global temperature change, especially when looking at a 20-yr basis.

Table 1. Effectiveness at reducing emissions.

Unit: t CO₂‑eq/Mt of methane abated

100-yr GWP 27,900,000
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Cost

To abate 1 Mt of methane, GCCS and methane capture have an initial cost of around US$410 million, an operating cost of roughly US$191 million, and revenue in the neighborhood of US$383 million. The net savings over a 30-yr amortization period is US$179 million. This means capturing and selling landfill methane will be a net economic gain for most landfill operators. We included LDAR operating costs in the overall operating costs for GCCS and methane use/destruction, although LDAR can be used prior to installation or with other strategies such as biocovers. We split the median costs for GCCS and methane use/destruction between 20-yr and 100-yr GWP (Table 2a).

Biocovers have an initial cost to abate 1 Mt of methane around US$380 million, operating costs of roughly US$0.4 million, and revenue of about US$0 million, and an overall net cost over a 30-yr amortization period of US$13 million. This means that using biocovers to abate landfill methane has a net cost. If a carbon credit system is in place, biocovers can recoup the costs or generate profits. Biocovers are reported to have lower installation and operation costs than GCCS because they are simpler to install and maintain, and can be used where local regulations might limit a landfill operator’s ability to capture and use methane (Fries, 2020). Table 2b shows that the median costs for biocovers are split between 20-yr and 100-yr GWP.

We found very limited data for the baseline scenario, which follows current practices without methane abatement. We considered the baseline costs to be zero for initial costs, operational costs, and revenue because landfills without management – such as open landfills or sanitary landfills with no methane controls – release methane as part of their regular operations, do not incur added maintenance or capital costs, and lack any energy savings from capturing and using methane.

Few data were available to characterize the initial costs of implementing landfill methane capture. We referenced reports from Ayandele et al. (2024a), City of Saskatoon (2023), DeFabrizio et al. (2021), and Government of Canada (2024), but the context and underlying assumptions costs were not always clear. 

Landfills are typically 202–243 ha (Sweeptech, 2022); however, the size can vary greatly, with the world’s largest landfill covering 890 ha (Trashcans Unlimited, 2022). Because larger landfills make more methane, facility size helps determine which methane management strategies make the most sense. We assumed the average landfill covered 243 ha when converting costs to our common unit. 

Data on revenues from the sale of collected LFG are also limited. We found some reports of revenue generated at a municipal level or monetized benefits from GHG emission reductions priced according to a social cost of methane or carbon credit system (Abichou, 2020; Government of Canada, 2024). These values may not apply at a global scale, especially when the credits are supported by programs such as the United States’ use of Renewable Identification Numbers.

Table 2. Cost per unit climate impact.

Unit: 2023 US$/t CO₂‑eq

Median (100-yr basis) -6.42
Median (20-yr basis) -2.21

Unit: 2023 US$/t CO₂‑eq

Median (100-yr basis) 0.47
Median (20-yr basis) 0.16
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Methods and Supporting Data

Methods and Supporting Data

Learning Curve

Landfill GCCSs are mature; we do not foresee declining implementation costs for these solutions due to extensive use of the same installation equipment and materials in other industries and infrastructure. Automation of GCCS settings and monitoring may improve efficiencies, but installation costs will stay largely the same. 

Landfill covers are a mature technology, having been used to control odors, fires, litter, and scavenging since 1935 (Barton, 2020). Biocover landfill cover costs could decrease as recycled organic materials are increasingly used in their construction. It is not clear how the cost of biocovers might decrease as adoption grows. 

Though LDAR might provide gains around efficiencies, little research offers insights here.

Speed of Action

Speed of action refers to how quickly a climate solution physically affects the atmosphere after it is deployed. This is different from speed of deployment, which is the pace at which solutions are adopted.

At Project Drawdown, we define the speed of action for each climate solution as emergency brake, gradual, or delayed.

Improve Landfill Management is an EMERGENCY BRAKE climate solution. It has the potential to deliver a more rapid impact than gradual and delayed solutions. Because emergency brake solutions can deliver their climate benefits quickly, they can help accelerate our efforts to address dangerous levels of climate change. For this reason, they are a high priority.

Caveats

Approximately 61% of methane generated from food waste happens within 3.6 years of being landfilled (Krause, et al., 2023). In the United States, the EPA requires GCCS to be installed after five years of the landfill closing, meaning that much of the food waste methane will evade GCCS before it is installed (Industrious Labs, 2024b). In contrast, biocovers can quickly (up to three months) reduce methane emissions once the bacteria have established (Stern et al., 2007). GCCS and biocovers should be installed as soon as possible to capture as much of the early methane produced from food waste. Due to unstable methane production during early- and end-of-life gas production, low-calorific flares or biocovers may be needed to destroy any poor-quality gas that has collected. Strategies that prevent organic waste from being deposited at landfills are captured in other Project Drawdown solutions: Deploy Methane Digesters, Increase Composting, and Reduce Food Loss & Waste.

The effectiveness of landfill management depends on methane capture and destruction efficiency. The U.S. EPA previously assumed methane capture efficiency to be 75% and then revised it to 65%; however, the actual recovery rate in the United States is closer to 43% (Industrious Labs, 2024b). 

Our assessment does not include the impact of the CO₂ created from the destruction of methane.

Current Adoption

We found little literature quantifying the current adoption of LFG methane abatement. We estimate that methane capture/use/destruction accounts for approximately 1.6 Mt/yr of abated global methane. 

We did not find unaggregated data about current adoption of biocovers or global data for landfill methane abatement that we could use to allocate the contribution to each landfill methane abatement strategy. A large portion of data for current adoption is from sources focused on landfills in the United States. Around 70 Mt of methane is currently being emitted globally from landfills in 2024 (IEA, 2025; Ocko et al., 2021). 

Table 3a shows the statistical ranges among the sources we found for current adoption of methane capture/use/destruction. We were not able to find sources measuring the current adoption of biocovers and the amount of methane abated and therefore report it as not determined (Table 3b)."

The U.S. EPA’s Landfill Methane Outreach Program helps reduce methane emissions from U.S. landfills. The program has worked with 535 of more than 3,000 U.S. landfills (U.S. EPA, 2024; Vasarhelyi, 2021). Global Methane Initiative (GMI) members abated 4.7 Mt of methane from 2004 to 2023 (GMI, 2024). Because GMI members cover only 70% of human-caused methane emissions overall – including wastewater and agricultural emissions this is an overestimate of current landfill methane abatement. Holley et al. (2024) determined that while some methane abatement was occuring in Mexico, only 0.13 Mt of methane was abated from 2018 to 2020, which is about 12% of Mexico’s 2021 solid waste sector methane emissions. India and Nigeria recently installed some methane capture/use/destruction systems, but these are excluded from our analysis due to unclear data (Ayandele et al., 2024b; Ayandele et al., 2024c). Industrious Labs (2024b) found that GCCS were less common than expected – the U.S. EPA assumes a 75% gas recovery rate for well-managed landfills. A study on Maryland landfills found that only half had GCCS in place, with an average collection efficiency of 59% (Industrious Labs, 2024b). 

Table 3. Current (2023) adoption level.

Unit: Mt/yr methane abated

25th percentile 1.26
Mean 1.64
Median (50th percentile) 1.59
75th percentile 2.00

Unit: Mt/yr methane abated

25th percentile not determined
Mean not determined
Median (50th percentile) not determined
75th percentile not determined
Left Text Column Width
Adoption Trend

Few studies explicitly quantify the adoption of methane abatement technologies over time; we estimated the adoption trend to be 0.22 Mt/yr of methane abated – mainly from methane capture/use/destruction. We were not able to find unaggregated data for the adoption trend of biocovers, so we estimated adoption from the U.S. EPA (2024), GMI (2024), Industrious Labs (2024b), and Van Dingenen et al. (2018). The U.S. EPA (2024) provided adoption data for a limited number of U.S. landfills that showed increasing methane abatement 2000–2013, a plateau 2013–2018, and slower progress 2018–2023 (Figure 2).

GMI (2024) show a gradual increase in methane abatement 2011–2022. However, these data do not differentiate landfill methane abatement from other abatement opportunities, and even include wastewater systems and agriculture. When the GMI (2024) data are used to estimate adoption trends, they result in an overestimate. Van Dingenen et al. (2018) attributed a decreasing trend in landfill methane emissions 1990–2012 to landfill regulations implemented in the 1990s. Table 4a shows statistical ranges among the sources we found for the adoption trend of landfill methane strategies. Due to a lack of sources, we assume a zero value for the adoption trend of biocovers (and the amount of methane abated) as shown in Table 4b.

Table 4. 2011–2022 adoption trend.

Unit: Mt/yr methane abated

25th percentile 0.05
Mean 0.38
Median (50th percentile) 0.22
75th percentile 0.54

Unit: Mt/yr methane abated

25th percentile 0
Mean 0
Median (50th percentile) 0
75th percentile 0
Left Text Column Width
Adoption Ceiling

GCCS and methane capture have an estimated adoption ceiling of 70 Mt/yr of methane abated based on the IEA’s (2025) estimate for methane emissions from the landfill waste sector. We assumed that current landfill methane emissions would remain the same into the future with no changes in waste produced or waste diversion employed.

Biocovers have an estimated adoption ceiling of 70 Mt/yr of methane based on the IEA’s (2025) estimate for methane emissions from the landfill waste sector. We assumed that current landfill methane emissions would remain the same into the future with no changes in waste produced or waste diversion employed.

The maximum possible abatement of LFG methane critically depends on the efficiency of the abatement technology; Powell et al. (2015) found that closed landfills (those not actively receiving new waste) were 17% more efficient than open landfills. Even so, research from Nesser et al. (2024) found that the gas capture efficiency among United States landfills was significantly lower than U.S. EPA assumptions – closer to 50% rather than 75%. Industrious Labs (2024b) found that landfill methane emissions could be reduced by up to 104 Mt of methane 2025–2050. Using biocovers and installing GCCS earlier (with consistent operation standards) may help reduce emissions throughout the landfill’s lifespan. Tables 5a and 5b show the adoption ceiling for GCCS and methane use/destruction strategies, and for biocovers when used separately.

Table 5. Adoption ceiling.

Unit: Mt/yr methane abated

Median (50th percentile) 70

Unit: Mt/yr methane abated

Median (50th percentile) 70
Left Text Column Width
Achievable Adoption

The amount of methane that can be abated from landfills is highly uncertain due to the difficulty in quantifying where and how much methane is emitted and how much of those emissions can be abated. 

GCCS and methane capture strategies have an achievable adoption range of 5–35 Mt/yr of methane (Table 6a). These values are aligned with estimates from DeFabrizio et al. (2021) and Scharff et al. (2023) for landfill methane abatement. 

Biocovers have an achievable adoption range of 35–57 Mt/yr of methane (Table 6b). This value is aligned with estimates of biocover gas destruction efficiency from Duan et al. (2022) and Scheutz et al. (2014). 

The use of these methane abatement strategies would still release around 13–65 Mt/yr of methane into the atmosphere (IEA, 2025). The amount of methane abated from both GCCS and methane use/destruction strategies and biocovers will vary with what kind of waste reduction and organic diversion is used (which can increase or decrease depending on the amount of organics sent to landfills). 

We referenced CCAC (2024), U.S. EPA (2011), Fries (2020), Industrious Labs (2024b), Lee et al. (2017), and Sperling Hansen (2020) when looking at the achievable adoption for global landfill methane abatement. Several resources focused on landfills in Canada, Denmark, South Korea, and the United States. We based the adoption achievable for biocovers only on sources that include the percentage of gas capture (destruction) efficiency over landfill sites. We exclude studies that include the percentage of biogas oxidized because they focus on specific areas where biocovers were applied. It is important to note that biocovers do not capture methane – they destroy it through methane oxidation. In addition, biocovers’ gas capture efficiency will not reach its optimal rate until the bacteria establishes. It may take up to three months (Stern et al., 2007) for methane oxidation rates to stabilize, and – because environmental changes can impact the bacteria’s methane oxidation rate – the value presented here likely overestimates biocover methane abatement potential in practice. Stern et al. (2007) found that biocovers can be a methane sink and oxidation rates of 100% have been measured at landfills. 

Few studies have examined how methane abatement is affected when all strategies are combined. A single landfill’s total methane abatement would likely increase with each added strategy, the total methane abatement is not expected to be additive between the strategies. For example, If a GCCS system can capture a large portion of LFG methane, then adding a biocover to the same landfill will play a reduced role in methane abatement. The values presented do not consider which geographies are best suited for specific methane abatement strategies. Compared with reality, those values may appear generous. 

Long-term landfill methane abatement will be necessary to manage emissions from previously deposited organic waste. Strong regulations for waste management can encourage methane abatement strategies at landfills and/or reduce the amount of organics sent their way. The infrastructure for these methane abatement strategies can still be employed in geographies without strong regulations. Tables 6a and 6b show the statistical low and high achievable ranges for GCCS and methane use/destruction strategies and for biocovers (when used separately) based on different reported sources for adoption ceilings.

Table 6. Range of achievable adoption levels.

Unit: Mt/yr methane abated

Current adoption 1.60
Achievable – low 4.50
Achievable – high 34.78
Adoption ceiling 69.56

Unit: Mt/yr methane abated

Current adoption not determined
Achievable – low 35.13
Achievable – high 57.04
Adoption ceiling 69.56
Left Text Column Width

Landfill methane abatement has a high potential for climate impact. 

GCCS and methane capture strategies can significantly reduce landfill GHG emissions (Table 7a).

Biocovers can be a useful strategy for controlling LFG methane (Table 7b) because they can oxidize methane in areas where GCCS and methane use/destruction strategies are not applicable. In addition, this strategy can help destroy methane missed from GCCS and even remove methane from the atmosphere (Stern et al., 2007). The lower cost for installation and operation when compared to installing GCCS systems and increased applicability at landfills large and small are encouraging factors for broadening their use around the world. 

LDAR can help identify methane leaks,allowing for targeted abatement (Industrious Labs, 2024a). 

Research has not quantified how methane abatement is affected by combining these strategies. We anticipate that the total methane abatement would increase with each additional strategy, but we do not expect them to be additive. The general belief is that biocovers are useful for reducing methane emissions in areas where a GCCS cannot be installed and will also help to remove residual methane emissions from GCCS systems. If there is a large increase in waste diversion, the abatement potential could be 0.13–1.59 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr for landfill methane abatement (DeFabrizio et al, 2021; Duan et al., 2022). In this scenario there will also be reduced sources of revenue due to lower LFG methane production affecting the economics.

UNEP (2021) underscored the need for additional methane measures to stay aligned with 1.5 °C scenarios. Meeting these goals requires the implementation of landfill GCCS and biocovers as well as improved waste diversion strategies – such as composting or reducing food loss and waste – to reduce methane emissions. The amount of landfill methane available to abate will grow or shrink depending on the amount of organic waste sent to landfills. Previously deposited organic waste will still produce methane for many years and will still require methane abatement.

Table 7. Climate impact at different levels of adoption.

Unit: Gt CO₂‑eq/yr, 100-yr basis

Current adoption 0.04
Achievable – low 0.13
Achievable – high 0.97
Adoption ceiling 1.94

Unit: Gt CO₂‑eq/yr, 20-yr basis

Current adoption 0.13
Achievable – low 0.37
Achievable – high 2.82
Adoption ceiling 5.65

Unit: Gt CO₂‑eq/yr, 100-yr basis

Current adoption not determined
Achievable – low 0.98
Achievable – high 1.59
Adoption ceiling 1.94

Unit: Gt CO₂‑eq/yr, 20-yr basis

Current adoption not determined
Achievable – low 2.85
Achievable – high 4.63
Adoption ceiling 5.65
Left Text Column Width
Additional Benefits

Income and Work

Generating electricity from LFG can create local jobs in drilling, piping, design, construction, and operation of energy projects. In the United States, LFG energy projects can create 10–70 jobs per project (EPA, 2024b).

Health

Landfill emissions can contribute to health issues such as cancer, respiratory and neurological problems, low birth weight, and birth defects (Brender et al., 2011; Industrious Labs, 2024a; Siddiqua et al. 2022). By reducing harmful air pollutants, capturing landfill methane emissions minimizes the health risks associated with exposure to these toxic landfill compounds. Capturing LFG can reduce malodorous landfill emissions – pollutants such as ammonia and hydrogen sulfide – that impact human well-being (Cai et al., 2018).

Equality

Landfill management practices that reduce community exposure to air pollution have implications for environmental justice (Casey et al., 2021). A large review of waste sites in the United States and Europe found that landfills are disproportionately located near low-income communities and near neighborhoods with racially and ethnically marginalized populations (Marzutti et al., 2010). Reducing disproportionate exposures to air pollution from landfills may reduce poor health outcomes in surrounding communities (Brender et al., 2011).

Air Quality

Using LFG for energy in place of other non-renewable sources – such as coal or fuel oil – reduces emissions of air pollutants such as sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and particulate matter (EPA, 2024b; Siddiqua et al., 2022). Untreated LFG is also a source of volatile organic compounds (VOCs) in low concentrations. Capturing and burning LFG to generate electricity reduces the hazards of these air pollutants. Methane emissions can contribute to landfill fires, which pose risks to the health and safety of nearby communities by releasing black carbon and carbon monoxide (Global Climate & Health Alliance [GCHA], 2024). Reducing landfill fires by capturing methane can also help improve local air quality. Landfill methane emissions can contribute to ozone pollution, particularly when other non-methane ozone precursors are present (Olaguer, 2021). 

Risks

GCCS can be voluntarily implemented with sufficient methane generated by the landfill and favorable natural gas prices, but when natural gas prices are low, it makes less economic sense (IEA, 2021). There is also a risk of encouraging organics to be sent to landfills in order to maintain methane capture rates. Reducing the amount of waste made in the first place will allow us to better utilize our resources and for the organic waste that is created; it can be better served with waste diversion strategies such as composting or methane digesters. 

Without policy support, regulation, carbon pricing mechanism, or other economic incentives – biocover adoption may be limited by installation costs. Some tools (like the United Nations’ clean development mechanism) encourage global landfill methane abatement projects. There have been criticisms of this mechanism’s effectiveness for failing to support waste diversion practices and focusing solely on GCCS and incinerator strategies (Tangri, 2010). Collected LFG methane can be used to reduce GHG emissions for hard to abate sectors but continued reliance on methane for industries where it is easier to switch to clean alternatives could encourage new natural gas infrastructure to be built which risks becoming a stranded asset and locking infrastructure to emitting forms of energy (Auth & Kincer, 2022).

Interactions with Other Solutions

Reinforcing

Landfill management can have a reinforcing impact on other solutions that reduce the amount of methane released to the atmosphere. By using strategies like GCCS, methane destruction, and LDAR, the landfill waste sector can help demonstrate the effectiveness and economic case for abating methane. This would build momentum for widespread adoption of methane abatement because successes in this sector can be leveraged in others as well. For example, processes and tools for identifying methane leaks are useful beyond landfills; LDAR as a key strategy for identifying methane emissions can be applied and studied more widely.

Competing

Landfill management can have a competing impact with solutions that provide clean electricity. Capturing methane uses natural gas infrastructure and can reduce the cost of using methane and natural gas as a fuel source. As a result, it could prolong the use of fossil fuels and slow down the transition to clean electricity sources.

Reducing the release of landfill methane will mean that solutions which divert organic waste from landfills will be less effective relative to landfill disposal.

Dashboard

Solution Basics

Mt methane abated

t CO₂-eq (100-yr)/unit
2.79×10⁷
units/yr
Current 1.59 04.534.78
Achievable (Low to High)

Climate Impact

Gt CO₂-eq (100-yr)/yr
Current 0.04 0.130.97
US$ per t CO₂-eq
-6
Emergency Brake

CH₄, N₂O, BC

Solution Basics

Mt methane abated

t CO₂-eq (100-yr)/unit
2.79×10⁷
units/yr
Current Not Determined 035.1357.04
Achievable (Low to High)

Climate Impact

Gt CO₂-eq (100-yr)/yr
Current Not Determined 0.981.59
US$ per t CO₂-eq
0
Emergency Brake

CH₄, N₂O, BC

Trade-offs

Landfill management strategies outlined in this solution can help to reduce methane emissions that reach the atmosphere. However, the methane used as fuel or destroyed will still emit GHGs. Strategies to capture CO₂ emissions from methane use will be needed to avoid adding any GHG emissions to the atmosphere. Research on this topic takes global methane emissions from landfills in 2023, and assumes they were fully combusted and converted to CO₂ emissions.

Mt CO2–eq/yr
< 0.5
0.5–1
1–3
3–5
> 5

Annual emissions from solid waste disposal sites, 2024

Landfills release methane when organic material breaks down. Globally, municipal solid waste was responsible for about 70 Mt out of the 354 Mt of anthropogenic methane emissions in 2024. This methane contributed 18% of total anthropogenic methane emissions in 2024, and is equivalent to 1,941 Mt CO2-eq based on a 100-year time scale.

Raniga, K., (2024). Waste sector: Estimating CH4 emissions from solid waste disposal sites [Data set]. WattTime, Climate TRACE Emissions Inventory. Retrieved April 21, 2025 from Link to source: https://climatetrace.org

International Energy Agency. (2025). Global methane tracker 2025: Data tools. Link to source: https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/data-tools/methane-tracker

Mt CO2–eq/yr
< 0.5
0.5–1
1–3
3–5
> 5

Annual emissions from solid waste disposal sites, 2024

Landfills release methane when organic material breaks down. Globally, municipal solid waste was responsible for about 70 Mt out of the 354 Mt of anthropogenic methane emissions in 2024. This methane contributed 18% of total anthropogenic methane emissions in 2024, and is equivalent to 1,941 Mt CO2-eq based on a 100-year time scale.

Raniga, K., (2024). Waste sector: Estimating CH4 emissions from solid waste disposal sites [Data set]. WattTime, Climate TRACE Emissions Inventory. Retrieved April 21, 2025 from Link to source: https://climatetrace.org

International Energy Agency. (2025). Global methane tracker 2025: Data tools. Link to source: https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/data-tools/methane-tracker

Maps Introduction

Methane emissions from landfills can vary geographically (IPCC, 2006) since rates of organic matter decomposition and methane generation depend on climate. In practice, however, landfill management has a more significant impact on related emissions and is correlated with country income levels.  

Many high-income countries have landfills that are considered sanitary landfills (where waste is covered daily and isolated from the environment) and have high waste collection rates. Basic covers are placed on the landfills to reduce the risk of odor, scavenging, and wildlife accessing the waste, and regulations are in place to manage and capture LFG emissions. These landfills are better prepared to install GCCS and methane use/destruction infrastructure than are other landfills. 

For landfills in low- and middle-income countries, existing waste management practices and regulations vary widely. In countries such as the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Nigeria, waste may not be regularly collected; when it is, it is often placed in open landfills where waste lies uncovered, as documented by Ayandele et al. (2024d). This can harm the environment by attracting scavengers and pest animals to the landfill. When this occurs, methane is more easily released to the atmosphere or burned as waste. the latter process creates pollutants that impact the nearby environment and generate additional GHG emissions.

Overall, managing methane emissions from landfills can be improved everywhere. In high-income countries, stronger regulations can ensure the methane generated from landfills is captured with GCCS and used or destroyed. In low- and middle-income countries, regular waste collection and storage of waste in sanitary landfills need to be implemented first before GCCS technology can be installed. Biocovers can be used around the world but may have the most impact in low- and middle-income countries that lack the expertise or infrastructure to effectively use GCCS methane use or destruction strategies (Ayandele et al., 2024d).

Action Word
Improve
Solution Title
Landfill Management
Classification
Highly Recommended
Lawmakers and Policymakers
  • Set standards for landfill emissions and goals for reductions.
  • Improve LDAR and emissions estimates by setting industry standards and investing in public research.
  • Mandate early installation of landfill covers and/or GCCSs for new landfills; mandate immediate installation for existing landfills.
  • Set standards for landfill covers and GCCS.
  • Invest in infrastructure to support biogas production and utilization.
  • Regulate industry practices for timely maintenance, such as wellhead turning and equipment monitoring.
  • Set standards for methane destruction, such as high-efficiency flares.
  • Conduct or fund research to fill the literature gap on policy options for landfill methane.
  • Reduce public food waste and loss, invest in infrastructure to separate organic waste before reaching the landfill (see Reduce Food Loss and Waste, Increase Composting, and Deploy Methane Digesters solutions).

Further information:

Practitioners
  • Improve LDAR at landfills for surface and fugitive emissions.
  • Install landfill biocovers as well as GCCSs.
  • Invest in infrastructure to support biogas production and utilization.
  • Ensure timely maintenance, such as wellhead turning and equipment monitoring.
  • Improve methane destruction practices, such as using high-efficiency flares.
  • Set goals to reduce landfill methane emissions from operations and help set regional, national, international, and industry reduction goals.
  • Conduct, contribute to, or fund research on technical solutions (e.g., regional abatement strategies) and policy options for landfill methane.
  • Separate food and organic waste from non-organic waste to create separate disposal streams (see Reduce Food Loss & Waste, Increase Centralized Composting, and Deploy Methane Digesters solutions).

Further information:

Business Leaders
  • Contract with waste collection facilities that utilize methane reduction strategies such as landfill covers, GCCSs, and robust monitoring systems.
  • Require suppliers to meet standards for low-carbon waste management.
  • If your company participates in the voluntary carbon market, fund high-integrity projects that reduce landfill emissions.
  • Proactively collaborate with government and regulatory actors to support policies that abate landfill methane.
  • Reduce your company’s food waste and loss (see Reduce Food Loss & Waste, Increase Centralized Composting, and Deploy Methane Digesters solutions).

Further information:

Nonprofit Leaders
  • Contract with waste collection facilities that utilize methane reduction strategies such as landfill covers, GCCSs, and robust monitoring systems.
  • Assist with monitoring and estimating landfill emissions.
  • Help design policies and regulations that support landfill methane abatement.
  • Publish research on policy options for landfill methane abatement.
  • Join or support efforts such as the Global Methane Alliance.
  • Encourage policymakers to create ambitious targets and regulations.
  • Pressure landfill companies and operators to improve their practices.
  • Reduce your organization’s food waste and loss, separate organic waste from other forms, and compost organic waste (see Reduce Food Loss & Waste, Increase Centralized Composting, and Deploy Methane Digesters solutions).

Further information:

Investors
  • Contract with waste collection facilities that utilize methane reduction strategies such as landfill covers, GCCSs, and robust monitoring systems.
  • Invest in projects that abate landfill methane emissions.
  • Pressure and influence private landfill operators within investment portfolios to implement methane abatement strategies, noting that some strategies, such as selling captured methane, can be sources of revenue and add value for investors.
  • Pressure and influence other portfolio companies to incorporate waste management and landfill methane abatement into their operations and/or net-zero targets.
  • Provide capital for nascent or regional landfill methane abatement technologies and LDAR instruments.
  • Seek impact investment opportunities, such as sustainability-linked loans in entities that set landfill methane abatement targets.
  • Reduce your company’s food waste and loss, separate organic waste from other forms, and compost organic waste (see Reduce Food Loss & Waste, Increase Centralized Composting, and Deploy Methane Digesters solutions).

Further information:

Philanthropists and International Aid Agencies
  • Contract with waste collection facilities that utilize methane reduction strategies such as landfill covers, GCCSs, and robust monitoring systems.
  • Provide capital for methane monitoring, de-risking, and abatement in the early stages of implementing landfill methane reduction technologies.
  • Support global, national, and local policies that reduce landfill methane emissions.
  • Support accelerators or multilateral initiatives like the Global Methane Hub.
  • Explore opportunities to fund landfill methane abatement strategies such as landfill covers, GCCSs, proper methane destruction, monitoring technologies, and other equipment upgrades.
  • Advance awareness of the air quality, public health, and climate benefits of landfill methane abatement.
  • Reduce your organization’s food waste and loss, separate organic waste from other forms, and compost organic waste (see Reduce Food Loss & Waste, Increase Centralized Composting, and Deploy Methane Digesters solutions).

Further information:

Thought Leaders
  • If applicable, contract with waste collection facilities that utilize methane reduction strategies such as landfill covers, GCCSs, and robust monitoring systems.
  • Provide technical assistance (e.g., monitoring and reporting landfill emissions) to businesses, government agencies, and landfill operators working to reduce methane emissions.
  • Help design policies and regulations that support landfill methane abatement.
  • Educate the public on the urgent need to abate landfill methane.
  • Join or support joint efforts such as the Global Methane Alliance.
  • Advocate to policymakers for more ambitious targets and regulations for landfill emissions.
  • Pressure landfill operators to improve their practices.
  • Reduce your food waste and loss, separate organic waste from other forms, and compost organic waste (see Reduce Food Loss & Waste, Increase Centralized Composting, and Deploy Methane Digesters solutions).

Further information:

Technologists and Researchers
  • Develop new LDAR technologies that reduce cost and required capacity.
  • Develop new biocover technologies sensitive to regional supply chains and/or availability of materials.
  • Improve methane destruction practices to reduce CO₂ emissions.
  • Research and improve estimates of landfill methane emissions.
  • Create new mechanisms to reduce public food waste and loss, and separate organic waste from landfill waste (see Reduce Food Loss & Waste, Increase Centralized Composting, and Deploy Methane Digesters solutions).

Further information:

Communities, Households, and Individuals
  • If possible, contract with waste collection facilities that utilize methane reduction strategies such as landfill covers, GCCSs, and robust monitoring systems.
  • If harmful landfill management practices impact you, document your experiences.
  • Share documentation of harmful practices and/or other key messages with policymakers, the press, and the public.
  • Advocate to policymakers for more ambitious targets and regulations for landfill emissions.
  • Support public education efforts on the urgency and need to address landfill methane.
  • Reduce your food waste and loss, separate organic waste from other forms, and compost organic waste (see Reduce Food Loss & Waste, Increase Centralized Composting, and Deploy Methane Digesters solutions).

Further information:

Sources
Evidence Base

Consensus of effectiveness in abating landfill methane emissions: High

There is a high consensus that methane abatement technologies are effective; they can often be deployed cost effectively with an immediate mitigating effect on climate change. 

Though many strategies are universally agreed-upon as effective, waste management practices vary between countries from what we found in our research. China, India, and the United States are the three largest G20 generators of municipal solid waste, though much of the data used in our assessment are from Western countries (Zhang, 2020). Ocko et al. (2021) found that economically feasible methane abatement options (including waste diversion) could reduce 80% of landfill methane emissions from 2020 levels by 2030. Methane abatement can reduce methane emissions from existing organic waste – which Stone (2023) notes can continue for more than 30 years. 

Scharff et al. (2023) found capture efficiencies of 10–90% depending on the LFG strategy used. They compared passive methods, late control of the landfill life, and early gas capture at an active landfill. The U.S. EPA (Krause et al., 2023) found that 61% of methane generated by food waste – which breaks down relatively quickly – evades gas capture systems at landfills. This illustrates how early installation of these capture systems can greatly help reduce the total amount of methane emitted from landfills. The U.S. EPA findings also highlight the potential impact of diverting organic waste from landfills, preventing LFG from being generated in the first place. 

Ayandele et al. (2024c) found that the working face of a landfill can be a large source of LFG and suggest that timely landfill covers – biocover-style or otherwise – can reduce methane released; timing of abatement strategies is important. Daily and interim landfill covers can prevent methane escape before biocovers are installed. 

Biocovers have a reported gas destruction rate of 26–96% (U.S. EPA, 2011; Lee et al., 2017). They could offer a cost-effective way to manage any LFG that is either missed by GCCS systems or emitted in the later stages of the landfill when LFG production decreases and is no longer worth capturing and selling (Martin Charlton Communications, 2020; Nisbet et al., 2020; Sperling Hansen Associates, 2020). Biocovers can also be applied soon after organic waste is deposited at a landfill as daily or interim covers where it is not as practical to install GCCS infrastructure and gas production has not yet stabilized (Waste Today, 2019). Scarapelli et al. (2024) found in the landfills they studied that emissions from working faces are poorly monitored and 79% of the observed emissions originated from landfill work faces. Covering landfill waste with any type of landfill cover (biocover or not), will reduce the work face emissions. 

LDAR can reduce landfill methane emissions by helping to locate the largest methane leaks and so allowing for more targeted abatement strategies. LDAR can also help identify leaks in landfill covers or in the GCCS infrastructure (Industrious Labs, 2024a). 

The results presented in this document summarize findings from 24 reviews and meta-analyses and 26 original studies reflecting current evidence from six countries, Canada, China, Denmark, Mexico, South Korea, and the United States, and from sources examining global landfill methane emissions. We recognize this limited geographic scope creates bias, and hope this work inspires research and data sharing on this topic in underrepresented regions.

Appendix

The following figures provide examples of where methane can escape from landfills and where sources of emissions have been found. This shows the difficulty in identifying where methane emissions are coming from and the importance of well maintained infrastructure to ensure methane is being abated.

Figure A1. Sources of methane emissions at landfills. Source: Garland et al. (2023).

Diagram of landfill components and emissions sources

Source: Garland E., Alves O., Frankiewicz T., & Ayandele E. (2023). Mitigating landfill methane. RMI. Link to source: https://rmi.org/wp-content/uploads/dlm_uploads/2023/06/landfill_monitoring_memo_series.pdf 

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Figure A2. Source of methane leaks at landfills. Source: Ayandele et al. (2024a).

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Source: Ayandele, E., Frankiewicz, T., & Garland, E. (2024a). Deploying advanced monitoring technologies at US landfills. RMI. 

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Deploy Offshore Wind Turbines

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Summary

Offshore wind turbines are ocean-based machines that harness natural wind to generate electricity. These turbines use the relatively strong winds over the water to rotate their blades, which power a generator to make electricity. The electricity travels through underwater cables to reach the land. There are two main types: fixed-bottom turbines, which are attached to the seabed in shallow waters (typically up to 60 meters deep), and floating turbines, which sit on platforms anchored in deeper waters. Offshore wind farms can produce more electricity than land-based wind farms because ocean winds are usually stronger and steadier than winds on land.

Deploying additional offshore wind turbines reduces CO₂ emissions by increasing the availability of renewable energy sources to meet electricity demand, therefore reducing dependence on fossil fuel-based sources in the overall electricity grid mix.

Income & work,Health
Nature protection,Air quality
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Deploy Offshore Wind is a Highly Recommended climate solution. It offers immense clean energy potential but faces challenges of high costs and competing uses of the seas.
Overview

An estimated 23% of global GHG emissions (100-yr basis) comes from electricity generation (Clarke et al., 2022); in 2022, more than 60% of global electricity generation came from fossil fuel–based energy sources (International Energy Agency [IEA], 2024a).

Offshore wind turbines generate electricity by converting the energy from rotating turbine blades into electrical energy. The main components of offshore wind turbines include rotor blades, a tower to raise the rotor above the water, a nacelle hub that houses the generator and other key components, and a foundation that stabilizes the structure in the water. Offshore wind farms require additional infrastructure to transport generated energy through undersea cables to transformers and power substations before electricity can be supplied to consumers (Figure 1). To optimize performance, offshore turbines often use advanced control systems (e.g., yaw, pitch, and safety sensors).

Figure 1. Simplified schematic of an offshore wind power system, showing electricity flow from wind turbines through array cables, offshore and onshore substations, and transmission and distribution infrastructure to end users.

Schematic diagram of an offshore wind power system.

Source: Ørsted (n.d.) 

Offshore wind turbines are often placed far from the coast to avoid causing noise pollution or taking up space on land. Foundations can be fixed to the seafloor (fixed-bottom) or floating depending on water depth and other characteristics, such as seabed topography and operational logistics (Afridi et al., 2024). Most offshore wind turbines operating in 2023 were fixed-bottom and limited to seafloor depths around 50 meters. Floating wind farms access wind resources over deeper waters, up to 1,000 meters (de La Beaumelle et al., 2023). 

Wind speeds over water are generally higher and more consistent than over land, which allows for more reliable and increased electricity generation. Potential power generated from offshore wind turbines is directly proportional to the swept area of the rotor blades and the wind speed cubed; a doubling of wind speed corresponds to an eightfold increase in power (U.S. Energy Information Administration [U.S. EIA], 2024). The maximum electrical power a turbine can generate is its capacity in MW. The average installed offshore wind turbine rating grew from 7.7 MW in 2022 to 9.7 MW in 2023 (McCoy et al., 2024), with the total global installed capacity reaching 75.2 gigawatts (GW) in 2023 (Global Wind Energy Council [GWEC], 2024).

The global weighted average capacity factor for offshore wind turbines has reached 41% (International Renewable Energy Agency [IRENA], 2024c) – an increase from 38% a decade earlier – driven by advancements in turbine efficiency, hub height, rotor diameter, and siting optimization. Our analysis assumed an offshore wind turbine capacity factor of 41% (IRENA, 2024c). Offshore wind capacity varies across regions due to differences in policy support, coastal geography, water depths, and infrastructure readiness. Electric power output can be converted to energy generated by multiplying capacity by the time interval and the capacity factor. For annual generation, we multiply by 8,760 hours for one year.

The main siting considerations for offshore wind farms are distance from shore and water depth, but energy output can also be impacted by atmospheric wind conditions as well as the configuration of turbines within a wind farm (de La Beaumelle et al., 2023; IRENA, 2024c). Protected areas are also excluded during siting.

Since wind is a clean and renewable resource, offshore wind turbines do not contribute to GHG emissions or air pollution while generating energy. There are emissions associated with the manufacturing and transportation of turbine components. For this assessment, we did not quantify emissions during the construction of offshore wind farms; these emissions can be addressed with industry-sector solution assessments. Increased deployment of offshore wind turbines contributes to reduced CO₂ emissions when it reduces the need for electricity generation from fossil fuels.

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International Energy Agency, & Nuclear Energy Agency. (2020). Projected costs of generating electricity – 2020 edition [Report]. OECD Publishing. Link to source: https://www.oecd-nea.org/upload/docs/application/pdf/2020-12/egc-2020_2020-12-09_18-26-46_781.pdf 

International Renewable Energy Agency. (2024a). Floating offshore wind outlook. Link to source: https://www.irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2024/Jul/IRENA_G7_Floating_offshore_wind_outlook_2024.pdf 

International Renewable Energy Agency. (2024b). Renewable energy statistics 2024. Link to source: https://www.irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2024/Jul/IRENA_Renewable_Energy_Statistics_2024.pdf 

International Renewable Energy Agency. (2024c). Renewable power generation costs in 2023. Link to source: https://www.irena.org/Publications/2024/Sep/Renewable-Power-Generation-Costs-in-2023 

International Renewable Energy Agency, & Global Wind Energy Council. (2023). Enabling frameworks for offshore wind scale up: Innovations in permitting. Link to source: https://www.energycentral.com/renewables/post/irena-enabling-frameworks-offshore-wind-scale---innovations-permitting-vZRn6mKeZ1hBX0n 

Jansen, M., Staffell, I., Kitzing, L., Quoilin, S., Wiggelinkhuizen, E., Bulder, B., Riepin, I., & Müsgens, F. (2020). Offshore wind competitiveness in mature markets without subsidy. Nature Energy, 5(8), 614–622. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41560-020-0661-2 

Kaldellis, J. K., & Apostolou, D. (2017). Life cycle energy and carbon footprint of offshore wind energy. Comparison with onshore counterpart. Renewable Energy, 108, 72–84. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/J.RENENE.2017.02.039 

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Letcher, T. M. (Ed.). (2023). Wind energy engineering : A handbook for onshore and offshore wind turbines (2nd ed.). Academic Press. Link to source: https://www.sciencedirect.com/book/9780323993531/wind-energy-engineering 

Lopez, A., Green, R., Williams, T., Lantz, E., Buster, G., & Roberts, B. (2022). Offshore wind energy technical potential for the contiguous United States [Report]. Link to source: https://docs.nrel.gov/docs/fy22osti/83650.pdf 

McCoy, A., Musial, W., Hammond, R., Mulas Hernando, D., Duffy, P., Beiter, P., Pérez, P., Baranowski, R., Reber, G., & Spitsen, P. (2024). Offshore wind market report: 2024 edition (NREL/TP-5000-90525) [Technical report]. National Renewable Energy Laboratory. Link to source: https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy24osti/90525.pdf 

Mello, G., Ferreira Dias, M., & Robaina, M. (2020). Wind farms life cycle assessment review: CO2 emissions and climate change. Energy Reports, 6, 214–219. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/J.EGYR.2020.11.104 

Millstein, D., O’Shaughnessy, E., & Wiser, R. (2024). Climate and air quality benefits of wind and solar generation in the United States from 2019 to 2022. Cell Reports Sustainability, 1(6), Article 100105. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/J.CRSUS.2024.100105 

Nagababu, G., Srinivas, B. A., Kachhwaha, S. S., Puppala, H., & Kumar, S. V. V. A. (2023). Can offshore wind energy help to attain carbon neutrality amid climate change? A GIS-MCDM based analysis to unravel the facts using CORDEX-SA. Renewable Energy, 219, Article 119400; Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/J.RENENE.2023.119400 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. (n.d.). Offshore wind energy: Assessing impacts to marine life. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Fisheries. Retrieved August 6, 2025, from Link to source: https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/topic/offshore-wind-energy/assessing-impacts-to-marine-life 

Ørsted (n.d.) How does offshore wind power work? Retrieved July 8, 2025, from Link to source: https://orsted.com/en/what-we-do/renewable-energy-solutions/offshore-wind/technology

Peach, S. (2021, June 30). What’s the carbon footprint of a wind turbine? Yale Climate Connections. Link to source: https://yaleclimateconnections.org/2021/06/whats-the-carbon-footprint-of-a-wind-turbine/ 

Qiu, M., Zigler, C. M., & Selin, N. E. (2022). Impacts of wind power on air quality, premature mortality, and exposure disparities in the United States. Science Advances, 8(48), Article eabn8762. Link to source: https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/sciadv.abn8762 

Ren, Z., Zhang, S., Liu, H., Pu, L., Wang, X., Wang, Z., Wu, M., & Chen, Z. (2025). The environmental and public health benefits of offshore wind power deployment in China. Environmental Science & Technology, 59(1), 315–327. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1021/acs.est.4c06125 

Rubin, E. S., Azevedo, I. M. L., Jaramillo, P., & Yeh, S. (2015). A review of learning rates for electricity supply technologies. Energy Policy, 86, 198–218. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/J.ENPOL.2015.06.011 

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Shawhan, D., Robson, S., & Russell, E. (2025). Offshore wind power examined: Effects, benefits, and costs of offshore wind farms along the US Atlantic and Gulf Coasts (Working Paper No. 24-17). Resources for the Future. Link to source: https://media.rff.org/documents/WP_24-17_2.25_Update.pdf 

Shields, M., Beiter, P., & Nunemaker, J. (2022). A systematic framework for projecting the future cost of offshore wind energy (NREL/TP-5000-81819) [Technical report]. National Renewable Energy Laboratory. Link to source: https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy23osti/81819.pdf 

Stefek, J., Constant, C., Clark, C., Tinnesand, H., Christol, C., & Baranowski, R. (2022). U.S. offshore wind workforce assessment (NREL/TP-5000-81798) [Technical report]. National Renewable Energy Laboratory. Link to source: https://docs.nrel.gov/docs/fy23osti/81798.pdf 

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Credits

Lead Fellow

  • Michael Dioha, Ph.D.

Contributors

  • Ruthie Burrows, Ph.D.

  • Daniel Jasper

Internal Reviewers

  • James Gerber, Ph.D.

  • Megan Matthews, Ph.D.

  • Amanda Smith, Ph.D.

Effectiveness

Based on data provided by the IEA, global emissions from electricity generation accounted for an estimated 530 kg CO₂‑eq /MWh (540 kg CO₂‑eq /MWh, 20-yr basis). To convert from MWh to MW, we used the global weighted average capacity factor for offshore wind turbines of 41% (IRENA, 2024c). We estimated offshore wind turbines to reduce 1,900 t CO₂‑eq /MW (1,900 t CO₂‑eq /MW, 20-yr basis) of installed capacity annually (Table 1).

Table 1. Effectiveness at reducing emissions.

Unit: t CO₂‑eq /MW installed capacity/yr, 100-yr basis

Estimate 1900
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To estimate the effectiveness of offshore wind turbines, we assumed that electricity generated by newly installed offshore wind displaces an equivalent MWh of the global electricity grid mix. Then, the reduction in emissions from additional offshore wind capacity was equal to emissions (per MWh) from the 2023 global electricity grid mix as per the IEA World Energy Balances (IEA, 2024a). We then used the offshore wind capacity factor to convert to annual emissions per MW of installed capacity.

During operation, offshore wind turbines do not emit GHGs, so we assumed zero emissions per MW of installed capacity. However, emissions arise during the manufacturing of components, transportation, installation, maintenance, and decommissioning (Atilgan Turkmen & Germirli Babuna, 2024; Kaldellis & Apostolou, 2017; Mello et al., 2020; Yuan et al., 2023). Life-cycle analyses estimate that lifetime GHG emissions of offshore wind turbines are approximately 25.76 g CO₂‑eq /kWh of electricity generated (Yuan et al., 2023).

In our analysis, we focused solely on emissions produced during electricity generation, so carbon payback time and embodied life-cycle emissions were not included in our estimates of effectiveness or climate impacts. 

Cost

We estimated a mean levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) for offshore wind turbines of US$96/MWh based on three industry reports (IEA, 2024b; IRENA, 2024c; Nuclear Energy Agency & IEA, 2020). LCOE is a widely used metric that allows for cost comparison across generation technologies, incorporating installed capital costs, operation and maintenance, project lifespan, and energy output. Between 2010–2023, the global weighted average LCOE for offshore wind fell by 63%, from US$203/MWh to US$75/MWh, reflecting improvements in turbine size, supply chains, and regulatory support (IRENA, 2024c). 

Regional costs vary significantly. Denmark had the lowest LCOE in 2023 at US$48/MWh due to favorable siting conditions and grid cost exemptions. The UK and Germany achieved the largest LCOE reductions since 2010, of 73% and 67%, respectively (IRENA, 2024c). In contrast, recent U.S. estimates exceed US$120/MWh for unsubsidized projects (McCoy et al., 2024), reflecting higher labor costs, permitting challenges, and nascent supply chains. Lazard (2023) reports a broad range of US$72–140/MWh, emphasizing how siting, project size, and technology selection influence cost outcomes.

These values mask substantial variability and project-specific risk factors. LCOEs are highly sensitive to financing terms, interest rates, permitting delays, regional grid integration requirements, and the availability of local supply chains. For context, offshore wind costs are increasingly competitive with fossil fuel–based power generation, which ranges between US$70–176/MWh (IRENA, 2024c). Offshore wind gigawatt-scale potential near load centers makes it a good potential option for decarbonizing coastal grids.

Methods and Supporting Data

Methods and Supporting Data

Learning Curve

Offshore wind turbines exhibit a clear learning curve, with costs declining as deployment scales and the technology matures. Learning rates for offshore wind could vary from 7.2–43%, depending on the type of costs considered, study period, technological advancements, and regional conditions. Most of the cost decline is driven by reductions in capital expenditure, particularly from larger turbines, improved manufacturing, streamlined installation, and economies of scale.

According to IRENA (2024c), the global weighted-average installed cost of offshore wind between 2010–2023 reflects a learning rate of 14.2%. Modeling by the U.S. National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) estimates capital cost reductions per doubling of installed capacity at 8.8% for fixed-bottom turbines and 11.5% for floating turbines (Shields et al., 2022). European forecasts suggest that ongoing innovation and learning by doing could reduce offshore wind’s LCOE by up to 25% by 2030 relative to 2020, with learning rates of 6–12% (TNO & BLIX, 2021).

Earlier meta-analyses found offshore wind learning rates of 5–19% between 1985–2001, driven by improved turbine design and installation methods (Rubin et al., 2015). More recent assessments focused on 2010–2016 suggest capital cost learning rates of 10–12% (Beiter et al., 2021). Looking ahead, global experts project cost reductions of 37–49% by 2050 due to continued technological progress (Wiser et al., 2021).

Learning rates also vary by geography. Mature markets like Europe benefit from robust supply chains and permitting frameworks, leading to faster cost declines. On the other hand, emerging markets face higher initial costs and slower learning trajectories. We estimated a 15.8% median global learning rate for offshore wind, implying a 15.8% reduction in LCOE for each doubling of installed capacity (Table 2).

Table 2. Learning rate: drop in cost per doubling of the installed solution base.

Unit: %

25th percentile 11.9
Mean 15.8
Median (50th percentile) 15.8
75th percentile 19.6
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Speed of Action

Speed of action refers to how quickly a climate solution physically affects the atmosphere after it is deployed. This is different from speed of deployment, which is the pace at which solutions are adopted.

At Project Drawdown, we define the speed of action for each climate solution as emergency brake, gradual, or delayed.

Deploy Offshore Wind Turbines is a GRADUAL climate solution. It has a steady, linear impact on the atmosphere. The cumulative effect over time builds as a straight line.

Caveats

One limitation of our approach is the assumption that each additional MWh generated by offshore wind turbines displaces an equivalent MWh of the existing grid mix. This simplification implies that new offshore wind may, at times, displace other renewables such as onshore wind, rather than fossil-based sources. In reality, the extent of avoided emissions varies based on regional grid dynamics, marginal generation sources, and the timing and location of electricity production. This approach could be refined in the future, as emerging evidence suggests that in some cases, wind generation tends to displace a larger share of fossil-fuel output than assumed in average grid-mix methods (e.g., Millstein et al., 2024). While offshore wind avoids many of the land-use constraints associated with onshore wind, it introduces unique challenges that may limit scaling. These include high up-front capital costs, limited port infrastructure, specialized vessels, and supply-chain constraints for large components such as floating platforms and subsea cables. There is also growing competition for ocean space from fisheries, marine conservation zones, and shipping corridors (IEA, 2019).

Like all large-scale infrastructure, offshore wind systems face some risk of early retirement or component failure, which can affect their life-cycle emissions. However, because offshore wind turbines produce zero emissions during operation, any electricity they generate displaces fossil-based power and avoids associated emissions. These benefits are not reversed if a turbine is decommissioned early. Most offshore wind turbines operate for 25–30 years, with newer designs expected to exceed this lifespan (Bills, 2021; IEA, 2019). The bulk of their life-cycle emissions are front-loaded, arising from manufacturing, transportation, and installation. As a result, early retirement reduces the amount of clean electricity generated over the turbine’s lifetime, but it does not erase the emissions already avoided during its operation.

Current Adoption

As of 2023, the global installed capacity for offshore wind energy reached approximately 73,000 MW (Table 3; IRENA, 2024b). Although we used 2023 as our baseline for current adoption, in 2024 an additional 10,000 MW of offshore wind capacity was installed, bringing the global total to over 83,000 MW (GWEC, 2025).

Table 3. Current adoption level, 2023.

Unit: MW installed capacity

Total 73,000
Left Text Column Width

China currently leads in offshore wind deployment, accounting for more than 40 GW, or over half of the global installed capacity. Adoption remains negligible in many countries with several regions – particularly in Africa, Latin America, and parts of Southeast Asia – reporting minimal or no offshore wind installations to date, despite their huge potential (GWEC, 2025). For example, the United States, despite its vast technical potential, had installed only 41 MW by 2023 (IRENA, 2024b).

The global offshore wind market has gained significant momentum in recent years. A record number of new installations occurred in 2021, with continued but slower growth in 2022 and 2023. The most active markets remain concentrated in Asia and Europe, with China, the United Kingdom, Germany, and the Netherlands leading in cumulative capacity. The European Union collectively reached 18.1 GW by 2023 (IRENA, 2024b), driven by favorable policy environments and advanced maritime infrastructure (IRENA, 2024a).

Adoption Trend

Global offshore wind capacity has grown rapidly, expanding from less than 1 GW in 2000 to about 73 GW by 2023 (Figure 2), reflecting technological progress, supportive policies, and accelerating investment. 

Figure 2. Global offshore wind turbine installed capacity, 2000–2023. Global offshore wind capacity expanded from less than 1 GW in 2000 to about 73 GW by 2023, reflecting rapid technological progress, supportive policies, and accelerating investment in clean energy.

International Renewable Energy Agency. (2024). Renewable capacity statistics 2024. https://www.irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2024/Mar/IRENA_RE_Capacity_Statistics_2024.pdf

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We calculated global adoption for each year 2013–2023 and took the year-to-year difference. The adoption trend of offshore wind energy from 2013–2023 reveals a rapid and accelerating growth trajectory with significant regional disparities. Globally, installed capacity expanded from 7,200 MW in 2013 to 73,000 MW in 2023, reflecting a 10-fold increase over the decade. The most dramatic acceleration occurred in 2020–2021, when global capacity jumped from 34,000 MW to 54,000 MW. Comparing year-to-year global adoption, the mean global adoption trend was adding approximately 6,000 MW of installed capacity per year (Table 4), but expansion was unevenly distributed geographically. 

Table 4. Adoption trend, 2013–2023.

Unit: MW installed capacity/yr

25th percentile 3,000
Mean 6,000
Median (50th percentile) 5,000
75th percentile 7,000
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Regionally, Asia demonstrated the most remarkable growth. This growth was particularly pronounced in 2020–2021, when capacity soared from 9,400 MW to 28,000 MW, largely driven by China’s rapid deployment. Meanwhile, Europe also experienced steady growth, with installed capacity increasing from 8,000 MW in 2014 to 33,000 MW in 2023. In contrast, North America lags behind, with only 41 MW of installed capacity recorded as of 2023, indicating slow current adoption trends. The slow adoption of offshore wind technology in North America may be attributed to various factors, including regulatory and social barriers as well as high interest rates (McCoy et al., 2024). 

Looking ahead, according to forecasts from the World Forum Offshore Wind (WFO, 2024), global offshore wind capacity is anticipated to reach 414 GW by 2032. The GWEC projects more than 350 GW of new offshore wind capacity in 2025–2034, with annual additions surpassing 30 GW by 2030 and 50 GW by 2033, bringing total capacity to about 441 GW by 2034 (GWEC, 2025).

Adoption Ceiling

The adoption ceiling for offshore wind turbines (Table 5) is determined by the technology’s global technical potential, representing the theoretical maximum deployment based on physical resource availability. Offshore wind benefits from vast oceanic areas with higher and more consistent wind speeds than onshore sites. However, its realizable potential is shaped by factors such as water depth, distance to shore, seabed conditions, regional wind patterns, and technological limitations.

Table 5. Adoption ceiling: upper limit for adoption level.

Unit: MW installed capacity

25th percentile 58,000,000
Mean 62,000,000
Median (50th percentile) 62,000,000
75th percentile 67,000,000
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Estimates of offshore wind’s technical potential vary widely. A meta-analysis by de La Beaumelle et al. (2023) found values of 4.17–626 petawatt-hours (PWh)/year, with a median of 193 PWh/year. The World Bank’s Energy Sector Management Assistance Program (ESMAP) analysis (2019; n.d.) suggests over 71,000 GW of global offshore wind potential, with more than 70% located in deep waters suitable only for floating turbines. Roughly 25% of this resource lies within low- and middle-income countries, offering major opportunities for clean energy expansion.

Technical potential is typically calculated using wind speed maps, turbine power curves, and water depth data. For example, the ESMAP-IFC 2019 study identified 3.1 terawatts (TW) of potential across eight emerging markets using global wind and ocean depth data (ESMAP, 2019). These figures, however, do not reflect constraints such as economics, regulation, infrastructure, or marine uses that would compete with offshore wind (ESMAP, 2019). Challenges like ecological impact, permitting, and grid integration could significantly reduce practical deployment.

Despite these hurdles, offshore wind’s potential remains vast. For this analysis, we defined the adoption ceiling using installable capacity rather than generation output to avoid forecasting uncertainty. Based on the literature, we estimated an adoption ceiling of 62,000,000 MW. The scaling of floating wind turbines, especially in deep waters, will be critical to unlocking this resource, and will require continued innovation and policy support (Tumse et al., 2024).

Achievable Adoption

The IEA’s World Energy Outlook (WEO) 2024 includes several key scenarios that explore different energy futures based on varying levels of policy intervention, technological development, and market dynamics. We define the adoption achievable range for offshore wind turbines based on the Stated Policies Scenario (STEPS) and Announced Pledges Scenario (APS) (IEA, 2024b).

Achievable – Low

The low achievable adoption level is based on STEPS, which captured the current trajectory for increased adoption of offshore wind energy as well as future projections based on existing and announced policies. Under this scenario, offshore wind capacity is projected to increase more than 13-fold from 73,000 MW to 1,000,000 MW by 2050 (Table 6). This corresponds to an average compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 10.2%.

Table 6. Range of achievable adoption levels.

Unit: MW installed capacity

Current adoption 73,000
Achievable – low 1,000,000
Achievable – high 1,600,000
Adoption ceiling 62,000,000
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Achievable – High

The high achievable adoption level is based on APS, which assumes the same policy framework as STEPS, plus full realization of announced national energy and climate targets – including net-zero commitments supported by stronger clean energy investments. Under this scenario, offshore wind capacity is projected to increase by a magnitude of approximately 22, from 73,000 MW to 1,600,000 MW by 2050 (Table 6). This would require a CAGR of roughly 12.1% over the same period.

Using our adoption ceiling of 62 million MW, the current adoption of offshore wind turbines constitutes approximately 0.1% of its technical potential. The achievable adoption range, as calculated, is 1.6–2.6% of this potential.

Using baseline global adoption and effectiveness, we estimated the current total climate impact of offshore wind turbines to be approximately 0.14 Gt CO₂‑eq (0.14 Gt CO₂‑eq , 20-yr basis) of reduced emissions per year (Table 7). We estimated future climate impacts using the emissions from the 2023 baseline electricity grid. Actual emissions reductions could differ depending on how the emissions intensity of electricity generation changes over time. Assuming global policies on offshore wind power – both existing and announced – are backed with adequate implementation provisions, global adoption could reach 1 million MW by 2050. This would result in an increased emissions reduction of approximately 1.9 Gt CO₂‑eq per year. If every nation’s energy and climate targets (including net-zero commitments backed by stronger clean energy investments) are realized, offshore wind adoption could reach 1.6 million MW by 2050. This would lead to an estimated 3.0 Gt CO₂‑eq of reduced emissions per year. 

Table 7. Annual climate impact at different levels of adoption.

Unit: Gt CO₂‑eq , 100-yr basis

Current adoption 0.14
Achievable – low 1.9
Achievable – high 3.0
Adoption ceiling 120
Left Text Column Width

We based the adoption ceiling solely on the technical potential and wind resources, while neglecting social and economic constraints and realistic scenarios of future power demand (Dioha et al, 2025). Offshore wind turbine installed capacity is unlikely to reach 62 million MW, but if current grid emissions remained constant while capacity increased, GHG emission reductions would be approximately 120 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr. This maximum is unrealistic as a forward-looking climate impact because it treats grid carbon intensity as permanently fixed at 2023 levels and ignores future decarbonization and corresponding decreases in marginal avoided emissions.

Additional Benefits

Income and Work

Wind power has a strong positive impact on the economy. Wind energy projects have been shown to increase total income and employment in high-income and low- and middle-income countries, although the costs of new projects may be higher in emerging markets until the market develops (Adeyeye et al., 2020; GWEC & Global Wind Organization, 2021; World Bank Group, 2021). As the offshore wind sector expands, so will the demand for workers. A report from NREL estimated that U.S. offshore wind projects between 2024–2030 will require an annual average of 15,000–58,000 full-time workers (Stefek et al., 2022). In California, planned and proposed offshore wind farms would add about 5,750 jobs and US$15 billion in wages and further contribute to the local economy by generating tax revenue (E2, 2023). Offshore wind could also strengthen energy security by diversifying the power mix and reducing dependence on imported fuels.

Health

Reduction in air pollution directly translates into health benefits and avoided premature mortality. Simulations of offshore wind projects in China estimate that reductions in air pollution could prevent about 165,000 premature deaths each year (Ren et al., 2025). Proposed offshore wind farms on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts of the United States could prevent about 2,100 premature deaths annually and save money in health benefits from improved air quality (Buonocore et al., 2016; Shawhan et al., 2024). Because these offshore wind projects would lessen demand for natural gas and coal-powered electricity generation, populated communities downwind from power plants along the East Coast of the United States – such as New York City – would experience health benefits from improved air quality (Shawhan et al., 2024). Although the economic benefits of improved health associated with wind power have already increased rapidly from US$2 billion in 2014 to US$16 billion in 2022, these benefits could be maximized by replacing fossil fuel power plants in regions with higher health damages (Qiu et al., 2022). 

Nature Protection

While there are some risks through increased ship traffic and noise and light pollution, offshore wind may provide some benefits to fish and marine life (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, n.d.; Galparsoro et al., 2022; World Economic Forum, 2025). Once constructed, offshore wind farms can serve as an artificial reef, providing new habitats in the submerged portion of the turbine (Degraer et al., 2020). When these habitats are colonized by marine organisms, this increases availability of food such as zooplankton and algae, which can increase the abundance of small fish nearby (Wilhelmsson et al., 2006).

Air Quality

Offshore wind energy reduces air pollutants released from fossil fuels, thereby reducing the emissions associated with burning coal and natural gas. A recent analysis of 32 planned or proposed offshore wind farms along the U.S. Atlantic and Gulf coasts estimated these projects could reduce emissions of nitrogen oxides by 4%, sulfur dioxide by 5%, and PM 2.5 by 6% (Shawhan et al., 2024). Modeling analyses of offshore wind in China estimate these projects could reduce about 3% of air pollution from electricity by lowering emissions from coal-powered electricity generation (Ren et al., 2025).

Risks

Implementing offshore wind energy involves several risks. Technically, offshore projects face harsh marine environments that can affect long-term reliability and increase maintenance costs (IRENA, 2024a). These risks can be reduced through advanced materials, corrosion‑resistant designs, predictive maintenance systems, and improved installation practices that extend turbine lifespans and reduce downtime. High capital costs and regulatory uncertainty remain among the most significant barriers, especially in emerging markets where financing, insurance, and investor confidence are limited (ESMAP, 2019). Addressing these challenges often requires stable policy frameworks, innovative financing mechanisms such as Contracts for Difference (CFDs) and blended finance, and public‑private partnerships to de‑risk investments and attract private capital. 

There are also ecological risks associated with offshore wind farms, which can disrupt marine habitats, impact migratory birds and marine mammals, and cause seabed disturbances during installation (Galparsoro et al., 2022). Mitigation strategies such as adaptive siting, seasonal construction limits, and biodiversity offsets are increasingly used to minimize these impacts. Social resistance can arise from local communities due to factors such as visual impact, place attachment, perceived lack of benefits, and competing uses of marine space, such as fisheries and shipping lanes (Gonyo et al., 2021; Haggett, 2011).

Interactions with Other Solutions

Reinforcing

Increased availability of renewable energy from offshore wind turbines helps reduce emissions from the electricity grid as a whole. Reduced emissions from the electricity grid lead to lower downstream emissions for these solutions that rely on electricity use. Deploying offshore wind turbines also supports increased integration of solar photovoltaic technology by diversifying the renewable energy mix and reducing overreliance on solar variability.

Electrification of transportation systems will be more beneficial in reducing global emissions if the underlying grid includes a higher proportion of non-emitting power sources. Electric transportation systems can also reduce curtailment of wind energy through controlled-time charging and other load-shifting technologies.

Competing

Offshore wind could compete for policy attention, funding, and coastal land with other renewables, potentially slowing their deployment. Implementing or deploying offshore wind turbines requires dedicated coastal land or ocean area use which limits conservation programs and raw material and food production. Offshore wind turbines are large structures that could shade photosynthetic organisms and potentially disrupt coastal and marine ecosystems during installation.

Offshore wind turbines are large structures that could shade photosynthetic organisms and potentially disrupt coastal and marine ecosystems. Fixed-bottom offshore turbines also require infrastructure that could damage bottom sediments and habitats during installation.

Dashboard

Solution Basics

MW installed capacity

t CO₂-eq (100-yr)/unit/yr
1,900
units
Current 73,000 01.0×10⁶1.6×10⁶
Achievable (Low to High)

Climate Impact

Gt CO₂-eq (100-yr)/yr
Current 0.14 1.93.04
Gradual

CO₂ , CH₄, N₂O, BC

Trade-offs

Offshore wind turbines do not emit GHGs during operation, but they are associated with embodied emissions from manufacturing, transport, and installation (Yuan et al., 2023). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) life-cycle assessment estimates indicate that offshore wind energy produces about 8–35 g CO₂‑eq /kWh, compared to about 400–1,000 g CO₂ --eq/kWh for fossil-based electricity generators (Schlömer et al., 2014).

Increasing steel and concrete demand for turbine construction may cause indirect emissions in the industrial sector. These trade‑offs can be mitigated through circular economy approaches such as recycling and repurposing turbine components to cut material demand and emissions. Despite these trade-offs, the emissions saved over a turbine’s 25- to 30-year lifetime greatly exceed the upfront emissions.

Fixed
Floating

Technical potential for offshore wind

Highlighted areas are suitable for offshore wind development for fixed turbines (those fixed to the seafloor, typically in waters less than 50 meters deep) and floating turbines (those anchored on platforms in waters less than 1,000 meters deep).

Energy Sector Management Assistant Program & The World Bank Group (2021). Global offshore wind technical potential (version 3) [Data set]. The World Bank Group. Link to source: https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/search/dataset/0037787 

Fixed
Floating

Technical potential for offshore wind

Highlighted areas are suitable for offshore wind development for fixed turbines (those fixed to the seafloor, typically in waters less than 50 meters deep) and floating turbines (those anchored on platforms in waters less than 1,000 meters deep).

Energy Sector Management Assistant Program & The World Bank Group (2021). Global offshore wind technical potential (version 3) [Data set]. The World Bank Group. Link to source: https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/search/dataset/0037787 

Maps Introduction

Offshore wind energy is most promising in coastal regions with high wind resources and the physical and regulatory capacity to support utility-scale deployment. It is particularly valuable for countries with limited land availability or high coastal population density, offering a scalable and increasingly cost-effective pathway toward decarbonization. Offshore wind’s effectiveness is underpinned by its strong technical fundamentals, especially its relatively high capacity factor.

We estimated global offshore wind technical potential at around 62,000,000 MW. Notably, more than 70% of the technical potential lies in waters deeper than 50 meters. As of 2023, global installed offshore wind capacity had reached 73 GW, a nearly 20-fold increase since 2010. Europe and Asia account for nearly equal shares of current capacity. Europe remains a global leader with around 30 GW, led by the United Kingdom, Germany, Denmark, and Netherlands. 

In Asia, China dominates the offshore wind space, with more than 30 GW installed and annual additions of nearly 17 GW in 2021 alone. Japan has set targets of 10 GW by 2030 and 30–45 GW by 2040, while South Korea aims for 14.3 GW by 2030 (IRENA, 2024a). The United States has vast offshore wind potential, with NREL estimating 1,476 GW for fixed‑bottom and 2,773 GW for floating installations (Lopez et al., 2022). The United States is beginning to scale up offshore wind through policy support from the Inflation Reduction Act, and large-scale projects are now under development along the East Coast. As of May 31, 2024, the country had 174 MW of offshore wind capacity installed (McCoy et al., 2024). While this installed capacity remains modest compared to Europe or China, it represents an initial step in building the domestic industry. Importantly, the U.S. offshore wind project development and operational pipeline exceeds 80,000 MW, highlighting the scale of development expected in the coming decade. Canada, with 9.3 TW of technical potential (7.2 TW of which is suitable for floating wind), has begun leasing processes in Nova Scotia targeting 5 GW by 2030 and integrating offshore wind into its green hydrogen strategy, while Australia’s Victoria state aims for 9 GW by 2040 (IRENA, 2024a).

Several emerging markets represent strong opportunities for future deployment. Brazil has more than 1,200 GW of estimated technical potential and is currently developing a national framework for offshore wind licensing. India plans to reach 37 GW by 2030, with auctions for 7.2 GW already scheduled (IRENA, 2024a). Other countries such as Vietnam and South Africa are beginning to position themselves as offshore wind markets (IRENA, 2024a).

Action Word
Deploy
Solution Title
Offshore Wind Turbines
Classification
Highly Recommended
Lawmakers and Policymakers
  • Integrate perspectives from key stakeholders into the decision-making process, including fisherfolk, coastal communities, port authorities, and other groups impacted by offshore wind development.
  • Simplify and standardize offshore environmental licensing and marine spatial planning to accelerate project approvals while preserving biodiversity safeguards.
  • Offer subsidies, grants, low-interest loans, preferential tax policies, and other incentives for developing and operating offshore wind farms and specialized port infrastructures.
  • Develop regulations, standards, and codes to ensure quality equipment production and operation – ideally, before development and adoption to prevent accidents.
  • Prioritize expansion of high-voltage subsea and coastal transmission infrastructure.
  • Offer equipment testing and certification systems, market information disclosures, and assistance with onsite supervision.
  • Set quotas for power companies and offer expedited permitting processes for renewable energy production, including offshore wind.
  • Set adjustments for wind power on-grid pricing through mechanisms such as feed-in tariffs, renewable energy auctions, or other guaranteed pricing methods for wind energy.
  • Provide financing for research and development to improve the performance of wind turbines, wind forecasting, and other related technology.
  • Mandate onsite wind power forecasting and set standards for data integrity.
  • Create training programs for engineers, operators, and other personnel.
  • Coordinate voluntary agreements with industry to increase offshore wind capacity and power generation.
  • Initiate public awareness campaigns focusing on wind turbine functionality, benefits, and any public concerns.
  • Implement carbon taxes and use funds to de-risk offshore investments.

Further information:

Practitioners
  • Work with external organizations to enter new markets and identify challenges early in development.
  • Plan integrated offshore logistics to anticipate specialized vessel needs and port upgrades.
  • Engage in marine spatial planning and cross-sector stakeholder dialogues to remove conflicts.
  • Investigate community-led or cooperative offshore business models to improve local acceptance.
  • Partner with academic institutions, technical institutions, vocational programs, and other external organizations to provide workforce development programs.
  • Focus research and development efforts on increasing the productivity and efficiency of turbines, improving offshore design, and supporting technology such as wind forecasting.
  • Utilize and integrate materials and designs that enhance recyclability and foster circular supply chains.
  • Participate in voluntary agreements with government bodies to increase policy support for onshore wind capacity and power generation.
  • Support and participate in public awareness campaigns focusing on wind turbine functionality, benefits, and any public concerns.
  • Stay abreast of changing policies, regulations, zoning laws, tax incentives, and other related developments.

Further information:

Business Leaders
  • Enter into Purchase Power Agreements (PPAs).
  • Purchase high-integrity Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs).
  • Invest in companies that provide offshore wind energy, transmission assets, shared port facilities, component manufacturers, or related technology, such as forecasting.
  • Initiate or join voluntary agreements with national or international bodies and support industry collaboration.
  • Develop workforce partnerships, offer employee scholarships, or sponsor training for careers in offshore wind or related professions such as marine engineering.
  • Support long-term, stable contracts (e.g., power purchase agreements or CFDs) that de-risk investment in floating offshore wind foundation technologies, encouraging their development and deployment.
  • Support community engagement initiatives in areas where you do business to educate and highlight the local economic benefits of offshore wind.

Further information:

Nonprofit Leaders
  • Advocate for favorable policies and incentives for offshore wind energy development, such as financing, preferential tax policies, guaranteed pricing methods, quotas, community engagement, and comanagement models.
  • Advocate for fair and transparent benefit-sharing with coastal communities affected by offshore wind.
  • Help conduct proactive land use planning to avoid infrastructure or development projects that might interfere with protected areas, biodiversity, cultural heritage, or traditional marine uses.
  • Propose or help develop regulations, standards, and codes to ensure quality equipment production and operation.
  • Conduct open-access research to improve the performance of wind turbines, wind forecasting, and other related technology.
  • Operate or assist with equipment testing and certification systems, market information disclosures, and onsite supervision.
  • Create or assist with training programs for engineers, operators, and other personnel.
  • Coordinate voluntary agreements between governments and industry to increase offshore wind capacity and power generation.
  • Initiate public awareness campaigns focusing on wind turbine functionality, benefits, and any public concerns. 

Further information:

Investors
  • Invest in the development of offshore wind farms.
  • Invest in exchange-traded funds (ETFs) and environmental, social, and governance (ESG) funds that hold offshore wind companies in their portfolios.
  • Consider offering flexible and low-interest loans for developing and operating offshore wind farms.
  • Invest in supporting infrastructure such as utility companies, grid development, and access roads.
  • Invest in component technology and related science, such as wind forecasting.
  • Help develop insurance products tailored to marine risks and early-stage offshore projects.
  • Invest in green bonds for companies developing offshore wind energy or supporting infrastructure.
  • Align investments with existing public-private partnerships, voluntary agreements, or voluntary guidance that might apply in the location of the investment (including those that apply to biodiversity).

Further information:

Philanthropists and International Aid Agencies
  • Provide catalytic financing for or help develop offshore wind farms.
  • Award grants to improve supporting infrastructure such as utility companies, grid development, and access roads.
  • Support the development of component technology and related science, such as wind forecasting.
  • Fund updates to high-resolution marine wind atlases and oceanographic data systems.
  • Foster cooperation between low- and middle-income countries for floating wind and deepwater innovation in emerging economies.
  • Advocate for favorable policies and incentives for offshore wind energy development, such as financing, preferential tax policies, guaranteed pricing methods, and quotas.
  • Propose, build capacity for, or help develop regulations, standards, and codes for marine permitting, offshore market design, equipment production, and operation.
  • Initiate public awareness campaigns focusing on wind turbine functionality, benefits, and any public concerns.
  • Facilitate partnerships to share wind turbine technology and best practices between established and emerging markets, promoting energy equity and access.

Further information:

Thought Leaders
  • Advocate for favorable policies and incentives for offshore wind energy development, such as financing, preferential tax policies, guaranteed pricing methods, and quotas.
  • Propose or help develop regulations, standards, and codes to ensure quality equipment production and operation.
  • Conduct research to improve the performance of wind turbines, wind forecasting, and other related technology.
  • Initiate public awareness campaigns focusing on how wind turbines function, benefits, and why they are necessary, addressing any public concerns.
  • Advocate for community engagement, respect for Indigenous rights, and preservation of cultural heritage and traditional ways of life to be included in wind power expansion efforts.

Further information:

Technologists and Researchers
  • Improve the productivity and efficiency of wind turbines.
  • Improve battery capacity for electricity storage.
  • Develop more accurate, timely, and cost-effective means of offshore wind forecasting.
  • Engineer new or improved means of manufacturing towers and components – ideally with locally sourced materials.
  • Enhance design features such as wake steering, bladeless wind power, and quiet wind turbines.
  • Optimize power output, efficiency, and deployment for vertical-axis turbines.
  • Refine methods for retaining power for low-speed winds.
  • Research and develop optimal ways offshore wind can provide habitats for marine species and reduce negative impacts on biodiversity; research total impact of offshore wind on local ecosystems.
  • Develop strategies to minimize the impact of the noise of offshore wind turbines, both under and above water.
  • Develop more accurate forecasting models for the performance of fixed-base and floating offshore wind turbines.
  • Improve the aero-servo-elasticity of floating offshore wind turbines to accommodate more advanced components.
  • Improve existing – or develop new – materials and designs that can withstand marine environments.
  • Help develop designs and operational protocols to facilitate installation, minimize maintenance, improve safety, and reduce overall costs.
  • Develop materials and designs that facilitate recycling and circulate supply chains.
  • Innovate grid connections and transmission infrastructure for offshore and deep-sea wind farms.
  • Improve smart grid connections to manage integrating offshore wind farms.

Further information:

Communities, Households, and Individuals
  • Purchase high-integrity RECs, which track ownership of renewable energy generation.
  • If your utility company offers transparent green pricing, which charges a premium to cover the extra cost of renewable energy, opt into it if possible.
  • Conduct research on the benefits and development of wind energy and share the information with your friends, family, and networks.
  • Stay informed about wind development projects that impact your community and support them when possible.
  • Support the development of community wind cooperatives or shared ownership structures that allow local communities to directly benefit from offshore wind projects.
  • Participate in public consultations, licensing hearings, and awareness campaigns focused on offshore wind projects.
  • Advocate for favorable policies and incentives for offshore wind energy development, such as financing, preferential tax policies, guaranteed pricing methods, and quotas.

Further information:

Sources
Evidence Base

Consensus of effectiveness in reducing GHG emissions: High

The scientific literature on offshore wind turbines reflects high consensus regarding their potential to significantly contribute to reducing GHG emissions and supporting the transition to sustainable energy. Technological advancements, decreasing costs, and increasing efficiency have positioned offshore wind as a key player in achieving global climate targets (Jansen et al., 2020; Letcher, 2023). 

Offshore wind turbines reduce GHG emissions by displacing fossil fuel-based electricity generation, thus avoiding the release of CO₂ and other climate pollutants (Akhtar et al., 2024; Nagababu et al., 2023; Shawhan et al., 2025). The strong and consistent wind speeds found over ocean surfaces make offshore turbines especially efficient, with relatively high-capacity factors and increasingly competitive costs (Akhtar et al., 2021; Bosch et al., 2018; Zhou et al., 2022).

The technical potential of offshore wind refers to the maximum electricity generation achievable using available wind resources, constrained only by physical and technological factors. Scientific reviews highlight the significant technical potential of offshore wind to meet global electricity demand many times over, particularly through expansion in deep waters using floating technologies (de La Beaumelle et al., 2023). The World Bank estimates the global technical potential for fixed and floating offshore wind at approximately 71,000 GW globally using current technology (ESMAP, n.d.). With just 83 GW installed so far (GWEC, 2025), this indicates that offshore wind’s potential remains largely untapped. 

The IPCC also sees offshore wind as a key low-emissions technology for achieving net-zero pathways and can be integrated into energy systems at scale with manageable economic and technical challenges (IPCC, 2023). While there is broad scientific agreement on the potential of offshore wind turbines to significantly reduce GHG emissions, there are also growing concerns, including uncertainties around floating platform scalability, ecological impacts, supply chain readiness, and long-term operations. Most of these issues are captured in the Risks & Trade-Offs section of this document.

The results presented in this document summarize findings from 17 peer reviewed academic papers (including 6 reviews and 11 research articles), 2 books and 11 agency or institutional reports, reflecting current evidence from representative regions around the world. We recognize this limited geographic scope creates bias, and hope this work inspires research and data sharing on this topic in underrepresented regions.

Updated Date

Deploy Onshore Wind Turbines

Submitted by Drawdown Admin on
Sector
Electricity
Mode
Cut Emissions
Cluster
Shift Production
Image
Onshore wind turbines
Coming Soon
Off
Summary

Onshore wind turbines are land-based machines that harness natural wind to generate electricity. Electricity generation from wind turbines depends on many factors, including natural wind speeds, consistency, and directionality. The Deploy Onshore Wind Turbines solution focuses on utility-scale electricity generation above 1 MW in rated capacity, generally from fields of turbines called wind farms. Deploy Micro Wind Turbines and Deploy Offshore Wind Turbines are discussed as separate solutions.

Deploying onshore wind turbines contributes to reduced CO₂ emissions by increasing the availability of renewable energy sources to meet electricity demand, thereby reducing dependence on fossil fuel–based sources in the overall electricity grid mix.

Income & work,Health
Nature protection,Water resources,Air quality
Description for Social and Search
Deploy Onshore Wind Turbines is a Highly Recommended climate solution. It reduces emissions from electricity generation by expanding production of clean and renewable wind energy.
Overview

An estimated 23% of global GHG emissions on a 100-yr basis comes from electricity generation annually (Clarke et al., 2022), and in 2022 more than 60% of global electricity generation came from fossil fuel–based energy sources (International Energy Agency [IEA], 2024c). Since wind is a clean and renewable resource, onshore wind turbines do not contribute to GHG emissions or air pollution while generating energy. The Deploy Onshore Wind Turbines solution reduces the need for electricity generation from fossil fuels, which reduces emissions of CO₂ as well as of smaller amounts of methane and nitrous oxide. 

An onshore wind turbine has a tower with a rotor mounted at the top, connected to a generator. Wind pressure on the turbine blades rotates the rotor, and the generator converts that motion into electrical power. Power potentially generated is directly proportional to the swept area of the rotor blades and the wind speed cubed. Utility-scale turbines require an annual average wind speed of at least 5.8 meters/second (Energy Information Administration [EIA], 2024b). Wind characteristics and technical aspects have a critical impact on electricity generation. Factors include, but are not limited to, wind speed, turbulence, site-specific effects, rotor size, turbine height, generator efficiency, and wind farm layout (Diógenes et al., 2020). Onshore wind farms are often sited where fewer obstacles lead to more consistent wind speeds (Maguire et al., 2024). 

The maximum electrical power a turbine can generate is its installed capacity in MW. Due to changing wind characteristics and operational decisions, onshore wind turbines do not always operate at maximum capacity. The capacity factor of a turbine captures the actual amount of power generated compared with maximum generation if the turbine always operated at its rated capacity. Due to technological improvements over the past decade, global weighted average capacity factors increased from 27% in 2010 to 36% in 2023 and can exceed 50% in some countries (International Renewable Energy Agency [IRENA], 2024a).

Utility-scale wind farms are connected to the grid to provide electricity. Electric power output can be converted to energy generated by multiplying capacity by the capacity factor and a specified time interval. For annual generation, we multiplied by one year and used our estimated median global capacity factor (37%). In 2023, onshore wind turbines generated 2,089 TWh of electricity, approximately 7% of global electricity generation (IEA, 2024c).

Onshore wind turbines can be classified according to their orientation. Horizontal-axis turbines need to face their rotors into the wind to generate power, while vertical-axis turbines operate independently of wind direction. Utility-scale onshore wind turbines are mostly horizontal-axis rotors with three blades, but smaller scale turbines (see Deploy Micro Wind Turbines) can have more complex rotor designs for a variety of applications. The International Electrical Commission (IEC) standardizes wind turbine classifications with distinct designs to maximize energy capture for different sites (IEC, 2019). Wind farms also require distribution systems to transport electricity to locations of electricity demand. 

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Credits

Lead Fellow

  • Megan Matthews, Ph.D.

Contributors

  • Ruthie Burrows, Ph.D.

  • James Gerber, Ph.D.

  • Yusuf Jameel, Ph.D.

  • Daniel Jasper

  • Alex Sweeney

Internal Reviewers

  • Aiyana Bodi

  • Hannah Henkin

  • Ted Otte

  • Michael Dioha, Ph.D.

  • James Gerber, Ph.D.

  • Zoltan Nagy, Ph.D.

  • Amanda D. Smith, Ph.D.

Effectiveness

Based on IEA data, global emissions from electricity generation accounted for an estimated 530 kg CO₂‑eq /MWh (540 kg CO₂‑eq /MWh, 20-year basis). To convert from MWh to MW, we used the median global average capacity factor for onshore wind turbines of 37% (IRENA, 2024a). We estimated onshore wind turbines to reduce 1,700 t CO₂‑eq /MW (1,700 t CO₂‑eq /MW, 20-year basis) of installed capacity annually (Table 1).

Table 1. Effectiveness at reducing emissions. 

Unit: t CO₂‑eq (100-year basis)/MW installed capacity/yr

Estimate 1,700
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To estimate the effectiveness of onshore wind turbines, we assumed that electricity generated by new installations displaces an equivalent MWh of the global electricity grid mix. Then, the reduction in emissions from additional onshore wind capacity was equal to emissions (per MWh) from the 2023 global electricity grid mix (IEA, 2024c). We then used the onshore wind capacity factor to convert to annual emissions per MW of installed capacity.

During operation, onshore wind turbines do not emit GHGs. Life-cycle analyses for onshore wind turbines have estimated lifetime GHG emissions as very low, 7–20 g CO₂‑eq per kWh (100-year) of electricity generated (Barthelmie et al., 2021; Wiser et al., 2011). Emissions from manufacturing, transportation, installation, and decommissioning are commonly paid back in less than two years of wind farm operation (Diógenes et al., 2020; Haces-Fernandez et al., 2022; Kaldellis & Zafirakis, 2011). 

Our analysis focused solely on emissions produced during electricity generation; emissions associated with construction and installation of onshore wind are attributed to the Industry, Materials & Waste sector. Thus, we did not include carbon payback time and embodied life-cycle emissions in our estimates of effectiveness, even though this may overestimate climate impacts. We qualitatively discuss life-cycle emissions in Caveats below.

Cost

We estimated a mean levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) for onshore wind turbines of US$52/MWh based on three industry reports (IEA, 2024d; IEA, 2020; IRENA, 2024a). LCOE is commonly used to compare costs across electricity generation technologies because it provides a single metric that combines total installed costs, costs of capital, operating and maintenance costs, the capacity factor, and lifetime of the project (EIA, 2022; Shah & Bazilian, 2020). 

In many global markets, wind power is one of the cheapest ways to generate electricity per MWh (IEA, 2024d); in 2023, newly commissioned onshore wind projects had lower electricity costs than the weighted average LCOE for fossil fuels, which was US$70–176/MWh (IRENA, 2024a). According to IRENA, the global weighted average LCOE for onshore wind turbines declined 91% between 1984–2023 (IRENA, 2024a). Although turbine prices increase with height, revenue from increased power generation available to larger turbines can offset increases in upfront costs, reducing LCOE (Beiter et al., 2021). Additional factors influencing cost-competitiveness of onshore wind include regional energy market fluctuations, social costs of carbon, and subsidies. These factors are not included in our analysis, but some policy levers are discussed in Take Action below. 

Methods and Supporting Data

Methods and Supporting Data

Learning Curve

Learning rates for onshore wind vary widely due to different underlying assumptions, geographies, and performance metrics. Past learning rate estimates for wind power ranged from –3%, implying that wind power is more expensive over time, to 33% (Beiter et al., 2021). Learning-by-doing rates, based on experience accumulated as capacity increases, ranged from 1–17%, while learning-by-research rates, based on innovation and technological development, ranged from 5–27% (Williams et al., 2017).

More recent LCOE-based learning rate estimates suggest a 10%–20% reduction in LCOE when cumulative global capacity is doubled (Wiser et al., 2021). Since upfront costs are the largest component of LCOE for onshore wind, the reduction in LCOE was driven by a 9–18% decrease in capital expenditures between 2014–2019 due to “turbine price declines, economies of size, technology innovation, and siting choices” (Beiter et al., 2021). Between 2008–2020, onshore wind turbine prices declined by 50% (Wiser et al., 2024). Additionally, installed costs per megawatt decreased with increasing project size, and wind farms above 200 MW had the lowest installed costs (Wiser et al., 2024). Supply chain bottlenecks and higher material costs caused project cost increases between 2020–2022, but in 2023 prices flattened or dropped compared to the previous year (Wiser et al., 2024). Industry experts predicted a 37–49% reduction in wind turbine costs by 2050 (Wiser et al., 2021).

Although learning rates vary from country to country and site to site, we used two high-quality global studies that provided LCOEs for onshore wind to estimate a global learning rate for onshore wind. This resulted in a 28% median global learning rate between 2014–2019 for onshore wind, implying a 28% reduction in LCOE for each doubling of installed capacity during that time period (Table 2). 

Table 2. Learning rate: drop in LCOE per doubling of the installed solution base.

 Unit: %

25th percentile 21
Mean 28
Median (50th percentile) 28
75th percentile 34
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Speed of Action

Speed of action refers to how quickly a climate solution physically affects the atmosphere after it is deployed. This is different from speed of deployment, which is the pace at which solutions are adopted.

At Project Drawdown, we define the speed of action for each climate solution as emergency brake, gradual, or delayed.

Deploy Onshore Wind Turbines is a GRADUAL climate solution. It has a steady, linear impact on the atmosphere. The cumulative effect over time builds as a straight line.

Caveats

Emissions from fossil fuel–based electricity generation can be reduced with increased deployment of wind power. One limitation of our approach is assuming that each additional MWh of installed capacity displaces one MWh of the existing grid mix. This implies that new onshore wind may, at times, displace other renewables, rather than fossil-based sources. In reality, the extent of avoided emissions varies based on regional grid dynamics, marginal generation sources, and the timing and location of electricity production. This approach could be refined in the future, since wind generation could displace a larger share of fossil-fuel output than assumed in average grid-mix methods (e.g., Millstein et al., 2024). We may overestimate the achievable range of climate impacts because grid-average emissions would decrease over time as more renewables are added to the grid mix. In regions where utility-scale wind farms contribute significantly to the electricity grid, continued expansion also faces socio-ecological challenges due to limited available land with good wind conditions (da Silva and Galvão, 2022). 

Increasing the speed of adoption of onshore wind turbines could lead to issues such as lack of financing, supply chain bottlenecks, land and permit availability, social acceptance, and necessary grid and infrastructure expansion (GWEC, 2024). Globally, bottlenecks in supply chains alongside increased commodity prices for steel and other turbine materials in recent years led to a slowdown in wind power installations compared to solar (Mathis & Saul, 2024). Poor governance and low stakeholder engagement from utilities can also limit future adoption.

Due to the successful adoption of onshore wind in the past, many existing wind farms will reach the end of their average 20- to 25-year project lifetime before 2050 (IEA, 2024b; IRENA, 2024a; Wiser et al., 2024). Global wind energy capacity could decrease as wind farms are decommissioned, which involves dismantling and disposal of turbines and related infrastructure (Agra Neto et al., 2024). However, it is unlikely that a wind farm would be replaced with a nonrenewable energy source (Maguire et al., 2024). Although 85–90% of turbine raw materials can be recycled, including steel and cement, composite materials are still landfilled, with environmental consequences (Barthelmie et al., 2021; GWEC, 2024). Wind farms can also be retrofitted or repowered at the end of their design lifetimes.

GHGs are emitted during construction, installation, operation, decommissioning, and disposal of onshore wind turbines, but full life-cycle emissions are an order of magnitude lower than emissions from fossil fuel–based energy sources (Barthelmie et al., 2021; National Renewable Energy Laboratory [NREL], 2021). Nonoperational emissions are attributed to solutions in the Industry, Materials & Waste sector.

Current Adoption

Current adoption of onshore wind power is well documented by international agencies; we based our estimate on reported installed capacity in 2023 from IRENA, IEA, and the Global Wind Energy Council (GWEC). Globally, onshore wind turbines exceeded 940,000 MW of installed capacity in 2023 (Table 3), based on the median across three global wind energy reports (GWEC, 2024; IEA, 2024d; IRENA, 2024b). Although we used 2023 as our baseline for current adoption, in 2024 an additional 109 GW of onshore wind capacity was installed, bringing the global total to over 1 million MW (GWEC, 2025).

Table 3. Current adoption level (2023).

Unit: MW installed capacity

Median 940,000
Left Text Column Width

Based on data from IRENA, onshore wind turbines generated electricity in 133 countries (IRENA, 2024b). At the country level, China led the market with more than 400,000 MW, and the lowest current adoption was in Trinidad and Tobago with 0.01 MW. Median country-level adoption was in Mongolia with 160 MW of installed capacity. Countries with less than 1 MW of installed capacity each were excluded from analysis, but their combined installed capacity was 6.4 MW across 16 countries. See Geographic Guidance for more regional details.

Adoption Trend

Based on the IRENA’s 2024 Renewable Energy Statistics, we calculated the global adoption trend by summing adoption across countries for each year between 2013–2023 and taking the year-to-year difference. Comparing year-to-year global adoption, the median global adoption trend was adding 54,000 MW of installed capacity per year (Table 4, Figure 1), but expansion was unevenly distributed geographically. 

Table 4. Adoption trend (2013–2023).

Unit: MW installed capacity per year

25th percentile 46,000
Mean 62,000
Median (50th percentile) 54,000
75th percentile 70,000
Left Text Column Width

Figure 1. Global adoption of onshore wind turbines, 2000–2023. Copyright © IRENA 2024

International Renewable Energy Agency. (2024b). Renewable energy capacity statistics 2024—Data product.

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Between 2010–2023, global cumulative onshore wind installed increased more than fourfold (IRENA, 2024a). Globally new onshore wind deployment declined between 2020–2022, but this trend reversed in 2023 with record global additions of 108,000 MW for a single year (GWEC, 2024; IEA, 2024b). GWEC projected that average annual installations would continue to increase, with 653,000 MW predicted to be added in 2024–2028 (GWEC, 2024).

Adoption Ceiling

The availability of wind resources sets the absolute upper limit of the adoption ceiling for onshore wind turbines with additional constraints due to land availability. However, wind resources are not evenly distributed around the world, so there will also be regional adoption ceilings for different countries (Wiser et al., 2011). In the literature, the global technical potential for onshore wind energy is calculated using power curves for turbines, statistical wind speed maps, and simulations (Jacobson & Archer, 2012; Jung, 2024). Land availability constrains the adoption ceiling because siting includes assessments of land cover type and exclusions of protected areas, bodies of water, and urban areas (Angliviel de La Beaumelle et al., 2023). 

At COP28 in 2023, nearly 200 countries pledged to triple renewable energy capacity by 2030 (IEA, 2024a). For onshore wind turbines, tripling capacity would mean accelerating adoption to nearly 270,000 MW installed annually. If that accelerated adoption trend is maintained between 2030–2050, the tripling pledge would result in more than 8.2 million MW of onshore wind turbine installed capacity by 2050. Additionally, the Net Zero Emissions by 2050 scenario in IEA’s World Energy Outlook projected 7.9 million MW of installed capacity for onshore and offshore wind power combined (IEA, 2024d), but we do not include combined wind power estimates in our adoption ceiling. For our analysis, we use the median technical potential to get an adoption ceiling of 12 million MW installed capacity for onshore wind turbines (Table 5).

Table 5. Adoption ceiling: upper limit for adoption level.

Unit: MW installed capacity

25th percentile 7,700,000
Mean 28,000,000
Median (50th percentile) 12,000,000
75th percentile 32,000,000
Left Text Column Width
Achievable Adoption

The IEA’s World Energy Outlook (WEO) 2024 includes several key scenarios that explore different energy futures based on varying levels of policy intervention, technological development, and market dynamics. We define the adoption achievable range for onshore wind turbines based on the Stated Policies Scenario (STEPS) and Announced Pledges Scenario (APS) (IEA, 2024d).

Achievable – Low

The Achievable – Low adoption level is based on STEPS, which captured the current trajectory for increased adoption of onshore wind energy as well as future projections based on existing and announced policies. Under this scenario, onshore wind capacity is projected to increase more than threefold from 940,000 MW to 3,200,000 MW by 2050 (Table 6). 

Achievable – High

The Achievable – High adoption level is based on APS, which assumes the same policy framework as STEPS, plus full realization of announced national energy and climate targets, including net-zero commitments supported by stronger clean energy investments. Under this scenario, onshore wind capacity is projected to increase more than fourfold from 940,000 MW to 4,400,000 MW by 2050 (Table 6).

Table 6. Range of achievable adoption levels.

Unit: MW installed capacity

Current adoption 940,000
Achievable – low 3,200,000
Achievable – high 4,400,000
Adoption ceiling 12,000,000
Left Text Column Width

Current adoption of onshore wind turbines was nearly 8% of our estimated 12 million MW adoption ceiling and the achievable range is between 27% and 37%.

Based on baseline global adoption and effectiveness, we estimate the current total climate impact of onshore wind turbines to be 1.6 Gt CO₂‑eq (1.6 Gt CO₂‑eq , 20-year basis) of reduced emissions per year. We estimated the achievable range of climate impacts using the emissions from the 2023 baseline electricity grid; actual emissions reductions could differ depending on how the emissions intensity of electricity generation changes over time. The IEA Stated Policies Scenario projected that global adoption would reach 3.2 million MW by 2050 (IEA, 2024d), resulting in an increased emissions reduction of 5.4 Gt CO₂‑eq (5.4 Gt CO₂‑eq , 20-year basis) per year. The IEA Announced Pledges Scenario projected 4.4 million MW of installed capacity by 2050 (IEA, 2024d), implying an estimated 7.5 Gt CO₂‑eq (7.5 Gt CO₂‑eq , 20-year basis) of reduced emissions per year (Table 7).

Table 7. Climate impact at different levels of adoption.

Unit: Gt CO₂‑eq (100-year basis) per year

Current adoption 1.6
Achievable – low 5.4
Achievable – high 7.5
Adoption ceiling 20
Left Text Column Width

We based the adoption ceiling solely on the technical potential and wind resources, while neglecting social and economic constraints and realistic scenarios of future power demand (Dioha et al, 2025). Onshore wind turbine installed capacity is unlikely to reach 12 million MW, but if current grid emissions remained constant while capacity increased, GHG emission reductions would be approximately 20 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr. This maximum is unrealistic as a forward-looking climate impact because it treats grid carbon intensity as permanently fixed at 2023 levels and ignores future decarbonization and corresponding decreases in marginal avoided emissions.

Additional Benefits

Income and Work

Wind power has a strong positive impact on the economy. Wind energy projects have been shown to increase both total income and employment in high-, low-, and middle-income countries, although the costs of new projects may be higher in emerging markets until the market develops (Adeyeye et al., 2020; GWEC & GWO, 2021; World Bank, 2021). According to the GWEC & GWO (2023), the wind industry will need more than half a million new technicians to reach renewable energy goals. Technical roles will also be supported by additional jobs for engineers, manufacturers, analysts, and managers. Many of these jobs are in the construction sector. They also include technicians, engineers, manufacturers, analysts, and managers. In the United States, wind energy employed more than 125,000 workers in 2022 (Hartman, 2024). Onshore wind could also strengthen energy security by diversifying the power mix and reducing dependence on imported fuels. 

Health

Improvements in air quality offer health benefits from reduced air pollution exposure, including reduced premature mortality. The magnitude and distribution of these benefits depends on the local electricity grid mix and the fuels used to generate electricity (Qiu et al., 2022). In 2022, the air quality health benefits from wind power amounted to US$16 billion at a rate of US$36 per megawatt-hour (Millstein et al., 2024). Health benefits of onshore wind can be greater for racial and ethnic minority groups and low-income populations, who often face higher exposure burdens from fossil-fuel electricity generation; however these benefits also depend on the existing grid and on how pollutants are transported in the atmosphere (Qiu et al., 2022). In the United States, economic benefits of improved health outcomes have already increased from US$2 billion in 2014 to US$16 billion in 2022, but these benefits could be maximized by replacing fossil-fuel power plants in regions with higher health damages (Qiu et al., 2022). 

Nature Protection

While some wind power systems could displace species through habitat loss, careful planning and development could reduce some of these risks and conserve biodiversity (Kati et al., 2021; Tolvanen et al., 2023). Wind-powered electricity generation can benefit the environment by requiring less water than fossil fuel–powered electricity. According to a life-cycle analysis by Meldrum et al. (2013), wind power has the lowest water consumption of all electricity generation methods. 

Water Resources

For a description of water resources benefits, please refer to the Nature Protection section.

Air Quality

Wind energy significantly reduces air pollutants released from fossil-fuel energy generation, thereby avoiding the emission of pollutants such as nitrogen oxides, sulfur dioxide, and particulate matter associated with burning coal and natural gas. In the U.S. Midwest, each MWh of wind energy added to the grid can avoid 4.9 pounds of sulfur dioxide and 2.0 pounds of nitrous oxides (Nordman, 2013). A life-cycle analysis of wind power in China found that wind farms could reduce sulfur dioxide,, nitrous oxides, and PM10 emissions by 80.38%, 57.31%, and 30.91%, respectively, compared with emissions from coal-based power plants (Xue et al., 2015). 

Risks

Several key risks could prevent growth in installed capacity of onshore wind turbines. Electricity generation from onshore wind turbines inherently fluctuates because wind speeds vary temporally and spatially. Onshore wind turbines face challenges integrating into regional electricity grids (Diógenes et al., 2020; Shafiullah et al., 2013), depending on their location. To reliably meet demand, many grid mixes rely on backup power from coal and natural gas (Haces-Fernandez et al., 2022; Millstein et al., 2024) – although advances in smart grids, storage, and grid flexibility can help reduce reliance on backup fossil-fuel power. Times of high wind generation can create instability (Smith, 2024), leading turbine operators to curtail power output to prevent overloading the electricity grid. Curtailment can also occur due to infrastructure limitations or market conditions (Hartman, 2024). However, we found that curtailment was often small: In 2018, less than 2% of wind power was curtailed in the United States and Germany (Zhang et al., 2020). Intermittency in wind energy could also drive increases in electricity costs, but this can be reduced through a variety of generation-side, demand-side, and storage technologies (Ren et al., 2017).

Interactions with Other Solutions

Reinforcing 

Increased availability of renewable energy from onshore wind turbines helps reduce emissions from the electricity grid as a whole. Reduced emissions from the electricity grid lead to lower downstream emissions for solutions that rely on electricity use. Deploying onshore wind turbines also supports increased integration of solar PV by diversifying the renewable energy mix and reducing overreliance on solar variability.

Automated and more efficient use of electricity in buildings can shift energy use to times of high renewable generation and reduce electricity demand to help balance intermittency challenges of onshore wind energy.

Electrification of transportation systems will be more beneficial in reducing global emissions if the underlying grid includes a higher proportion of non-emitting power sources. Electric transportation systems can also reduce curtailment of wind energy through controlled-time charging and other load-shifting technologies.

Competing

Deploying onshore wind energy requires dedicated land use which limits land availability for other renewable energy technologies, raw material and food production, and conservation programs. Deploy Onshore Wind Turbines competes with the following solutions for land:

Dashboard

Solution Basics

MW installed capacity

t CO₂-eq (100-yr)/unit/yr
1,700
units
Current 940,000 03.2×10⁶4.4×10⁶
Achievable (Low to High)

Climate Impact

Gt CO₂-eq (100-yr)/yr
Current 1.6 5.47.5
Gradual

CO₂ , CH₄, N₂O, BC

Trade-offs

Siting, transportation, and transmission challenges involve trade-offs between electricity generation requirements, cost, and impacts to people and the environment (Tarfarte & Lehmann, 2023). Construction delays occur due to regulatory and permitting challenges (McKenna et al., 2025; Timilsina et al., 2013). Larger turbines, which provide more power, also exacerbate logistical challenges of construction, transportation, installation, and optimization (Afridi et al., 2024). Construction and siting of new onshore wind farms could threaten land used for agriculture, Indigenous land rights, cultural landscapes, and ecosystems if not carefully assessed during project planning phases, including minimizing visual disturbances and vibrations (Gorayeb et al., 2018; McKenna et al., 2025; Tolvanen et al., 2023). There are emissions associated with land use change (LUC) for new wind farms because sequestered carbon is released as CO₂ when soil is disturbed during construction. The magnitude of LUC emissions depends on the land cover type that the wind farm replaces. LUC emissions caused by constructing on pastureland, cropland, and forests were 6–17% of annual emissions savings from deploying the wind turbines (Albanito et al., 2022; Marashli et al., 2022), and constructing on peatlands could cause emissions greater than the emission savings (Albanito et al., 2022). 

m/s
0≥ 10

Mean Wind Speed at 100 meters above surface

This map shows average wind speeds at 100 meters above the surface, roughly the height of modern turbine towers. Wind speeds above 6 meters per second (m/s) are generally suitable for onshore wind farms, while 9–10 m/s and higher are considered excellent for power generation. The color scale highlights differences: lighter areas show weaker winds, while darker areas indicate strong winds that make onshore projects most efficient.

Global Wind Atlas (2025). Mean wind speed (version 4.0) [Data set]. Technical University of Denmark (DTU). Link to source: https://globalwindatlas.info/

m/s
0≥ 10

Mean Wind Speed at 100 meters above surface

This map shows average wind speeds at 100 meters above the surface, roughly the height of modern turbine towers. Wind speeds above 6 meters per second (m/s) are generally suitable for onshore wind farms, while 9–10 m/s and higher are considered excellent for power generation. The color scale highlights differences: lighter areas show weaker winds, while darker areas indicate strong winds that make onshore projects most efficient.

Global Wind Atlas (2025). Mean wind speed (version 4.0) [Data set]. Technical University of Denmark (DTU). Link to source: https://globalwindatlas.info/

Maps Introduction

China, the United States, and Germany lead the market for installed onshore wind capacity, with 60% of global capacity in the United States and China. Installed capacity in China alone was greater than installed capacity across the rest of the world, excluding the United States (IRENA, 2024b). 

Capacity factors vary geographically. In 2023, Brazil had the sixth-highest installed capacity globally (29,000 MW) and reported the highest capacity factors, 54%, while capacity factors in China were only 34%, below the global median capacity factor of 37% (IRENA, 2024b). Higher capacity factors lead to better performance and increased electricity output from clean energy sources.

Regions with fossil fuel–dominated grid mixes use onshore wind turbines to diversify electricity sources and cut emissions from electricity generation. Although China led the onshore wind market in 2023, wind energy from both offshore and onshore turbines only accounted for 6% of electricity generation in Asia and the Pacific, while 56% came from coal (IEA, 2022a). Germany and Spain had the highest installed capacity in Europe as of 2023 with combined onshore and offshore energy contributing 14% of total electricity generation, the highest percentage of any regional grid (IEA, 2022b). 

While expanding onshore wind in established markets such as Europe is important, targeting regions with little to no electricity generation from renewables could have a larger impact on emissions reductions by providing a clean energy alternative to fossil fuels. It is also critical to ensure that as wind power expands into low- and middle-income countries, the transition to a more renewable electricity grid is done equitably and benefits local communities (Gorayeb et al., 2018).

In 2023, China, the United States, Brazil, Germany, and India cumulatively made up 82% of new global additions to onshore wind capacity (Global Wind Energy Council [GWEC], 2024). Across all countries with new onshore wind installations in 2023, the median global trend was adding 39 MW of installed capacity per year, but expansion was unevenly distributed around the world. China and India were examples of rapidly expanding markets, with adoption trends of more than 32,000 MW per year and 2,600 MW per year, respectively. Despite a reduction in installations in 2023 compared with 2022, previous installations in the United States contributed to a high 10-year adoption trend of 8,800 MW per year (IRENA, 2024b). The slowest expanding countries, Denmark and the Netherlands, were adding 130–430 MW of onshore wind turbine capacity per year, most likely due to highly saturated existing markets for wind power. 

There is ample technical potential for onshore wind adoption in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and the Pacific, although current installed capacity is relatively low in those regions (IRENA, 2024b; Wiser et al., 2011). The Global Wind Energy Council highlighted Australia, Azerbaijan, Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Japan, Kenya, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, the United States, and Vietnam as markets to watch for growth (GWEC, 2024).

Action Word
Deploy
Solution Title
Onshore Wind Turbines
Classification
Highly Recommended
Lawmakers and Policymakers
  • Coordinate wind power policies horizontally (e.g., across agencies) and vertically (e.g., across subnational, national, and international efforts), ensuring an inclusive process for impacted communities and consumers.
  • Develop regulations, standards, and codes to ensure quality equipment production, safe operation, and quick deployment – ideally, before development and adoption to prevent accidents and delays.
  • Offer equipment testing and certification systems, market information disclosures, and assistance with onsite supervision
  • Set quotas for power companies and offer expedited permitting processes for renewable energy production, including onshore wind, while maintaining environmental safeguards.
  • Set adjustments for wind power on-grid pricing through schemes such as feed-in tariffs, renewable energy auctions, or other guaranteed pricing methods for wind energy.
  • Offer subsidies, grants, low-interest loans, and preferential tax policies for manufacturers, developers, and operators of onshore wind farms.
  • Invest in and develop grid infrastructure – particularly, high-voltage transmission capacity.
  • Provide financing for research and development (R&D) to improve the performance of wind turbines, wind forecasting, and related technology.
  • Mandate onsite wind power forecasting and set standards for data integrity.
  • Create training programs for engineers, operators, and other personnel.
  • Coordinate voluntary agreements with industry to increase onshore wind capacity and power generation.
  • Initiate public awareness campaigns focusing on how wind turbines function, their benefits, and any public concerns.
  • Disincentivize fuel-based power generation and use funds to subsidize new onshore wind investments.

Further information:

Practitioners
  • Work with external organizations to enter new markets and identify challenges early in development.
  • Participate in, offer, or explore coinvestments in, electricity infrastructure (e.g., shared transmission).
  • Partner with academic institutions and other external organizations to provide workforce development programs.
  • Focus R&D on increasing the productivity and efficiency of turbines, especially in areas with lower wind conditions, and on supporting technology such as wind forecasting.
  • Consider leasing usable land for onshore wind development.
  • Participate in voluntary agreements with government bodies to increase policy support for onshore wind capacity and power generation.
  • Conduct integrated logistics planning to anticipate transport challenges for large turbine components.
  • Strengthen local workforce skills through partnerships with technical schools and vocational programs.
  • Support and participate in public awareness campaigns focusing on how wind turbines function, their benefits, and any public concerns.
  • Stay abreast of and engage with changing policies, regulations, zoning laws, tax incentives, and related developments to help remove commercial barriers.

Further information:

Business Leaders
  • Enter into Purchase Power Agreements (PPAs), long-term contracts between a company (the buyer) and a renewable energy producer (the seller).
  • Purchase high-integrity renewable energy certificates (RECs), which track ownership of renewable energy generation.
  • Support long-term, stable contracts (e.g., PPAs or Contracts for Difference) that de-risk investment in onshore wind technologies and incentivize local supply chain development.
  • Invest in companies that provide onshore wind energy, those that make components for onshore wind, or those that develop related technology, such as forecasting.
  • Initiate or join voluntary agreements with national or international bodies and support industry collaboration.
  • Support workforce development programs and/or offer employee scholarships or sponsor training for careers in onshore wind.
  • Support community engagement initiatives in areas where you do business to educate and highlight the local economic benefits of onshore wind.

Further information:

Nonprofit Leaders
  • Advocate for favorable policies and incentives for onshore wind energy development, such as financing, preferential tax policies, guaranteed pricing methods, and quotas.
  • Propose or help develop regulations, standards, and codes to ensure quality equipment production, safe operation, and quick deployment.
  • Advocate for equitable sharing of revenue and taxes in areas that produce wind power.
  • Support fair benefit-sharing arrangements and conflict resolution mechanisms to settle land use disputes.
  • Conduct open-access research to improve the performance of wind turbines, wind forecasting, and related technology.
  • Operate or help with equipment testing and certification systems, market information disclosures, and onsite supervision.
  • Create or help with training programs for engineers, operators, and other personnel.
  • Coordinate voluntary agreements between governments and industry to increase onshore wind capacity and power generation.
  • Initiate public awareness campaigns focusing on how wind turbines function, their benefits, and any public concerns.

Further information:

Investors
  • Invest in the development of onshore wind farms.
  • Consider offering flexible and low-interest loans for developing and operating onshore wind farms.
  • Invest in supporting infrastructures such as utility companies, grid development, and access roads.
  • Invest in component technology and related science, such as wind forecasting.
  • Invest in green bonds and/or explore blended finance structures to mobilize capital for companies developing onshore wind energy or supporting infrastructure.
  • Help develop insurance products for onshore wind in emerging markets.
  • Align investments with existing public-private partnerships, voluntary agreements, or voluntary guidance that may apply in the location of the investment (including those that apply to biodiversity).

Further information:

Philanthropists and International Aid Agencies
  • Provide catalytic financing for, or help develop, onshore wind farms.
  • Award grants to improve supporting infrastructures such as utility companies, grid development, and access roads.
  • Support the development of component technology and related science, such as wind forecasting.
  • Fund updates to high-resolution wind atlases and data platforms to improve resource assessment and project planning.
  • Facilitate partnerships to share wind turbine technology and best practices between established and emerging markets, promoting energy equity and access.
  • Foster cooperation and technology transfer between low- and middle-income countries with emerging wind sectors.
  • Advocate for favorable policies and incentives for onshore wind energy development, such as financing, preferential tax policies, guaranteed pricing methods, and quotas.
  • Propose or help develop regulations, standards, and codes to ensure quality equipment production, safe operation, and quick deployment.
  • Initiate public awareness campaigns focusing on how wind turbines function, their benefits, and any public concerns.

Further information:

Thought Leaders
  • Advocate for favorable policies and incentives for onshore wind energy development, such as financing, preferential tax policies, guaranteed pricing methods, and quotas.
  • Propose or help develop regulations, standards, and codes to ensure quality equipment production, safe operation, and quick deployment.
  • Conduct research to improve the performance of wind turbines, wind forecasting, and related technology.
  • Initiate public awareness campaigns focusing on how wind turbines function, their benefits, why they are necessary, and any public concerns.
  • Advocate for inclusion of community engagement, respect for Indigenous rights, and preservation of cultural heritage and traditional ways of life in wind power expansion efforts.
  • Advance academic and/or public discourse on fully pricing fossil-fuel externalities to improve fair competition for renewables.

Further information:

Technologists and Researchers
  • Improve the productivity and efficiency of wind turbines.
  • Improve battery capacity for electricity storage.
  • Develop more accurate, timely, and cost-effective means of wind forecasting.
  • Develop siting maps that highlight exclusion zones for Indigenous lands, cultural heritage sites, and biodiversity hot spots.
  • Engineer new or improved means of manufacturing towers and components – ideally with locally sourced materials.
  • Enhance design features such as wake steering, bladeless wind power, and quiet wind turbines.
  • Develop materials and designs that facilitate recycling and circulate supply chains.
  • Optimize power output, efficiency, and deployment for vertical axis turbines.
  • Refine methods for retaining power for low-speed winds.
  • Research the cumulative social, environmental, and climate impacts of the onshore wind industry.
  • Explore smart transmission and advanced grid management to address future connection bottlenecks.

Further information:

Communities, Households, and Individuals
  • Purchase high-integrity RECs, which track ownership of renewable energy generation.
  • Advocate for equitable sharing of revenue and taxes in areas that produce wind power.
  • Participate in public consultations and licensing hearings for wind projects.
  • Stay informed about wind development projects that impact your community and support them when possible.
  • Conduct research on the benefits and development of wind energy and share the information with your friends, family, and other networks.
  • Support the development of community wind cooperatives or shared ownership structures that allow local communities to directly benefit from onshore wind projects.
  • Participate in public awareness campaigns focused on onshore wind projects.
  • Advocate for favorable policies and incentives for onshore wind energy development, such as financing, preferential tax policies, guaranteed pricing methods, and quotas.
  • If your utility company offers transparent green pricing, which charges a premium to cover the extra cost of renewable energy, and if it fits your budget, opt into it.

Further information:

Sources
Evidence Base

Consensus of overall effectiveness of onshore wind turbines: High

Onshore wind energy is inherently renewable and well established as an efficient and effective electricity source. Increasing availability of wind energy reduces the need for fossil fuel–derived energy sources such as coal and gas, leading to lower GHG emissions from the global electricity sector. Through reduced emissions, deploying onshore wind turbines also leads to climate and air quality benefits (Afridi et al., 2024; Millstein et al., 2024). Wind energy is widely adopted around the world, and in 2023 “the country weighted average turbine capacity ranged from 2.5 MW to 5.8 MW” across 133 countries (IRENA, 2024a).

Ongoing innovation is necessary for broader global adoption of onshore wind. Estimates of technical adoption potential depend on site characteristics and socioeconomic conditions (Jung & Schindler 2023; McKenna et al., 2022). According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), “at low to medium levels of wind electricity penetration (up to 20% of total electricity demand), the integration of wind energy generally poses no insurmountable technical barriers and is economically manageable” (Wiser et al., 2011). Potentially exploitable wind resources are 20–30 times higher than 2017 global electricity demand (Clarke et al., 2022).

The results presented in this document summarize findings from 8 reviews and meta-analyses, 29 original studies, 18 agency reports, and 4 articles reflecting current evidence from 133 countries. We prioritized global data, but some research primarily focuses on trends in the United States, Brazil, China, and Germany. We recognize this limited geographic scope creates bias, and hope this work inspires research and data sharing on this topic in underrepresented regions.

Updated Date

Deploy Distributed Solar PV

Submitted by Drawdown Admin on
Sector
Electricity
Mode
Cut Emissions
Cluster
Shift Production
Image
Solar panels on house roof
Coming Soon
On
Summary

Distributed solar photovoltaic (PV) systems are small-scale solar PV systems – usually under 1 MW, and installed near the point of use, such as on homes, businesses, or local facilities – that generate electricity for on-site consumption or local grid supply. This solution reduces reliance on centralized fossil-fuel power, cutting GHG emissions and minimizing transmission losses. There are various configurations of distributed solar PV systems; our analysis includes residential systems on homes, commercial and industrial (C&I) systems on businesses or institutions, and mini-grid solar PV systems, which are often coupled with storage.

Extreme weather events
Income & work,Food security,Energy availability,Health
Air quality
Description for Social and Search
The Deploy Distributed Solar PV solution is coming soon.
Overview

An estimated 23% of GHG emissions on a 100-yr basis comes from electricity generation annually (Clarke et al., 2022). In 2022, more than 60% of global electricity generation came from fossil fuel–based energy sources (International Energy Agency [IEA], 2024a). Since solar is a clean and renewable resource, distributed solar PV does not contribute to GHG emissions or air pollution while generating electricity. Deploy Distributed Solar PV reduces the need for electricity generation from fossil fuels, which reduces emissions of CO₂ as well as smaller amounts of methane and nitrous oxide. 

Distributed solar PV systems are decentralized energy systems that generate electricity from sunlight at or near the point of use. These systems are commonly installed on residential, commercial, and institutional rooftops, converting solar radiation directly into usable electricity through PV cells. These cells are grouped into modules, which in turn form panels and arrays (DOE, n.d.) that deliver electricity to consumers (Figure 1). Their modular nature allows flexible system sizing, making distributed solar PV well-suited to varying energy demands, rooftop space, and financial capacity. Distributed solar PV systems are typically installed and operated by homeowners, businesses, municipalities, and third-party service providers. 

Figure 1. Distributed solar PV systems are commonly installed on residential, commercial, and institutional rooftops, converting solar radiation directly into usable electricity. Photovoltaic cells are grouped into modules, which in turn form panels and arrays that deliver electricity to consumers for on-site use. In some cases, excess generation can be exported to the grid. Modified Engineering Discoveries (n.d.).

Diagram showing solar photovoltaic on a grid system

Source: Engineering Discoveries. (n.d.). Solar power plant main components, working, advantages and disadvantages.

The primary climate benefit of distributed solar PV is the reduction of CO₂ emissions. By generating zero-emissions electricity on-site, these systems displace electricity that would otherwise be supplied by fossil fuel–based grid power and reduce demand on electricity transmission from power plants to consumers. In doing so, distributed solar PV also avoids upstream emissions of methane and nitrous oxide associated with the extraction, transportation, and combustion of fossil fuels.

A significant number of distributed solar PV systems supply electricity directly to the buildings where they are installed, which offsets grid demand and lowers electricity bills for PV owners. In some cases, excess generation can be exported to the grid, contributing to the broader renewable electricity mix and reducing peak loads and system cost (Rahdan et al., 2024). Distributed solar PV systems therefore provide both emissions reductions and grid benefits (Tran et al., 2023; Uzum et al., 20210; Z. Zhang et al., 2023, 2025). 

Although distributed solar PV systems typically have lower capacity factors than utility-scale solar systems, they require less land, avoid transmission losses, and enable clean electricity access in urban, peri-urban, and rural areas. Implementation is primarily led by households, small businesses, public entities, and local developers. Governments and utilities often provide incentives such as subsidies, feed-in tariffs, or tax credits to stimulate deployment. Continued cost declines – especially in balance-of-system (BoS) and soft costs like labor and permitting – are expected to increase adoption. Distributed solar PV offers a scalable, low-carbon electricity solution that supports both climate mitigation and energy equity.

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Credits

Lead Fellow

  • Michael Dioha, Ph.D.

Contributors

  • Ruthie Burrows, Ph.D.

  • James Gerber, Ph.D.

  • Daniel Jasper

  • Megan Matthews Ph.D.

  • Alex Sweeney

Internal Reviewers

  • James Gerber, Ph.D.

  • Amanda D. Smith, Ph.D.

  • Al-Amin Bugaje, Ph.D.

Effectiveness

Based on IEA World Energy Balances, global emissions from electricity generation accounted for an estimated 530 kg CO₂‑eq /MWh (540 kg CO₂‑eq /MWh, 20-yr basis; IEA, 2024a; see Methodology: Appendix A for calculation details). To convert from MWh to MW, we used the median global average capacity factor for distributed solar PV of 14% (Jacobson et al., 2017). Distributed solar PV is estimated to reduce emissions by 650 t CO₂‑eq /MW/yr (660 t CO₂‑eq /MW/yr, 20-yr basis; Table 1).

Table 1. Effectiveness at reducing emissions.

Unit: t CO₂‑eq /MW installed capacity/yr, 100-yr basis

Estimate 650
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We assumed that newly installed distributed solar PV displaces an equivalent MWh of the global electricity grid mix. We then assumed the reduction in emissions from additional distributed solar PV capacity was equal to emissions (per MWh) from the 2023 global electricity grid mix (IEA, 2024a). Since new distributed solar PV does not displace an equivalent MWh of the global grid mix, actual avoided emissions will depend on conditions of the local grid at a particular time and place, including the level of solar already deployed, regional solar radiation, and grid carbon intensity. As a result, our global effectiveness estimate may differ significantly from regional estimates. Studies in the United States show that for 2007–2015, avoided emissions from solar were approximately 0.5 t CO₂ /MWh (613 t CO₂ /MW/yr; Millstein et al., 2017), and a 15% increase in deployment avoided 8.54 Mt CO₂ /yr (Biswas et al., 2025). For regions that rely heavily on fossil-fuel generators for electricity generation, widespread adoption of distributed solar PV could cut emissions much more than estimated here (Sustainable Energy for All, 2024). 

Distributed solar PV systems have no operational emissions and low life-cycle GHG footprints. We excluded carbon payback time and embodied life-cycle emissions from manufacturing, transport, installation, and end-of-life processing in our estimates of effectiveness and climate impacts. Life-cycle emissions of rooftop solar PV systems were 25.5–42.9 g CO₂‑eq /kWh, depending on the module technology used (IEA-PVPS, 2022). This is significantly lower than fossil fuel–based electricity generation, which can exceed 1,000 g CO₂‑eq /kWh (Gibon et al., 2021).

Cost

We estimated a mean levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) for distributed solar PV of US$145/MWh based on two key industry reports (International Renewable Energy Agency [IRENA], 2020; NEA & IEA, 2020; see Methodology: Appendix A for details). LCOE values represent the average cost of producing one MWh of electricity over the operational lifetime of a power plant, allowing investors to compare their expected revenue to a standard set of costs. International agencies have used this cost metric to estimate total costs of power generation technologies, incorporating installed capital costs, operation and maintenance, project lifespan, and energy output.

While distributed solar PV generally carries a higher cost per MWh than utility-scale solar (IRENA, 2020), rapid declines in cost have been observed across rooftop and mini-grid markets. Residential rooftop PV systems, for instance, saw their average LCOE drop from US$0.301/kWh (US$301/MWh) in 2010 to US$0.063/kWh (US$63/MWh) in 2019 – a 79% reduction driven by falling module prices, better installation methods, and policy support (IRENA, 2020). Similarly, commercial-scale rooftop PV (≤500 kW) achieved its lowest country-level LCOEs – of US$0.062/kWh (US$62/MWh) in India, and US$0.064/kWh (US$64/MWh) in China – during the same period (IRENA, 2020).

Methods and Supporting Data

Methods and Supporting Data

Learning Curve

Distributed solar PV exhibits a pronounced learning curve, most clearly reflected in the steady decline of solar module prices as global deployment expands. The median learning rate for PV modules is estimated at 34%, meaning module prices fall by roughly one-third with every doubling of installed capacity (Table 2). Significant economies of scale over the past decade have driven an even steeper learning rate of 42% (Masson et al., 2024). Similarly, a historical assessment (Philipps & Warmuth , 2025) found that module prices have decreased by 25.7% per doubling over the past 44 years, reinforcing the scale-driven cost reduction dynamics in the distributed solar market. Our estimated learning rate is based on trends of the past decade, while a longer historical estimate would reveal lower learning rates.

Table 2. Learning rate: drop in cost per doubling of the installed solution base, 2010–2023.

Unit: %

25th percentile 30
Mean 34
Median (50th percentile) 34
75th percentile 38
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Looking forward, the pace of module cost decline is expected to slow somewhat. According to the DNV 2024 Energy Transition Outlook (DNV, 2024), the current global learning rate for module costs is about 26%, but projections suggest this rate will slow to around 17% by 2050 as cost components stabilize and the largest gains from scaling are realized. 

In addition to modules, distributed solar PV costs are significantly influenced by BoS components, which include inverters, racking, labor, permitting, and customer acquisition. While these costs are more localized and less exposed to global manufacturing dynamics, they have also followed a learning trajectory. Elshurafa et al. (2018) analyzed BoS costs across more than 20 countries and found a global learning curve of 89%, corresponding to a BoS learning rate of 11%. This is lower than the module rate but nonetheless meaningful – especially in markets where soft costs dominate. 

In the United States, residential distributed solar PV system costs fell 76% between 2010 and 2024, while commercial rooftop PV system costs declined 84% during the same period (Ramasamy et al., 2025). These reductions reflect improvements in module efficiency, digital tools for system design and sales, streamlined installation, and, in some regions, lower permitting and inspection costs.

Still, challenges remain. In mature distributed markets such as the United States, costs other than hardware – such as labor, permitting, interconnection fees, and customer acquisition – continue to account for the majority of overall system prices (Barbose et al., 2023; Dong et al., 2023). 

Speed of Action

The term speed of action refers to how quickly a climate solution physically affects the atmosphere after it is deployed. This is separate from the speed of deployment, which is the pace at which solutions are adopted.

At Project Drawdown, we define the speed of action for each climate solution as emergency brake, gradual, and delayed.

Deploy Distributed Solar PV is a GRADUAL climate solution. It has a steady, linear impact on the atmosphere. As installed capacity of distributed solar PV increases over time, emissions from electricity generation are expected to decrease, assuming solar and other renewables displace fossil fuel sources.

Caveats

One limitation is our assumption that each additional MWh from distributed solar PV displaces an equivalent MWh from the grid. In practice, without net metering or export compensation, generation from distributed systems may not be fully recognized or integrated into the grid – meaning those MWh might not contribute to net electricity flows or emissions displacement. In such cases, any solar output not exported to the grid cannot contribute to grid-level emissions benefits. Owners of distributed solar PV systems are eligible to claim renewable energy certificates (RECs), but if they don’t do so, their utility may instead claim the RECs on their behalf without reducing emissions from their electricity generation. While RECs are used most widely in the United States, this additionality concern could impact any international energy market that also has tradable renewable energy certificates (NREL, 2015). 

Our definition of distributed solar PV includes both rooftop systems and mini-grids, many of which are coupled with battery storage. However, our aggregated analysis does not fully differentiate between these diverse configurations, nor does it account for their varying operational patterns, grid interactions, or backup roles. These differences are important but difficult to capture within the scope of this analysis. Consequently, the results presented should be interpreted as a high-level approximation rather than a detailed assessment of all distributed solar PV system types.

Distributed solar PV implementation comes with several limitations and uncertainties. One concern is whether new installations meaningfully reduce emissions. In regions where the electricity grid is already low-carbon or underused, adding distributed solar may have limited climate impact.

The long-term impact of distributed solar also depends on system reliability, maintenance, and policy stability. Poorly maintained systems may underperform and sudden policy changes – such as the removal of net metering or the elimination of tax credits – can reduce uptake (Gautier & Jacqmin, 2020; Leite et al., 2024; Venkatachalam et al., 2025). In many low-income regions specifically, high up-front costs, limited access to financing, and insufficient technical capacity can hinder large-scale adoption (Ukoba et al., 2024). Even when demand exists in these regions, supply chain limitations, lack of skilled labor, and inconsistent regulatory frameworks may slow progress.

Technical challenges also arise with increasing deployment. Variability in distributed solar PV generation can lead to voltage instability in distribution networks (Cook et al., 2018; Impram et al., 2020; Tamimi et al., 2013), especially when systems are not paired with smart inverters or batteries. Although emissions from manufacturing and disposal of solar PV panels are relatively lower than those from fossil fuel power, they are not zero. Another technical caveat is the growing concern of e-waste, particularly for off-grid and rural PV deployments. A recent prospective material flow analysis across 15 West African countries estimates that cumulative PV waste could reach 2.3 to 7.8 Mt by 2050, with about 70% originating from off-grid systems (D. Dong et al., 2025).

Current Adoption

We estimated current adoption of distributed solar PV based on IEA reports (IEA, 2023; Masson et al., 2024). As of 2023, the global installed capacity for distributed solar PV reached approximately 708,000 MW (Table 3). Although we used 2023 as our baseline for current adoption, an estimated additional 182,100 MW of distributed solar PV capacity was installed in 2024 – bringing the global total to 890,400 MW (IEA, 2023).

Table 3. Current adoption level, 2023.

Unit: MW installed capacity

25th percentile 702,000
Mean 708,000
Median (50th percentile) 708,000
75th percentile 715,000
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From 2011–2016, the global distributed solar PV market remained relatively stable, with annual installations ranging between 16 and 19 GW (Masson et al., 2024). This trend shifted significantly when China expanded its domestic distributed solar PV sector, implementing policy and infrastructure measures that nearly doubled market capacity between 2016 and 2018. By 2023, global distributed solar PV installations had reached 189.0 GW – up from 177.7 GW in 2022 (Masson et al., 2024). In recent years, many countries, particularly in Europe, have adopted collective and distributed self-consumption models as a new framework for residential and commercial electricity customers. This approach increases access to self-generated renewable electricity, even for consumers unable to install their own PV systems. 

Off-grid solar PV applications are expanding too, primarily driven by rural electrification efforts across Asia, Africa, and parts of South America (World Bank Group, 2024). In many remote areas, especially in Africa and Asia, off-grid and mini-grid systems with storage serve as viable alternatives to grid extension or as interim solutions before future grid connections. For further details, see the Geographic Guidance section.

Adoption Trend

Based on the IEA’s solar PV power capacity in the Net Zero Scenario (IEA, 2024), we calculated the global adoption trend by summing global adoption for each year 2015–2023 and taking the year-to-year difference. Comparing year-to-year global adoption, the median global adoption trend was adding 54,000 MW/yr of installed capacity, but expansion was unevenly distributed geographically (Table 4, Figure 1).

Figure 2. Global adoption of distributed solar PV, 2015–2023.

Source: International Energy Agency. (2023). Solar PV power capacity in the Net Zero Scenario, 2015-2030. License: CC BY 4.0

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Table 4. Adoption trend, 2015–2023.

Unit: MW installed capacity/yr

25th percentile 40,300
Mean 72,400
Median (50th percentile) 54,000
75th percentile 80,800
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Global distributed solar PV deployment more than sextupled between 2015 and 2023, growing from 116 GW to 695 GW of installed capacity (Figure 2; IEA, 2023). Growth in the mid-2010s was relatively moderate, with yearly additions rising gradually from 19 GW in 2016 to 45 GW by 2019. However, a notable acceleration began after 2020. Annual capacity additions jumped from 63 GW in 2020 to 192 GW in 2023 – more than tripling in just three years (IEA, 2023). This surge reflects growing policy support, cost declines, and higher demand for behind-the-meter solar solutions. The rolling trendline since 2015 now averages 72 GW/yr, nearly double the average before 2020. This trend is likely to continue as distributed solar PV continues to gain ground in both developed and emerging markets.

Adoption Ceiling

The adoption ceiling for distributed solar PV is determined by the global technical potential of rooftop surfaces, parking structures, and other built environments suitable for solar PV deployment. Unlike utility-scale systems that require dedicated land, distributed solar PV leverages existing infrastructure – primarily the rooftops of residential, commercial, and government buildings.

Estimates of the technical potential for distributed solar PV vary considerably across the literature, reflecting differences in study period, system types included, and methodological approaches. Despite these variations, recent global assessments converge on the view that rooftop and other distributed solar PV systems offer substantial potential, though they are constrained by surface area availability and system efficiencies. A meta-analysis by de La Beaumelle et al. (2023) reported rooftop solar PV technical potential ranging from 6 PWh/yr to 69 PWh/yr, with a median of 15.8 PWh/yr and an average of 21.1 PWh/yr (de La Beaumelle et al., 2023). Another study estimated the global net energy potential from rooftop PV at 7.81 PWh/yr for residential rooftops and 8.02 PWh/yr for commercial rooftops. Similarly, Deng et al. (2015) estimated the global technical potential of rooftop PV systems at 33.6 PWh/yr, with an additional 25 PWh/yr from building facades (Deng et al., 2015), while Joshi et al. (2021) identified approximately 0.2 million km2 of suitable rooftop area from 130 million km2 of global land surface, corresponding to an estimated electricity generation potential of 27 PWh/yr (Joshi et al., 2021).

Key constraints to distributed solar PV adoption include rooftop suitability (such as shading, tilt, and orientation), grid integration, permitting hurdles, and up-front costs (Sengupta et al., 2024 Masson et al., 2025). While these barriers may limit near-term deployment, innovations like building-integrated photovoltaics, virtual net metering, and smart inverters offer pathways to expand deployment. For this analysis, we adopt a global median estimate of 17.4 million MW installed capacity as the adoption ceiling for distributed solar PV (Table 5).

Table 5. Adoption ceiling: upper limit for adoption.

Unit: MW installed capacity

25th percentile 12,400,000
Mean 23,400,000
Median (50th percentile) 17,400,000
75th percentile 28,500,000
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Achievable Adoption

The IEA’s World Energy Outlook (WEO) 2024 presented several scenarios that explored future energy pathways under different assumptions about policies, technologies, and markets. For this analysis, we defined the adoption achievable range for distributed solar PV based on the Stated Policies Scenario (STEPS) and the Announced Pledges Scenario (APS) (IEA, 2024b). However, the WEO does not explicitly distinguish between distributed and utility-scale solar PV in its projections. To bridge this gap, we conducted a simple linear projection using historical deployment trends to estimate the likely share of distributed solar PV within total solar PV capacity. Our analysis suggests that by 2050, distributed solar PV could represent approximately 26% of all solar PV deployment. This finding is consistent with IRENA’s REmap analysis, which projects that utility-scale systems will account for 60–80% of global solar PV capacity by mid-century (IRENA, 2019). Accordingly, for our study we assume that 26% of the IEA’s projected solar PV deployment in 2050 will come from distributed solar PV systems. This provides a reasonable basis for estimating achievable adoption, while aligning with both historical patterns and complementary international assessments.

Achievable – Low

The low achievable adoption level is based on STEPS, which reflects the current trajectory of distributed solar PV expansion under existing and announced policies. In this scenario, assuming utility-scale projects account for 26% of total solar PV capacity, global capacity is projected to grow about sixfold, from 708,000 MW in 2023 to approximately 4.30 million MW by 2050 (Table 6). This corresponds to an average compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 7.3%.

Table 6. Range of achievable adoption levels.

 Unit: MW installed capacity

Current adoption 708,000
Achievable – low 4,300,000
Achievable – high 5,300,000
Adoption Ceiling 17,400,000
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Achievable – High

The high achievable adoption level is based on APS, which assumes the same policy framework as STEPS, plus full realization of announced national energy and climate targets, including net-zero commitments supported by stronger clean energy investments. Under this scenario, distributed solar PV capacity is projected to increase approximately sevenfold from 708,000 MW in 2023 to approximately 5.30 million MW by 2050 (Table 6), requiring a CAGR of 8% over the same period.

Using our adoption ceiling of 17.4 million MW, the current adoption of distributed solar PV constitutes approximately 4.1% of its technical potential. The achievable adoption range, as calculated, is 24.8–30.3% of this potential.

Based on baseline global adoption and effectiveness, we estimated the current total climate impact of distributed solar PV to be approximately 0.46 Gt CO₂‑eq (0.47 Gt CO₂‑eq , 20-yr basis) of reduced emissions per year (Table 7). We estimated future climate impacts using the emissions from the 2023 baseline electricity grid; actual emissions reductions could differ depending on how the emissions intensity of electricity generation changes over time. 

Table 7. Climate impact at different levels of adoption.

Unit: Gt CO₂‑eq/yr, 100-yr basis

Current adoption 0.46
Achievable – low 2.8
Achievable – high 3.5
Adoption Ceiling 11
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Climate impacts are highly uncertain.They will vary depending on actual emissions intensity, as well as future development of electricity grids, markets and policies, and enabling technologies, like batteries. As solar and other renewables grow to represent an increasingly high percentage of power generation sources, grid emissions are expected to decrease (DNV, 2024; IEA, 2024b), so the climate impacts presented here are likely overestimates. Additionally, in regions with significant solar radiation where utility-scale solar PV is competitive, increased adoption of distributed solar PV could displace utility-scale PV without reducing emissions (Bistline & Watten, 2025). Assuming the existing and announced policies of countries around the world for distributed solar PV installation are backed with adequate provisions for implementation, global adoption could reach 4 million MW by 2050 – resulting in an increased emissions reduction of approximately 2.8 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr (2.9 Gt CO₂‑eq , 20-yr basis). Assuming full realization of all national energy and climate targets (including net-zero commitments) with the support of stronger clean energy investments, distributed solar PV adoption could reach 5 million MW by 2050, which would lead to an estimated 3.5 Gt CO₂‑eq (3.5 Gt CO₂‑eq , 20-yr basis) of reduced emissions per year. 

We based the adoption ceiling solely on the technical potential of distributed solar PV, while neglecting social and economic constraints and realistic scenarios of future power demand (Dioha et al, 2025). Distributed solar PV installed capacity is unlikely to reach 17 million MW, but if current grid emissions remained constant while capacity increased, GHG emission reductions would be approximately 11 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr (11 Gt CO₂‑eq , 20-yr basis). This maximum is unrealistic as a forward-looking climate impact because it treats grid carbon intensity as permanently fixed at 2023 levels and ignores future decarbonization and corresponding decreases in marginal avoided emissions.

Additional Benefits

Income and Work

Solar PV can have a positive effect on the economy because it accounts for 44% of renewable energy jobs globally and is the fastest-growing sector of renewable energy employment (IRENA, 2024). In the United States as of 2021, solar PV employed about 250,000 full-time workers, mainly in the installation, project development, and manufacturing sectors (Gadzanku et al., 2023). The National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) projected that about 509,000–757,000 jobs for both utility- and distributed-scale solar PV will be added by 2030 in the United States (Truitt et al., 2022).

Factors such as local policies that allow for net metering, tax credits, weather, and the price of electricity can determine individual cost benefits and payback periods of distributed solar (Sexton et al., 2018; Vaishnav et al., 2017). After the initial investment, consumers see savings in their monthly electricity bills (NREL, 2018).

Distributed solar PV can provide access to electricity in rural areas of low- and middle-income countries (Kumar et al., 2019). Enhanced access to electricity in these countries can foster economic development of agricultural communities and increase farmer incomes (Candelise et al., 2021; Saha, 2025).

Food Security

Improved electricity access through distributed solar PV can also enhance food production and ensure resilience of agricultural systems in low- and middle-income countries (Ukoba et al., 2024). Improved electricity access strengthens food security by providing refrigeration for perishable food, ensuring higher food quality, and reducing food loss (Candelise et al., 2021; Ukoba et al., 2024).

Energy Availability

Distributed solar PV can provide electricity to households and communities where expanding grid electricity would prove too expensive or physically inaccessible (Kannan & Vakeesan, 2016; Kumar et al., 2019; Maka & Alabid, 2022). Using distributed mini-grids as a source of electricity is especially applicable to low- and middle-income countries with abundant solar resources (Maka & Alabid, 2022). For example, distributed rooftop solar has been an important source of electricity access in Bangladesh, where rooftop PV systems provide electricity to about 12% of the population (Kumar et al., 2019).

Health

Improvements in air quality offer health benefits from reduced air pollution exposure, including reduced premature mortality. The magnitude and distribution of these benefits depend on the local electricity grid mix, the fuels used to generate electricity, and atmospheric conditions that determine how far pollutants travel from emission sources (Buonocore et al., 2019). Regions with a higher proportion of coal-powered electricity generation will often see more health benefits (Buonocore et al., 2019). These health benefits often translate into cost savings associated with reductions in hospital admissions, improved respiratory and cardiovascular conditions, and work and school days that might have otherwise been missed due to illness (Millstein et al., 2017; Wiser et al., 2016). A study of the health benefits of distributed solar PV in eastern China found that reductions in air pollution were linked to a 1.2% decrease in air pollution–related premature mortality (Yang et al., 2018). Distributed solar PV can provide electricity to power electric cookstoves, which can reduce morbidities linked to poor indoor air quality (Jhunjhunwala & Kaur, 2018).

Increasing energy availability through distributed solar PV has important implications for health-care delivery in rural communities in low- and middle-income countries. By providing electricity access to health clinics located in hard-to-reach areas, mini-grid or rooftop PV systems can improve health services (Maka & Alabid, 2022; Soto et al., 2022; Ukoba et al., 2024). Electricity is essential for health-care services such as lighting during procedures, refrigeration of vaccines, sterilization of devices, and medical imaging, which can impact infection rates, neonatal mortality, and surgical outcomes (Soto et al., 2022). PV systems can deliver stable electricity to health clinics in low- and middle-income countries, which often experience power outages due to grid instability or natural disasters (Soto et al., 2022). 

Extreme Weather Events

Rooftop PV systems and mini-grids have the potential to supply electricity when the grid is unstable, improving resilience during or after extreme weather events (Galvan et al., 2020; NREL, 2014).

Air Quality

Solar PV reduces air pollutants released from fossil-fuel energy generation, thereby avoiding the emission of pollutants such as nitrogen oxides, sulfur dioxide, and PM2.5 associated with burning coal and natural gas (Abel et al., 2018; Millstein et al., 2024; Millstein et al., 2018; Wiser et al., 2016). The amount and type of air pollutants avoided will vary regionally depending on the fossil fuel type that PV displaces (Gallagher & Holloway, 2020). For example, since coal has different emissions than gas, regions with higher levels of coal-powered electricity will experience different air quality benefits than regions with more gas-powered electricity (Millstein et al., 2018). Pollutants can be transported for long distances depending on meteorological conditions, so air pollution benefits can be widespread (Millstein et al., 2024).

Risks

A significant risk of implementing distributed solar PV involves changes or instability in policy, especially pertaining to compensation schemes such as net metering and feed‑in tariffs. The economic viability of rooftop solar systems often hinges on favorable tariff or compensation rules; when these policies are reduced or withdrawn, investment returns drop markedly. For example, a report from IEA‑PVPS shows that many emerging economies have laws enabling net metering, but suffer from delays in implementation or weak compensation levels, which limit residential uptake of rooftop PV systems under self‑consumption policies (Roux & Shanker, 2018).

Another risk is the structure of electricity rates and fixed charges. A study of the impact of fixed charges on the viability of self‑consumption found that high fixed or volumetric charges in retail tariffs can dramatically reduce the financial benefit of self‑consumed PV generation, particularly when surplus PV electricity exported to the grid receives little or no compensation (Solano et al., 2018). These risks combine to lower the real output and emissions reduction potential of distributed PV. When policies incentivize self-consumption rather than exporting electricity to the grid, a greater proportion of the PV-generated electricity is used; however, policies that reduce the financial benefit of PV generation can stymie adoption.

Interactions with Other Solutions

Reinforcing

Increased availability of renewable energy from distributed solar PV helps reduce emissions from the electricity grid as a whole. Reduced emissions from the electricity grid leads to lower downstream emissions for solutions that rely on electricity use from the grid. Deploying distributed solar PV also supports increased integration of offshore and onshore wind turbines by diversifying the renewable energy mix, and can alleviate reliability challenges associated with variability in wind alone. Increasing deployment of variable renewable sources like solar PV can also drive procurement of firm baseload power in the form of geothermal and hydropower sources.

Electrification of transportation will be more beneficial in reducing global emissions if the underlying electricity generation mix includes a higher proportion of non-emitting power sources. 

Competing

Distributed solar PV can compete with utility-scale solar PV, agrivoltaics, and wind energy for policy attention, subsidies, and grid access. Additionally, when many distributed solar PV systems are installed, they generate power during the day when the sun is shining. This can lower electricity prices at those times because solar power is cheap to produce. As a result, utility-scale solar PV and agrivoltaic power plants can earn less money from selling electricity.

Dashboard

Solution Basics

MW installed capacity

t CO₂-eq (100-yr)/unit/yr
650
units
Current 708,000 04.3×10⁶5.3×10⁶
Achievable (Low to High)

Climate Impact

Gt CO₂-eq (100-yr)/yr
Current 0.46 2.83.5
Gradual

CO₂ , CH₄, N₂O, BC

Trade-offs

Implementing distributed solar PV involves several trade-offs. Embodied emissions from module manufacturing, transport, installation, and decommissioning are estimated at 10–36 g CO₂‑eq /kWh or approximately 2–8% of typical grid electricity emissions (~530 g CO₂‑eq /kWh), which implies over 90% net savings per kWh generated (Schlömer et al., 2014; Smith et al., 2024). Manufacturing using coal-intensive grids increases embodied emissions, highlighting the necessity of decarbonizing supply chains (Gan et al., 2023; Pehl et al., 2017). These emissions could reduce the net climate benefit, especially when displacing grid electricity from other renewables. 

The temporal variability of solar energy also creates trade-offs. When demand peaks in evening hours, non-solar energy sources ramp up generation, which could lead to increases in marginal emissions (Gagnon & O’Shaughnessy, 2025). In regions with high solar deployment, increased adoption of distributed solar PV could displace utility-scale solar generation, since both operate diurnally, resulting in no net reduction in grid emissions (Bistline & Watten, 2025). However, adoption of distributed solar can be very beneficial in low- and middle-income countries, as well as in places where utility-scale projects face interconnection constraints, permitting issues, or other challenges that limit adoption (Zhang et al., 2025). 

Another trade-off arises when limited rooftop space is used for PV infrastructure instead of alternative uses, such as cool or green roofs, or cooling/HVAC systems, which could offer thermal insulation or carbon sequestration benefits (Cubi et al., 2016; Kazemian & Xiang, 2025). 

Action Word
Deploy
Solution Title
Distributed Solar PV
Classification
Highly Recommended
Lawmakers and Policymakers
  • Set ambitious long-term renewable energy goals and incorporate them into national climate plans and multilateral agreements; design national electrification guidelines for technicians to enable renewable energy goals.
  • Ensure regulatory frameworks around solar are strong and enforced, while also being accessible and timely; coordinate solar power policies horizontally (e.g., across agencies) and vertically (e.g., across subnational, national, and international efforts); seek to align social and environmental safeguards and streamline permitting processes.
  • Streamline regulations such as permitting for renewable energy projects, including both distributed solar and mini-grids; standardize documents for regular engagements, such as templates for power purchase agreements.
  • Provide incentives to consumers, such as subsidies (especially to reduce up-front cost), feed-in tariffs, tax credits, grants, waived grid connection fees, and forgivable or concessional loans; simultaneously allow for grid injections and net-metering schemes; ensure policies and incentives are long term and will remain stable for at least five years; use similar financial incentives for supporting equipment manufacturers, such as those that produce batteries and inverters.
  • Offer incentives such as subsidies and tax credits to manufacturers, operators, developers, and other relevant actors; as the market matures and becomes competitive, gradually reduce these incentives to create long-term market stability.
  • Develop building codes and regulations to incentivize efficiency and self-consumption of PV-generated electricity, especially among new construction; require PV-ready buildings and infrastructure.
  • Implement carbon taxes and remove subsidies from fossil-fuel infrastructure; redirect those funds into renewable energy financing.
  • Implement or strengthen renewable portfolio standards, clean energy standards, or other similar policy mechanisms with carve-outs for distributed solar.
  • Consider using green bonds to finance mini-grids and/or de-risk markets.
  • Invest in and subsidize improvements to grid integration and flexibility, storage, and infrastructure to manage variable generation; deploy smart-grid technologies.
  • Work with industry to diversify supply chains; design incentives and policies to stimulate local or regional production and advance R&D for solar and related equipment such as batteries.
  • Earmark a percentage of financial incentives for low- and middle-income communities and/or countries; if relevant, provide technology transfers and capacity building in low- and middle-income countries.
  • Improve labor- and human-rights laws and standards around solar PV supply chains; enforce standards within industry – particularly for the extraction and use of critical minerals and panel manufacturing.
  • Ensure regulations allow for a variety of development models, such as build-own-operate, public-private partnerships, utility models, energy communities, and cooperatives.
  • Ensure strong quality control requirements for all stages of deployment, including resource extraction, manufacturing, installation, maintenance, and end-of-life service; create certification programs for each stage of the process.
  • Require or encourage manufacturers to provide minimum warranties; establish an independent grievance system to resolve customer disputes and help foster trust in the industry.
  • To the extent possible, regulate and standardize distributed panel components with the aim of facilitating self-installation and ensuring safety. 
  • Work with the private sector to develop workforce training programs; ensure capacity development for all stages of deployment, including end-of-life services; create certifications for the full spectrum of roles.
  • Ensure strong regulations are in place for end-of-life services; enact Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) for manufacturers; work with industry to foster a market for used, refurbished, and recycled panels.
  • Join, create, or participate in public-private partnerships dedicated to de-risking markets, deployment, technology transfers, education, and other relevant areas.
  • Establish one-stop-shop educational programs that use online and in-person methods to educate industry and the public on regulations, benefits of solar, best practices for development, and other relevant information; ensure the material is both appropriate and sufficient for local contexts, paying particularly close attention to language barriers. 

Further information:

Practitioners
  • Conduct careful planning for installation, ensuring that panel tilt, maintenance, and shading are evaluated based on local climatic conditions and are accounted for properly.
  • Conduct regular maintenance and cleaning to enhance cost efficiency and energy savings, especially in arid climates.
  • Utilize geospatial and satellite data to gather information on landscape, market dynamics, and initial customer base.
  • When cost-effective, employ building-integrated photovoltaics, net metering/billing, batteries, and smart inverters.
  • Utilize pay-as-you-go, energy-as-a-service, and other financial models that offset high up-front costs for residential and off-grid customers.
  • Take advantage of government incentives such as subsidies, feed-in tariffs, auctions, tax credits, and contracts for difference; as the market matures and becomes competitive, seek to gradually reduce reliance on these incentives to create long-term market stability.
  • Offer periodic site visits and maintenance services; facilitate reselling of PV systems on the secondhand market
  • Design distributed solar PV and mini-grid systems to be compatible with the main grid, even in areas far from the main grid, so as to allow for future connection. 
  • Consider providing feed-in tariffs or other financial incentives if they are not provided by the government; consider lease-to-own models.
  • Investigate using green bonds to finance public projects and mini-grids, or to de-risk markets.
  • Work with regulators and other industry leaders to standardize distributed panel components with the aim of facilitating self-installation and ensuring safety. 
  • Invest in strengthening grid integration and improving flexibility through expanded energy storage, upgraded infrastructure, and deployment of smart grid technologies to effectively manage variable renewable generation.
  • Reduce soft costs of customer acquisition with prediction models that use machine learning classifiers like XGBoost, which are trained on widely available socioeconomic data to identify households likely to adopt PV.
  • When developing mini-grids, work directly with the community as well as nonprofits and relevant businesses (such as appliance retailers) to help educate the community on the mini-grid’s capabilities and how to choose suitable appliances.
  • Work with the public sector to diversify supply chains; take advantage of incentives and policies that stimulate local or regional production and advance R&D.
  • Ensure supply chains comply with international labor and human rights laws and standards, particularly for the extraction of critical minerals, and panel manufacturing.
  • Seek to decarbonize the full life cycle – including supply chains, production, installation, recycling, and disposal – as much as possible.
  • Ensure strong quality control for all stages of deployment, including resource extraction, manufacturing, installation, maintenance, and end-of-life service.
  • Work with the public sector and private organizations to develop workforce training programs; ensure capacity development for all stages of deployment, including end-of-life services.
  • Adhere to regulations regarding end-of-life servicing; adopt extended producer responsibility and high-integrity end-of-life servicing standards if no policy framework exists.
  • Invest directly into, and help develop, recycling infrastructure for solar panels.
  • Participate in voluntary agreements with government bodies to increase policy support for solar capacity and power generation.
  • Stay abreast of, and engage with, changing policies, regulations, zoning laws, tax incentives, and related developments to help remove commercial barriers.
  • Join, create, or participate in public-private partnerships dedicated to deployment, technology transfers, education, de-risking markets, and other relevant areas.

Further information:

Business Leaders
  • Set ambitious long-term renewable energy goals and incorporate them into corporate net-zero strategies.
  • Install distributed solar panels when possible, focusing on available rooftops and parking lots.
  • Support long-term, stable contracts (e.g., Purchase Power Agreements) that de-risk investment in solar technologies and incentivize local supply chain development.
  • Take advantage of government incentives such as tax credits, if possible; seek to gradually reduce reliance on these incentives to create long-term market stability.
  • Invest in companies that produce, deploy, or provide end-of-life servicing for solar panels; seek to diversify and localize supply chains.
  • Invest in R&D and related technology, such as batteries.
  • Support workforce development programs, offer employee scholarships, and/or sponsor training for careers in solar power; ensure capacity development for all stages of deployment, including end-of-life services.
  • Offer pro bono business advice or general support for community solar projects, such as community-shared and cooperative business models.
  • Join, create, or participate in public-private partnerships dedicated to deployment, technology transfers, education, de-risking markets, and other relevant areas.

Further information:

Nonprofit Leaders
  • Install distributed solar panels when possible, focusing on available rooftops and parking lots.
  • Advocate for ambitious long-term national goals on solar and renewable energy; advocate to incorporate them into national climate plans and multilateral agreements; request national electrification guidelines for technicians.
  • Operate or help with equipment testing and certification systems, market information disclosures, and onsite supervision.
  • Conduct open-access research to improve the performance of solar PVs, forecasting, and related technologies.
  • Work with industry and government officials to help develop regulations and standards for distributed panel components, with the aim of facilitating self-installation and ensuring safety. 
  • Advocate for strong regulatory frameworks that are also accessible and timely; recommend coordinated solar power policies, both horizontally (e.g., across agencies) and vertically (e.g., across subnational, national, and international efforts); help align social and environmental safeguards and a streamlined permitting processes.
  • Call for government incentives for consumers such as subsidies (especially to reduce up-front cost), feed-in tariffs, tax credits, grants, waived grid connection fees, and forgivable or concessional loans; help ensure regulations allow for grid injections and net-metering schemes; advocate for long-term policies and incentives that will remain stable for at least five years; call for similar financial incentives for supporting equipment manufacturers, such as those that produce batteries and inverters.
  • Urge governments to provide incentives – such as subsidies, feed-in tariffs, auctions, tax credits, and contracts for difference – to manufacturers, operators, developers, and other relevant actors; recommend gradual reductions of these incentives to create long-term market stability.
  • Campaign for public investments in improvements to grid integration and flexibility, storage, and infrastructure to manage variable generation.
  • Call for a percentage of public financing to be earmarked for low- and middle-income communities and/or countries.
  • Help improve enforcement of labor and human rights laws and standards around solar PV supply chains – particularly for the extraction and use of critical minerals.
  • Help create or support community solar projects using a variety of models, such as build-own-operate, public-private partnerships, utility models, energy communities, and cooperatives.
  • Create resources and/or standards to improve quality control for all stages of deployment, including resource extraction, manufacturing, installation, maintenance, and end-of-life service; create and/or administer certification programs for each stage of the process.
  • Work with the public and private sectors to develop workforce training programs; ensure capacity development for all stages of deployment, including end-of-life services.
  • Urge governments and industry to adopt strong regulations for end-of-life services; call for extended producer responsibility; work with industry to foster a market for used, refurbished, or recycled panels.
  • Advocate for carbon taxes and the removal of subsidies from fossil-fuel infrastructure; recommend those funds be redirected into renewable energy.
  • Join, create, or participate in public-private partnerships dedicated to deployment, technology transfers, education, de-risking markets, and other relevant areas.
  • Establish one-stop-shop educational programs that use online and in-person methods to educate industry and the public on regulations, benefits of solar, best practices for development, and other relevant information; ensure the material is sufficient and appropriate for local contexts, paying particularly close attention to language barriers. 

Further information:

Investors
  • Offer low-interest loans and concessional financing for manufacturers, customers, developers, operators, and recyclers.
  • Invest directly in the development of mini-grid projects.
  • Invest in companies that produce, deploy, or provide end-of-life servicing for solar panels; seek to diversify and localize supply chains.
  • Invest in supporting infrastructures such as utility companies, grid development, and access roads.
  • Invest in green bonds and/or explore blended finance structures to mobilize capital for companies developing solar energy or supporting infrastructure.
  • Invest in the recycling infrastructure for solar panels and circular supply chains.
  • Invest in R&D, component technology, and related equipment, such as batteries.
  • Help de-risk energy transitions in low- and middle-income countries by offering low-interest loans, concessional financing, and/or, favorable terms.
  • Align investments with existing public-private partnerships, voluntary agreements, or voluntary guidance that may apply in the location of the investment.

Further information:

Philanthropists and International Aid Agencies
  • Provide catalytic financing for or help develop, distributed solar PV projects and mini-grids.
  • Award grants to enhance grid integration, flexibility, and reliability by supporting innovations in energy storage systems, advanced grid management, transmission infrastructure, and traditional infrastructure (such as access roads) that enable effective integration of solar PV generation.
  • Work with other philanthropies, investors, and implementers to develop standardized reporting mechanisms and create monitoring and evaluation frameworks.
  • Allow for extended program timelines to allow for mini-grid sector development and cost recovery. 
  • Support the development of component technology and related equipment, such as batteries.
  • Award grants to improve recycling infrastructure for solar panels, and build circular supply chains.
  • Facilitate partnerships to share solar technology and best practices between established and emerging markets, promoting energy equity and access.
  • Foster cooperation and technology transfer between low- and middle-income countries with emerging solar sectors.
  • Advocate for ambitious long-term national goals on solar and renewable energy; advocate to incorporate them into national climate plans and multilateral agreements; request national electrification guidelines for technicians.
  • Operate, fund, or support equipment testing and certification systems, and market information disclosures.
  • Conduct open-access research to improve the performance of solar PVs, forecasting, and related technologies.
  • Work with industry and government officials to help develop regulations and standards for distributed panel components, with the aim of facilitating self-installation and ensuring safety. 
  • Advocate for strong regulatory frameworks that are also accessible and timely; recommend coordinated solar power policies, both horizontally (e.g., across agencies) and vertically (e.g., across subnational, national, and international efforts); help align social and environmental safeguards and a streamlined permitting processes.
  • Advocate for a percentage of public financing to be earmarked for low- and middle-income communities and/or countries.
  • Help improve enforcement of labor and human-rights laws and standards around solar PV supply chains – particularly for the extraction and use of critical minerals.
  • Help create or support community solar projects using a variety of models, such as build-own-operate, public-private partnerships, utility models, energy communities, and cooperatives.
  • Create resources and/or standards to improve quality control for all stages of deployment, including resource extraction, manufacturing, installation, maintenance, and end-of-life service; create and/or administer certification programs for each stage of the process.
  • Work with the public and private sectors to develop workforce training programs; ensure capacity development for all stages of deployment, including end-of-life services.
  • Urge governments and industry to adopt strong regulations for end-of-life services; call for extended producer responsibility; work with industry to foster a market for used, refurbished, or recycled panels.
  • Join, create, or participate in public-private partnerships dedicated to deployment, technology transfers, education, de-risking markets, and other relevant areas.
  • Establish one-stop-shop educational programs that use online and in-person methods to educate industry and the public on regulations, benefits of solar, best practices for development, and other relevant information; ensure the material is sufficient and appropriate for local contexts, paying particularly close attention to language barriers.

Further information:

Thought Leaders
  • Install solar panels at home, at the office, and/or at other properties; share your experience and tips with neighbors and the broader community.
  • Advocate for ambitious long-term national goals on solar and renewable energy; advocate to incorporate them into national climate plans and multilateral agreements; request national electrification guidelines for technicians.
  • Operate or help with equipment testing and certification systems, market information disclosures, and onsite supervision.
  • Conduct open-access research to improve the performance of solar PVs, forecasting, and related technologies.
  • Work with industry and government officials to help develop regulations and standards for distributed panel components, with the aim of facilitating self-installation and ensuring safety. 
  • Advocate for strong regulatory frameworks that are also accessible and timely; recommend coordinated solar power policies, both horizontally (e.g., across agencies) and vertically (e.g., across subnational, national, and international efforts); help align social and environmental safeguards and a streamlined permitting processes.
  • Call for government incentives for consumers such as subsidies (especially to reduce up-front cost), feed-in tariffs, tax credits, grants, waived grid connection fees, and forgivable or concessional loans; help ensure regulations allow for grid injections and net-metering schemes; advocate for long-term policies and incentives that will remain stable for at least five years; call for similar financial incentives for supporting equipment manufacturers, such as those that produce batteries and inverters.
  • Urge governments to provide incentives – such as subsidies, feed-in tariffs, auctions, tax credits, and contracts for difference – to manufacturers, operators, developers, and other relevant actors; recommend gradual reductions of these incentives to create long-term market stability.
  • Campaign for public investments in improvements to grid integration and flexibility, storage, and infrastructure to manage variable generation.
  • Advocate for a percentage of public financing to be earmarked for low- and middle-income communities and/or countries.
  • Help improve enforcement of labor and human-rights laws and standards around solar PV supply chains – particularly for the extraction and use of critical minerals.
  • Help create or support community solar projects using a variety of models, such as build-own-operate, public-private partnerships, utility models, energy communities, and cooperatives.
  • Advocate for strong regulations for end-of-life services; advocate for extended producer responsibility; work with industry to foster a market for used, refurbished, or recycled panels.
  • Advocate for carbon taxes and the removal of subsidies from fossil-fuel infrastructure; recommend those funds be redirected into renewable energy.
  • Join, create, or participate in public-private partnerships dedicated to deployment, technology transfers, education, de-risking markets, and other relevant areas.
  • Establish one-stop-shop educational programs that use online and in-person methods to educate industry and the public on regulations, benefits of solar, best practices for development, and other relevant information; ensure the material is sufficient and appropriate for local contexts, paying particularly close attention to language barriers. 

Further information:

Technologists and Researchers
  • Continue advancing the performance of monocrystalline and polycrystalline silicon cells.
  • Improve cooperation between building automation systems and monitoring and control of PV systems.
  • Investigate the ability of PV to assist in frequency regulation and other ancillary services to maintain grid stability as more renewables displace conventional power plants.
  • Develop a platform that provides up-to-date and publicly available data on mini-grid operations, related policies, technologies, standards, and other relevant information.
  • Advance energy-storage systems technologies, such as battery, hydrogen, and gravity-based.
  • Improve manufacturing efficiencies such as larger wafer formats, enhanced cell architectures, and advanced wafer-processing techniques.
  • Advance the use of AI or other technological means for predictive analytics, forecasting, and power system control.
  • Improve recycling infrastructure and scalable technologies to repair, reuse, or recover materials from solar panels.
  • Create more heat-tolerant PV technologies and systems to reduce heat exposure and/or absorption.
  • Create better protection and cleaning systems for PV to preserve functionality during extreme weather, and in extreme environments – especially deserts. 
  • Improve related mining technologies for critical minerals, making the extraction process safer, less disruptive to local communities and ecosystems, and less energy-intensive.
  • Develop ways of eliminating, reducing, reusing, and/or safely disposing of hazardous by-products of PV manufacturing.
  • Research factors that lead to community acceptance and the role of distributed solar in a fair and just energy transition. 

Further information:

Communities, Households, and Individuals
  • Install solar panels at home, at the office, and/or at other properties; share your experience and tips with neighbors and the broader community.
  • If your community is not connected to the main grid, consider developing a local mini-grid.
  • Conduct careful planning for installation, ensuring panel tilt, maintenance, and shading are evaluated based on local climatic conditions and are accounted for properly.
  • Conduct regular maintenance and cleaning to enhance cost efficiency and energy savings, especially in arid climates.
  • Help create or support community solar projects using a variety of models, such as build-own-operate, public-private partnerships, utility models, energy communities, and cooperatives.
  • If available, take advantage of government incentives such as subsidies, tax breaks, and forgivable or concessional loans for development.
  • Call for government incentives for consumers, if necessary, such as subsidies ( especially to reduce up-front cost), feed-in tariffs, tax credits, grants, waived grid connection fees, and forgivable or concessional loans; help ensure regulations allow for grid injections and net-metering schemes; advocate for long-term policies and incentives that will remain stable for at least five years; call for similar financial incentives for supporting equipment manufacturers, such as those that produce batteries and inverters.
  • Advocate for carbon taxes and the removal of subsidies from fossil-fuel infrastructure; recommend those funds be redirected into renewable energy.
  • Join, create, or participate in public-private partnerships dedicated to deployment, technology transfers, education, de-risking markets, and other relevant areas.
  • Participate in public awareness campaigns focused on solar projects; share information with your community and networks.

Further information:

Sources
Evidence Base

Level of consensus: High

The scientific consensus surrounding distributed solar PV is strong in support of its emissions reduction potential, cost declines, and grid benefits, although nuances and regional gaps persist. Many studies have documented adoption drivers, grid impacts, performance constraints, and social equity issues, together forming a robust evidence base.

Distributed solar PV not only reduces emissions but also enhances local grid resilience, with one study demonstrating reductions in peak load and frequency interruptions (Ovaere et al., 2020). However, careful grid integration planning, smart inverter controls, and grid upgrades are required to avoid adverse effects because rooftop PV affects voltage quality, reverse power flow, frequency stability, and protection systems (Alboaouh & Mohagheghi, 2020). High penetration of rooftop PV can also lead to voltage issues and power disruptions, create protection coordination issues, and strain regional grid elements (Tran et al., 2023; Uzum et al., 2021). 

Broad solar adoption, including household-level PV, depends on many factors, including key determinants such as affordability, policy support, infrastructure, and social norms. This is especially true in developing countries (Oliva & Atehortua Santamaria, 2025; Shakeel et al., 2023). In China, distributed solar PV development is now shaped by subsidy phase-out and grid parity dynamics after a decade of evolving policy and finance mechanisms (A. H. Zhang & Sirin, 2024). However, regardless of the regional policy landscape, distributed rooftop systems face real-world performance losses due to shading, panel tilt, temperature, and maintenance constraints (Venkatachalam et al., 2025).

The literature strongly supports the notion that distributed solar PV is an effective and scalable mitigation option that can reduce emissions, improve grid reliability, and democratize energy access. There is high consensus on its value, especially when deployed with supportive policy, proper engineering, and system integration. However, unresolved issues remain around cost dynamics of non-hardware components, performance in fragile grids, and equity of deployment. For instance, studies on environmental justice point to lower PV uptake in disadvantaged communities despite high solar potential (Lukanov & Krieger, 2019).

The results discussed in our analysis draw on 10 reviews/meta-analyses, 44 research articles, and 31 institutional reports, covering evidence from different parts of the world, covering evidence primarily from North America, Europe, and Asia. Many low-income and off-grid regions remain underrepresented, limiting generalizability. Further empirical research in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America is needed to understand distributed PV’s performance, policy interactions, and grid impacts in diverse contexts.

Updated Date

Deploy Utility-Scale Solar PV

Submitted by Drawdown Admin on
Sector
Electricity
Mode
Cut Emissions
Cluster
Shift Production
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Utility-scale solar photovoltaic array
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Summary

Utility-scale solar PV refers to large solar power systems, typically installed on open land and connected directly to a central electric grid, that generate electricity for widespread distribution. These systems generally have an installed capacity above 1 MW. There are various configurations of utility-scale solar PV systems and we include fixed-tilt and tracking systems in this solution. Systems on cropland are also considered in this solution, but dual production of crops and solar energy on the same land area is analyzed as a separate agrivoltaics solution.

Income & work,Health
Land resources,Water resources,Air quality
Description for Social and Search
Deploy Utility-Scale Solar PV is a Highly Recommended climate solution. It reduces the need to generate electricity from fossil fuels and so reduces GHG emissions.
Overview

An estimated 23% of GHG emissions on a 100-year basis comes from electricity generation annually (Clarke et al., 2022), and in 2022, more than 60% of global electricity generation came from fossil fuel–based energy sources (International Energy Agency [IEA], 2024b). Since solar is a clean, renewable resource, utility-scale solar PV does not contribute to GHG emissions or air pollution while generating energy. Deploying utility-scale solar PV reduces the need for electricity generation from fossil fuels, which reduces CO₂ emissions, as well as smaller amounts of methane and nitrous oxide. 

Utility-scale solar PV systems generate electricity by converting sunlight directly into electrical energy through the photovoltaic effect. These systems typically consist of large arrays of solar panels made from semiconductor materials (most commonly crystalline silicon), inverters that convert direct current (DC) electricity to alternating current (AC), structural mounting systems, and transformers. When sunlight strikes the surface of a solar panel, light energy is absorbed and transferred to electrons in the semiconductor material. If the energy is high enough, electrons then move between semiconductor layers producing a flow of electric current (US EIA, 2024). This electricity is routed through inverters, converted into grid-compatible AC power, and delivered to substations and transmission lines (Figure 1). The amount of electricity generated depends on the system size, the intensity of sunlight at the location (solar irradiance), panel efficiency, and the system’s capacity factor. Utility-scale solar PV achieves capacity factors of 9–35%, depending on geography, seasonal variation, and system design (Bolinger et al., 2023). 

There are two main categories of utility-scale systems – fixed-tilt installations, where solar panels are mounted in a static position, and tracking systems, which rotate to follow the sun’s path across the sky, improving energy yield. Newer advances in module design, including bifacial modules and cell technologies such as perovskite-silicon tandem cells, continue to improve system efficiency and lower overall costs of utility-scale solar PV (Gu et al., 2020; Mdallal et al., 2025). 

Utility-scale solar PV generates additional benefits, such as reduced air pollution, lower water use compared to thermal power plants, and relatively fewer public health impacts from energy production. While there are emissions associated with the manufacturing, transportation, and installation of utility-scale solar PV panels, these life-cycle emissions are more than 10 times lower than emissions from fossil fuel–based electricity generation (National Renewable Energy Laboratory [NREL], 2021). These life-cycle emissions are not quantified in this assessment but are typically addressed under industry- or supply chain-focused solutions. Because utility-scale solar PV produces no emissions during operation, the technology contributes significantly to clean energy transitions. 

Figure 1. (a) Anatomy of a solar cell. Two layers of semiconductor material – most commonly crystalline silicone – are sandwiched between electrodes. Both layers together create a silicon wafer. The layers of this silicon wafer are oppositely charged, which creates an electric field at the material interface. When energy from the sun is absorbed, electrons with sufficient energy cross the electric field and flow towards the electrodes, creating an electric current. (b) Solar panels are built by combining multiple solar cells into modules; multiple panels are used in a solar array. After electricity generation, inverters and transmission systems deliver power to consumers. Modified from (a) Husain et al. and (b) Renew Wisconsin.

Diagrams demonstrating components of a solar cell and a utility-scale transmission system

Sources: Husain, A.A., Hasan, W.Z.W., Shafie, S., Hamidon, M.N., & Pandey, S.S. (2018). Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 94, 779–791; (b) Renew Wisconsin. (2018). Utility-scale solar in Wisconsin.

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Adeh, E. H., Good, S. P., Calaf, M., & Higgins, C. W. (2019). Solar PV power potential is greatest over croplands. 9(1), Article 11442. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-019-47803-3

Ahmad, A., Power, N., & Finegan, E. (2025). Maximising solar PV potential: A comprehensive review of factors affecting photovoltaic installation and generation in a mild temperate oceanic climate. Solar Energy Advances, 5, Article 100111. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/J.SEJA.2025.100111 

Ahmad, M., Zeeshan, M., & Khan, J. A. (2023). Life cycle multi-objective (geospatial, techno-economic, and environmental) feasibility and potential assessment of utility scale photovoltaic power plants. Energy Conversion and Management, 291. Article 117260. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enconman.2023.117260

Badza, K., Soro, Y. M., & Sawadogo, M. (2023). Life cycle assessment of a 33.7 MW solar photovoltaic power plant in the context of a developing country. Sustainable Environment Research, 33(1), Article 38. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1186/S42834-023-00201-X

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Bolinger, M., Wiser, R., & O’Shaughnessy, E. (2022). Levelized cost-based learning analysis of utility-scale wind and solar in the United States. iScience, 25(6). Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/J.ISCI.2022.104378

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Credits

Lead Fellow

  • Michael Dioha, Ph.D.

Contributors

  • Al-Amin Bugaje, Ph.D.

  • Ruthie Burrows, Ph.D.

  • James Gerber, Ph.D.

  • Daniel Jasper

  • Megan Matthews, Ph.D.

  • Alex Sweeney

Internal Reviewers

  • James Gerber, Ph.D.

  • Amanda D. Smith, Ph.D.

Effectiveness

Table 1. Effectiveness at reducing emissions.

Unit: t CO₂‑eq/MW installed capacity/yr, 100-yr basis

Estimate 760
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Based on data provided by the IEA, global emissions from electricity generation accounted for an estimated 530 kg CO₂‑eq /MWh (540 kg CO₂‑eq /MWh, 20-yr basis) (IEA, 2024b; see Methodology: Appendix A for calculation details). To convert from MWh to MW, we used the global weighted average capacity factor for utility-scale solar PV of 16.2% (International Renewable Energy Agency [IRENA], 2024a). Utility-scale solar PV is estimated to reduce 760 t CO₂‑eq /MW (760 t CO₂‑eq /MW, 20-yr basis) of installed capacity annually (Table 1). 

To estimate the effectiveness of utility-scale solar PV, we assumed that newly installed utility-scale solar PV displaces an equivalent MWh of the global electricity grid mix. We then assumed the reduction in emissions from additional utility-scale solar PV capacity was equal to emissions (per MWh) from the 2023 global electricity grid mix (IEA, 2024b). Finally, we used the utility-scale solar PV capacity factor to convert to annual emissions per MW of installed capacity.

Actual avoided emissions will depend on the condition of the local grid at a particular time and place, including the level of solar already deployed (see Methodology, Appendix A). However, the relative emissions benefit from increased solar deployment depends on the energy sources it potentially displaces. Because solar energy output varies diurnally, demand peaks in the evenings need to be met by stored energy or other energy sources that can provide power as demand increases. In coal-dominated markets, increasing utility-scale solar PV generation could lead to overall increased emissions per MWh, even if coal plants operate less often because coal plants emit more during suboptimal operation and ramp-up/ramp-down phases (Suri et al., 2025). 

During operation, utility-scale solar PV emits negligible GHGs, so we assumed zero emissions per MW of installed capacity. However, emissions arise during manufacturing of components, transportation, installation, maintenance, and decommissioning, and are paid back within approximately 1–2 years (Ahmad et al., 2023; Badza et al., 2023; Mehedi et al., 2022; Pincelli et al., 2024; Smith et al., 2024). Studies from many different countries show that total emissions remain far below those of fossil fuel generation (Badza et al., 2023; Pincelli et al., 2024; NREL, 2021; Smith et al., 2024). Manufacturing using coal-intensive grids increases embodied emissions, highlighting the necessity of decarbonizing supply chains (Gan et al., 2023; Pehl et al., 2017).

In our analysis, we focused solely on emissions produced during electricity generation, so carbon payback time and embodied life-cycle emissions were not included in our estimates of effectiveness or climate impacts. 

Cost

We estimated a mean levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) for utility-scale solar PV of US$53/MWh based on three industry reports (IEA, 2024a; IRENA, 2025; NEA & IEA, 2020; see Methodology: Appendix A for details). LCOE values represent the average cost of producing one MWh of electricity over the operational lifetime of a power plant, allowing investors to compare their expected revenue to a standard set of costs. This cost metric has been used by international agencies for cost comparison across generation technologies, incorporating installed capital costs, operation and maintenance (O&M), project lifespan, and energy output. According to IRENA, between 2010 and 2024 the global weighted average LCOE for utility-scale solar PV fell by 90%, from US$417/MWh to US$43/MWh. This decline was driven by cost reductions across the PV value chain, with module and inverter price declines accounting for 55% of the LCOE drop (IRENA, 2025). Technological advances such as larger wafer sizes, improved ingot growth methods, diamond wire wafering, and new cell architectures supported these changes. Balance-of-system (BoS) hardware contributed another 8%, while engineering, procurement, construction, installation, development, and other soft costs accounted for 28% of the reduction in LCOE (IRENA, 2025). Better financing conditions, improved capacity factors, and lower O&M costs also played a role.

Recent macroeconomic conditions have slightly reversed the downward trend. Between 2023 and 2024, the global weighted average LCOE for utility-scale solar PV increased by 0.6%, with 13 of the 15 largest markets experiencing cost increases ranging from 7% in Poland to 36% in Australia. Higher financing costs from inflation and elevated interest rates helped drive these shifts. Despite these headwinds, utility-scale solar PV remains one of the cheapest options worldwide for generating electricity. Our estimated global mean LCOE (US$53/MWh) is lower than the 2023 weighted average LCOE for fossil fuels, which was US$70–176/MWh (IRENA, 2024a). However, since LCOE excludes revenue, real-world costs of utility-scale solar generation could be higher than estimated here.

Methods and Supporting Data

Methods and Supporting Data

Learning Curve

Table 2. Learning rate: drop in cost per doubling of the installed utility-scale solar PV production capacity.

Unit: %

25th percentile 30
Mean 34
Median (50th percentile) 34
75th percentile 38
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Utility-scale solar PV exhibits a pronounced learning curve, most clearly reflected in the steady decline of solar module prices as global deployment expands. The median learning rate for PV modules is estimated at 34%, meaning module prices fall by roughly one-third with every doubling of installed capacity (Table 2). Our estimated learning rate is based on trends in the past decade, while a longer historical estimate would be lower. According to a single source, significant economies of scale over the last decade have driven an even steeper learning rate of 42% (Masson et al., 2023). According to DNV’s Energy Transition Outlook 2024, the current global learning rate for module costs is about 26%, but projections suggest this will slow to around 17% by 2050 as cost components stabilize and the largest gains from scaling are realized (DNV, 2024). 

While module prices have seen the most dramatic reductions, similar trends are evident in total system costs. Studies tracking installed costs and LCOE for PV in the United States since 2007 report a 24% learning rate based on normalized LCOE for utility-scale PV, with an accelerated 45% between 2014 and 2020 (Bolinger et al., 2022). Between 2010 and 2023, IRENA (2024a) found that utility-scale solar PV achieved the highest global weighted-average learning rate for total installed costs among major renewables at 33.4%. Haas et al. (2023) similarly estimated a 33% learning rate for installed costs between 2010 and 2019. Meanwhile, operational expenditure (OPEX) is also expected to benefit from incremental learning, with DNV (2024) projecting a 9% OPEX-based learning rate through 2050, supported by advances in digital monitoring and maintenance practices. 

The drivers of these declines include economies of scale, technology improvements, and manufacturing efficiencies such as larger wafer formats, improved cell architectures, and advanced wafer processing techniques. Given this strong and sustained learning dynamic, continued global deployment is likely to further reduce costs. However, the pace of cost decline will vary depending on the time period, geographic market conditions, and whether costs are measured at the module level or across the full system.

Speed of Action

Speed of action refers to how quickly a climate solution physically affects the atmosphere after it is deployed. This is different from speed of deployment, which is the pace at which solutions are adopted.

At Project Drawdown, we define the speed of action for each climate solution as emergency brake, gradual, or delayed.

Deploy Utility-Scale Solar PV is a GRADUAL climate solution. It has a steady, linear impact on the atmosphere. As installed capacity of utility-scale PV increases over time, emissions from electricity generation are expected to decrease, assuming solar and other renewables displace fossil-fuel sources.

Caveats

One limitation of our approach is the assumption that each additional MWh generated by utility-scale solar PV displaces an equivalent MWh of the existing grid mix. This simplification implies that new utility-scale solar PV may at times displace other renewables such as onshore wind, rather than fossil fuel–based sources. In reality, the extent of avoided emissions varies based on regional grid dynamics, marginal generation sources, and the timing and location of electricity production. Utility-scale solar PV displaces a relatively high share of fossil fuel generation in grids where renewables are supported by flexible energy sources, such as natural gas (Suri et al., 2025). However, fossil fuel displacement is lower in coal-dominated grids, grids with significant nuclear or geothermal capacity, or regions where existing renewable capacity is already high (Baik et al., 2021; Bistline & Watten, 2025). 

Implementing utility-scale solar PV involves several caveats. Technically, projects require large areas of suitable land and strong grid connections. Poor siting can reduce output due to shading, dust, or suboptimal solar resource (Bamisile et al., 2025; Sengupta et al., 2024). These challenges can be reduced through careful site selection, use of bifacial modules, use of tracking systems, and improved maintenance practices such as dry-cleaning technologies in arid regions. Another technical caveat is end-of-life management. Cumulative global PV waste is expected to reach 60–78 million metric tons by 2050 (IRENA & IEA-PVPS, 2016), so scaling up recycling infrastructure and circular design is essential (Ovaitt et al., 2022). 

High capital intensity and financing constraints remain important barriers, particularly in emerging markets where high interest rates, policy uncertainty, and limited investor confidence increase project risk. Addressing these challenges often requires stable regulatory frameworks, concessional finance, and public–private partnerships to de-risk investments (Dioha, 2025). Supply-chain concentration also presents a caveat, as China dominates polysilicon and module production (IEA, 2022). 

There are also ecological and social caveats. Large solar farms may compete with agriculture or alter local ecosystems, particularly in sensitive desert or grassland habitats (Hernandez et al., 2014; Lafitte et al., 2023; Xu et al., 2024). Mitigation strategies such as agrivoltaics and siting on degraded land are increasingly used to minimize conflicts and deliver additional benefits (Adeh et al., 2019; Giri & Mohanty, 2022; Tawalbeh et al., 2021; Yavari et al., 2022). Social resistance can also emerge around land rights, visual impacts, or perceived inequitable distribution of project benefits, highlighting the importance of community engagement and benefit-sharing (Shyu & Yang, 2025; Susskind et al., 2022).

Current Adoption

Table 3. Current adoption level, 2023.

Unit: MW installed capacity

25th percentile 917,000
Mean 918,000
Median (50th percentile) 918,000
75th percentile 918,000
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As of 2023, the global installed capacity for utility-scale solar PV reached approximately 918,000 MW (Table 3). We estimated current adoption of utility-scale solar PV based on IEA reports (IEA, 2023a; Masson et al., 2024). Although we use 2023 as our baseline for current adoption, in 2024 an estimated additional 308,300 MW of utility-scale solar PV capacity was installed, bringing the global total to 1,226,000 MW or more than 1 TW (IEA, 2023a). 

In 2023, utility-scale solar PV accounted for 269.9 GW of new capacity additions, representing 59% of total global solar PV installed capacity that year (Masson et al., 2024). China continues to lead by a wide margin, with more than 435 GW of installed capacity, more than half the global total (Masson et al., 2024). Utility-scale solar PV systems are driving the majority of new additions in several key markets where large projects dominate deployment, including the U.S., India, Spain, and South Korea. By contrast, other regions such as the Middle East and Africa are progressing more slowly, with relatively limited large-scale deployments despite vast solar energy potential (SolarPower Europe, 2025). These disparities highlight the uneven pace of adoption across markets. For further details, see the Geographic Guidance section.

Adoption Trend

Figure 2. Global adoption of utility-scale solar PV, 2015–2023

Source: International Energy Agency. (2023). Solar PV power capacity in the Net Zero Scenario, 2015-2030. https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/solar-pv-power-capacity-in-the-net-zero-scenario-2015-2030 Licence: CC BY 4.0

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Table 4. Adoption trend, 2015–2023.

Unit: MW installed capacity/yr

25th percentile 65,000
Mean 101,000
Median (50th percentile) 82,000
75th percentile 99,000
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Global utility-scale solar PV capacity has grown rapidly, expanding from 113 GW in 2015 to about 918 GW by 2023 (Figure 2), reflecting technological progress, supportive policies, and accelerating investment. 

We calculated the global adoption trend by summing global adoption for each year between 2015 and 2023 and taking the year-to-year difference. Comparing year-to-year global adoption, the median global adoption trend was adding 82,000 MW of installed capacity per year, but expansion was unevenly distributed geographically (Table 4, Figure 2). 

Global utility-scale solar PV capacity expanded more than eightfold between 2015 and 2023 (IEA, 2023a). Growth was steady during the mid-2010s, averaging about 60–70 GW added per year, but adoption accelerated sharply in 2020, with annual additions climbing from 90 GW to 243 GW in 2023 (IEA, 2023a). This means that in 2023 alone, installations were more than double the yearly average of the previous five years, pushing the mean trendline to ~100 GW of annual growth since 2015. The data show a clear shift from incremental to exponential deployment, with utility-scale solar PV now accounting for the majority of global new renewable capacity (IRENA, 2024b).

Adoption Ceiling

Table 5. Adoption ceiling: upper limit for adoption level.

Unit: MW installed capacity

25th percentile 224,000,000
Mean 252,000,000
Median (50th percentile) 252,000,000
75th percentile 279,000,000
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The adoption ceiling for utility-scale solar PV is determined by the technology’s global technical potential, based primarily on solar resource availability. Since sunlight is geographically widespread and virtually inexhaustible, solar PV has one of the highest technical potentials of all renewable energy technologies. However, realistic deployment could vary across regions depending on land use, transmission access, and electricity demand. 

Estimates of utility-scale solar PV potential vary widely across the literature. A meta-analysis found global technical potential ranging from 1.01 × 10² PWh/yr to 1.36 × 10⁴ PWh/yr, spanning two orders of magnitude; the median value was 4.65 × 10² PWh/yr while the average was 2.20 × 10³ PWh/yr (de La Beaumelle et al., 2023). Dupont et al. (2020) estimated the global net potential at 225 PWh/yr for poly-Si PV and 332 PWh/yr for mono-Si PV, while Deng et al. (2015), using a 1 km² global grid analysis, estimated realistic long-term potentials of 88–782 PWh/yr. 

Despite the abundant solar resource, the adoption ceiling is unlikely to be reached due to other constraints. Land availability as well as competition with agriculture, urbanization, and protected ecosystems can restrict deployment (Diffendorfer et al., 2024; van de Ven et al., 2021). Grid integration poses another challenge, as high penetration of variable solar requires substantial investment in storage, flexible generation, and transmission to ensure system reliability. Regional solar resource quality, siting regulations, and access to capital further influence adoption (Ahmad et al., 2025; Bamisile et al., 2025). Emerging technologies such as agrivoltaics and floating PV can help overcome some of these barriers, bringing practical adoption levels closer to the ceiling (Adeh et al., 2019). 

For our analysis, we estimated the median technical potential, which corresponds to an adoption ceiling of 252 million MW of installed capacity for utility-scale solar PV (Table 5). 

Achievable Adoption

Table 6. Range of achievable adoption levels.

Unit: MW installed capacity

Current adoption 918,000
Achievable – low 12,000,000
Achievable – high 15,000,000
Adoption ceiling 252,000,000
Left Text Column Width

The IEA’s World Energy Outlook (WEO) 2024 presents several scenarios that explore future energy pathways under different assumptions about policies, technologies, and markets. For this analysis, we define the adoption achievable range for utility-scale solar PV based on the Stated Policies Scenario (STEPS) and the Announced Pledges Scenario (APS) (IEA, 2024a). However, the WEO does not explicitly distinguish between utility-scale and distributed solar PV in its projections. To bridge this gap, we conducted a simple linear projection using historical deployment trends to estimate the likely share of utility-scale PV within total solar PV capacity. Our analysis suggests that by 2050, utility-scale solar PV could represent approximately 74% of all solar PV deployment. This finding is consistent with IRENA’s REmap analysis, which projects that utility-scale systems will account for 60–80% of global solar PV capacity by mid-century (IRENA, 2019). Accordingly, for our study we assume that 74% of the IEA’s projected solar PV deployment in 2050 will come from utility-scale systems. This provides a reasonable basis for estimating adoption levels, while aligning with both historical patterns and complementary international assessments.

Achievable – Low 

The low achievable adoption level is based on the Stated Policies Scenario (STEPS), which reflects the current trajectory of utility-scale solar PV expansion under existing and announced policies. In this scenario, assuming utility-scale projects account for 74% of total solar PV capacity, global capacity is projected to grow more than 13-fold; from 918,000 MW in 2023 to approximately 12 million MW by 2050 (Table 6). This corresponds to an average compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 10%.

Achievable – High 

The high achievable adoption level is based on APS, which assumes the same policy framework as STEPS, plus full realization of announced national energy and climate targets, including net-zero commitments supported by stronger clean energy investments. Under this scenario, utility-scale solar PV capacity is projected to increase approximately 16-fold from 918,000 MW in 2023 to approximately 15 million MW by 2050 (Table 6), requiring a CAGR of 10.8% over the same period. 

Using our adoption ceiling of 252 million MW, the current adoption of utility-scale solar PV constitutes approximately 0.4% of its technical potential. The achievable adoption range, as calculated, lies between 4.8% and 5.9% of this potential.

Table 7. Climate impact at different levels of adoption.

Unit: Gt CO₂‑eq/yr, 100-yr basis

Current adoption 0.69
Achievable – low 9.2
Achievable – high 11.2
Adoption ceiling 190
Left Text Column Width

Using baseline global adoption and effectiveness, we estimated the current total climate impact of utility-scale solar PV to be approximately 0.70 Gt CO₂‑eq of reduced emissions per year (Table 7). 

We estimated climate impacts using the emissions from the 2023 baseline electricity grid. Actual emissions reductions could differ depending on how the emissions intensity of electricity generation changes over time. As solar and other renewables grow to represent an increasingly high percentage of power generation sources, grid emissions are expected to decrease over time (DNV, 2024; IEA, 2024a). As a result, the climate impacts presented here are likely overestimates. Assuming global policies on utility-scale solar PV – both existing and announced – are backed with adequate implementation provisions, global adoption could reach 12 million MW by 2050. This would result in an increased emissions reduction of approximately 9.2 Gt CO₂ ‑eq per year. If every nation’s energy and climate targets (including net-zero commitments backed by stronger clean energy investments) are realized, utility-scale solar PV adoption could reach 15 million MW by 2050, leading to an estimated 11 Gt CO₂ ‑eq of reduced emissions per year. 

We based the adoption ceiling solely on the technical potential of utility-scale solar PV, while neglecting social and economic constraints and realistic scenarios of future power demand (Dioha et al, 2025). Utility-scale solar PV installed capacity is unlikely to reach 252 million MW, but if current grid emissions remained constant while capacity increased, GHG emission reductions would be approximately 190 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr. This maximum is unrealistic as a forward-looking climate impact because it treats grid carbon intensity as permanently fixed at 2023 levels and ignores future decarbonization and corresponding decreases in marginal avoided emissions.

Additional Benefits

Income and Work

Solar PV can have a strong positive effect on the economy, as it accounts for 44% of renewable energy jobs globally and is the fastest-growing sector of renewable energy employment (IRENA & ILO, 2024). The majority of direct and indirect jobs in solar PV are found in China, followed by the European Union (IRENA & ILO, 2024). In the United States as of 2021, it was estimated that solar PV accounted for about 250,000 full-time jobs, with the majority of these jobs in the installation, project development, and manufacturing sectors (Gadzanku et al., 2023). While about half of solar PV jobs are in the distributed PV sector, utility-scale PV accounts for about 20% of these jobs and is expected to grow as installed capacities grow (Gadzanku et al., 2023). According to a report from NREL, about 509,000–757,000 jobs for both utility- and distributed-scale solar PV are projected to be added in the U.S. by 2030 (Truitt et al., 2022).

Health

Improvements in air quality offer health benefits from reduced air pollution exposure, including reduced premature mortality. The magnitude and distribution of these benefits depend on the local electricity grid mix, the fuels used to generate electricity, and atmospheric conditions that affect how far pollutants travel from emission sources (Buonocore et al., 2019). Regions with a higher proportion of coal-powered electricity generation will see more health benefits when utility-scale PV is deployed (Buonocore et al., 2019). These health benefits often translate into cost savings associated with reductions in hospital admissions, improved respiratory and cardiovascular conditions, and avoidance of lost work and school days (Millstein et al., 2017; Wiser et al., 2016). For example, a study from Chile found that when utility-scale solar PV projects were deployed, there was a reduction in hospital admissions for cardiovascular and respiratory conditions in cities downwind of fossil fuel–powered electricity plants (Rivera et al., 2024). 

Water Resources

Utility-scale solar PV systems have lower rates of water withdrawals and consumption than other fossil fuel–based electricity generation (Wiser et al., 2016). The majority of water use for PV electricity is for washing and dust suppression on the panels (Hernandez et al., 2014).

Land Resources

Although utility-scale PV projects require large areas of suitable land (see Caveats and Interactions), these projects can utilize degraded lands that may not be suitable for other uses (Diffendorfer et al., 2024; Hernandez et al., 2014).

Air Quality

Solar PV reduces air pollutants released from fossil fuel energy generation, thereby avoiding the emission of pollutants such as nitrogen oxides, sulfur dioxide, and PM2.5 associated with burning coal and natural gas (Abel et al., 2018; Millstein et al., 2024; Millstein et al., 2017; Wiser et al., 2016). Regional differences in the amount and type of air pollutants avoided will vary depending on the fossil fuel type that PV displaces (Gallagher & Holloway, 2020). For example, since coal has different emissions than gas, regions with higher levels of coal-powered electricity will experience different air quality benefits than regions with more gas-powered electricity (Millstein et al., 2017). Depending on meteorological conditions, pollutants can be transported for long distances after they are emitted, so air pollution benefits can be widespread (Millstein et al., 2024).

Risks

Several risks accompany the large-scale rollout of utility-scale solar PV. Rapid deployment without adequate storage, grid flexibility, or transmission can elevate curtailment rates, undermining both financial returns and emissions reductions (Firoozi et al., 2025; Zubi et al., 2024). However, financial risk from high solar deployment and integration can be avoided with various policy levers, such as carbon taxes (Brown & Reichenberg, 2021). Different policy levers are necessary at different levels of adoption. The combined impact of higher shares of renewables generating electricity and increased electrification of consumer services can lead to greater risk of the intermittent supply from renewables being unable to meet electricity demand at all hours of the year (Wolak, 2022). Since long-term forecasting of supply is more challenging for technologies like wind and solar, stable electricity prices are not always guaranteed. This higher investment risk can discourage generators from investing in clean energy deployment (Dimanchev et al., 2024) in the absence of policy mechanisms such as contracts for difference that can manage investment risks by supporting creation of electricity markets with stable long-term prices (Beiter et al., 2024). 

Concentrated supply chains also create vulnerabilities to trade disruptions, geopolitical tensions, and ethical risks, including documented concerns concerning forced labor in parts of the supply chain (IEA, 2022; Reinsch & Arrieta-Kenna, 2021). Environmental and health risks arise if end-of-life infrastructure and policies are inadequate; billions of metric tons of PV waste could otherwise end up in landfills, with additional concerns in some areas over water usage for panel cleaning or habitat disruption due to poorly sited installations (Bajagain et al., 2020; Chowdhury et al., 2020; IRENA & IEA-PVPS, 2016).

Interactions with Other Solutions

Reinforcing

Increased availability of renewable energy from utility-scale solar PV helps reduce emissions from the electricity grid as a whole. Reduced emissions from the electricity grid lead to lower downstream emissions for solutions that rely on electricity use. Deploying utility-scale solar PV also supports increased integration of wind power technologies by diversifying the renewable energy mix and reducing exposure to wind variability.

High penetration of utility-scale PV could incentivize increased adoption of automation systems that take advantage of times of high solar generation and lower electricity prices.

Electrification of transportation systems will be more beneficial in reducing global emissions if the underlying grid includes a higher proportion of non-emitting power sources. Electric transportation systems can also reduce curtailment of solar energy through controlled-time charging and other load-shifting technologies.

Competing

In regions where grid expansion is slow, prioritizing large-scale solar PV plants may delay distributed PV systems that are essential for rural or last-mile electrification.

Since wind and solar can generate electricity at the same times of day, deploying utility-scale solar PV could create competition for grid connections, reduce daytime electricity revenues, and suppress adoption of additional wind power.

Increased development and installation of utility-scale solar PV requires dedicated land use which limits land availability for other renewable energy technologies, raw material and food production, and conservation programs. For example, utility-scale solar PV competes with the following solutions for land:

Dashboard

Solution Basics

MW installed capacity

t CO₂-eq (100-yr)/unit
760
units/yr
Current 918,000 01.2×10⁷1.5×10⁷
Achievable (Low to High)

Climate Impact

Gt CO₂-eq (100-yr)/yr
Current 0.69 9.211
Gradual

CO₂ , CH₄, N₂O, BC

Trade-offs

Utility-scale solar PV delivers substantial net emissions savings, but significant trade-offs persist. Curtailment often reflects economic policy outcomes and grid integration constraints rather than a technical necessity. Limited integration infrastructure may also necessitate reliance on backup fossil-powered plants, thereby shifting emissions elsewhere in the energy system (Frew et al., 2021). Land use also involves trade-offs, as large projects can disrupt ecosystems or agricultural land, though co-location strategies such as agrivoltaics and usage of degraded lands can help offset these impacts (Chopdar et al., 2024; Giri & Mohanty, 2022). 

The temporal variability of solar energy also creates trade-offs. When demand peaks in evening hours, non-solar energy sources ramp up generation, which could lead to increases in marginal emissions (Gagnon & O’Shaughnessy, 2024). In regions with high solar deployment, increased adoption of distributed PV could displace utility-scale solar generation, since both operate diurnally, resulting in no net reduction in grid emissions (Bistline & Watten, 2025).

kWh/m2/yr
3622400

Annual global horizontal irradiance (GHI)

Global horizontal irradiance (GHI) measures the intensity (energy per area per year) of all solar radiant energy on a horizontal surface. The power output of fixed solar PV systems is limited by horizontal irradiance, although additional solar energy can be captured if tracking systems are incorporated into panels. These estimates are based on regional data from as early as 1994 and as late as 2024.

Energy Sector Management Assistant Program, The World Bank Group & Solargis. (2025). GHI - Global horizontal irradiation (GSA 2.12) [Data set]. The World Bank Group. Retrieved March 13, 2026, from Link to source: https://globalsolaratlas.info/download/world

kWh/m2/yr
3622400

Annual global horizontal irradiance (GHI)

Global horizontal irradiance (GHI) measures the intensity (energy per area per year) of all solar radiant energy on a horizontal surface. The power output of fixed solar PV systems is limited by horizontal irradiance, although additional solar energy can be captured if tracking systems are incorporated into panels. These estimates are based on regional data from as early as 1994 and as late as 2024.

Energy Sector Management Assistant Program, The World Bank Group & Solargis. (2025). GHI - Global horizontal irradiation (GSA 2.12) [Data set]. The World Bank Group. Retrieved March 13, 2026, from Link to source: https://globalsolaratlas.info/download/world

Maps Introduction

Utility-scale solar PV deployment is driven by a variety of factors, some of which are spatial (such as total incident solar radiation) and some which may indirectly depend on geography, such as socioeconomic and market conditions.

More than 30 countries had more than 1 GW installed by the end of 2023 including new markets in the Middle East and Africa. Ten countries represented 84% of total solar markets in 2023, including distributed solar PV, with China, the United States, and India at the top of the list (IEA PVPS, 2023). Utility-scale solar PV dominated 2023 solar PV installations in both China and the United States, accounting for 65% and 70% of the Chinese and U.S. solar markets respectively (IEA PVPS, 2023).

In many regions, deployment of utility-scale solar PV lags significantly behind the economic and decarbonization potential, and large-scale deployment does not typically align with regions of maximal potential, as can be seen by comparing maps of installed capacity and irradiance. Brazil and Australia are notable exceptions, having significant deployment and high levels of GHI (Bamisile et al., 2025). However, utility-scale solar PV markets in Brazil and Australia are much smaller than in China and the United States. In emerging markets, solar PV competitiveness is stifled by limited access to capital, lack of technical talent, and persistent fossil-fuel subsidies. Targeted capital investments in sub-Saharan Africa can yield up to nine times the GHG emissions reduction of equivalent investments in more mature markets (Peters, 2025). In more mature markets like the U.S., barriers are primarily structural, including long grid interconnection timelines and high costs (Gorman et al., 2025). 

The emissions benefit from increased solar PV deployment depends on the energy sources it displaces. Displacing sources of electricity that emit more GHGs leads to greater emissions reductions. However, real-world emissions reductions also depend on which sources are able to provide power when solar PV is unable to meet peaks in demand. In addition to targeting regions with dirtier grids, increasing utility-scale solar PV in regions with more dispatchable power sources and robust storage infrastructure could increase emissions reductions (Bistline & Watten, 2025). Here we show a map of avoided emissions with each incremental addition of solar PV, calculated by WattTime (watttime.org).

Action Word
Deploy
Solution Title
Utility-Scale Solar PV
Classification
Highly Recommended
Lawmakers and Policymakers
  • Set ambitious long-term renewable energy goals, and incorporate them into national climate plans and multilateral agreements.
  • Ensure regulatory frameworks around solar are strong and enforced, while also being accessible and timely; coordinate solar power policies horizontally (e.g., across agencies) and vertically (e.g., across subnational, national, and international efforts); seek to align social and environmental safeguards and streamline permitting processes.
  • Adopt and progressively raise renewable energy procurement standards for the public sector to expand demand and investment in utility-scale solar PV.
  • Set renewable energy quotas for power companies; offer expedited permitting processes for renewable energy production, including solar where competitive, while maintaining social and environmental safeguards.
  • Develop long-term, flexible partnership frameworks with industry to align power supply contracts (such as adaptable or aggregated Purchase Power Agreements (PPAs) with national decarbonization targets and timelines.
  • Set adjustments for solar power on-grid pricing through schemes such as feed-in tariffs, renewable energy auctions, or other guaranteed pricing methods for solar energy.
  • Offer incentives to manufacturers, operators, developers, and other relevant actors, such as subsidies, feed-in tariffs, auctions, tax credits, and contracts-for-difference; as the market matures and becomes competitive, gradually reduce these incentives to create long-term market stability.
  • Implement carbon taxes and remove subsidies from fossil fuel infrastructure; redirect those funds into renewable energy.
  • Consider using green bonds to finance public projects and/or de-risk markets.
  • Invest in and subsidize improvements to grid integration and flexibility, storage, and transmission infrastructure to manage variable generation; deploy smart grid technologies.
  • Work with industry to diversify supply chains; design incentives and policies to stimulate local or regional production and advance R&D.
  • Provide incentives for consumers to adjust energy use in response to renewable availability and grid conditions, such as through dynamic or demand-responsive pricing models that complement solar PV generation and support decarbonization.
  • Earmark a percentage of financial incentives for low- and middle-income communities and/or countries.
  • Improve labor and human rights laws and environmental standards around solar PV supply chains; enforce standards with industry – particularly for the extraction and use of critical minerals and panel manufacturing.
  • Co-design utility-scale solar projects with the local community; ensure the community engagement process starts early and is transparent, inclusive, and ongoing; solicit feedback from the local community – including from opposition groups – on location, design, finance, and mitigation; ensure finalized projects address relevant sociological, agricultural, and ecological considerations.
  • Ensure projects operating in or with Indigenous communities only do so under free, prior, and informed consent; codify free, prior, and informed consent into legal systems.
  • Encourage utility-scale solar projects to distribute benefits to the local community, such as reduced utility rates; encourage developers to use Community Benefit Agreements (CBAs).
  • Create and/or incentivize pathways for community solar projects, such as community-shared and cooperative business models.
  • Regulate zoning and distance from existing houses, communities, and villages to prevent enclosing these spaces or interfering with the quality of life for local residents; avoid developing on sensitive ecosystems, such as wetlands and forests; require assessments and techniques to protect against negative impacts on biodiversity.
  • Ensure strong quality control requirements for all stages of deployment including resource extraction, manufacturing, installation, maintenance, and end-of-life service; create certification programs for each stage of the process.
  • Work with the private sector to develop workforce training programs, ensuring capacity development for all stages of deployment – including end-of-life services.
  • Ensure strong regulations are in place for end-of-life services; enact Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) for manufacturers; work with industry to foster a market for used, refurbished, and recycled panels.
  • Join, create, or participate in public-private partnerships dedicated to de-risking markets, deployment, technology transfers, education, and other relevant areas.
  • Establish one-stop-shop educational programs that use online and in-person methods to educate the industry and public on regulations, the benefits of solar, best practices for development, and other relevant information: ensure the material is sufficient and appropriate for local contexts, paying particularly close attention to language barriers. 

Further information:

Practitioners
  • Enter into long-term flexible industry agreements, such as PPAs, with both public and private sectors.
  • If possible, work with government bodies, companies, and large institutions to provide renewable energy directly to their operations.
  • Take advantage of government incentives such as subsidies, feed-in tariffs, auctions, tax credits, and contracts-for-difference; as the market matures and becomes competitive, seek to gradually reduce reliance on these incentives to create long-term market stability.
  • Consider using green bonds to finance public projects or de-risk markets.
  • Invest in strengthening grid integration and flexibility through expanded energy storage, upgraded transmission infrastructure, and the deployment of smart grid technologies to effectively manage variable renewable generation.
  • Work with the public sector to diversify supply chains; take advantage of incentives and policies that stimulate local or regional production and advance R&D.
  • Ensure supply chains comply with international labor and human rights laws and standards – particularly, for the extraction of critical minerals and panel manufacturing.
  • Co-design utility-scale solar projects with the local community; ensure the community engagement process starts early and is transparent, inclusive, and ongoing; solicit feedback from the local community – including from opposition groups – on location, design, finance, and mitigation; ensure finalized projects address relevant sociological, agricultural, and ecological considerations.
  • Ensure projects operating in or with Indigenous communities only do so under free, prior, and informed consent; incorporate free, prior, and informed consent into bylaws and/or procedures.
  • Design utility-scale solar projects to support the development of the local community such as reduced utility rates; utilize CBAs.
  • Ensure development is a safe distance from existing houses, communities, and villages to prevent enclosing these spaces or interfering with the quality of life for local residents; avoid developing on sensitive ecosystems, such as wetlands and forests; conduct assessments and deploy techniques to protect negative impacts on biodiversity.
  • Seek to decarbonize the full life cycle including supply chains, production, installation, recycling, and disposal as much as possible.
  • Ensure strong quality control for all stages of deployment, including resource extraction, manufacturing, installation, maintenance, and end-of-life service.
  • Work with the public sector and private organizations to develop workforce training programs, ensuring capacity development for all stages of deployment – including end-of-life services.
  • Adhere to regulations regarding end-of-life servicing; adopt extended producer responsibility and high-integrity end-of-life servicing standards if no policy framework exists.
  • Use bifacial modules, tracking systems, and improved maintenance practices, such as dry-cleaning, when beneficial.
  • Invest directly into and help develop recycling infrastructure for solar panels.
  • Participate in, offer, or explore co-investments in electricity infrastructure (e.g., shared transmission).
  • Grant access to researchers and offer data, when possible, to advance deployment and refine best practices.
  • Participate in voluntary agreements with government bodies to increase policy support for solar capacity and power generation.
  • Stay abreast of and engage with changing policies, regulations, zoning laws, tax incentives, and related developments to help remove commercial barriers.
  • Join, create, or participate in public-private partnerships dedicated to de-risking markets, deployment, technology transfers, education, and other relevant areas.

Further information:

Business Leaders
  • Set ambitious long term renewable energy goals, incorporate them into corporate net zero strategies.
  • Enter into PPAs, long-term contracts between a company (the buyer) and a renewable energy producer (the seller).
  • Support long-term, stable contracts (e.g., PPAs or contracts for difference) that de-risk investment in solar technologies and incentivize local supply chain development.
  • Take advantage of government incentives, such as tax credits, if possible; seek to gradually reduce reliance on these incentives to create long-term market stability.
  • Purchase high-integrity renewable energy certificates (RECs) for solar energy; help create transparent, verified, and reliable REC markets.
  • Invest in companies that produce, deploy, or provide end-of-life servicing for solar panels; seek to diversify and localize supply chains.
  • Invest in R&D and related technology.
  • Support workforce development programs, offer employee scholarships, and/or sponsor training for careers in solar power; ensuring capacity development for all stages of deployment – including end-of-life services.
  • Participate in community engagement processes and co-design utility-scale solar projects with the local community; help educate the public and highlight the local economic benefits of solar and renewable energy.
  • Offer pro bono business advice or general support for community solar projects, such as community-shared and cooperative business models.
  • Join, create, or participate in public-private partnerships dedicated to de-risking markets, deployment, technology transfers, education, and other relevant areas.

Further information:

Nonprofit Leaders
  • Advocate for ambitious long-term national goals on solar and renewable energy; advocate to incorporate them into national climate plans and multilateral agreements.
  • Operate or help with equipment testing and certification systems, market information disclosures, and onsite supervision.
  • Coordinate voluntary agreements between governments and industry to increase utility-scale solar capacity and power generation.
  • Conduct open-access research to improve the performance of solar PVs, forecasting, and related technologies.
  • Advocate for strong regulatory frameworks that are also accessible and timely; recommend coordinated solar power policies – both horizontally (e.g., across agencies) and vertically (e.g., across subnational, national, and international efforts); help align social and environmental safeguards and pursue streamlined permitting processes.
  • Urge governments to provide incentives to manufacturers, operators, developers, and other relevant actors, such as subsidies, feed-in tariffs, auctions, tax credits, and contracts-for-difference; recommend gradual reductions of these incentives to create long-term market stability.
  • Campaign for public investments in improvements to grid integration and flexibility, storage, and transmission infrastructure to manage variable generation.
  • Call for a percentage of public financing to be earmarked for low- and middle-income communities and/or countries.
  • Help improve enforcement of labor and human rights laws and standards around solar PV supply chains – particularly for the extraction and use of critical minerals.
  • Call on governments and developers to use transparent, inclusive, and ongoing community engagement processes to co-design utility-scale solar installations; help solicit community feedback on location, design, finance, mitigation, and distribution of benefits; help ensure finalized projects address relevant sociological, agricultural, and ecological considerations.
  • Advocate and/or support for the use of free, prior, and informed consent with projects operating in or with Indigenous communities; advocate to codify free, prior, and informed consent into legal systems.
  • Advocate for distributed benefits to the local community from utility-scale solar projects, such as reduced utility rates; encourage developers to use CBAs.
  • Help create or support community solar projects, such as community-shared, third-party-owned, and cooperative business models.
  • Advocate for zoning laws to prevent enclosing communities or interfering with the quality of life for local residents; help developers avoid sensitive ecosystems, such as wetlands and forests; conduct site assessments and offer recommendations to prevent or mitigate negative impacts on biodiversity.
  • Create resources and/or standards to improve quality control for all stages of deployment, including resource extraction, manufacturing, installation, maintenance, and end-of-life service; create and/or administer certification programs for each stage of the process.
  • Work with the public and private sectors to develop workforce training programs, ensuring capacity development for all stages of deployment – including end-of-life services.
  • Urge governments and industry to adopt strong regulations for end-of-life services; call for extended producer responsibility; work with industry to foster a market for used, refurbished, or recycled panels.
  • Advocate for carbon taxes and the removal of subsidies from fossil fuel infrastructure; recommend those funds be redirected into renewable energy.
  • Join, create, or participate in public-private partnerships dedicated to de-risking markets, deployment, technology transfers, education, and other relevant areas.
  • Establish one-stop-shop educational programs that use online and in-person methods to educate the industry and public on regulations, the benefits of solar, best practices for development, and other relevant information; ensure the material is sufficient and appropriate for local contexts, paying particularly close attention to language barriers. 

Further information:

Investors
  • Offer low-interest loans and concessional financing for manufacturers, developers, operators, and recyclers.
  • Invest directly in the development of utility-scale solar projects; ensure projects include community engagement processes, seek to distribute benefits, and operate under free, prior, and informed consent when working with Indigenous communities.
  • Invest in companies that produce, deploy, or provide end-of-life servicing for solar panels; seek to diversify and localize supply chains.
  • Invest in supporting infrastructures, such as utility companies, grid development, and access roads.
  • Invest in green bonds and/or explore blended finance structures to mobilize capital for companies developing solar energy or supporting infrastructure.
  • Invest in the recycling infrastructure for solar panels and circular supply chains.
  • Invest in R&D, component technology, and related science, such as forecasting.
  • Help de-risk energy transitions in low- and middle-income countries by offering low-interest loans, concessional financing, and/or favorable terms.
  • Align investments with existing public-private partnerships, voluntary agreements, or voluntary guidance that may apply in the location of the investment (including those that apply to biodiversity).

Further information:

Philanthropists and International Aid Agencies
  • Provide catalytic financing for, or help develop, utility-scale solar projects.
  • Award grants to improve supporting infrastructures, such as utility companies, grid development, and access roads.
  • Support the development of component technology and related science, such as forecasting.
  • Award grants to improve the recycling infrastructure for solar panels and build circular supply chains.
  • Facilitate partnerships to share solar technology and best practices between established and emerging markets, promoting energy equity and access.
  • Foster cooperation and technology transfer between low- and middle-income countries with emerging solar sectors.
  • Award grants to enhance grid integration, flexibility, and reliability by supporting innovations in energy storage systems, advanced grid management, and transmission infrastructure that enable effective integration of solar PV generation.
  • Advocate for ambitious long-term national goals on solar and renewable energy; advocate to incorporate them into national climate plans and multilateral agreements.
  • Operate, fund, or support equipment testing and certification systems, market information disclosures, and onsite supervision.
  • Coordinate voluntary agreements between governments and industry to increase utility-scale solar capacity and power generation.
  • Conduct open-access research to improve the performance of solar PVs, forecasting, and related technologies.
  • Advocate for strong regulatory frameworks that are also accessible and timely; recommend coordinated solar power policies – both horizontally (e.g., across agencies) and vertically (e.g., across subnational, national, and international efforts); help align social and environmental safeguards and pursue streamlined permitting processes.
  • Advocate for a percentage of public financing to be earmarked for low- and middle-income communities and/or countries.
  • Help improve enforcement of labor and human rights laws and standards around solar PV supply chains – particularly for the extraction and use of critical minerals.
  • Call on governments and developers to use transparent, inclusive, and ongoing community engagement processes to co-design utility-scale solar installations; help solicit community feedback on location, design, finance, mitigation, and distribution of benefits; help ensure finalized projects address relevant sociological, agricultural, and ecological considerations.
  • Champion and/or support for the use of free, prior, and informed consent with projects operating in or with Indigenous communities; advocate to codify free, prior, and informed consent into legal systems.
  • Advocate for distributed benefits to the local community from utility-scale solar projects, such as reduced utility rates; encourage developers to use CBAs.
  • Help create or support community solar projects, such as community-shared and cooperative business models.
  • Create resources and/or standards to improve quality control for all stages of deployment, including resource extraction, manufacturing, installation, maintenance, and end-of-life service; create and/or administer certification programs for each stage of the process.
  • Work with the public and private sectors to develop workforce training programs; ensuring capacity development for all stages of deployment – including end-of-life services.
  • Urge governments and industry to adopt strong regulations for end-of-life services; call for extended producer responsibility; work with industry to foster a market for used, refurbished, or recycled panels.
  • Join, create, or participate in public-private partnerships dedicated to de-risking markets, deployment, technology transfers, education, and other relevant areas.
  • Establish one-stop-shop educational programs that use online and in-person methods to educate the industry and public on regulations, the benefits of solar, best practices for development, and other relevant information; ensure the material is sufficient and appropriate for local contexts, paying particularly close attention to language barriers. 

Further information:

Further information: 

Thought Leaders
  • Advocate for ambitious long-term national goals on solar and renewable energy; advocate to incorporate them into national climate plans and multilateral agreements.
  • Operate or help with equipment testing and certification systems, market information disclosures, and onsite supervision.
  • Conduct open-access research to improve the performance of solar PVs, forecasting, and related technologies.
  • Advocate for strong regulatory frameworks that are also accessible and timely; recommend coordinated solar power policies – both horizontally (e.g., across agencies) and vertically (e.g., across subnational, national, and international efforts); help align social and environmental safeguards and pursue streamlined permitting processes.
  • Urge governments to provide incentives to manufacturers, operators, developers, and other relevant actors, such as subsidies, feed-in tariffs, auctions, tax credits, and contracts-for-difference; recommend gradual reductions of these incentives to create long-term market stability.
  • Campaign for public investments in improvements to grid integration and flexibility, storage, and transmission infrastructure to manage variable generation.
  • Advocate for a percentage of public financing to be earmarked for low- and middle-income communities and/or countries.
  • Help improve enforcement of labor and human rights laws and standards around solar PV supply chains – particularly for the extraction and use of critical minerals.
  • Call on governments and developers to use transparent, inclusive, and ongoing community engagement processes to co-design utility-scale solar installations; help solicit community feedback on location, design, finance, mitigation, and distribution of benefits; help ensure finalized projects address relevant sociological, agricultural, and ecological considerations.
  • Champion and/or support for the use of free, prior, and informed consent with projects operating in or with Indigenous communities; advocate to codify free, prior, and informed consent into legal systems.
  • Advocate for distributed benefits to the local community from utility-scale solar projects, such as reduced utility rates; encourage developers to use CBAs.
  • Help create or support community solar projects, such as community-shared, third-party-owned, and cooperative business models.
  • Advocate for strong regulations for end-of-life services; advocate for extended producer responsibility; work with industry to foster a market for used, refurbished, or recycled panels.
  • Advocate for carbon taxes and the removal of subsidies from fossil fuel infrastructure; recommend those funds be redirected into renewable energy.
  • Join, create, or participate in public-private partnerships dedicated to de-risking markets, deployment, technology transfers, education, and other relevant areas.
  • Establish one-stop-shop educational programs that use online and in-person methods to educate the industry and public on regulations, the benefits of solar, best practices for development, and other relevant information; ensure the material is sufficient and appropriate for local contexts, paying particularly close attention to language barriers. 

Further information:

Technologists and Researchers
  • Continue advancing the performance of monocrystalline and polycrystalline silicon cells.
  • Continue advancing bifacial module designs and next-generation solar cell technologies, including perovskite-silicon tandem cells, organic photovoltaics, dye-sensitized solar cells, and passivated emitter and rear contact cells.
  • Advance energy storage systems technologies, such as battery, hydrogen, gravity-based, and other energy storage systems.
  • Improve manufacturing efficiencies, such as larger wafer formats, improved cell architectures, and advanced wafer processing techniques.
  • Continue developing agrivoltaics; improve scientific understanding of water drainage, runoff, and erosion under and near utility-scale solar PV; develop relevant best practices.
  • Advance technologies for floating solar PV installations; seek scalable solutions relevant for utility-scale.
  • Improve recycling infrastructure and scalable technologies to repair, reuse, or recover materials from solar panels.
  • Create more heat-tolerant PV technologies and systems to reduce heat exposure and/or absorption.
  • Create better protection and cleaning systems for PV to preserve functionality during extreme weather and in extreme environments, particularly in deserts.
  • Improve related mining technologies for critical minerals to be safer, less disruptive to local communities and ecosystems, and less energy-intensive.
  • Develop ways of eliminating, reducing, reusing, and/or safely disposing of hazardous byproducts of the PV manufacturing process.
  • Research and develop analytical tools for land allocation and development, taking into account human rights, environmental concerns, energy needs, agricultural demands, and other relevant factors, such as changing weather patterns.
  • Research factors that lead to community acceptance and energy justice for utility-scale solar.
  • Research the impact of utility-scale solar on biodiversity – particularly mammals, amphibians, reptiles, and microorganisms; examine methods to mitigate impacts on biodiversity; research optimal land allocation strategies, comparisons between installation methods and operations, best practices, and the potential for solar installations to provide habitats to some native species; examine relationship with and impacts on invasive species.
  • Research the impacts of floating PV installations on biodiversity – particularly terrestrial or semi-aquatic species.

Further information:

Communities, Households, and Individuals
  • Purchase high-integrity RECs, which track ownership of renewable energy generation.
  • If your utility company offers transparent green pricing – which charges a premium to cover the extra cost of renewable energy – and if it fits your budget, opt into it.
  • Help create or support community solar projects, such as community-shared, third-party-owned, and cooperative business models.
  • Call on governments and developers to use transparent, inclusive, and ongoing community engagement processes; participate in these processes when possible to co-design utility-scale solar installations; provide and help collect feedback on location, design, finance, mitigation, and distribution of benefits; help ensure finalized projects address relevant sociological, agricultural, and ecological considerations.
  • Advocate for a percentage of public financing to be earmarked for low- and middle-income communities and/or countries.
  • Champion and/or support for the use of free, prior, and informed consent with projects operating in or with Indigenous communities; advocate to codify free, prior, and informed consent into legal systems.
  • Advocate for distributed benefits to the local community from utility-scale solar projects, such as reduced utility rates; encourage developers to use CBAs.
  • Participate in public awareness campaigns focused on solar projects; share information with your community and networks.

Further information:

Sources
Evidence Base

Consensus of effectiveness of utility-scale solar PV in reducing greenhouse gas emissions: High

Utility-scale solar PV is firmly established as an efficient and effective electricity source. Increasing availability of energy produced from PV reduces the need for fossil fuel–derived energy sources such as coal and gas, leading to lower GHG emissions from the global electricity sector. The evidence base for utility-scale solar PV is robust and a wide range of peer-reviewed studies, international energy outlooks, and meta-analyses converge on the conclusion that solar PV is a cornerstone of sustainable global energy production. The IPCC (IPCC, 2023) identifies solar PV as indispensable in all mitigation scenarios, while the IEA’s World Energy Outlook 2024 (IEA, 2024a) highlights PV as the largest single source of electricity in net-zero aligned pathways. Similarly, IRENA documents how rapid cost declines, performance improvements, and policy support have enabled utility-scale solar PV to become one of the cheapest sources of new electricity in many regions (IRENA, 2025). Utility-scale solar PV projects have particularly benefited from economies of scale and competitive auctions, accelerating their role in global electricity markets (DNV, 2024; Masson et al., 2024).

The technical potential of solar PV refers to the maximum electricity generation achievable given solar resource availability, constrained only by physical and technological factors. Meta-analyses reveal wide ranges from 101 PWh/yr to more than 13,600 PWh/yr (de La Beaumelle et al., 2023). With only 1.29 PWh generated from solar PV in 2023, the sector is still far from its potential ceiling due to multiple barriers (IEA, 2024b). 

Integration into power systems requires significant investment in grid flexibility, storage, and transmission infrastructure to manage variable generation (Frew et al., 2021; IEA-ETSAP & IRENA, 2015; Tambari et al., 2020). Financing barriers, particularly in Africa and parts of the Global South, remain critical, with high capital costs and policy uncertainty slowing adoption despite abundant solar resource (Dato et al., 2025). 

Notwithstanding, there is high scientific agreement on the effectiveness of utility-scale solar PV as a core climate solution. The results presented here summarize findings from 11 reviews/meta-analyses, 45 research articles, and 25 institutional reports, covering evidence from different parts of the world. We acknowledge potential underrepresentation of insights from sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, which could introduce regional bias in those regions where utility-scale solar PV deployment potential remains substantially underdeveloped.

Updated Date

Deploy LED Lighting

Submitted by Drawdown Admin on
Sector
Electricity
Mode
Cut Emissions
Cluster
Enhance Efficiency
Image
Office building exterior showing many floors of indoor lit offices
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Summary

We define the Deploy LED Lighting solution as replacing energy-inefficient light sources with light-emitting diodes (LEDs). Lighting accounts for 15–20% of electricity use in buildings. Using LEDs reduces the electricity that building lighting consumes, and thereby cuts GHG emissions from global electricity generation.

Income & work,Health
Water quality,Air quality
Description for Social and Search
Using LEDs reduces the electricity that building lighting consumes, and thereby cuts GHG emissions from global electricity generation.
Overview

LED technology for lighting indoor and outdoor spaces is more energy-efficient than other lighting sources currently on the market (Zissis et al., 2021). This is because LEDs are solid-state semiconductors that emit light generated through a direct conversion of the flow of electricity (electroluminescence) rather than heating a tungsten filament to make it glow. More of the electrical energy goes to producing light in an LED lamp than in less-efficient alternative lighting technologies such as incandescent light bulbs or compact fluorescent lamps (CFLs) (Koretsky, 2021; Nair & Dhoble, 2021a). This difference offers significant energy-efficiency gains (see Figure 1).

Globally, lighting-related electricity consumption can account for as much as 20% of the total annual electricity used in buildings (Gayral, 2017; Pompei et al., 2020; Pompei et al., 2022). In 2022, the IEA estimated that total electricity consumption for lighting buildings globally was 1,736 TWh (Lane, 2023). Schleich et al. (2014) and others have argued that buildings consume more electricity for lighting due to a rebound effect when occupants perceive a lighting source as efficient. However, the growing adoption of LED lighting over the years has significantly optimized electricity consumption from building lighting, especially in residential buildings (Lane, 2023).

According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2006), generating electricity from fossil fuels emits CO₂,  methane, and nitrous oxide. Replacing inefficient lamps with LEDs cuts these emissions by reducing electricity demand. LEDs often have a power rating of 4–10 W, which is 3–10 times lower than alternatives. LEDs also last significantly longer: With a lifespan that can exceed 25,000 hours, they vastly outperform incandescent bulbs (1,000 hours) and CFLs (10,000 hours), as shown in Figure 1. LED’s longevity leads to potential long-term savings due to fewer replacements. The amount of light produced per energy input (luminous efficacy) is up to 10 times greater than alternative lighting sources. This means substantially more lighting for less energy.

Figure 1. A comparison of light sources for building lighting (data from Lane, 2023; Mathias et al., 2023; Nair & Dhoble, 2021b; Xu, 2019).

Light source type Power rating (watts) Luminous efficacy (lumens/watt) Lifespan (hours)
Incandescent 40–100 10–15 1,000
CFL 12–20 60–63 10,000
LED 4–10 110–150 25,000–100,000

The International Energy Agency (IEA) and other international bodies report LED market penetration in terms of percentages of the global lighting market (Lane, 2023). We chose this approach to track the impact of adopting LEDs.

Take Action Intro

Would you like to help deploy LED lighting? Below are some ways you can make a difference, depending on the roles you play in your professional or personal life.

These actions are meant to be starting points for involvement and may or may not be the most important, impactful, or doable actions you can take. We encourage you to explore, get creative, and take a step that is right for you!

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Amann, J. T., Fadie, B., Mauer, J., Swaroop, K., & Tolentino, C. (2022). Farewell to fluorescent lighting: How a phaseout can cut mercury pollution, protect the climate, and save money. Link to source: https://www.aceee.org/research-report/b2202

Behar-Cohen, F., Martinsons, C., Viénot, F., Zissis, G., Barlier-Salsi, A., Cesarini, J. P.,Enouf, O., Garcia, M., Picaud, S., & Attia, D.. (2011). Light-emitting diodes (LED) for domestic lighting: Any risks for the eye? Progress in Retinal and Eye Research, 30(4), 239–257. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.preteyeres.2011.04.002

Booysen, M. J., Samuels, J. A., & Grobbelaar, S. S. (2021). LED there be light: The impact of replacing lights at schools in South Africa. Energy and Buildings, 235, 110736. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enbuild.2021.110736

Bose-O'Reilly, S., McCarty, K. M., Steckling, N., & Lettmeier, B. (2010). Mercury exposure and children's health. Current Problems in Pediatric and Adolescent Health Care, 40(8), 186–215. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cppeds.2010.07.002

Build Up. (2019). Overview_Decarbonising the non-residential building stock. European Commission. Retrieved 05 March 2025 from Link to source: https://build-up.ec.europa.eu/en/resources-and-tools/articles/overview-decarbonising-non-residential-building-stock

Cenci, M. P., Dal Berto, F. C., Schneider, E. L., & Veit, H. M. (2020). Assessment of LED lamps components and materials for a recycling perspective. Waste Management, 107, 285-293. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wasman.2020.04.028

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). (2024). Power sector programs - progress report. Link to source: https://www.epa.gov/power-sector/progress-report

Forastiere, S., Piselli, C., Silei, A., Sciurpi, F., Pisello, A. L., Cotana, F., & Balocco, C. (2024). Energy efficiency and sustainability in food retail buildings: Introducing a novel assessment framework. Energies, 17(19), 4882. Link to source: https://www.mdpi.com/1996-1073/17/19/4882

Fu, X., Feng, D., Jiang, X., & Wu, T. (2023). The effect of correlated color temperature and illumination level of LED lighting on visual comfort during sustained attention activities. Sustainability, 15(4), 3826. Link to source: https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/15/4/3826

Gao, W., Sun, Z., Wu, Y., Song, J., Tao, T., Chen, F., Zhang, Y., & Cao, H.(2022). Criticality assessment of metal resources for light-emitting diode (LED) production – a case study in China. Cleaner Engineering and Technology, 6, 100380. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.clet.2021.100380

Gasparotto, J., & Da Boit Martinello, K. (2021). Coal as an energy source and its impacts on human health. Energy Geoscience, 2(2), 113–120. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.engeos.2020.07.003

Gayral, B. (2017). LEDs for lighting: Basic physics and prospects for energy savings. Comptes Rendus Physique, 18(7), 453–461. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.crhy.2017.09.001

Hasan, M. M., Moznuzzaman, M., Shaha, A., & Khan, I. (2025). Enhancing energy efficiency in Bangladesh's readymade garment sector: The untapped potential of LED lighting retrofits. International Journal of Energy Sector Management, 19(3), 569–588. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1108/ijesm-05-2024-0009

Henneman, L., Choirat, C., Dedoussi, I., Dominici, F., Roberts, J., & Zigler, C. (2023). Mortality risk from United States coal electricity generation. 382(6673), 941–946. Link to source: https://doi.org/doi:10.1126/science.adf4915

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). (2006). 2006 IPCC guidelines for national greenhouse gas inventories volume 2: Energy; Chapter 2: Stationary combustion. Link to source: https://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/public/2006gl/pdf/2_Volume2/V2_2_Ch2_Stationary_Combustion.pdf

International Energy Agency (IEA). (2022). Targeting 100% LED lighting sales by 2025. Link to source: https://www.iea.org/reports/targeting-100-led-lighting-sales-by-2025

International Energy Agency (IEA). (2023). Global floor area and buildings energy intensity in the net zero scenario, 2010-2030. Retrieved 06 March 2025 from Link to source: https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/global-floor-area-and-buildings-energy-intensity-in-the-net-zero-scenario-2010-2030

International Energy Agency (IEA). (2024). World energy balances. IEA. Link to source: https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/data-product/world-energy-balances

Iskra-Golec, I., Wazna, A., & Smith, L. (2012). Effects of blue-enriched light on the daily course of mood, sleepiness and light perception: A field experiment. 44(4), 506-513. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1177/1477153512447528

Kamat, A. S., Khosla, R., & Narayanamurti, V. (2020). Illuminating homes with LEDs in India: Rapid market creation towards low-carbon technology transition in a developing country. Energy Research & Social Science, 66, 101488. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2020.101488

Khan, N., & Abas, N. (2011). Comparative study of energy saving light sources. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 15(1), 296–309. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2010.07.072

Koretsky, Z. (2021). Phasing out an embedded technology: Insights from banning the incandescent light bulb in europe. Energy Research & Social Science, 82, 102310. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2021.102310

Lane, K. (2023, 11 July 2023). Lighting. International Energy Agency (IEA). Retrieved 13 December 2024 from Link to source: https://www.iea.org/energy-system/buildings/lighting

Lee, K., Donnelly, S., & Phillips, G. (2024). 2020 U.S. Lighting market characterization. Link to source: https://www.osti.gov/biblio/2371534

Lee, K., Nubbe, V., Rego, B., Hansen, M., & Pattison, M. (2021). 2020 LED manufacturing supply chain. U. S. DOE. Link to source: https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2021-05/ssl-2020-led-mfg-supply-chain-mar21.pdf

Mathias, J. A., Juenger, K. M., & Horton, J. J. (2023). Advances in the energy efficiency of residential appliances in the US: A review. Energy Efficiency, 16(5), 34. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12053-023-10114-8

Miah, M. A. R., & Kabir, R. (2023). Energy savings forecast for solid-state lighting in residential and commercial buildings in Bangladesh. IEEE PES 15th Asia-Pacific Power and Energy Engineering Conference (APPEEC), pp. 1-6. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1109/APPEEC57400.2023.10561921

Moadab, N. H., Olsson, T., Fischl, G., & Aries, M. (2021). Smart versus conventional lighting in apartments - electric lighting energy consumption simulation for three different households. Energy and Buildings, 244, 111009. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enbuild.2021.111009

Moyano, D. B., Moyano, S. B., López, M. G., Aznal, A. S., & Lezcano, R. A. G. (2020). Nominal risk analysis of the blue light from LED luminaires in indoor lighting design. Optik, 223, 165599. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijleo.2020.165599

Nair, G. B., & Dhoble, S. J. (2021a). 2 - fundamentals of LEDs. In G. B. Nair & S. J. Dhoble (Eds.), The fundamentals and applications of light-emitting diodes (pp. 35–57). Woodhead Publishing. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-819605-2.00002-1

Nair, G. B., & Dhoble, S. J. (2021b). 6 - general lighting. In G. B. Nair & S. J. Dhoble (Eds.), The fundamentals and applications of light-emitting diodes (pp. 155–176). Woodhead Publishing. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-819605-2.00006-9

Pattison, M., Hansen, M., Bardsley, N., Elliott, C., Lee, K., Pattison, L., & Tsao, J. (2020). 2019 lighting R&D opportunities. Link to source: https://www.osti.gov/biblio/1618035

Periyannan, E., Ramachandra, T., & Geekiyanage, D. (2023). Assessment of costs and benefits of green retrofit technologies: Case study of hotel buildings in Sri Lanka. Journal of Building Engineering, 78, 107631. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jobe.2023.107631

Placek, M. (2023). LED lighting in the United States - statistics & facts. Statista. Retrieved 09 February 2025 from Link to source: https://www.statista.com/topics/1144/led-lighting-in-the-us/#topicOverview

Pompei, L., Blaso, L., Fumagalli, S., & Bisegna, F. (2022). The impact of key parameters on the energy requirements for artificial lighting in Italian buildings based on standard en 15193-1:2017. Energy and Buildings, 263, 112025. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enbuild.2022.112025

Pompei, L., Mattoni, B., Bisegna, F., Blaso, L., & Fumagalli, S. (2020, 9–12 June 2020). Evaluation of the energy consumption of an educational building, based on the uni en 15193–1:2017, varying different lighting control systems. 2020 IEEE International Conference on Environment and Electrical Engineering and 2020 IEEE Industrial and Commercial Power Systems Europe (EEEIC / I&CPS Europe), Madrid, Spain, 2020, pp. 1-6. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1109/EEEIC/ICPSEurope49358.2020.9160588

Sarigiannis, D. A., Karakitsios, S. P., Antonakopoulou, M. P., & Gotti, A. (2012). Exposure analysis of accidental release of mercury from compact fluorescent lamps (CFLs). Science of The Total Environment, 435–436, 306–315. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2012.07.026

Saunders, H. D., & Tsao, J. Y. (2012). Rebound effects for lighting. Energy Policy, 49, 477-478. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2012.06.050

Schleich, J., Mills, B., & Dütschke, E. (2014). A brighter future? Quantifying the rebound effect in energy efficient lighting. Energy Policy, 72, 35–42. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2014.04.028

Schratz, M., Gupta, C., Struhs, T. J., & Gray, K. (2016). A new way to see the light: Improving light quality with cost-effective led technology. IEEE Industry Applications Magazine, 22(4), 55–62. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1109/MIAS.2015.2459089

United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). (2021). SADC member states welcome the introduction of new efficient lighting standards. UNIDO. Retrieved 05 March 2025 from Link to source: https://www.unido.org/news/sadc-member-states-welcome-introduction-new-efficient-lighting-standards

U.S. Department of Energy. (2016). Solid-state lighting R&D plan. Link to source: https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2016/06/f32/ssl_rd-plan_%20jun2016_2.pdf

U.S. Department of Energy (2024). 2020 U.S. lighting market characterization. Link to source: https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2024-08/ssl-lmc2020_apr24.pdf

World Furniture Online (2017). The lighting fixtures market in Australia and New Zealand. Link to source: https://www.worldfurnitureonline.com/report/the-lighting-fixtures-market-in-australia-and-new-zealand/

Xiong, Y., Guo, H., Nor, D. D. M. M., Song, A., & Dai, L. (2023). Mineral resources depletion, environmental degradation, and exploitation of natural resources: Covid-19 aftereffects. Resources Policy, 85, 103907. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2023.103907

Xu, Y. (2019). Chapter 2.1 - nature and source of light for plant factory. In M. Anpo, H. Fukuda, & T. Wada (Eds.), Plant factory using artificial light (pp. 47–69). Elsevier. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-813973-8.00002-6

Zhang, H., Cai, J., & Braun, J. E. (2023). A whole building life-cycle assessment methodology and its application for carbon footprint analysis of U.S. commercial buildings. Journal of Building Performance Simulation, 16(1), 38–56. Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1080/19401493.2022.2107071

Zissis, G., Bertoldi, P., & Serrenho, T. (2021). Update on the status of LED-lighting world market since 2018. Publications Office of the European Union. Link to source: https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC122760

Credits

Lead Fellow

  • Henry Igugu, Ph.D.

Contributors

  • Ruthie Burrows, Ph.D.

  • James Gerber, Ph.D.

  • Daniel Jasper

  • Alex Sweeney

Internal Reviewers

  • Aiyana Bodi

  • Hannah Henkin

  • Megan Matthews, Ph.D.

  • Ted Otte

  • Amanda D. Smith, Ph.D.

  • Christina Swanson, Ph.D.

Effectiveness

Replacing 1% of the building lighting market with LED lamps avoids approximately 7.09 Mt CO₂‑eq/yr emissions on a 100-yr basis (Table 1) or 7.15 Mt CO₂‑eq/yr on a 20-yr basis.

We estimated this solution’s effectiveness (Table 1) by multiplying the global electricity savings intensity (kWh/%) by an emissions intensity for each GHG emitted (in g/kWh)  due to electricity generation. Using the IEA (2024)’s energy balances data, we estimated emissions intensities of approximately 529 g/kWh for CO₂, 0.07 g/kWh for methane, and 0.01 g/kWh for nitrous oxide. Country-specific data were limited. Therefore, we developed the savings intensity using the IEA’s adoption trend (%/yr) and electricity consumption reduction (kWh/yr) for residential buildings globally (Lane, 2023). We then scaled up the savings intensity to represent all buildings (since LEDs are applicable in all types of buildings), but we could not find global data specifying the energy savings potential of converting the lighting market in nonresidential buildings to LEDs. Notably, artificial lighting’s energy consumption varies across building types (Moadab et al., 2021) and is typically greater in nonresidential buildings (Build Up, 2019). This presents some level of uncertainty, but also suggests that our estimates could be conservative – and that there is potential for even greater savings in nonresidential buildings.

Table 1. Effectiveness at reducing emissions.

Unit: t CO₂‑eq/% lamps LED/yr, 100-yr basis

Estimate 7090000
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Cost

Our lifetime initial cost estimate of switching 1% of the global building lighting market to LEDs is approximately US$1.5 billion. Because LEDs use less electricity than alternative lamps, they cost less to operate, resulting in operating costs of –US$1.3 billion/yr (i.e., cost savings). Building owners typically are not paid to use LED lighting; therefore, the revenue is zero. After we amortize the initial cost over 30 years, the net annual cost for this solution is –US$1.2 billion/yr globally. Thus, replacing other bulbs with LEDs saves money despite the initial cost.

We estimated the cost (Table 2) by first identifying initial and operating costs from studies that retrofitted buildings with LEDs, such as Periyannan et al. (2023), Hasan et al. (2025), and Forastiere et al. (2024). We then divided the costs by the impact of the LED retrofit on the amount of electricity consumed by lighting in each study and multiplied this by the global electricity savings intensity (kWh/%) we estimated during the effectiveness analysis. The result was the cost per percent of lamps in buildings converted to LED lighting (US$/% lamps LED).

We estimated the cost per unit climate impact by dividing the annual cost savings per adoption unit by the CO₂‑eq emissions reduced yearly per adoption unit (Table 2).

Table 2. Cost per unit climate impact.

Unit: 2023 US$/t CO₂‑eq, 100-yr basis

Median -175.0

Negative values reflect cost savings.

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Methods and Supporting Data

Methods and Supporting Data

Learning Curve

As LEDs became more common in building lighting, costs dropped significantly in recent years.

Trends based on LED adoption data (Lane, 2023) and the cost of LED lighting (Pattison et al., 2020) showed a 29.7% drop in cost as LED adoption doubled between 2016 and 2019.

The cost data we used to identify the learning curve for this solution (Table 3) are specific to the United States and limited to pre-2020. More recent LED cost data may show additional benefits with respect to cost, but this value may not be applicable for other countries. However, the cost data we analyzed do provide a useful sample of the broader LED cost-reduction trend.

Table 3. Learning rate: drop in cost per doubling of the installed solution base

Units: %

Estimate 29.7
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Speed of Action

Speed of action refers to how quickly a climate solution physically affects the atmosphere after it is deployed. This is different from speed of deployment, which is the pace at which solutions are adopted.

At Project Drawdown, we define the speed of action for each climate solution as emergency brake, gradual, or delayed.

Deploy LED Lighting is a GRADUAL climate solution. It has a steady, linear impact on the atmosphere. The cumulative effect over time builds as a straight line.

Caveats

Our effectiveness analysis is based on the current state of LED technology. If the adoption ceiling is attained, further improvements to the amount of light that LEDs generate per unit electricity could enhance the solution’s impact through further reductions in electricity use.

The rebound effect – where building occupants use more lighting in response to increased energy-efficiency of lamps – is a well-established concern (Saunders and Tsao, 2012; Schleich et al., 2014). We attempted to address this concern by using IEA data on actual electricity consumption originating from building lighting to determine both its effectiveness and cost implications (Lane, 2023).

We did not fully account for the cost savings that potentially arise from fewer bulb replacements, since LEDs may replace various types of lamps. Because LEDs last significantly longer than all alternative lamp technologies, building owners may require fewer replacements when using LED lamps compared with other lighting sources.

Current Adoption

Lane (2023) found that LED lamps represented 50.5% of the lighting market globally for residential buildings in 2022, but does not provide adoption data specific to nonresidential buildings. Studies that provide global or geographically segmented LED adoption data for all building types are also limited. Therefore, we assume 50.5% to be representative of LED adoption across all buildings globally (Table 4).

Other studies highlight adoption levels across various countries. The data captured in these studies and reports provide context with specific adoption levels from different regions (see Geographic Guidance).

The IEA and U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) report that LEDs are increasingly the preferred choice of homeowners and the general building lighting market. This preference is evident in the growing market share of LED lamps sold and installed annually (Lane, 2023; Lee et al., 2024).

In general, the solution’s current adoption globally is substantial, and we recognize that some countries possess more room for the solution to scale. While adoption barriers vary across regions, many countries are establishing lighting standards to drive LED adoption, especially across Africa [(IEA, 2022; United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), 2021].

Table 4. Current (2022) adoption level.

Units: % lamps LED

Estimate 50.5
Left Text Column Width
Adoption Trend

Adoption of LEDs has grown approximately 3.75%/yr over the past two decades.

Lane (2023) found that the proportion of lamps sold annually for building lighting that are LEDs grew from 1.1% in 2010 to 50.5% in 2022 (Figure 2). We estimated the adoption trend (Table 5) by determining the percentage growth between successive years, and calculating the variances.

Figure 2. Trend in LED adoption between 2010 and 2022 (adapted from Lane, 2023).

Source: Lane, K. (2023, 11 July 2023). Lighting. International Energy Agency (IEA). Retrieved 13 December 2024 from https://www.iea.org/energy-system/buildings/lighting

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Data on the growth of LEDs across regional building lighting markets are limited. Lee et al. (2024)’s analysis of the U.S. lighting market found 46.5% growth 2010–2020, which translates to 4.65% annually. Zissis et al. (2021) reported 26% growth for France for 2017–2020, which averages 8.67% annually.

Table 5. 2010–2022 adoption trend.

Units: % lamps LED market share growth/yr

25th percentile 2.85
Mean 4.12
Median (50th percentile) 3.75
75th percentile 5.4
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Adoption Ceiling

The adoption ceiling (Table 6) is 100%, meaning all lamps in buildings are LEDs. Lane (2023) projects 100% LED market penetration by 2030. If current adoption trends continue, 100% LED adoption is a practical and achievable upper limit. However, countries will need to overcome challenges such as regulatory enforcement, financial, and technology access issues, while preventing the entrance of inferior quality LEDs into their lighting market (IEA, 2022).

Table 6. Adoption ceiling

Units: % lamps LED

Estimate 100
Left Text Column Width
Achievable Adoption

We estimate a low achievable adoption scenario of 87% based on Statista’s projections about LED lighting market penetration by 2030 (Placek, 2023). The values were similar in Zissis et al. (2021).

For the high achievable scenario, we projected 10 years beyond the 2022 adoption level using the mean adoption trend of 4.12%/yr. This translates to a 41% growth on top of the current adoption level of 50.5%, summing up to a 92% LED adoption level (Table 7).

Table 7. Range of achievable adoption levels.

Unit: % lamps LED

Current adoption 50.5
Achievable – low 87
Achievable – high 92
Adoption ceiling 100
Left Text Column Width

We estimated that current adoption cuts about 0.36 Gt CO₂‑eq emissions on a 100-yr basis compared with the previous alternative lighting sources (Table 8). The low achievable adoption scenario of 87% LED lamps could cut emissions 0.62 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr due to reduced electricity consumption, while a high achievable adoption scenario of 92% LED lamps could cut emissions 0.65 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr. If the adoption ceiling of 100% LEDs for lighting buildings is reached, we estimate that 0.71 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr could be avoided (Table 8).

LED lighting could further cut electricity consumption as LED technology continues to improve. However, the technology’s future climate impacts will depend on the emissions of future electricity-generation systems.

Table 8. Climate impact at different levels of adoption.

Unit: Gt CO₂‑eq/yr, 100-yr basis

Current adoption 0.36
Achievable – low 0.62
Achievable – high 0.65
Adoption ceiling 0.71
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Additional Benefits

Income and Work

Because LEDs use less electricity than fluorescent and incandescent light bulbs (Khan & Abas, 2011), households and businesses using LED technology can save money on electricity costs. The payback period for the initial investment from lower utility bills is about one year for residential buildings and about two months for commercial buildings (Amann et al., 2022). LED lighting can contribute to savings by minimizing energy demand for cooling, since LEDs emit less heat than fluorescent and incandescent bulbs (Albatayneh et al., 2021; Schratz et al., 2016). However, it could also lead to a greater need for space heating in some regions. LED lights also last longer than alternative lighting technologies, which can lead to lower maintenance costs (Schratz et al., 2016).

Health

Reductions in air pollution due to LED lighting’s lower electricity demand decrease exposures to pollutants such as mercury and fine particulate matter generated from fossil fuel-based power plants, improving the health of nearby communities [Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 2024]. These pollutants have been linked to increased morbidity from cardiovascular and respiratory disease, asthma, infections, and cancer, and to increased risk of mortality (Gasparotto & Martinello, 2021; Henneman et al., 2023). Because LEDs do not contain mercury, they can mitigate small health risks associated with mercury exposure when fluorescent light bulbs break (Bose-O’Reilly et al., 2010; Sarigiannis et al., 2012). Switching to LEDs can also enhance a visual environment and improve occupants’ well-being, visual comfort, and overall productivity when lamps with the appropriate lighting quality and correlated color temperature are selected (Fu et al., 2023; Iskra-Golec et al., 2012; Nair & Dhoble, 2021b).

Air and Water Quality

The lower electricity demand of LEDs could help reduce emissions from power plants and improve air quality (Amann et al., 2022). Additionally, LEDs can mitigate small amounts of mercury found in fluorescent lights (Amann et al., 2022). Mercury contamination from discarded bulbs in landfills can leach into surrounding water bodies and accumulate in aquatic life. LEDs also have longer lifespans than fluorescent and incandescent bulbs (Nair & Dhoble, 2021b) which can reduce the amount of discarded bulbs and further mitigate environmental degradation from landfills. 

Risks

We found limited data indicating risks with choosing LEDs over other lighting sources. Concerns about eye health raised in the early days of LED adoption (Behar-Cohen et al., 2011) have been allayed by studies that found that LEDs do not pose a greater risk to the eye than comparable lighting sources (Moyano et al., 2020). 

LED manufacturing uses metals like gold, indium, and gallium (Gao et al., 2022). This creates environmental risks due to mining (Xiong et al., 2023) and makes LED supply chains susceptible to macroeconomic uncertainties (Lee et al., 2021). With growing adoption of LED lights, there is also the risk of greater electronic waste at the end of the LED’s lifespan. Therefore, recycling is increasingly important (Cenci et al., 2020). 

Interactions with Other Solutions

Competing

Some studies demonstrate an increase in the indoor heating requirements when switching to LED lighting from other lighting sources, such as incandescent lamps, that produce more heat than LEDs. The difference is often small, but worth taking into account when adopting LEDs in a building with previously energy-inefficient lighting.

Dashboard

Solution Basics

% lamps LED

t CO₂-eq (100-yr)/unit/yr
7.09×10⁶
units
Current 50.5 08792
Achievable (Low to High)

Climate Impact

Gt CO₂-eq (100-yr)/yr
Current 0.36 0.620.65
US$ per t CO₂-eq
-175
Gradual

CO₂ , CH₄, N₂O, BC

Trade-offs

LED lamp manufacturing creates more emissions than manufacturing other types of lamps. For example, Zhang et al. (2023) compared the manufacturing emissions of a 12.5W LED lamp with a 14W CFL and a 60W incandescent bulb. These light sources provided similar levels of illumination (850–900 lumens). The production of one LED bulb resulted in 9.81 kg CO₂‑eq emissions, while the CFL and incandescent resulted in 2.29 and 0.73 kg CO₂‑eq emissions, respectively. However, LEDs are preferred because their longevity results in fewer LED lamps required to provide the same amount of lighting over time. LEDs can last 25 times longer than incandescent lamps with an identical lumen output (Nair & Dhoble, 2021b; Xu, 2019; Zhang et al., 2023). 

% lamps LED
< 20
20–40
40–60
> 60
No data

Percentage of lamps that are LEDs, circa 2020

The percentage of lamps used to light buildings that are LEDs varies around the world, with limited data available on a per-country basis.

Miah, M. A. R., & Kabir, R. (2023). Energy savings forecast for solid-state lighting in residential and commercial buildings in Bangladesh. IEEE PES 15th Asia-Pacific Power and Energy Engineering Conference (APPEEC), pp. 1-6, Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1109/APPEEC57400.2023.10561921

U.S. Department of Energy (2024). 2020 U.S. lighting market characterization. Link to source: https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2024-08/ssl-lmc2020_apr24.pdf

World Furniture Online (2017). The lighting fixtures market in Australia and New Zealand. Link to source: https://www.worldfurnitureonline.com/report/the-lighting-fixtures-market-in-australia-and-new-zealand/

Zissis, G., Bertoldi, P., & Serrenho, T. (2021). Update on the status of LED-lighting world market since 2018. Publications Office of the European Union. Link to source: https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC122760

% lamps LED
< 20
20–40
40–60
> 60
No data

Percentage of lamps that are LEDs, circa 2020

The percentage of lamps used to light buildings that are LEDs varies around the world, with limited data available on a per-country basis.

Miah, M. A. R., & Kabir, R. (2023). Energy savings forecast for solid-state lighting in residential and commercial buildings in Bangladesh. IEEE PES 15th Asia-Pacific Power and Energy Engineering Conference (APPEEC), pp. 1-6, Link to source: https://doi.org/10.1109/APPEEC57400.2023.10561921

U.S. Department of Energy (2024). 2020 U.S. lighting market characterization. Link to source: https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2024-08/ssl-lmc2020_apr24.pdf

World Furniture Online (2017). The lighting fixtures market in Australia and New Zealand. Link to source: https://www.worldfurnitureonline.com/report/the-lighting-fixtures-market-in-australia-and-new-zealand/

Zissis, G., Bertoldi, P., & Serrenho, T. (2021). Update on the status of LED-lighting world market since 2018. Publications Office of the European Union. Link to source: https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC122760

Maps Introduction

The Deploy LED Lighting solution can be equally effective at reducing electricity use across global regions because the efficiency gained by replacing other bulbs with LEDs is functionally identical. However, its climate impact will vary with the emissions intensity of each region’s electricity grid. Secondary considerations associated with uptake of LED lighting also can vary with climate and hence geography. In particular, the decrease in heating associated with LED lighting can reduce demands on air conditioning, leading to increased incentive for solution uptake in warmer climates.

Historically, a few countries typically account for the bulk of LEDs purchased. For example, 30% of the 5 billion LEDs sold globally in 2016 were sold in China. In the same period, North America accounted for 15% while Western Europe, Japan, and India represented 11%, 10%, and 8% of the LEDs sold, respectively (Kamat et al., 2020; U.S. DOE, 2016). Essentially, the growing sales of LEDs drove global adoption levels from 17.6% of the building lighting market in 2016 to 50.5% in 2022 (Lane, 2023). However, current adoption still varies considerably around the world. For instance, Lee et al. (2024) reported that LED market penetration in the U.S. was 47.5% in 2020, compared with 43.3% globally in the same period (Lane, 2023). Meanwhile, LED adoption in France was 35% in 2017, and countries in the Middle East such as the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey had over 70% LED adoption that same year; residential buildings in the United Kingdom had 13% LED adoption in 2018, while Japan had 60% LED adoption as of 2019 (Zissis et al., 2021). This demonstrates potential to scale LED adoption in the future, especially in low- and middle-income countries where the bulk of new building occurs (IEA, 2023).

Action Word
Deploy
Solution Title
LED Lighting
Classification
Highly Recommended
Lawmakers and Policymakers
  • Use regulations to phase out and replace energy-inefficient lighting sources with LEDs.
  • Set regulations that encourage sufficient lighting to limit the overuse of LEDs (or rebound effects).
  • Require that public lighting use LEDs.
  • Use financial incentives such as tax breaks, subsidies, and grants to facilitate the transition to LEDs.
  • Revise building energy-efficiency standards to reflect energy savings of LEDs.
  • Develop production standards and mandate labeling for LEDs.
  • Build sufficient inspection capacity for LED manufacturers and penalize noncompliance with standards.
  • Use energy-efficiency purchase agreements to help support utility companies during the transition to LED lighting.
  • Invest in research and development that improves the cost and efficiency of LED lighting.
  • Develop a certification program for LED lighting.
  • Create exchange programs or buy-back programs for inefficient light bulbs.
  • Start demonstration projects to promote LED lighting.
  • Join, support, or create educational programs that raise public awareness about the cost savings and energy-efficiency gains associated with LEDs.

Further information:

Practitioners
  • Take advantage of or advocate for financial incentives such as tax breaks, subsidies, and grants to facilitate the production of LED lighting.
  • Help develop circular supply chains in renovating, remanufacturing, reusing, and redistributing materials.
  • Invest in research and development to improve efficiency and cost of LEDs.
  • Adhere to, or advocate for, national LED standards.
  • Develop, produce, and sell LED lighting that imitates incandescent or other familiar lighting.
  • Consider bundling services with retrofitting companies and collaborating with utility companies to offer rebates or other incentives.
  • Improve self-service of LEDs by reducing obstacles to installation and ensuring LEDs can be easily replaced.
  • Help create positive perceptions of LED lighting by showcasing usage, cost savings, and emissions reductions.
  • Create feedback mechanisms, such as apps that alert users to real-time benefits such as energy and cost savings.
  • Start demonstration projects to promote LED lighting.
  • Join, support, or create educational programs that raise public awareness about the cost savings and energy-efficiency gains associated with LEDs.

Further information:

Business Leaders
  • Retrofit existing operations for LEDs, replace inefficient bulbs, and purchase only LEDs going forward.
  • Help develop circular supply chains in renovating, remanufacturing, reusing, and redistributing LED lighting materials.
  • Take advantage of financial incentives such as tax breaks, subsidies, and grants to facilitate the transition to LED lighting.
  • Invest in research and development that improves the cost and efficiency of LED lighting.
  • Join, support, or create educational programs that raise public awareness about the cost savings and energy-efficiency gains associated with LEDs.

Further information:

Nonprofit Leaders
  • Retrofit existing operations for LEDs, replace inefficient bulbs, and purchase only LEDs going forward.
  • Help develop circular supply chains in renovating, remanufacturing, reusing, and redistributing LED lighting materials.
  • Take advantage of, or advocate for, financial incentives such as tax breaks, subsidies, and grants to facilitate the transition to LED lighting.
  • Advocate for regulations to phase out and replace energy-inefficient lighting sources with LEDs.
  • Advocate for production standards and labeling for LEDs.
  • Call for regulations that encourage sufficient lighting to limit the overuse of LEDs (or rebound effects).
  • Start demonstration projects to promote LED lighting.
  • Help develop, support, or administer a certification program for LED lighting.
  • Create national catalogs of LED manufacturers, suppliers, and retailers.
  • Join, support, or create educational programs that raise public awareness about the cost savings and energy-efficiency gains associated with LEDs.

Further information:

Investors
  • Retrofit existing operations for LEDs, replace inefficient bulbs, and purchase only LEDs going forward.
  • Take advantage of financial incentives such as tax breaks, subsidies, and grants to facilitate the transition to LED lighting.
  • Invest in LED manufacturers, supply chains, and supportive industries.
  • Support research and development to improve the efficiency and cost of LEDs.
  • Invest in LED companies.
  • Fund companies that provide retrofitting services (energy service companies).
  • Invest in businesses dedicated to advancing LED use.
  • Ensure portfolio companies do not produce or support non-LED lighting supply chains.
  • Join, support, or create educational programs that raise public awareness about the cost savings and energy-efficiency gains associated with LEDs.

Further information:

Philanthropists and International Aid Agencies
  • Retrofit existing operations for LEDs, replace inefficient bulbs, and purchase only LEDs going forward.
  • Take advantage of financial incentives such as tax breaks, subsidies, and grants to facilitate the transition to LED lighting.
  • Provide financing such as low-interest loans, grants, and micro-grants to help accelerate LED adoption.
  • Fund companies that provide retrofitting services (energy service companies).
  • Advocate for regulations to phase out energy-inefficient lighting sources and replace them with LEDs.
  • Call for regulations that encourage sufficient lighting to limit the overuse of LEDs (or rebound effects).
  • Start demonstration projects to promote LED lighting.
  • Help develop, support, or administer a certification program for LED lighting.
  • Create national catalogs of LED manufacturers, suppliers, and retailers.
  • Join, support, or create educational programs that raise public awareness about the cost savings and energy-efficiency gains associated with LEDs.

Further information:

Thought Leaders
  • Retrofit buildings for LED lighting, replace inefficient bulbs, and purchase only LEDs going forward.
  • Help create positive perceptions of LED lighting by highlighting your personal usage, cost and energy savings, and emissions reductions.
  • Help develop circular supply chains in renovating, remanufacturing, reusing, and redistributing materials.
  • Take advantage of, or advocate for, financial incentives such as tax breaks, subsidies, and grants to facilitate the transition to LED lighting.
  • Advocate for regulations to phase out energy-inefficient lighting sources and replace them with LEDs.
  • Advocate for LED standards.
  • Advocate for regulations that encourage sufficient lighting and guard against overuse of LEDs (or rebound effects).
  • Start demonstration projects to promote LED lighting.
  • Help develop, support, or administer a certification program for LED lighting.
  • Create national catalogs of LED manufacturers, suppliers, and retailers.
  • Join, support, or create educational programs that raise public awareness about the cost savings and energy-efficiency gains associated with LEDs.

Further information:

Technologists and Researchers
  • Develop circular supply chains in renovating, remanufacturing, reusing, and redistributing materials.
  • Improve the efficiency and cost of LEDs.
  • Improve LED lighting to imitate familiar lighting, offer customers settings, and augment color rendering.
  • Improve self-service of LEDs by reducing obstacles to installation and ensuring LEDs can be replaced individually.
  • Help develop standards for LEDs.
  • Create feedback mechanisms, such as apps that alert users to real-time benefits such as energy and cost savings.

Further information:

Communities, Households, and Individuals
  • Retrofit for LEDs, replace inefficient bulbs, and purchase only LEDs going forward.
  • Help create positive perceptions of LED lighting by highlighting your personal usage, cost and energy savings, and emissions reductions.
  • Help develop circular supply chains in renovating, remanufacturing, reusing, and redistributing materials.
  • Take advantage of or advocate for financial incentives such as tax breaks, subsidies, and grants to facilitate the transition to LED lighting.
  • Advocate for regulations to phase out and replace energy-inefficient lighting sources with LEDs.
  • Advocate for LED standards.
  • Advocate for regulations that encourage sufficient lighting to limit the overuse of LEDs (or rebound effects).
  • Join, support, or create educational programs that raise public awareness about the cost savings and energy-efficiency gains associated with LEDs.

Further information:

Sources
Evidence Base

Consensus of effectiveness in reducing GHG emissions from electricity generation: High

Using LEDs significantly minimizes the electricity required to light buildings, thereby reducing GHG emissions from electricity generation. Many countries are phasing out other lighting sources to reduce GHG emissions (Lane, 2023).

The IEA reported that global adoption of LEDs drove a nearly 30% reduction in annual electricity consumption for lighting in homes between 2010 and 2022 (Lane, 2023). Hasan et al. (2025) indicated that LEDs could reduce the lighting energy usage of buildings (and their resulting GHG emissions) in Bangladesh by 50%. Periyannan et al. (2023) recorded significant electricity savings after evaluating the impact of retrofitting hotels in Sri Lanka with LEDs. Forastiere et al. (2024)’s analysis of the retail buildings in Italy showed an 11% reduction in energy consumption from replacing other lamps with LEDs. Booysen et al., (2021) also achieved significant energy reduction with lighting retrofits in South African educational buildings.

The results presented in this document summarize findings from six original studies and three public sector/multilateral agency reports, which collectively reflect current evidence both globally and from six countries on four different continents. We recognize this limited geographic scope creates bias, and hope this work inspires research and data sharing on this topic in underrepresented regions.

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