The amount of pollution in the atmosphere that affects the health of humans, wildlife, and ecosystems  

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Manage Oil & Gas Methane

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Summary

Oil and gas methane management is the process of reducing methane emissions from oil and gas (O&G) supply chains. These supply chains release methane when pipes and other system parts leak or methane is intentionally vented for operation and safety reasons. We define the Manage Oil & Gas Methane solution as adopting approaches to reduce methane emissions, including fixing leaks in components, upgrading control equipment, changing procedures, and destroying methane by burning methane as a fuel or in flares.

Health
Air quality
Overview

Methane can be unintentionally released due to imperfections and faults along the supply chain or intentionally released as part of operations and maintenance. Atmospheric methane has a GWP of 81 over a 20-yr time basis and a GWP of 28 over a 100-yr time basis (IPCC, 2023). This means methane is 81 times more effective at trapping heat than CO₂.  Because methane is a short-lived climate pollutant that has a much stronger warming effect than CO₂ over a given time period, abating methane will have a relatively large near-term impact on slowing global climate change (IEA, 2023b).

The first step to reduce methane releases from O&G production is to identify where releases occur along the supply chain. Many occur during O&G extraction as methane is either intentionally vented or unintentionally emitted. The International Energy Agency (IEA, 2024) estimated more than 60% of global energy-related methane emissions originated from the O&G sector in 2023, with the remaining emissions mostly coming from coal use and some bioenergy (Figure 1). The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) has formed a transparency and accountability initiative whose members are responsible for 42% of global O&G production. It reported that activities involved in exploration and processing of O&G accounted for 83% of total reported O&G emissions from 2020 to 2023, with production processes being responsible for 90% of those emissions (UNEP 2024). Alvarez et al. (2018) found that in the United States, more than 58% of O&G methane emissions came from production and about 20% came from extraction in 2015. 

Figure 1. Methane emissions (kt) from energy sources (IEA, 2025).

Source: International Energy Agency. (2025). Methane tracker: Data tools. https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/data-tools/methane-tracker 

O&G producers can reduce their methane emissions by preventing its release or by converting it to CO₂ through combustion. Strategies for reducing O&G methane emissions can be put into two broad categories (Climate & Clean Air Coalition [CCAC], 2021):

Device conversion, replacement, and installation is the practice of fixing leaks in pipes, valves, compressors, pumps, and other equipment. This can include converting natural gas–powered devices to electric, driving compressors/pneumatics with air instead of natural gas, or replacing emitting components with non-emitting ones (Pembina Institute, 2024).

Changes to operations and maintenance practices seek to reduce the intentional venting of methane. They include eliminating the need for blow-down (releasing gases during the maintenance or operation of pipe infrastructure), reducing venting, and capturing methane before it is released into the atmosphere, then using it as fuel for product refining or burning it to convert it into CO₂.

 Leak detection and repair (LDAR) is the practice of regularly monitoring for methane leaks and modifying or replacing leaking equipment. 

References

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Mar, K. A., Unger, C., Walderdorff, L., & Butler, T. (2022). Beyond CO₂ equivalence: The impacts of methane on climate, ecosystems, and health. Environmental Science & Policy, 134, 127-136. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2022.03.027 

Marks, L. (2022). The abatement cost of methane emissions from natural gas production. Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, 9(2). https://doi.org/10.1086/716700 

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Credits

Lead Fellow

  • Jason Lam

Contributors

  • Ruthie Burrows, Ph.D.

  • James Gerber, Ph.D.

  • Yusuf Jameel, Ph.D.

  • Daniel Jasper

  • Alex Sweeney

Internal Reviewers

  • Aiyana Bodi

  • Hannah Henkin

  • Ted Otte

  • Amanda Smith, Ph.D.

  • Paul West, Ph.D.

Effectiveness

Each Mt of methane that is not emitted avoids 81.2 million t CO₂‑eq on a 20-yr basis and 27.9 million t CO₂‑eq on a 100-yr basis (Smith et al., 2021). The GWP of methane is shown in Table 1. If the methane is burned (converted into CO₂ ), the contribution to climate change will still be less than that of methane released directly into the atmosphere. Methane abatement can have a more immediate impact on future global temperature rise because it has a larger and faster warming effect than CO₂. Mitigating methane emissions in the near term can give us more time for reducing GHG emissions in hard to abate sectors.

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Table 1. Effectiveness at reducing emissions.

Unit: t CO₂‑eq /Mt of methane abated

100-yr Global Warming Potential 27,900,000
20-yr Global Warming Potential 81,200,000
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Cost

The cost of methane abatement will vary depending on the type of O&G production, the methane content of the O&G resource, and the strategies used to address it. We averaged the costs for various abatement strategies; methane content is sufficiently high to utilize methane abatement strategies, and energy infrastructure is available to utilize abated methane. The initial cost to abate 1 Mt of methane is US$594 million, the revenue is about US$193 million, and the overall net savings over a 30-yr amortization period is US$173 million. This means that reducing O&G methane emissions offers a net economic gain for O&G producers. We were not able to find operating cost information for the solution, meaning the net economic gain may be lower in practice. 

We considered the baseline scenario where O&G producers do not have systems or practices in place to monitor or stop methane from escaping to the atmosphere and found very limited cost data. We assumed baseline costs to be 0 for initial costs, operational costs, and revenue because current practices and infrastructure are releasing methane to the atmosphere as a part of their existing cost of doing business. 

Many of the initial cost data for methane abatement come from studies estimating how much capital would be required to reach methane emission targets for the O&G industry. These costs are for the global scale of O&G methane abatement and not from the point of view of an individual O&G producer. These studies do not go into detail about the cost of specific abatement strategies or their potential revenues. The context and assumptions are difficult to identify, since the abatement strategies must be tailored to each site. Ocko et al (2021) noted that most (around 80%) of economically feasible methane abatement actions are from the O&G sector. 

Table 2 shows the costs per t CO₂‑eq .The value of the methane sold, instead of released, will often bring in revenue that covers the costs of abatement. Refer to the Appendix for information on the proportion of strategies that O&G producers could implement at low to no cost.

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Table 2. Net cost per unit of climate impact.

Unit: 2023 US$/t CO₂‑eq

median (100-yr basis) -6.20
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Learning Curve

Many of the technology solutions for reducing methane emissions are mature, and we were unable to find literature suggesting the costs to implement these solutions will fall in the future. There may be efficiencies to be gained in LDAR, but little research offers insights into the costs of LDAR programs (Delphi Group, 2017, ICF 2016). 

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Speed of Action

Speed of action refers to how quickly a climate solution physically affects the atmosphere after it is deployed. This is different from speed of deployment, which is the pace at which solutions are adopted.

At Project Drawdown, we define the speed of action for each climate solution as gradual, emergency brake, or delayed.

Manage OIl & Gas Methane is an EMERGENCY BRAKE climate solution. It has the potential to deliver a more rapid impact than nominal and delayed solutions. Because emergency brake solutions can deliver their climate benefits quickly, they can help accelerate our efforts to address dangerous levels of climate change. For this reason, they are a high priority.

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Caveats

Burning methane produces CO₂. Though the GWP is far less than that of releasing methane into the atmosphere, the practice still creates a negative climate impact. Depending on the type of O&G production, methane abatement is already practiced with natural gas production and is likely to bring additional profit. However, oil producers who are not already producing methane for profit may not be able to abate methane at a profit. 

Avoiding fossil fuel extraction, transport, and use is the only way to permanently reduce emissions from O&G production. For many low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), O&G is the main source of energy, and it is challenging for them to completely eliminate O&G from their energy mix while they are simultaneously working to improve living standards. High-income countries can help LMICs develop clean energy infrastructure by providing financial and technological support. This will prevent new investments in O&G infrastructure (Laan, et al., 2024), which would result in ongoing emissions for decades. It would also allow LMICs a realistic pathway to transition away from their existing O&G usage. O&G demand must fall by 80% between 2022 and 2050 to stay in alignment with the net-zero emissions scenarios modeled by IEA (2023c). O&G methane abatement will decrease over time as the O&G industry produces less methane to be abated.

Our assessment does not include the impact of the CO₂ created from the destruction of methane.

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Current Adoption

We found little literature quantifying the current adoption of methane management; much of the methane abatement research revolves around the amount of methane that needs to be abated to reach certain climate targets. Based on data from Global Methane Initiative (GMI, 2024), 0 Mt of methane was abated in 2023 and is shown in Table 3.


GMI (2024) provided a conservative estimate of cumulative methane emissions abated each year, with a total of 153.6 Mt CO₂‑eq (5.51 Mt methane) abated as of 2023. The methane is given as a cumulative value to show the incremental increase in total methane abated and to avoid double counting methane abated. GMI members only cover 70% of human-caused methane emissions, and the organization does not capture methane mitigation that occurs outside of GMI members. This suggests that even in years where methane was abated, it would likely still be an underestimate of what may have actually occurred globally. The untapped potential for methane abatement suggests that O&G companies are investing in increasing natural gas production, which may be due to relatively smaller profits from abatement and nonbinding regulations (Shindell et al., 2024). 

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Table 3. Current (2023) adoption level.

Unit: Mt of methane abated/yr

median (50th percentile) 0
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Adoption Trend

Although there is little research specifically quantifying the adoption of methane abatement strategies over time, we estimate the average adoption trend in recent years to be about 0.35 Mt/yr of methane abated. To create this estimate, we relied on GMI analysis (GMI, 2024). GMI showed methane abatement gradually increasing from 2011 to 2023, then tapering off around 2020 and beginning to decrease among its member organizations. Table 4 shows the adoption trend for O&G methane abatement.

The IEA (2025) compiled country-level reporting for GHG emissions with data up to 2024. However, we were not able to use the data for the adoption trend because the changes in methane emissions could have been due to reasons other than methane abatement. In reality, methane emissions may be affected by multiple factors such as natural disasters, political conditions, changes in O&G demand, and changes in O&G industry practices.

Oil and Gas Climate Initiative (2023) data on methane abatement to date for 12 major O&G companies indicate that methane emissions decreased 50% from 2017 to 2022; however, we cannot assume the rest of the O&G industry has made the same level of progress. 

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Table 4. Adoption trend, 2011–2022.

Unit: Mt methane abated/yr

median (50th percentile) 0.35
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Adoption Ceiling

We found an adoption ceiling of 80.7 Mt/yr of methane based on the IEA’s (2025) estimate for total methane emissions from the O&G sector. We assumed that current O&G methane emissions would remain the same into the future with no changes in O&G production or demand. Table 5 shows the adoption ceiling for O&G methane abatement.

Even in the IEA’s (2023c) highest methane abatement energy scenario, only 93% of the methane emissions are reduced by 2050. This would still leave methane emissions being released into the atmosphere by the O&G sector. Reduced O&G production will reduce the amount of methane emissions produced by the O&G sector and consequently reduce the amount of methane that needs to be controlled with methane abatement. 

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Table 5. Adoption ceiling.

Unit: Mt methane abated/yr

median (50th percentile) 80.7
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Achievable Adoption

Based on the limited data available for current adoption and adoption trend, we expect 3.26–8.84 Mt/yr of methane abated. The Achievable – Low value aligns with the IEA (2023c) baseline energy scenario (STEPS), in which partial methane abatement is used but not all technically possible methane is abated. The Achievable – High value aligns with the IEA (2023c) baseline scenario (STEPS), in which full methane abatement is employed (all technically possible methane is abated). We determined this range by taking the total methane abated in these scenarios and dividing by the difference between the target year and 2024 to determine an average amount of methane abated each year to reach the scenario target. Under both scenarios, reduced demand for O&G would reduce methane emissions produced and lower the adoption ceiling possible for methane abatement. Even in scenarios where there is reduced O&G demand, methane abatement would still be required to control fugitive methane emissions from O&G infrastructure and limit global climate change. 

The amount of methane that can be abated varies greatly depending on how much methane the O&G industry produces. If O&G production remains steady, cumulative methane abatement could be 21–81 Mt, according to the IEA energy scenarios. If O&G demand drops 80% (IEA’s Net Zero Emissions scenario), total methane emissions would decline to 18 Mt, and the use of methane abatement would reduce methane emissions further by 17 Mt, leaving only 1 Mt of methane emitted in 2050. 

There has been growing interest from governments and academia to more accurately identify methane emissions using technologies such as satellite sensing (MethaneSat, 2024); UNEP (2024) has set up a monitoring and operator’s alliance group that will share best practices among O&G producers. This alliance group has identified more than 1,200 methane releases, but only 15 responses from government or companies provided detail about the source of the emissions or whether any mitigation action was considered or taken. This shows there are still many opportunities to abate methane emissions. 

More than 150 countries (representing 50% of the world’s human-caused methane emissions) have joined the Global Methane Pledge to reduce methane emissions 30% from 2020 to 2030 (UNEP, 2021). The IEA (2023b) found that many governments already have announced or put into place measures to cut methane emissions, so we expect global methane abatement to grow. 

Conrad et al. (2023) found that the emission inventories reported by the Alberta, Canada, government underestimate the methane emissions from the O&G sector, with a large portion coming from venting. These sources of methane are relatively easier to address and can allow the O&G sector to quickly reduce methane emissions. Table 6 shows the statistical low and high achievable ranges for O&G methane abatement based on different sources for future uptake of O&G methane abatement.

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Table 6. Achievable adoption.

Unit: Mt methane abated/yr

Current Adoption 0
Achievable – Low 3.26
Achievable – High 8.84
Adoption Ceiling 80.66
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We estimate that the O&G industry is currently abating approximately 0 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr on a 100-yr basis and 0 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr on a 20-yr basis using methane abatement strategies. 

As the O&G industry grows or shrinks its emissions, the amount of methane available to abate will change accordingly. If O&G demand and production stay constant to 2050, we estimate 0.09–0.25 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr of methane could be abated. 

However, if O&G demand drops, the methane abatement potential would drop because the O&G sector is producing less methane. This is projected in the different energy scenarios modeled by the IEA (2023). The range between the current O&G methane abatement and the adoption ceiling is shown in Table 7.

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Table 7. Climate impact at different levels of adoption.

Unit: Gt CO₂‑eq/yr, 100-yr basis

Current Adoption 0
Achievable – Low 0.09
Achievable – High 0.25
Adoption Ceiling 2.25
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Additional Benefits

Air pollution and health

Methane reacts with other pollutants to create ground-level ozone (Mar et al., 2022), and incomplete combustion of methane releases CO₂, carbon monoxide, black carbon, and other pollutants such as volatile organic compounds (Fawole et al., 2016; Johnson and Coderre, 2012; Motte et al., 2021). These pollutants cause respiratory, reproductive, and neurological diseases; cancer; and premature death (Michanowicz et al., 2021; Motte et al., 2021; Tran et al., 2024), so reducing methane release can improve human health. Reducing or stopping flaring at a small number of the largest active sites can significantly reduce air pollution (Anejionu et al., 2015; Johnson and Coderre, 2012). Van Dingenen et al. (2018) estimate that ambitious methane reduction could prevent 70,000 to 130,000 ozone-related deaths worldwide each year.

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Figure 2. Air pollutants emitted along the O&G life cycle (Moore et al., 2014). BTEX = benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene, xylene.

Diagram listing air pollutants emitted along the oil and gas life cycle

Source: Moore, C. W., Zielinska, B., Pétron, G., & Jackson, R. B. (2014). Air impacts of increased natural gas acquisition, processing, and use: A critical review. Environmental Science & Technology, 48(15), 8349–8359. https://doi.org/10.1021/es4053472

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Food security

Methane reacts with chemicals like VOCs to form tropospheric, or ground-level ozone (Fiore et al., 2002). Ground-level ozone has been linked to reduced crop growth and yields (Mills et al., 2018; Samperdo et al., 2023; Tai et al., 2021). Mitigating methane emissions from O&G could improve food security by reducing ground-level ozone and its harmful impacts on agricultural productivity (Tai et al., 2014; Ramya et al., 2023)

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Risks

If natural gas prices drop there would be less economic reason for industries to voluntarily abate methane (IEA, 2021). Without policy support enforcing the use of methane abatement technologies, methane could continue to be released into the atmosphere. The use of methane abatement will be needed regardless of whether O&G demand remains the same or decreases over time because it has an immediate effect on reducing global temperature rise in the near term.

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Interactions with Other Solutions

Reinforcing

Managing O&G methane can reinforce other solutions that reduce the amount of methane released to the atmosphere. The use of solutions such as applying changes to operations and maintenance; converting, replacing, and installing devices; and LDAR in the O&G industry can help demonstrate the effectiveness and economic case for methane abatement elsewhere and build momentum for adoption of methane abatement in other sectors. 

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Competing

Managing O&G methane has the potential to compete with solutions that provide clean electricity and solutions that focus on fuel switching in transportation because this solution increases O&G supply and can reduce the cost of O&G products. As a result, it could prolong the use of fossil fuels and slow down the transition to clean electricity.

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Dashboard

Solution Basics

Mt methane abated

tCO2-eq/unit
2.79×10⁷
units/yr
Current 03.268.84
Achievable (Low to High)

Climate Impact

GtCO2-eq/yr
Current 0 0.090.25
US$ per tCO2-eq
-6
Emergency Brake

CH₄

Trade-offs

Methane abatement could increase the use of O&G resources without a broader strategy to reduce reliance on O&G as an energy resource. The use of methane abatement strategies to extend the use of existing O&G infrastructure, or building new O&G infrastructure, will not result in a net decrease in emissions. Beck et al. (2020) found that more than 57% of the GHG emissions from the O&G supply chain are from methane emissions, while the rest is due to CO₂ emissions (15% from the extraction process and 28% from O&G energy use). Even with methane mitigation, continued use of O&G will generate CO₂ emissions and will contribute to global temperature rise. 

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Mt CO2–eq
< 50
50–100
100–200
200–300
> 300
Refining
Production
Transport

Annual emissions from oil and gas sources, 2024

Globally, oil and gas sources (production, refining, and transport) are responsible for 78 of the 347 Mt of anthropogenic methane emissions in 2023. This is equivalent to 2,106 Mt CO2-eq based on a 100-year time scale. Methane emissions occur throughout the supply chain due to equipment imperfections, leaks, and intentional venting.

International Energy Agency. (2024). Methane tracker: Data tools. https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/data-tools/methane-tracker

Schmeisser, L., Tecza, A., Huffman, M., Bylsma, S., Delang, M., Stanger, J., Conway, TJ, and Gordon, D. (2024). Fossil fuel operations sector: Oil and gas production and transport emissions [Data set]. RMI, Climate TRACE Emissions Inventory. Retrieved April 18, 2025 from https://climatetrace.org

Wang, J., Fallurin, J., Peltier, M., Conway, TJ, and Gordon, D. (2024). Fossil fuel operations sector: Refining emissions [Data set]. RMI, Climate TRACE Emissions Inventory. Retrieved April 18, 2025 from https://climatetrace.org

Mt CO2–eq
< 50
50–100
100–200
200–300
> 300
Refining
Production
Transport

Annual emissions from oil and gas sources, 2024

Globally, oil and gas sources (production, refining, and transport) are responsible for 78 of the 347 Mt of anthropogenic methane emissions in 2023. This is equivalent to 2,106 Mt CO2-eq based on a 100-year time scale. Methane emissions occur throughout the supply chain due to equipment imperfections, leaks, and intentional venting.

International Energy Agency. (2024). Methane tracker: Data tools. https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/data-tools/methane-tracker

Schmeisser, L., Tecza, A., Huffman, M., Bylsma, S., Delang, M., Stanger, J., Conway, TJ, and Gordon, D. (2024). Fossil fuel operations sector: Oil and gas production and transport emissions [Data set]. RMI, Climate TRACE Emissions Inventory. Retrieved April 18, 2025 from https://climatetrace.org

Wang, J., Fallurin, J., Peltier, M., Conway, TJ, and Gordon, D. (2024). Fossil fuel operations sector: Refining emissions [Data set]. RMI, Climate TRACE Emissions Inventory. Retrieved April 18, 2025 from https://climatetrace.org

Geographic Guidance Introduction

Methane abatement is recommended for all oil and gas (O&G) production. The levels of achievable abatement can vary geographically, depending on the extraction technology used (i.e., conventional drilling versus hydraulic fracturing). The Middle East, Europe, Asia, and North America are among the largest O&G producers and have the highest related methane emissions, according to the IEA (2025). Research from Shindell et al. (2024) found that North America, Russia, and several countries in the Middle East and Africa have the most methane abatement potential in O&G. O&G methane abatement could be accelerated if technologies and strategies used in high-income countries are shared with other O&G producing countries.

Action Word
Manage
Solution Title
Oil & Gas Methane
Classification
Highly Recommended
Lawmakers and Policymakers
  • Hold well owners accountable for harm caused to the public and environment.
  • Introduce performance goals for emissions reductions.
  • Use economic measures such as taxes or financial incentives.
  • Regulate key aspects of abatement, such as the use of LDAR, and enforce existing regulations.
  • Utilize data-driven public information programs such as collecting and publishing monitoring and reporting data (“naming and shaming”).
  • Distribute information to operators, such as technology options that fit relevant regulations. 

Further information:

Practitioners
  • Shift business models toward 100% renewable energy.
  • Detect and repair methane leaks.
  • Implement device conversion, replacement, and installation and LDAR.
  • Change operations and maintenance practices to reduce or recover vented methane.
  • Implement zero-tolerance policies for methane leaks.
  • Increase transparency on emissions and practices.
  • Join cross-company and industry coalitions that facilitate implementation.

Further information:

Business Leaders
  • Eliminate major methane O&G emitters in your value chains or pressure them to improve performance.
  • Create a plan to transition to renewable energy.
  • Center methane in net-zero strategies, such as establishing internal methane pricing mechanisms and requiring suppliers to meet standards for monitoring and reducing methane emissions in your operations.
  • Identify technology partners that are monitoring and reducing methane emissions and make market commitments.
  • If your company is participating in the voluntary carbon market, look into funding projects that plug methane leaks.
  • Proactively collaborate with government and regulatory actors to support methane abatement policies.
  • Join or support transparency initiatives led by trusted third parties, such as the Oil and Gas Methane Partnership 2.0.

Further information:

Nonprofit Leaders
  • Help with monitoring and reporting by, for example, utilizing satellite data.
  • Help design policies and regulations that support methane abatement.
  • Educate the public on the urgent need to abate methane.
  • Join or support efforts such as the Global Methane Alliance.
  • Encourage policymakers to create ambitious targets and regulations.
  • Pressure O&G companies to improve their practices.
  • Take or support legal action when companies do not follow relevant regulations.
  • Work with journalists and the media to support public education on the importance of methane abatement.

Further information:

Investors
  • Pressure and influence portfolio companies to incorporate methane abatement into their operations, noting that this saves money and adds value for investors.
  • Provide capital for nascent methane abatement strategies and leak detection and monitoring instruments.
  • Invest in green bonds and other financial instruments that support methane abatement projects.
  • Seek impact investment opportunities such as sustainability-linked loans in entities that set methane abatement targets.
  • Invest in projects that plug methane leaks. 

Further information:

Philanthropists and International Aid Agencies
  • Provide capital for methane monitoring, de-risking, and abatement in the early stages of implementation.
  • Support global, national, and local policies that reduce methane emissions.
  • Support accelerators or multilateral initiatives like the Global Methane Hub.
  • If working in a fossil fuel–producing nation, support sustainable developments in other sectors of the economy.
  • Explore opportunities to fund the plugging of abandoned oil or gas wells that leak methane.
  • Advance awareness of the public health and climate threats from the O&G industry. 

Further information:

Thought Leaders
  • Provide technical assistance (e.g., monitoring and reporting) to businesses, government agencies, and other entities working to reduce methane emissions.
  • Help design policies and regulations that support methane abatement.
  • Analyze historical emissions patterns to identify and publicize successful programs.
  • Educate the public on the urgent need to abate methane.
  • Join or support joint efforts such as the Global Methane Alliance.
  • Advocate to policymakers for more ambitious targets and regulations.
  • Pressure O&G companies to improve their practices.

Further information:

Technologists and Researchers
  • Develop new LDAR technologies that reduce cost and required capacity.
  • Develop new technologies for measuring and verifying emissions.
  • Conduct longitudinal studies to measure emissions against objectives or means of enforcement. 

Further information:

Communities, Households, and Individuals
  • If you are impacted by harmful O&G methane management practices, document your experiences.
  • Reduce household consumption of fossil fuels by adopting clean energy sources, increasing energy efficiency, and replacing fossil fuel-powered equipment with electricity-powered equipment.
  • Share documentation of harmful practices and/or other key messages with policymakers, the press, and the public.
  • Encourage policymakers to improve regulations.
  • Support public education efforts on the urgency and need to address the issue.

Further information:

Evidence Base

Consensus of effectiveness of abating methane emissions in the O&G sector: High

There is a high level of consensus about the effectiveness of methane abatement strategies. These strategies can be deployed cost effectively in many cases and have an immediate impact on reducing global temperature rise. 

Authoritative sources such as the IEA (2023d), UNEP (2021), and Global Methane Hub (2024) agree that reducing methane emissions can noticeably reduce the rate of global temperature rise. DeFabrizio et al. (2021) identified that methane abatement strategies such as LDAR, switching from natural gas fuel to electric power, using air for pneumatic devices, and using vapor recovery units could reduce O&G methane emissions by 40% by 2030 based on global 2017 O&G emissions. With methane being the second largest contributor to climate change after CO₂, reductions in methane emissions can quickly reduce global temperature rise.

Others (Marks Levi, 2022; DeFabrizio et al., 2021; Malley et al., 2023) have identified that many methane abatement strategies can use existing technologies, often at low cost. Dunsky (2023) found that implementing 24 of the least expensive abatement measures in the exploration and production phases of Canada’s O&G industry could help Canada achieve its 2030 methane target. The IEA (2023a) noted that the O&G industry was responsible for 80 Mt of methane in 2022 and had the largest potential for abatement in the near term. The O&G industry has the potential to abate 60 Mt of methane by 2030 using abatement strategies; 40% of that could be abated at no net cost based on average natural gas prices from 2017 to 2021 (IEA, 2023a).

The results presented in this document summarize findings from more than 15 reviews and meta-analyses and more than 10 original studies reflecting current evidence from two countries, primarily from the United States and Canada, and from global sources. We recognize this limited geographic scope creates bias, and hope this work inspires research and data-sharing on this topic in underrepresented regions.

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Appendix

Data describing methane abatement potential in the O&G industry are often shown in marginal abatement cost curves (MACCs), which incorporate the initial cost, operating cost, revenue, and any extra costs per unit of emissions reduced as one value.

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Figure A1. Marginal abatement cost curves (MACC) for methane abatement in the O&G industry (IEA, 2024).

Cost curve chart.

Source: International Energy Agency (Global Methane Tracker 2024).

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MACCs indicate a range of potential climate actions and show at a glance the magnitude of financial return or financial cost across that range. In Figure A1, for the blocks below the horizontal axis, the value received from the sale of the captured methane is greater than the cost of the solution employed. The width of a block shows the annual amount of emissions a technology can abate, with wider blocks abating more emissions than narrower blocks.

MACCs are useful for identifying which climate action could have the most impact at reducing emissions or which options have a net economic gain. However, they do not illustrate the intricacies that may be in play among different climate actions and can lead users to ignore hard-to-abate emissions. The World Bank (2023) identified that MACCs are useful to find which option will reduce emissions by a set percentage but less useful for reducing absolute emissions to near zero. 

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Updated Date

Manage Coal Mine Methane

Submitted by Drawdown Admin on
Sector
Other Energy
Mode
Cut Emissions
Cluster
Cut Fugitive Emissions
Image
Worker in a coal mine
Coming Soon
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Summary

Managing coal mine methane (CMM) is the process of reducing methane emissions released from coal deposits and surrounding rock layers due to mining activities. CMM is naturally found in coal seams and released into the atmosphere when the coal seams are disturbed. Coal mines can continue to emit methane even after being closed or abandoned, which is known as abandoned mine methane (AMM). CMM and AMM can be captured and then utilized as a fuel source or destroyed before they reach the atmosphere [U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 2024a].

Food security,Health
Air quality
Overview

CMM is released from coal mines before, during, and after active coal mining and from coal being transported (EPA, 2024a). Atmospheric methane has a GWP of 81 on a 20-yr basis and a GWP of 28 on a 100-yr basis (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], 2023). This means methane is 81 times more effective at trapping heat than CO₂. Because methane is a short-lived climate pollutant that has a much stronger warming effect than CO₂ over a given time period, abating methane from coal mines will have a powerful near-term impact on slowing global climate change. If capturing methane is not possible, destroying the methane by burning it is preferable to releasing it.

CMM comes from five major sources throughout the coal mine’s life cycle: 

  1. Degasification systems – pipes installed in the ground to move methane into the atmosphere before starting mining
  2. Ventilation air – air escaping from underground mines when fresh air is used to push out underground methane during mining
  3. Surface mines – exposed coal seams that emit methane directly into the atmosphere during mining
  4. Fugitive emissions – already mined coal that emits methane while being transported or stored
  5. Abandoned or closed mines – coal seams and rock strata that are exposed to air, allowing AMM to escape through existing vents or cracks after mine closure. 

Figure 1. Percent breakdown of CMM sources in the United States, 2021.

Source: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2024d). Sources of coal mine methane. Retrieved November 5, 2024. https://www.epa.gov/cmop/sources-coal-mine-methane

CMM management relies on several practices and technologies to reduce the amount of methane released into the atmosphere. The CMM that is captured can be used as a fuel at high concentrations and destroyed through flaring or oxidation at low concentrations. The methane captured from degasification systems typically has a high concentration while fugitive and ventilation methane sources are low concentration. CMM management also includes leak detection and repair using satellites, drones, or other technologies to prevent methane from escaping into the atmosphere.

Underground coal mines have more methane abatement strategies available due to higher average methane concentrations and relative ease of capture. Surface coal mines are exposed directly to the atmosphere and can cover large areas, making them more difficult to abate methane, though there are technologies that can reduce CMM emissions. See the Appendix for more details on the abatement technologies specific to underground and surface coal mines.

References

Assan, S., & Whittle, E. (2023). In the dark: Underreporting of coal mine methane is a major climate risk. Ember. https://ember-energy.org/latest-insights/in-the-dark-underreporting-of-coal-mine-methane-is-a-major-climate-risk/#supporting-material 

Assan, S. (2024). Understanding the EU’s methane regulation for coal. Ember. https://ember-energy.org/latest-insights/eumethane-reg-explained/ 

CNX. (2024, March 20). Jumpstarting coal mine methane capture projects for beneficial end use [PowerPoint slides].Global Methane Initiative. https://www.globalmethane.org/resources/details.aspx?resourceid=5386 

DeFabrizio, S., Glazener, W., Hart, C., Henderson, K., Kar, J., Katz, J., Pratt, M. P., Rogers, M., Ulanov, A., & Tryggestad, C. (2021). Curbing methane emissions: How five industries can counter a major climate threat. McKinsey Sustainability. https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/business%20functions/sustainability/our%20insights/curbing%20methane%20emissions%20how%20five%20industries%20can%20counter%20a%20major%20climate%20threat/curbing-methane-emissions-how-five-industries-can-counter-a-major-climate-threat-v4.pdf 

Domingo, N. G. G., Fiore, A. M., Lamarque, J.-F., Kinney, P. L., Jiang, L., Gasparrini, A., Breitner, S., Lavigne, E., Madureira, J., Masselot, P., das Neves Pereira da Silva, S., Sheng Ng, C. F., Kyselý, J., Guo, Y., Tong, S., Kan, H., Urban, A., Orru, H., Maasikmets, M., … Chen, K. (2024). Ozone-related acute excess mortality projected to increase in the absence of climate and air quality controls consistent with the Paris Agreement. One Earth (Cambridge, Mass.), 7(2), 325–335. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.oneear.2024.01.001

Fiore, A. M., Jacob, D. J., & Field, B. D. (2002). Linking ozone pollution and climate change: The case for controlling methane. Geophysical Research Letters, 29(19), 182-197. https://doi.org/10.1029/2002GL015601 

Gajdzik, B., Tobór-Osadnik, K., Wolniak, R., & Grebski, W. W. (2024). European climate policy in the context of the problem of methane emissions from coal mines in Poland. Energies, 17(10), 2396. https://doi.org/10.3390/en17102396 

Global Energy Monitor (n.d.). Global coal mine tracker. Retrieved February 27, 2025 from https://globalenergymonitor.org/projects/global-coal-mine-tracker/ 

Global Methane Initiative. (2015). Coal mine methane country profiles. https://www.globalmethane.org/documents/toolsres_coal_overview_fullreport.pdf 

Global Methane Initiative (2018). Expert dialogue on ventilation air methane (VAM). https://www.globalmethane.org/documents/res_coal_VAM_Dialogue_Report_20181025.pdf 

Global Methane Initiative (2024a). 2023 Accomplishments in methane mitigation, recovery, and use through U.S.-supported international efforts. https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2024-12/epa430r24009-fy23-accomplishments-report.pdf 

Global Methane Initiative (2024b). International coal mine methane project list. https://globalmethane.org/resources/details.aspx?resourceid=1981 

Hong, C., Mueller, N. D., Burney, J. A., Zhang, Y., AghaKouchak, A., Moore, F. C., Qin, Y., Tong, D., & Davis, S. J. (2020). Impacts of ozone and climate change on yields of perennial crops in California. Nature Food, 1(3), 166–172. https://doi.org/10.1038/s43016-020-0043-8 

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). (2023). In: Climate change 2023: Synthesis report. Contribution of working groups I, II and III to the sixth assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change [core writing team, H. Lee and J. Romero (eds.)]. IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland, pp. 1–34, doi: 10.59327/IPCC/AR6-9789291691647.001 https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/syr/ 

International Energy Agency. (2021). Global methane tracker 2021: Methane abatement and regulation. https://www.iea.org/reports/methane-tracker-2021/methane-abatement-and-regulation 

International Energy Agency. (2023a). Net zero roadmap: A global pathway to keep the 1.5℃ goal in reach - 2023 update. https://www.iea.org/reports/net-zero-roadmap-a-global-pathway-to-keep-the-15-0c-goal-in-reach 

International Energy Agency. (2023b). Strategies to reduce emissions from coal supply. Global Methane Tracker 2023. https://www.iea.org/reports/global-methane-tracker-2023/strategies-to-reduce-emissions-from-coal-supply 

International Energy Agency. (2023c). The imperative of cutting methane from fossil fuels. https://www.iea.org/reports/the-imperative-of-cutting-methane-from-fossil-fuels 

International Energy Agency. (2023d). Global methane tracker 2023: Overview. https://www.iea.org/reports/global-methane-tracker-2023/overview 

International Energy Agency. (2024a). Global methane tracker documentation 2024 version. https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/d42fc095-f706-422a-9008-6b9e4e1ee616/GlobalMethaneTracker_Documentation.pdf 

International Energy Agency. (2024b). Methane tracker: Data tools. https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/data-tools/methane-tracker 

International Energy Agency. (2024c). World energy outlook 2024. https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-outlook-2024 

International Energy Agency. (2025). Global methane tracker documentation 2025 version. https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/2c0cf2d5-3910-46bc-a271-1367edfed212/GlobalMethaneTracker2025.pdf 

Kholod, N., Evans, M., Pilcher, R. C., Roshchanka, V., Ruiz, F., Coté, M., & Collings, R. (2020). Global methane emissions from coal mining to continue growing even with declining coal production. Journal of Cleaner Production, 256. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2020.120489 

Lewis, C., Tate, R.D., and Mei, D.L. (2024). Fuel operations sector: Coal mining emissions methodology [Data set]. WattTime and Global Energy Monitor, Climate TRACE Emissions Inventory. Retrieved April 18, 2025, from https://climatetrace.org 

Malley, C. S., Borgford-Parnell, N. Haeussling, S., Howard, L. C., Lefèvre E. N., & Kuylenstierna J. C. I. (2023). A roadmap to achieve the global methane pledge. Environmental Research: Climate, 2(1). https://doi.org/10.1088/2752-5295/acb4b4 

Mar, K. A., Unger, C., Walderdorff, L., & Butler, T. (2022). Beyond CO₂ equivalence: The impacts of methane on climate, ecosystems, and health. Environmental Science & Policy, 134, 127–136. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2022.03.027 

MethaneSAT. (2024). Solving a crucial climate challenge. Retrieved September 2, 2024 https://www.methanesat.org/satellite/ 

Mills, G., Sharps, K., Simpson, D., Pleijel, H., Frei, M., Burkey, K., Emberson, L., Cuddling, J., Broberg, M., Feng, Z., Kobayashi, K. & Agrawal, M. (2018). Closing the global ozone yield gap: Quantification and cobenefits for multistress tolerance. Global Change Biology, 24(10), 4869–4893. https://doi.org/10.1111/gcb.14381 

Ocko, I. B., Sun, T., Shindell, D., Oppenheimer, M. Hristov, A. N., Pacala, S. W., Mauzerall, D. L., Xu, Y. & Hamburg, S. P. (2021). Acting rapidly to deploy readily available methane mitigation measures by sector can immediately slow global warming. Environmental Research, 16(5). https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/abf9c8 

Ramya, A., Dhevagi, P., Poornima, R., Avudainayagam, S., Watanabe, M., & Agathokleous, E. (2023). Effect of ozone stress on crop productivity: A threat to food security. Environmental Research, 236(2), 116816. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envres.2023.116816 

Roshchanka, V., Evans, M., Ruiz, F., & Kholod, N. (2017). A strategic approach to selecting policy mechanisms for addressing coal mine methane emissions: A case study on Kazakhstan. Environmental Science & Policy, 78, 185–192. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2017.08.005 

Roshchanka, V., & Talkington, C. (2022). Effective monitoring, reporting and verification of methane emissions in the coal industry and the linkage to methane mitigation. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4298409

Rystad Energy. (2023, October 18). Methane tracking technologies study [PowerPoint slides]. Environmental Defense Fund. https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/documents/Methane%20Tracking%20Technologies%20Study%20Oct%2018%202023.pdf 

Sampedro, J., Waldhoff, S., Sarofim, M., & Van Dingenen, R. (2023). Marginal damage of methane emissions: Ozone impacts on agriculture. Environmental and Resource Economics, 84(4), 1095–1126. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-022-00750-6 

Setiawan, D. & Wright, C. (2024). The risks of ignoring methane emissions in coal mining. Ember. https://ember-energy.org/latest-insights/the-risks-of-ignoring-methane-emissions-in-coal-mining/#supporting-material 

Shindell, D., Sadavarte, P., Aben, I., Bredariol, T. O., Dreyfus, G., Höglund-Isaksson, L., Poulter, B., Saunois, M., Schmidt, G. A., Szopa, S., Rentz, K., Parsons, L., Qu, Z., Faluvegi, G., & Maasakkers, J. D. (2024). The methane imperative. Frontiers. https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/science/articles/10.3389/fsci.2024.1349770/full

Silvia, F., Talia, V., & Di Matteo, M. (2021). Coal mining and policy responses: Are externalities appropriately addressed? A meta-analysis. Environmental Science & Policy, 126, 39–47. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2021.09.013

Smith, C., Nicholls, Z. R. J., Armour, K., Collins, W., Forster, P., Meinshausen, M., Palmer, M. D., & Watanabe, M. (2021). The earth’s energy budget, climate feedbacks, and climate sensitivity supplementary material (climate change 2021: The physical science basis. Contribution of working group I to the sixth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change). Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). https://www.ipcc.ch/ 

Tai, A. P., Sadiq, M., Pang, J. Y., Yung, D. H., & Feng, Z. (2021). Impacts of surface ozone pollution on global crop yields: comparing different ozone exposure metrics and incorporating co-effects of CO₂.  Frontiers in Sustainable Food Systems, 5, 534616. https://doi.org/10.3389/fsufs.2021.534616 

Tao, S., Chen, S., & Pan, Z. (2019). Current status, challenges, and policy suggestions for coalbed methane industry development in China: A review. Energy Science & Engineering, 7(4), 1059–1074. https://doi.org/10.1002/ese3.358

Tate, R. D., (2022). Bigger than oil or gas? Sizing up coal mine methane. Global Energy Monitor. https://globalenergymonitor.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/GEM_CCM2022_final.pdf 

United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). (2019). Best practice guidance for effective methane recovery and use from abandoned coal mines. https://unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/energy/images/CMM/CMM_CE/Best_Practice_Guidance_for_Effective_Methane_Recovery_and_Use_from_Abandoned_Coal_Mines_FINAL__with_covers_.pdf 

United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). (2022). Best practice guidance for effective management of coal mine methane at national level: Monitoring, reporting, verification and mitigation. https://globalmethane.org/documents/Best%20Practice%20Guidance%20for%20Effective%20Management%20of%20Coal%20Mine%20Methane%20at%20National%20Level%20Monitoring,%20Reporting,%20Verification%20and%20Mitigation.pdf 

United Nations Environment Program. (2022). Coal mine methane science studies road map. https://www.unep.org/resources/other-evaluation-reportsdocuments/coal-mine-methane-science-studies-road-map 

U.S. Center for Disease Control and Prevention, (2024, September 25). Mining fires and explosions. https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/mining/topics/fires-explosions.html 

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2019). Global non-CO₂ greenhouse gas emission projections & mitigation 2015 - 2050. https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2019-09/documents/epa_non-co2_greenhouse_gases_rpt-epa430r19010.pdf 

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2024a). About coal mine methane. Retrieved November 5, 2024. https://www.epa.gov/cmop/about-coal-mine-methane 

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2024b). Coalbed methane outreach program accomplishments. https://www.epa.gov/cmop/coalbed-methane-outreach-program-accomplishments 

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2024c). GHGRP underground coal mines. Retrieved November 5, 2024. https://www.epa.gov/ghgreporting/ghgrp-underground-coal-mines 

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2024d). Sources of coal mine methane. Retrieved November 5, 2024. https://www.epa.gov/cmop/sources-coal-mine-methane 

Ward, K., Mountain State Spotlight, Mierjeski, A. & Scott Pham. (2023). In the game of musical mines, environmental damage takes a back seat. ProPublica. https://www.propublica.org/article/west-virginia-coal-blackjewel-bankruptcy-pollution 

Zhu, R., Khanna, N., Gordon, J., Dai, F., & Lin, J. (2023). Abandoned coal mine methane reduction. Berkeley Lab. https://ccci.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/Abandonded%20Coal%20Mines_Final%20%28EN%29.pdf 

Credits

Lead Fellow

  • Jason Lam

Contributors

  • James Gerber, Ph.D.

  • Yusuf Jameel, Ph.D. 

  • Ruthie Burrows, Ph.D.

  • Daniel Jasper

  • Alex Sweeney

Internal Reviewers

  • Sarah Gleeson, Ph.D.

  • Aiyana Bodi

  • Hannah Henkin

  • Ted Otte

  • Amanda Smith, Ph.D.

  • Paul West, Ph.D.

Effectiveness

Each Mt of methane that is not emitted avoids 81.2 Mt CO₂‑eq on a 20-yr basis and 27.9 Mt CO₂‑eq on a 100-yr basis (Smith et al., 2021). The GWP of methane is shown in Table 1. If the methane is converted into CO₂ through burning the contribution to global climate change will still be less than if the methane were released into the atmosphere. Methane abatement can have a more immediate impact on future global temperature rise because it has a larger and faster warming effect than CO₂. Mitigating methane emissions in the near term can give us more time for reducing GHG emissions in hard to abate sectors.

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Table 1. Effectiveness at reducing emissions.

Unit: t CO₂‑eq/Mt methane abated

100-yr GWP 27,900,000
20-yr GWP 81,200,000
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Cost

The cost of methane abatement will vary depending on the type of coal mine, the methane content of the coal seam, the strategies used, and the availability of financial support for methane abatement. For our analysis, we average the costs for various feasible abatement strategies under two general assumptions: sufficiently high methane content for any of the major abatement strategies to be applied (IEA, 2024a) and the ability to use the abated methane on-site or sell it to natural gas companies. The initial cost to abate 1 Mt of methane is US$1.5 billion, the operating cost is about US$130 million, revenue is about US$260 million and the overall net savings over a 30-yr amortization period is US$90 million. We were only able to find revenue information from the IEA (2023b, 2024a), meaning the net cost could be different than shown here due to the site specific nature of methane abatement strategies. 

We considered the baseline scenario to be coal mining practices without methane abatement; all cost estimates here are relative to that scenario.

Cost data were limited for this solution. The available costs for a specific abatement strategy were normalized according to the cost of abating one Mt of methane, and it was assumed that a single strategy abated all of the methane for the coal mine. This results in an overestimate of the effectiveness of any individual strategy. In reality, multiple strategies are likely to be used. The costs shown in Table 2 are for the global scale of coal methane abatement and not from the point of view of an individual coal producer. Many studies that look at global coal methane abatement put multiple abatement strategies together and do not go into detail about the individual technology costs. The IEA (2024a) included costs for individual CMM abatement strategies; however, the costs were only applicable for coal mines that produce enough methane for it to be economically feasible to deploy the specific abatement strategy. Flaring is an effective strategy for destroying captured methane, but will not create revenue in the absence of a carbon market. For more details on important aspects for coal methane abatement strategies, refer to the Appendix.

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Table 2. Cost per unit climate impact.

Unit: 2023 US$/t CO₂‑eq, 100-yr basis

median -3.17
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Learning Curve

Many of the solutions for reducing methane emissions from coal mining are mature. Research from Rystad (2023) found that technologies for abating CMM emissions, such as drainage gas utilization, sealing and rerouting, and flaring, were considered mature in Australian coal mines. Regenerative thermal oxidation technology is in commercial use for destroying volatile organic compounds and can be used for destroying ventilation air methane (VAM), but the manufacturers have little interest in improving the technology for use in coal mines without confirmed markets (GMI, 2018; Rystad, 2023). We do not foresee the costs of implementing these solutions falling in the future. CMM regulations may encourage manufacturers to improve oxidation technology, but the technology is already used commercially, so there may not be large efficiency gains.

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Speed of Action

Speed of action refers to how quickly a climate solution physically affects the atmosphere after it is deployed. This is different from speed of deployment, which is the pace at which solutions are adopted.

At Project Drawdown, we define the speed of action for each climate solution as gradual, emergency brake, or delayed.

Manage Coal Mine Methane is an EMERGENCY BRAKE climate solution. It has the potential to deliver a more rapid impact than nominal and delayed solutions. Because emergency brake solutions can deliver their climate benefits quickly, they can help accelerate our efforts to address dangerous levels of climate change. For this reason, they are a high priority.

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Caveats

CMM abatement consists of capturing methane that would otherwise be released into the atmosphere. If the methane is burned, CO₂ will be emitted as a byproduct; however, this provides a net climate benefit compared to the methane that would be emitted. CMM emissions management can be avoided by not extracting, transporting, or using coal in the first place. 

As coal demand drops, the number of closed or abandoned coal mines will increase. These mines will continue to release AMM into the atmosphere for many decades. Sealing underground mines can stop methane from being released, but seals have been known to fail and require ongoing monitoring to verify methane is not escaping (Kholod et al., 2020). Gas collection systems can be used to capture AMM, but the CO₂ produced will need to be captured for complete emission reductions. Flooding underground coal mines is very effective at stopping methane from being released; however, there are concerns about water contamination (McKinsey, 2021).

Our assessment does not include the impact of the CO₂ created from the destruction of methane.

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Current Adoption

We estimated that the coal sector abated 0.59 Mt of methane in 2023 and released 40 Mt in 2024 (IEA, 2025). Reports from EPA (2022), and GMI (2023) estimated the amount of CMM abated to date, and the statistical ranges from the sources are shown in Table 3. However, most of the data focused on coal mines in the United States. The EPA (2024b) stated that 0.3 Mt of methane was captured in 2021 due to the Coalbed Methane Outreach Program. CMM is controlled at coal mines for health and safety reasons, but only in 2024 was regulation introduced for reducing methane emissions from the energy sector in the European Union (Assan, 2024).


GMI (2024a) reports that 0.79 Mt of methane was abated from coal mines in 2023 among its member countries. The organization includes 48 GMI member countries but covers only 70% of human-caused methane emissions and does not track methane mitigation that has occurred outside of the group. GMI (2024b) currently lists more than 471 CMM abatement projects in 20 countries worldwide. According to Global Energy Monitor (n.d.), over 6,000 coal mines were active in more than 70 countries as of April 2024. With these data sources, we consider our analysis of the current adoption of CMM abatement as conservative. 

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Table 3. Current (2023) adoption level.

Unit: Mt/yr of methane abated

25th percentile 0.49
mean 0.59
median (50th percentile) 0.59
75th percentile 0.69
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Adoption Trend

Although there are little data specifically quantifying the adoption trend of methane abatement strategies, we estimate the median adoption trend to be about 0.60 Mt/yr of methane abated.  Table 4 shows the adoption trend for CMM abatement.

GMI (2024) reported methane abatement staying relatively stable from 2016 to 2023 at about 0.8 Mt/yr, with a small increase to 1.0 Mt of methane in 2019–2022 before decreasing back to 0.8 Mt in 2023, causing the adoption trend to be higher than the current adoption value we state above. The EPA (2024a) Coalbed Methane Outreach Program showed fairly stable emission reductions of around 0.33 Mt/yr between 2016 and 2022. The annual methane emission abatement from this program gradually increased 2003–2011, followed by a continued trend of methane abatement at a slower rate 2011–2022. The IEA (2024b) found that almost 2.0 Mt of methane was emitted in 2023 by the United States coal industry, and 60% of those emissions could be abated.

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Table 4. (2016–2023) adoption trend.

Unit: Mt/yr methane abated

25th percentile 0.46
mean 0.60
median (50th percentile) 0.60
75th percentile 0.73
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Adoption Ceiling

We found an adoption ceiling of about 40.3 Mt/yr of methane based on the IEA’s (2025) estimate for total methane emissions from the coal mine sector. We assumed that current CMM emissions would remain the same into the future with no changes in coal production or demand. Table 5 shows the adoption ceiling for coal mine methane abatement.

Even in the IEA’s (2023c) highest methane abatement energy scenario, only 93% of the methane emissions are reduced by 2050. This would still leave the coal sector releasing methane into the atmosphere. Reduced coal production will reduce the amount of methane emissions produced by the coal sector and consequently reduce the amount of methane that needs to be controlled with methane abatement. However, methane abatement will still be important for abating the remaining CMM emissions and the growing proportion of AMM emissions (IEA, 2023c, Kholod et al., 2020). 

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Table 5. Adoption ceiling.

Unit: Mt/yr of methane abated

median (50th percentile) 40.30
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Achievable Adoption

The amount of methane that could be abated from CMM varies greatly depending on global coal demand. We estimate an achievable adoption range of 2.83–4.40 Mt/yr of methane abated.The Achievable – Low value aligns with the IEA (2023c) Announced Pledges scenario, in which all announced climate policies are met and full methane abatement is employed, but net-zero emissions are not achieved. This range of high and low values was determined by taking the total methane abated in these scenarios and dividing by the difference between the target year and 2024 to determine an average amount of methane abated each year to reach the scenario target. 

The Achievable – High value aligns with Ocko et al.(2021), where all economically and technically feasible methane abatement is employed by 2030. DeFabrizio et al. (2021) estimated that the degasification of underground mines and flaring would be the source of most methane abatement from coal mining, with degasification of surface mines abating a smaller proportion of methane over time. However, research from Kholod et al. (2020) suggested there will be an increase in AMM emissions as coal mines are closed. Methane emissions from AMM are not extensively monitored right now, and there is limited research on the topic. Methane abatement strategies will be needed to abate growing AMM emissions (Zhu et al, 2023). 

In addition, some research suggested CMM is being underestimated, with global emissions being as high as 67 Mt/yr (Assan & Whittle, 2023). If coal demand drops by 90%, as outlined in IEA’s Net Zero Emissions scenario, total coal methane emissions would decline to 3 Mt/yr, and the use of methane abatement would reduce emissions by 2 Mt/yr, leaving only 1 Mt/yr of CMM emitted in 2050. 

With growing interest and investment from governments and academia in identifying methane leaks using technologies such as satellite sensing (MethaneSAT, 2024), the opportunities for methane abatement will increase. Over 150 countries have joined the Global Methane Pledge (representing 50% of the world’s human-caused methane) to reduce methane emissions by 30% of 2020 emissions by 2030 (UNEP, 2021). The IEA (2023a) found that even in a baseline scenario, many governments have announced or put in place measures to cut methane emissions; we would expect a growing trend in global methane abatement to occur. The IEA (2024c) states that in all scenarios global coal demand will decrease. Table 6 shows the statistical low and high achievable ranges for CMM abatement based on different sources for future uptake of CMM abatement.

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Table 6. Range of achievable adoption levels.

Unit: Mt/yr methane abated

Current Adoption 0.59
Achievable – Low 2.83
Achievable – High 4.40
Adoption Ceiling 40.30
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We estimate that the coal industry is currently abating approximately 0.02 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr on a 100-yr basis and 0.03 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr on a 20-yr basis using methane abatement strategies. This is about 1% of total methane emissions emitted in 2024 (IEA, 2025). 

As the coal industry opens or closes coal mines due to changing coal demand, the opportunities for CMM abatement projects will change along with it. If coal demand gradually drops by 2050, more than 0.12 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr of methane could be abated. However, if coal demand drops more quickly from the implementation of energy and climate policies, the methane abatement potential would drop because the coal sector is producing less methane. This is projected in the different energy scenarios modeled by the IEA (2023c). The range between the current CMM abatement and the adoption ceiling is shown in Table 7.

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Table 7. Climate impact at different levels of adoption.

Unit: Gt CO₂‑eq/yr, 100-yr basis

Current Adoption 0.02
Achievable – Low 0.08
Achievable – High 0.12
Adoption Ceiling 1.12
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Additional Benefits

Air quality and health

Around 10% of anthropogenic methane comes from coal mines (IEA, 2024a). Methane released from coal mines contributes to ground-level ozone pollution, which can harm lung function, exacerbating conditions like asthma, bronchitis, and emphysema, and can contribute to premature mortality (Mar et al., 2022). Domingo et al. (2024) estimated that ground-level ozone accounted for about 6,600 excess deaths per year in about 400 cities globally. 

Methane released from coal mines also endangers workers’ safety in the mines, increasing the possibility of explosions, which are a significant source of fatalities and injuries (CDC, 2024). In the United States, from 2006 to 2011, mine explosions were responsible for about 25% of fatalities in the mining industry (CDC, 2024). While advances in methane mitigation technologies can prevent explosions and fatalities, mines across LMICs usually do not have methane mitigation protocols in place. Installing methane abatement strategies can potentially protect workers from such explosions (Tate, 2022).

Food security 

Methane reacts with chemicals like VOCs to form tropospheric, or ground-level ozone (Fiore et al., 2002). Ground-level ozone has been linked to reduced crop growth and yields (Mills et al., 2018; Samperdo et al., 2023; Tai et al., 2021). Mitigating methane emissions from coal mines could improve food security by reducing ground-level ozone and its harmful impacts on agricultural productivity (Tai et al., 2014; Ramya et al., 2023)

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Risks

CMM abatement strategies could be implemented on a voluntary basis due to favorable natural gas prices, but if natural gas prices drop there is less economic incentive to abate methane (IEA, 2021). Without policy support enforcing methane abatement, emissions could continue, especially from VAM and AMM, which are more difficult to capture and use. Ensuring long-term monitoring and abatement of CMM can be challenging if coal mines are abandoned due to owners going bankrupt, leaving environmental damages unpaid for and remediation up to nearby communities or taxpayers (Ward et al., 2023). 

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Interactions with Other Solutions

Reinforcing

Managing coal methane can have a positive impact on other solutions that reduce methane release to the atmosphere. The use of technologies such as degasification systems, methane destruction, and Leak Detection and Repair (LDAR) in the coal mine sector can demonstrate the effectiveness and economic case for employing methane abatement. This would build momentum for the widespread adoption of methane abatement because successes in the coal sector can be leveraged and applied to other sectors. In addition, LDAR is a key part in identifying where we can abate methane emissions and lessons learned from the coal sector can be applied to other sites, as well as identifying methane leaks in general. 

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Competing

CMM management interacts negatively with solutions that provide clean electricity as this solution captures methane that can be used as an energy source, prolonging the use of natural gas infrastructure and reducing the cost of methane as a fuel source. 

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Dashboard

Solution Basics

1 Mt of methane abated

tCO2-eq/unit
2.79×10⁷
units/yr
Current 0.592.834.4
Achievable (Low to High)

Climate Impact

GtCO2-eq/yr
Current 0.02 0.080.12
US$ per tCO2-eq
-3
Emergency Brake

CH₄

Trade-offs

Methane abatement strategies are a powerful tool to reduce methane emissions; however, providing a secondary source of revenue for coal mining could increase the profitability and longevity of some coal mines. A broad strategy to reduce reliance on coal as an energy resource is needed to reduce the amount of CMM generated. Even with methane abatement strategies in place, methane used as a fuel or destroyed through flaring will still emit GHGs and contribute to global climate change.

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Mt CO2–eq
< 1
1–3
3–5
5–7
7–9
> 9

Annual emissions from coal mine sources, 2024

Globally, coal mines are responsible for 40 of the 347 Mt of anthropogenic methane emissions in 2023. This is equivalent to 1,080 Mt CO2–eq based on a 100-year time scale. Methane emissions occur throughout the life of a coal mine and can continue after mines are closed or abandoned.

Lewis, C., Tate, R.D., and Mei, D.L. (2024). Fuel operations sector: Coal mining emissions methodology [Data set]. WattTime and Global Energy Monitor, Climate TRACE Emissions Inventory. Retrieved April 18, 2025, from https://climatetrace.org

International Energy Agency. (2024). Methane tracker: Data tools. https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/data-tools/methane-tracker

Mt CO2–eq
< 1
1–3
3–5
5–7
7–9
> 9

Annual emissions from coal mine sources, 2024

Globally, coal mines are responsible for 40 of the 347 Mt of anthropogenic methane emissions in 2023. This is equivalent to 1,080 Mt CO2–eq based on a 100-year time scale. Methane emissions occur throughout the life of a coal mine and can continue after mines are closed or abandoned.

Lewis, C., Tate, R.D., and Mei, D.L. (2024). Fuel operations sector: Coal mining emissions methodology [Data set]. WattTime and Global Energy Monitor, Climate TRACE Emissions Inventory. Retrieved April 18, 2025, from https://climatetrace.org

International Energy Agency. (2024). Methane tracker: Data tools. https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/data-tools/methane-tracker

Geographic Guidance Introduction

Coal mine methane abatement is applicable in any area with coal mines. While China and the United States are the largest coal producers, Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and India also generated more than 10 Mt CO₂-eq (100–yr) from coal mines in 2015 (GMI, 2015).

Levels of methane emissions from coal mines can vary geographically. The greatest abatement potential is in China, Kazakhstan, Australia, and several countries in Eastern Europe and Africa (Shindell et al., 2024). However, methane abatement is recommended for all coal mining activities, and high-income countries are in a position to share supportive technologies and practices for coal mine methane abatement with other coal-producing countries to reduce methane emissions from active and abandoned or closed mines.

Action Word
Manage
Solution Title
Coal Mine Methane
Classification
Highly Recommended
Lawmakers and Policymakers
  • Create policies based on global best practices, such as the IEA’s roadmap to implementing CMM regulations.
  • Require all coal mines to measure and report on methane emissions.
  • Invest in monitoring, reporting, and verification technologies, such as satellites, and support low-income countries in monitoring emissions.
  • Provide financial incentives, such as reduced taxes, subsidies, grants, low-interest loans, and feed-in tariffs, for adopting drainage and capture technologies suitable for the region.
  • Require closed and abandoned mines to be sealed and monitored.
  • Compile or update global inventories of the status of abandoned and closed mines.
  • When possible, do not approve the construction of new coal mines.
  • Require low-emitting technologies for equipment, coal processing, storage, and transportation.
  • Develop infrastructure to use captured CMM, including gas processing, grid connections, and industry capacity.
  • Establish clear resource rights to methane emitted from active and abandoned mines.
  • Include CMM recovery in Nationally Determined Contributions and other international reporting instruments.
  • Provide educational resources to industry leaders, including potential reduction options, workshops, actionable reports, direct engagements, and demonstrations.
  • Join, support, or create public initiatives such as the Global Methane Initiative, Global Methane Pledge, or Global Methane Hub.

Further information:

Practitioners
  • Utilize or destroy CMM to the maximum extent.
  • Work with policymakers to create policies based on global best practices, such as the IEA’s roadmap to implementing CMM regulations.
  • Measure and report on methane emissions.
  • Invest in monitoring, reporting, and verification technologies, such as satellites, and support low-income countries to monitor emissions.
  • Take advantage of any financial incentives, such as reduced taxes, subsidies, grants, low-interest loans, and feed-in tariffs, to adopt drainage and capture technologies suitable for the region.
  • Ensure abandoned and closed mines are sealed and monitored.
  • Compile or update global inventories of the status of abandoned and closed mines.
  • When possible, do not approve the construction of new coal mines.
  • Develop infrastructure to use captured CMM, including gas processing, grid connections, and industry capacity.
  • Assist policymakers in establishing clear resource rights to methane emitted from active and abandoned mines.
  • Use existing drainage systems for gas capture, utilization, and sale.
  • Improve technologies, such as thermal oxidizers, for the purposes of VAM destruction.
  • Partner with carbon markets that are linked to CMM abatement.
  • Improve CMM emissions modeling and monitoring, including satellites and on-the-ground methods.
  • Invest in R&D to improve extraction, capture, storage, transportation, and utilization technologies.
  • Join, support, or create public initiatives such as the Global Methane Initiative, Global Methane Pledge, or Global Methane Hub.
  • Utilize educational resources to industry leaders, including potential reduction options, workshops, actionable reports, direct engagements, and demonstrations.

Further information:

Business Leaders
  • Ensure that operations or investments that include coal mines utilize or destroy methane emissions.
  • Do not invest, plan to use, or create agreements with new coal mines.
  • Invest in high-integrity carbon markets that are linked to CMM abatement.
  • Invest in R&D to improve the efficiency of extraction, capture, storage, transportation, and utilization technologies.
  • Develop infrastructure to use captured CMM, including gas processing, grid connections, and industry capacity.
  • Utilize existing data sets such as the UN’s International Methane Emissions Observatory to inform current and future decisions.
  • Join, support, or create public initiatives such as the Global Methane Initiative, Global Methane Pledge, or Global Methane Hub.

Further information:

Nonprofit Leaders
  • Advocate for regulating CMM emissions and local policies based on global best practices, such as the IEA’s roadmap to implementing CMM regulations.
  • Assist coal mines in measuring and reporting or conducting independent studies on CMM emissions.
  • Advocate for financial incentives, such as reduced taxes, subsidies, grants, low-interest loans, and feed-in tariffs, for the adoption of drainage and capture technologies suitable for the region.
  • Advocate to stop the construction of new coal mines.
  • Compile or update global inventories of the status of abandoned and closed mines.
  • Help create high-integrity carbon markets that are linked to CMM abatement.
  • Provide educational resources to industry leaders, including potential reduction options, workshops, actionable reports, direct engagements, and demonstrations.
  • Join, support, or create public initiatives such as the Global Methane Initiative, Global Methane Pledge, or Global Methane Hub.

Further information:

Investors
  • Invest in monitoring, reporting, and verification technologies, such as satellites, and support low-income countries to monitor emissions.
  • Provide financial support through low-interest loans or green bonds to adopt drainage and capture technologies suitable for the region.
  • Do not invest in constructing new coal mines and require any existing investments to provide transparent emissions data and time-based reduction strategies.
  • Invest in R&D to improve the efficiency of extraction, capture, storage, transportation, and utilization technologies.
  • Develop infrastructure to use captured CMM, including gas processing, grid connections, and industry capacity.
  • Invest in high-integrity carbon markets that are linked to CMM abatement.
  • Join, support, or create public initiatives such as the Global Methane Initiative, Global Methane Pledge, or Global Methane Hub.

Further information:

Philanthropists and International Aid Agencies
  • Invest in monitoring, reporting, and verification technologies, such as satellites, and support low-income countries to monitor emissions.
  • Provide financial support to adopt drainage and capture technologies suitable for the region.
  • Invest in R&D to improve the efficiency of extraction, capture, storage, transportation, and utilization technologies.
  • Assist in establishing clear resource rights to methane emitted from active and abandoned mines.
  • Help create high-integrity carbon markets that are linked to CMM abatement.
  • Join, support, or create public initiatives such as the Global Methane Initiative, Global Methane Pledge, or Global Methane Hub.
  • Provide educational resources to industry leaders, including potential reduction options, workshops, actionable reports, direct engagements, and demonstrations.
  • Advocate for regulating CMM emissions and local policies based on global best practices, such as the IEA’s roadmap to implementing CMM regulations.
  • Compile or update global inventories of the status of abandoned and closed mines.

Further information:

Thought Leaders
  • Advocate for regulating CMM emissions and local policies based on global best practices, such as the IEA’s roadmap to implementing CMM regulations.
  • Assist coal mines in measuring and reporting or conducting independent studies on CMM emissions.
  • Advocate for financial incentives, such as reduced taxes, subsidies, grants, low-interest loans, and feed-in tariffs, for adopting drainage and capture technologies suitable for the region.
  • Assist in establishing clear resource rights to methane emitted from active and abandoned mines.
  • Advocate to stop the construction of new coal mines.
  • Compile or update global inventories of the status of abandoned and closed mines.
  • Help create high-integrity carbon markets that are linked to CMM abatement.
  • Provide educational resources to industry leaders, including potential reduction options, workshops, actionable reports, direct engagements, and demonstrations.
  • Join, support, or create public initiatives such as the Global Methane Initiative, Global Methane Pledge, or Global Methane Hub.

Further information:

Technologists and Researchers
  • Improve CMM emissions modeling and monitoring, including satellites and on-the-ground methods.
  • Compile or update global inventories of the status of abandoned and closed mines.
  • Develop infrastructure to use captured CMM, including gas processing, grid connections, and industry capacity.
  • Discover ways to utilize existing drainage systems for gas capture, utilization, and sale.
  • Improve technologies, such as thermal oxidizers, for the purposes of VAM destruction.
  • Develop new ways to improve extraction, capture, storage, transportation, and utilization technologies.
  • Develop verifiable carbon credits using technology such as blockchain to improve the integrity of carbon markets.
  • Improve the efficiency of mining equipment to reduce maintenance requirements and costs.

Further information:

Communities, Households, and Individuals
  • Advocate for regulating CMM emissions and local policies based on global best practices, such as the IEA’s roadmap to implementing CMM regulations.
  • Advocate for financial incentives, such as reduced taxes, subsidies, grants, low-interest loans, and feed-in tariffs, for the adoption of drainage and capture technologies suitable for the region.
  • Advocate to stop the construction of new coal mines.
  • Assist coal mines in measuring and reporting or conducting independent studies on CMM emissions.
  • Provide educational resources to industry leaders, including potential reduction options, workshops, actionable reports, direct engagements, and demonstrations.
  • Join, support, or create public initiatives such as the Global Methane Initiative, Global Methane Pledge, or Global Methane Hub.

Further information:

Evidence Base

Consensus of effectiveness of abating methane emissions from coal mines: High

There is a high level of consensus about the effectiveness of methane abatement strategies. These strategies can be deployed cost effectively in many cases and have an immediate impact on reducing global temperature rise. 

Authoritative sources such as the IEA (2024c) and UNEP (2021) agree that reducing methane emissions can noticeably slow global climate change. Methane is a short-lived climate pollutant that has a much stronger warming effect than CO₂ over a given time period. IEA (2023d) identified that close to 55% (22 Mt) of CMM emissions could be abated with existing technologies. However, there are significant challenges in measuring and recovering methane emissions in the coal sector. Analysis from Assan & Whittle (2023) found that global CMM emissions could be significantly higher than reported, 38–67 Mt/yr compared with the 40 Mt/yr reported by the IEA (2025).

The IEA (2023a) noted that more than half of CMM emissions could be abated through utilization, flaring, or oxidation technologies, with abatement being more practical for underground mines. Many studies (DeFabrizio et al., 2021; Malley et al., 2023; Shindell et al., 2024) have shown that methane abatement strategies can use existing technologies, often at low cost. In some countries, coal operators already identify the location and sources of CMM to meet health and safety regulations (Assan & Whittle, 2023); Setiawan & Wright (2024) noted that existing technologies such as pre-mine drainage and VAM mitigation have been proven in various places around the world over the past 25 years. According to UNEP (2021), coal methane abatement could reduce emissions by 12–25 Mt/yr, with up to 98% of the measures implemented at low cost. However, costs may vary significantly based on the available infrastructure and characteristics of an individual coal mine.

The results presented in this document summarize findings from 21 reviews and meta-analyses and 20 original studies reflecting current evidence from three countries (Australia, China, and the United States) as well as from sources examining global CMM emissions. We recognize this limited geographic scope creates bias, and hope this work inspires research and data sharing on this topic in underrepresented regions.

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Appendix

CMM abatement strategy constraints:

The type of coal mine, the amount of methane produced, and the available infrastructure greatly affect which abatement strategies are economical. Underground coal mines often produce more CMM and are likely to capture CMM using degasification systems and use it for productive purposes such as electricity generation or selling captured methane. However, VAM, which is a major part of CMM emissions, can be challenging to use for productive purposes due to the low methane concentrations. VAM requires regenerative thermal oxidation technology to effectively destroy and with more gassy coal mines. According to the IEA (2023b), technologies such as flaring and drained CMM can be used at less gassy mines with lower initial capital cost. Capturing methane for destruction has the disadvantage of not creating a source of revenue to offset the capital cost of methane abatement without a form of carbon markets in place. 

More than 60% of methane-related emissions from coal mining are from the ventilation of underground coal mines. Large amounts of fresh air are used to lower the concentration of methane and reduce the risk of explosions in underground mines. This makes it challenging to destroy or use the low concentrations of VAM (UNEP, 2022). It is also challenging to capture methane from surface mines because the coal is in direct contact with the atmosphere and over a larger surface area. However, thermal oxidation systems have been used to destroy VAM (U.S. EPA, 2019) and there have been examples of degasification systems used for surface mines as well (IEA, 2023b). Methane emissions from AMM can be dealt with by flooding underground mines with water (Kholod et al., 2020) or by sealing and using capture and utilization projects (Zhu et al., 2023). 

Technologies for reducing methane emissions can be divided between underground and surface coal mines:

Underground mines
  • Predainage prior to mining
  • VAM capture and utilization
  • Capture of abandoned mine gas
  • Sealing or flooding of abandoned mines 
Surface mines
  • Degasification of surface mines
  • Predrainage of surface mines

Appendix References

CNX. (2024, March 20). Jumpstarting coal mine methane capture projects for beneficial end use [PowerPoint slides].Global Methane Initiative. https://www.globalmethane.org/resources/details.aspx?resourceid=5386 

United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). (2019). Best practice guidance for effective methane recovery and use from abandoned coal mines. https://unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/energy/images/CMM/CMM_CE/Best_Practice_Guidance_for_Effective_Methane_Recovery_and_Use_from_Abandoned_Coal_Mines_FINAL__with_covers_.pdf 

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Updated Date

Mobilize Electric Cars

Submitted by Drawdown Admin on
Sector
Transportation
Mode
Cut Emissions
Cluster
Electrify Vehicles Fuel Switching
Image
Electric car plugged into charging station
Coming Soon
Off
Summary

Electric cars are four-wheeled passenger cars that run on electricity, usually from the electricity grid and stored in onboard batteries (i.e., not including fuel cell electric cars). This definition includes electric pickup trucks, motorhomes, and other such vehicles. It does not include two-wheeled vehicles or hybrid cars (which combine an electric motor with a gasoline or diesel engine). It also does not include freight and commercial vehicles, such as electric heavy trucks, buses, and ambulances. We define Mobilizing Electric Cars as replacing fossil fuel–powered cars (i.e., those powered by internal combustion engines) with electric equivalents, as well as building out the necessary infrastructure (especially charging stations) to support them.

Income & work,Health
Water quality,Air quality
Overview

Electric cars provide the same functionality as fossil fuel–powered cars, but use electric motors rather than fuel-burning engines. The energy for the motors comes from an onboard battery, which is normally charged using electricity from the grid.

Electric cars have no direct tailpipe emissions, since electric motors do not burn fuel to function. The grid electricity used to charge their batteries may have come from fossil fuel-burning power plants, meaning electric cars are not entirely free of direct emissions. However, in most electrical grids, even those that mainly generate electricity from fossil fuels, electric cars usually still produce fewer emissions per pkm than fossil fuel–powered cars. This is for three reasons. First, large, fixed power plants and efficient electric grids can convert fossil fuels into useful energy more efficiently than smaller, mobile internal combustion engines in cars. In extreme cases, such as grids powered entirely by coal, this might not be the case, particularly if the grid has a lot of transmission and distribution losses. Second, the powertrain of an electric car delivers electricity from the battery to the wheels much more efficiently than the powertrain of a fossil fuel–powered car, which wastes much more energy as heat (International Transport Forum, 2020; Mofolasayo, 2023; Verma et al., 2022). Third, electric cars’ powertrains enable regenerative braking, where the kinetic energy of the car’s motion is put back into the battery when the driver brakes (Yang et al., 2024).

Electric cars reduce emissions of CO₂,  methane, and nitrous oxide to the atmosphere by replacing fuel-powered cars, which emit these gases from their tailpipes.

References

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Dillman, K. J., Árnadóttir, Á., Heinonen, J., Czepkiewicz, M., & Davíðsdóttir, B. (2020). Review and Meta-Analysis of EVs: Embodied Emissions and Environmental Breakeven. Sustainability, 12(22), Article 22. https://doi.org/10.3390/su12229390

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IEA. (2022). Electric Vehicles: Total Cost of Ownership Tool. IEA. https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/data-tools/electric-vehicles-total-cost-of-ownership-tool

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International Council on Clean Transportation. (2024). Clearing the air: Why EVs can outperform conventional vehicles in freezing temperatures. International Council on Clean Transportation. https://theicct.org/clearing-the-air-why-evs-can-outperform-conventional-vehicles-in-freezing-temperatures-oct24/

International Transport Forum. (2020). Good to Go? Assessing the Environmental Performance of New Mobility (Corporate Partnership Board). OECD. https://www.itf-oecd.org/sites/default/files/docs/environmental-performance-new-mobility.pdf

IPCC. (2022). Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge. https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg3/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGIII_FullReport.pdf

Jones, S. J. (2019). If electric cars are the answer, what was the question? British Medical Bulletin, 129(1), 13–23. https://doi.org/10.1093/bmb/ldy044

Kerr, G. H., Goldberg, D. L., & Anenberg, S. C. (2021). COVID-19 pandemic reveals persistent disparities in nitrogen dioxide pollution. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 118(30), e2022409118. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2022409118

Kittner, N., Tsiropoulos, I., Tarvydas, D., Schmidt, O., Staffell, I., & Kammen, D. M. (2020). Chapter 9—Electric vehicles. In M. Junginger & A. Louwen (Eds.), Technological Learning in the Transition to a Low-Carbon Energy System (pp. 145–163). Academic Press. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-818762-3.00009-1

Larson, E., Grieg, C., Jenkins, J., Mayfield, E., Pascale, A., Zhang, C., Drossman, J., Williams, R., Pacala, S., Socolow, R., Baik, E., Birdesy, R., Duke, R., Jones, R., Haley, B., Leslie, E., Paustain, K., & Swan, A. (2021). Net-Zero America: Potential Pathways, Infrastructure, and Impacts. Princeton University. https://lpdd.org/resources/princeton-report-net-zero-america/

Melaina, M., Bush, B., Eichman, J., Wood, E., Stright, D., Krishnan, V., Keyser, D., Mai, T., & McLaren, J. (2016). National Economic Value Assessment of Plug-in Electric Vehicles: Volume I (No. NREL/TP-5400-66980). National Renewable Energy Lab. (NREL), Golden, CO (United States). https://doi.org/10.2172/1338175

Milovanoff, A., Posen, I. D., & MacLean, H. L. (2020). Electrification of light-duty vehicle fleet alone will not meet mitigation targets. Nature Climate Change, 1–6. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-020-00921-7

Mofolasayo, A. (2023). Assessing and Managing the Direct and Indirect Emissions from Electric and Fossil-Powered Vehicles. Sustainability, 15(2), Article 2. https://doi.org/10.3390/su15021138

Nguyen, C. T. P., Nguyễn, B.-H., Ta, M. C., & Trovão, J. P. F. (2023). Dual-Motor Dual-Source High Performance EV: A Comprehensive Review. Energies, 16(20), Article 20. https://doi.org/10.3390/en16207048

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Credits

Lead Fellow

  • Cameron Roberts, Ph.D.

Contributors

  • Ruthie Burrows, Ph.D.

  • James Gerber, Ph.D.

  • Daniel Jasper

  • Heather Jones, Ph.D.

  • Heather McDiarmid, Ph.D.

  • Alex Sweeney

Internal Reviewers

  • Aiyana Bodi

  • James Gerber, Ph.D.

  • Hannah Henkin

  • Jason Lam

  • Ted Otte

  • Amanda Smith, Ph.D.
Effectiveness

Every million pkm shifted from fossil fuel–powered cars to electric cars reduces 48.52 t CO₂‑eq on a 100-yr basis (Table 1), or 49.13 t CO₂‑eq on a 20-yr basis. 

We found this by collecting data on electricity consumption for a range of electric car models (Electric Vehicle Database, 2024) and multiplying it by the global average emissions per kWh of electricity generation. Fossil fuel–powered cars emit 115.3 t CO₂‑eq/pkm on a 100-yr basis (116.4 t CO₂‑eq/pkm on a 20-yr basis). Electric cars already have lower emissions in countries with large shares of renewable, nuclear, or hydropower generation in their electricity grids (International Transport Forum, 2020; Verma et al., 2022).

These data come disproportionately from North America and Europe, and, notably, leave out China, which has made major progress on electric cars in recent years and has many of its own makes and models. 

Electric cars today are disproportionately used in high- and upper-middle-income countries, whose electricity grids emit fewer GHG emissions than the global average per unit of electricity generated (IEA, 2024). Electric cars in use today reduce more emissions on average than the figure we have calculated. 

Electric cars have higher embodied emissions than fossil fuel–powered cars, due to the GHG-intensive process of manufacturing batteries. This gives them a carbon payback period which ranges from zero to over 10 years (Dillman et al., 2020; Ren et al., 2023).

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Table 1. Effectiveness at reducing emissions.

Unit: t CO₂‑eq/million pkm

25th percentile 38.95
mean 49.54
median (50th percentile) 48.52
75th percentile 62.82

Shifted from fossil fuel–powered cars to electric cars, 100-yr basis.

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Cost

Including purchase price, financing, fuel and electricity costs, maintenance costs, and insurance, electric cars cost on average US$0.05 less per pkm (US$49,442.19/million pkm) than fuel-powered cars. This is based on a population-weighted average of the cost differential between electric and fossil fuel–powered cars in seven countries: Japan, South Korea, China, the United States, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (Nickel Institute, 2021b, 2021c, 2021a). 

While this analysis found that electric cars are less expensive than fossil fuel–powered cars almost everywhere, the margin is often quite small. The difference is less than US$0.01/pkm (US$10,000/million pkm) in South Korea, the United States, and Germany. In some markets, electric cars are more expensive per pkm than fossil fuel–powered cars (IEA, 2022).

This amounts to savings of US$1,019/t CO₂‑eq on a 100-yr basis (Table 2), or US$1,006/t CO₂‑eq avoided emissions on a 20-yr basis). 

Our analysis does not include costs that are the same for both electric and fossil fuel–powered cars, including taxes, insurance costs, and public costs of building road infrastructure.

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Table 2. Cost per unit climate impact.

Unit: 2023 US$/t CO₂‑eq, 100-yr basis

median -1,019
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Learning Curve

For every doubling in electric car production, costs decline by approximately 23% (Table 3; Goetzel & Hasanuzzaman, 2022; Kittner et al., 2020; Weiss et al., 2015). 

In addition to manufacturing improvements and economies of scale, this reflects rapid technological advancements in battery production, which is a significant cost component of an electric powertrain (Weiss et al., 2015).

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Table 3. Learning rate: drop in cost per doubling of the installed solution base.

Unit: %

25th percentile 23.00
mean 22.84
median (50th percentile) 23.00
75th percentile 24.00
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Speed of Action

Speed of action refers to how quickly a climate solution physically affects the atmosphere after it is deployed. This is different from speed of deployment, which is the pace at which solutions are adopted.

At Project Drawdown, we define the speed of action for each climate solution as gradual, emergency brake, or delayed.

Mobilize Electric Cars is a GRADUAL climate solution. It has a steady, linear impact on the atmosphere. The cumulative effect over time builds as a straight line.

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Caveats

The effectiveness of electric cars in mitigating GHG emissions is critically dependent on the emissions associated with electricity production. In electricity grids dominated by fossil fuels, electric cars have far higher emissions than in jurisdictions with low-emission electricity generation (International Transport Forum, 2020; IPCC, 2022; Milovanoff et al., 2020).

Electric car adoption faces a major obstacle in the form of constraints on battery production. While electric car battery production is being aggressively upscaled (IEA, 2024), building enough batteries to replace a significant fraction of fossil fuel–powered cars is an enormous challenge and will likely slow down a transition to electric cars, even if there is very high consumer demand (Milovanoff et al., 2020). 

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Current Adoption

Approximately 28 million electric cars are in use worldwide (IEA, 2024). This corresponds to about 819,000 million pkm traveled by electric car worldwide each year (Table 4). We assume that all of this travel would be undertaken by a fossil fuel–powered car if the car’s occupants did not use an electric car. Adoption is much higher in some countries, such as Norway, where the share of electric cars was 29% in 2023.

To convert the IEA’s electric car estimates into pkm traveled, we needed to determine the average passenger-distance that each passenger car travels per year. Using population-weighted data from several different countries, the average car carries 1.5 people and travels an average of 29,250 pkm/yr. Multiplying this number by the number of electric cars in use gives the total travel distance shift from fossil fuel–powered cars to electric cars.

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Table 4. Current (2024) adoption level.

Unit: million pkm/yr

Population-weighted mean 818,900

Implied travel shift from fossil fuel-powered cars to electric cars.

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Adoption Trend

Globally, about 104 billion pkm are displaced from fossil fuel–powered cars by electric cars every year (Table 5). The number of new electric cars purchased each year is growing at an average rate of over 10% (Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2024; IEA, 2024), although purchase rates have declined slightly from record highs between 2020–2022. Global purchases of electric cars are still increasing by around 3.6 million cars/yr. This is based on globally representative data (Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2024; IEA, 2024).

Despite this impressive rate of growth, electric cars still have a long way to go before they replace a large percentage of the more than 2 billion cars currently driven (WHO, 2024).

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Table 5. 2023-2024 adoption trend.

Unit: million pkm/yr

Median, or population-weighted mean 104,000

Implied travel shift from fossil fuel-powered cars to electric cars.

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Adoption Ceiling

The adoption ceiling for electric cars is equal to the total passenger-distance driven by the more than 2 billion cars worldwide (WHO, 2024). Using a population-weighted mean of the average distance (in pkm) traveled per car annually, this translates to about 59 trillion pkm (Table 6).

Replacing every single fossil fuel–powered car with an electric car would require an enormous upscaling of electric car production capacity, rapid development of charging infrastructure, cost reductions to increase affordability, and technological improvements to improve suitability for more kinds of drivers and trips. It would also face cultural obstacles from drivers who are attached to fossil fuel–powered cars (Roberts, 2022).

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Table 6. Adoption ceiling.

Unit: million pkm/yr

Median, or population-weighted mean 59,140,000

Implied travel shift from fossil fuel-powered cars to electric cars.

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Achievable Adoption

The achievable adoption of electric car travel ranges from about 26–47 trillion pkm displaced from fossil fuel–powered cars (Table 7).

Various organizations have produced forecasts for electric car adoption. These are not assessments of feasible adoption per se; they are instead trying to predict likely rates of adoption, given various assumptions about the future (Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2024; IEA, 2024). However, they are useful in that they take a large number of different variables into account to make their estimates. To convert these estimates of future likely adoption into estimates of the achievable adoption range, we apply some assumptions to the numbers in the scenario projections. 

To find a high rate of electric car adoption, we assume that every country could reach the highest rate of adoption projected to occur for any country. Bloomberg New Energy Finance’s (2024) Economic Transition scenario predicts that Norway will reach an 80% electric vehicle stock share by 2040. We therefore set our high adoption rate at 80% worldwide. This corresponds to 1,617 million total electric cars in use, or 47 trillion pkm traveled by electric car. An important caveat is that with a global supply constraint in the production of electric car batteries, per-country adoption rates are somewhat zero-sum. Every electric car purchased in Norway is one that cannot be purchased elsewhere. Therefore, for the whole world to achieve an 80% electric car stock share, global electric car and battery production would have to increase radically. While this might be possible due to technological improvements or radical increases in investment, it should not be taken for granted.

To identify a lower feasible rate of electric car adoption, we simply take the highest estimate for global electric car adoption. Bloomberg’s Economic Transition scenario predicts 44% global electric car adoption by 2050. This corresponds to 890 million electric cars, or 26 trillion pkm.

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Table 7. Range of achievable adoption levels.

Unit: million pkm/yr.

Current Adoption 818,900
Achievable – Low 26,020,000
Achievable – High 47,310,000
Adoption ceiling (physical limit) 59,140,000
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Electric cars are currently displacing 0.040 Gt CO₂‑eq of GHG emissions from the transportation system on a 20-yr basis (Table 8), or 0.040 Gt CO₂‑eq on a 100-yr basis. 

If electric cars reach 44% of the global car stock share by 2040, as Bloomberg (2024) projects, without any change in the total number of cars on the road, they will displace 1.263 Gt CO₂‑eq GHG emissions on a 100-yr basis (1.279 Gt CO₂‑eq  on a 20-yr basis).

If electric cars globally reach 80% of car stock share, as Bloomberg projects might happen in Norway by 2040, they will displace 2.296 Gt CO₂‑eq GHG emissions on a 100-yr basis (2.325 Gt CO₂‑eq on a 20-yr basis).

If electric cars replace 100% of the global car fleet, they will displace 2.870 Gt CO₂‑eq  GHG emissions on a 100-yr basis (2.906 Gt CO₂‑eq on a 20-yr basis).

These numbers are based on the present-day average emissions intensity from electrical grids in countries with high rates of electric car adoption. If more clean energy is deployed on electricity grids, the total climate impact from electric cars will increase considerably.

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Table 8. Climate impact at different levels of adoption.

Unit: Gt CO₂‑eq/yr, 100-yr basis

Current Adoption 0.040
Achievable – Low 1.263
Achievable – High 2.296
Adoption ceiling (physical limit) 2.870
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Additional Benefits

Air quality

The adoption of electric cars reduces emissions of air pollutants, including sulfur oxides, sulfur dioxide, and nitrous oxides, and especially carbon monoxide and volatile organic compounds. It has a smaller impact on particulate emissions (Requia et al., 2018). Some air pollution reductions are limited (particularly PM and ozone) due to heavier electric cars and pollution from brakes, tires, and wear on the batteries (Carey, 2023; Jones, 2019).

Water quality

Substituting electric car charging points for gas stations can eliminate soil and water pollution from leaking underground gas tanks (Yoder, 2023). 

Health

Since electric cars do not have tailpipe emissions, they can mitigate traffic-related air pollution, which is associated with asthma, lung cancer, increased emergency department visits for respiratory disease, and increased mortality (Anenberg et al., 2019; Guarnieri & Balmes, 2014; Pan et al., 2023; Pennington et al., 2024; Requia et al., 2018; Szyszkowicz et al., 2018). Transitioning to electric cars can reduce exposure to air pollution, improve health, and prevent premature mortality (Garcia et al., 2023; Larson et al., 2021; Peters et al., 2020).

The health benefits of adopting electric cars vary spatially and partly depend upon how communities generate electricity (Choma et al., 2020), but there is evidence that they have improved health. A study in California found a reduction in emergency department visits in ZIP codes with an increase in zero-emissions cars (Garcia et al., 2023). By 2050, projections estimate that about 64,000–167,000 deaths could be avoided by adopting electric cars (Larson et al., 2021).

Communities rich in racial and ethnic minorities tend to be located near highways and major traffic corridors and so are disproportionately exposed to air pollution (Kerr et al., 2021). Transitioning to electric cars could improve health in marginalized urban neighborhoods that are located near highways, industry, or ports (Pennington et al., 2024). These benefits depend upon an equitable distribution of electric cars and infrastructure to support the adoption of electric cars (Garcia et al., 2023). Low-income households may not see the same savings from an electric car due to the cost and stability of electricity prices and distance to essential services (Vega-Perkins et al., 2023)

Income & Work

Adopting electric cars can reduce a household’s energy burden, or the proportion of income spent on residential energy (Vega-Perkins et al., 2023). About 90% of United States households that use a car could see a reduction in energy burden by transitioning to an electric car. Money spent to charge electric cars is more likely to stay closer to the local community where electricity is generated, whereas money spent on fossil fuels often benefits oil-producing regions. This benefits local and national economies by improving their trade balance (Melaina et al., 2016).

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Risks

Mining minerals necessary to produce electric car batteries carries environmental and social risks. This has been associated with significant harms, particularly in lower-income countries that supply many of these minerals (Agusdinata et al., 2018; Sovacool, 2019).

Electric cars might also pose additional safety risks due to their higher weight, which means they have longer stopping distances and can cause more significant damage in collisions and to pedestrians and cyclists (Jones, 2019). This risk includes dual-motor electric cars that incorporate two electric motors – one for the front axle and one for the rear – providing all-wheel drive (AWD) capabilities. The addition of a second motor increases the vehicle's weight and complexity, which can lead to higher energy consumption and reduced overall efficiency. Moreover, the increased manufacturing costs associated with dual-motor systems can result in higher purchase prices for consumers (Nguyen et al., 2023). However, this configuration enhances vehicle performance, offering improved acceleration, traction, and handling, particularly in adverse weather conditions which are valued by some consumers. 

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Interactions with Other Solutions

Reinforcing

Electric car batteries can potentially be used as stationary batteries for use as energy storage to balance electrical grids, either through vehicle-to-grid (V2G) technology or with degraded electric car batteries being installed in stationary battery farms as a form of reuse (Ravi & Aziz, 2022). 

The effectiveness of electric cars in reducing GHG emissions increases as electricity grids become cleaner, since lower-carbon electricity further reduces the emissions associated with car charging. 

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Competing

Electric cars compete with heat pumps for electricity. Installing both heat pumps and electric cars could strain the electric grid’s capacity (Fakhrooeian et al., 2024).

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Scaling up the production of electric cars requires more mining of critical minerals, which could affect ecosystems that are valuable carbon sinks (Agusdinata et al., 2018).

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Getting travelers onto bicycles, sidewalks, public transit networks, or smaller electric vehicles (such as electric bicycles) provides a greater climate benefit than getting them into electric cars. There is an opportunity cost to deploying electric cars because those resources could otherwise be used to support these more effective solutions (APEC, 2024).

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Dashboard

Solution Basics

1 million passenger-kilometers

tCO2-eq/unit
48.52
units/yr
Current 818,9002.6×10⁷4.73×10⁷
Achievable (Low to High)

Climate Impact

GtCO2-eq/yr
Current 0.04 1.262.3
US$ per tCO2-eq
-1,019
Gradual

CO₂, CH₄, N₂O

Trade-offs

Electric car batteries are currently quite emissions-intensive to produce, resulting in high embodied emissions. While the embodied emissions are higher for electric cars than fossil fuel–powered cars, the results are mixed when coupling these with operating emissions. Dillman et al.’s (2020) review of the literature on this topic found that producing the average battery-electric car emits 63% more GHG emissions than the average gasoline-powered car, and 77% more GHG emissions than the average diesel-powered car. Taking their lower tailpipe emissions into account, this gives them a GHG payback period of zero to more than 10 years. In some cases, the emissions payback period is longer than the expected lifespan of the electric car, meaning it will have higher life cycle GHG emissions than a comparable gasoline or diesel-powered car. However, the ITF (2020) found that the lifetime emissions from manufacturing, operation, and infrastructure are lower for electric cars. All of these studies relied on assumptions, including the type of car, size of battery, electricity grid, km/yr, and lifetime. 

There is some criticism against any solution that advocates for car ownership, contending that the focus should be on solutions such as Enhance Public Transit that reduce car ownership and usage. Jones (2019) noted “there is little evidence to suggest that EVs can offer the universal solution that global governments are seeking,” and that efforts to popularize electric cars “may be better directed at creating more efficient public transport systems, rather than supporting personal transportation, if the significant health disbenefits of car use during the past 150 years are to be in any way reduced.”

Milovanoff et al. (2020) offered similar criticism: “Closing the mitigation gap solely with EVs would require more than 350 million on-road EVs (90% of the fleet), half of national electricity demand, and excessive amounts of critical materials to be deployed in 2050. Improving [the] average fuel consumption of fossil fuel–powered vehicles, with stringent standards and weight control, would reduce the requirement for alternative technologies, but is unlikely to fully bridge the mitigation gap. There is therefore a need for a wide range of policies that include measures to reduce vehicle ownership and usage.”

Allocating the limited global battery supply to privately owned electric cars might undermine the deployment of other solutions that also require batteries, but are more effective at avoiding GHG emissions (Castelvecchi, 2021). These could include electric buses, electric rail, and electric bicycles.

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Mt CO2-eq
0–4
4–8
8–12
12–16
16–20
> 20
No data

Annual road transportation emissions, 2024

Cars are the largest source of vehicle emissions, which are shown here for urban areas.

Kott, T., Foster, K., Villafane-Delgado, M., Loschen, W., Sicurello, P., Ghebreselassie, M., Reilly, E., and Hughes, M. (2024). Transportation sector - Global road emissions. [Data set]. The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL), Climate TRACE Emissions Inventory. Retrieved March 12, 2025 from https://climatetrace.org

Mt CO2-eq
0–4
4–8
8–12
12–16
16–20
> 20
No data

Annual road transportation emissions, 2024

Cars are the largest source of vehicle emissions, which are shown here for urban areas.

Kott, T., Foster, K., Villafane-Delgado, M., Loschen, W., Sicurello, P., Ghebreselassie, M., Reilly, E., and Hughes, M. (2024). Transportation sector - Global road emissions. [Data set]. The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL), Climate TRACE Emissions Inventory. Retrieved March 12, 2025 from https://climatetrace.org

Geographic Guidance Introduction

Electric cars can effectively mitigate climate change in all geographic regions, although there is spatial variability that influences per-pkm effectiveness and potential solution uptake. Effectiveness heavily depends on the carbon intensity of the charging source, which varies greatly between and within countries. The effectiveness of electric cars decreases for larger vehicles, favored in some countries (Jones, 2019; Nguyen et al., 2023).  

The uptake of electric cars can be significantly influenced by socioeconomic factors, including the relative costs of fuels and electricity, the capacity of civil society to provide adequate charging infrastructure, and the availability of subsidies for electric vehicles.

Extreme temperatures can negatively impact vehicle range, both by slowing battery chemistry and increasing energy demands for regulating passenger compartment temperature, which can adversely affect consumers’ perceptions of electric car suitability in locations with such climates (International Council on Clean Transportation, 2024).

Electric cars are most effective in regions with low-carbon electricity grids (International Transport Forum, 2020; Verma et al., 2022). This includes countries with high hydro power (including Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and parts of Canada such as British Columbia and Quebec), nuclear energy (such as France), and renewables (including Portugal, New Zealand, and parts of the United States, including California and some of the Northwest) (IEA, 2024). Electric car adoption is growing rapidly in a number of regions. For future scaling, targeting countries with supportive policies, renewable energy potential, and growing urban populations will deliver the greatest climate benefits.

Action Word
Mobilize
Solution Title
Electric Cars
Classification
Highly Recommended
Lawmakers and Policymakers
  • Create government procurement policies to transition government fleets to electric cars.
  • Provide financial incentives such as tax breaks, subsidies, or grants for electric car production and purchases that gradually reduce as market adoption increases.
  • Provide complimentary benefits for electric car drivers, such as privileged parking areas, free tolls, and access schemes.
  • Use targeted financial incentives to assist low-income communities in purchasing electric cars and to incentivize manufacturers to produce more affordable options.
  • Develop charging infrastructure, ensuring adequate spacing between stations and equitable distribution of stations.
  • Invest in R&D or implement regulations to improve manufacturing, adoption, supply chain standards, and circularity of electric cars, particularly batteries.
  • Transition fossil fuel electricity production to renewables while promoting the transition to electric cars.
  • Disincentivize fossil fuel–powered car ownership by gradually introducing taxes, penalties, buy-back programs, or other mechanisms.
  • Offer educational resources and one-stop shops for information on electric vehicles, including demonstrations, cost savings, environmental impact, and maintenance.
  • Work with industry and labor leaders to construct new electric car plants and to transition fossil fuel–powered car manufacturing into electric car production.
  • Set regulations for sustainable use of electric car batteries and improve recycling infrastructure.
  • Join international efforts to promote and ensure that environmental and human rights standards are met for supply chains.
  • Incentivize or mandate life-cycle assessments and product labeling (e.g., Environmental Product Declarations).
  • Create, support, or join partnerships that offer information, training, and general support for electric car adoption.

Further information:

Practitioners
  • Produce and sell affordable electric car models.
  • Collaborate with dealers to provide incentives, low-interest financing, or income-based payment options.
  • Develop charging infrastructure, ensuring adequate spacing between stations and equitable distribution of stations.
  • Invest in R&D to improve manufacturing, adoption, supply chain standards, and circularity of electric cars, particularly batteries.
  • Offer educational resources and one-stop shops for information on electric cars, including demonstrations, cost savings, environmental impact, and maintenance.
  • Work with policymakers and labor leaders to construct new electric car plants and to transition fossil fuel–powered car manufacturing into electric car production.
  • Join international efforts to promote and ensure that environmental and human rights standards are met for supply chains.
  • Invest in recycling and circular economy infrastructure.
  • Conduct life-cycle assessments and ensure product labeling (e.g., Environmental Product Declarations).
  • Create, support, or join partnerships that offer information, training, and general support for electric car adoption.

Further information:

Business Leaders
  • Set company procurement policies to transition corporate fleets to electric cars.
  • Take advantage of any financial incentives such as tax breaks, subsidies, or grants for electric car purchases.
  • Create long-term purchasing agreements with electric car manufacturers to support stable demand and improve economies of scale.
  • Install charging stations and offer employee benefits for electric car drivers, such as privileged parking areas.
  • Invest in R&D to improve manufacturing, adoption, supply chain standards, and circularity of electric cars, particularly batteries.
  • Work with industry and labor leaders to transition fossil fuel–powered car manufacturing into electric car production.
  • Advocate for financial incentives and policies that promote electric car adoption.
  • Join international efforts to promote and ensure that environmental and human rights standards are met for supply chains.
  • Educate customers and investors about the company's transition to electric cars and encourage them to learn more about them.
  • Create, support, or join partnerships that offer information, training, and general support for electric car adoption.

Further information:

Nonprofit Leaders
  • Set organizational procurement policies to transition fleets to electric cars.
  • Take advantage of financial incentives such as tax breaks, subsidies, or grants for electric car purchases.
  • Advocate for financial incentives and policies that promote electric car adoption.
  • Install charging stations and offer employee benefits for electric car drivers, such as privileged parking areas.
  • Advocate for or provide improved charging infrastructure.
  • Offer workshops or support to low-income communities for purchasing and owning electric cars.
  • Work with industry and labor leaders to transition fossil fuel–powered car manufacturing into electric car production.
  • Join international efforts to promote and ensure that environmental and human rights standards are met for supply chains.
  • Advocate for regulations on lithium-ion batteries and investments in recycling facilities.
  • Offer educational resources and one-stop shops for information on electric cars, including demonstrations, cost savings, environmental impact, and maintenance.
  • Create, support, or join partnerships that offer information, training, and general support for electric car adoption.

Further information:

Investors
  • Invest in electric car companies.
  • Support portfolio companies in transitioning their corporate fleets.
  • Invest in companies that provide charging equipment or installation.
  • Invest in R&D to improve manufacturing, adoption, supply chain standards, and circularity of electric cars, particularly batteries.
  • Invest in electric car companies, associated supply chains, and end-user businesses like rideshare apps.
  • Join international efforts to promote and ensure that environmental and human rights standards are met for supply chains.
  • Create, support, or join partnerships that offer information, training, and general support for electric car adoption. 

Further information:

Philanthropists and International Aid Agencies
  • Set organizational procurement policies to transition fleets to electric cars.
  • Install charging stations and offer employee benefits for electric car drivers, such as privileged parking areas.
  • Take advantage of any financial incentives such as tax breaks, subsidies, or grants for electric car purchases.
  • Advocate for financial incentives and policies that promote electric car adoption.
  • Advocate for or provide improved charging infrastructure.
  • Offer financial services such as low-interest loans or grants for purchasing electric cars and charging equipment.
  • Offer workshops or support to low-income communities for purchasing and owning electric cars.
  • Work with industry and labor leaders to transition fossil fuel–powered car manufacturing into electric car production.
  • Join international efforts to promote and ensure that environmental and human rights standards are met for supply chains.
  • Advocate for regulations on lithium-ion batteries and investments in recycling facilities.
  • Offer educational resources and one-stop shops for information on electric cars, including demonstrations, cost savings, environmental impact, and maintenance.
  • Create, support, or join partnerships that offer information, training, and general support for electric car adoption.

Further information:

Thought Leaders
  • If purchasing a new car, buy an electric car.
  • Take advantage of financial incentives such as tax breaks, subsidies, or grants for electric car purchases.
  • Share your experiences with electric cars through social media and peer-to-peer networks, highlighting the cost savings, benefits, incentive programs, and troubleshooting tips.
  • Advocate for financial incentives and policies that promote electric car adoption.
  • Advocate for improved charging infrastructure.
  • Help improve the circularity of electric car supply chains through design, advocacy, or implementation.
  • Conduct in-depth life-cycle assessments of electric cars in particular geographies.
  • Research ways to reduce weight and improve the performance of electric cars while appealing to customers.
  • Join international efforts to promote and ensure that environmental and human rights standards are met for supply chains.
  • Create, support, or join partnerships that offer information, training, and general support for electric car adoption.

Further information:

Technologists and Researchers
  • Improve the circularity of supply chains for electric car components.
  • Reduce the amount of critical minerals required for electric car batteries.
  • Innovate low-cost methods to improve safety, labor standards, and supply chains in mining for critical minerals.
  • Research ways to reduce weight and improve the performance of electric cars while appealing to customers.
  • Develop vehicle-grid integration and feasible means of using the electrical capacity of electric cars to manage the broader grid.
  • Improve techniques to repurpose used electric car batteries for stationary energy storage.
  • Develop methods of converting fossil fuel–powered car manufacturing and infrastructure to electric.

Further information:

Communities, Households, and Individuals
  • If purchasing a new car, purchase an electric car.
  • Take advantage of any financial incentives such as tax breaks, subsidies, or grants for electric car purchases.
  • Share your experiences with electric cars through social media and peer-to-peer networks, highlighting the cost-savings, benefits, incentive programs, and troubleshooting tips.
  • Help shift the narrative around electric cars by demonstrating capability and performance.
  • Advocate for financial incentives and policies that promote electric car adoption.
  • Advocate for improved charging infrastructure.
  • Help improve ciricularity of electric car supply chains.
  • Join international efforts to promote and ensure that environmental and human rights standards are met for supply chains.
  • Create, support, or join partnerships that offer information, training, and general support for electric car adoption.

Further information:

Sources
Evidence Base

Consensus of effectiveness in reducing emissions: Mixed

There is a high level of consensus among major organizations and researchers working on climate solutions that electric cars offer a substantial reduction in GHG emissions compared to fossil fuel–powered cars. This advantage is strongest in places where electricity in the grid comes from sources with low GHG emissions, but it persists even if fossil fuels play a major role in energy production. 

Major climate research organizations generally see electric cars as the primary means of reducing GHG emissions from passenger transportation. This perspective has received criticism from some scholars who argue that electric cars have been overstated as a climate solution, pointing to supply constraints, embodied emissions, and emissions from electricity generation (Jones, 2019; Milovanoff et al., 2020). Embodied emissions are outside the scope of this assessment. 

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2022) estimated well-to-wheel (upstream and downstream emissions) GHG emissions intensity from gasoline and diesel cars at 139 g CO₂‑eq/pkm and 107 g CO₂‑eq/pkm, respectively. They estimated that electric cars running on low-carbon electricity (solar, wind, and nuclear sourced) emit 9 g CO₂‑eq/pkm; electric cars running on natural gas electricity emit 104 g CO₂‑eq/pkm; and electric cars running entirely on coal electricity emit 187 g CO₂‑eq/pkm. These estimates include upstream emissions, such as those from oil refining and coal mining.

The International Energy Agency (IEA, 2024) noted that “[a] battery electric car sold in 2023 will emit half as much as fossil fuel–powered equivalents over its lifetime. This includes full life-cycle emissions, including those from producing the car.” 

The International Transport Forum (ITF) (2020) estimated that fossil fuel–powered cars emit 162 g CO₂‑eq/pkm, while electric cars emit 125 g CO₂‑eq/pkm. This included embodied and upstream emissions, which are outside the scope of this assessment..

The results presented in this document summarize findings from 15 reviews and meta-analyses and 24 original studies reflecting current evidence from 52 countries, primarily the IEA’s Electric Vehicle Outlook 2024), the Electric Vehicle Database 2024), the International Transportation Forum’s life cycle analysis on sustainable transportation 2020), the Nickel Institute’s cost estimates on electric cars (Nickel Institute, 2021b, 2021c, 2021a). We recognize this limited geographic scope creates bias, and hope this work inspires research and data sharing on this topic in underrepresented regions.

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Updated Date

Mobilize Electric Bicycles

Submitted by Drawdown Admin on
Sector
Transportation
Mode
Cut Emissions
Cluster
Electrify Vehicles Fuel Switching
Image
Parent riding electric bicycle with children seated in back carrier
Coming Soon
Off
Summary

We define the Mobilize Electric Bicycles solution as increased travel by bicycles that have an electric motor to supplement the effort of the rider, but require the rider to turn the pedals to activate the motor. Some sources refer to electric mopeds or motorcycles as electric bicycles, but those modes of transportation fall within Project Drawdown’s Mobilize Electric Scooters & Motorcycles solution and are not covered here. Also known as pedelecs or e-bikes, electric bicycles can be deployed as privately owned electric bicycles or as shared electric bicycles, which are available as part of bicycle sharing networks typically operated at the city level for short-term rental on a per-trip basis.

Income & work,Health
Air quality
Overview

Electric bicycles use electric power to supplement the muscular effort of the rider. Like conventional bicycles and other forms of nonmotorized transportation, electric bicycles get some of their motive power from human muscle power, which in turn comes from food calories – a form of closed-loop biomass power with no emissions (see Project Drawdown’s Improve Nonmotorized Transportation solution). Unlike conventional bicycles, however, electric bicycles get additional power from electricity, which comes from the grid and is stored in a battery.

This partial reliance on grid electricity, as well as the production of the battery and electric motors, increases the carbon emissions and cost of an electric bicycle compared to those of a conventional bicycle. Nevertheless, electric bicycle emissions remain far lower than the emissions of cars (including electric cars), meaning that every passenger-kilometer (pkm) moved from a car to an electric bicycle achieves significant GHG emissions savings. 

Since the additional electric power enables electric bicycle riders to cover longer distances at greater speeds, climb larger hills, and carry heavier loads – and do it all with substantially less physical effort – electric bicycles can substitute for more car trips than conventional bicycles can. This can amplify electric bicycles’ potential carbon savings relative to conventional bicycles, even if the savings per pkm traveled are lower. Electric bicycles also tend to get used at high rates, and a large proportion of pkm by electric bicycle are pkm that would otherwise have been by car (Bigazzi & Wong, 2020; Bourne et al., 2020; Cairns et al., 2017; Fukushige et al., 2021).

Shared electric bicycles can enhance this effect. The need for docking stations and rebalancing services (i.e., the use of larger vehicles to reposition bicycles to avoid one-way trips that create shortages in some places and surpluses in others) increases the carbon emissions of electric bicycles per pkm compared with private electric bicycles. By renting out electric bicycles one trip at a time, however, bicycle-share systems can make electric bicycles affordable to a larger percentage of the public, further increasing the number of pkm that can be shifted to electric bicycles.

The adoption of electric bicycles reduces emissions of CO₂ and methane from cars by displacing pkm traveled via car. When electric bicycles replace a trip by a gasoline- or diesel-powered car, they also eliminate reliance on fossil fuels to complete that trip. Even if the electricity used to power electric bicycles comes from fossil fuels, those emissions are relatively small and could eventually be replaced with low-emission electricity through the deployment of renewables or similar technologies.

References

Astegiano, P., Fermi, F., & Martino, A. (2019). Investigating the impact of e-bikes on modal share and greenhouse emissions: A system dynamic approach. Transportation Research Procedia, 37, 163-170. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trpro.2018.12.179

Berjisian, E., & Bigazzi, A. (2019). Summarizing the impacts of electric bicycle adoption on vehicle travel, emissions, and physical activity. UBC REACT LAb. https://civil-reactlab.sites.olt.ubc.ca/files/2019/07/BerjisianBigazzi_ImpactsofE-bikes_Report_July2019.pdf

Bigazzi, A., & Wong, K. (2020). Electric bicycle mode substitution for driving, public transit, conventional cycling, and walking. Transportation Research Part D: Transport and Environment, 85, 102412. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trd.2020.102412

Bourne, J. E., Cooper, A. R., Kelly, P., Kinnear, F. J., England, C., Leary, S., & Page, A. (2020). The impact of e-cycling on travel behaviour: A scoping review. Journal of Transport & Health, 19, 100910. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jth.2020.100910

Bucher, D., Buffat, R., Froemelt, A., & Raubal, M. (2019). Energy and greenhouse gas emission reduction potentials resulting from different commuter electric bicycle adoption scenarios in Switzerland. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 114, 109298. 

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2019.109298 

Cairns, S., Behrendt, F., Raffo, D., Beaumont, C., & Kiefer, C. (2017). Electrically-assisted bikes: Potential impacts on travel behaviour. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 103, 327-342. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tra.2017.03.007

Carracedo, D., & Mostofi, H. (2022). Electric cargo bikes in urban areas: A new mobility option for private transportation. Transportation Research Interdisciplinary Perspectives, 16, 100705. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trip.2022.100705

Dekker, P. (2013). Electrification of road transport-An analysis of the economic performance of electric two-wheelers. Utrecht University. https://studenttheses.uu.nl/bitstream/handle/20.500.12932/13022/Thesis%20P.W.K.%20Dekker%2012%20May%202013.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

eBicycles. (2025a). How much does an electric bike cost? E-bike price breakdown [2025]. 

https://www.ebicycles.com/how-much-does-an-electric-bike-cost/ 

eBicycles. (2025b). Useful facts & stats of e-bikes [for 2025] + infographic. https://www.ebicycles.com/ebike-facts-statistics/ 

Ebike Canada. (2025). The best electric bikes & scooters in canada for 2025. Ebike Canada. 

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Pekow, C. (2024, April 1). E-bikes could cut smog, energy use and congestion globally—But will they? Mongabay Environmental News. https://news.mongabay.com/2024/04/e-bikes-could-cut-smog-energy-use-and-congestion-globally-but-will-they/

Philips, I., Anable, J., & Chatterton, T. (2022). E-bikes and their capability to reduce car CO₂ emissions. Transport Policy, 116, 11-23. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tranpol.2021.11.019

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Credits

Lead Fellows

  • Heather Jones, Ph.D.

  • Cameron Roberts, Ph.D.

Contributors

  • Ruthie Burrows, Ph.D.

  • James Gerber, Ph.D.

  • Yusuf Jameel, Ph.D.

  • Daniel Jasper

  • Heather McDiarmid, Ph.D.

  • Alex Sweeney

Internal Reviewers

  • Aiyana Bodi

  • Hannah Henkin

  • Ted Otte

  • Amanda Smith, Ph.D.

Effectiveness

Per 1,000 private electric bicycles, approximately 110.5 t CO₂‑eq/yr is offset by displacing trips taken by higher-emission transportation modes such as cars and public transit (Table 1). 

Per 1,000 shared electric bicycles, approximately 14.44 t CO₂‑eq/yr is offset. This lower value is due to the additional emissions produced in the operation of a shared electric-bicycle system (e.g., due to the need to reposition bicycles after they accumulate in some locations while becoming depleted in others). Additionally, other modes of transportation are shifted to shared electric bicycles at different rates than privately owned electric bicycles – notably shifted less from car travel. These factors limit the total GHG emissions reduced per shared electric bicycle.

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Table 1. Effectiveness at reducing emissions.

Unit: t CO₂‑eq /1,000 electric bicycles, 100-yr basis

25th percentile 58.87
mean 136.1
median (50th percentile) 110.5
75th percentile 220.5

Unit: t CO₂‑eq /1,000 electric bicycles, 100-yr basis

25th percentile 1.415
mean 14.62
median (50th percentile) 14.44
75th percentile 34.31
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Cost

Electric bicycles vary significantly in cost, but generally are more expensive than traditional bicycles due to the cost of batteries, motors, and other electronic components, as well as the need for more durable mechanical components. 

Private electric bicycles cost about US$2,700, plus another few hundred dollars per year in maintenance costs. All told, assuming a 10-year lifespan, electric bicycles cost about US$600/yr to operate . The average privately owned electric bicycle is ridden 2,400 km/yr; since 28.67% of that distance is shifted from car trips, electric bicycles displace approximately 688 pkm/yr traveled by car. Car travel costs US$0.53/pkm while electric bicycle travel costs US$0.25/pkm, meaning every pkm traveled via electric bicycle saves US$0.28. Multiplied over 688 pkm/yr, this translates to every electric bicycle saving its owner approximately US$193/yr in avoided car trips (Bucher et al., 2019; Carracedo & Mostofi, 2022; eBicycles, 2025a; Ebike Canada, 2025; Gössling et al., 2019; Helton, 2025; Huang et al., 2022; International Transport Forum, 2020; Jones, 2019; Luxe Digital, 2025; Mellino et al., 2017; N, 2023; So, 2024; Weiss et al., 2015).

Most of the costs of riding an electric bicycle are up-front costs. As a result, electric bicycle owners who shift more trips from a car onto their electric bicycle will significantly increase their savings. Privately owned electric bicycles save US$1,748 for every t CO₂‑eq they avoid (Table 2).

Shared electric bicycles are more expensive to the system provider than privately owned electric bicycles due to greater needs for infrastructure, maintenance, operating expenses, and services, such as rebalancing. Shared electric bicycles cost US$2.42/pkm and displace an average of 156 pkm/yr from car trips per bicycle. The same distance traveled by car costs US$83, meaning that shared electric bicycles cost an additional US$295/yr compared to traveling the same distance by car (Gössling et al., 2019; Guidon et al., 2018; Hanna, 2023; Matasyan, 2015; Summit Bike Share, 2023). Shared electric bicycles cost US$22,860/t CO₂‑eq avoided due to their higher costs, higher emissions, and the lower chance that riders on shared electric bicycles would otherwise have been traveling by car.

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Table 2. Cost per climate impact.

Unit: US$ (2023) per t CO₂‑eq , 100-year basis

median -1,748

Unit: US$ (2023) per t CO₂‑eq , 100-year basis

median 22,860

*Cost to the provider of the system, not the user

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Learning Curve

Learning rates for electric bicycles are often negative (i.e., prices increase with cumulative production). This is largely because electric bicycle batteries have grown larger over time, causing the bicycles to become more expensive (Dekker, 2013; Weiss et al., 2015). The learning rate per electric bicycle ranges from 15% to –43%(Table 3). This range has improved the general value proposition of electric bicycles, however, since larger batteries enable electric bicycles to go further and faster than before.

To compensate for this, it is useful to calculate the learning rate per kWh battery capacity rather than per bicycle. On this measure, Dekker (2013) calculates a learning rate of 7.9% cost reduction per kWh of electric bicycle battery capacity for every doubling of cumulative production.

These estimates are based on analyses published in 2013 and 2015, respectively, and therefore do not take into account more recent advances in electric bicycle production. More up-to-date research on electric bicycle learning rates is needed to inform future assessments on this topic.

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Table 3. Learning rate: drop in cost per doubling of cumulative electric bicycle production.*

Unit: %

25th percentile -43.50
mean -26.86
median (50th percentile) -36.00
75th percentile 15

* These data are from 2013 and 2015, due to a lack of available research on this topic.

Unit: %

25th percentile
mean
median (50th percentile) 7.90
75th percentile

* These data are from 2013 and 2015, due to a lack of available research on this topic.

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Speed of Action

Speed of action refers to how quickly a climate solution physically affects the atmosphere after it is deployed. This is different from speed of deployment, which is the pace at which solutions are adopted.

At Project Drawdown, we define the speed of action for each climate solution as gradual, emergency brake, or delayed.

Mobilize Electric Bicycles is a GRADUAL climate solution. It has a steady, linear impact on the atmosphere. The cumulative effect over time builds as a straight line.

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Caveats

Electric bicycles do not only compete with cars for the total passenger transport demand; a given electric bicycle trip might also substitute for public transit. This can sometimes still be beneficial since, as electric bicycles often have lower per-kilometer emissions than public transit vehicles (International Transport Forum, 2020). However, an electric bicycle trip might also substitute for a conventional bicycle trip or for a pedestrian journey, in which case electric bicycle usage would actually increase emissions. Finally, some electric bicycle trips are new journeys, meaning that they would not occur at all if the traveler did not have an electric bicycle, which also increases emissions (Astegiano et al., 2019; Berjisian & Bigazzi, 2019; Bourne et al., 2020; Cairns et al., 2017; Dekker, 2013).

Generally speaking however, electric bicycles still shift enough passenger car trips to make up for this effect, although the scale can be more marginal with shared electric bicycle systems. However, electric bicycles are more likely to substitute more for whichever forms of transportation their users were already using previously (Wamburu et al., 2021). This means that wider adoption of electric bicycles in car-dependent North American suburbs, for example, will have a much clearer and more beneficial climate impact than in a dense, pedestrianized European city center, or in a low-income country where most people do not have access to a car (although in these contexts electric bicycles could still produce major social and economic benefits).

Our estimates of the total adoption ceiling potential of electric bicycles (described in the Adoption section) are based on the ratio of adoption between electric bicycles and cars, on the grounds that each electric bicycle avoids some amount of car travel. However, the relationship is not necessarily quite so simple. Car trips with passengers might require more than one electric bicycle trip to replace them (unless the passengers are children, who can be carried as passengers on electric bicycles). On the other side of the equation, some households own more than one car per person. Having more than one electric bicycle per car would therefore not meaningfully reduce car trips. Lastly, our approach of tracking electric bicycle adoption in relation to car ownership neglects people whose use of an electric bicycle enables them to avoid owning a car at all. Estimates of adoption should be taken as rough guesses, rather than authoritative forecasts.

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Current Adoption

Private electric bicycles have experienced significant growth since 2015. We estimate there are approximately 278 million private electric bicycles in use in the world today (Table 4). 

Data on this subject typically include throttle-assisted electric bicycles, e-scooter/trotinettes, and sometimes mopeds and motorcycles; these are not included in this solution. Data from China, the highest adopter of electric bicycles, does not usually distinguish between types of electric two-wheelers. For this reason, we used more conservative estimates, preferring to understate adoption than overstate it. We used several global estimates, data on electric bicycle sales in Canada, the United States, and Europe, and stock estimates from the Asia-Pacific region (eBicycles, 2025b; Mordor Intelligence, 2022; Precedence Research, 2024; Stewart & Ramachandran, 2022;, Strategic Market Research, 2024; The Freedonia Group, 2024). To convert from European and American sales data to stocks data, we assumed that all electric bicycles sold over the past 10 years (the lifespan of an electric bicycle) are still in use today. We then calculated the number of electric bicycles per 1,000 people in each of the three regions, used those three values to calculate a population-weighted global mean adoption rate, and multiplied the result by the number of residents of high- and upper-middle income countries worldwide (where we assume most electric bicycle adoption takes place). This calculation provided a global estimate.

Shared electric bicycle schemes now exist in many cities around the world, with at least 2 million shared electric bicycles currently in use as part of electric bicycle sharing systems (eBicycles, 2025b; Innovation Origins, 2023; PBSC Urban Solutions, 2022; Strategic Market Research, 2024). This is a conservative estimate because research published in a reputable academic journal claimed that China has 8.7 million shared electric bicycles in 2022 (Shi et al., 2024). 

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Table 4. Current (2024) adoption level.

Unit: 1,000 electric bicycles

mean* 277,600

* Population-weighted

Unit: 1,000 electric bicycles

mean* 2,000

* Population-weighted

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Adoption Trend

Private electric bicycles are being adopted at a rate of about 37 million new bicycles every year (Table 5; eBicycles, 2025b; Mordor Intelligence, 2022; Precedence Research, 2024; Stewart & Ramachandran, 2022; Strategic Market Research, 2024; The Freedonia Group, 2024). Electric bicycles are also attracting interest from consumers who do not normally ride bicycles, including people in rural areas (Philips et al., 2022) and members of vulnerable groups, such as the elderly. 

Shared electric bicycles are being added to cities at a rate of approximately 413,000/yr (eBicycles, 2025b; Innovation Origins, 2023; PBSC Urban Solutions, 2022; Strategic Market Research, 2024). Cities and private companies are adding shared electric bicycle systems at a rate of around 30/yr (Galatoulas et al., 2020).Based on these data, we calculate a 37.97% compounding annual growth rate in electric bicycle sharing system installations around the world. 

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Table 5. 2023–2024 adoption trend.

Unit: 1,000 electric bicycles/yr

25th percentile 34,000
population-weighted mean 37,330
median (50th percentile) 38,000
75th percentile 40,000

Unit: 1,000 electric bicycles/yr

25th percentile
population-weighted mean
median (50th percentile) 412.5
75th percentile
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Adoption Ceiling

Because we model electric bicycles as a solution primarily due to their ability to shift travel from fossil fuel–powered cars, we estimate adoption by reference to the ratio of electric bicycles to cars. This doesn’t mean that people without access to a car won’t use electric bicycles; it means that they are not shifting their pkm from fossil fuel–powered cars and therefore are not included in the calculations of shifting from car to electric bicycle. 

Private electric bicycles’ adoption ceiling (Table 6) would be approximately 2 billion around the world: one for every car (World Health Organization, 2021). This would mean that every motorist has an electric bicycle as a ready alternative to a car.

Shared electric bicycles’ adoption ceiling can be measured similarly, except that we assume these systems are only viable in cities. Therefore, we set the maximum adoption ceiling of shared electric bicycles to be 1.3 billion – the number of cars in cities around the world. we estimated by multiplying the global urban population (4.45 billion) by the global average car registrations per 1,000 people (286.2) (World Health Organization, 2021; World Bank, 2024).

This upper-bound scenario faces many of the same caveats as the upper-bound scenario for the Nonmotorized Transportation solution: It would require a revolution in support for electric bicycles:new infrastructure, new traffic laws, a substantial increase in electric battery production capacity, and major changes to built environments, including increases in population and land-use density to make more journeys feasible by electric bicycle. However, this scenario would require less dramatic change than a similar upper-bound scenario for the Improve Nonmotorized Transportation solution because electric bicycles go faster, have higher carrying capacities, can travel longer distances, and are easier to use than nonmotorized travel modes (Weiss et al., 2015).

A limitation of this analysis is that one electric bicycle per car does not necessarily correspond to one electric bicycle per person traveling in a car. For example, it is possible that replacing one car trip with electric bicycles would result in multiple electric bicycle trips in order to carry multiple passengers. Our estimates should therefore be seen as approximate. 

It is also possible for total electric bicycle adoption and usage to exceed car use (i.e., electric bicycles also replace other modes of transportation or generate new trips). We do not consider this scenario in our adoption ceiling because additional adoption above car adoption would not produce a major climate benefit.

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Table 6. Adoption ceiling.

Unit: 1,000 electric bicycles

Adoption ceiling 2,022,000

Unit: 1,000 electric bicycles

Adoption ceiling 1,273,000
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Achievable Adoption

Private electric bicycles are currently in use across the Asia-Pacific region at a rate of approximately 0.07 electric bicycles for every car. A low achievable adoption rate might see every country in the world achieve this same ratio, which would lead to a global electric bicycle fleet of 421 million (Table 7). For a higher rate of adoption, we posit one electric bicycle in use for every two cars. This would see just more than 1 billion electric bicycles in use worldwide.

Using the median and 75th percentile of the ratio of shared electric bicycles to cars (for which we have data) as the rate of adoption seen in every city in the world leads to 22 to 69 million shared electric bicycles in cities worldwide.

Note: We based these estimates on electric bicycles per car rather than electric bicycles per person because the climate impact of electric bicycle adoption in a given place depends on the availability of cars to replace. 

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Table 7. Range of achievable adoption levels.

Unit: 1,000 electric bicycles

Current Adoption 277,600
Achievable – Low 421,300
Achievable – High 1,011,000
Adoption Ceiling 2,022,000

Unit: 1,000 electric bicycles

Current Adoption 2,000
Achievable – Low 22,010
Achievable – High 69,260
Adoption Ceiling 1,273,000
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If every motorist had an electric bicycle they used to replace at least some car trips), it would mitigate 224 Mt CO₂‑eq/yr – equal to the total global carbon emissions produced by cars, minus the emissions that would be produced due to electric bicycles traveling the same distance. If there were one electric bicycle for every two cars, it would avoid 117 Mt CO₂‑eq/yr. And if global electric bicycle adoption reached the rate currently seen in the Asia-Pacific region (China, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand), it would avoid 47 Mt CO₂‑eq/yr (Table 8).

Our Achievable – Low scenario of 22 million shared electric bicycles in cities worldwide would save 284 kt CO₂‑eq/yr. Our Achievable – High scenario of 69.3 million shared electric bicycles worldwide would save 895 kt CO₂‑eq/yr. The maximum possible shared electric bicycle deployment would save approximately 16.6 Mt CO₂‑eq/yr.

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Table 8. Climate impact at different levels of adoption.

Unit: Gt CO₂-eq/yr, 100-yr basis

Current Adoption 0.0307
Achievable – Low 0.0466
Achievable – High 0.1117
Adoption Ceiling (Physical limit) 0.2235

Unit: Gt CO₂-eq/yr, 100-yr basis

Current Adoption 0.00002584
Achievable – Low 0.0002844
Achievable – High 0.0008949
Adoption Ceiling (Physical limit) 0.01645
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Additional Benefits

Health

Electric assistance reduces the physical fitness and other health benefits of cycling. However, electric bicycles still require pedaling, and studies show that this level of effort required can still have substantial health benefits (Berjisian & Bigazzii, 2019; Langford et al., 2017). Electric bicycles can also enable people to cycle who might not otherwise be able to (Bourne et al., 2020). Additionally, electric bicycles can reduce total car traffic, which could reduce the risk of injury and death from car crashes, which kill 1.2 million people annually (WHO, 2023). Similarly, electric bicycles can reduce health impacts of traffic noise (de Nazelle et al., 2011).

Income and work

In addition to being cheaper than car travel, electric bicycles allow people to travel farther and faster than they could on foot, on a conventional bicycle, or (often) on public transit. These time and money savings provide an economic benefit (Bourne, 2020). 

Air quality

The fossil fuel–powered vehicles most similar to electric bicycles (motorcycles, scooters, etc.) are extremely polluting (Platt et al., 2014). Substituting electric bicycles for these can substantially reduce air pollution.

Other

Electric bicycles provide quality-of-life benefits for some people who use them (Bourne, 2020; Carracedo & Mostofi, 2022; Teixeira et al., 2022; Thomas, 2022). Electric bicycles can also reduce traffic congestion and save time (Koning & Conway, 2016).

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Risks

Electric bicycles pose some safety concerns, centering on an ongoing debate over whether electric cyclists ride more recklessly than other cyclists (Fishman & Cherry, 2016; Langford et al., 2015). While electric bicycles have a lower injury rate than conventional bicycles, when injuries do happen during electric bicycle travel the health consequences tend to be more severe due to the higher speed (Berjisian & Bigazzi, 2019). There may also be risks related to the bicycles’ lithium-ion batteries catching fire. Strong regulations can minimize this risk (Pekow, 2024). Improved infrastructure, such as separated bike lanes and paths, can also reduce the safety risks associated with electric bicycles (Roberts, 2020).

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Interactions with Other Solutions

Reinforcing

Electric bicycles can complement other forms of low-carbon mobility, especially those that reduce dependence on private cars. People who rely on public transit, conventional travel, pedestrian travel, carpools, or other sustainable modes of transportation for some kinds of trips can use electric bicycles to fill in some of the gaps in their personal transportation arrangements (Roberts, 2023). For public transit in particular, electric bicycles can play an important last-mile role, enabling transit riders to more easily access stops. This is important because research suggests that the key to a low-carbon mobility system is to enable people to live high-quality lives without owning cars (Van Acker & Witlox, 2010).

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Electric bicycles require a lot less space than private cars. If sufficient adoption of electric bicycles and other alternatives to private cars enables a reduction in car lanes, parking spaces, and related infrastructure, then some of this space could be reallocated to ecosystem conservation through revegetation and other land-based methods of GHG sequestration (Rodriguez Mendez et al., 2024). 

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Competing

Electric bicycles compete with electric and hybrid cars for adoption.

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Dashboard

Solution Basics

1,000 electric bicycles

tCO2-eq/unit
110.5
units
Current 277,600421,3001.01×10⁶
Achievable (Low to High)

Climate Impact

GtCO2-eq/yr
Current 0.03 0.050.11
US$ per tCO2-eq
-1,748
Gradual

CO₂, CH₄, N₂O

Solution Basics

1,000 electric bicycles

tCO2-eq/unit
14.44
units
Current 2,00022,01069,260
Achievable (Low to High)

Climate Impact

GtCO2-eq/yr
Current 2.58×10⁻⁵ 2.84×10⁻⁴8.95×10⁻⁴
US$ per tCO2-eq
22,860
Gradual

CO₂, CH₄, N₂O

Trade-offs

If an electric bicycle replaces primarily car trips, it provides an unambiguous climate benefit. If it replaces public transit, the size of the benefit will depend on the specifics of the public transit system it replaces. If it replaces pedestrian trips or conventional cycling trips, or generates new trips, the net climate benefit is negative. Travel survey data suggest that electric bicycles replace enough car journeys to more than offset any journeys by the more sustainable modes of transportation they replace (Bigazzi & Wong, 2020; Bourne et al., 2020; Cairns et al., 2017; Fukushige et al., 2021). However, electric bicycles in cities that already have very low-carbon mobility systems, or in lower-income countries where car ownership is rare, might have a net negative climate impact. 

Electric bicycles also require batteries, the production and disposal of which generates pollution (Yang et al., 2021). However, electric bicycles require much less battery capacity than many other electrification technologies, such as electric vehicles (Weiss et al., 2015).

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Mt CO2–eq
0–4
4–8
8–12
12–16
16–20
> 20
No data

Annual road transportation emissions, 2024

Cars are the largest source of road transportation vehicle emissions, which are shown here for urban areas.

Kott, T., Foster, K., Villafane-Delgado, M., Loschen, W., Sicurello, P., Ghebreselassie, M., Reilly, E., and Hughes, M. (2024). Transportation sector - Global road emissions [Data set]. The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL), Climate TRACE Emissions Inventory. Retrieved March 12, 2025 from https://climatetrace.org

Mt CO2–eq
0–4
4–8
8–12
12–16
16–20
> 20
No data

Annual road transportation emissions, 2024

Cars are the largest source of road transportation vehicle emissions, which are shown here for urban areas.

Kott, T., Foster, K., Villafane-Delgado, M., Loschen, W., Sicurello, P., Ghebreselassie, M., Reilly, E., and Hughes, M. (2024). Transportation sector - Global road emissions [Data set]. The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL), Climate TRACE Emissions Inventory. Retrieved March 12, 2025 from https://climatetrace.org

Geographic Guidance Introduction

Electric bicycle effectiveness in mitigating climate change varies by region, depending on the carbon intensity of the charging electricity, the extent to which they replace higher-emission travel (such as cars, motorcycles, or taxis), and the need and type of vehicle used for rebalancing shared electric bicycles (International Transport Forum, 2020). They are most effective in areas with cleaner electricity grids and where they can substitute for cars. 

Since electric bicycles are more effective when replacing cars, this means that wider adoption of electric bicycles in car-dependent regions, such as North American suburbs, will have a much more significant climate impact than in a dense, pedestrianized European city center or in a low-income country where most people do not have access to a car (although in these contexts electric bicycles could still produce significant social and economic benefits) (Wamburu et al., 2021).

Socio-economic and infrastructural factors play a major role in adoption. These include upfront costs of private electric bicycles, availability and affordability of shared electric bicycles, supportive cycling infrastructure, and policies such as subsidies or rebates. In many countries, electric bicycles increase the accessibility of nonmotorized transport to older adults, people with disabilities, and those commuting longer distances or in hilly areas by reducing physical effort (Bourne et al., 2020).

Future geographic targets for scaling adoption with strong climate and equity outcomes include South and Southeast Asian cities (e.g., Dhaka, Jakarta, Ho Chi Minh City) with high trip density, short trip lengths, and growing pollution concerns, all of which make them ideal for adoption. Sub-Saharan African cities (e.g., Kampala, Accra) where electric bicycles could complement or replace informal motorcycle taxis, reducing emissions and improving affordability and safety, are also important targets. North America has potential as both private and shared programs are beginning to expand in urban areas, helped by municipal investment and rising consumer interest.

Action Word
Mobilize
Solution Title
Electric Bicycles
Classification
Highly Recommended
Lawmakers and Policymakers
  • Establish policies that reduce the associated time, distance, risk, and risk perception for users and potential users.
  • Provide financial incentives such as tax breaks, subsidies, or grants for electric bicycle production and purchases.
  • Use targeted financial incentives to assist low-income communities in purchasing electric bicycles and to incentivize manufacturers to produce more affordable options.
  • Develop local bicycle and charging infrastructure, such as building physically separated bicycle lanes.
  • Have locking posts installed in public spaces that can accommodate electric bicycles.
  • Increase maintenance of bicycle infrastructure, such as path clearing.
  • Create international standards for the manufacturing and classification of electric bicycles.
  • Transition fossil fuel electricity production to renewables while promoting the transition to electric bicycles.
  • Offer one-stop shops for information on electric and non-motorized bicycles, including demonstrations and educational resources on cost savings, environmental impact, and maintenance.
  • Set regulations for sustainable use of electric bicycle batteries and improve recycling infrastructure.
  • Join international efforts to promote and ensure supply chain environmental and human rights standards – particularly, for the production of batteries.
  • Create, support, or join partnerships that offer information, training, and general support for electric and non-motorized bicycle adoption.

Further information:

Practitioners
  • Share your experiences with electric bicycles, providing tips and reasons for choosing this mode of transportation..
  • Participate in local bike groups, public events, and volunteer opportunities.
  • Advocate tor local officials for infrastructure improvements and note specific locations where improvements can be made.
  • Encourage local businesses to create employee incentives.
  • Provide information and resources to help individuals, households, and business owners take advantage of state and local tax benefits or rebates for electric bicycle purchases.

Further information:

Business Leaders
  • Advocate for better cycling infrastructure and sharing systems with city officials.
  • Educate customers about local bicycle infrastructure and encourage them to engage public officials.
  • Offer employees who agree to forgo a free parking space the annualized cash value or cost of that parking space as a salary increase.
  • Provide battery recycling services.
  • Offer free classes for electric bicycle maintenance and repair; educate employees about what they should know before purchasing an electric bicycle.
  •  
  • Install locking posts, parking, and security for electric bicycles.
  • Provide adequate onsite storage and charging, create educational materials on best practices for commuting, and offer pre-tax commuter benefits to encourage employee ridership.
  • Encourage electric bicycle use in company fleets by replacing or supplementing vehicles for local deliveries or transiting between office locations.
  • Incorporate electric bicycle programs into company sustainability and emission reduction initiatives;communicate how those programs support broader company goals. 

Further information:

Nonprofit Leaders
  • Inform the public about the health and environmental benefits of electric bicycles.
  • Educate the public on government incentives for electric bicycles and how to take advantage of them.
  • Provide impartial information on local electric bicycle infrastructure, best practices for maintenance, and factors to consider when renting or buying electric bicycles.
  • Advocate to policymakers for improved infrastructure and incentives.
  • Administer public initiatives such as ride-share or buy-back programs.

Further information:

Investors
  • Invest in electric bicycle companies and start-ups, including battery and component suppliers.
  • Explore investment opportunities that address supply chain issues such as battery suppliers and maintenance providers.
  • Invest in companies conducting R&D to improve electric bicycle performance, decrease the need for materials, and reduce maintenance costs.
  • Invest in public or private electric bicycle sharing systems.
  • Finance electric bicycle purchases via low-interest loans.
  • Invest in charging infrastructure for electric bicycles.

Further information:

Philanthropists and International Aid Agencies
  • Award grants to local organizations advocating for improved bicycle infrastructure and services.
  • Support access through the distribution or discounting of electric bicycles and help educate community members about relevant incentives.
  • Strengthen local infrastructure and build local capacity for infrastructure design and construction.
  • Ensure that donated bicycles are appropriate for the environment and that recipients have access to maintenance and supplies.
  • Sponsor community engagement programs such as group bike rides or free maintenance classes.
  • Assist with local policy design.

Further information:

Thought Leaders
  • Lead by example and use an electric bicycle as a regular means of transport.
  • Focus public messages on key decision factors for commuters, such as associated health and fitness benefits, climate and environmental benefits, weather forecasts, and traffic information.
  • Showcase principles of safe urban design and highlight dangerous areas.
  • Share detailed information on local bike routes, general electric bicycle maintenance tips, items to consider when purchasing a bike, and related educational information.
  • Collaborate with schools to teach bicycle instruction, including safe riding habits and maintenance tips.

Further information:

Technologists and Researchers
  • Examine and improve elements of battery design and maintenance.
  • Improve electric bicycle infrastructure design.
  • Improve circularity, repairability, and ease of disassembly for electric bicycles.
  • Increase the physical carrying capacities for users of electric bicycles to facilitate shopping and transporting children, pets, and materials.
  • Improve other variables that increase the convenience, safety, and comfort levels of nonmotorized transportation.

Further information:

Communities, Households, and Individuals
  • Share your experiences with electric bicycles; provide tips and reasons for choosing this mode of transportation.
  • Participate in local bike groups, public events, and volunteer opportunities.
  • Advocate to employers and local businesses to provide incentives for electric bicycle usage and help start local initiatives.
  • Advocate to local officials for infrastructure improvements and note specific locations where improvements can be made.
  • Encourage local businesses to create employee incentives.

Further information:

Sources
Evidence Base

Consensus of effectiveness in reducing emissions: High

When people purchase electric bicycles, they tend to use them often, with many of the trips they take on electric bicycles replacing trips that would otherwise have been taken via private car (Bigazzi & Wong, 2020; Bourne et al., 2020; Cairns et al., 2017; Fukushige et al., 2021). The evidence is similarly conclusive regarding the ability of shared electric bicycles to replace a large number of car trips. However, evidence regarding the carbon benefits of shared electric bicycles is more mixed due to the additional emissions required to run a shared electric-bicycle system.

Berjiisian and Bigazzi (2019) reviewed much of the literature on electric bicycles. and found that electric bicycle trips are shifted from car trips (44%) and transit trips (12%) providing significant emissions benefits. Other net benefits include less travel by cars, lower GHG emissions and more physical activity. “E-bike adoption is expected to provide net benefits in the forms of reduced motor vehicle travel, reduced greenhouse gas emissions, and increased physical activity. A little more than half of e-bike trips are expected to shift travel from motor vehicles (44% car trips and 12% transit trips), which is sufficient to provide significant emissions benefits.”

Weiss et al. (2015) surveyed evidence of the economic, social, and environmental impacts of electric bicycles. They found that electric bicycles are more efficient and less polluting than cars. They reduce exposure to pollution as their environmental impacts come mainly from being produced and the electricity that they use, both of which are usually outside of urban areas.

Philips et al. (2022) investigated the potential for electric bicycles to replace car trips in the UK. Their geospatial model provided a good indication of what might be possible in other places and showed that electric bicycles have considerable potential in rural areas as well as urban ones. 

Li et al. (2023) reported that based on the mix of mode share replaced, shared electric bicycle trips decreased carbon emissions by 108–120 g/km carbon emissions than fossil fuel-powered cars per kilometer.”

This research is biased toward high-income countries. While there is substantial research on electric bicycles in China, that country often considers e-scooters (which do not have pedals) and throttle-assisted electric bikes as interchangeable with pedelecs electric bicycles. This made it hard to include Chinese research in our analysis. We recognize this limited geographic scope creates bias, and hope this work inspires research harmonization and data sharing on this topic in underrepresented regions in the future.

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Updated Date

Enhance Public Transit

Submitted by Drawdown Admin on
Sector
Transportation
Mode
Cut Emissions
Cluster
Shift to Alternatives
Image
Train with city in the distance
Coming Soon
Off
Summary

We define the Enhance Public Transit solution as increasing the use of any form of passenger transportation that uses publicly available vehicles (e.g., buses, streetcars, subways, commuter trains, and ferries) operating along fixed routes. It does not include increasing the use of publicly available forms of transportation without fixed routes, such as taxis, except when these transport options supplement a larger public transit system (for example, to help passengers with disabilities). It also does not include increasing the use of vehicles traveling over long distances, such as intercity trains, intercity buses, or aircraft. The cost per climate unit is the cost to the transit provider, not the passenger.

Income & work,Health,Equality
Nature protection,Air quality
Overview

Public transit vehicles are far more fuel-efficient – and thus less GHG-intensive – on a per-pkm basis than fossil fuel–powered cars. Diesel-powered buses emit fewer GHGs/pkm than cars because of their much higher occupancy. Electric buses further reduce GHG emissions (Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2018), as do forms of public transit that already run on electricity. Finally, a fleet of large, centralized public transit vehicles operating along fixed routes is usually easier to electrify than a fleet of fossil fuel–powered cars. 

Enhancing public transit to reduce emissions from transportation relies on two processes. First is increasing the modal share of existing public transit networks by encouraging people to travel by public transit rather than car. This requires building new public transit capacity while also overcoming political, sociocultural, economic, and technical hurdles. Second is improving the emissions performance of public transit networks through electrification and efficiency improvements. We accommodate the latter in this solution by assuming that all shifted trips to buses are electric buses.

These two processes are linked in complex ways. For example, construction of the new public transit networks needed to accommodate additional demand creates an opportunity to install low-carbon vehicles and infrastructures, and bringing additional passengers onto an underused public transit network generates close to zero additional GHG emissions. However, since these complexities are difficult to calculate, we assume that all increases in public transit ridership are supported by a linear increase in capacity.

Buses, trains, streetcars, subways, and other public-transit vehicles predate cars. During the 19th century, most cities developed complex and efficient networks of streetcars and rail that carried large numbers of passengers (Norton, 2011; Schrag, 2000). As a result, it’s clear that a good public transit network can provide for the basic mobility needs of most people, and can therefore substitute for most – if not all – transportation that fossil fuel–powered cars currently provide. Today, public transit networks worldwide already collectively deliver trillions of pkm, not only in big cities but also in small towns and rural areas. 

We identified several different types of public transit:

Buses

Low-capacity vehicles running on rubber tires on roads. Buses in the baseline are a mix of diesel and electric. For the purposes of this solution, we assume that all buses serving shifted trips are electric.

Trams or streetcars

Mid-capacity vehicles running on steel rails that for at least part of their routes run on roads with traffic, rather than in a dedicated rail corridor or tunnel.

Metros, subways, or light rail

High-capacity urban train systems using their own dedicated right-of-way that may or may not be underground.

Commuter rail

Large trains running mostly on the surface designed to bring large numbers of commuters from the suburbs into the core of a city that often overlap with regional or intercity rail.

Other modes

Ferries, cable cars, funiculars, and other forms of public transit that generally play a marginal role.

We assessed all modes together rather than individually because public transit relies on the interactions among different vehicles to maximize the reach, speed, and efficiency of the system. Public transit reduces emissions of CO₂,  methane, and nitrous oxide to the atmosphere by replacing fuel-powered cars, which emit these gases from their tailpipes. Some diesel-powered buses in regions that have low quality diesel emit black carbon. The black carbon global annual total emissions from transportation is negligible compared with carbon emissions and is therefore not quantified in our study. 

References

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American Public Transit Association. (2021). National Transit Database Tables. American Public Transportation Association. https://www.apta.com/research-technical-resources/transit-statistics/ntd-data-tables/

Beaudoin, J., Farzin, Y. H., & Lin Lawell, C.-Y. C. (2015). Public transit investment and sustainable transportation: A review of studies of transit’s impact on traffic congestion and air quality. Research in Transportation Economics, 52, 15–22. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.retrec.2015.10.004

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Kennedy, C. A. (2002). A comparison of the sustainability of public and private transportation systems: Study of the Greater Toronto Area. Transportation, 29(4), 459–493. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1016302913909

Kuminek, T. (2013). Energy Consumption in Tram Transport. Logistics and Transport. https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Energy-Consumption-in-Tram-Transport-Kuminek/2aa2d97130a8e51ea7f64913c2065e8437126774

Lim, L. K., Muis, Z. A., Hashim, H., Ho, W. S., & Idris, M. N. M. (2021). Potential of Electric Bus as a Carbon Mitigation Strategies and Energy Modelling: A Review. Chemical Engineering Transactions, 89, 529–534. https://doi.org/10.3303/CET2189089

Lovasi, G. S., Treat, C. A., Fry, D., Shah, I., Clougherty, J. E., Berberian, A., Perera, F. P., & Kioumourtzoglou, M.-A. (2023). Clean fleets, different streets: Evaluating the effect of New York City’s clean bus program on changes to estimated ambient air pollution. Journal of Exposure Science & Environmental Epidemiology, 33(3), 332–338. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41370-022-00454-5

Litman, T. (2024). Evaluating Public Transit Benefits and Costs.

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Padeiro, M., Louro, A., & da Costa, N. M. (2019). Transit-oriented development and gentrification: A systematic review. Transport Reviews, 39(6), 733–754. https://doi.org/10.1080/01441647.2019.1649316

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Credits

Lead Fellow

  • Cameron Roberts

Contributors

  • Ruthie Burrows

  • James Gerber

  • Yusuf Jameel 

  • Daniel Jasper

  • Heather Jones

  • Alex Sweeney

Internal Reviewers

  • Aiyana Bodi

  • Hannah Henkin

  • Ted Otte

  • Amanda Smith

  • Tina Swanson

Effectiveness

Our calculations suggest that an efficiently designed public transit system using the best available vehicle technologies (especially battery-electric buses) would save 58.26 t CO₂‑eq /million pkm (0.000058 t CO₂‑eq /pkm) on a 100-yr basis compared with fossil fuel–powered cars, in line with the estimates by other large transportation focused organizations (International Transport Forum, 2020; US Department of Transportation, 2010). This number is highly sensitive to public transit vehicle occupancy, which we estimated using the most recent available data (American Public Transit Association, 2021). Increasing the number of trips taken via public transit would likely increase occupancy, although ideally not to the point of passenger discomfort. This elevated ridership would significantly reduce public transit’s pkm emissions.

To arrive at this figure, we first estimated the emissions of fossil fuel–powered cars as 115 t CO₂‑eq /million pkm (0.000115 t/pkm, 100-yr basis). We then separately calculated the emissions of commuter rail, metros and subways, trams and light rail systems, and electric buses. We used data on the modal share of different vehicles within public transit systems around the world (although much of the available data are biased towards systems in the United States and Europe) to determine what each transit system’s emissions would be per million pkm given our per-million-pkm values for different transit vehicles (UITP, 2024). The median of these city-level values is 58 t CO₂‑eq /pkm (0.000058 t/pkm, 100-yr basis). Subtracting this value from the per-pkm emissions for cars gives us the public transit GHG savings figure cited above. Note that none of these values includes embodied emissions (such as emissions from producing cars, buses, trains, roads, etc.), or upstream emissions (such as those from oil refineries).

Pessimistic assumptions regarding the emissions and occupancy of public transit vehicles, and optimistic assumptions about emissions from cars, can suggest a much more marginal climate benefit from public transit (see the 25th percentile row in Table 1). In most cases, however, well-managed public transit is likely to produce a meaningful climate benefit. Such an outcome will depend on increasing the average occupancy of vehicles, which faces a challenge because transit has seen declining occupancies since the COVID-19 pandemic (Qi et al., 2023). For this reason, encouraging additional use of public transit networks without expanding these networks can have an outsized impact because it will allow the substitution of fossil fuel–powered car trips by trips on public transit vehicles for which emissions would not change meaningfully as a result of adding passengers.

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Table 1. Effectiveness at reducing emissions.

Unit: t CO₂‑eq/million pkm, 100-yr basis

25th percentile 0.127
mean 61.76
median (50th percentile) 58.27
75th percentile 106.7

The extremely large range of values between the 25th and 75th percentile is the result of 1) the large diversity of public transit systems in the world and 2) multiplying multiple layers of uncertainty (e.g., varying estimates for occupancy, energy consumption per vehicle kilometer (vkm), percent of pkm reliant on buses vs. trains).

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Cost

Under present-day public transit costs and revenues, it costs the transit provider US$0.23 to transport a single passenger one kilometer. In comparison, travel by car costs the consumer US$0.42/pkm. On a per passenger basis, for the transit provider, public transit is almost 50% cheaper than car transportation, costing US$0.20/pkm less. Combined with the emissions reductions from using public transit, this means that the emissions reductions from shifting people out of cars onto public transit has a net negative cost, saving US$3,300/t CO₂‑eq mitigated (Table 2). 

This figure includes all relevant direct costs for travel by public transit and by car, including the costs of infrastructure, operations, vehicle purchase, and fuel. It does not include external costs, such as medical costs resulting from car crashes. Capital costs (i.e., the large fixed costs of building public transit infrastructure) are accounted for via the annualized capital costs listed in public transit agencies’ financial reports. 

A very large proportion of the total costs of providing public transit is labor (e.g., wages for bus drivers and station attendants). This cost is unlikely to come down as a result of technological innovations (Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2018).

For an individual passenger, however, the marginal costs of public transit (i.e., the fares they pay) can sometimes be higher than the marginal costs of driving. This is in large part due to many external costs of driving which are borne by society at large (Litman, 2024). However, increasing the public transit availability would likely increase occupancy, which would in turn drive costs down.

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Table 2. Cost per unit of climate impact.

Unit: 2023 US$/t CO₂‑eq , 100-yr basis

median -3300

Transit provider cost, not passenger cost.

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Learning Curve

Public transit is a largely mature technology with limited opportunities for radical cost-saving innovation. While our research did not find any papers reporting a learning curve in public transit as a whole, battery-electric buses are in fact subject to many of the same experience effects of other battery-electric vehicles. Although there are no studies assessing declines in the cost of electric buses as a whole, there are studies assessing learning curves for their batteries, which is the most costly component. The cost of batteries used in battery-electric buses has declined 19.25% with each doubling of installed capacity (Table 3).

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Table 3. Learning rate: drop in cost per doubling of the installed solution base.

Unit: %

25th percentile 18.63
mean 19.25
median (50th percentile) 19.25
75th percentile 19.88

This applies only to the cost of batteries in electric buses, not to public transportation as a whole.

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Speed of Action

Speed of action refers to how quickly a climate solution physically affects the atmosphere after it is deployed. This is different from speed of deployment, which is the pace at which solutions are adopted.

At Project Drawdown, we define the speed of action for each climate solution as gradual, emergency brake, or delayed.

Enhance Public Transit is a GRADUAL climate solution. It has a steady, linear impact on the atmosphere. The cumulative effect over time builds as a straight line.

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Caveats

Public transit competes for passengers not just with cars, but also with other transportation modes – some of which have lower emissions on average. If an increase in public transit’s modal share comes at the expense of nonmotorized transportation (i.e., pedestrian travel or cycling), or electric bicycles, this will result in a net increase in emissions. Similarly, public transit could generate additional trips that would not have occurred if the public transit network those trips were taken on did not exist. Under this scenario, a net increase in emissions would occur; however, these new trips might bring additional social benefits that would outweigh these new emissions.

Low occupancy could also diminish the climate benefit of enhancing public transit. While it is certainly possible to build effective and efficient public transit networks in suburban and rural areas, there is a risk that such networks could have high per-pkm GHG emissions if they have low average occupancy (Mees, 2010). It is therefore important to efficiently plan public transit networks, ensure vehicles are right-sized and have efficient powertrains, and promote high levels of ridership even in rural areas to maximize the climate benefit of these kinds of networks.

Upscaling public transit networks – and, crucially, convincing more motorists to use them – is an enduring challenge that faces cultural resistance in some countries, issues with cost, and sometimes a lack of political will. Successfully enhancing public transit will require that these hurdles are overcome.

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Current Adoption

In cities around the world surveyed over the last 15 years, public transit has an average modal share of approximately 26.2% of trips. In comparison, fossil fuel–powered cars account for 51.4% of all trips, while nonmotorized transportation accounts for 22.4% (Prieto-Curiel & Ospina, 2024). The 26.2% of trips taken via public transit corresponds to approximately 16.7 trillion pkm traveled on public transit in cities every year (Table 4).

These numbers are calculated from modal share data (i.e., the percentage of trips in a given city that are taken via various modes of transportation). We estimated total pkm traveled by assuming a global average daily distance traveled, using travel surveys from the United States as well as several European countries (Christensen & Vázquez, 2013; Department for Transport, 2024; Ecke, 2023; Federal Highway Administration, 2022; Statistics Netherlands, 2024). We used Prieto-Curiel and Ospina’s (2024) global population-weighted mean modal share as our global adoption value. The other statistical measures in Table 4 reflect the distribution of estimates drawn from the literature, most of which do not account for population, and therefore give too much weight to small cities, skewing the results. 

We assumed that Prieto-Curiel and Ospina’s data refers only to urban modal share. While the database does include some small towns and rural areas, most of the modal share data we found comes from cities. Public transit can be useful in rural areas (Börjesson et al, 2020), but we did not attempt to estimate rural public transit adoption in this assessment .

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Table 4. Current (2024) adoption level.

Unit: million pkm/yr 

25th percentile 512,900
Population-weighted mean 16,720,000
median (50th percentile) 5,106,000
75th percentile 15,080,000

We used the population-weighted mean calculated by Prieto-Curiel and Ospina (2024) as our authoritative estimate to carry forward to other calculations.

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Adoption Trend

Based on data from Prieto-Curiel and Ospina (2024) and the UITP (2024) for 1,097 cities worldwide, the rate of adoption of public transit has not changed since 2010, with the median annual growth rate equal to 0 (Table 5). This was calculated using all of the cities in Prieto-Curiel and Ospina’s (2024) database for which modal share data exist.

Despite the lack of a global trend in public transit use, some cities, including Amsterdam, Edinburgh, and Leeds, report double-digit growth rates in the use of public transit.

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Table 5. 2023–2024 adoption trend.

Unit: million pkm/yr

25th percentile -697,100
mean 71,490
median (50th percentile) 0.00
75th percentile 1,791,000
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Adoption Ceiling

Public transit could theoretically replace all trips currently undertaken by fossil fuel–powered cars. This would amount to 75 trillion pkm on public transit annually, worldwide (Table 6). This would not be feasible to achieve in practice, as it would require construction of new public transit vehicles and infrastructure on an unfeasibly large scale, and massive changes to living patterns for many people. It would also be much more expensive than we calculated above, because such a change would require extending public transit coverage into areas where it would be highly uneconomic. Public transit is capable of providing a good transportation option in rural areas, but there is a limit to its benefits when population densities are low even by rural standards. Even in cities, this scenario would require a radical redesign of some neighborhoods to prioritize public transit. Such large public transit coverage would also inevitably shift other modes of transportation, such as pedestrian travel and cycling, leading to an even higher pkm total than that suggested by current adoption of fossil fuel–powered cars.

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Table 6. Adoption ceiling.

Unit: million pkm/yr

median (50th percentile) 75,000,000
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Achievable Adoption

The achievable range of public transit adoption is 22.2–41.9 trillion pkm traveled by public transit in cities globally.

To estimate the upper bound of achievable adoption, we assumed that urban trips taken by fossil fuel–powered car (currently 51.4% of trips globally) can be shifted to public transit until public transit increases to 76.6% of trips (the current highest modal share of public transit in any city with a population of more than 1 million) or until car travel decreases to 12.0% of trips (the current lowest modal share of fossil fuel–powered cars in any city with a population of more than 1 million). This equals a shift of 25.2 trillion pkm from fossil fuel–powered car travel to public transit, which, added to present-day public transit trips (16.7 trillion trips/yr), equals 41.9 trillion pkm/yr (Table 7).

To set the lower bound, we performed the same calculation as above, but on a regional basis, adding up all the resultant modal shifts to get a global figure. For example, every northern European city might reach the public transit modal share of London (44.5% of trips), while every South Asian city might reach that of Mumbai (52.0% of trips). Having done that, we then added together the public transit adoption rates from all world regions, apart from three (Polynesia, Micronesia, and Melanesia) for which we did not find any modal share data. This corresponds to a shift of 5.5 trillion pkm/yr from cars to public transit, and a total achievable public transit adoption rate of 22.2 trillion pkm/yr.

Achieving both of these levels of adoption would require not only major investments in expanding public transit networks, but also major changes in how cities are planned so as to allow more areas to be effectively served by transit. These levels of adoption would also require overcoming cultural and political resistance to abandoning cars in favor of public modes. However, unlike the scenario discussed under Adoption Ceiling, these scenarios are feasible, since they are based on real achievements by cities around the world.

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Table 7. Range of achievable adoption levels.

Unit: million pkm/yr

Current Adoption 16,720,000
Achievable – Low 21,980,000
Achievable – High 41,910,000
Adoption Ceiling 75,000,000
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If all public transit trips were taken by fossil fuel–powered cars instead of by public transit, they would result in an additional 0.97 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr of emissions (Table 8).

The global potential climate impact of enhancing public transit, if all car trips were shifted onto public transit systems, is 4.37 Gt. As discussed under Adoption Ceiling, this is an unrealistic scenario.

In a more realistic scenario, if every city in the world shifted car traffic onto public transit until it reached the public transit modal share of Hong Kong (i.e., the high estimate of achievable adoption), it would save 2.44 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr globally. Meanwhile, if every city shifts car trips to public transit until it reaches the car modal share of the region’s least car-dependent city (i.e., the low estimate of achievable adoption), it would save 1.28 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr.

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Table 8. Climate impact at different levels of adoption.

Unit: Gt CO₂‑eq/yr, 100-yr basis

Current Adoption 0.97
Achievable – Low 1.28
Achievable – High 2.44
Adoption Ceiling 4.37
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Additional Benefits

Air Quality

GHG emissions from transportation are often emitted with other harmful air pollutants. Consequently, reducing fuel consumption by replacing transport by fossil fuel–powered cars with public transit can lead to cleaner air. The scale of this benefit varies by location and is influenced by differences in emission levels between private and public transit travels and the relative demand substitutability between modes (Beaudoin et al., 2015). For U.S. cities, significant investment in public transit could cut pollution around 1.7% on average (Borck, 2019). The benefits are more significant in low- and middle-income countries, where fossil fuel–powered cars are more polluting due to lenient air quality regulations (Goel & Gupta, 2017; Guo & Chen, 2019).

Health Benefits

Improved air quality due to enhanced public transit has direct health benefits, such as lowering cardiovascular disease risk, and secondary health benefits, such as increased physical activity (Xiao et al., 2019), fewer traffic-related injuries, lower rates of cancer, and enhanced access to health-care facilities and nutritious food (Gouldson et al., 2018; Health Affairs, 2021).

Equality

Limited access to transportation restricts labor participation, particularly for women. Expanding public transit can foster gender equity by improving women’s access to employment opportunities. For example, in Peru expansion of public transit has led to improvements in women’s employment and earnings (Martinez et al., 2020). Similarly, in India, the extension of the light rail system in Delhi has increased women’s willingness to commute for work (Tayal & Mehta, 2021).

Public transit enhances community connectivity by providing accessible transportation options. Expanded mobility allows individuals to reach employment, health-care, education, and recreational sites with greater ease, heightening social inclusion. The social equity benefits of public transit are especially significant for low-income people in terms of time and cost savings and safety and health benefits (Serulle & Cirillo, 2016; Venter et al., 2017). 

Income and work

Investment in enhancing public transit can also generate substantial economic returns. The APTA estimated that each US$1 billion invested in transit can create 49,700 jobs and yield a five-to-one economic return (APTA, 2020). According to another study, shifting 50% of highway funds to mass transit systems in 20 U.S. metropolises could generate more than 1 million new transit jobs within five years (Swanstrom et al., 2010). 

Nature protection

An indirect benefit of enhanced public transit is its contribution to reducing resource consumption, such as the minerals used in manufacturing personal vehicles. Enhanced public transit can also improve land-use efficiency by curbing urban sprawl, which helps reduce pollution and limit biodiversity loss (Ortiz, 2002). 

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Risks

If expanded service on high-quality public transit systems replaced journeys from nonmotorized transportation or electric bicycles rather than from cars – or if expanded service on high-quality public transit systems generated journeys that would not have otherwise happened – this will have a net-negative climate impact, since public transit has higher per-pkm GHG emissions than electric bicycles or not traveling (International Transport Forum, 2020). 

There may be cases where public transit networks cannot be implemented efficiently enough to provide a meaningful benefit compared to fossil fuel–powered cars in terms of GHG emissions. This would occur in places where there are so few potential riders that most trips would have a very low occupancy. The result would be a much higher rate of emissions per pkm. However, effective public transit networks can be built in suburban and even rural areas (Börjesson et al., 2020; Mees, 2010).

Finally, expanding public transit networks has proven very difficult in recent years. Entrenched preferences for car travel, reluctance on the part of governments to invest heavily in new transit infrastructure, and local political challenges over land use, noise, gentrification, and similar issues are all obstacles to increased public transit use. Public transit expansion has faced stronger headwinds in recent years in particular, due to both the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and competition from new (and mostly less sustainable) mobility services, such as app-based ride-hailing (Shaller, 2017).

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Interactions with Other Solutions

Reinforcing

For people living without cars, public transit provides a crucial service that is hard to replace for certain kinds of trips, such as trips over long distances, with small children, or carrying large objects. As a result, public transit plays a large role in making it more viable for people to live without owning a car (Brown, 2017). Research suggests that the key to a low-carbon mobility system is to reduce the need for people to own cars altogether (Van Acker & Witlox, 2010).

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Public transit requires a lot less space than cars. Some of this space could be reallocated to ecosystem conservation through revegetation and other land-based methods of GHG sequestration (Rodriguez Mendez et al., 2024).

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Competing 

Electric cars and public transit compete for pkm. Consequently, increased use of public transit could reduce kilometers traveled using electric cars. 

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Dashboard

Solution Basics

million passenger kilometers (million pkm)

tCO2-eq/unit/yr
58.27
units/yr
Current 1.67×10⁷2.2×10⁷4.19×10⁷
Achievable (Low to High)

Climate Impact

GtCO2-eq/yr
Current 0.97 1.282.44
US$ per tCO2-eq
-3,300
Gradual

CO₂, CH₄, N₂O

Trade-offs

Public transit vehicles are sometimes unsafe, particularly for vulnerable groups such as women (Loukaitou-Sideris, 2014). In some circumstances – although this remains controversial – new public transit routes can also lead to gentrification of neighborhoods, forcing people to move far away from city centers and use cars for travel (Padeiro et al., 2019). 

Expansion of public transit networks could also have negative consequences in areas directly adjacent to transit infrastructure. Diesel buses create air pollution (Lovasi et al., 2022), and public transit networks of all types can create noise pollution (Hemmat et al., 2023).

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Population (millions)
1
10
30
Active Mobility
Public Transport
Private Cars

Primary mode of transport

Mapping the primary mode of transportation reveals mobility patterns and opportunities to shift travel toward lower-emitting modes.

Prieto-Curiel, R. and Ospina, Juan P. (2024). The ABC of mobility [Data set]. Environmental International, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envint.2024.108541. Retrieved May 9, 2025 from https://github.com/rafaelprietocuriel/ModalShare/tree/main

Population (millions)
1
10
30
Active Mobility
Public Transport
Private Cars

Primary mode of transport

Mapping the primary mode of transportation reveals mobility patterns and opportunities to shift travel toward lower-emitting modes.

Prieto-Curiel, R. and Ospina, Juan P. (2024). The ABC of mobility [Data set]. Environmental International, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envint.2024.108541. Retrieved May 9, 2025 from https://github.com/rafaelprietocuriel/ModalShare/tree/main

Geographic Guidance Introduction

Public transit is most effective in urban areas with high population density, where buses, subways, trams, and commuter rail can efficiently carry large numbers of passengers. Electrified or low-emission transit modes achieve the greatest climate impact, especially in regions with clean electricity grids (Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2018). However, even diesel-based public transit systems can outperform fossil fuel-powered cars on a per-pkm basis if they have high ridership and operate efficiently.

Socioeconomic and political factors, including investment capacity, institutional coordination, and public perceptions of reliability, safety, and comfort, highly influence the adoption and effectiveness of public transit. Regions with well-funded public infrastructure, integrated fare systems, and strong governance tend to have the highest adoption and climate benefits. Conversely, underinvestment, informal transit dominance, or poorly maintained systems can undermine public transit’s potential (Börjesson et al., 2020; Mees, 2010).

High public transit adoption is seen in Western and Northern Europe, Post-Soviet countries, East Asia (including Japan, South Korea, and China), and some Latin American cities, like Bogotá and Santiago. In contrast, many developing regions face barriers to public transit expansion, such as inadequate funding, urban sprawl, or a reliance on informal minibus systems. However, these same areas offer some of the highest potential for impact. Rapid urbanization, growing demand for mobility, and severe air quality challenges create strong incentives to expand and modernize transit networks.

Action Word
Enhance
Solution Title
Public Transit
Classification
Highly Recommended
Lawmakers and Policymakers
  • Use public transit and create incentive programs for government employees to use public transit.
  • Improve and invest in local public transit infrastructure, increasing routes and frequency while improving onboard safety, especially for women.
  • Electrify public buses, vans, and other vehicles used in the public transit system.
  • Implement the recommendations of transit-oriented development, such as increasing residential and commercial density, placing development near stations, and ensuring stations are easily accessible.
  • Provide online information, ticketing, and payment services.
  • Implement regional or nationwide public transit ticketing systems.
  • Consider a wide range of policy options that include demand-side options, such as free fare or fare reductions, and that are informed by citizen-centered approaches.
  • Create dedicated coordinating bodies across government agencies, businesses, and the public to develop public transit.
  • Disincentivize car trips in areas serviced by public transit through reduced access, increases in parking fares, congestion charges, taxes, or other means.
  • Incorporate social signaling in public transit information and signage, such as smiley faces and “sustainable transport” labels.
  • Develop public transit awareness campaigns – starting from early childhood – focusing on internally motivating factors such as money saved, health benefits, reduced pollution, free time while traveling, and lifestyle sustainability.

Further information:

Practitioners
  • Use public transit and create incentive programs for government employees to utilize public transit.
  • Increase routes and frequency while also improving onboard safety, especially for women.
  • Electrify public buses, vans, and other vehicles used in the public transit system.
  • Incorporate social signaling in public transit information and signage, such as smiley faces and “sustainable transport” labels.
  • Provide online information, ticketing, and payment services
  • Implement regional or nationwide public transit ticketing systems.
  • Consider a wide range of policy options that include demand-side options, such as free fare or fare reductions, and that are informed through citizen-centered approaches.
  • Create dedicated coordinating bodies across government agencies, businesses, and the public to develop public transit.
  • Develop public transit awareness campaigns – starting from early childhood – focusing on internally motivating factors such as money saved, health benefits, reduced pollution, free time while traveling, and a sustainable lifestyle.

Further information:

Business Leaders
  • Use public transit and encourage employees to do so when feasible.
  • Encourage public transit use for company purposes.
  • Offer employees who agree to forego a free parking space the annualized cash value or cost of that parking space as a salary increase.
  • Incorporate company policies on public transit use into company sustainability and emission reduction initiatives and communicate how they support broader company goals.
  • Ensure your business is accessible via public transit and offer information on nearest access points both online and in person.
  • Offer employees pre-tax commuter benefits to include reimbursement for public transit expenses.
  • Create and distribute educational materials for employees on commuting best practices.
  • Partner with, support, and/or donate to infrastructure investments and public transit awareness campaigns.
  • Advocate for better public transit systems with city officials.

Further information:

Nonprofit Leaders
  • Use public transit and encourage staff to do so when feasible.
  • Offer staff pre-tax commuter benefits to include reimbursement for public transit expenses.
  • Offer employees who agree to forego a free parking space the annualized cash value or cost of that parking space as a salary increase.
  • Expand access to underserved communities by providing fare assistance through microgrants and/or public-private partnerships.
  • Create, support, or partner with existing public transit awareness campaigns that – starting from early childhood – focus on internally motivating factors such as money saved, health benefits, reduced pollution, free time while traveling, and a sustainable lifestyle.
  • Ensure your office is accessible via public transit and offer information – online and in person – on the nearest access points.
  • Advocate to policymakers for improved infrastructure and incentives for riders.
  • Advocate for infrastructure improvements and note specific locations where improvements can be made.
  • Encourage local businesses to create employee incentives.
  • Host or support community participation in local public transit infrastructure design.
  • Join public-private partnerships to encourage, improve, or operate public transit.

Further information:

Investors
  • Use public transit and encourage staff to do so when feasible.
  • Encourage public transit use for company purposes.
  • Invest in electric battery and component suppliers for public buses and vehicle fleets.
  • Deploy capital to efforts that improve public transit comfort, convenience, access, and safety.
  • Seek investment opportunities that reduce material and maintenance costs for public transit.

Further information:

Philanthropists and International Aid Agencies
  • Use public transit and encourage staff to do so when feasible.
  • Award grants to local organizations advocating for improved public transit and services.
  • Expand access to underserved communities by providing fare assistance through microgrants and/or public-private partnerships.
  • Improve and finance local infrastructure and public transit capacity.
  • Build local capacity for infrastructure design, maintenance, and construction.
  • Assist with local policy design or provide means for assessments, data collection, citizen participation, and other steps in the policymaking process.
  • Create, support, or partner with existing public transit awareness campaigns that – starting from early childhood – focus on internally motivating factors such as money saved, health benefits, reduced pollution, free time while traveling, and a sustainable lifestyle.

Further information:

Thought Leaders
  • Lead by example and use public transit regularly.
  • Create, support, or partner with existing public transit awareness campaigns that – starting from early childhood – focus on internally motivating factors such as money saved, health benefits, reduced pollution, free time while traveling, and a sustainable lifestyle.
  • Share detailed information on local public transit routes.
  • Assist with local policy design or provide means for assessments, data collection, citizen participation, and other steps in the policymaking process.
  • Advocate to policymakers for improved infrastructure, noting specific locations that need improvements and incentives for riders.

Further information:

Technologists and Researchers
  • Use public transit and encourage your colleagues to use public transit when feasible.
  • Improve electric batteries and electrification infrastructure for public buses and vehicles.
  • Develop models for policymakers to demonstrate the impact of public transit policies on pollutant emissions, health, and other socioeconomic variables.
  • Conduct randomized control trials and collect longitudinal data on the impacts of interventions to increase public transit usage.
  • Innovate better, faster, and cheaper public transit networks – focusing on infrastructure, operations, and public transit vehicles.

Further information:

Communities, Households, and Individuals
  • Use public transit and encourage your household and neighbors to use public transit when feasible.
  • Share your experiences with public transit, as well as tips and reasons for choosing this mode of transportation.
  • Advocate to local officials for infrastructure improvements and note specific locations where improvements can be made.
  • Advocate to employers and local businesses to provide incentives and start local initiatives.

Further information:

Sources
Evidence Base

Consensus of effectiveness in reducing transportation emissions: High

Experts agree that public transit usually produces fewer GHG/pkm than fossil fuel–powered cars (Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2018; Brunner et al., 2018; Ilie et al., 2014; International Transport Forum, 2020; Kennedy, 2002; Kuminek, 2013; Lim et al., 2021; Mahmoud et al., 2016; Rodrigues & Seixas, 2022; Sertsoz et al., 2013). There is also consensus on two points: First, shifting people from cars to public transit even under status-quo emissions levels will reduce transport emissions overall; second, opportunities exist to decarbonize the highest-emitting parts of public transit systems through electrification, especially buses (Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2018).

According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2023), public transit can help decrease vehicle travel and lower GHG emissions by reducing both the number and length of trips made in fossil fuel–powered cars (medium confidence). Adjustments to public transportation operations – such as increasing bus stop density, reducing the distance between stops and households, improving trip duration and frequency, and lowering fares – can encourage a shift from fossil fuel–powered car use to public transit.

Bloomberg New Energy Finance (2018) provides a good overview of the state of electric buses – a technology crucial to reduce the public transit fleet’s fossil fuel consumption, and help transition these fleets entirely to electric power. It determined that electric buses have significantly lower operating costs and can be more cost-effective than conventional buses when considering total ownership costs.

Litman (2024) found that “High quality (relatively fast, convenient, comfortable, and integrated) transit can attract discretionary passengers who would otherwise drive, which reduces traffic problems including congestion, parking costs, accidents, and pollution emissions. This provides direct user benefits, since they would not change mode if they did not consider themselves better off overall.”

The results presented in this document summarize findings from 28 reviews and meta-analyses and 23 original studies reflecting current evidence from 32 countries, primarily the American Public Transit Association (APTA, 2020), Bloomberg New Energy Finance (2018), International Transport Forum (2020), and UITP (2024). We recognize this limited geographic scope creates bias, and hope this work inspires research and data sharing on this topic in underrepresented regions.

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Updated Date

Improve Nonmotorized Transportation

Submitted by Drawdown Admin on
Sector
Transportation
Mode
Cut Emissions
Cluster
Shift to Alternatives
Image
Many people in a crosswalk viewed from above
Coming Soon
Off
Summary

We define Improve Nonmotorized Transportation as increasing any form of travel that does not use a motor or engine. In theory, this includes a huge range of transportation modes, including horses, cross-country skis, sailboats, hand-operated rickshaws, and animal-drawn carriages. In practice, pedestrian travel and cycling account for most nonmotorized utilitarian passenger travel.

Income & work,Health
Nature protection,Air quality
Overview

Travel shifted from motorized to nonmotorized transportation saves GHG emissions – mostly CO₂, but also small amounts of nitrous oxide and methane (Center for Sustainable Systems, 2023) – that a fossil fuel-powered car would otherwise emit. Nonmotorized transportation uses human muscle power to move people from place to place. 

We divided nonmotorized transportation into three subcategories: 1) pedestrian travel, including walking and the use of mobility aids such as wheelchairs; 2) private bicycles owned by the user, meaning that they are typically used for both the outgoing and return legs of a trip; and 3) shared bicycles, which are sometimes used for only one leg of a trip and so have to be repositioned by other means.

Pedestrian travel

Pedestrian travel (including both walking and travel using mobility aids such as wheelchairs) has the advantage of being something that most people can do and often does not require special equipment or dedicated infrastructure (although some infrastructure, such as sidewalks, can be helpful). Pedestrian travel is 81.7% of global urban nonmotorized pkm. 

Private bicycles

Private bicycles cost money and require maintenance but enable travel at much faster speeds and therefore longer distances. Private bicycles are 13% of global urban nonmotorized pkm.

Shared bicycles 

Shared bicycles eliminate the financial overhead of bicycle ownership, but usually only permit travel within specific urban areas and sometimes between established docking stations. Shared bicycles are 5.1% of global urban nonmotorized pkm. 

Note that we did not include electric bicycles in this analysis. Electric bicycles are analyzed as a separate solution.

While improving nonmotorized transportation can be a valuable climate solution virtually anywhere, we limit our analysis to cities due to the high number of relatively short-distance trips and the abundance of available data compared with rural locations.

The fuel for cycling and pedestrian travel is the food the traveler eats. When the traveler metabolizes the food, they produce CO₂. Some studies factor the GHG emissions produced by the additional metabolism required by nonmotorized transportation into its climate impact because of the emissions that come from the food system (Mizdrak et al., 2020). This is controversial, however, because it is unclear whether pedestrians and cyclists have a higher calorie intake than people who travel in other ways (Noussan et al., 2022). Furthermore, additional food eaten to fuel physical labor is not typically counted in life-cycle analyses. This analysis, therefore, does not consider the upstream climate impacts of food calories that fuel cycling, pedestrian travel, driving, or any other activity.

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Credits

Lead Fellows

  • Heather Jones, Ph.D.

  • Cameron Roberts, Ph.D.

Contributors

  • James Gerber, Ph.D.

  • Yusuf Jameel , Ph.D.

  • Daniel Jasper

  • Heather McDiarmid, Ph.D.

  • Alex Sweeney

Internal Reviewers

  • Aiyana Bodi

  • Hannah Henkin

  • Yusuf Jameel, Ph.D. 

  • Heather McDiarmid, Ph.D.

  • Ted Otte

  • Amanda Smith, Ph.D.
Effectiveness

Nonmotorized transportation can save 115.6 t CO₂‑eq /million pkm, compared with fossil fuel–powered cars (Table 1). This makes it a highly effective climate solution. Every trip shifted from a fossil fuel–powered car to cycling or pedestrian travel avoids most, if not all, of the GHG emissions associated with car travel. Nonmotorized transportation effectiveness is calculated by taking the share of each mode and multiplying it by its effectiveness, and adding this value from all three modes. 

Cars produce 116 t CO₂‑eq /million pkm (International Transport Forum, 2020; IPCC, 2023; Montoya-Torres et al., 2023; TNMT, 2021; Verma et al., 2022). Note that this value does not correspond directly to the estimates arrived at in most of these references because it is common practice to include embodied and upstream emissions in life-cycle calculations. Because we do not include embodied and upstream emissions (which are accounted for in other solutions), our estimate for the current emissions from the global vehicle fleet comes from an original calculation using values from these sources and arrives at a lower figure than they do.

Pedestrian travel and private bicycles have negligible direct emissions (Bonilla-Alicea et al., 2020; Brand et al., 2021; International Transport Forum, 2020; Noussan et al., 2022; TNMT, 2021). This means people avoid all direct GHG emissions from driving fossil fuel–powered cars when they use nonmotorized transportation instead. Thus, shifting from cars to nonmotorized transportation saves 116 t CO₂‑eq /million pkm, not including indirect emissions, such as those from manufacturing the equipment and infrastructure necessary for those forms of mobility. Life-cycle emissions from cycling are approximately 12 t CO₂‑eq /million pkm, most of which come from manufacturing bicycles (Bonilla-Alicea et al., 2019; Brand et al., 2021; ITF, 2020; Montoya-Torres et al., 2023; Noussan et al., 2020; TNMT, 2021), while emissions from pedestrian travel are negligible (TNMT, 2021). These life-cycle emissions are not quantified for this analysis, but may be addressed by other solutions in the industrial sector.

Shared bicycles provide fewer emissions savings than privately owned bicycles do. Shared bicycle schemes have direct GHG emissions of 7.49 t CO₂‑eq /million pkm, about 109 fewer than the average fossil fuel-powered car. Because people sometimes use shared bicycles for one-way trips, the bike-sharing system can become unbalanced, with fewer bicycles in places where people start their journeys and more bicycles in places where people end them. This is fixed by driving the shared bicycles from places with surplus to places with shortage, which increases emissions. The total increase in emissions caused by this can be mitigated through measures such as using electric vehicles to reposition the bikes or incentivizing riders to reposition the bicycles themselves without the use of a vehicle. 

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Table 1. Effectiveness at reducing emissions.

Unit: t CO₂‑eq /million pkm, 100-yr basis

Nonmotorized Transportation
25th percentile 99.33
mean 118.8
median (50th percentile) 115.6
75th percentile 136.9
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Cost

Driving a fossil fuel–powered car has private costs (i.e., those that accrue to the motorist themselves) of US$0.25/pkm and public costs (for roads, lights, traffic enforcement, etc.) of US$0.11/pkm. It generates public revenues of US$0.03/pkm from taxes, fees, fines, etc. (AAA, 2024; Autocosts.org, 2024; Burnham et al., 2021; Gössling et al., 2019). This means that its net cost to the passenger is US$0.32/pkm. Cars also have externality costs, such as the cost of health care due to road injuries or air pollution (Litman, 2024). We do not factor these externalities into our cost analysis.

Nonmotorized transportation (costs weighted by mode share) has private costs of US$0.08/pkm and public costs US$0.04/pkm. It produces no revenues to the user. It has a net cost of US$0.12/pkm and saves US$0.21/pkm compared with car travel. This equals a savings of US$1,771/t CO₂‑eq (Table 2).

Pedestrian travel has private costs of US$0.09/pkm (mostly for shoes) and public costs of US$0.1/pkm (for sidewalks, staircases, bridges, etc.). It produces no new revenues. It has a net cost of US$0.10/pkm and saves US$0.23/pkm compared to car travel (Gössling et al., 2019; Litman, 2024). 

Private bicycles have private costs of US$0.06/pkm (for the cost of the bicycle itself, as well as repairs, clothing, etc.) and public costs of US$0.002/pkm (for bike lanes and other infrastructure). They produce no new revenues. They have net costs of US$0.07/pkm and save US$0.26/pkm compared to car travel (Gössling et al., 2019; Litman, 2024). These costs are cheaper than those of pedestrian travel on a per-pkm basis because, while a bicycle costs more than a pair of shoes, it can also travel much farther.

Shared bicycle systems have different cost structures. They can be very expensive (US$9.00/km in London), free (Buenos Aires) and very inexpensive (less than US$0.00 in Tehran) based on what operators charge users. Rides are usually priced by time rather than distance (DeMaio, 2009). Calculations were made as to distance covered by time to arrive at a price per km (CityTransit Data, 2025; Fishman & Schepers, 2016; Pro Cycling Coaching, 2025). Assuming that this roughly covered operating costs, it means that these systems cost US$0.22/pkm more than car travel.

An important consideration for each of these is that we must divide the cost of a bicycle, car, pair of shoes, or piece of infrastructure (road, bike lane, sidewalk) by the pkm of travel it supports over its lifespan. This means that nonmotorized transportation, which is cheaper but slower than cars, can have less of a cost advantage per pkm than might seem intuitive, and is part of the reason why cycling is cheaper per pkm than pedestrian travel. In addition, all of these estimates are based on very limited data and research and should be treated as approximate. Lastly, per-pkm infrastructural costs of cycling and pedestrian travel will decrease as cyclists and pedestrians use the infrastructure more intensively.

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Table 2. Cost per unit of climate impact.

Unit: 2023 US$/t CO₂‑eq , 100-yr basis

Nonmotorized Transportation
median -1,771
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Learning Curve

Walking and cycling are mature technologies, so the concept of a learning rate is not applicable.

There is also limited opportunity for cost reductions in cycling or pedestrian infrastructure built using construction techniques very similar to those used in the road industry. However, while learning effects might not do much to reduce the costs of nonmotorized transportation infrastructure, they could do a great deal to improve its effectiveness. Safe cycling infrastructure, in particular, has improved considerably over the past few decades. This could continue into the future as best practices are further improved.

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Speed of Action

Speed of action refers to how quickly a climate solution physically affects the atmosphere after it is deployed. This is different from speed of deployment, which is the pace at which solutions are adopted.

At Project Drawdown, we define the speed of action for each climate solution as gradual, emergency brake, or delayed.

Improve Nonmotorized Transportation is a GRADUAL climate solution. It has a steady, linear impact on the atmosphere. The cumulative effect over time builds as a straight line.

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Caveats

Increases to the modal share of nonmotorized transportation only have the benefits discussed here if they replace travel by car. Replacing public transit travel with travel using nonmotorized transportation will have a much smaller climate benefit. The climate benefit of nonmotorized mobility will also diminish if the average emissions of the global car fleet shrink, for example, due to the wider adoption of electric vehicles. 

There are also uncertainties around trip length. A small number of long trips taken by car will not be replaceable by nonmotorized transportation. Replacing the average trip by car with cycling or pedestrian travel will, in many cases, require that trip to be shortened (for example, by placing businesses closer to people’s homes). If this is not possible, increased adoption of nonmotorized transportation will apply to only some trips, reducing the impact on both emissions and costs.

Weather and climate pose significant challenges and risks for nonmotorized transportation. Extreme heat or cold, wind, rain, or storms can make people reluctant to travel without the protection of a vehicle and, in some cases, can make doing so unsafe (Gössling et al., 2023). This will reduce the adoption of nonmotorized transportation in some places, although it can be mitigated through measures such as providing information and subsidies for proper clothing, removing or grooming snow on bicycle paths, and providing indoor/covered paths that allow pedestrians to travel through a city without exposure to the elements.

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Current Adoption

Analysts most frequently report adoption of nonmotorized transportation as a percentage modal share of all trips taken in a city. Cities around the world have radically different modal shares of bicycle and pedestrian trips. Cities in LMICs often have a high nonmotorized modal share because many people cannot afford cars. Cities in high-income countries are often difficult to navigate without a car, resulting in low modal shares for nonmotorized transportation (Prieto-Curiel & Ospina, 2024). 

Prieto-Curiel and Ospina (2024) estimated that northern North America (the United States and Canada) had the lowest modal share of nonmotorized transportation, at 3.5%. Western Europe reached 29% modal share, while Western and Eastern Africa reached 42.9% and 46%, respectively.

Converting these numbers into vehicle-kilometers traveled on a national level for various countries requires assumptions. A population-weighted average of data available from the United States and several Western European countries finds that people take approximately three 13.2 km trips per day, totaling 39.7 km of daily travel with considerable variation between countries (Christensen & Vázquez, 2013; Department for Transport, 2024; Federal Highway Administration, 2022; Statistics Netherlands, 2024). For example, English people in 2022 traveled an average of 25.5 km/day, while Americans in 2020 traveled 53.5 km/day. The value we use in our analysis comes from a population-weighted average that excludes data from 2020 and 2021 to exclude data skewed by the COVID-19 pandemic. Because the United States has by far the highest population of the countries for which we found data, it skews the average much higher than many of the European countries. World data (ITF, 2021) reports that nonmotorized transportation is 14.4% of all urban pkm.

We assumed that in urban environments, each trip taken by nonmotorized transportation corresponds to one fewer car trip of this average length. This implies that nonmotorized transportation currently shifts approximately 12.9 trillion pkm from cars (Table 3). However, it should be noted that this figure includes low-income countries, where some residents have less access to private vehicles.

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Table 3. Current (2024) adoption level.

Unit: million pkm/yr*

25th percentile 1,913,000
mean 12,860,000
median (50th percentile) 8,617,000
75th percentile 22,340,000

*These data are extrapolated from a range of individual city estimates from 2010 to 2020 and are limited by the fact that not all cities have accurate data on passenger travel modal share. We used the mean value from Prieto-Curiel and Ospina (2024) as the authoritative estimate of current adoption here and for calculations in future sections.

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Adoption Trend

In all cities for which appropriate data exist, nonmotorized transportation showed a growth rate of 0.45% of all passenger trips per year (Prieto-Curiel & Ospina, 2024). This amounts to 114 billion pkm (Table 4) according to our estimation procedure outlined above. In some cities, adoption has grown much more quickly. For example, Hanover, Germany, achieved an average growth of 7.8%/yr in 2011–2017, which amounts to approximately 593 million additional pkm traveled by bicycle every year during that time. However, the rate of adoption is extremely variable. The 25th percentile of estimates shows a global decline in nonmotorized transportation to the tune of 312 billion fewer pkm shifted to nonmotorized modes every year.

Adoption rates of nonmotorized transportation vary widely within a country and between different years within the same city (Prieto-Curiel & Ospina, 2024).

Many people, particularly in LMICs, walk or cycle because they have limited access to a vehicle. When countries become wealthier, travel often shifts from nonmotorized transportation to cars (Seum et al., 2020). If transportation policy in these countries prioritizes car-free mobility, high levels of nonmotorized transportation adoption could potentially be preserved even as living standards increase.

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Table 4. 2023–2024 adoption trend.

Unit: million pkm/yr

25th percentile -311,800
mean 68,450
median (50th percentile) 114,400
75th percentile 687,200
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Adoption Ceiling

We estimated that 20.2% of all trips in cities worldwide, or approximately 12.9 trillion pkm/yr, are traveled by nonmotorized transportation, while 66.2%, or approximately 42.2 trillion pkm/yr, are traveled by fossil fuel–powered car. This suggests that switching all urban trips currently taken by car to nonmotorized transportation would lead to a nonmotorized modal share of 86.4% in cities globally, or 55 trillion pkm/yr (Table 5).

This calculation uses the same assumptions discussed under Current Adoption above. In this case, however, our assumption that every nonmotorized trip is shifted from a car trip of the same length requires further justification. We are not assuming that very long car trips, trips on highways, etc., are replaced directly by bicycle or pedestrian trips. Instead, we assume that shorter nonmotorized trips can substitute for longer car trips with appropriate investment in better urban planning and infrastructure. So, for example, a 10 km drive to a large grocery store could be replaced by a 1 km walk to a neighborhood grocery store. 

This would require replanning many cities so they better accommodate shorter trips. It would also require improving options for people with disabilities or those carrying heavy loads. And it would face climatic and topographic constraints. Furthermore, it is unlikely that all car traffic would ever be substituted by any single alternative mode. Other sustainable modes, particularly public transit, are likely to play a role.

It is also possible for rural trips to be undertaken by nonmotorized transportation. Indeed, this is already very common in low-and middle-income countries. However, rural data are sparse, and discerning how many trips could be shifted to nonmotorized travel in these areas is highly speculative. Therefore, we omit rural areas from our analysis.

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Table 5. Adoption ceiling.

Unit: million pkm/yr

median (50th percentile) 55,090,000
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Achievable Adoption

To estimate the upper bound of feasible adoption, we assumed that urban trips taken by fossil fuel–powered cars can be shifted to nonmotorized transportation until the latter accounts for 65% of trips (the current highest modal share of nonmotorized transportation in any city with a population of more than one million) or until car travel decreases to 7% of trips (the current lowest modal share of fossil fuel–powered cars in any city with a population of more than one million). 

The global modal share of car travel is 51.4% of trips, or 37.6 trillion pkm/yr, and the global modal share of nonmotorized transportation in cities is 22.4% of trips, or 12.9 trillion pkm/yr. If we shift modal share from cars to nonmotorized transportation until it reaches 65% of travel in cities, that leaves the modal share of cars in cities at 8.8%, still higher than the 7% modal share mentioned above. This amounts to a total modal share shift of 42.6% in all global cities. Multiplying this by the global urban population of 4.4 billion and factoring in the average annual travel distance per capita of 16,590 pkm/yr results in a total of 31.2 million pkm/yr shifted from car travel to nonmotorized transportation in cities around the world, for a total of 41.5 trillion pkm/yr (Table 6).

To set the lower bound, we do the same calculation as above, but for each individual region, adding up all the resultant modal shifts to get a global figure. So, for example, every East Asian city might reach the nonmotorized transportation modal share of Singapore (23% of trips), while every northern European city might reach that of Copenhagen, Denmark (41% of trips). This corresponds to a total achievable nonmotorized transportation modal share of 28.6 trillion pkm/yr.

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Table 6. Range of achievable adoption levels.

Unit: million pkm/yr

Current Adoption 12,860,000
Achievable – Low 28,630,000
Achievable – High 41,490,000
Adoption Ceiling 55,090,000
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If all cycling and pedestrian trips undertaken today would otherwise have happened by car, they are currently displacing approximately 1.5 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr emissions (Table 7). This is an overestimate, however, since this figure includes data from places where most people have low access to cars.

Walking and private bicycles have a different effectiveness than shared bicycles. To calculate the climate impacts of different levels of adoption, we applied the effectiveness in the share of each mode of nonmotorized transportation. Walking and private bicycling are 94.4% of nonmotorized pkm and shared bicycling is 5.3%. This gives nonmotorized transportation effectiveness at reducing emissions 115.6 t CO₂‑eq /million pkm.

On the lower end, if every city achieved a pedestrian and cycling modal share equivalent to the least-motorized city in its region, it would save 3.3 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr. On the higher end, if every city shifted enough passenger car traffic to achieve a car modal share as low as Hong Kong, China, it would save 4.8 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr. If all trips taken by car were shifted onto nonmotorized transportation (an unrealistic scenario), it would save 6.4 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr.

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Table 7. Climate impact at different levels of adoption.

Unit: Gt CO₂‑eq/yr, 100-yr basis

Current Adoption 1.487
Achievable – Low 3.310
Achievable – High 4.797
Adoption Ceiling 6.370
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Additional Benefits

Air pollution and health

Air pollution kills approximately 7 million people yearly (Roser, 2024). By reducing vehicle emissions, nonmotorized transportation can alleviate related air pollution (Mailloux et al., 2021) and thereby reduce premature deaths. For example, cutting U.S. transportation emissions by 75% by 2030 could prevent 14,000 premature deaths annually due to decreased exposure to PM2.5 and ozone (Shindell et al., 2016). 

Nonmotorized transportation has other health and safety benefits (Blondiau et al., 2016; European Commission, 2019; Glazener & Khreis, 2019; Gössling et al., 2023; Mueller et al., 2015; State of Colorado, 2016; Xia et al., 2013). Switching from driving to walking or cycling boosts health by promoting physical activity and decreasing risks of cardiovascular issues, diabetes, and mental disorders (Mailloux et al., 2021).

Noise pollution from motorized vehicles has significant impacts on cardiovascular health, mental health, and sleep disturbances, contributing to 1.6 million lost healthy life years in 2004 and up to 1,100 deaths attributable to hypertension in Europe in 2024 (Staatsen et al., 2004; Munzel et al., 2024). Enhancing nonmotorized transportation can reduce the health impacts of traffic noise (de Nazelle et al., 2011).

Finally, nonmotorized transportation improves quality of life. It increases opportunities for human connection, integrates physical activity and fun into daily commutes, and increases the autonomy of less mobile groups such as children and elders. Cities with high modal shares for nonmotorized transportation generally have high quality of life (Adamos et al., 2020; Günther & Krems, 2022; Glazener and Khreis, 2019).

The use of nonmotorized transportation can reduce car crashes, which kill around 1.2 million people annually (WHO, 2023).

Income and work

Nonmotorized transportation infrastructure tends to be good for local businesses. Cyclists and pedestrians are more likely to stop at businesses they pass and therefore spend more money locally, creating more jobs (Volker & Handy, 2021). 

Nature protection

In 2011, roads and associated infrastructure accounted for 10–30% of land in residential areas and 50–70% of land in commercial areas (Litman, 2011). Transforming these lands into green spaces could provide additional habitats and reduce biodiversity loss while increasing the protection of land, soil, and water resources (European Commission, 2019).

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Risks

Some literature suggested that nonmotorized transportation can lead to gentrification because bike lanes and pleasant walkable streets can increase property values, driving people who used to live in a neighborhood into other places that might still be car-dependent (Flanagan et al., 2016). This risk can be addressed by ensuring that nonmotorized transportation infrastructure is built in an equitable way, connecting different neighborhoods regardless of their social and economic status. Increasing the number of neighborhoods accessible without a car will mean that people do not have to pay a premium to live in those neighborhoods. This will avoid making accessibility without a car a privilege that only the wealthy can afford.

Cycling in a city with lots of traffic and poor cycling infrastructure puts cyclists at risk of injury from collisions with cars. This risk, however, comes mainly from the presence of cars on roads. Reducing the number of cars on the road by shifting trips to other modes can improve safety for cyclists and pedestrians (Bopp et al., 2018).

The positive impacts that nonmotorized transportation have on traffic congestion could be self-defeating if not managed well. This is because less congestion will make driving more appealing, which can, in turn, lead to additional induced demand, increasing car use and congestion (Hymel et al., 2010).

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Interactions with Other Solutions

Reinforcing

Nonmotorized transportation can help passengers access public transit systems, train stations, and carpool pickup points. This is important because research suggests that the key to a low-carbon mobility system is to reduce the need for people to own cars (Van Acker & Witlox, 2010).

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Electric bicycles use the same infrastructure as nonmotorized transportation – especially conventional bicycles. Building bike lanes, bike paths, mixed-use paths, and similar infrastructure for cyclists and pedestrians can also help with the uptake of electric bicycles. This is even more true for shared electric bicycles, which can and often do use the same sharing systems as shared conventional bicycles.

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One way to encourage the adoption of electric cars is through electric car–sharing services, in which people can access a communal electric car when they need it. This has the additional benefit of reducing the need for car ownership, which is closely correlated with car use (Van Acker and Witlox, 2010). Good nonmotorized transportation infrastructure can make it easier for users of these services to access shared vehicles parked at central locations.

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Nonmotorized transportation requires a lot less space than cars. Some of this space could be reallocated to ecosystem conservation and other land-based methods of GHG sequestration. In 2011, roads and parking accounted for 10–30% of land in residential areas and 50–70% of land in commercial areas (Litman, 2011). Transforming 35% of the land area of European cities alone into green spaces could sequester an additional 26 Mt CO₂‑eq/yr. Globally, this kind of effort could sequester 0.1–0.3 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr (Rodriguez Mendez et al., 2024).

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Competing

Electric cars, hybrid cars, and nonmotorized transportation compete for the same pool of total pkm. Increased use of nonmotorized transportation could reduce kilometers traveled using electric cars. 

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Consensus

Consensus of effectiveness in decarbonizing the transport sector: High

The large reductions in emissions that come from shifting passenger transportation from fossil fuel-powered cars to nonmotorized modes are not controversial. There is some disagreement, however, over how many pkm traveled by car can be realistically shifted to nonmotorized transportation.

Brand et al. (2021) compared the GHG emissions of active transportation with those of cars. They concluded that “locking in, investing in and promoting active travel should be a cornerstone of sustainability strategies, policies and planning.”

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2023) sixth assessment report mentioned nonmotorized transportation as a solution in its transportation chapter. The authors expressed high confidence in the potential of these transportation modes to reduce emissions and recommended policy and infrastructural measures to support them.

Litman’s (2024) study of the costs and benefits of active transportation summarized the direct financial costs as well as externalities associated with pedestrian and bicycle travel compared with travel by fossil fuel–powered car. Litman noted that “active transport can provide relatively large energy savings if it substitutes for short urban trips that have high emission rates per mile due to cold starts (engines are inefficient during the first few minutes of operation) and congestion. As a result, each 1% shift from automobile to active travel typically reduces fuel consumption 2–4%.”

This research is, unfortunately, heavily biased toward richer countries, especially in Europe and North America, even though nonmotorized transportation plays a very important role in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). The research on this topic is also biased toward cities, even though nonmotorized transportation can be a valuable means of mobility in rural areas. 

The results presented in this document summarize findings from 19 reviews and meta-analyses and 14 original studies reflecting current evidence from 84 countries, primarily the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union. We recognize this limited geographic scope creates bias, and hope this work inspires research and data sharing on this topic in underrepresented regions.

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Dashboard

Solution Basics

one million passenger-kilometers (pkm)

tCO2-eq/unit
115.6
units/yr
Current 1.29×10⁷2.86×10⁷4.15×10⁷
Achievable (Low to High)

Climate Impact

GtCO2-eq/yr
Current 1.49 3.314.8
US$ per tCO2-eq
-1,771
Gradual

CO₂, CH₄, N₂O

Trade-offs

Production of equipment (such as bicycles) and infrastructure (such as sidewalks) creates some emissions, but these are small when divided by the total distance traveled by pedestrians and cyclists. On a per-pkm basis, this makes little difference in the emissions saved by nonmotorized transportation. 

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% population
0–20
20–40
40–60
60–80
> 80

Percentage of city population living near protected bikeways, 2023

Proximity to related infrastructure, such as protected bikeways, facilitates the safe and convenient use of nonmotorized modes of transportation.

Reich, D. T. & Braga, K. (2024). Atlas of Sustainable City Transport [Data set]. Institute for Transportation and Development Policy. Retrieved June 2, 2025 from atlas.itdp.org

% population
0–20
20–40
40–60
60–80
> 80

Percentage of city population living near protected bikeways, 2023

Proximity to related infrastructure, such as protected bikeways, facilitates the safe and convenient use of nonmotorized modes of transportation.

Reich, D. T. & Braga, K. (2024). Atlas of Sustainable City Transport [Data set]. Institute for Transportation and Development Policy. Retrieved June 2, 2025 from atlas.itdp.org

Geographic Guidance Introduction

Nonmotorized transportation effectiveness is high across all geographic regions, though the built environment, safety, and socio-cultural norms heavily shape its adoption and impact. Key determinants of effectiveness include the extent of safe and connected infrastructure (e.g., sidewalks, bike lanes, protected intersections), land-use patterns supporting short trips, and public policies prioritizing nonmotorized transportation.

Overall, effectiveness depends on adoption. In many cities across Europe and Asia, walking and cycling remain integral to daily travel. Cities like Amsterdam, Copenhagen, and Tokyo have successfully integrated nonmotorized modes into their broader transport systems through dedicated infrastructure and supportive urban design. In contrast, cities in North America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and parts of Latin America often lack safe, accessible infrastructure, which limits adoption.

Socioeconomic factors, including income levels, urban design, and perceptions of status, also influence the adoption of nonmotorized transport. In wealthier regions, cycling may be viewed as a lifestyle choice or an environmental statement, whereas in lower-income settings, it may be perceived as a necessity or even a sign of economic disadvantage, influencing user behavior and policy support (Seum et al., 2020).

Although shared bicycles have a lower effectiveness than walking or private bicycles, they are much more effective than cars. Increasing the number of shared bicycle systems in any geographic area can increase adoption and, therefore, make them more effective. This is particularly effective in lower-income areas where owning a private bicycle might be cost-prohibitive (Litman, 2024). Increasing shared systems in less urban and more suburban areas can be more effective, as they often replace trips made by car (Brand et al., 2021).

Nonmotorized modes are generally resilient and functional in a wide range of climates. Extreme weather conditions, including high heat, heavy rainfall, or snow, can reduce walking and cycling, although these can be mitigated through appropriate infrastructure (e.g., shaded or covered walkways, snow clearing, bike shelters).

Action Word
Improve
Solution Title
Nonmotorized Transportation
Classification
Highly Recommended
Lawmakers and Policymakers
  • Use nonmotorized transportation.
  • Reduce the associated time, distance, risk, and risk perception of nonmotorized transportation.
  • Improve infrastructure such as sidewalks, footpaths, and bike lanes.
  • Implement traffic-calming methods such as speed bumps.
  • Increase residential and commercial density.
  • Use a citizen-centered approach when designing infrastructure.
  • Enact infrastructure standards for nonmotorized transportation, such as curb ramp designs, and train contractors to implement them.
  • Establish public bike-sharing programs.
  • Create dedicated coordinating bodies across government agencies, businesses, and the public to develop nonmotorized infrastructure.
  • Disincentivize car ownership through reduced access, increases in parking fares, taxes, or other means. 

Further information:

Practitioners
  • Use nonmotorized transportation.
  • Share your experiences, tips, and reasons for choosing your modes of transportation.
  • Participate in local bike groups, public events, and volunteer opportunities.
  • Advocate to local officials for infrastructure improvements and note specific locations for improvements.
  • Encourage local businesses to create employee incentives.
  • Create “bike buses” or “walking buses” for the community and local schools.

Further information:

Business Leaders
  • Use nonmotorized transportation.
  • Ensure your business is accessible via nonmotorized transportation.
  • Advocate for better infrastructure for nonmotorized transportation.
  • Educate customers about the local infrastructure.
  • Partner with other businesses to encourage employees to cycle or walk.
  • Encourage employees to walk or cycle to and from work as their circumstances allow.
  • Create educational materials for employees on commuting best practices.
  • Offer employees pre-tax commuter benefits to include reimbursement for nonmotorized travel expenses.
  • Organize staff bike rides to increase familiarity and comfort with bicycling.
  • Install adequate bike storage, such as locking posts.
  • Emphasize walking and biking as part of company-wide sustainability initiatives and communicate how walking and biking support broader GHG emission reduction efforts.

Further information:

Nonprofit Leaders
  • Use nonmotorized transportation.
  • Ensure your office is accessible to nonmotorized transportation.
  • Advocate for infrastructure improvements and note specific locations where improvements can be made.
  • Encourage local businesses to create employee incentives.
  • Create “bike buses” or “walking buses” for the community and/or local schools.
  • Offer free classes on subjects such as bike maintenance, local bike routes, or what to know before purchasing a bike.
  • Host or support community participation in local infrastructure design.
  • Join public-private partnerships to encourage biking and walking, emphasizing the health and savings benefits.

Further information:

Investors
  • Use nonmotorized transportation.
  • Deploy capital to efforts that improve bicycle and walking comfort, convenience, access, and safety.
  • Invest in public or private bike-sharing systems.
  • Invest in local supply chains for bicycles and other forms of nonmotorized transportation.
  • Seek investment opportunities that reduce material and maintenance costs for bicycles.
  • Finance bicycle purchases via low-interest loans.
  • Consider investments in nonmotorized transportation start-ups.

Further information:

Philanthropists and International Aid Agencies
  • Use nonmotorized transportation.
  • Award grants to local organizations advocating for improved walking and bicycle infrastructure.
  • Build capacity for walking and bicycle infrastructure design and construction.
  • Support organizations that distribute, refurbish, and/or donate bikes in your community.
  • Facilitate access to bicycle maintenance and supplies.
  • Host or support community education or participation efforts.
  • Donate fixtures such as street lights, guardrails, and road signs.
  • Educate the public and policymakers on the benefits and best practices of nonmotorized transportation.

Further information:

Thought Leaders
  • Use nonmotorized transportation.
  • Focus messages on key decision factors for nonmotorized commuters, such as the associated health benefits and importance of fitness, climate and environmental benefits, weather forecasts, and traffic information.
  • Highlight principles of safe urban design and point out dangerous areas.
  • Share information on local bike and walking routes, general bike maintenance tips, items to consider when purchasing a bike, and related educational information.
  • Collaborate with schools on bicycle instruction, including safe riding habits and maintenance.

Further information:

Technologists and Researchers
  • Use nonmotorized transportation.
  • Examine and improve elements of infrastructure design.
  • Improve circularity, repairability, and ease of disassembly for bikes.
  • Increase the physical carrying capacities (storage) for walkers and bicyclists to facilitate shopping and transporting children, pets, and materials.
  • Identify and encourage the deployment of messaging that enhances nonmotorized transportation use.

Further information:

Communities, Households, and Individuals
  • Use nonmotorized transportation.
  • Share your experiences, tips, and reasons for choosing nonmotorized transportation.
  • Participate in local bike groups, public events, and volunteer opportunities.
  • Advocate to local officials for infrastructure improvements and note specific locations where improvements can be made.
  • Encourage local businesses to create employee incentives for using nonmotorized transportation.
  • Create “bike buses” or “walking buses” for the community and local schools.

Further information:

Sources
Updated Date

Improve Cement Production

Submitted by Drawdown Admin on
Sector
Industry, Materials & Waste
Mode
Cut Emissions
Cluster
Improve Materials
Image
Cement factory
Coming Soon
Off
Summary

Cement is a key ingredient of concrete, a manufactured material used in massive quantities around the world. Cement production generates high CO₂ emissions from the production of clinker, a binding ingredient. These emissions come from not only the chemical reaction that produces clinker, but also burning fossil fuels to provide heat for this reaction. We define the Improve Cement Production solution as reducing GHG emissions related to cement manufacturing by substituting other materials for clinker, using alternative fuels, and improving process efficiency.

Health
Air quality
Overview

Concrete production requires the manufacturing of 4 Gt of cement annually (U.S. Geological Survey, 2024). Roughly 85% of cement industry GHG emissions come from the production of a key cement component called clinker. Both the clinker formation chemical reaction and fuel combustion for high-temperature clinker kilns release GHGs (Goldman et al., 2023). Figure 1 illustrates the manufacturing steps responsible for these emissions and highlights how three approaches – clinker material substitution, use of alternative fuels, and process efficiency upgrades – could mitigate emissions.

Figure 1. Cement production GHG emissions. Some 85% of GHGs emitted during cement production are released when clinker is produced in high-temperature kilns. The three approaches analyzed in this solution – clinker material substitution, alternative fuels, and process efficiency upgrades – aim to mitigate such emissions. Modified from Goldman et al. (2023).

Diagram of energy used in cement production process

Source: Goldman, S., Majsztrik, P., Sgro Rojas, I., Gavvalapalli, M., Gaikwad, R., Feric, T., Visconti, K., & McMurty, B. (2023). Pathways to commercial liftoff: Low-carbon cement. U.S. Department of Energy. https://liftoff.energy.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/20230918-Pathways-to-Commercial-Liftoff-Cement.pdf 

Clinker material substitution replaces a portion of the clinker used in cement with alternative materials, thus reducing the amount of clinker manufactured. This decreases the amount of CO₂ emitted by the chemical reaction and fuel combustion. Clinker is made by heating limestone to convert it to lime. This reaction releases CO₂. Some of the CO₂ production can be eliminated by replacing some of the clinker with substitute materials such as industrial waste products, other cementitious compounds, or available minerals. Clinker material substitution also reduces energy demand, lowering emissions from burning fossil fuels. Clinker fraction in cement is often expressed as a clinker-to-cement ratio, which ranges from 0 (no clinker) to 1 (entirely clinker). The most common type of cement, Portland cement, typically has a clinker-to-cement ratio of 0.95, meaning the cement is 95% clinker by mass.

Alternative fuels that can be used to heat cement kilns in place of fossil fuels are typically biomass and waste-based fuels. Cement production uses two kilns, one heated to ~700 °C and the other to ~1,400 °C (U.S. Department of Energy, 2022). The energy needed to provide this heat typically comes from burning fossil fuels such as oil, gas, coal, and petroleum coke on-site, which emits CO₂ as well as small amounts of other GHGs, including methane and nitrous oxide, and air pollutants, including nitrogen oxides, sulfur oxides, and particulate matter (Hottle et al., 2022; Miller & Moore, 2020). Switching to alternative fuels decreases emissions by reducing the mining and combustion of fossil fuels and recovering energy from waste streams that would have otherwise released GHG during decomposition or incineration (Georgiopoulou & Lyberatos, 2018).

Process efficiency upgrades include a broad suite of technologies such as improved controls, electrically efficient equipment (e.g., mills, fans, and motors), thermally efficient and multistage kilns, and waste heat recovery. These improvements lead to less wasted heat and input energy, and therefore require less fossil fuel burning during manufacturing. In particular, upgrading kilns has the potential for high emissions mitigation (Mokhtar & Nasooti, 2020; Morrow III et al., 2014). Kiln upgrades can include processing dry raw material (which is more efficient than expending energy to remove moisture from wet feedstock), adding a preheater that uses kiln exhaust gas to dry and preheat raw material, and adding a precalciner kiln that uses some of the fuel to partially calcinate raw material at a lower temperature (European Cement Research Academy, 2022; Schorcht et al., 2013). Each study included in our analysis for effectiveness and cost included a set group of technologies that were considered to be process efficiency upgrades.

The cost and avoided emissions from each approach vary depending on the other technologies in use at a particular cement plant (Glenk et al., 2023). While coupling the impacts of the approaches would provide the most accurate representation of this solution, that analysis is complex and outside the scope of this assessment. Therefore, we will consider the three approaches separately. 

5.42%
of total global emissions
4.1 Billion

Worldwide, we make 4.1 billion metric tons of cement every year.

3.2 Gt

In the process, we produce more than 3 Gt CO₂‑eq of greenhouse gases – 5.42% of global annual emissions

Take Action Intro

Would you like to help reduce the climate impacts of cement production? Below are some ways you make a difference, depending on the roles you play in your professional or personal life.

These actions are meant to be starting points for involvement and may or may not be the most important, impactful, or doable actions you can take. We encourage you to explore, get creative, and take a step that is right for you!

References

Afsah, S. (2004). CDM potential in the cement sector: The challenge of demonstrating additionality. Performeks LLC. https://www.performeks.com/media/downloads/CDM-Cement%20Sector_May%202004.pdf 

Cannon, C., Guido, V., & Wright, L. (2021). Concrete solutions guide: Mix it up: Supplementary cementitious materials (SCMs). RMI. https://rmi.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/ConcreteGuide2.pdf 

Cao, Z., Masanet, E., Tiwari, A., and Akolawala, S. (2021). Decarbonizing concrete: Deep decarbonization pathways for the cement and concrete cycle in the United States, India, and China. Industrial Sustainability Analysis Laboratory. https://www.climateworks.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Decarbonizing_Concrete.pdf 

Cavalett, O., Watanabe, M. D. B., Voldsund, M., Roussanaly, S., & Cherubini, F. (2024). Paving the way for sustainable decarbonization of the European cement industry. Nature Sustainability, 7, 568–580. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-024-01320-y 

CEMBUREAU. (n.d.) Clinker substitution. Retrieved August 7, 2024, from https://lowcarboneconomy.cembureau.eu/5-parallel-routes/resource-efficiency/clinker-substitution/ 

Clark, G., Davis, M., Shibani, & Kumar, A. (2024). Assessment of fuel switching as a decarbonization strategy in the cement sector. Energy Conversion and Management, 312, 118585. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enconman.2024.118585 

ClimeCo. (2022). Low carbon cement production. https://www.climateactionreserve.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Low-Carbon-Cement-Issue-Paper-05-20-2022_final.pdf 

Daehn, K., Basuhi, R., Gregory, J., Berlinger, M., Somjit, V., & Olivetti, E. A. (2022). Innovations to decarbonize materials industries. Nature Reviews Materials, 7, 275–294. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41578-021-00376-y 

de Puy Kamp, M. (2021, July 9). How marginalized communities in the South are paying the price for ‘green energy’ in Europe. CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/interactive/2021/07/us/american-south-biomass-energy-invs/ 

European Cement Research Academy. (2022). The ECRA technology papers 2022: State of the art cement manufacturing, current technologies and their future development. https://api.ecra-online.org/fileadmin/files/tp/ECRA_Technology_Papers_2022.pdf 

Georgiopoulou, M., & Lyberatos, G. (2018). Life cycle assessment of the use of alternative fuels in cement kilns: A case study. Journal of Environmental Management, 216, 224–234. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2017.07.017 

Glenk, G., Kelnhofer, A., Meier, R., & Reichelstein, S. (2023). Cost-efficient pathways to decarbonizing Portland cement production. ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 23-023. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4434830 

Global Cement and Concrete Association. (2021). Concrete future: The GCCA 2050 cement and concrete industry roadmap for net zero concrete. https://gccassociation.org/concretefuture/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/GCCA-Concrete-Future-Roadmap-Document-AW.pdf 

Goldman, S., Majsztrik, P., Sgro Rojas, I., Gavvalapalli, M., Gaikwad, R., Feric, T., Visconti, K., & McMurty, B. (2023). Pathways to commercial liftoff: Low-carbon cement. U.S. Department of Energy. https://liftoff.energy.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/20230918-Pathways-to-Commercial-Liftoff-Cement.pdf 

Gómez, D. R., & Watterson, J. D., et al. (2006). Stationary combustion. In S. Eggelston, L. Buendia, K. Miwa, T. Ngara, & K. Tanabe (Eds.), 2006 IPCC guidelines for national greenhouse gas inventories (Vol. 2). Institute for Global Environmental Strategies (IGES) for the IPCC. https://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/public/2006gl/pdf/2_Volume2/V2_2_Ch2_Stationary_Combustion.pdf 

Griffiths, S., Sovacool, B. K., Furszyfer Del Rio, D. D., Foley, A. M., Bazilian, M. D., Kim, J., & Uratani, J. M. (2023). Decarbonizing the cement and concrete industry: A systematic review of socio-technical systems, technological innovations, and policy options. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 180, 113291. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2023.113291 

Habert, G., Miller, S. A., John, V. M., Provis, J. L., Favier, A., Horvath, A., & Scrivener, K. L. (2020). Environmental impacts and decarbonization strategies in the cement and concrete industries. Nature Reviews Earth & Environment, 1, 559–573. https://doi.org/10.1038/s43017-020-0093-3 

Hottle, T., Hawkins, T. R., Chiquelin, C., Lange, B., Young, B., Sun, P., Elgowainy, A., & Wang, M. (2022). Environmental life-cycle assessment of concrete produced in the United States. Journal of Cleaner Production, 363, 131834. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2022.131834 

International Energy Agency. (2018). Technology roadmap: Low-carbon transition in the cement industry. https://www.iea.org/reports/technology-roadmap-low-carbon-transition-in-the-cement-industry 

International Energy Agency. (2023a). CO₂ emitted and captured in the cement sector and clinker-to-cement ratio in the Net Zero Scenario, 2015–2030. https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/co2-emitted-and-captured-in-the-cement-sector-and-clinker-to-cement-ratio-in-the-net-zero-scenario-2015-2030 

International Energy Agency. (2023b). Global cement production in the Net Zero Scenario, 2010–2030. https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/global-cement-production-in-the-net-zero-scenario-2010-2030-5260 

International Energy Agency. (2023c). Global thermal energy intensity of clinker production by fuel in the Net Zero Scenario, 2010–2030. https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/global-thermal-energy-intensity-of-clinker-production-by-fuel-in-the-net-zero-scenario-2010-2030 

Isabirye, A., & Sinha, A. (2023). Manufacturing sector: Cement manufacturing emissions. ClimateTRACE. https://github.com/climatetracecoalition/methodology-documents/blob/main/2023/Manufacturing/Manufacturing%20and%20Industrial%20Processes%20sector-%20Cement%20Manufacturing%20Emissions%20methodology.docx.pdf 

Juenger, M. C. G., Snellings, R., & Bernal, S. A. (2019). Supplementary cementitious materials: New sources, characterization, and performance insights. Cement and Concrete Research, 122, 257–273. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cemconres.2019.05.008 

Miller, S. A., & Moore, F. C. (2020). Climate and health damages from global concrete production. Nature Climate Change, 10(5), 439–443. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-020-0733-0

Mokhtar, A., & Nasooti, M. (2020). A decision support tool for cement industry to select energy efficiency measures. Energy Strategy Reviews, 28, 100458. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esr.2020.100458 

Morrow III, W. R., Hasanbeigi, A., Sathaye, J., & Xu, T. (2014). Assessment of energy efficiency improvement and CO₂ emission reduction potentials in India's cement and iron & steel industries. Journal of Cleaner Production, 65, 131–141. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2013.07.022 

Rissman, J., Bataille, C., Masanet, E., Aden, N., Morrow III, W. R., Zhou, N., Elliott, N., Dell, R., Heeren, N., Huckestein, B., Cresko, J., Miller, S. A., Roy, J., Fennell, P., Cremmins, B., Blank, T. K., Hone, D., Williams, E. D., de la Rue du Can, S., …Helseth, J. (2020). Technologies and policies to decarbonize global industry: Review and assessment of mitigation drivers through 2070. Applied Energy, 266, 114848. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2020.114848 

Schorcht, F., Kourti, I., Scalet, B. M., Roudier, S., & Delgado Sancho L. (2013). Best available techniques (BAT) reference document for the production of cement, lime and magnesium oxide – Industrial Emissions Directive 2010/75/EU (integrated pollution prevention and control) (Joint Research Center publication JRC 83006). European Commission, Joint Research Centre, Institute for Prospective Technological Studies. https://doi.org/10.2788/12850 

Shah, I. H., Miller, S. A., Jiang, D., & Myers, R. J. (2022). Cement substitution with secondary materials can reduce annual global CO₂ emissions by up to 1.3 gigatons. Nature Communications, 13, 5758. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-022-33289-7 

Sinha, A., and Crane, V. (2024). Manufacturing and industrial processes sector: Cement manufacturing emissions. TransitionZero, UK, Climate TRACE Emissions Inventory. https://climatetrace.org

Snellings, R. (2016). Assessing, understanding and unlocking supplementary cementitious materials. RILEM Technical Letters, 1, 50–55. https://doi.org/10.21809/rilemtechlett.2016.12 

Snellings, R., Suraneni, P., & Skibsted, J. (2023). Future and emerging supplementary cementitious materials. Cement and Concrete Research, 171, 107199. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cemconres.2023.107199

U.S. Department of Energy. (2022). Industrial decarbonization roadmap. https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2022-09/Industrial%20Decarbonization%20Roadmap.pdf 

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. (2016). Greenhouse gas inventory guidance: Direct emissions from stationary combustion sources. https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2016-03/documents/stationaryemissions_3_2016.pdf 

U.S. Federal Highway Administration. (n.d.). Use of supplementary cementitious materials (SCMs) in concrete mixtures (FHWA-HIF-19-054). U.S. Department of Transportation. https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/pavement/concrete/trailer/resources/hif19054.pdf 

U.S. Geological Survey. (2024). Mineral commodity summaries 2024. https://doi.org/10.3133/mcs2024 

Yang, X., Teng, F., & Wang, G. (2013). Incorporating environmental co-benefits into climate policies: A regional study of the cement industry in China. Applied Energy, 112, 1446–1453. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2013.03.040

Zhang, S., Ren, H., Zhou, W., Yu, Y., & Chen, C. (2018). Assessing air pollution abatement co-benefits of energy efficiency improvement in cement industry: A city level analysis. Journal of Cleaner Production, 185, 761–771. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2018.02.293

Zhang, S., Worrell, E., & Crijns-Graus, W. (2015). Evaluating co-benefits of energy efficiency and air pollution abatement in China’s cement industry. Applied Energy, 147, 192–213. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2015.02.081

Zhang, S., Xie, Y., Sander, R., Yue, H., & Shu, Y. (2021). Potentials of energy efficiency improvement and energy–emission–health nexus in Jing-Jin-Ji’s cement industry. Journal of Cleaner Production, 278, 123335. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2020.123335

Credits

Lead Fellow

  • Sarah Gleeson, Ph.D.

Contributors

  • James Gerber, Ph.D.

  • Yusuf Jameel, Ph.D.

  • Daniel Jasper

  • Alex Sweeney

Internal Reviewers

  • Aiyana Bodi

  • Hannah Henkin

  • Ted Otte

  • Amanda Smith, Ph.D.

  • Tina Swanson, Ph.D.

Effectiveness

Cement production currently emits 760,000 t CO₂‑eq /Mt cement produced, based on our analysis. With global cement production exceeding 4 Gt/yr (U.S. Geological Survey, 2024), the scale of emissions to be mitigated is large.

Clinker material substitution is the most effective of the three approaches at reducing emissions, eliminating approximately 240,000 t CO₂‑eq /Mt cement produced. This is equivalent to 690,000 t CO₂‑eq /Mt clinker avoided (Table 1a). This estimate is based on expert predictions of GHG savings for realistic target levels of clinker replacement with material substitutes.

Alternative fuels and process efficiency upgrades ) have carbon abatement potentials of 96,000 and 90,000 t CO₂‑eq /Mt cement produced, respectively, when calculated based on production levels (Table 1b). Since the units of adoption for process efficiency upgrades are GJ thermal energy input, when calculating climate impact we used an effectiveness per GJ of thermal energy, calculated using an emission factor for fuel combustion. This effectiveness is 0.0847 t CO₂ /GJ thermal energy input (Table 1c) (Gómez & Watterson et al., 2006; IEA, 2023c). 

We calculated the effectiveness of these three approaches separately. Because the implementation of each affects the effectiveness potential of the others (Glenk et al., 2023), the actual effectiveness will be lower when the approaches are implemented together.

Emissions reductions from these approaches can be directly related to how the approach impacts GHG emissions from clinker production and fossil fuel burning. However, sourcing, processing, and transporting clinker substitutes and alternative fuels also produces GHGs. Our data sources did not always report whether such indirect emissions were accounted for, so our analysis primarily focuses on direct emissions. Further analysis of other life-cycle emissions considerations would be valuable in future research; however, indirect emission levels for both clinker substitutes and alternative fuels are reportedly small compared to direct emissions (European Cement Research Academy, 2022; Shah et al., 2022).

Additionally, cement industry members sometimes assume that there are no direct emissions from burning biomass fuels (Goldman et al., 2023). As a result, we assume that direct emissions from biomass are not fully accounted for in the data and therefore that the climate benefit of using alternative fuels may be exaggerated.

While other GHGs, including methane and nitrous oxide, are also released during cement manufacturing, these gases represent a small fraction (<3% combined) of overall CO₂‑eq emissions so we considered them negligible in our calculations (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2016; Hottle et al., 2022). 

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Table 1. Effectiveness at reducing emissions.

Unit: t CO₂‑eq /Mt cement produced (100-year basis)

25th percentile 540,000
mean 710,000
median (50th percentile) 690,000
75th percentile 860,000

Unit: t CO₂‑eq /Mt cement produced (100-year basis)

25th percentile 77,000
mean 94,000
median (50th percentile) 96,000
75th percentile 99,000

Unit: t CO₂‑eq /Mt cement produced (100-year basis)

calculated value 0.0847
Cost

All three approaches to mitigating cement emissions result in cost savings by our analysis. Despite high initial costs, when considering the long technology lifetime and annual operational savings, the net lifetime and annualized costs are lower than conventional cement production.

Clinker material substitution has the highest net savings of the three approaches, with US$7 million/Mt cement produced generating savings of US$30/t CO₂‑eq . While initial and operating costs may vary between different substitute materials, we averaged all material types for each cost estimate. Goldman et al. (2023) and the European Cement Research Academy (2022) offer breakdowns of cost by material type.

Alternative fuels generate savings of US$5 million/Mt cement, or US$50/t CO₂‑eq mitigated. For both clinker material substitution and alternative fuels, cost and emissions will vary based on local material availability (Cannon et al., 2021). We assumed equivalent costs for all alternative fuel types.

Process efficiency upgrades save US$6 million/Mt cement and have the highest cost savings per unit climate impact (US$60/t CO₂‑eq ). While process efficiency upgrades encompass many different technologies, this cost estimate incorporates the costs of two of the technologies yielding high avoided emissions – replacing long kilns with preheater/precalciner kilns and implementing efficient clinker cooler technology. Between these technologies, upgrading to preheater/precalciner kilns represents most of the initial cost increase and the operational cost savings (European Cement Research Academy, 2022).

The costs of each approach (Table 2) were calculated as amortized initial costs of upgrading plants, added to the expected changes in annual operational costs. Only very limited data are available for price premiums on low-carbon cement. Therefore, we did not include any revenues for low-carbon cement. 

While we calculated these costs separately, in reality the cost for implementing multiple approaches will be different due to interactions between technologies (Glenk et al., 2023). For example, material processing equipment could change based on the type of clinker substitute materials. We do not expect the costs to be additive as we assumed in our analysis, and limited cost data means that this estimate is based on limited sources.

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Table 2: Cost per unit climate impact.

Unit: 2023 US$/t CO₂‑eq (100-yr basis)

Clinker material substitution -30
Alternative fuels -50
Process efficiency upgrades -60

Negative values reflect cost savings.

Learning Curve

The technologies needed for all approaches in this solution are well developed and ready to deploy at scale, so we did not consider learning curves. 

We did not find any global data on cost changes related to adoption levels for equipment, including energy-efficient processing technologies, dry-process kilns, or material storage. A portion of the solution’s initial costs come from plant downtimes, which would not be impacted by the technology learning curve. For feedstock components of the solution, including alternative fuels and clinker material substitutes, the costs will be subject to material availability, market prices, and transportation, and therefore will not necessarily decrease with adoption.

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Speed of Action

Speed of action refers to how quickly a climate solution physically affects the atmosphere after it is deployed. This is different from speed of deployment, which is the pace at which solutions are adopted.

At Project Drawdown, we define the speed of action for each climate solution as gradual, emergency brake, or delayed.

Improve Cement Production is a GRADUAL climate solution. It has a steady, linear impact on the atmosphere. The cumulative effect over time builds as a straight line.

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Caveats

Manufacturing emissions reductions due to clinker material substitution, alternative fuels, and process efficiency upgrades are both permanent and additional. 

Permanence 

There is a low risk that the emission reductions this solution generates will be reversed in the next 100 years. This approach calls for reduced burning of fossil fuels and less calcination of limestone into clinker, thereby avoiding emissions from these activities. Meanwhile, carbon that is not released as CO₂ due to these technologies will remain stable in limestone or fossil fuel reserves indefinitely, making the emissions mitigation permanent.

Additionality 

These cement emissions reductions are additional if they are adopted in amounts higher than what is currently required and used in local or regional cement manufacturing. Afsah (2004) assessed additionality based on whether it represents “not common practice” from a national standpoint of market share or adoption. ClimeCo (2022) suggested that for clinker material substitutes to be considered additional, the substitute needs to meet two criteria: The replacement is not mandated by law, and new or emerging materials are used.

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Current Adoption

Few global data are available for current adoption. Most data are from regional sources, typically the United States or Europe. As a result, we do not expect these data to be representative at the global level – China and India alone produce more than 60% of the world’s cement (U.S. Geological Survey, 2024). Therefore, we quantified adoption only from a limited number of worldwide sources, using the adoption units listed in Figure 2.

Clinker material substitution is challenging to assess for adoption, since it is implemented with a broad range of materials and replacement fractions. We therefore simplified adoption in this analysis by quantifying it as the amount of global cement material that is not clinker. The adoption tonnage (Table 3a) represents Mt of clinker production avoided, using conventional Portland cement (5% non-clinker) as a baseline (CEMBUREAU, n.d.). Note that this is different from the way we considered cement tonnage for effectiveness and cost. There, we calculated emissions reductions for a Mt of cement produced including substituted material. For adoption, however, we considered tonnage to be clinker avoided (based on amount replaced with other materials).

The IEA (2023a) and the European Cement Research Academy (2022) estimated the global clinker-to-cement ratio to be approximately 0.72, meaning that 28% of cement composition is material other than clinker. This correlates to 980 Mt clinker avoided/yr used over the Portland cement baseline.

Alternative fuels are currently used to replace approximately 7% of fossil fuels in global cement production (Global Cement and Concrete Association, 2021; IEA, 2023c). We assumed this means approximately 300 Mt cement/yr are currently produced with biomass and waste fuels (Table 3b).

Process efficiency upgrades encompass dozens of technological improvements, which – along with a paucity of available data – make adoption levels challenging to assess. To estimate the current state of energy usage in the cement industry, we used the IEA (2023c) estimate of 3,550,000 GJ/Mt clinker as the 2022 benchmark thermal energy input for clinker production. This value does not include electrical efficiency and can vary based on fuel mix, but approximates the current state of energy use. We converted it to GJ/yr using amounts of annual clinker production, yielding 10.5 billion GJ thermal energy consumed each year for clinker production. Since there is no baseline for efficiency, we consider this value to be the zero adoption scenario and 0 GJ/yr are saved (Table 3c).

For the other approaches, there is a clear baseline case of “zero adoption” where no substitutes or alternative fuels are in use. However, thermal energy input is an energy use indicator that represents a continuum with no clear baseline. We therefore had to benchmark future energy savings against an initial value, which we chose as 2022 since it provided the most recent available data. All future estimates represent annual GHG savings relative to global cement production’s 2022 GHG emissions levels.

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Table 3. Current adoption level (2022).

Unit: Mt clinker avoided/yr

median (50th percentile) 980

Unit: Mt cement produced using alternative fuels/yr

median (50th percentile) 300

Unit: GJ thermal energy input/yr saved

median (50th percentile) 0
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Adoption Trend

Clinker material substitution has experienced relatively unchanged adoption worldwide in recent years (Table 4a). Since 2016, there has been a small increase in clinker-to-cement ratio, indicating a slight decrease in adoption of this approach (IEA, 2023a). This corresponds to 40 Mt fewer clinker material substitutes being used each year, on average. 

Alternative fuels adoption is slowly on the rise as percent of fuel mix (Table 4b). According to the IEA (2023c), the percentage of global clinker produced by bioenergy and waste fuels increased from 6.5% in 2015 to 8.5% in 2022. This corresponds to a median annual increase of 12 Mt cement/yr produced by alternative fuels. 

The IEA (2023c) reported process efficiency upgrades to have led to a median annual decrease of 5,000 GJ/Mt clinker from 2011 to 2022, representing a –0.14% annual change in energy input. This indicates that processes consuming thermal energy have become slightly more efficient in recent years. When converted to GJ/yr, this is 15 million fewer GJ thermal energy consumed each year (Table 4c).

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Table 4. Adoption trend.

Unit: change in Mt clinker avoided/yr

median (50th percentile) –40

2016–2022 adoption trend

Unit: change in Mt cement produced using alternative fuels/yr

median (50th percentile) 12

2015–2022 adoption trend

Unit: annual change in GJ thermal energy input/yr

median (50th percentile) -15,000,000

2011–2022 adoption trend

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Adoption Ceiling

The adoption ceiling (Table 5a, Table 5b, Table 5c) is high for all approaches within this solution.

Clinker material substitution adoption is likely to be limited primarily by material standards and availability. Across literature, the median adoption ceiling is considered to be 3,000 Mt clinker avoided/yr beyond the Portland cement baseline, yielding a clinker-to-cement ratio of 0.2. Snellings (2016) calculated the worldwide amount of clinker materials substitutes and found that a maximum of ~2,000 Mt/yr would be available, which would result in a clinker-to-cement ratio of approximately 0.5. In the future, some waste materials – like fly ash and ground granulated blast furnace slag – are likely to be less available so increasing the possible substitute amounts would require research on new materials or cement properties.

Alternative fuels are typically assumed to be applicable to roughly 90% of cement production globally, or approximately 4,000 Mt cement/yr at 2022 global production levels (Daehn et al., 2022). In theory, kilns can use 100% alternative fuels, although composition of the fuel can influence the trace elements or calorific value (European Cement Research Academy, 2022). In particular, several analyses point to the lower calorific value of alternative fuels as an adoption-limiting factor. Cavalett et al. (2024) considered 90% to be the maximum. A separate analysis of Canadian cement production determined that 65% is the threshold due to lower-calorie fuels only being applicable in a precalciner kiln – the equipment where fuel is used to begin decomposing limestone through the calcination process (Clark et al., 2024).

Process efficiency upgrades have their adoption ceiling limited by the minimum thermal energy demand needed to run cement kilns. The European Cement Research Academy estimates this lower threshold of energy input to be approximately 2,300,000 GJ/Mt clinker, considering chemical reaction and evaporation energy needs (European Cement Research Academy, 2022). This converts to 6.9 billion GJ thermal energy used each year, or 3.6 billion GJ/yr saved over current thermal energy efficiency levels (Table 5c).

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Table 5. Adoption ceiling.

Unit: Mt clinker avoided/yr

median (50th percentile) 3,000

Unit: Mt cement produced using alternative fuels/yr

median (50th percentile) 4,000

Unit: GJ thermal energy input/yr saved over current levels

median (50th percentile) 3,600,000,000

Lower limit for energy input

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Achievable Adoption

Clinker material substitution achievable adoption (Table 6a) is primarily limited by material availability and initial costs. Global estimates generally expect 30–50% of total substituted material to be reasonable, which correlates to a clinker-to-cement ratio of 0.4–0.6 and 1,000–2,000 Mt clinker avoided/yr (Habert et al., 2020; European Cement Research Academy, 2022). In a separate U.S.-specific analysis, the substitute amount was projected to vary from 5% to 45% depending on the availability and performance of the material substitute (Goldman et al., 2023).

Alternative fuels are projected to account for roughly 40% of the cement fuel mix in 2050 for both global and North American estimates. Taking the median of the global achievable adoption estimates, this correlates to 2,000 Mt cement/yr that would be produced using alternative kiln fuels. As a low estimate, if the current adoption trend holds, approximately 16% of global cement fuel (producing 610 Mt cement/yr) will come from biomass and waste (IEA, 2023c). A reasonable adoption range is 610–2,000 Mt cement/yr (Table 6b), although some European countries currently have ~80% adoption of alternative fuels, meaning that >40% adoption in an aggressive 2050 scenario may be feasible (Cavalett et al., 2024).

Little information exists on projected global adoption of process efficiency upgrades between now and 2050. In an analysis of a fraction of cement plants in China, India, and the U.S., it was estimated that these three countries – which represent more than 70% of current cement production worldwide – could reach a thermal energy input of 3.15–3.25 million GJ/Mt clinker by 2060, or 9.30–9.59 billion GJ/yr, which is 0.886–1.18 billion GJ/yr saved over current adoption levels (Table 6c; Cao et al., 2021). Meanwhile, in a European analysis, the European Cement Research Academy found the same range to be possible by 2050 (European Cement Research Academy, 2022). This is not significantly lower than the current state due to the fact that the highest-producing countries – China and India – have newer manufacturing facilities with more efficient equipment today. Countries with more room to improve in thermal energy efficiency – such as the U.S. – produce only a small fraction of the world’s cement. Approximately 92% of global plants are estimated to use more efficient dry kiln technology, indicating that some of the more energy-saving equipment upgrades are already highly adopted (Isabirye & Sinha, 2023). Therefore, there is less room for increased adoption in kiln technologies worldwide, although electrical efficiency measures could further improve these values.

 While the estimates for tonnage of cement impacted by these approaches are based on 2022 global production numbers, cement production will change through 2050, meaning the impacted mass of cement will also change as these emissions-reducing measures are adopted (IEA, 2023b).

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Table 6. Range of achievable adoption levels.

Unit: Mt clinker avoided/yr

Current Adoption 980
Achievable – Low 1,000
Achievable – High 2000
Adoption Ceiling 3000

Unit: Mt cement produced using alternative fuels/yr

Current Adoption 300
Achievable – Low 610
Achievable – High 2,000
Adoption Ceiling 4,000

Unit: GJ thermal energy input/yr saved over current adoption levels

Current Adoption 0
Achievable – Low 886,000,000
Achievable – High 1,180,000,000
Adoption Ceiling 3,600,000,000

Note: High adoption in this case results in lower energy use for each unit of clinker produced, and thus better efficiency. 

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Improved cement production has high potential for climate impact. Since cement production is responsible for 7–8% of global GHG emissions, mitigating even a portion of these emissions will meaningfully reduce the world’s carbon output. 

Clinker material substitution has the highest current and potential GHG emissions savings of the three approaches (Table 7a). To calculate the climate impact, we used effectiveness and adoption on the basis of Mt clinker avoided. Climate impact was calculated as:

CO₂ abatedyear =CO₂ abatedclinker avoidedx  clinker avoidedyear 

  • Current GHG savings: 0.67 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr
  • GHG savings ceiling: 2 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr
  • Achievable GHG savings range: 0.7–1 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr

Alternative fuels have a low current climate impact but possess the potential to be adopted for a much greater fraction of the global kiln fuel mix (Table 7b). However, alternative fuels’ potential GHG emissions savings are lower than those for clinker material substitutes because alternative fuels have a lower CO₂ mitigation effectiveness. Climate impact is calculated as:

CO₂ abatedyear =CO₂ abatedcement producedx  cement producedyear 

  • Current GHG savings: 0.03 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr
  • GHG savings ceiling: 0.4 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr
  • Achievable GHG savings range: 0.06–0.2 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr

Process efficiency upgrades are the most challenging to assess for climate impact because they represent a broad range of equipment upgrades with no clear baseline efficiency. We considered adoption to be energy savings from the current (2022) baseline in GJ thermal energy input/yr. We converted adoption to climate impact using the emission factor of 0.0847 t CO₂‑eq /GJ thermal energy input (calculated using data from Gómez & Watterson et al., 2006 and IEA, 2023c). The resulting calculation is as follows:

CO₂ abatedyear =CO₂ emissionsthermal energyx  thermal energy savings from 2022 baselineyr 

  • Current GHG savings: N/A (we consider the current adoption to be the baseline)
  • GHG savings ceiling: 0.31 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr less than 2022
  • Achievable GHG savings range: 0.0760–0.101 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr less than 2022

While clinker material substitution, alternative fuels, and process efficiency upgrades are quantified separately here, the adoption of any of these approaches will reduce the climate impact of the others. In particular, the climate impacts for technologies that reduce emissions per Mt of clinker (such as alternative fuels and process efficiency upgrades) will be lower when implemented along with technologies that reduce the amount of clinker used (such as clinker material substitution), and vice versa (Glenk et al., 2023). Therefore, these impacts will not be additive, although they will contribute to reduced emissions when implemented together.

While our analysis found clinker material substitution to have the highest climate impact, cement manufacturers will have to prioritize these technologies depending on their plant’s existing equipment, local availability of materials, and regional cement standards.

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Table 7. Climate impact at different levels of adoption.

Unit: Gt CO₂‑eq/yr, 100-yr basis

Current Adoption 0.67
Achievable – Low 0.7
Achievable – High 1
Adoption Ceiling 2

Unit: Gt CO₂‑eq/yr, 100-yr basis

Current Adoption 0.03
Achievable – Low 0.06
Achievable – High 0.2
Adoption Ceiling 0.4

Unit: Gt CO₂‑eq/yr, 100-yr basis

Current Adoption N/A
Achievable – Low 0.075
Achievable – High 0.100
Adoption Ceiling 0.31
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Additional Benefits

The main non-climate benefits of improved cement production are reduced air pollution and improved public health.

Air Quality 

Cement production is a major contributor to air pollution. Globally, concrete production accounts for approximately 8% of nitrogen oxide emissions, 5% of sulfur oxide emissions, and 5% of particulate matter emissions, with a significant portion of all these emissions stemming exclusively from cement production (Miller & Moore, 2020). Cement-related air pollution is especially acute in China, which produces over 50% of the world’s cement (U.S. Geological Survey, 2024). In 2009, China's cement industry emitted 3.59 Mt of particulate matter, making the industry the leading source of particulate matter emissions in the country (Yang et al., 2013). China also released 0.88 Mt of sulfur dioxide, accounting for about 4% of the national total, and emitted 1.7 Mt of nitrogen oxides (Yang et al., 2013). Process efficiency upgrades in cement manufacturing can reduce these harmful emissions. For example, implementing energy efficiency measures in China’s cement industry could reduce particulate matter by more than 3%, lower sulfur dioxide emissions by more than 15%, and decrease nitrogen oxide emissions by more than 12% by 2030 (Zhang et al., 2015). In Jiangsu province, which is the largest cement producer in China, energy and CO₂ reduction techniques could cut particulate matter and nitrogen oxide emissions by 30% and 56%, respectively, by 2030 (Zhang et al., 2018).

Health 

Miller & Moore (2020) estimated that the health damages associated with cement production amounted to approximately US$60 billion globally in 2015. These health damages are due to air pollutants produced during cement manufacturing, which would be reduced by this solution as described above. In China, one study estimated that improving energy efficiency in the Jing Jin Ji region’s cement industry could prevent morbidity in 17,000 individuals (Zhang et al., 2021). 

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Risks

According to the U.S. Federal Highway Administration (n.d.), the use of clinker material substitutes in cement slows concrete curing times. Additionally, some clinker material substitutes, such as fly ash, raise ecotoxicity concerns and require safe handling (U.S. Department of Energy, 2022). Robust research and development is needed for new compositions of cement to accelerate testing, standardization, and adoption (Griffiths et al., 2023). Since regional standards vary for cement and concrete, policy and regulatory support designed for specific locations will be necessary to influence adoption levels and rates.

Most clinker material substitutes have limited or regional availability, leading to shortages, high costs, and transportation emissions (Habert et al., 2020). Because some substitute materials are sourced from the waste streams of other industries, such as the coal and steel industries, the long-term feasibility of sourcing these materials is uncertain (Goldman et al., 2023; Juenger et al., 2019). However, one study found that most leading cement-producing countries have substitute materials available in sufficient quantities to replace at least half of their current clinker usage (Shah et al., 2022). 

In terms of risks associated with alternative fuels, they can be subject to regional scarcity. Lack of available waste fuel in particular could risk non-waste biomass burning, leading to deforestation and high net emissions (de Puy Kamp, 2021). In addition, waste fuels can have varying compositions that can lead to different heats of combustion, kiln compatibility, or emitted pollutants (Griffiths et al., 2023). Finally, the use of waste products requires cement plants to be situated near industrial waste sources, risking low adoption for cement plants that are not located near a waste source. 

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Interactions with Other Solutions

Reinforcing

Lower-carbon cement will improve the effectiveness and enhance the net climate impact of any solutions that might require new construction. The embodied emissions from the cement and concrete used for new built structures or roads will be reduced.

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Technological advancements and increased adoption of efficient cement manufacturing equipment will improve the rate and cost of scaling similar high-efficiency machinery.

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Industrial electrification in cement plants will be faster and easier to adopt if the plants’ energy demands are lowered via reduced clinker production and more efficient processes.

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Competing

All of these solutions rely on biomass as a raw material or feedstock. For that reason, the use of biomass as an alternative kiln fuel or a source of ash for clinker substitutes will reduce the overall availability of biomass and increase the cost of using it for other applications.

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Dashboard

Solution Basics

Mt clinker avoided/yr

tCO2-eq/unit
690,000
units
Current 9801,0002,000
Achievable (Low to High)

Climate Impact

GtCO2-eq/yr
Current 0.67 0.71
US$ per tCO2-eq
-30
Gradual

CO₂

Solution Basics

Mt cement produced using alternative fuels/yr

tCO2-eq/unit
96,000
units
Current 3006102,000
Achievable (Low to High)

Climate Impact

GtCO2-eq/yr
Current 0.03 0.060.2
US$ per tCO2-eq
-50
Gradual

CO₂

Solution Basics

GJ thermal energy input/yr reduced

tCO2-eq/unit
0.08
units
Current 08.86×10⁸1.18×10⁹
Achievable (Low to High)

Climate Impact

GtCO2-eq/yr
0.080.1
US$ per tCO2-eq
-60
Gradual

CO₂

Trade-offs

Wider adoption of clinker material substitutes, alternative fuels, and process efficiency upgrades could generate new GHG emissions, including emissions stemming from the transportation of clinker material substitutes and alternative fuels as well as embodied emissions from manufacturing and installing new cement plant equipment. Nevertheless, the overall solution effectiveness is not expected to be significantly impacted. In some of the largest cement-producing countries, the emissions from transport of clinker material substitutes has been calculated to be an order of magnitude less than the emissions savings from the use of those substitutes in place of clinker (Shah et al., 2022). 

In terms of environmental impact, some clinker substitutes such as calcined clays and natural pozzolans can increase water use (Juenger et al., 2019; Snellings et al., 2023). Additionally, the use of biomass as an alternative fuel source could lead to trade-offs – such as increased water use and land use, or diminished resource availability – although the risk of this outcome is low since biomass for kiln fuels tends to be agricultural by-products or other waste (Clark et al., 2024; Georgiopoulou & Lyberatos, 2018). 

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Mt CO2-eq
< 2
2 - 4
4 - 6
6 - 8
8 - 10
> 10

Annual cement plant emissions, 2024

Cement production is responsible for approximately 4% of global GHG emissions. This is partly due to burning fossil fuels to run kilns and partly due to CO2 emissions associated with the chemistry of producing clinker, a key component of cement.

Sinha, A. and Crane, V. (2024). Manufacturing and industrial processes sector: Cement manufacturing emissions [Data set]. TransitionZero, Climate TRACE Emissions Inventory. Retrieved February 11, 2025, from https://climatetrace.org

Mt CO2-eq
< 2
2 - 4
4 - 6
6 - 8
8 - 10
> 10

Annual cement plant emissions, 2024

Cement production is responsible for approximately 4% of global GHG emissions. This is partly due to burning fossil fuels to run kilns and partly due to CO2 emissions associated with the chemistry of producing clinker, a key component of cement.

Sinha, A. and Crane, V. (2024). Manufacturing and industrial processes sector: Cement manufacturing emissions [Data set]. TransitionZero, Climate TRACE Emissions Inventory. Retrieved February 11, 2025, from https://climatetrace.org

Geographic Guidance Introduction

There are no location-specific constraints to the effectiveness of the Improve Cement Production solution as there are for solutions dependent on climatic factors. However, there is geographic variation associated with current uptake of solutions and feasibility/expense of future uptake. Moreover, the distribution of cement-producing facilities around the world is non-uniform, thus the solution set naturally has the greatest applicability in regions with the greatest concentration of cement production. China and India have particularly high production of cement at 51% and 8% of global totals in 2024, respectively (Sinha & Crane, 2024).

Newer cement plants are more likely to have high thermal efficiencies, and the age of cement plants varies around the world, with average ages of cement plants less than 20 years in much of Asia, and greater than 40 years in much of the US and Europe.

Uptake of alternative fuels is relatively high in Europe and low in the Americas.  

While use of clinker substitutes is in principle possible anywhere, the materials themselves are not readily available everywhere, thus transportation costs and associated emissions can place constraints on their viability (Shah et al., 2022).

Action Word
Improve
Solution Title
Cement Production
Current State Introduction

Our analysis of the current state of solutions for improved cement production included three separate approaches to reducing emissions: clinker material substitution, alternative fuels, and process efficiency upgrades. Each approach had adoption units chosen based on data availability and consistency between calculated values. Figure 2 summarizes the units and conversions used for all approaches (Habert et al., 2020).

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Figure 2: Units of quantification used in the Current State, Adoption, and Impacts analyses below.

Approach Clinker material substitution Alternative fuels Process efficiency upgrades
Effectiveness

t CO₂-eq abated/Mt clinker avoided*

t CO₂ abated/Mt cement produced*

 t CO₂-eq abated/Mt cement produced

t CO₂-eq abated/GJ thermal energy input**

t CO₂-eq abated/Mt cement produced**
Cost US$/Mt cement produced US$/Mt cement produced US$/Mt cement produced
Adoption Mt clinker avoided/yr Mt cement/yr produced using alternative fuels GJ thermal energy input saved/yr
Climate impact Gt CO₂-eq/yr Gt CO₂-eq/yr Gt CO₂-eq/yr

*Clinker material substitution effectiveness was calculated in two different adoption units using the same source data. Effectiveness in t CO₂‑eq abated/Mt cement produced was used to calculate cost per climate impact. Effectiveness was converted to t CO₂‑eq abated/Mt clinker avoided using the clinker-to-cement ratio for each individual study in the analysis, and this was used to calculate climate impact.

**Process efficiency upgrades effectiveness in units of t CO₂‑eq abated/Mt cement produced was used to calculate cost per climate impact. Separately, a calculated fuel emission factor effectiveness in units of t CO₂‑eq abated/GJ thermal energy was used to quantify climate impact.

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Classification
Highly Recommended
Lawmakers and Policymakers
  • Hold cement manufacturers accountable for safety standards.
  • Regulate clinker material substitution, alternative fuel usage, and process efficiency upgrades.
  • Set standards for low-carbon cement and reporting on embodied carbon for new projects.
  • Provide financial incentives such as grants, subsidies, and/or carbon taxes.
  • Set low-carbon cement standards for public procurement.
  • Implement building codes and standards that allow for the safe, tested use of low-clinker cement while accounting for regional variability in cement compositions.
  • When possible integrate low-carbon cement standards into industry standards such as LEED certification or CALGreen.
  • Increase investment in research and development of clinker material substitutes.
  • Promote a circular economy by creating reverse supply chains to collect industrial and biomass waste to be used as feedstocks for cement kilns and products.
  • Require labels for low-carbon products and materials.
  • Engage impacted communities and incorporate public feedback into policy design.
  • Ensure permit processes for mining or collecting clinker substitutes allow local supply chains to develop.
  • Integrate water management into policy planning when adopting new cement technologies, especially in drought-prone areas.

Further information:

Practitioners
  • Increase the fraction of clinker substitutes in cement, which will reduce production costs.
  • Use alternative fuels as manufacturing energy sources, ideally from renewable sources when possible, which will reduce production costs.
  • Upgrade equipment and production process to be more efficient, which will reduce production costs.
  • Invest in research and development for clinker material substitutes and process improvements.
  • Work to form national and regional industrial strategies for low-carbon cement.
  • Join industry coalitions such as the Global Cement and Concrete Association and/or Concrete Sustainability Council.
  • Engage with local community members and use their feedback to create safer and healthier production facilities.
  • Increase transparency and reporting around the energy usage of manufacturing processes, fuel composition, and the material composition of cement products.
  • Integrate water management safeguards when adopting new cement technologies, especially in drought-prone areas.

Further information:

Business Leaders
  • Source from low-carbon cement producers.
  • Advocate for low-carbon cement during project design and construction.
  • Promote concrete alternatives in high-profile projects.
  • Purchase, promote, and/or invest in local manufacturing and supply chains not only for materials and equipment used to make low-carbon cement, but also for low-carbon cementitious products.
  • Create off-take agreements for emerging cement technologies.
  • Create training and capacity-building programs for industry professionals related to the use and benefits of low-carbon cement and concrete.
  • Launch education and awareness campaigns that share case studies and pilot projects with industry media and other key stakeholders.
  • Leverage carbon markets to help subsidize the cost of low-carbon cement.
  • Work with governments and financial institutions to establish standards and incentives for utilizing low-carbon materials.

Further information:

Nonprofit Leaders
  • Assist with monitoring and reporting related to the energy usage of manufacturing processes, fuel composition, and the material composition of cement products.
  • Help design policies and regulations that support low-carbon cement production.
  • Educate the public about the urgent need for low-carbon cement while showcasing its many benefits.
  • Join or support efforts such as the Concrete Sustainability Council.
  • Encourage policymakers to create ambitious targets and regulations.
  • Encourage cement manufacturers to improve their practices.

Further information:

Investors
  • Invest in low-carbon cement producers, low-carbon cement research and development, and shared recycling infrastructure for cement materials.
  • Invest in supply chains for new clinker substitutes, alternative fuels, and technologies that improve production efficiency.
  • Encourage portfolio companies to produce low-carbon cement or source from low-carbon cement producers, noting that low-carbon retrofits will save money for producers.
  • Seek impact investment opportunities, such as low-interest loans for construction or renovation projects that use low-carbon cement, or favorable loans for entities that set low-carbon cement policies or targets.

Further information:

Philanthropists and International Aid Agencies
  • Set low-carbon cement standards for construction-related grants, loans, and awards.
  • Provide capital for local supply chains and the acquisition or production of clinker material substitutes.
  • Support global, national, and local policies that promote low-carbon cement use.
  • Support accelerators or multilateral initiatives like the Concrete Sustainability Council.
  • Explore opportunities to fund low-carbon cement start-ups.
  • Advance awareness of the public health and climate benefits of low-carbon cement. 

Further information:

Thought Leaders
  • Provide technical assistance (e.g., circular economy design) to producers, government agencies, and other entities working to reduce cement emissions.
  • Help design policies and regulations that support the adoption of low-carbon cement.
  • Educate the public through campaigns emphasizing the urgent need to reduce cement production emissions.
  • Join or support efforts such as the Concrete Sustainability Council.
  • Encourage policymakers to create more ambitious targets and regulations.
  • Pressure the cement industry to improve its production practices.

Further information:

Technologists and Researchers
  • Develop new separation technology for recycling cement material.
  • Assess new clinker substitutes and improve supply chains for known substitutes.
  • Improve the efficiency of processing technology and equipment.
  • Increase the safety of extraction, transport, handling, and processing of clinker material substitutes.
  • Develop on-site testing and reporting methods for tracking the energy use of manufacturing processes, fuel composition, and the material composition of cement products.
  • Examine and refine understandings of the potential revenue and price premiums of low-carbon cement products.

Further information:

Communities, Households, and Individuals
  • Purchase low-carbon cement and concrete products when possible.
  • Document your experiences if harmful cement production practices impact you. Share documentation of harmful cement production practices and/or other key messages with policymakers, the media, and your community.
  • Encourage policymakers to improve regulations related to cement production.
  • Support public education efforts to raise awareness about the urgent need to make cement production practices more environmentally sustainable.
  • Pressure the cement industry to improve its production practices.

Further information:

Sources
Evidence Base

Consensus of effectiveness in reducing cement industry emissions: High

The cement industry produces an estimated 7–8% of global CO₂ emissions (Goldman et al., 2023), so this is an important area to target. There is high scientific consensus that clinker material substitution, alternative fuels, and process efficiency upgrades can be immediately and effectively implemented. Other emissions reduction strategies – including hydrogen kiln fuel, electrification, and carbon capture and storage technologies – have generated mixed scientific opinions on their potential for immediate impact and were not considered in this analysis. 

The U.S. Department of Energy (2022) highlighted cement as one of five high-emitting industries with potential for mitigation. The technologies identified as having the highest level of maturity and market readiness were energy efficiency measures, biomass and natural gas fuels, material efficiency measures, and blended-material cements. 

An extensive review of industrial decarbonization points to four technologies that could be implemented in the near term across global industries: electrification, material efficiency, energy efficiency, and circularity (Rissman et al., 2020). The European Cement Research Academy (2022) classified the three cement industry approaches considered in this solution – clinker material substitution, alternative fuels, and process efficiency upgrades – as meeting the highest technology readiness level.

Goldman et al. (2023) identified clinker material substitution, alternative fuels, and efficiency improvements as deployable today, estimating that these three approaches could abate 30% of U.S. cement industry emissions by 2030. Habert et al. (2020) proposed technologies that could reduce emissions up to 50% in the next few decades, including “cement improvements” of supplementary clinker materials, alternative fuels, and more efficient technologies. The International Energy Agency (IEA, 2018) estimated that clinker material replacement, alternative fuels, and efficiency improvements could provide 37%, 12%, and 3% of cement emissions savings by 2050, respectively.

The results presented in this document summarize findings from two reviews and meta-analyses, eight original studies, nine reports, and several data sets reflecting current evidence from 33 countries, primarily high cement-producing countries in North America, Europe, and Asia. We recognize this limited geographic scope creates bias, and hope this work inspires research and data sharing on this topic in underrepresented regions.

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Updated Date

Improve Landfill Management

Submitted by Drawdown Admin on
Sector
Electricity & Industry
Mode
Cut Emissions
Cluster
Cut Fugitive Emissions
Image
Methane tap valve from a landfill
Coming Soon
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Summary

Landfill management is the process of reducing methane emissions from landfill gas (LFG). As bacteria break down organic waste in an environment without oxygen, they produce methane and release it into the atmosphere if there are no controls in place. This solution focuses on two methane abatement strategies: 1) gas collection and control systems (GCCSs) and methane use/destruction, and 2) biocovers. When methane is used or destroyed it is converted into CO₂ (Garland et al., 2023).

Income & work,Health,Equality
Air quality
Overview

Landfill management relies on several practices and technologies that prevent methane from being released into the atmosphere. When organic material is broken down, it creates LFG, which usually is half methane and half CO₂, and water vapor (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency [EPA], 2024a). Methane that is directly released into the atmosphere has a GWP of 81 over a 20-yr basis and a GWP of 28 over a 100-yr basis (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], 2023). This means methane is 81 times more effective at trapping heat than CO₂. Because methane is a short-lived climate pollutant that has a much stronger warming effect than CO₂ over a given time period, abating methane will have a relatively large near-term impact on slowing global climate change (International Energy Agency [IEA], 2023). LFG contains trace amounts of oxygen, nitrogen, sulfides, hydrogen, and other organic compounds that can negatively affect nearby environments with odors, acid rain, and smog (New York State Government, 2024).

Methods for reducing methane emissions can be put into two broad strategies (Garland et al., 2023):

GCCS and methane use/destruction utilizes pipes to route LFG to be used as an energy source or to flare. The gas can be used on-site for landfill equipment or refined into biomethane and sold; unrefined LFG can also be sold to local utilities or industries for their own use. In areas where electricity generation is carbon intensive, the LFG can help to reduce local emissions by displacing fossil fuels. Methane that can’t be used for energy is burned in a flare during system downtime or at the end of the landfill life, when LFG production has decreased and collecting it no longer makes economic sense. High-efficiency (enclosed) flares have a 99% methane destruction rate. Open flares can be used but research from Plant et al. (2022) has found that the methane destruction rate in practice is much lower than the 90% value the EPA assumes. 

Biocovers are a type of landfill cover designed to promote bacteria that convert methane to CO₂ and water. Biocovers have an organic layer that provides an environment for the bacteria to grow and a gas distribution layer to separate the landfill waste from the organic layer. Non-biocover landfill covers – made with impermeable material like clay or synthetic materials – can also be used to prevent methane from being released. The methane oxidation from these covers will be minimal – they mostly serve to limit LFG from escaping – but they can then be used in conjunction with GCCS to improve gas collection. Landfills also use daily and interim landfill covers. It is important to note that studies on biocover abatement potential and cost are limited and biocovers may not be appropriate for all situations.

Leak Detection and Repair (LDAR) involves regularly monitoring for methane leaks and modifying or replacing leaking equipment. LDAR does not directly reduce emissions but is used to determine where to apply the above technology and practices and is considered a critical part of methane abatement strategies. Methane can be monitored through satellites, drones, continuous sensors, or on-site walking surveys (Carbon Mapper, 2024). LDAR is an important step in identifying where methane escapes from the gas collection infrastructure or landfill cover. Quick repairs help reduce GHG emissions while allowing more methane to be used for energy or fuel. The Appendix shows where methane can escape from landfills.

References

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Sperling Hansen Associates (2020). 7 Mile landfill operational biocover study. https://www.rdmw.bc.ca/media/2020%2003%2017%207Mile%20Landfill%20Operational%20Biocover%20Study.pdf 

Stern, J. C., Chanton, J., Ahicou, T., Powelson, D., Yuan, L., Escoriza, S. & Bogner, J.. (2007). Use of a biologically active cover to reduce landfill methane emissions and enhance methane oxidation. Waste Management 27(9), 1248-1258 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wasman.2006.07.018 

Stone, E. (2023, September 7). Landfills: 'Zombie' landfills emit tons of methane decades after shutting down. Here's why that's a big problem. LAist. https://laist.com/news/climate-environment/zombie-landfills-emit-tons-of-methane-decades-after-shutting-down-heres-why-thats-a-big-problem 

Sweeptech. (2022). What is a landfill site’s environmental impact?. Retrieved March 7, 2025. https://www.sweeptech.co.uk/what-is-a-landfill-site-and-how-does-landfill-impact-the-environment/#:~:text=The%20average%20size%20of%20a,for%20these%20massive%20waste%20dumps. 

Tangri, N. (2010). Respect for recyclers: Protecting the climate through zero waste. Gaia. https://www.no-burn.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Respect-for-Recyclers-English_1.pdf 

Towprayoon, S., Ishigaki, T., Chiemchaisri, C., & Abdel-Aziz, A. O. (2019). Chapter 3: Solid waste disposal. In 2019 refinement to the 2006 IPCC guidelines for national greenhouse gas inventories. International Panel on Climate Change. https://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/public/2019rf/pdf/5_Volume5/19R_V5_3_Ch03_SWDS.pdf

Trashcans Unlimited. (2022). Biggest landfill in the world. Retrieved March 7, 2025. https://trashcansunlimited.com/blog/biggest-landfill-in-the-world/ 

UN Environment Program. (2021). Global methane assessment: Benefits and costs of mitigating methane emissions. https://www.unep.org/resources/report/global-methane-assessment-benefits-and-costs-mitigating-methane-emissions 

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. (2019). Global non-CO₂ greenhouse gas emission projections & mitigation 2015 - 2050. https://www.epa.gov/ozone-layer-protection/transitioning-low-gwp-alternatives-residential-and-commercial-air

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. (2024a). Basic information about landfill gas. Retrieved September 2, 2024. https://www.epa.gov/lmop/basic-information-about-landfill-gas 

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. (2024b). Benefits of landfill gas energy projects. Retrieved September 23, 2024. https://www.epa.gov/lmop/benefits-landfill-gas-energy-projects 

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. (2025). Accomplishments of the landfill methane outreach program. Retrieved March 5, 2025. https://www.epa.gov/lmop/accomplishments-landfill-methane-outreach-program 

Van Dingenen, R., Crippa, M., Maenhout, G., Guizzardi, D., & Dentener, F. (2018). Global trends of methane emissions and their impacts on ozone concentrations. European Commission. https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/c40e6fc4-dbf9-11e8-afb3-01aa75ed71a1/language-en 

Vasarhelyi, K. (2021, April 15). The hidden damage of landfills. University of Colorado Boulder. https://www.colorado.edu/ecenter/2021/04/15/hidden-damage-landfills#:~:text=The%20average%20landfill%20size%20is,liners%20tend%20to%20have%20leaks 

Waste Today. (2019, June 26). How landfill covers can help improve operations. Retrieved April 13, 2025. https://www.wastetodaymagazine.com/news/interim-daily-landfill-covers/ 

Zhang, T. (2020, May 8). Landfill earth: A global perspective on the waste problem. Universitat de Barcelona. https://diposit.ub.edu/dspace/bitstream/2445/170328/1/Landfill%20Eart.%20A%20Global%20Perspective%20on%20the%20Waste%20Problem.pdf 

Credits

Lead Fellow

  • Jason Lam

Contributors

  • Yusuf Jameel

  • Daniel Jasper

  • James Gerber

  • Alex Sweeney

Internal Reviewers

  • Erika Luna

  • Paul West

  • Amanda Smith

  • Aiyana Bodi

  • Hannah Henkin

  • Ted Otte

Effectiveness

According to the IPCC, preventing 1 Mt of emitted methane avoids 81.2 Mt CO₂‑eq on a 20-yr basis and 27.9 Mt CO₂‑eq on a 100-yr basis (Smith et al., 2021, Table 1). If the methane is burned (converted into CO₂), the contribution to GHG emissions is still less than that of methane released directly into the atmosphere. Methane abatement can immediately limit future global climate change because of its outsized impact on global temperature change, especially when looking at a 20-yr basis.

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Table 1. Effectiveness at reducing emissions.

Unit: tCO₂‑eq/Mt of methane abated

100-yr GWPl 27,900,000
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Cost

To abate 1 Mt of methane, GCCS and methane use/destruction have an initial cost of around US$410 million, an operating cost of roughly US$191 million, and revenue in the neighborhood of US$383 million. The net savings over a 30-yr amortization period is US$179 million. This means capturing and selling landfill methane will be a net economic gain for most landfill operators. We included LDAR operating costs in the overall operating costs for GCCS and methane use/destruction, although LDAR can be used prior to installation or with other strategies such as biocovers. We split the median costs for GCCS and methane use/destruction between 20-yr and 100-yr GWP (Table 2a).

Biocovers have an initial cost to abate 1 Mt of methane around US$380 million, operating costs of roughly US$0.4 million, and revenue of about US$0 million, and an overall net cost over a 30-yr amortization period of US$13 million. This means that using biocovers to abate landfill methane has a net cost. If a carbon credit system is in place, biocovers can recoup the costs or generate profits. Biocovers are reported to have lower installation and operation costs than GCCS because they are simpler to install and maintain, and can be used where local regulations might limit a landfill operator’s ability to capture and use methane (Fries, 2020). Table 2b shows that the median costs for biocovers are split between 20-yr and 100-yr GWP.

We found very limited data for the baseline scenario, which follows current practices without methane abatement. We considered the baseline costs to be zero for initial costs, operational costs, and revenue because landfills without management – such as open landfills or sanitary landfills with no methane controls – release methane as part of their regular operations, do not incur additional maintenance or capital costs, and lack any energy savings from capturing and using methane.

Few data were available to characterize the initial costs of implementing landfill methane capture. We referenced reports from Ayandele et al. (2024a), City of Saskatoon (2023), DeFabrizio et al. (2021), and Government of Canada (2024), but the context and underlying assumptions costs were not always clear. 

Landfills are typically 202–243 ha (Sweeptech, 2022); however, the size can vary greatly, with the world’s largest landfill covering 890 ha (Trashcans Unlimited, 2022). Because larger landfills make more methane, facility size helps determine which methane management strategies make the most sense. We assumed the average landfill covered 243 ha when converting costs to our common unit. 

Data on revenues from the sale of collected LFG are also limited. We found some reports of revenue generated at a municipal level or monetized benefits from GHG emission reductions priced according to a social cost of methane or carbon credit system (Abichou, 2020; Government of Canada, 2024). These values may not apply at a global scale, especially when the credits are supported by programs such as the United States’ use of Renewable Identification Numbers.

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Table 2. Cost per unit climate impact.

Unit: 2023 US$/t CO₂‑eq

Median (100-yr basis) -6.42
Median (20-yr basis) -2.21

Unit: 2023 US$/t CO₂‑eq

Median (100-yr basis) 0.47
Median (20-yr basis) 0.16
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Learning Curve

Landfill GCCSs are mature; we do not foresee declining implementation costs for these solutions due to extensive use of the same installation equipment and materials in other industries and infrastructure. Automation of GCCS settings and monitoring may improve efficiencies, but installation costs will stay largely the same. 

Landfill covers are a mature technology, having been used to control odors, fires, litter, and scavenging since 1935 (Barton, 2020). Biocover landfill cover costs could decrease as recycled organic materials are increasingly used in their construction. It is not clear how the cost of biocovers might decrease as adoption grows. 

Though LDAR might provide gains around efficiencies, little research offers insights here.

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Speed of Action

Speed of action refers to how quickly a climate solution physically affects the atmosphere after it is deployed. This is different from speed of deployment, which is the pace at which solutions are adopted.

At Project Drawdown, we define the speed of action for each climate solution as gradual, emergency brake, or delayed.

Improve Landfill Management is an EMERGENCY BRAKE climate solution. It has the potential to deliver a more rapid impact than nominal and delayed solutions. Because emergency brake solutions can deliver their climate benefits quickly, they can help accelerate our efforts to address dangerous levels of climate change. For this reason, they are a high priority.

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Caveats

Approximately 61% of methane generated from food waste happens within 3.6 years of being landfilled (Krause, et al., 2023). In the United States, the EPA requires GCCS to be installed after five years of the landfill closing, meaning that much of the food waste methane will evade GCCS before it is installed (Industrious Labs, 2024b). In contrast, biocovers can quickly (up to three months) reduce methane emissions once the bacteria have established (Stern et al., 2007). GCCS and biocovers should be installed as soon as possible to capture as much of the early methane produced from food waste. Due to unstable methane production during early- and end-of-life gas production, low-calorific flares or biocovers may be needed to destroy any poor-quality gas that has collected. Strategies that prevent organic waste from being deposited at landfills are captured in other Project Drawdown solutions: Deploy Methane Digesters, Increase Composting, and Reduce Food Loss and Waste.

The effectiveness of landfill management depends on methane capture and destruction efficiency. The EPA previously assumed methane capture efficiency to be 75% and then revised it to 65%; however, the actual recovery rate in the United States is closer to 43% (Industrious Labs, 2024b). 

Our assessment does not include the impact of the CO₂ created from the destruction of methane.

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Current Adoption

We found little literature quantifying the current adoption of LFG methane abatement. We estimate that GCCS and methane use/destruction strategies account for approximately 1.6 Mt/yr of abated global methane. 

We did not find unaggregated data about current adoption of biocovers or global data for landfill methane abatement that we could use to allocate the contribution to each landfill methane abatement strategy. A large portion of data for current adoption is from sources focused on landfills in the U.S.. Around 70 Mt of methane is currently being emitted globally from landfills in 2024 (IEA, 2025; Ocko et al., 2021). 

Table 3a shows the statistical ranges among the sources we found for current adoption of GCCS and methane use/destruction strategies. We were not able to find sources measuring the current adoption of biocovers and the amount of methane abated and assume it was 0 in 2023 (Table 3b).

The EPA’s Landfill Methane Outreach Program helps reduce methane emissions from U.S. landfills. The program has worked with 535 of more than 3,000 U.S. landfills (EPA, 2024; Vasarhelyi, 2021). Global Methane Initiative (GMI) members abated 4.7 Mt of methane from 2004 to 2023 (GMI, 2024). Because GMI members cover only 70% of human-caused methane emissions overall – including wastewater and agricultural emissions this is an overestimate of current landfill methane abatement. Holley et al. (2024) determined that while some methane abatement was occuring in Mexico, only 0.13 Mt of methane was abated from 2018 to 2020, which is about 12% of Mexico’s 2021 solid waste sector methane emissions. India and Nigeria recently installed some GCCS and methane use/destruction systems, but these are excluded from our analysis due to unclear data (Ayandele et al., 2024b; Ayandele et al., 2024c). Industrious Labs (2024b) found that GCCS were less common than expected – the EPA assumes a 75% gas recovery rate for well-managed landfills. A study on Maryland landfills found that only half had GCCS in place, with an average collection efficiency of 59% (Industrious Labs, 2024b). 

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Table 3. Current (2023) adoption level.

Unit: Mt/yr methane abated

25th percentile 1.26
mean 1.64
median (50th percentile) 1.59
75th percentile 2.00

Unit: Mt/yr methane abated

25th percentile 0
mean 0
median (50th percentile) 0
75th percentile 0
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Adoption Trend

Few studies explicitly quantify the adoption of methane abatement technologies over time; we estimated the adoption trend to be 0.22 Mt/yr of methane abated – mainly from GCCS and methane use/destruction. We were not able to find unaggregated data for the adoption trend of biocovers, so we estimated adoption from EPA (2024), GMI (2024), Industrious Labs (2024b), and Van Dingenen et al. (2018). The EPA (2024) provided adoption data for a limited number of U.S. landfills that showed increasing methane abatement 2000–2013, a plateau 2013–2018, and slower progress 2018–2023 (Figure 2).

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GMI (2024) show a gradual increase in methane abatement 2011–2022. However, these data do not differentiate landfill methane abatement from other abatement opportunities, and even include wastewater systems and agriculture. When the GMI (2024) data are used to estimate adoption trends, they result in an overestimate. Van Dingenen et al. (2018) attributed a decreasing trend in landfill methane emissions 1990–2012 to landfill regulations implemented in the 1990s. Table 4a shows statistical ranges among the sources we found for the adoption trend of landfill methane strategies. Due to a lack of sources, we assume a zero value for the adoption trend of biocovers (and the amount of methane abated) as shown in Table 4b.

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Table 4. 2011–2022 adoption trend.

Unit: Mt/yr methane abated

25th percentile 0.05
mean 0.38
median (50th percentile) 0.22
75th percentile 0.54

Unit: Mt/yr methane abated

25th percentile 0
mean 0
median (50th percentile) 0
75th percentile 0
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Adoption Ceiling

GCCS and methane use/destruction have an estimated adoption ceiling of 70 Mt/yr of methane abated based on the IEA’s (2025) estimate for methane emissions from the landfill waste sector. We assumed that current landfill methane emissions would remain the same into the future with no changes in waste produced or waste diversion employed.

Biocovers have an estimated adoption ceiling of 70 Mt/yr of methane based on the IEA’s (2025) estimate for methane emissions from the landfill waste sector. We assumed that current landfill methane emissions would remain the same into the future with no changes in waste produced or waste diversion employed.

The maximum possible abatement of LFG methane critically depends on the efficiency of the abatement technology; Powell et al. (2015) found that closed landfills (those not actively receiving new waste) were 17% more efficient than open landfills. Even so, research from Nesser et al. (2024) found that the gas capture efficiency among United States landfills was significantly lower than EPA assumptions – closer to 50% rather than 75%. Industrious Labs (2024b) found that landfill methane emissions could be reduced by up to 104 Mt of methane 2025–2050. Using biocovers and installing GCCS earlier (with consistent operation standards) may help reduce emissions throughout the landfill’s lifespan. Tables 5a and 5b show the adoption ceiling for GCCS and methane use/destruction strategies, and for biocovers when used separately.

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Table 5. Adoption ceiling.

Unit: Mt/yr methane abated

median (50th percentile) 70

Unit: Mt/yr methane abated

median (50th percentile) 70
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Achievable Adoption

The amount of methane that can be abated from landfills is highly uncertain due to the difficulty in quantifying where and how much methane is emitted and how much of those emissions can be abated. 

GCCS and methane use/destruction strategies have an achievable adoption range of 5–35 Mt/yr of methane (Table 6a). These values are aligned with estimates from DeFabrizio et al. (2021) and Scharff et al. (2023) for landfill methane abatement. 

Biocovers have an achievable adoption range of 35–57 Mt/yr of methane (Table 6b). This value is aligned with estimates of biocover gas destruction efficiency from Duan et al. (2022) and Scheutz et al. (2014). 

The use of these methane abatement strategies would still release around 13–65 Mt/yr of methane into the atmosphere (IEA, 2025). The amount of methane abated from both GCCS and methane use/destruction strategies and biocovers will vary with what kind of waste reduction and organic diversion is used (which can increase or decrease depending on the amount of organics sent to landfills). 

We referenced CCAC (2024), EPA (2011), Fries (2020), Industrious Labs (2024b), Lee et al. (2017), and Sperling Hansen (2020) when looking at the achievable adoption for global landfill methane abatement. Several resources focused on landfills in Canada, Denmark, South Korea, and the United States. We based the adoption achievable for biocovers only on sources that include the percentage of gas capture (destruction) efficiency over landfill sites. We exclude studies that include the percentage of biogas oxidized because they focus on specific areas where biocovers were applied. It is important to note that biocovers do not capture methane – they destroy it through methane oxidation. In addition, biocovers’ gas capture efficiency will not reach its optimal rate until the bacteria establishes. It may take up to three months (Stern et al., 2007) for methane oxidation rates to stabilize, and – because environmental changes can impact the bacteria’s methane oxidation rate – the value presented here likely overestimates biocover methane abatement potential in practice. Stern et al. (2007) found that biocovers can be a methane sink and oxidation rates of 100% have been measured at landfills. 

Few studies have examined how methane abatement is affected when all strategies are combined. A single landfill’s total methane abatement would likely increase with each added strategy, the total methane abatement is not expected to be additive between the strategies. For example, If a GCCS system can capture a large portion of LFG methane, then adding a biocover to the same landfill will play a reduced role in methane abatement. The values presented do not consider which geographies are best suited for specific methane abatement strategies. Compared with reality, those values may appear generous. 

Long-term landfill methane abatement will be necessary to manage emissions from previously deposited organic waste. Strong regulations for waste management can encourage methane abatement strategies at landfills and/or reduce the amount of organics sent their way. The infrastructure for these methane abatement strategies can still be employed in geographies without strong regulations. Tables 6a and 6b show the statistical low and high achievable ranges for GCCS and methane use/destruction strategies and for biocovers (when used separately) based on different reported sources for adoption ceilings.

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Table 6. Range of achievable adoption levels.

Unit: Mt/yr methane abated

Current Adoption 1.60
Achievable – Low 4.50
Achievable – High 34.78
Adoption Ceiling 69.56

Unit: Mt/yr methane abated

Current Adoption 0.00
Achievable – Low 35.13
Achievable – High 57.04
Adoption Ceiling 69.56
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Landfill methane abatement has a high potential for climate impact. 

GCCS and methane use/destruction strategies can significantly reduce landfill GHG emissions (table 7a).

Biocovers can be a useful strategy for controlling LFG methane (table 7b) because they can oxidize methane in areas where GCCS and methane use/destruction strategies are not applicable. In addition, this strategy can help destroy methane missed from GCCS and even remove methane from the atmosphere (Stern et al., 2007). The lower cost for installation and operation when compared to installing GCCS systems and increased applicability at landfills large and small are encouraging factors for broadening their use around the world. 

LDAR can help identify methane leaks,allowing for targeted abatement (Industrious Labs, 2024a). 

Research has not quantified how methane abatement is affected by combining these strategies. We anticipate that the total methane abatement would increase with each additional strategy, but we don’t expect them to be additive. The general belief is that biocovers are useful for reducing methane emissions in areas where a GCCS cannot be installed and will also help to remove residual methane emissions from GCCS systems. If there is a large increase in waste diversion, the abatement potential could be 0.13–1.59 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr for landfill methane abatement (DeFabrizio et al, 2021; Duan et al., 2022). In this scenario there will also be reduced sources of revenue due to lower LFG methane production affecting the economics.

UNEP (2021) underscored the need for additional methane measures to stay aligned with 1.5 °C scenarios. Meeting these goals requires the implementation of landfill GCCS and biocovers as well as improved waste diversion strategies – such as composting or reducing food loss and waste – to reduce methane emissions. The amount of landfill methane available to abate will grow or shrink depending on the amount of organic waste sent to landfills. Previously deposited organic waste will still produce methane for many years and will still require methane abatement.

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Table 7. Climate impact at different levels of adoption.

Unit: Gt CO₂‑eq/yr, 100-yr basis

Current Adoption 0.04
Achievable – Low 0.13
Achievable – High 0.97
Adoption Ceiling 1.94

Unit: Gt CO₂‑eq/yr, 20-yr basis

Current Adoption 0.13
Achievable – Low 0.37
Achievable – High 2.82
Adoption Ceiling 5.65

Unit: Gt CO₂‑eq/yr, 100-yr basis

Current Adoption 0
Achievable – Low 0.98
Achievable – High 1.59
Adoption Ceiling 1.94

Unit: Gt CO₂‑eq/yr, 20-yr basis

Current Adoption 0
Achievable – Low 2.85
Achievable – High 4.63
Adoption Ceiling 5.65
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Additional Benefits

Air quality

Using LFG for energy in place of other non-renewable sources – such as coal or fuel oil – reduces emissions of air pollutants such as sulfur dioxide, nitrous oxides, and particulate matter (EPA, 2024b; Siddiqua et al., 2022). Untreated LFG is also a source of volatile organic compounds (VOCs) in low concentrations. Capturing and burning LFG to generate electricity reduces the hazards of these air pollutants. Methane emissions can contribute to landfill fires, which pose risks to the health and safety of nearby communities by releasing black carbon and carbon monoxide (Global Climate & Health Alliance [GCHA], 2024). Reducing landfill fires by capturing methane can also help improve local air quality. Landfill methane emissions can contribute to ozone pollution, particularly when other non-methane ozone precursors are present (Olaguer, 2021). 

Health

Landfill emissions can contribute to health issues such as cancer, respiratory and neurological problems, low birth weight, and birth defects (Brender et al., 2011; Industrious Labs, 2024a; Siddiqua et al. 2022). By reducing harmful air pollutants, capturing landfill methane emissions minimizes the health risks associated with exposure to these toxic landfill compounds. Capturing LFG can reduce malodorous landfill emissions – pollutants such as ammonia and hydrogen sulfide – that impact human well-being (Cai et al., 2018).

Equality

Landfill management practices that reduce community exposure to air pollution have implications for environmental justice (Casey et al., 2021). A large review of waste sites in the United States and Europe found that landfills are disproportionately located near low-income communities and near neighborhoods with racially and ethnically marginalized populations (Marzutti et al., 2010). Reducing disproportionate exposures to air pollution from landfills may mitigate poor health outcomes in surrounding communities (Brender et al., 2011).

Income and work

Generating electricity from LFG can create local jobs in drilling, piping, design, construction, and operation of energy projects. In the United States, LFG energy projects can create 10–70 jobs per project (EPA, 2024b).

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Risks

GCCS can be voluntarily implemented with sufficient methane generated by the landfill and favorable natural gas prices, but when natural gas prices are low, it makes less economic sense (IEA, 2021). There is also a risk of encouraging organics to be sent to landfills in order to maintain methane capture rates. Reducing the amount of waste made in the first place will allow us to better utilize our resources and for the organic waste that is created; it can be better served with waste diversion strategies such as composting or methane digesters. 

Without policy support, regulation, carbon pricing mechanism, or other economic incentives – biocover adoption may be limited by installation costs. Some tools (like the United Nations’ clean development mechanism) encourage global landfill methane abatement projects. There have been criticisms of this mechanism’s effectiveness for failing to support waste diversion practices and focusing solely on GCCS and incinerator strategies (Tangri, 2010). Collected LFG methane can be used to reduce GHG emissions for hard to abate sectors but continued reliance on methane for industries where it is easier to switch to clean alternatives could encourage new natural gas infrastructure to be built which risks becoming a stranded asset and locking infrastructure to emitting forms of energy (Auth & Kincer, 2022).

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Interactions with Other Solutions

Reinforcing

Landfill management can have a reinforcing impact on other solutions that reduce the amount of methane released to the atmosphere. By using strategies like GCCS, methane destruction, and LDAR, the landfill waste sector can help demonstrate the effectiveness and economic case for abating methane. This would build momentum for widespread adoption of methane abatement because successes in this sector can be leveraged in others as well. For example, processes and tools for identifying methane leaks are useful beyond landfills; LDAR as a key strategy for identifying methane emissions can be applied and studied more widely.

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Competing

Landfill management can have a competing impact with solutions that provide clean electricity. Capturing methane uses natural gas infrastructure and can reduce the cost of using methane and natural gas as a fuel source. As a result, it could prolong the use of fossil fuels and slow down the transition to clean electricity sources.

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Dashboard

Solution Basics

1 Mt methane abated

tCO2-eq/unit
2.79×10⁷
units
Current 1.594.534.78
Achievable (Low to High)

Climate Impact

GtCO2-eq/yr
Current 0.04 0.130.97
US$ per tCO2-eq
-6
Emergency Brake

CO₂, CH₄, N₂O, BC

Solution Basics

1 Mt methane abated

tCO2-eq/unit
2.79×10⁷
units
Current 035.1357.04
Achievable (Low to High)

Climate Impact

GtCO2-eq/yr
Current 0 0.981.59
US$ per tCO2-eq
0
Emergency Brake

CO₂, CH₄, N₂O, BC

Trade-offs

Landfill management strategies outlined in this solution can help to reduce methane emissions that reach the atmosphere. However, the methane used as fuel or destroyed will still emit GHGs. Strategies to capture CO₂ emissions from methane use will be needed to avoid adding any GHG emissions to the atmosphere. Research on this topic takes global methane emissions from landfills in 2023, and assumes they were fully combusted and converted to CO₂ emissions.

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Mt CO2–eq
< 0.5
0.5–1
1–3
3–5
> 5

Annual emissions from solid waste disposal sites, 2024

Landfills release methane when organic material breaks down. Globally, municipal solid waste was responsible for about 67 Mt of methane emissions in 2023. This methane contributed 19% of total anthropogenic methane emissions in 2023, and is equivalent to 1,809 Mt CO2-eq based on a 100-year time scale.

Raniga, K., (2024). Waste sector: Estimating CH4 emissions from solid waste disposal sites [Data set]. WattTime, Climate TRACE Emissions Inventory. Retrieved April 21, 2025 from https://climatetrace.org

International Energy Agency. (2024). Methane tracker: Data tools. https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/data-tools/methane-tracker

Mt CO2–eq
< 0.5
0.5–1
1–3
3–5
> 5

Annual emissions from solid waste disposal sites, 2024

Landfills release methane when organic material breaks down. Globally, municipal solid waste was responsible for about 67 Mt of methane emissions in 2023. This methane contributed 19% of total anthropogenic methane emissions in 2023, and is equivalent to 1,809 Mt CO2-eq based on a 100-year time scale.

Raniga, K., (2024). Waste sector: Estimating CH4 emissions from solid waste disposal sites [Data set]. WattTime, Climate TRACE Emissions Inventory. Retrieved April 21, 2025 from https://climatetrace.org

International Energy Agency. (2024). Methane tracker: Data tools. https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/data-tools/methane-tracker

Geographic Guidance Introduction

Methane emissions from landfills can vary geographically (IPCC, 2006) since rates of organic matter decomposition and methane generation depend on climate. In practice, however, landfill management has a more significant impact on related emissions and is correlated with country income levels.  

Many high-income countries have landfills that are considered sanitary landfills (where waste is covered daily and isolated from the environment) and have high waste collection rates. Basic covers are placed on the landfills to reduce the risk of odor, scavenging, and wildlife accessing the waste, and there are regulations in place to manage and capture landfill gas (LFG) emissions. These landfills are better prepared to install Gas Collection and Control Systems (GCCS) and methane use or destruction infrastructure. 

For landfills in low- and middle-income countries, existing waste management practices and regulations can vary widely. In countries like the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Nigeria, waste may not be regularly collected; when it is, it is often placed in open landfills where waste lies uncovered, as documented by Ayandele et al. (2024d). This can negatively impact the environment by attracting scavengers and pest animals to the landfill. When this occurs, methane is more easily released to the atmosphere or burned as waste, the latter process creating pollutants that impact the nearby environment (not to mention generating additional GHG emissions).

Overall, managing methane emissions from landfills can be improved everywhere with stronger regulations for high-income countries that will ensure the methane generated from landfills is captured with GCCS and used or destroyed. For low- and middle-income countries, regular waste collection and storage of waste in sanitary landfills need to be implemented first before GCCS technology can be installed. Biocovers can be used around the world but may have the most impact in low- and middle-income countries as they may not have the expertise or infrastructure to effectively use GCCS methane use or destruction strategies (Ayandele et al., 2024d).

Action Word
Improve
Solution Title
Landfill Management
Classification
Highly Recommended
Lawmakers and Policymakers
  • Set standards for landfill emissions and goals for reductions.
  • Improve LDAR and emissions estimates by setting industry standards and investing in public research.
  • Mandate early installation of landfill covers and/or GCCSs for new landfills; mandate immediate installation for existing landfills.
  • Set standards for landfill covers and GCCS.
  • Invest in infrastructure to support biogas production and utilization.
  • Regulate industry practices for timely maintenance, such as wellhead turning and equipment monitoring.
  • Set standards for methane destruction, such as high-efficiency flares.
  • Conduct or fund research to fill the literature gap on policy options for landfill methane.
  • Reduce public food waste and loss, invest in infrastructure to separate organic waste before reaching the landfill (see Reduce Food Loss and Waste, Increase Composting, and Deploy Methane Digesters solutions).

Further information:

Practitioners
  • Improve LDAR at landfills for surface and fugitive emissions.
  • Install landfill biocovers as well as GCCSs.
  • Invest in infrastructure to support biogas production and utilization.
  • Ensure timely maintenance, such as wellhead turning and equipment monitoring.
  • Improve methane destruction practices, such as using high-efficiency flares.
  • Set goals to reduce landfill methane emissions from operations and help set regional, national, international, and industry reduction goals.
  • Conduct, contribute to, or fund research on technical solutions (e.g., regional abatement strategies) and policy options for landfill methane.
  • Separate food and organic waste from non-organic waste to create separate disposal streams (see Reduce Food Loss  and Waste, Increase Composting, and Deploy Methane Digesters solutions).

Further information:

Business Leaders
  • Contract with waste collection facilities that utilize methane reduction strategies such as landfill covers, GCCSs, and robust monitoring systems.
  • Require suppliers to meet standards for low-carbon waste management.
  • If your company participates in the voluntary carbon market, fund high-integrity projects that reduce landfill emissions.
  • Proactively collaborate with government and regulatory actors to support policies that abate landfill methane.
  • Reduce your company’s food waste and loss (see Reduce Food Loss  and Waste, Increase Composting, and Deploy Methane Digesters solutions).

Further information:

Nonprofit Leaders
  • Contract with waste collection facilities that utilize methane reduction strategies such as landfill covers, GCCSs, and robust monitoring systems.
  • Assist with monitoring and estimating landfill emissions.
  • Help design policies and regulations that support landfill methane abatement.
  • Publish research on policy options for landfill methane abatement.
  • Join or support efforts such as the Global Methane Alliance.
  • Encourage policymakers to create ambitious targets and regulations.
  • Pressure landfill companies and operators to improve their practices.
  • Reduce your organization’s food waste and loss, separate organic waste from other forms, and compost organic waste (see Reduce Food Loss  and Waste, Increase Composting, and Deploy Methane Digesters solutions).

Further information:

Investors
  • Contract with waste collection facilities that utilize methane reduction strategies such as landfill covers, GCCSs, and robust monitoring systems.
  • Invest in projects that abate landfill methane emissions.
  • Pressure and influence private landfill operators within investment portfolios to implement methane abatement strategies, noting that some strategies, such as selling captured methane, can be sources of revenue and add value for investors.
  • Pressure and influence other portfolio companies to incorporate waste management and landfill methane abatement into their operations and/or net-zero targets.
  • Provide capital for nascent or regional landfill methane abatement technologies and LDAR instruments.
  • Seek impact investment opportunities, such as sustainability-linked loans in entities that set landfill methane abatement targets.
  • Reduce your company’s food waste and loss, separate organic waste from other forms, and compost organic waste (see Reduce Food Loss  and Waste, Increase Composting, and Deploy Methane Digesters solutions).

Further information:

Philanthropists and International Aid Agencies
  • Contract with waste collection facilities that utilize methane reduction strategies such as landfill covers, GCCSs, and robust monitoring systems.
  • Provide capital for methane monitoring, de-risking, and abatement in the early stages of implementing landfill methane reduction technologies.
  • Support global, national, and local policies that reduce landfill methane emissions.
  • Support accelerators or multilateral initiatives like the Global Methane Hub.
  • Explore opportunities to fund landfill methane abatement strategies such as landfill covers, GCCSs, proper methane destruction, monitoring technologies, and other equipment upgrades.
  • Advance awareness of the air quality, public health, and climate benefits of landfill methane abatement.
  • Reduce your organization’s food waste and loss, separate organic waste from other forms, and compost organic waste (see Reduce Food Loss  and Waste, Increase Composting, and Deploy Methane Digesters solutions).

Further information:

Thought Leaders
  • If applicable, contract with waste collection facilities that utilize methane reduction strategies such as landfill covers, GCCSs, and robust monitoring systems.
  • Provide technical assistance (e.g., monitoring and reporting landfill emissions) to businesses, government agencies, and landfill operators working to reduce methane emissions.
  • Help design policies and regulations that support landfill methane abatement.
  • Educate the public on the urgent need to abate landfill methane.
  • Join or support joint efforts such as the Global Methane Alliance.
  • Advocate to policymakers for more ambitious targets and regulations for landfill emissions.
  • Pressure landfill operators to improve their practices.
  • Reduce your food waste and loss, separate organic waste from other forms, and compost organic waste (see Reduce Food Loss  and Waste, Increase Composting, and Deploy Methane Digesters solutions).

Further information:

Technologists and Researchers
  • Develop new LDAR technologies that reduce cost and required capacity.
  • Develop new biocover technologies sensitive to regional supply chains and/or availability of materials.
  • Improve methane destruction practices to reduce CO₂ emissions.
  • Research and improve estimates of landfill methane emissions.
  • Create new mechanisms to reduce public food waste and loss, and separate organic waste from landfill waste (see Reduce Food Loss  and Waste, Increase Composting, and Deploy Methane Digesters solutions).

Further information:

Communities, Households, and Individuals
  • If possible, contract with waste collection facilities that utilize methane reduction strategies such as landfill covers, GCCSs, and robust monitoring systems.
  • If harmful landfill management practices impact you, document your experiences.
  • Share documentation of harmful practices and/or other key messages with policymakers, the press, and the public.
  • Advocate to policymakers for more ambitious targets and regulations for landfill emissions.
  • Support public education efforts on the urgency and need to address landfill methane.
  • Reduce your food waste and loss, separate organic waste from other forms, and compost organic waste (see Reduce Food Loss  and Waste, Increase Composting, and Deploy Methane Digesters solutions).

Further information:

Sources
Evidence Base

Consensus of effectiveness in abating landfill methane emissions: High

There is a high consensus that methane abatement technologies are effective; they can often be deployed cost effectively with an immediate mitigating effect on climate change. 

Though many strategies are universally agreed-upon as effective, waste management practices vary between countries from what we found in our research. China, India, and the United States are the three largest G20 generators of municipal solid waste, though much of the data used in our assessment are from Western countries (Zhang, 2020). Ocko et al. (2021) found that economically feasible methane abatement options (including waste diversion) could reduce 80% of landfill methane emissions from 2020 levels by 2030. Methane abatement can reduce methane emissions from existing organic waste – which Stone (2023) notes can continue for more than 30 years. 

Scharff et al. (2023) found capture efficiencies of 10–90% depending on the LFG strategy used. They compared passive methods, late control of the landfill life, and early gas capture at an active landfill. The EPA (Krause et al., 2023) found that 61% of methane generated by food waste – which breaks down relatively quickly – evades gas capture systems at landfills. This illustrates how early installation of these capture systems can greatly help reduce the total amount of methane emitted from landfills. The EPA findings also highlight the potential impact of diverting organic waste from landfills, preventing LFG from being generated in the first place. 

Ayandele et al. (2024c) found that the working face of a landfill can be a large source of LFG and suggest that timely landfill covers – biocover-style or otherwise – can reduce methane released; timing of abatement strategies is important. Daily and interim landfill covers can prevent methane escape before biocovers are installed. 

Biocovers have a reported gas destruction rate of 26–96% (EPA, 2011; Lee et al. 2017). They could offer a cost-effective way to manage any LFG that is either missed by GCCS systems or emitted in the later stages of the landfill when LFG production decreases and is no longer worth capturing and selling (Martin Charlton Communications, 2020; Nisbet et al., 2020; Sperling Hansen Associates, 2020). Biocovers can also be applied soon after organic waste is deposited at a landfill as daily or interim covers where it is not as practical to install GCCS infrastructure and gas production has not yet stabilized (Waste Today, 2019). Scarapelli et al. (2024) found in the landfills they studied that emissions from working faces are poorly monitored and 79% of the observed emissions originated from landfill work faces. Covering landfill waste with any type of landfill cover (biocover or not), will reduce the work face emissions. 

LDAR can reduce landfill methane emissions by helping to locate the largest methane leaks and so allowing for more targeted abatement strategies. LDAR can also help identify leaks in landfill covers or in the GCCS infrastructure (Industrious Labs, 2024a). 

The results presented in this document summarize findings from 24 reviews and meta-analyses and 26 original studies reflecting current evidence from six countries, Canada, China, Denmark, Mexico, South Korea, and the United States, and from sources examining global landfill methane emissions. We recognize this limited geographic scope creates bias, and hope this work inspires research and data sharing on this topic in underrepresented regions.

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Appendix

The following figures provide examples of where methane can escape from landfills and where sources of emissions have been found. This shows the difficulty in identifying where methane emissions are coming from and the importance of well maintained infrastructure to ensure methane is being abated.

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Figure A1. Sources of methane emissions at landfills. Source: Garland et al. (2023).

Diagram of landfill components and emissions sources

Source: Garland E., Alves O., Frankiewicz T., & Ayandele E. (2023). Mitigating landfill methane. RMI. https://rmi.org/wp-content/uploads/dlm_uploads/2023/06/landfill_monitoring_memo_series.pdf 

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Figure A2. Source of methane leaks at landfills. Source: Ayandele et al. (2024a).

Source: Ayandele, E., Frankiewicz, T., & Garland, E. (2024a). Deploying advanced monitoring technologies at US landfills. RMI. 

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Deploy LED Lighting

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Sector
Electricity
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Cut Emissions
Cluster
Enhance Efficiency
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Office building exterior showing many floors of indoor lit offices
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Summary

We define the Deploy LED Lighting solution as replacing energy-inefficient light sources with light-emitting diodes (LEDs). Lighting accounts for 15–20% of electricity use in buildings. Using LEDs reduces the electricity that building lighting consumes, and thereby cuts GHG emissions from global electricity generation.

Income & work,Health
Water quality,Air quality
Overview

LED technology for lighting indoor and outdoor spaces is more energy-efficient than other lighting sources currently on the market (Zissis et al., 2021). This is because LEDs are solid-state semiconductors that emit light generated through a direct conversion of the flow of electricity (electroluminescence) rather than heating a tungsten filament to make it glow. More of the electrical energy goes to producing light in an LED lamp than in less-efficient alternative lighting technologies such as incandescent light bulbs or compact fluorescent lamps (CFLs) (Koretsky, 2021; Nair & Dhoble, 2021a). This difference offers significant energy-efficiency gains (see Figure 1).

Globally, lighting-related electricity consumption can account for as much as 20% of the total annual electricity used in buildings (Gayral, 2017; Pompei et al., 2020; Pompei et al., 2022). In 2022, the IEA estimated that total electricity consumption for lighting buildings globally was 1,736 TWh (Lane, 2023). Schleich et al. (2014) and others have argued that buildings consume more electricity for lighting when occupants perceive a lighting source as efficient (rebound effect). However, the growing adoption of LED lighting over the years has significantly optimized electricity consumption from building lighting, especially in residential buildings (Lane, 2023).

According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2006), generating electricity from fossil fuels emits CO₂,  methane, and nitrous oxide. Replacing inefficient lamps with LEDs cuts these emissions by reducing electricity demand. LEDs often have a power rating of 4–10W, which is 3–10 times lower than alternatives. LEDs also last significantly longer: With a lifespan that can exceed 25,000 hours, they vastly outperform incandescent bulbs (1,000 hours) and CFLs (10,000 hours), as shown in Figure 1. LED’s longevity leads to potential long-term savings due to fewer replacements. The amount of light produced per energy input (luminous efficacy) is up to 10 times greater than alternative lighting sources. This means substantially more lighting for less energy.

Figure 1. A comparison of light sources for building lighting (data from Lane, 2023; Mathias et al., 2023; Nair & Dhoble, 2021b; Xu, 2019).

Light source type Power rating (watts) Luminous efficacy (lumens/watt) Lifespan (hours)
Incandescent 40–100 10–15 1,000
CFL 12–20 60–63 10,000
LED 4–10 110–150 25,000–100,000

The International Energy Agency (IEA) and other international bodies report LED market penetration in terms of percentages of the global lighting market (Lane, 2023). We chose this approach to track the impact of adopting LEDs.

Take Action Intro

Would you like to help deploy LED lighting? Below are some ways you can make a difference, depending on the roles you play in your professional or personal life.

These actions are meant to be starting points for involvement and may or may not be the most important, impactful, or doable actions you can take. We encourage you to explore, get creative, and take a step that is right for you!

References

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Amann, J. T., Fadie, B., Mauer, J., Swaroop, K., & Tolentino, C. (2022). Farewell to fluorescent lighting: How a phaseout can cut mercury pollution, protect the climate, and save money. https://www.aceee.org/research-report/b2202

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Forastiere, S., Piselli, C., Silei, A., Sciurpi, F., Pisello, A. L., Cotana, F., & Balocco, C. (2024). Energy efficiency and sustainability in food retail buildings: Introducing a novel assessment framework. Energies, 17(19), 4882. https://www.mdpi.com/1996-1073/17/19/4882

Fu, X., Feng, D., Jiang, X., & Wu, T. (2023). The effect of correlated color temperature and illumination level of LED lighting on visual comfort during sustained attention activities. Sustainability, 15(4), 3826. https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/15/4/3826

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Gasparotto, J., & Da Boit Martinello, K. (2021). Coal as an energy source and its impacts on human health. Energy Geoscience, 2(2), 113–120. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.engeos.2020.07.003

Gayral, B. (2017). LEDs for lighting: Basic physics and prospects for energy savings. Comptes Rendus Physique, 18(7), 453–461. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.crhy.2017.09.001

Gromada, A., & Trębska, P. (2024). Energy efficiency—case study for households in poland. Energies, 17(18), 4592. https://www.mdpi.com/1996-1073/17/18/4592

Hasan, M. M., Moznuzzaman, M., Shaha, A., & Khan, I. (2024). Enhancing energy efficiency in Bangladesh's readymade garment sector: The untapped potential of LED lighting retrofits. International Journal of Energy Sector Management, ahead-of-print(ahead-of-print). https://doi.org/10.1108/IJESM-05-2024-0009

Henneman, L., Choirat, C., Dedoussi, I., Dominici, F., Roberts, J., & Zigler, C. (2023). Mortality risk from United States coal electricity generation. 382(6673), 941–946. https://doi.org/doi:10.1126/science.adf4915

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). (2006). 2022 IPCC guidelines for national greenhouse gas inventories volume 3: Energy; Chapter 2: Stationary combustion. https://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/public/2006gl/pdf/2_Volume2/V2_2_Ch2_Stationary_Combustion.pdf

International Energy Agency (IEA). (2022). Targeting 100% LED lighting sales by 2025. https://www.iea.org/reports/targeting-100-led-lighting-sales-by-2025

International Energy Agency (IEA). (2023). Global floor area and buildings energy intensity in the net zero scenario, 2010-2030. Retrieved 06 March 2025 from https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/global-floor-area-and-buildings-energy-intensity-in-the-net-zero-scenario-2010-2030

International Energy Agency (IEA). (2024). World energy balances. IEA. https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/data-product/world-energy-balances

Iskra-Golec, I., Wazna, A., & Smith, L. (2012). Effects of blue-enriched light on the daily course of mood, sleepiness and light perception: A field experiment. 44(4), 506-513. https://doi.org/10.1177/1477153512447528

Kamat, A. S., Khosla, R., & Narayanamurti, V. (2020). Illuminating homes with LEDs in india: Rapid market creation towards low-carbon technology transition in a developing country. Energy Research & Social Science, 66, 101488. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2020.101488

Khan, N., & Abas, N. (2011). Comparative study of energy saving light sources. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 15(1), 296–309. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2010.07.072

Koretsky, Z. (2021). Phasing out an embedded technology: Insights from banning the incandescent light bulb in europe. Energy Research & Social Science, 82, 102310. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2021.102310

Lane, K. (2023, 11 July 2023). Lighting. International Energy Agency (IEA). Retrieved 13 December 2024 from https://www.iea.org/energy-system/buildings/lighting

Lee, K., Donnelly, S., & Phillips, G. (2024). 2020 U.S. Lighting market characterization. https://www.osti.gov/biblio/2371534

Lee, K., Nubbe, V., Rego, B., Hansen, M., & Pattison, M. (2021). 2020 LED manufacturing supply chain. U. S. DOE. https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2021-05/ssl-2020-led-mfg-supply-chain-mar21.pdf

Mathias, J. A., Juenger, K. M., & Horton, J. J. (2023). Advances in the energy efficiency of residential appliances in the US: A review. Energy Efficiency, 16(5), 34. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12053-023-10114-8

Moadab, N. H., Olsson, T., Fischl, G., & Aries, M. (2021). Smart versus conventional lighting in apartments - electric lighting energy consumption simulation for three different households. Energy and Buildings, 244, 111009. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enbuild.2021.111009

Moyano, D. B., Moyano, S. B., López, M. G., Aznal, A. S., & Lezcano, R. A. G. (2020). Nominal risk analysis of the blue light from LED luminaires in indoor lighting design. Optik, 223, 165599. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijleo.2020.165599

Nair, G. B., & Dhoble, S. J. (2021a). 2 - fundamentals of LEDs. In G. B. Nair & S. J. Dhoble (Eds.), The fundamentals and applications of light-emitting diodes (pp. 35–57). Woodhead Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-819605-2.00002-1

Nair, G. B., & Dhoble, S. J. (2021b). 6 - general lighting. In G. B. Nair & S. J. Dhoble (Eds.), The fundamentals and applications of light-emitting diodes (pp. 155–176). Woodhead Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-819605-2.00006-9

Pattison, M., Hansen, M., Bardsley, N., Elliott, C., Lee, K., Pattison, L., & Tsao, J. (2020). 2019 lighting R&D opportunities. https://www.osti.gov/biblio/1618035

Periyannan, E., Ramachandra, T., & Geekiyanage, D. (2023). Assessment of costs and benefits of green retrofit technologies: Case study of hotel buildings in Sri Lanka. Journal of Building Engineering, 78, 107631. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jobe.2023.107631

Placek, M. (2023). LED lighting in the United States - statistics & facts. Statista. Retrieved 09 February 2025 from https://www.statista.com/topics/1144/led-lighting-in-the-us/#topicOverview

Pompei, L., Blaso, L., Fumagalli, S., & Bisegna, F. (2022). The impact of key parameters on the energy requirements for artificial lighting in Italian buildings based on standard en 15193-1:2017. Energy and Buildings, 263, 112025. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enbuild.2022.112025

Pompei, L., Mattoni, B., Bisegna, F., Blaso, L., & Fumagalli, S. (2020, 9–12 June 2020). Evaluation of the energy consumption of an educational building, based on the uni en 15193–1:2017, varying different lighting control systems. 2020 IEEE International Conference on Environment and Electrical Engineering and 2020 IEEE Industrial and Commercial Power Systems Europe (EEEIC / I&CPS Europe)

Sarigiannis, D. A., Karakitsios, S. P., Antonakopoulou, M. P., & Gotti, A. (2012). Exposure analysis of accidental release of mercury from compact fluorescent lamps (CFLs). Science of The Total Environment, 435–436, 306–315. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2012.07.026

Saunders, H. D., & Tsao, J. Y. (2012). Rebound effects for lighting. Energy Policy, 49, 477-478. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2012.06.050

Schleich, J., Mills, B., & Dütschke, E. (2014). A brighter future? Quantifying the rebound effect in energy efficient lighting. Energy Policy, 72, 35–42. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2014.04.028

Schratz, M., Gupta, C., Struhs, T. J., & Gray, K. (2016). A new way to see the light: Improving light quality with cost-effective led technology. IEEE Industry Applications Magazine, 22(4), 55–62. https://doi.org/10.1109/MIAS.2015.2459089

United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). (2021). SADC member states welcome the introduction of new efficient lighting standards. UNIDO. Retrieved 05 March 2025 from https://www.unido.org/news/sadc-member-states-welcome-introduction-new-efficient-lighting-standards

U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). (2016). Solid-state lighting R&D plan. https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2016/06/f32/ssl_rd-plan_%20jun2016_2.pdf

Xiong, Y., Guo, H., Nor, D. D. M. M., Song, A., & Dai, L. (2023). Mineral resources depletion, environmental degradation, and exploitation of natural resources: Covid-19 aftereffects. Resources Policy, 85, 103907. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2023.103907

Xu, Y. (2019). Chapter 2.1 - nature and source of light for plant factory. In M. Anpo, H. Fukuda, & T. Wada (Eds.), Plant factory using artificial light (pp. 47–69). Elsevier. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-813973-8.00002-6

Zhang, H., Cai, J., & Braun, J. E. (2023). A whole building life-cycle assessment methodology and its application for carbon footprint analysis of U.S. Commercial buildings. Journal of Building Performance Simulation, 16(1), 38–56. https://doi.org/10.1080/19401493.2022.2107071

Zissis, G., Bertoldi, P., & Serrenho, T. (2021). Update on the status of LED-lighting world market since 2018. Publications Office of the European Union. https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC122760

Credits

Lead Fellow

  • Henry Igugu, Ph.D.

Contributors

  • Ruthie Burrows, Ph.D.

  • James Gerber, Ph.D.

  • Daniel Jasper

  • Alex Sweeney

Internal Reviewers

  • Aiyana Bodi

  • Hannah Henkin

  • Megan Matthews

  • Ted Otte

  • Amanda Smith, Ph.D.

  • Tina Swanson, Ph.D.

Effectiveness

Replacing 1% of the building lighting market with LED lamps avoids approximately 7.09 Mt CO₂‑eq/yr emissions on a 100-yr basis (Table 1) or 7.15 Mt CO₂‑eq/yr on a 20-yr basis.

We estimated this solution’s effectiveness (Table 1) by multiplying the global electricity savings intensity (kWh/%) by an emissions intensity (g/kWh) for each GHG emitted due to electricity generation. Using the IEA (2024)’s energy balances data, we estimated emissions intensities of approximately 529 g/kWh for CO₂, 0.07 g/kWh for methane and 0.01 g/kWh for nitrous oxide. Country-specific data were limited. Therefore, we developed the savings intensity using the IEA’s adoption trend (%/yr) and electricity consumption reduction (kWh/yr) for residential buildings globally (Lane, 2023). We then scaled up the savings intensity to represent all buildings (since LEDs are applicable in all types of buildings), but we could not find global data specifying the energy savings potential of converting the lighting market in nonresidential buildings to LEDs. Notably, artificial lighting’s energy consumption varies across building types (Moadab et al., 2021) and is typically greater in nonresidential buildings (Build Up, 2019). This presents some level of uncertainty, but also suggests that our estimates could be conservative – and that there is potential for even greater savings in nonresidential buildings.

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Table 1. Effectiveness at reducing emissions.

Unit: t CO₂‑eq/% lamps LED/yr, 100-yr basis

Estimate 7090000
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Cost

Our lifetime initial cost estimate of switching 1% of the global building lighting market to LEDs is approximately US$1.5 billion. Because LEDs use less electricity than alternative lamps, they cost less to operate, resulting in operating costs of –US$1.3 billion/yr (i.e., cost savings). Building owners typically are not paid to use LED lighting; therefore, the revenue is zero. After amortizing the initial cost over 30 years, the net annual cost for this solution is –US$1.2 billion/yr globally. Thus, replacing other bulbs with LEDs saves money despite the initial cost.

We estimated the cost (Table 2) by first identifying initial and operating costs from studies that retrofitted buildings with LEDs, such as Periyannan et al. (2023), Hasan et al. (2024), and Forastiere et al. (2024). We then divided the costs by the impact of the LED retrofit on the amount of electricity consumed by lighting in each study and multiplied this by the global electricity savings intensity (kWh/%) we estimated during the effectiveness analysis. The result was the cost per percent of lamps in buildings converted to LED lighting (US$/% lamps LED).

We estimated the cost per unit climate impact by dividing the annual cost savings per adoption unit by the CO₂‑eq emissions reduced yearly per adoption unit (Table 2).

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Table 2. Cost per unit climate impact.

Unit: 2023 US$/t CO₂‑eq, 100-yr basis

median -175.0

Negative values reflect cost savings.

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Learning Curve

As LEDs became more common in building lighting, costs dropped significantly in recent years.

Trends based on LED adoption data (Lane, 2023) and the cost of LED lighting (Pattison et al., 2020) showed a 29.7% drop in cost as LED adoption doubled between 2016 and 2019.

The cost data we used to identify the learning curve for this solution (Table 3) are specific to the United States and limited to pre-2020. More recent LED cost data may show additional cost benefits, but this value may not be applicable for other countries. However, the cost data we analyzed do provide a useful sample of the broader LED cost-reduction trend.

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Table 3. Learning rate: drop in cost per doubling of the installed solution base

Units: %

Estimate 29.7
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Speed of Action

Speed of action refers to how quickly a climate solution physically affects the atmosphere after it is deployed. This is different from speed of deployment, which is the pace at which solutions are adopted.

At Project Drawdown, we define the speed of action for each climate solution as gradual, emergency brake, or delayed.

Deploy LED Lighting is a GRADUAL climate solution. It has a steady, linear impact on the atmosphere. The cumulative effect over time builds as a straight line.

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Caveats

Our effectiveness analysis is based on the current state of LED technology. If the adoption ceiling is attained, further improvements to the amount of light that LEDs generate per unit electricity could enhance the solution’s impact through further reductions in electricity use.

The rebound effect – where building occupants use more lighting in response to increased energy-efficiency of lamps – is a well-established concern (Saunders and Tsao, 2012; Schleich et al. 2014). We attempted to address this concern by using IEA data on actual electricity consumption originating from building lighting to determine both its effectiveness and cost implications (Lane, 2023).

We did not fully account for the cost savings that potentially arise from fewer bulb replacements, since LEDs may replace various types of lamps. Because LEDs last significantly longer than all alternative lamp technologies, building owners may require fewer replacements when using LED lamps compared with other lighting sources.

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Current Adoption

Lane (2023) found that LED lamps represented 50.5% of the lighting market globally for residential buildings in 2022, but does not provide adoption data specific to nonresidential buildings. Studies that provide global or geographically segmented LED adoption data for all building types are also limited. Therefore, we assume 50.5% to be representative of LED adoption across all buildings globally (Table 4).

Other studies highlight adoption levels across various countries. The data captured in these studies and reports provide context with specific adoption levels from different regions (see Geographic Guidance).

The IEA and U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) report that LEDs are increasingly the preferred choice of homeowners and the general building lighting market. This preference is evident in the growing market share of LED lamps sold and installed annually (Lane, 2023; Lee et al., 2024).

In general, the solution’s current adoption globally is substantial, and we recognize that some countries possess more room for the solution to scale. While adoption barriers vary across regions, many countries are establishing lighting standards to drive LED adoption, especially across Africa [(IEA, 2022; United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), 2021].

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Table 4. Current (2022) adoption level.

Units: % lamps LED

Estimate 50.5
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Adoption Trend

Adoption of LEDs has grown approximately 3.75%/yr over the past two decades.

Lane (2023) found that the proportion of lamps sold annually for building lighting that are LEDs grew from 1.1% in 2010 to 50.5% in 2022 (Figure 2). We estimated the adoption trend (Table 5) by determining the percentage growth between successive years, and calculating the variances.

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Figure 2. Trend in LED adoption between 2010 and 2022 (adapted from Lane, 2023).

Source: Lane, K. (2023, 11 July 2023). Lighting. International Energy Agency (IEA). Retrieved 13 December 2024 from https://www.iea.org/energy-system/buildings/lighting

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Data on the growth of LEDs across regional building lighting markets are limited. Lee et al. (2024)’s analysis of the U.S. lighting market found 46.5% growth 2010–2020, which translates to 4.65% annually. Zissis et al. (2021) reported 26% growth for France for 2017–2020, which averages 8.67% annually.

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Table 5. 2010–2022 adoption trend.

Units: % lamps LED market share growth/yr

25th percentile 2.85
mean 4.12
median (50th percentile) 3.75
75th percentile 5.4
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Adoption Ceiling

The adoption ceiling (Table 6) is 100%, meaning all lamps in buildings are LEDs. Lane (2023) projects 100% LED market penetration by 2030. If current adoption trends continue, 100% LED adoption is a practical and achievable upper limit. However, countries will need to overcome challenges such as regulatory enforcement, financial, and technology access issues, while preventing the entrance of inferior quality LEDs into their lighting market (IEA, 2022).

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Table 6. Adoption ceiling

Units: % lamps LED

Estimate 100
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Achievable Adoption

We estimate a low achievable adoption scenario of 87% based on Statista’s projections about LED lighting market penetration by 2030 (Placek, 2023). The values were similar in Zissis et al. (2021).

For the high achievable scenario, we projected 10 years beyond the 2022 adoption level using the mean adoption trend of 4.12%/yr. This translates to a 41% growth on top of the current adoption level of 50.5%, summing up to a 92% LED adoption level (Table 7).

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Table 7. Range of achievable adoption levels.

Unit: % lamps LED

Current Adoption 50.5
Achievable – Low 87
Achievable – High 92
Adoption Ceiling 100
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We estimated that current adoption cuts about 0.36 Gt CO₂‑eq emissions on a 100-yr basis compared with the previous alternative lighting sources (Table 8). The low achievable adoption scenario of 87% LED lamps could cut emissions 0.62 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr due to reduced electricity consumption, while a high achievable adoption scenario of 92% LED lamps could cut emissions 0.65 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr. If the adoption ceiling of 100% LEDs for lighting buildings is reached, we estimate that 0.71 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr could be avoided (Table 8).

LED lighting could further cut electricity consumption as LED technology continues to improve. However, the technology’s future climate impacts will depend on the emissions of future electricity-generation systems.

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Table 8. Climate impact at different levels of adoption.

Unit: Gt CO₂‑eq/yr 100-yr basis

Current Adoption 0.36
Achievable – Low 0.62
Achievable – High 0.65
Adoption Ceiling 0.71
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Additional Benefits

Air and Water Quality

The lower electricity demand of LEDs could help reduce emissions from power plants and so improve air quality (Amann et al., 2022). Additionally, LEDs can mitigate small amounts of mercury found in fluorescent lights (Amann et al., 2022). Mercury contamination from discarded bulbs in landfills can leach into surrounding water bodies and accumulate in aquatic life. LEDs also have longer lifespans than fluorescent and incandescent bulbs (Nair & Dhoble, 2021b) which can reduce the amount of discarded bulbs and further mitigate environmental degradation from landfills. 

Income and Work

Because LEDs use less electricity than fluorescent and incandescent light bulbs (Khan & Abas, 2011), households and businesses using LED technology can save money on electricity costs. The payback period for the initial investment from lower utility bills is about one year for residential buildings and about two months for commercial buildings (Amann et al., 2022). LED lighting can contribute to savings by minimizing energy demand for cooling, since LEDs emit less heat than fluorescent and incandescent bulbs (Albatayneh et al., 2021; Schratz et al., 2016). However, it could also lead to a greater need for space heating in some regions. LED lights also last longer than alternative lighting technologies, which can lead to lower maintenance costs (Schratz et al., 2016).

Health

Reductions in air pollution due to LED lighting’s lower electricity demand decrease exposures to pollutants such as mercury and fine particulate matter generated from fossil fuel-based power plants, improving the health of nearby communities [Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 2024]. These pollutants have been linked to increased morbidity from cardiovascular and respiratory disease, asthma, infections, and cancer, (Gasparotto & Martinello, 2021) and to increased risk of mortality (Henneman et al., 2023). Because LEDs do not contain mercury, they can mitigate small health risks associated with mercury exposure when fluorescent light bulbs break (Bose-O’Reilly et al., 2010; Sarigiannis et al., 2012). Switching to LEDs can also enhance a visual environment and improve occupants’ well-being, visual comfort, and overall productivity when lamps with the appropriate lighting quality and correlated color temperature are selected (Fu et al., 2023; Iskra-Golec et al., 2012; Nair & Dhoble, 2021b).

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Risks

We found limited data indicating risks with choosing LEDs over other lighting sources. Concerns about eye health raised in the early days of LED adoption (Behar-Cohen et al., 2011) have been allayed by studies that found that LEDs do not pose a greater risk to the eye than comparable lighting sources (Moyano et al. 2020). 

LED manufacturing uses metals like gold, indium, and gallium (Gao et al., 2022). This creates environmental risks due to mining (Xiong et al., 2023) and makes LED supply chains susceptible to macroeconomic uncertainties (Lee et al., 2021). With growing adoption of LED lights, there is also the risk of greater electronic waste at the end of the LED’s lifespan. Therefore, recycling is increasingly important (Cenci et al., 2020). 

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Interactions with Other Solutions

Reinforcing

Other lighting sources such as incandescent lamps are known to produce some heat, thus adding to the cooling load. LEDs are more energy-efficient, and therefore could reduce the cooling requirements of a space. 

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Competing

Some studies demonstrate an increase in the indoor heating requirements when switching to LED lighting from other lighting sources, such as incandescent lamps, that produce more heat than LEDs. The difference is often small, but worth taking into account when adopting LEDs in a building with previously energy-inefficient lighting.

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Dashboard

Solution Basics

% lamps LED

tCO2-eq/unit
7.09×10⁶
units
Current 50.58792
Achievable (Low to High)

Climate Impact

GtCO2-eq/yr
Current 0.36 0.620.65
US$ per tCO2-eq
-175
Gradual

CO₂, CH₄, N₂O, BC

Trade-offs

LED lamp manufacturing creates more emissions than manufacturing other types of lamps. For example, Zhang et al. (2023) compared the manufacturing emissions of a 12.5W LED lamp with a 14W CFL and a 60W incandescent bulb. These light sources provided similar levels of illumination (850–900 lumens). The production of one LED bulb resulted in 9.81 kg CO₂‑eq emissions, while the CFL and incandescent resulted in 2.29 and 0.73 kg CO₂‑eq emissions, respectively. However, LEDs are preferred because their longevity results in fewer LED lamps required to provide the same amount of lighting over time. LEDs can last 25 times longer than incandescent lamps with an identical lumen output (Nair & Dhoble, 2021b; Xu, 2019; Zhang et al., 2023). 

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% LED lamps
< 20
20–40
40–60
> 60
No data

Percentage of lamps that are LEDs, circa 2020

The percentage of lamps used to light buildings that are LEDs varies around the world, with limited data available on a per-country basis.

Miah, M. A. R., & Kabir, R. (2023). Energy savings forecast for solid-state lighting in residential and commercial buildings in Bangladesh. IEEE PES 15th Asia-Pacific Power and Energy Engineering Conference (APPEEC), pp. 1-6, doi: 10.1109/APPEEC57400.2023.10561921

U.S. Department of Energy (2024). 2020 U.S. lighting market characterization. https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2024-08/ssl-lmc2020_apr24.pdf

World Furniture Online (2017). The lighting fixtures market in Australia and New Zealand. https://www.worldfurnitureonline.com/report/the-lighting-fixtures-market-in-australia-and-new-zealand/

Zissis, G., Bertoldi, P., & Serrenho, T. (2021). Update on the status of LED-lighting world market since 2018. Publications Office of the European Union. https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC122760

% LED lamps
< 20
20–40
40–60
> 60
No data

Percentage of lamps that are LEDs, circa 2020

The percentage of lamps used to light buildings that are LEDs varies around the world, with limited data available on a per-country basis.

Miah, M. A. R., & Kabir, R. (2023). Energy savings forecast for solid-state lighting in residential and commercial buildings in Bangladesh. IEEE PES 15th Asia-Pacific Power and Energy Engineering Conference (APPEEC), pp. 1-6, doi: 10.1109/APPEEC57400.2023.10561921

U.S. Department of Energy (2024). 2020 U.S. lighting market characterization. https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2024-08/ssl-lmc2020_apr24.pdf

World Furniture Online (2017). The lighting fixtures market in Australia and New Zealand. https://www.worldfurnitureonline.com/report/the-lighting-fixtures-market-in-australia-and-new-zealand/

Zissis, G., Bertoldi, P., & Serrenho, T. (2021). Update on the status of LED-lighting world market since 2018. Publications Office of the European Union. https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC122760

Geographic Guidance Introduction

The Deploy LED Lighting solution can be equally effective at reducing electricity use across global regions because the efficiency gained by replacing other bulbs with LEDs is functionally identical. However, its climate impact will vary with the emissions intensity of each region’s electricity grid. Secondary considerations associated with uptake of LED lighting also can vary with climate and hence geography. In particular, the decrease in heating associated with LED lighting can reduce demands on air conditioning, leading to increased incentive for solution uptake in warmer climates.

Historically, a few countries typically account for the bulk of LEDs purchased. For example, 30% of the 5 billion LEDs sold globally in 2016 were sold in China. In the same period, North America accounted for 15% while Western Europe, Japan, and India represented 11%, 10%, and 8% of the LEDs sold, respectively (Kamat et al., 2020; U.S. DOE, 2016). Essentially, the growing sales of LEDs drove global adoption levels from 17.6% of the building lighting market in 2016 to 50.5% in 2022 (Lane, 2023). However, current adoption still varies considerably around the world. For instance, Lee et al. (2024) reported that LED market penetration in the U.S. was 47.5% in 2020, compared with 43.3% globally in the same period (Lane, 2023). Meanwhile, LED adoption in France was 35% in 2017, and countries in the Middle East such as the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey had over 70% LED adoption that same year; residential buildings in the United Kingdom had 13% LED adoption in 2018, while Japan had 60% LED adoption as of 2019 (Zissis et al., 2021). This demonstrates potential to scale LED adoption in the future, especially in low- and middle-income countries where the bulk of new building occurs (IEA, 2023).

Action Word
Deploy
Solution Title
LED Lighting
Classification
Highly Recommended
Lawmakers and Policymakers
  • Use regulations to phase out and replace energy-inefficient lighting sources with LEDs.
  • Set regulations that encourage sufficient lighting to limit the overuse of LEDs (or rebound effects).
  • Require that public lighting use LEDs.
  • Use financial incentives such as tax breaks, subsidies, and grants to facilitate the transition to LEDs.
  • Revise building energy-efficiency standards to reflect energy savings of LEDs.
  • Develop production standards and mandate labeling for LEDs.
  • Build sufficient inspection capacity for LED manufacturers and penalize noncompliance with standards.
  • Use energy-efficiency purchase agreements to help support utility companies during the transition to LED lighting.
  • Invest in research and development that improves the cost and efficiency of LED lighting.
  • Develop a certification program for LED lighting.
  • Create exchange programs or buy-back programs for inefficient light bulbs.
  • Start demonstration projects to promote LED lighting.
  • Join, support, or create educational programs that raise public awareness about the cost savings and energy-efficiency gains associated with LEDs.

Further information:

Practitioners
  • Take advantage of or advocate for financial incentives such as tax breaks, subsidies, and grants to facilitate the production of LED lighting.
  • Help develop circular supply chains in renovating, remanufacturing, reusing, and redistributing materials.
  • Invest in research and development to improve efficiency and cost of LEDs.
  • Adhere to, or advocate for, national LED standards.
  • Develop, produce, and sell LED lighting that imitates incandescent or other familiar lighting.
  • Consider bundling services with retrofitting companies and collaborating with utility companies to offer rebates or other incentives.
  • Improve self-service of LEDs by reducing obstacles to installation and ensuring LEDs can be easily replaced.
  • Help create positive perceptions of LED lighting by showcasing usage, cost savings, and emissions reductions.
  • Create feedback mechanisms, such as apps that alert users to real-time benefits such as energy and cost savings.
  • Start demonstration projects to promote LED lighting.
  • Join, support, or create educational programs that raise public awareness about the cost savings and energy-efficiency gains associated with LEDs.

Further information:

Business Leaders
  • Retrofit existing operations for LEDs, replace inefficient bulbs, and purchase only LEDs going forward.
  • Help develop circular supply chains in renovating, remanufacturing, reusing, and redistributing LED lighting materials.
  • Take advantage of financial incentives such as tax breaks, subsidies, and grants to facilitate the transition to LED lighting.
  • Invest in research and development that improves the cost and efficiency of LED lighting.
  • Join, support, or create educational programs that raise public awareness about the cost savings and energy-efficiency gains associated with LEDs.

Further information:

Nonprofit Leaders
  • Retrofit existing operations for LEDs, replace inefficient bulbs, and purchase only LEDs going forward.
  • Help develop circular supply chains in renovating, remanufacturing, reusing, and redistributing LED lighting materials.
  • Take advantage of, or advocate for, financial incentives such as tax breaks, subsidies, and grants to facilitate the transition to LED lighting.
  • Advocate for regulations to phase out and replace energy-inefficient lighting sources with LEDs.
  • Advocate for production standards and labeling for LEDs.
  • Call for regulations that encourage sufficient lighting to limit the overuse of LEDs (or rebound effects).
  • Start demonstration projects to promote LED lighting.
  • Help develop, support, or administer a certification program for LED lighting.
  • Create national catalogs of LED manufacturers, suppliers, and retailers.
  • Join, support, or create educational programs that raise public awareness about the cost savings and energy-efficiency gains associated with LEDs.

Further information:

Investors
  • Retrofit existing operations for LEDs, replace inefficient bulbs, and purchase only LEDs going forward.
  • Take advantage of financial incentives such as tax breaks, subsidies, and grants to facilitate the transition to LED lighting.
  • Invest in LED manufacturers, supply chains, and supportive industries.
  • Support research and development to improve the efficiency and cost of LEDs.
  • Invest in LED companies.
  • Fund companies that provide retrofitting services (energy service companies).
  • Invest in businesses dedicated to advancing LED use.
  • Ensure portfolio companies do not produce or support non-LED lighting supply chains.
  • Join, support, or create educational programs that raise public awareness about the cost savings and energy-efficiency gains associated with LEDs.

Further information:

Philanthropists and International Aid Agencies
  • Retrofit existing operations for LEDs, replace inefficient bulbs, and purchase only LEDs going forward.
  • Take advantage of financial incentives such as tax breaks, subsidies, and grants to facilitate the transition to LED lighting.
  • Provide financing such as low-interest loans, grants, and micro-grants to help accelerate LED adoption.
  • Fund companies that provide retrofitting services (energy service companies).
  • Advocate for regulations to phase out energy-inefficient lighting sources and replace them with LEDs.
  • Call for regulations that encourage sufficient lighting to limit the overuse of LEDs (or rebound effects).
  • Start demonstration projects to promote LED lighting.
  • Help develop, support, or administer a certification program for LED lighting.
  • Create national catalogs of LED manufacturers, suppliers, and retailers.
  • Join, support, or create educational programs that raise public awareness about the cost savings and energy-efficiency gains associated with LEDs.

Further information:

Thought Leaders
  • Retrofit buildings for LED lighting, replace inefficient bulbs, and purchase only LEDs going forward.
  • Help create positive perceptions of LED lighting by highlighting your personal usage, cost and energy savings, and emissions reductions.
  • Help develop circular supply chains in renovating, remanufacturing, reusing, and redistributing materials.
  • Take advantage of, or advocate for, financial incentives such as tax breaks, subsidies, and grants to facilitate the transition to LED lighting.
  • Advocate for regulations to phase out energy-inefficient lighting sources and replace them with LEDs.
  • Advocate for LED standards.
  • Advocate for regulations that encourage sufficient lighting and guard against overuse of LEDs (or rebound effects).
  • Start demonstration projects to promote LED lighting.
  • Help develop, support, or administer a certification program for LED lighting.
  • Create national catalogs of LED manufacturers, suppliers, and retailers.
  • Join, support, or create educational programs that raise public awareness about the cost savings and energy-efficiency gains associated with LEDs.

Further information:

Technologists and Researchers
  • Develop circular supply chains in renovating, remanufacturing, reusing, and redistributing materials.
  • Improve the efficiency and cost of LEDs.
  • Improve LED lighting to imitate familiar lighting, offer customers settings, and augment color rendering.
  • Improve self-service of LEDs by reducing obstacles to installation and ensuring LEDs can be replaced individually.
  • Help develop standards for LEDs.
  • Create feedback mechanisms, such as apps that alert users to real-time benefits such as energy and cost savings.

Further information:

Communities, Households, and Individuals
  • Retrofit for LEDs, replace inefficient bulbs, and purchase only LEDs going forward.
  • Help create positive perceptions of LED lighting by highlighting your personal usage, cost and energy savings, and emissions reductions.
  • Help develop circular supply chains in renovating, remanufacturing, reusing, and redistributing materials.
  • Take advantage of or advocate for financial incentives such as tax breaks, subsidies, and grants to facilitate the transition to LED lighting.
  • Advocate for regulations to phase out and replace energy-inefficient lighting sources with LEDs.
  • Advocate for LED standards.
  • Advocate for regulations that encourage sufficient lighting to limit the overuse of LEDs (or rebound effects).
  • Join, support, or create educational programs that raise public awareness about the cost savings and energy-efficiency gains associated with LEDs.

Further information:

Sources
Evidence Base

The level of consensus about the effectiveness of replacing other lighting sources with LEDs is High. 

Using LEDs significantly minimizes the electricity required to light buildings, thereby reducing GHG emissions from electricity generation. Many countries are phasing out other lighting sources to reduce GHG emissions (Lane, 2023).

The IEA reported that global adoption of LEDs drove a nearly 30% reduction in annual electricity consumption for lighting in homes between 2010 and 2022 (Lane, 2023). Hasan et al. (2024) indicated that LEDs could reduce the lighting energy usage of buildings (and their resulting GHG emissions) in Bangladesh by 50%. Periyannan et al. (2023) recorded significant electricity savings after evaluating the impact of retrofitting hotels in Sri Lanka with LEDs. Forastiere et al. (2024)’s analysis of the retail buildings in Italy showed an 11% reduction in energy consumption from replacing other lamps with LEDs. Booysen et al., (2021) also achieved significant energy reduction with lighting retrofits in South African educational buildings.

The results presented in this document summarize findings from six original studies and three public sector/multilateral agency reports, which collectively reflect current evidence both globally and from six countries on four different continents. We recognize this limited geographic scope creates bias, and hope this work inspires research and data sharing on this topic in underrepresented regions.

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Updated Date

Deploy Clean Cooking

Submitted by Drawdown Admin on
Sector
Buildings
Mode
Cut Emissions
Cluster
Shift Energy Sources
Image
Family cooking on a clean stove indoors
Coming Soon
Off
Summary

We define the Deploy Clean Cooking solution as the use of cleaner cooking fuels (liquid petroleum gas, natural gas, electricity, biogas, and ethanol) in place of polluting fuels such as wood, charcoal, dung, kerosene, and coal, and/or the use of efficient cookstove technologies (together called cleaner cooking solutions). Replacing unclean fuel and cookstoves with cleaner approaches can drastically reduce GHG emissions while offering health and biodiversity benefits.

Income & work,Health,Equality
Nature protection,Air quality
Overview

Worldwide, cooking is responsible for an estimated 1.7 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr (100-yr basis), (World Health Organization [WHO], 2023), or almost 3% of annual global emissions. Most of these emissions come from burning nonrenewable biomass fuels. Only the CO₂‑eq on a 100-yr basis is reported here due to lack of data on the relative contributions of GHGs. The International Energy Agency (IEA, 2023a) states that 2.3 billion people in 128 countries currently cook with coal, charcoal, kerosene, firewood, agricultural waste, or dung over open fires or inefficient cookstoves because they do not have the ability to regularly cook using cleaner cooking solutions. Even when sustainably harvested, biomass fuel is not climate neutral because it emits methane and black carbon (Smith, 2002).

Clean cooking reduces GHG emissions through three pathways: 

Improving efficiency

Traditional biomass or charcoal cookstoves are less than 15% efficient (Khavari et al., 2023), meaning most generated heat is lost to the environment rather than heating the cooking vessel and food. Cleaner fuels and technologies can be many times more efficient, using less energy to prepare meals than traditional fuels and cookstoves (Kashyap et al., 2024). 

Reducing carbon intensity

Cleaner fuels have lower carbon intensity, producing significantly fewer GHG emissions per unit of heat generated than conventional fuels. Carbon intensity includes CO₂, methane, and nitrous oxides as well as black carbon. For instance, charcoal cookstoves emit approximately 572 kg CO₂‑eq /GJ of heat delivered for cooking (Cashman et al., 2016). In contrast, liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) and biogas emit about 292 and 11 kg CO₂‑eq /GJ, respectively (Cashman et al., 2016) and, excluding the embodied carbon, stoves that heat with electricity generated from renewable energy sources such as solar, wind, or hydroelectric have zero emissions.

Reducing deforestation

Cleaner cooking also helps mitigate climate change by reducing deforestation (Clean Cooking Alliance [CCA], 2023) and associated GHG emissions. 

Figure 1. Classification of household cooking fuels as clean (green) and polluting (orange). Adapted from Stoner et al. 2021.

Source: Stoner, O., Lewis, J., Martínez, I. L., Gumy, S., Economou, T., & Adair-Rohani, H. (2021). Household cooking fuel estimates at global and country level for 1990 to 2030. Nature communications, 12(1), 5793.https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-021-26036-x

References

Afrane, G., & Ntiamoah, A. (2011). Comparative life cycle assessment of charcoal, biogas, and liquefied petroleum gas as cooking fuels in Ghana. Journal of Industrial Ecology, 15(4), 539-549. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1530-9290.2011.00350.x

Afrane, G., & Ntiamoah, A. (2012). Analysis of the life-cycle costs and environmental impacts of cooking fuels used in Ghana. Applied energy, 98, 301-306. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0306261912002590

Anenberg, S. C., Balakrishnan, K., Jetter, J., Masera, O., Mehta, S., Moss, J., & Ramanathan, V. (2013). Cleaner cooking solutions to achieve health, climate, and economic cobenefits. https://pubs.acs.org/doi/10.1021/es304942e

Bailis, R., Drigo, R., Ghilardi, A., & Masera, O. (2015). The carbon footprint of traditional woodfuels. Nature Climate Change, 5(3), 266-272. https://www.nature.com/articles/nclimate2491

Bensch, G., Jeuland, M., & Peters, J. (2021). Efficient biomass cooking in Africa for climate change mitigation and development. One Earth, 4(6), 879-890. https://www.cell.com/one-earth/pdf/S2590-3322(21)00296-7.pdf

Bennitt, F. B., Wozniak, S. S., Causey, K., Burkart, K., & Brauer, M. (2021). Estimating disease burden attributable to household air pollution: new methods within the Global Burden of Disease Study. The Lancet Global Health, 9, S18. https://doi.org/10.1016/S2214-109X(21)00126-1

Bergero, C., Gosnell, G., Gielen, D., Kang, S., Bazilian, M., & Davis, S. J. (2023). Pathways to net-zero emissions from aviation. Nature Sustainability, 6(4), 404-414. https://www.nature.com/articles/s41893-022-01046-9

​​Biswas, S., & Das, U. (2022). Adding fuel to human capital: Exploring the educational effects of cooking fuel choice from rural India. Energy Economics, 105, 105744. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2021.105744

Cabiyo, B., Ray, I., & Levine, D. I. (2020). The refill gap: clean cooking fuel adoption in rural India. Environmental Research Letters, 16(1), 014035. https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/abd133

Cashman, S., Rodgers, M., & Huff, M. (2016). Life-cycle assessment of cookstove fuels in India and China. US Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, DC. EPA/600/R-15/325. https://cleancooking.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/496-1.pdf

Clean Cooking Alliance (CCA). (2023). Accelerating clean cooking as a nature-based solution. https://cleancooking.org/reports-and-tools/accelerating-clean-cooking-as-a-nature-based-climate-solution/

Clean Cooking Alliance. (2022). Clean cooking as a catalyst for sustainable food systems. https://cleancooking.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/CCA_Clean-Cooking-as-a-Catalyst-for-Sustainable-Food-Systems.pdf

Climate & Clean Air Coalition (2024). Nationally determined contributions and clean cooking. https://www.ccacoalition.org/resources/nationally-determined-contributions-and-clean-cooking

Choudhuri, P., & Desai, S. (2021). Lack of access to clean fuel and piped water and children’s educational outcomes in rural India. World Development, 145, 105535. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2021.105535

Dagnachew, A. G., Lucas, P. L., van Vuuren, D. P., & Hof, A. F. (2018). Towards universal access to clean cooking solutions in sub-Saharan Africa. PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency.

Energy Sector Management Assistance Program. (2023). Building evidence to unlock impact finance : A field assessment of lean cooking co-benefits for climate, health, and gender. Retrieved 13 September 2024, from https://www.esmap.org/Building_Evidence_To_unloc_Impact_Finance_Benefits

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International Energy Agency (2023a). A vision for clean cooking access for all. https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/f63eebbc-a3df-4542-b2fb-364dd66a2199/AVisionforCleanCookingAccessforAll.pdf 

International Energy Agency (2023b). Electricity market report. https://www.iea.org/reports/electricity-market-report-update-2023

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Jewitt, S., Atagher, P., & Clifford, M. (2020). “We cannot stop cooking”: Stove stacking, seasonality and the risky practices of household cookstove transitions in Nigeria. Energy Research & Social Science, 61, 101340. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214629619304700?via%3Dihub

Johnson, E. (2009). Charcoal versus LPG grilling: a carbon-footprint comparison. Environmental Impact Assessment Review, 29(6), 370-378. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0195925509000420

Kapsalyamova, Z., Mishra, R., Kerimray, A., Karymshakov, K., & Azhgaliyeva, D. (2021). Why energy access is not enough for choosing clean cooking fuels? Evidence from the multinomial logit model. Journal of Environmental Management, 290, 112539. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301479721006010

Khavari, B., Ramirez, C., Jeuland, M., & Fuso Nerini, F. (2023). A geospatial approach to understanding clean cooking challenges in sub-Saharan Africa. Nature Sustainability, 6(4), 447-457 https://www.nature.com/articles/s41893-022-01039-8

Lacey, F. G., Henze, D. K., Lee, C. J., van Donkelaar, A., & Martin, R. V. (2017). Transient climate and ambient health impacts due to national solid fuel cookstove emissions. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 114(6), 1269-1274.https://www.pnas.org/doi/full/10.1073/pnas.1612430114

Lansche, J., & Müller, J. (2017). Life cycle assessment (LCA) of biogas versus dung combustion household cooking systems in developing countries–a case study in Ethiopia. Journal of cleaner production, 165, 828-835. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0959652617315597

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Mazorra, J., Sánchez-Jacob, E., de la Sota, C., Fernández, L., & Lumbreras, J. (2020). A comprehensive analysis of cooking solutions co-benefits at household level: Healthy lives and well-being, gender and climate change. Science of The Total Environment, 707, 135968. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0048969719359637

Po, J. Y. T., FitzGerald, J. M., & Carlsten, C. (2011). Respiratory disease associated with solid biomass fuel exposure in rural women and children: Systematic review and meta-analysis. Thorax, 66(3), 232–239. https://doi.org/10.1136/thx.2010.147884

Rosenthal, J., Quinn, A., Grieshop, A. P., Pillarisetti, A., & Glass, R. I. (2018). Clean cooking and the SDGs: Integrated analytical approaches to guide energy interventions for health and environment goals. Energy for Sustainable Development, 42, 152-159. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0973082617309857

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Credits

Lead Fellow

  • Yusuf Jameel, Ph.D.

Contributors

  • Ruthie Burrows, Ph.D.

  • James Gerber, Ph.D.

  • Yusuf Jameel, Ph.D.

  • Daniel Jasper

  • Heather McDiarmid, Ph.D.

  • Amanda Smith, Ph.D.

  • Alex Sweeney

Internal Reviewers

  • Aiyana Bodi

  • Hannah Henkin

  • Megan Matthews, Ph.D.

  • Ted Otte

  • Amanda Smith, Ph.D.

  • Tina Swanson, Ph.D.

Effectiveness

The climate impact of cleaner cooking depends on which fuel and technology is being replaced and what is replacing it. The WHO (2024) categorizes cooking fuels as clean, transitional, or polluting based primarily on health impacts. Clean fuels include solar, electric, biogas, LPG, and alcohols, while kerosene and unprocessed coal are polluting fuels. Biomass cooking technologies may be classified as clean, transitional, or polluting depending on the levels of fine particulate matter and carbon monoxide produced. Switching from traditional cookstoves (polluting) to improved cookstoves (transitional) can reduce emissions 20–40%, while switching to an LPG or electric cookstove can reduce emissions more than 60% (Johnson, 2009). Not including the embodied carbon, switching completely to solar-powered electric cookstoves can reduce emissions 100%.

We estimated the effectiveness of cleaner cooking by calculating the reduction in GHG emissions per household switching to cleaner cooking solutions per year (Table 1). Our analysis of national, regional, and global studies suggested that switching to cleaner fuels and technologies can reduce emissions by 0.83–3.4 t CO₂‑eq /household/yr (100-yr basis), including CO₂, methane, black carbon, and sometimes other GHGs. The large range is due to varying assumptions. For example, the IEA arrived at 3.2 t CO₂‑eq /household/yr (100-yr basis) by assuming that >50% of the households switched to electricity or LPG. In comparison, Bailis et al. (2015) assumed a switch from unclean cookstoves to improved biomass cookstoves, resulting in an emissions reduction of only 0.98 t CO₂‑eq /household/yr (100-yr basis).

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Table 1. Effectiveness at reducing GHG emissions of switching from unclean cooking fuels and technologies to cleaner versions.

Unit: t CO₂-eq/household switching to cleaner cooking solutions/yr, 100-yr basis

25th percentile 1.5
mean 2.2
median (50th percentile) 2.3
75th percentile 3.1
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While we estimated a median reduction of 2.3 t CO₂‑eq /household switching to cleaner cooking solutions/yr (100-yr basis), the actual reduction per household might be lower because households often stack cleaner cooking fuel with unclean fuel. This could result from multiple socioeconomic factors. For instance, a household may primarily rely on LPG as its main cooking fuel but occasionally turn to firewood or kerosene for specific dishes, price fluctuation, or fuel shortages (Khavari et al., 2023). In rural areas, cleaner fuels and traditional biomass (e.g., wood or dung) are used together to cut costs or due to personal preferences.

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Cost

People can obtain traditional unclean fuels and traditional woodstoves for little or no cost (Bensch et al., 2021; Kapsalyamova, 2021). Our analysis estimated the cost of woodstoves at US$1.50/household and the monetary cost of biomass fuel at US$0.00/household/yr. Over the two-yr lifespan of a woodstove, the net annualized cost is US$0.75/household/yr. While collecting this fuel might be free, it contributes to poverty because households can spend one to three hours daily collecting fuelwood. This can contribute to children, especially girls, missing school (Jameel et al., 2023). 

We estimated the median upfront cost of transitioning from primarily unclean cooking fuels and technology to cleaner cooking to be approximately US$54/household, with stoves lasting 3–10 years. However, the range of annual costs is large because several cleaner cooking technologies have significant variations in price, and cleaner fuel cost is even more variable. Our analysis showed a median annual fuel cost of US$56/household/yr with costs ranging from savings of US$9/household/yr when buying less biomass for more efficient biomass stoves to costs of US$187/household/yr for LPG. Over a five-yr lifespan, cleaner cooking solutions have a net cost of US$64/household/yr (Table 2). 

Our analysis may overestimate operational costs due to a lack of data on biomass and charcoal costs. The IEA (2023a) estimates that an annual investment of US$8 billion is needed to supply cleaner cookstoves, equipment, and infrastructure to support a transition to cleaner cooking. This translates to US$17/household/yr. 

The IEA (2023) assumes improved biomass and charcoal cookstoves are predominantly adopted in rural areas while LPG and electric stoves are adopted in urban regions because, in LMICs, economic and infrastructure challenges can limit access to LPG and electricity in rural areas. If every household were to switch exclusively to modern cooking (e.g., LPG and electricity), the cost would be much higher. The World Bank estimates the cost of implementing these solutions to be US$1.5 trillion between 2020 and 2030 or ~US$150 billion/yr over the next 10 years. This translates into an average cost of US$214/household/yr (World Bank, 2020). 

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Table 2. Cost of cleaner cooking solutions.

Unit: 2023 US$/household switching to cleaner cooking solution

Median cookstove cost 1.50
Median annual fuel cost 0.00
Net annual cost 0.74

Unit: 2023 US$/household switching to cleaner cooking solution

Median cookstove cost 54
Median annual fuel cost 56
Net annual cost 64
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The median cost per unit of climate impact was US$27/t CO₂‑eq (100-yr basis, Table 3), obtained by taking the difference between median cost of cooking with polluting sources and the cost of adopting cleaner fuel, then dividing by the median reduction per household (Table 1). Beyond climate benefits, cleaner cooking offers significant other benefits (discussed under Additional Benefits below). While the median cost presented here is a reasonable first-order estimate, the actual cost of GHG reduction will depend upon several factors, including the type of stove adopted, stove usage, fuel consumption, and scale of adoption. 

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Table 3. Cost per unit climate impact.

Unit: 2023 US$/t CO₂‑eq, 100-yr basis

median (50th percentile) 27
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Learning Curve

Deploying cleaner cooking is a mature technology, and prices are unlikely to decrease in high-income countries where cleaner cooking fuels and technologies have been completely adopted. Nonetheless, the high cost of cleaner cooking technologies and the fluctuating prices of cleaner cooking fuel have been among the main impediments in the transition of households experiencing poverty away from unclean fuels and technologies. For example, recent price surges in Africa rendered LPG unaffordable for 30 million people (IEA, 2022). Electricity prices have also fluctuated regionally. In Europe and India, prices were higher in 2023 than in 2019 (IEA, 2023b). In contrast, U.S. electricity prices have remained stable over the past five years, while China experienced an 8% decrease.

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Speed of Action

Speed of action refers to how quickly a climate solution physically affects the atmosphere after it is deployed. This is different from speed of deployment, which is the pace at which solutions are adopted.

At Project Drawdown, we define the speed of action for each climate solution as gradual, emergency brake, or delayed.

Deploy Clean Cooking is an EMERGENCY BRAKE climate solution. It has the potential to deliver a more rapid impact than nominal and delayed solutions. Because emergency brake solutions can deliver their climate benefits quickly, they can help accelerate our efforts to address dangerous levels of climate change. For this reason, they are a high priority.

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Caveats

Households may continue using unclean cooking fuel and technologies alongside cleaner fuels and technologies (referred to as stacking). The data on cleaner cooking are typically measured as the number of households primarily relying on cleaner cooking fuel. This fails to capture the secondary fuel source used in the household. A review from LMICs revealed that stacking can range from low (28%) to as high as 100%, which would mean that every household is simultaneously using cleaner and unclean fuel (Shankar et al., 2020). This can happen due to factors like an increase in the cost of cleaner cooking fuel, cooking preference, unavailability of cleaner fuel, and unfamiliarity with cleaner cooking technologies. Stacking is challenging to avoid, and there is a growing realization from cleaner cooking practitioners of the need for cleaner approaches, even when multiple stoves are used. For example, electric stoves can be supplemented with LPG or ethanol stoves.

Permanence

There are significant permanence challenges associated with cleaner cooking. Households switch back from cleaner cooking fuels and technologies to unclean fuels and technologies (Jewitt et al., 2020). 

Finance

Finance is vital to supercharge adoption of cleaner cooking. Investment in the cleaner cooking sector remains significantly below the scale of the global challenge, with current funding at approximately US$130 million. This is many times lower than the amount needed each year to expand adoption of cleaner cooking solutions for the 2.4 billion people who still rely on polluting fuels and technologies (CCA 2023). At the current business-as-usual adoption rate, limited by severe underfunding, more than 80% of the population in sub-Saharan Africa will continue to rely on unclean fuels and technologies in 2030 (Stoner et al., 2021)

Climate funding, developmental finance, and subsidies have made some progress in increasing adoption of cleaner cooking. For instance, the World Bank invested more than US$562 million between 2015 and 2020, enabling 43 million people across 30 countries to adopt cleaner cooking solutions (World Bank, 2023; ESMAP, 2023). However, the emissions reductions these programs achieve can be overestimated. A recent analysis (Gill-Wiehl et al., 2024) found that 7.8 million clean cooking offset credits in reality only amounted to about 1.1 million credits. This discrepancy underscores the urgent need for updated methodologies and standards to accurately estimate emissions reductions and the cost of reduction per t CO₂‑eq (100-yr basis). 

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Current Adoption

The WHO (2025) estimated that 74% of the global population in 2022 used cleaner cooking fuels and technologies. This translates to 1.2 billion households using cleaner cooking (Table 4) and 420 million households that have yet to switch to clean cooking solutions (Table 4). The adoption of cleaner cooking is not evenly spread across the world. On the higher end of the spectrum are the Americas and Europe, where, on average, more than 93% of people primarily rely on cleaner cooking fuels and technologies (WHO, 2025). On the lower end of the spectrum are sub-Saharan countries such as Madagascar, Mali and Uganda, where primary reliance on cleaner cooking fuel and technologies is <5%. 

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Table 4. Current adoption level (2022).

Unit: households using cleaner cooking solutions

mean 1,200,000,000
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Adoption Trend

Global adoption of cleaner cooking fuel and technologies as the primary source of cooking increased from 61% of the population in 2013 to 74% in 2023 (WHO, 2025). This translates to roughly 21 million households adopting cleaner cooking technologies/yr (Table 5). This uptake, however, is not evenly distributed (see Maps section above).

Large-scale adoption across China, India, and Indonesia has driven the recent increase. Between 2011 and 2021, use of cleaner fuels and technologies as the primary means of cooking rose from 61% to 83% of the population in China. In India, adoption expanded from 38% to 71%, and in Indonesia, it increased from 47% to 87% (WHO, 2024a). In contrast, primary reliance on cleaner cooking in sub-Saharan Africa only increased from 12% in 2010 to 16% in 2020 (Stoner et al., 2021). 

Based on the existing policies, population growth, and investments, more than 75% of the sub-Saharan African population will use unclean cooking fuels and technologies in 2030 (Stoner et al., 2021). In Central and Southern Asia, about 25% of the population will use unclean cooking fuels and technologies by 2030 (Stoner et al., 2021).

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Table 5. Adoption trend (2013–2023).

Unit: households switching to cleaner cooking solutions/yr

mean 21,000,000
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Adoption Ceiling

The World Bank (2020) estimated that universal adoption of modern energy cooking services by 2030 is possible with an annual investment of US$148–156 billion, with 26% of the investment coming from governments and development partners, 7% from private investment, and 67% from households. Universal adoption and use of cleaner fuels and technologies is possible with an investment of US$8–10 billion/yr (IEA, 2023a; World Bank, 2020). We therefore set the adoption ceiling at 100% of households adopting and using cleaner cooking solutions, which entails 420 million households switching from unclean solutions (Table 6).

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Table 6.Cleaner cooking adoption ceiling: upper limit for new adoption of cleaner cooking solutions.

Unit: households switching to cleaner cooking solutions

mean 420,000,000
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Achievable Adoption

Universal adoption and use of cleaner cooking solutions is achievable before 2050 (Table 7). This is because if the current adoption trend continues, all households that currently use unclean cooking fuels and technologies will have switched to using cleaner versions by 2043. 

China, India, and Indonesia have shown that it is possible to rapidly expand adoption with the right set of policies and investments. In Indonesia, for example, use of cleaner cooking solutions increased from 9% of the population to 89% between 2002 and 2012 (WHO, 2025). 

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Table 7. Range of achievable adoption levels.

Unit: households switching to cleaner cooking solutions

Current Adoption 0
Achievable – Low 420,000,000
Achievable – High 420,000,000
Adoption Ceiling 420,000,000
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Cooking from all fuel types is responsible for approximately 1.7 Gt CO₂‑eq (100-yr basis) emissions every year (WHO 2023), on par with global emissions from the aviation industry (Bergero et al., 2023). Unclean cooking fuels and technologies are also the largest source of black carbon (Climate & Clean Air Coalition, 2024), a short-lived climate pollutant with a GWP several hundred times higher than CO₂ that contributes to millions of premature deaths yearly (Garland et al., 2017). 

The actual reduction in climate impact will depend upon the mix of cleaner fuel and technologies that replace unclean fuel. The IEA (2023a) estimates that if the cleanest cooking fuels and technologies (e.g., electric and LPG) are adopted, emissions could be reduced by 1.5 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr (100-yr basis) by 2030. In contrast, a greater reliance on improved cookstoves as cleaner cooking solutions will result in lower emissions reductions. The WHO (2023) estimates that much of the shift by 2030 will involve using improved biomass and charcoal cookstoves, especially in rural areas, reducing emissions 0.6 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr (100-yr basis) by 2030 and ~1.6 CO₂‑eq/yr (100-yr basis) by 2050, closely matching the IEA estimate.

According to our analysis, deploying cleaner cooking can reduce emissions by 0.98 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr (100-yr basis) between now and 2050 (Table 8). Our emissions reduction estimates are lower than those of the IEA because we do not assume that the shift to cleaner cooking will be dominated by LPG and renewables.

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Table 8. Climate impact at different levels of adoption.

Unit: Gt CO₂-eq/yr, 100-yr basis

Current Adoption 0.00
Achievable – Low 0.98
Achievable – High 0.98
Adoption Ceiling 0.98
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Additional Benefits

Air Quality and Health

Unclean cooking fuels and technologies produce household air pollution (HAP), with smoke and fine particulates sometimes reaching levels up to 100 times acceptable limits, particularly in poorly ventilated spaces (WHO, 2024b). HAP is linked to numerous health issues, such as stroke, ischemic heart disease, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, lung cancer, and poor birth outcomes (Jameel et al., 2022). It accounts for more than 3.2 million early deaths annually (WHO 2024b). In 2019, it accounted for over 4% of all the deaths globally (Bennitt et al., 2021). The World Bank (2020) estimated that the negative health impact of unclean cooking fuels and technologies is valued at US$1.4 trillion/yr. Globally, switching to cleaner fuels and technologies could prevent 21 million premature deaths 2000–2100 (Lacey et al., 2017). A recent study offered empirical evidence of potential cardiovascular benefits stemming from household cleaner energy policies (Lee et al., 2024).

Equality

Unclean cooking disproportionately impacts women and children who are traditionally responsible for collecting fuelwood or biomass. Typically, they spend an hour every day collecting solid fuel; however, in some countries (e.g., Senegal, Niger, and Cameroon), daily average collection time can exceed three hours (Jameel et al., 2022). Time-saving cooking fuels are associated with more education in women and children (Biswas & Das, 2022; Choudhuri & Desai, 2021) and can additionally promote gender equity through economic empowerment by allowing women to pursue additional employment opportunities (CCA, 2023). In conflict zones, adoption of cleaner fuels and technologies has been shown to reduce gender-based violence (Jameel et al., 2022). Finally, cleaner cooking fuels can improve health equity as women are disproportionately exposed to indoor air pollution generated from cooking (Fullerton et al., 2008; Po et al., 2011). 

Nature protection

The unsustainable harvest of wood for cooking fuel has led to deforestation and biodiversity loss in regions such as South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa (CCA, 2022). East African nations, including Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda, are particularly affected by the rapid depletion of sustainable wood fuel resources. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 84% of harvested wood is charcoal or firewood (World Bank, 2018). Switching to cleaner cooking fuels and technologies can reduce deforestation and protect biodiversity (Anenberg et al., 2013; Dagnachew et al., 2018; CCA, 2022).

Income and Work

Simkovich et al. (2019) found that time gained by switching to cleaner fuel can increase daily income 3.8–4.7%. Their analysis excludes the expenses related to fuel, as well as the costs associated with delivery or transportation for refilling cleaner fuel. Mazorra et al. (2020) reported that if 50% of the time saved from not gathering firewood were redirected to income-generating activities, it could lead to an estimated annual income increase of approximately US$125 (2023 dollars) in the Gambia, US$113 in Guinea-Bissau, and US$200 in Senegal. 

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Risks

The expensive nature of cleaner cooking presents a significant barrier to adoption. Households that have recently transitioned to cleaner cooking face a high risk of defaulting back to unclean fuels and technologies. For example, among the households that received free LPG connection as a part of the Pradhan Mantri Ujjwala Yojana in India, low-income households reverted to unclean fuels and technologies during extensive periods of refill gaps (Cabiyo et al., 2020). In total, 9 million recipients could not refill their LPG cylinders even once in 2021–22 due to high LPG costs and other factors (Down to Earth 2022).

Beyond the cost, there is an adjustment period  for the households adopting the cleaner cooking solution, which includes familiarizing themselves with the technology and fostering cultural and behavioral changes, including overcoming biases and adopting new habits.

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Interactions with Other Solutions

Reinforcing

Shifting to cleaner cooking reduces the need to burn biomass and so contributes positively to protecting and restoring forests, grasslands, and savannas. 

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Dashboard

Solution Basics

1 household switching to cleaner cooking

tCO2-eq/unit/yr
2.3
units
Current 04.2×10⁸4.2×10⁸
Achievable (Low to High)

Climate Impact

GtCO2-eq/yr
Current 0 0.980.98
US$ per tCO2-eq
27
Emergency Brake

CO₂, CH₄, BC

Trade-offs

Switching to electric cooking will meaningfully reduce GHG emissions only if the grid is powered by clean energy. A life-cycle assessment of cooking fuels in India and China (Cashman et al., 2016) showed that unclean cooking fuels such as crop residue and cow dung had a lower carbon footprint than electricity because in these countries >80% of the electricity was produced by coal and natural gas. 

LPG has been the leading cleaner fuel source replacing unclean cooking fuel globally (IEA, 2023a). The IEA (2023a) estimated that 33% of households transitioning to cleaner cooking fuels and technologies will do so using LPG to transition. Because LPG is a fossil fuel, increased reliance can hinder or slow the transition from fossil fuels. 

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% population
0–15
15–30
30–45
45–60
60–75
75–100
No data

Percentage of country population relying primarily on clean cooking technologies, 2023

Access to clean cooking technology – and the benefits it confers – varies widely around the world.

World Health Organization (2025). Proportion of population with primary reliance on clean fuels and technologies for cooking (%) [Data set]. The Global Health Observatory Indicators. Retrieved May 8, 2025 from https://www.who.int/data/gho/data/indicators/indicator-details/GHO/gho-phe-primary-reliance-on-clean-fuels-and-technologies-proportion

% population
0–15
15–30
30–45
45–60
60–75
75–100
No data

Percentage of country population relying primarily on clean cooking technologies, 2023

Access to clean cooking technology – and the benefits it confers – varies widely around the world.

World Health Organization (2025). Proportion of population with primary reliance on clean fuels and technologies for cooking (%) [Data set]. The Global Health Observatory Indicators. Retrieved May 8, 2025 from https://www.who.int/data/gho/data/indicators/indicator-details/GHO/gho-phe-primary-reliance-on-clean-fuels-and-technologies-proportion

Geographic Guidance Introduction

The Deploy Clean Cooking solution applies to geographies where low-cost, inefficient, and polluting cooking methods are common. Sub-Saharan Africa is the overwhelming target, with only 23% of the population relying on clean cooking technologies (WHO, 2025). 

There are significant correlations between the lack of clean cooking solutions and levels of extreme poverty (World Bank, 2024), and the financial cost of clean fuel and cookstoves is a significant barrier to adoption (WHO, 2023).  

Some of the key benefits of deploying clean cooking will vary based on geography and landscape. For instance, freeing up time spent collecting firewood will be more notable in areas with less dense forests, since people in such locations would have to travel further to harvest the wood (Khavari et al., 2023).

Barriers to the adoption of clean cooking can also vary with geography. Examples noted by Khavari et al. (2023) include robustness of supply chains, which can be influenced by population density and road networks.

Action Word
Deploy
Solution Title
Clean Cooking
Classification
Highly Recommended
Lawmakers and Policymakers
  • Prioritize the issue at the national level to coordinate policy, coordinate resources, and ensure a robust effort.
  • Create a dedicated coordinating body across relevant ministries, agencies, and sectors.
  • Create subsidies and fuel price caps, and ban unclean cooking fuels and technologies.
  • Remove taxes and levies on clean-cooking stoves.
  • Create dedicated teams to deliver cleaner cooking equipment.
  • Run public education campaigns appropriate for the context. 

Further information:

Practitioners
  • Serve as a clean cooking ambassador to raise awareness within your industry and community.
  • Participate in training programs.
  • Develop feedback channels with manufacturers to enhance design and overcome local challenges.
  • Restaurant owners and cooks can adopt clean cooking in their kitchens to reduce emissions, lower costs, and improve worker health and safety. 

Further information:

Business Leaders

Further information:

Nonprofit Leaders
  • Ensure operations use clean cooking methods.
  • Educate the public on the benefits of clean cooking, available options, and applicable incentive programs.
  • Advocate to policymakers on issues such as targeted subsidies and providing government support.
  • Educate investors and the business community on local needs and market trends. 

Further information:

Investors

Further information:

Philanthropists and International Aid Agencies
  • Distribute cleaner cooking equipment and fuel.
  • Work with local policymakers to ensure that recipient communities can maintain fuel costs over the long term (possibly through fuel subsidies).
  • Provide grants to businesses in this sector.
  • Fund education campaigns appropriate for the context.
  • Advance political action through public-private partnerships such as the CCA. 

Further information:

Thought Leaders
  • Educate the public on the health, gender, climate, and environmental impacts of unclean cooking and the benefits of cleaner cooking.
  • Hone your message to fit the context and share through appropriate messengers and platforms.
  • Use mechanisms to promote trust, such as working with local health-care workers or other respected professionals. 

Further information:

Technologists and Researchers
  • Develop regional-specific technology that uses local sources of energy, such as biogas or high-efficiency charcoal.
  • Create technology that works with the local environment and economy and has reliable supply chains.

Further information:

Communities, Households, and Individuals
  • Learn about the benefits and harms associated with unclean fuels and technologies.
  • Identify the right technology to purchase by considering the availability and affordability of fuels; practicality of the equipment in producing the quantity, quality, and type of preferred food, and ease of use. 

Further information:

Sources

Clean cooking: An “emergency brake” climate solution. Alexander et al. (2023)

Cooking industry catalyst. CCA (n.d.)

Clean cooking industry snapshot – third edition. CCA (2022)

Why investment in clean cooking is falling short. Coldrey et al. (2023)

Modern energy cooking: review of the funding landscape. Energy 4 Impact (2022)

The clean cooking planning tool: a new resource to explore the costs and benefits of transitioning to clean cooking. Energy Sector Management Assistance Program (2022)

A vision for clean cooking access for all – analysis. IEA (2023)

Tracking SDG7: the energy progress report 2023. International Renewable Energy Agency. (2023)

Behavior change approaches for clean cooking. U.S. Agency for International Development (2015)

Evidence Base

There is a strong consensus on the effectiveness of cleaner cooking as a climate solution. Research over the past two decades (e.g., Anenberg et al., 2013; Mazorra et al., 2020; Rosenthal et al., 2017) has supported the contention that replacing solid fuel cooking with cleaner fuel reduces GHG emissions. 

There is high agreement and robust evidence that switching cooking from unclean fuels and technologies to cleaner alternatives such as burning LPG or electric stoves offers health, air quality, and climate change benefits (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], 2022).

The IPCC (2022) identified unclean fuels such as biomass as a major source of short-lived climate pollutants (e.g., black carbon, organic carbon, carbon monoxide, and methane) and switching to cleaner fuels and technologies can reduce the emission of short-lived climate pollutants.

Regional and country-level analyses provide additional evidence of the efficacy of cleaner cooking solutions. Khavari et al. (2023) reported that in sub-Saharan Africa, replacing unclean solid fuels with cleaner cooking could reduce GHG emissions by 0.5 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr (100-yr basis). Life cycle assessments comparing different cooking fuels and technologies (Afrane et al., 2011; Afrane et al., 2012; Lansche et al., 2017; Singh et al., 2014) also have shown that cleaner cooking fuels and technologies emit less GHG per unit of energy delivered than unclean fuels.

The IEA estimated that switching completely to clean cooking fuels and technologies by 2030 would result in a net reduction of 1.5 Gt CO₂‑eq/yr (100-yr basis) by 2030 (IEA, 2023a). 

The results presented in this document summarize findings from five reviews and meta-analyses and 23 original studies and reports reflecting current evidence from 13 countries, primarily in sub-Saharan Africa. We recognize this limited geographic scope creates bias, and hope this work inspires research and data sharing on this topic in underrepresented regions.

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